The current ASaC7 is on the venerable Sea King but as CVF construction continues the next generation of airborne early warning system is under consideration. Given that CVF will not be having cats and traps a vertical launch system seems the inevitable choice to fulfil the Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) requirement. Have a look here and here for an in depth description.

The Sea King based system is a mature system and consistently under rated, in some areas it’s performanceis said to exceed that of the much vaunted US E2 Hawkeye and has seen service in Afghanistan, supplementing other ISR assets such as the Sentinel and RAPTOR equipped Tornadoes in the Counter IED mission.

A CV22 based system, using the same electronic systems, has also been proposed for the ASaC7 replacement but this would mean introducing yet another airframe into system and the cost of this would seem to rule it out. The name would have to be changed if we did buy it, the CV22 Tactical Organic Sensing System (TOSS) might raise an eyebrow or two!

CV22 TOSS

A Merlin based system is self evidently the lowest cost and lowest risk solution.

AW791 AW101 ASaC

Looking at the cutaway diagram there seems to be quite a lot of excess space in the back, I wonder if this could be fitted to an NH90?

My ideal helicopter force for the UK would be a CH53K and NH90 instead of Lynx, Puma, Merlin, Sea King and Chinook.

Replace 6 types and multiple versions with 2 with the obvious commonality savings, another post perhaps!

The contract, worth £41.8milllion, has been awarded to AgustaWestland and will see the final 10 airframes upgraded. These are in addition to the previous 12 which began conversion at the end of last year. The out of service date for the Mk 9A has also been extended to 2016. The Minister for Defence Equipment and support, Quentin Davies said:

“This improved version of the very successful Lynx helicopter will greatly benefit our troops in Afghanistan when it deploys there for the first time next month. The enhancements will allow it to perform in the extremes of climate and geography that characterise that theatre of operations.”

Quentin Davies was right when he said it will greatly benefit our troops as operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq were severely limited by Lynx’s inability to operate in hot and high conditions, especially during the summer months. At times the troop carrying capability has been reduced to one, which makes something of a lonely patrol.

Quentin Davies was not so correct however in calling the Lynx successful.

The naval version may have sold a respectable number, but the only service to actually use the ‘battlefield’ version is the British Army. All the other Lynx operators stick to using it where it belongs, in the naval role. One also wonders if Quentin Wilson is also aware that the Lynx was known to be underpowered when it took part in the first Gulf War back in 1991?

A point which has been raised many times on this blog.

It should be noted that the Mk 9 is not the only Lynx version operating in Afghanistan. The Mk 7 (skid version), also has a presence in theatre. The question that needs to be raised is will any of the Mk 7’s be re-engined to Mk 7A standard? Or will they be left to struggle in the heat of the Afghan summer?

Given that the fact that the Lynx’s replacement, the Wildcat, is not due to enter service until 2014, this means the AAC will have to soldier on with the underpowered Mk 7 for another four years, possibly longer. At around £4.2million conversion cost per aircraft would the modification of a small number be acceptable if it means such a quantum leap in capability?

The main rotor gearboxes and LHTEC CTS800 engines of any converted aircraft could be re-used on the Lynx Wildcat.

Readers may be aware that the Lynx Mk 7 has been in service for quite a while, since 1988 in fact, and many of these were upgraded from the original Mark 1’s which entered service in 1978.

The advantage offered by a re-engined Mark 7 is that they are lighter than the Mk 9’s due to their simple skids instead of a heavier set of wheels and associated oleos. This would give them an improved hot and high capability over the Mk 9.

Although the Lynx is not a true battlefield helicopter and has its limitations, this additional capability should be a welcome improvement in a very difficult environment.

This amazing series of photographs shows the loading of a C17 at RAF brize Norton with the first of a batch of Merlin helicopters bound for Afghanistan.

Not much to say except, brilliant…

The Chinook upgrade especially will result in a wholly consistent and coherent modification status across the whole fleet. The Puma upgrade will also result in the same state but the Lynx, Sea King and Merlin fleet will consist of a wide variety of modification states and versions. From a through life management perspective this is a bad thing, over complicating training, logistics and maintenance. The overwhelming desire for more airframes for operations, almost at any cost, means this situation will be compounded. The same is true for Army vehicles, perhaps even more so.

The replacement for the Sea King Commando and Puma helicopters is covered in the Future Medium Helicopter programme. All existing Army Lynx’s will be replaced by Lynx Wildcat and all Gazelles will be withdrawn with no replacement.

There still exists a need for a three tier helicopter fleet, large, medium and small. The large slot is naturally filled by the Chinook although some have argued that the CH53 might be a possible replacement given the fact that it can be embarked on a ship, with its folding rotor and tail. The Chinook does not have folding rotors which limits its ship borne deployment options. However, given the existing investment in Chinook the significant investment in replacing it does seem like poor value for money. There is also a proposed European heavy lift helicopter to replace the German CH53’s but given the likely issues this also does not seem an attractive option either.

I have previously argued that the Puma and Sea King Commando should be replaced as soon as possible with a single type, a Merlin equipped with tail fold as per the Italian Navy’s TTH transport variant. This would satisfy the medium slot.

Italian Navy EH101

For the light slot the Army is proposing to withdraw the Gazelle and replace all of its Lynx fleet with the Wildcat. I have stated it many times but the Wildcat is very poor value for money, is totally unsuited to the light utility role because it is too small to lift an infantry section (unless they are clad only in their underpants) and offers a sensor fit that is replicated in the Apache, Watchkeeper and a number of other manned and unmanned systems. Richard Stockley reinforces these points here

The usefulness of a light utility helicopter should not be underestimated; it can perform many roles that are unsuitable or impossible for a larger aircraft like a Merlin or Chinook to perform but their principal advantage is their numbers, lower cost should enable many to be obtained.  At approximately £25m each the Wildcat is eye wateringly expensive; very few will be obtained because of it.

Although I like the look of the US Marine Corps UH-1Y because it is proven, has excellent avionics, a massive logistics base, low cost and is very robust, Richard thinks the AW139 would be a better fit for the UK and is quite a bit shorter which means deployment on our ships would be much easier.

One of the primary tasks for a light/medium utility helicopter is the tactical transport of an 8 man infantry section or fire support section (Javelin or Sustained Fire GPMG for example) with all their kit, others include casevac or light cargo movement. The UK uses the Chinook in the medical evacuation role because of the space in the cabin allows a number of medical specialists to work on the patient in the all important immediate aftermath of the injury and it is very fast. The US on the other hand uses the Blackhawk in this role for their Pedro teams (combat rescue). It could be argued that the Chinook is too large for tactical rescue; its downwash has on occasion exacerbated a situation so a small airframe for the role might be useful. It would not be armed with anything apart from self defence weapons as this would dramatically increase cost and this is what we have Attack Helicopter for but a comprehensive sensor, defensive aids and avionics fit should be specified.

Our proposal therefore, is to replace the Gazelle and Lynx Wildcat with a medium utility helicopter that is smaller than Merlin but larger than for example an EC635. The NH90 and Blackhawk would be slightly too large so this leads logically to the AW139, which is actually slightly smaller than the Lynx but able to carry much more.

Given that Richard has much expertise on these matters I thought I would have another look at the AW139.

Agusta Westland AW139
The Agusta Westland AW139 is a derivative of the Augusta Bell 139 and is the best selling helicopter in its class. Although larger than the Gazelle and officially classed as a medium helicopter it is much smaller than our traditional classification of medium as embodied by the Merlin. Both the Lynx and Gazelle are small and but more or less too small to be useful.

It is in widespread civilian and police use and the Irish armed forces use it in a tactical capacity (picture below, highlighting the tactical crash protected seating).

Irish Air Corps AW139 05

Irish Air Corps AW139 04

Irish Air Corps AW139 03

Irish Air Corps AW139 02

Irish Air Corps AW139 01

There may be better choices in terms of pure military capability but the AW139 is a sensible and low cost option for the wide range of tasks a utility helicopter would be expected to carry out. It can lift a full section including their kit, be fitted with self defence machine guns, can have a fast rope fitted, comes with a winch, has modern avionics, can lift a 105mm Light Gun, very economic (about a third of the running costs of an NH90) to run and is in widespread service.  It will require some modification, self sealing fuel tanks, more robust under carriage and defensive aids for example.

Qatar paid 260m Euros for 18 AW139’s. If one assumes a third for training, logistics etc that works out at roughly 10m Euros each.

FB Heliservices already operate the AW139 as part of the Defence Helicopter Flying School, specifically for Search and Rescue (SAR) training. They are also operated by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency.

AW139 - FB Heliservices

Agusta Westland AW149
Agusta Westland launched the AW149 in 2006 and is a slightly larger and more ‘military’ version although this might be a little too large, veering into NH90 country, with associated cost increases. This may be a more suitable type depending on cost factors.

If introduced it would be ideal if a Rolls Royce RTM322 engine could be detuned and fitted as this would mean engine commonality across the helicopter fleet, excepting the Chinook, the costs savings would be considerable. If not feasible, then the existing Pratt and Whitney PT6C engine could be replaced with the LHTEC CTS800 engine that has been fitted into the up engine Lynx AH9A’s and will be fitted into the Wildcat. We have already paid for a number of them so it would make sense to re-use if possible.

This would leave a decision on the Royal Navy Wildcat, in my zeal to create a coherent fleet it would get the chop as well and be replaced with a maritime variant of the AW139. Although long term savings would be considerable, the short term cost should not be underestimated and I wouldn’t hazard a guess what the creation of a maritime variant of the AW139 would cost although all of the systems could be transferred from the Wildcat design. If this were not feasible the RN Wildcat design should be retained.

Coherence
Moving beyond the current fleet problems and lack of airframes for operations, a coherent, long term strategy for helicopters is needed to ensure future operations can be met without having to scramble for solutions, short term decision making and costly stop gaps.

The only way to do this is with a long term investment plan that provides industry and the armed forces with the confidence to prepare and make appropriate investments.

Agusta Westland have been a controversial choice for many years and their performance has often left much room for improvement but if we are to maintain a national capability to design, manufacture and maintain helicopters then we must accept their place and ensure that good performance is appropriately rewarded and where poor performance is in evidence, appropriate penalties applied. If we absolutely have to maintain helicopter manufacturing in the South West then we would have to insist they were manufactured in the UK, rather in Italy.

To summarise;

Stay with the Chinook in the medium to long term
Replace Sea King and Puma with tail fold Merlins
Cancel Wildcat and replace existing Lynx and Gazelle with AW139/149

Puma and Lynx
We covered the Lynx upgrade in a previous post and observed that at a cost of approximately £6.5million each the Army Air Corps would be getting 20 upgraded AH Mk.9A Lynx helicopters.

Although announced a while ago the MoD have also recently covered the Puma upgrade contracts.

In a similar move to the Chinook upgrade 30 Pumas will receive new, more powerful engines (Turbomeca Makila), new avionics and a number of other improvements to enable them to be deployed to Afghanistan. Eurocopter will carry out the upgrade work in Romania following a 12 month assessment contract. Although it is stated that 30 airframes will be upgraded the deal provides for 28 upgrades with an option on the final pair. The rest of the fleet will be withdrawn and/or used for spares, something that is happening a great deal anyway so is hardly news.

The total contracted cost is £300million; each airframe will therefore cost just under £11million each.

Much has been made of the fact that the contract will create or sustain jobs in Romania rather than the UK because of the recession. The union Amicus waded into the issue, preferring the Sea King upgrade option and the MoD dithered. Lord Mandelson intervened in favour of the Eurocopter option because of the reported Airbus link (EADS), work is carried out in the UK for the Airbus wing assemblies.

The upgrade will see the Puma remain in service until 2022, by which time the MoD may well have decided what the Future Medium Helicopter programme will look like.

The original announcements were £400million for 33 aircraft so this latest news that it is the same price for 28 aircraft comes as no surprise, it seems to be common to announce the cost and number but quietly reduce the number whilst retaining the cost in subsequent announcements.

Upgraded Lynx, £6.5million each, total contract value £140million

Upgraded Chinook, £11million each, total contract value £408million

Upgraded Puma, £11million each, total contract value £300million

After years of dithering and delays the operational and political need for more helicopters in Afghanistan has meant the MoD are against the wall, needing to make a hasty decision based on the political imperative to ‘get more helicopters’

We must commend the MoD for finally squeezing the Treasury for just shy of £850million for these upgrades, this in addition to the money for the ex Danish Merlin’s (total cost approximately £180million) and Chinook HC3 reversion (total cost including original purchase approximately £422million)

No doubt each of these upgrades will result in worthwhile capability improvements to assist with operations in Afghanistan and when carping about the cost we should remember this but why does the vast majority of our rotary fleet need an upgrade to operate in Afghanistan, is it because it has been underfunded for decades?

It is interesting to note the timings of these announcements, nothing at all to do with the Labour Party Conference, of course.

Are we really getting good value for money with these three upgrades, has delay and dither resulted in us buying the ‘last chicken in the shop’ and has the need for the political message of ‘supporting our brave boys’ forced a hasty and poor long term decision?

Chinook
A £408 million upgrade project has been awarded to Vector Aerospace in Gosport to bring the entire fleet of airframes up to a common standard. The upgrade is split into 2 elements, engines and avionics. The announcement was made in early August under the Project Julius banner.

The existing engines are being replaced with Honeywell T55 L714A engines, although a couple of RAF Chinooks do use this engine. The engine upgrade improves power by approximately 20%, increases fuel efficiency and reduces maintenance requirements. The net result will be improved performance and greater availability.

The avionics upgrade will convert the analogue cockpit dials with fully digital displays, much more suited to night time flying at a cost of £280m. A forward looking infra red system, additional BOWMAN and other enhancements will also be fitted.

The project will provide a useful capability increase and perhaps more importantly will create a harmonised fleet that will reduce maintenance costs significantly. Of course it won’t happen overnight and it is estimated that the project will be complete by 2015 although the engine upgrade will be sooner.

Some of the upgrades already exist and recent UOR’s have resulted in a fleet with little revision harmony so this is an eminently sensible and long term investment to standardise the fleet.

The cost across the fleet works out to just under £11m each.

Compare and contrast the US CH47F upgrade for the US forces.

The US Army operates a huge fleet of Chinook’s with some over 40 years old. In a similar move their aim was to harmonise the entire fleet to a single level and provide a number of new builds. Boeing will be providing both upgrades and new builds in a multi year deal. Some of the airframes will be the special forces ‘G’ version but the vast majority will be to the F standard. The F standard will have the T55 L714A engines as the RAF upgrade a similar range of avionics and systems upgrades across a number of design areas although the upgraded models will have completely rebuilt fuselages to provide a life extension, digital avionics and a number of other improvements.

So the new RAF Chinooks and the US Army CH47F have a great deal of similarity although it would be fair to say each will have advantages and disadvantages when compared to each other.

The US Army paid Boeing in the order to $9 million per upgrade and $32 million for a new build or put another way, £6million per upgrade and £21million per new build (and I am being generous in the conversion)

Without knowing the exact details of the upgrade, current prices, quantities and other peripheral costs it is very difficult to make a meaningful comparison but the RAF’s upgrades cost £11 million and the US Army’s cost £6million.

£6 million is also the very rough figure for an engine upgrade on the Lynx Mk9A’s we covered in a previous post.

The US Army get a completely remanufactured and upgraded Chinook and we get an up engineed Lynx for about the same cost.
Are we getting value for money?

This latest hot potato comes in the form of a row that appears to be smouldering in Westminster between David Law, Liberal Democrat MP for Yeovil and the Douglas Carswell, Conservative MP for Clacton and Harwich. Spats between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives are nothing new, if anything they should be actively encouraged. However, this one concerns the defence of the realm, or the lack of it depending on who you choose to believe.

Future Lynx Army Version

On or around 2014, development problems aside, the British Army will receive its latest combat helicopter, the ‘Future Lynx’. Unfortunately in the last few years the Lynx has had tendency to make the headlines for all the wrong reasons, these being a number of fatal crashes and the subsequent groundings of the fleet.

The Lynx as we know it entered service with the British armed forces in 1978, it saw action in the Falklands Conflict, the first Gulf War, Iraq and Afghanistan, to name but a few. The Royal Navy use it to hunt ships and submarines, which it does very well, and the army uses it as a battlefield taxi, which it does admirably, but not as well as it should.

The gestation of Future Lynx has been somewhat difficult, following its initial inception. Defence procurement in the UK can be a dicey affair at the best of times with cost over-runs and late deliveries appearing to be the norm. The ones who seem to repeatedly get the raw end of the deal are the servicemen and women who have to operate the equipment and the tax payers who have to foot the inevitable over-inflated bill. The original Lynx helicopter also had its fair share of problems, however with the advent of the £1billion Future Lynx project, all of these problems should be ironed out; or at least we can hope that they are.

For the Lynx to become a ‘Future Lynx’ a number of modifications and improvements have been made, namely:

• New engines. The old Rolls Royce Gem engines have been replaced by more powerful LHTEC CTS800-4N engines which will vastly improve performance.
• Navy style landing gear for both army and navy versions.
• Crashworthy seating for the crew and passengers. These are the same seats as used in the American Blackhawk and vastly improve survivability.
• An uprated transmission system.
• Structural strengthening. The Lynx airframe was known to be weak in several areas.
• Crashworthy fuel tanks to reduce the risk of a post crash fire.
• Addition of a large optical aid, and in the case of the navy version, a new radar.

In addition to these modifications the helicopter bristles with the latest communication, targeting, detection equipment and weaponry that the MOD can lay its wallet on, or at least the navy version does. The version destined for use by the British Army doesn’t quite bristle as much. Being predominately land based, it forgoes the Sea Skua anti-ship and Hellfire anti-armour missiles, its dipping sonar and the radar of its navy sibling and replaces them with…….a machine gun or at least a choice of machine guns; either a single 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm machine gun to be exact.

Being land based one would expect things to be somewhat more simplistic, naval warfare by its very nature is both highly specialised and highly sophisticated. Land warfare on the other hand tends to be more bayonet technology than stealth technology, or so you would think. This assertion is incorrect however, as a close up inspection of the latest Apache gunship will testify. After feasting your eyes on its 30 mm automatic cannon, its multitude of Hellfire missiles and high velocity rockets, you feel yourself empathising with the large swathes of the Iraqi army that surrendered when one of these gunships hoved into view. Apart from its menacing looks, the Apache has a number of features designed explicitly for the modern battlefield:

• Its powerful engines are widely spaced to prevent the other engine getting damaged if one is hit by anti-aircraft fire.
• Its airframe had ‘crashworthiness’ designed into it from inception.
• A robust undercarriage for landing on rough terrain.
• It carries the latest in anti-armour missiles, rockets and has an in built cannon slaved to the pilots helmet, so where he looks, the cannon points.
• It has a ‘Longbow’ radar mounted above the rotor blades, allowing it to peer over terrain to acquire targets for its missiles and remain largely hidden from view.
• Ballistically tolerant flight controls and multiple hydraulic systems to allow redundancy in case battle damage.

With the army version of Future Lynx, there is very little on which your eyes can actually feast, but then it has a distinctly different role. It is not by its nature a gunship, so, you may ask, what does it do?

Well that depends on the MOD, and whether it can make its mind up. When the powers at be at the MOD decided they needed a Lynx replacement, the best solution appeared to be somewhat elusive. So in 2002 they called on the then Westland Helicopters to help them, and gave them £10 million pounds of taxpayers money to carry out an in-depth study to find one.

The Westland Helicopters solution was……to buy more Westland Lynx helicopters, albeit improved ones. Surprising stuff you may think; the biggest surprise being the fact that it cost £10 million pounds to arrive at this conclusion. It should be noted at this point that the nominal sum of £10 million pounds could purchase two light reconnaissance helicopters.

What the army required was a Battlefield Light Utility Helicopter (BLUH). Unfortunately, Lynx is too small to be a true troop carrying utility helicopter. Having realised this, and to save the potential embarrassment of having a troop carrier that couldn’t carry enough troops, the MOD changed the role to that of Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter (BRH). This way it didn’t matter how many troops it could carry, any troops at all would be seen as a bonus. It was a case of massaging the role to fit the aircraft as opposed to buying an aircraft that actually suited the role.

Given this new role it could now peer from behind cover and observe the enemy at will, although it can’t because the observation aid is in the nose, requiring most of the aircraft to be exposed to view the enemy. This was to maintain commonality with the navy version.

In its new role it can now designate targets for the Army Air Corps Apache gunships, which unfortunately it can’t do all of the time because it doesn’t have a ‘Longbow’ radar. The Apache uses two types of Hellfire missiles, semi-active laser guided and millimetre radar guided.

Guess which one Future Lynx can’t designate for?

At least it can carry troops and deploy them at will around the battlefield. Well it can, but not as well as you’d expect. The original Lynx could carry nine troops, but not with all their equipment and certainly not with a door gunner. Movie buffs familiar with such films as ‘Apocalypse Now’ and ‘Blackhawk Down’ will remember scenes of the door gunners blazing away as the helicopter approached a hot landing zone. The Lynx can do this too, or at least half of it as it only carries one door gunner at a time. This creates a tactical problem for the Lynx crew; if the enemy fires at the aircraft from the other side, where there is no door gunner, what does one do? Answers on a post card to the MOD. If the Lynx does manage to land in one piece, it cannot deploy an infantry section of eight men as the cabin isn’t big enough, especially with a door gunner on board. Future Lynx cannot do this either as it carries less troops than the current Lynx courtesy of its crashworthy seating. As if to confound its problems, if the Lynx did have the space to carry the additional troops, it wouldn’t get off the ground anyway as its current Rolls Royce engines lack sufficient power.

The Lynx as we know it is the army’s ‘battlefield taxi’, or at least it should be if it could carry enough troops, and two door gunners to defend itself against hostile fire. The Lynx Mk 7 had the advantage of carrying eight TOW anti-tank missiles, or it did until the Apache gunship pulled the rug from under its skids to become the army’s number one tank killer. The Lynx Mk 9 cannot carry TOW missiles, but has a robust wheeled undercarriage for landing on rough terrain, something the Future Lynx does not. It has a navy style undercarriage, again to maintain parity with the navy version. The army version of Future Lynx isn’t destined to carry missiles of any sort either.

To compare Future Lynx against its contemporaries also raises a few disparities. It appears to be too large and expensive to be a light reconnaissance helicopter and it is too small to be a true troop carrying, utility helicopter. So what is it? As any aircraft designer will tell you, a helicopter is a compromise of function, performance and cost. If it cannot carry out the basic functions of its role, what is its purpose? If it cannot fly and operate within the expected parameters, how can it adequately perform? And if it is too expensive for the role expected of it, is it actually worth it? In this sense the army version of Future Lynx seems to be too much of a compromise.

The Lynx has been likened by those who fly it, to something akin to a flying supercar, in that it’s fast, it’s highly manoeuvrable and a pleasure to ‘drive’. But like the famed supercars it emulates, it is temperamental, prone to unreliability and expensive to maintain. With the Future Lynx price tag being muted at £14 million pounds per helicopter, it doesn’t come cheap either. A light reconnaissance helicopter, such as the Eurocopter EC145, a helicopter favoured by many UK police forces as their spy-in-the-sky, costs less than half of the Future Lynx. The Americans should know they’ve just bought several hundred as medevac helicopters for their army. The EC145 in the utility role can also carry nine troops compared to Future Lynx’s seven, even though it’s a lot smaller, lighter and has the same crashworthy seating. The Agusta 412EP Griffon, used by the RAF to train helicopter pilots, also costs significantly less, and can carry a full infantry section with the added bonus of two door gunners, something of a novelty in the circumstances!

In essence the army version of Future Lynx is simply a navy helicopter without the advantage of guided weapons or radar. It is under sized, under armed, overly expensive and seemingly ill-suited to its intended role. So why is the MOD buying it?

That, it seems is the £14 million question. Part of the MOD selection criteria looked at the ‘strategic’ view of Future Lynx. Westland Helicopters was and is the UK’s one and only helicopter manufacturer. To buy a foreign make would effectively consign Westland’s to oblivion. So, to maintain the UK’s helicopter manufacturing base, the British Army uses Lynx helicopters. The twist in the situation is that Westland’s has now become Agusta Westland, teaming up with the Italian helicopter manufacturer. This has led to the product range being expanded, so the Lynx helicopter is no longer the only possible choice from the Company brochure. However, the MOD being the MOD, is standing by its decision, thus giving the British Army no choice but to stick with the Lynx until 2039.

When it finally ends its days, the Lynx will have been in service for over sixty years. Sixty years of temperamental reliability, high maintenance costs and political interference. Why doesn’t the RAF use it? The RAF doesn’t use it because the RAF has enough political clout to say no. Why does the Royal Navy use it? The Royal Navy uses it because it is a navy helicopter and it suits its role to a tee. Those sophisticated systems that it carries also justify its purchase and operating costs. Why does the army use it? The army uses it because the Army Air Corps is not a service, it is a corps within a service and therefore lacks the political clout that the RAF and the Royal Navy seem to enjoy.

Future Lynx Naval Version

So what, if any, are the alternatives?

• Buy a foreign equivalent, such as the Blackhawk or the Eurocopter NH90. That could cost British jobs and is therefore politically sensitive unless licence production can be secured. In fact Westland’s previously had a licence production agreement with Sikorsky to build the Blackhawk, however the UK government refused to buy it.
• Purchase or lease Agusta 412EP Griffon’s. These are already used by the RAF as training and rescue helicopters. Although they have some of the drawbacks of their Vietnam era forebears, they are still an effective aircraft and are used by several other NATO countries. They are also inherently cheaper. These could be used in the short term until something better is developed.
• Develop and adapt the Agusta Westland AW139, which is a civilian helicopter, into a military transport. This would take time and money, but it is still cheaper than Future Lynx, it is also manufactured by the same company and it can carry more troops.
• Build a bigger Future Lynx, with a larger cabin to hold more troops. Now there’s a possibility! In fact Westland’s has a lot of experience in doing just that. The Westland WG30, although not a commercial success and did court some controversy, was derived from the Lynx Mk 1. In simplistic terms they took the engines, transmission and rotor head and stuck a larger fuselage underneath that carried nearly twice as many troops. Although not perfect, it proves the concept is feasible.

David Hillcoat, Agusta Westland’s Future Lynx Programme Head, stated in 2007 that, “The aircraft looks the same, but it’s completely new.” In essence the Future Lynx is 95% different to the current Lynx models, with very few interchangeable parts. If this is the case, why didn’t they have the foresight to make the cabin larger? The fact is they could have, but it’s the MOD that issues the specification and requirements. Agusta Westland just makes the product, and in this case the MOD merely changed the requirements to suit what Agusta Westland could produce. The MOD also tendered the BLUH, sorry I mean BRH, to Westland’s under a single tender, so Westland’s effectively got the contract without any competition whatsoever.

For our £1billion, UK forces will get sixty two helicopters; thirty four for the army and twenty eight for the navy. These numbers have been reduced however, from a total of seventy aircraft. Yet the overall project costs are still being cited at £1billion. Are development costs soaring? Are we, the tax payers missing something? Where are our eight missing helicopters?

It is only fair at this point to state that the Lynx is not a bad aircraft, it is not a widow maker by any stretch of the imagination and all aircraft have their own problems and idiosyncrasies. Future Lynx is a vast improvement over the current Lynx. Its engines are a lot more powerful, giving it greater performance. Its airframe is stronger and it has crashworthy seating, which will significantly enhance crew survivability. Its systems are a generation ahead in capability and when it is eventually unleashed on the high seas by the Royal Navy our enemies will no doubt have many sleepless nights. This version of Future Lynx definitely has a deserved future, and rightly so.

However, what is good on the high seas does not always translate to the battlefield. Navy helicopters have in the past served with distinction overland, the Sea King in the Falklands Conflict was a war winner, the Wessex started life as a navy helicopter and both were manufactured by Westland’s. But these aircraft, unlike the Lynx, are dedicated troop carriers and cargo shifters. Their primary task is to haul men and equipment, which they did, and some still do admirably. However with the Lynx, Westland’s and the MOD seem to have got lost along the way. The ‘Huey’ of Vietnam fame set the standard for troop carrying utility helicopters. It was cheap, simple to maintain, robust and could haul a section of men, including door gunners, across the battlefield. Unfortunately, the Huey is old, noisy and relatively slow. The battlefield has changed significantly since Vietnam and the modern helicopter needs to be somewhat more sophisticated, but unless a helicopter can meet the basic criteria of what is essentially a ‘battlefield taxi’, it is not truly fit for purpose.

Fortunately for Future Lynx, it has friends in the right places, friends such as General Sir Kevin O’Donoghue, Chief of Defence Material. He was quoted in the recent ‘Defence Equipment 2009’ report, when asked, “(If) an off-the-shelf solution would have provided the same capability at lower cost?” He replied, “I do not actually agree ….. that we could buy a helicopter which you could fly off the back of a ship and fly in the battlefield and have a common helicopter. I do not agree that we could buy that cheaper.” When pressed further, he went on to say that, “…(Future Lynx is) exactly what’s required.”

General Sir Kevin is obviously unaware of the ship borne versions of the ‘Huey’, such as the AB 212ASW which could carry torpedoes and Sea Skua missiles or the AB 412 Sentinel which featured an under nose radar, sound familiar? These aircraft also have a high degree of commonality with their land based counterparts and the AB 212 ASW is still operated by a number of NATO navies. Although these aircraft may no longer be regarded as state-of-the-art in naval circles, they are well proven airframes and their electronic systems can easily be upgraded. So contrary to what the General thinks alternatives are available, they are significantly cheaper and incredulously, they are manufactured by the same company! But then it’s not his money that’s being lavished on Agusta Westland, it’s ours.

Another keen supporter of Future Lynx is David Laws MP, he believes that it will be highly effective in meeting the Ministry of Defence’s needs. But then he would, the Agusta Westland factory is in his constituency, what else would we expect him to say? Fortunately for David Laws and the staff at the MOD, they won’t have to fly repeatedly over an increasing hostile battlefield in Future Lynx as our servicemen and women will.

One of the few opponents to Future Lynx is Douglas Carswell MP, he has attacked the project as a waste of money, and has stated that British servicemen and women will subsequently pay a blood price because of it. Whether you agree with this or not, serious questions do need to be raised about its introduction into army service. As a troop carrier or as a reconnaissance platform, Future Lynx certainly isn’t value for money, and not by a long shot. And although it’s a lot more powerful and crashworthy than its predecessor, its flight control systems still lacks the full redundancy and ballistic tolerance taken for granted in other contemporary helicopters. Its engines aren’t widely spaced apart either, unlike the Blackhawk or Apache. These things aren’t aesthetic design features they are the culmination of the hard won lessons of combat experience.

Future Lynx is due to have its maiden flight later this year and it won’t be introduced into service until 2014. It certainly won’t be ready for use in Afghanistan or anywhere else for the foreseeable future. In this sense, its name ‘Future Lynx’ seems somewhat apt. It is widely known that the helicopter lift capability of our armed forces is approaching that of scandalous, there are simply not enough to go around. What our forces need are cost effective, reliable helicopters that are fit for purpose, and they need them now, not in 2014.

One small ray of light to come out the Future Lynx debate is the fulfilment of an Urgent Operational Requirement for Afghanistan. Twelve existing Lynx Mk 9’s will be fitted with LHTEC CTS800-4N engines to vastly improve their hot and high performance. However, no-one has said whether this ‘generosity’ will be extended to include the crashworthy seating, crashworthy fuel tanks and cockpit airbags that the Americans seem to take for granted. It should also be noted that the lack of power in the Lynx’s engines was widely recognised during the first Gulf war in 1991. Unfortunately it has taken seventeen years and another conflict to finally spur the MOD into action.

With the proposed introduction of Future Lynx into the army our servicemen and women will once again have to gaze in awe and envy at the superior equipment used by their allies. They will have to fly into combat in a helicopter that is too small, carrying SA80 rifles that have a frighteningly chequered history and talk to each other on ‘Bowman’ radios that don’t work properly. The vital importance of just these key items cannot be emphasised enough, yet each costs millions of pounds more than it should, was late into service or both. They also failed to deliver what was simply expected of them.

This situation is clearly unacceptable, especially when cheaper, more effective and proven systems are readily available ‘off the shelf’. A country has a strategic interest to produce materials for its own armed forces, this is accepted. But the question needs to be asked, if we cannot produce the necessary equipment or even produce equipment that is simply fit for purpose, is it not right to look elsewhere? We ask a high price of our servicemen and women, and we owe them a duty when we send them into harms way to provide them with the best equipment that is available. In this sense we appear to have failed them, and failed them for the sake of national pride, strategic interests and political expediency.

Given the opportunity and sufficient funding, Agusta Westland could produce a truly exceptional battlefield helicopter that would be highly sought after, and guarantee the security of the company for a long time to come. With Future Lynx though, it really does seem that we are taking a step backwards in capability as we move forwards into the future.

Richard Stockley

Added by Editor

Another eminantly suitable alternative is the Bell UH-1Y Venom or Super Huey currently being delivered to the USMC. Like FLynx it is based on an old design but unlike FLynx is well suited to the Army requirements even having such refinements as folding rotors to make it suitable to be deployed from amphibious assault vessels like HMS Ocean. This would also make it a viable alternative to the Sea King Mk4 Commando currently in service with the Royal Marines / Fleet Air Arm that are also due for replacement.

Links to relevant sources

http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/aircraft/military/bellUH-1Y.cfm

http://www.nhindustries.com/

http://www.agustawestland.com/