Think Defence » Future

Mid Point Review and Look Forward

Think Defence — Sun, 09 Oct 2011 18:25:59 +0000

We are about half way through the Future of the British Army series, having done the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, so a review and look forward will set us up for the next stages.

Because of the timespan of this series some of the posts are out of date, having been overtaken by events. I have also included recent posts that cover similar subjects.

Royal Air Force

Royal Navy

British Army

We have yet to complete the Army series and I have these subjects in the future post pipeline;

16AAB and 3CDO
Dismounted close combat
The challenge of operating in urban and mixed urban areas
Communications
Military engineering
Artillery and indirect fire
ISTAR
Cyber
Forward presence and building regional security
The role of the reserves
Energy and fuel
Logistics and containers

Some of the subject areas may be combined and in addition I am working on a large multi part series on military bridging.

Any more suggestions?

The Future of the British Army 09 – Wheels (A Sensible Solution)

Think Defence — Tue, 26 Jul 2011 19:37:45 +0000

To say that the British Army wheeled vehicle fleet is somewhat lacking in coherence is rather an understatement. Various factors have conspired to create a wheeled fleet that at best is far too diverse and worse, a complete dog’s breakfast that is costing a fortune in support costs.

This is not news of course, it is well recognised by all concerned and several programmes have sought to rein it in, but the combination of a lack of cash, other priorities and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have put paid to most of these or put them so far back on the back burner they are still current in name only.

Whilst the MoD and its civilian and military staff can be rightly proud of the manner in which Urgent Operational Requirements have been fulfilled, the failure of the MoD and Army to provide adequate vehicles in the main equipment programme is an illustration writ large of all that is wrong with our system of acquisition.

We should not let the success of the UOR system compensate or somehow obscure the fact that a UOR is a fundamental admission of failure to provide equipment for largely foreseeable needs. The majority of UOR vehicle types (but not all) have been a reaction to the proliferation of IED’s in Iraq and Afghanistan, whilst the MoD might say this came as a surprise, it wasn’t, and the fact that UK forces have been dealing with mines and IED’s for decades and has a vast corporate knowledge of the issue, makes it even harder to stomach. The very fact that UOR’s can generally be fulfilled with ‘off the shelf’ solutions indicates that someone had already foreseen the problem sufficiently early to put the said solution on their shelves for us to buy.

Short term economic expediency has resulted in a vehicle fleet that was and still is, limited in capability and so varied the logistic overheads are huge. PFI’s and overtly political decisions have made things worse.

Several years ago we selected the MAN SX/HX to fulfil the Support Vehicle requirement but also selected the Oshkosh MTVR derived Close Support Tanker and Heavy Equipment Transporter, instantly creating a two manufacturer supply chain where with a longer term view on logistics commonality, we might have had one.

Compounding the problem is the C Vehicle PFI. The logical solution would have been to stipulate in the contract that the MAN HX/SX range would have to be provided for plant transport and as a base for a number of specialist vehicles like concrete mixers and tippers.

But no, it wasn’t.

The C Vehicle PFI is an availability contract, we don’t specify equipment types but instead concentrate on capabilities, the provider is, within the realms of the performance criteria, able to fulfil that requirement with any vehicle they like. Consequently, ALC, the C Vehicle PFI provider, have introduced the Iveco Trakker truck. ALC pick up the maintenance tab in the UK and Germany, but the reality on operations is somewhat different to the predictable environment of the UK and Germany. There still needs to be separate driver training and there needs to be an in theatre logistics support operation for yet another vehicle type. When ‘on hire’ in theatre it is REME that carry out maintenance on the C Vehicle PFI fleet.

There is nothing wrong with the Trakker but there is nothing unique about it either, there is no practical reason why the MAN HX/SX could not have been specified. One suspects it finally came down to a cost argument but this is penny wise, pound foolish. ALC cannot shoulder any blame for selecting the Trakker, no doubt they are rightly approaching this from a narrow contractual perspective, meeting the contract terms and that is all that matters. Ironically, one of the objectives of the C Vehicle PFI is to reduce the number of types in service. Where we used to have Volvo, Terex, JCB, CAT, Hydrema and others; we now concentrate on a few number of manufacturers.

There are also a few legacy vehicles in the system, the Alvis Unipower for the General Support Bridge and Volvo FL12 Self Loading Dump Truck being a couple of notable examples.

Go down slightly down on the size scale with Pinzgauer and Mowag Duro based vehicles we have another couple.

If one has four or five basic truck types in an operational theatre, no matter what the contract arrangements, four or five sets of spare windscreens, indicator arms or fuel pumps have to be shipped there. Given the tremendous logistic challenge that Afghanistan, for example, represents, the impact of this, either in operational or cost terms, should not be underestimated.

On top of the logistic vehicles we also have plant and some of the more combat oriented wheeled vehicles like protected patrol Ridgeback, Jackal, Husky etc etc

We often hear how the air bridge is over stretched or the cost of fuel transporting things to Afghanistan is astronomical yet we seem to make life harder on ourselves.

Any vehicle has thousands of parts that can all go wrong and if any form of vehicle availability is to be maintained, spares are needed at the point of use.

These were not UOR decisions, where capability is more important than logistics or coherence and it is simply not god enough. As any reader of Think Defence will know, one of our recurring themes is ‘ruthless commonality’ and if this costs more in the short term it will reap enormous cost savings and operational benefits later.

The first massive problem to overcome is a hugely diverse wheeled vehicle fleet that is sitting on the MoD’s ‘books’

Saying in modern conflicts there is no such thing as a front line is incorrect but one thing is certain, the grey areas are much larger. When looking at vehicles we must make certain assumptions about threats and to some extent, the future character of conflict and operations we can reasonably be expected to be involved in.

This of course raises the general issue of protection and the specific issue of IED protection. If we make the assumption that casualty tolerance remains relatively low and the most likely enemy forces will employ IED’s we must therefore set our position against these factors and design vehicles appropriately.

This sets up the possibility of a two tier wheeled vehicle fleet.

On operations where even a low threat of IED’s or small arms attack exist almost every vehicle will need some form of protection. If we look at wheeled vehicles in Afghanistan, the overwhelming vast majority of them now have IED, small arms and RPG protection, all added as UOR’s.

On other operations that are at a lesser scale of threat the disadvantages of this additional protection are many, fuel consumption, maintenance issues and even the outward appearance of vehicles can be detrimental.

The problem with slapping protection onto existing vehicles is they are very rarely designed to take it without penalty and the underlying designs are such as overcoming inherent design features to provide protection to appropriate levels becomes increasingly difficult.

I think the Army face some tough choices on vehicles, the days of putting a GS Land Rover into an operational theatre are long gone but there are tens of thousands of Land Rovers in service and little money or appetite to address these difficult issues. As we have discussed endlessly there are so many competing draws on a finite budget it is hard to see anything being given to a B vehicle fleet when the assumption is that the Army will be involved in nothing but Trooping the Colour for the next two decades.

Personally, I don’t wholly buy into this theory. There will of course be an elevated level of political reluctance to get stuck in beyond a spot of bombing from afar for some time, but politics change, circumstances change and we have to ensure we never go into an operation at the same level of equipment preparedness as we did for Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is the second fundamental problem for wheeled logistics vehicles, the protection dilemma

The Current Situation

It’s difficult to know where to start this should provide a reasonable idea of the scale of the problem (don’t forget, these don’t include tracked vehicles or mobile plant like excavator or wheeled loaders and the RAF’s specialist vehicles are also not on the list)

Some of these are due out of service soon, if they haven’t already gone to Withams

Harley Davidson MT350 – manufactured for the MoD over a period of 7 years the MT350 is a derivative of the Armstrong MT500. About 1,700 were supplied over this period and they have seen extensive service although many have now been disposed of.

Yamaha Grizzly 450 Quad Bikes and Logic SMT 171B trailers are used extensively in Afghanistan to support infantry patrols and move small items from helicopter landing sites and they have now been enhanced by the issue of a short gap crossing kit called Gap Crossing Capability Short – Quad (GXC(S) Quad) or a pair of ramps to me and you.

Supacat ATMP provides light transport functionality

Truck Utility Medium/Light or more commonly known as the Land Rover is synonymous with the British Army and there are a very large number in service of various types. Project REMUS 1 will see about 6,000 of the TUM(HS) Wolf fleet bought up to a common standard for safety and compliance.

The TUM(High Specification) or HS, more commonly known as Wolf Land Rovers were fitted with a Weapons Mount Installation Kit (WMIK), now more commonly known just as a WMIK they have evolved through a number of revisions such as the Higher Payload (HP) to the latest variant called R-WMIK (Ricardo)

The Snatch Vixen is the latest version of the protected mobility land rover.

Click here to view the embedded video.

It’s a full time job keeping track of the various versions of Land Rovers!

Truck Utility Medium (HD) is the Pinzgauer and used in 6×6 and 4×4 variants with a number used in specialist roles in addition to the armoured/protected Vector, now withdrawn.

Supacat Jackal 2 is the latest variant of the HMT400 derived reconnaissance, rapid assault, fire support and convoy protection vehicle and the Coyote is its tactical support vehicle (TSV-Light) big brother.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Supacat Extenda is in service with special forces with the bolt on axle or hamper providing extra carrying capacity.

Truck Utility Heavy Duty 6×6 Duro III are generally used by Royal Signals users for the Reacher satellite terminals but also forms the basis of the Tellar EOD vehicle

The mechanised infantry are still nominally equipped with the unloved, Bedford derived, Saxon.

Acting in the light gun limber and other roles is the equally despised RB44 that has the turning circle of a super tanker and equally dodgy stopping distance.

Mastiff 3 is the latest variant of the large protected patrol vehicle

Click here to view the embedded video.

Ridgeback is the smaller version of Mastiff, 4×4 instead of 6×6

Wolfhound is a cargo variant of Mastiff and designed to provide a number of specialist functions including towing the Light Gun and transporting specialist EOD equipment (4.5 tonne cargo capacity or 3 NATO pallets) but by far the coolest variant is the modular working dog transport system. This replaces the standard load bed and provides for the safe and air conditioned transport of up to 3 dogs.

Panther is a command and liaison vehicle

Tactical Support Vehicle (Medium) or Husky from Navistar Defence is used in the infantry support role, fuel, water, ammunition and general stores carriage, although as with most vehicles in theatre it tends to get used for whatever is needed. It has replaced the Pinzgauer and Vector vehicles in Afghanistan

The Light Protected Patrol Vehicle UOR competition was won by the innovative Force Protection/Ricardo Ocelot, to be called Foxhound in UK service. This will be delivered in the patrol and support variants.

Click here to view the embedded video.

DROPS vehicles are based on a Foden or Leyland chassis

Leyland DROPS

The Oshkosh wheeled tanker is deployed in three variants, the water and fuel close support tanker and tactical air refueller.

Also from Oshkosh is the Heavy Equipment Transporter

HET with Broshuis trailer

Although due to replaced by the Support Vehicles there are still plenty of Leyland DAF and Bedford 4, 8 and 14 tonners in the system

DAF 4 Tonner, (Image from (by Flickr user chippy1920)

The Volvo FL12 Self Loading Dump Truck is used by the Royal Engineers

The C Vehicle PFI provides a number a Iveco Trakker 6×6 and 8×8 vehicles in a number of variants.

Fuchs NBC is a specialist reconnaissance vehicle

The Tank bridge transporter and General Support Bridging systems use various versions of the Alvis Unipower 8×8 truck

Seddon Atkinson Light Equipment Transporters supplement the Heavy Equipment Transporters

Due to be replaced by the SV recovery vehicle the Foden Recovery vehicle is still in service

Bushmaster is in service with a small number of very special users

The Force Protection Buffalo forms part of the Talisman counter IED system

Various MAN Support Vehicles will replace the 4, 8 and 14 tonne trucks including variants

EPLS

I think that’s it

Oh, hang on

Springer, a light transport vehicle, I looked at this one in detail a while ago

The engine and sub systems commonality between these is almost non-existent.

If we started from scratch with a clean sheet of paper could we have possibly designed a more diverse fleet of vehicles, many of which do more or less the same job?

The current situation is not sustainable and is being held together by the daily miracles performed by The Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and Royal Corps of Logistics, largely out of the spotlight. We do not help their cause by shovelling new vehicle types into the pipeline at every opportunity and whilst the understandable and entirely proper UOR purchases are serving their purpose, beyond current operations the drive for commonality must become an obsession.

The beast is out of control.

The Jekyll and Hyde PFI/Non PFI mix is also a serious cause for concern.

Lets be clear, this is one of those ‘no ones fault’ type situations and many of the vehicles are due out of service but we are where we are but have to look forward.

Programmes and Projects

Wheeled vehicle programmes seem to come and go at the MoD with alarming regularity but some have endured.

Support Vehicles

The Support Vehicles (SV) contract was designed to replace DAF 4 tonners and Bedford TM 8 and 14 tonne trucks plus assorted vehicles based on these chassis like the old POD’s and recovery vehicles. The contract was awarded in a cloud of acrimony and many think it was due to pressure to award it to a European rather than British or US organisation.

Total fleet size should be about 6,600 vehicles for £1.3billion, the numbers having been continually revised down from about 7,200 in initial news releases. However, with a number of UOR purchases that original number might actually be achieved but one kind of doubts the original contract value of £1.3billion will remain! Despite the controversy they are an excellent design, if more complex than what they replace, with a long heritage and the programme should complete in 2013.

On numbers, every time I read anything on the Support Vehicle contract the numbers change, I think a good final estimate will be about 7,000 across over 40 variants, some winterised and waterproofed etc.

MAN Military Trucks produce two variants, the SX has a stiffer chassis and coil springs so has much greater mobility, the HX is the lower specification variant, which of course we have ordered many more of. As usual with these programmes there were many more DAF’s and Bedford’s than SV’s, greater reliability and capability was factored into the requirement and low and behold, we need fewer to do the same job.

HX is available in…

Medium Mobility – HX60, 4×4
Medium Mobility - HX61, 6×6
Medium Mobility - HX58, 6×6
Medium Mobility - HX80, 6×6 tractor
Medium Mobility - HX81, 8×8 tractor
Medium Mobility - HX77, 8×8

SX is available in…

Improved Medium Mobility - SX44, 6×6
Improved Medium Mobility - SX45, 8×8

It’s difficult to provide a full list of the variants but the main types and initial ordered quantities are;

5213, Cargo Vehicle Light CV(L)- Medium Mobility – 6 tonne (4×4)
376, Cargo Vehicle Medium CV(M) – Medium Mobility – 9 tonne (6×6)
105, Cargo Vehicle Medium CV(M) – Improved Medium Mobility – 9 tonne (6×6)
923, Cargo Vehicle Heavy CV(H) – Medium Mobility – 15 tonne (8×8)
230, Unit Support Tanker (UST) – Medium Mobility – 9 tonne (6×6)
81, Unit Support Tanker (UST) – Improved Medium Mobility – 9 tonne (6×6)
288, Recovery Vehicle (RV) – Improved Medium Mobility (8×8)
69, Recovery Trailers

A number of these will have hydraulic jibs and lifting tailgates

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have of course influenced the programme; in 2008 Project Fortress was initiated to provide a protected cab, weapons mount, run-flat tires and other theatre specific enhancements to just over 600 vehicles in a couple of tranches. Although a Riotous Assembly Protection (RAP) kit was designed the additional protection kit delivers an adequate level of protection when the vehicles are used in a combat logistic patrol, the route being cleared and/or proven beforehand. It a balance, the MAN integrated protection cab offers a greater level of protection but it is a case of balancing risks against programme costs.

The Unit Support Tanker is particularly impressive, the payload system is from Fluid Transfer International and a significant improvement on the old UBRE’s although it would have been preferable to have the fuel delivery element as a discrete loadable unit delivering obvious flexibility benefits but I suspect legislation prevented this.

This was a UOR so costs were in addition to the programme.

Also outside the main contract the Falcon communication system will use 107 HX60 6 tonne vehicles instead of the original Supacat HMT based solution that was unable to accommodate the additional protection now deemed necessary.

A benefit of the maturity of programme is the final number delivered will be applied across a much smaller number of Army personnel; we might actually end up with about the right number of vehicles.

C Vehicle PFI

The C Vehicle PFI incorporates engineering plant, cranes and other equipment. Awarded to the Amey Lex Consortium (ALC) in 2005 after a lengthy bidding process and is a 15 year deal, valued at approximately £600million. Equipment is centrally pooled in a number of locations and when units use the equipment they are in effect, hiring it. VT have subsequently acquired Lex Defence and are now part of the Babcock organisation. On contract commencement, ALC purchased the MoD’s equipment although it is rumoured that acceptance criteria was so stringent the MoD had to spend considerable sums getting equipment ready for the handover and for the same costs it could have bought new. This legacy equipment was to be phased out and replaced with new equipment as the agreement progresses, most of this has already happened.

Although the scheme includes operator training, surely it would have been logical to use the same equipment as the rest of the Army?

Not in crazy PFI land it isn’t, despite nearly 500 of the MAN Support Vehicles being fitted with jibs the C Vehicle PFI has provided similarly equipped Iveco Trakker units. There is nothing wrong with the Trakker but another vehicle type that overlaps completely with existing vehicles but provided as part of the PFI means yet another training requirement at a time when we should be consolidating equipment types, funnily enough, one of the core objectives of the C Vehicle PFI, the halving of equipment types.

The PFI has provided a number of 6×6 Trakker vehicles, total chassis order was 206 with variants include Self Loading Dump Trucks (SLDT), Medium Dump Truck (MDT) tippers fitted with the Thompson Loadmaster tipping body, Nurock volumetric concrete mixing plant, Truck Mounted Loader with an Atlas Terex lifting arm and a small number of well drilling rigs.

The MoD have also used the C Vehicle Contract vehicle to obtain a small number of 8×8 Trakkers with protected cabs of the Self Loading Dump Truck (SLDT) variant to replace the Volvo FL12 SLDT in Afghanistan.

Although the contract is running well I despair at two aspects, the decision to allow ALC to use the Trakker instead of specifying the MAN Support Vehicle and using dedicated vehicles for the concrete mixing, tippers and well drills when it would have been much more sensible to specify them as demountable units for use with DROPS/EPLS.

I will leave commenting on the PFI itself for another post but this disparity between equipment types is an obvious down side, plus of course the 120 days notice required for equipment unless a penalty payment is made.

Heavy Equipment Transporter PFI

The Oskosh Global Heavy Equipment Tractor (HET) is teamed up with a number of trailers from King Trailers and Broshuis, the King trailers being used mainly for very heavy equipment like Challenger and the Broshuis for Warrior sized and below loads (max 45 tonnes). The HET is a version of the US M1070 HET.

The HET’s are provided by Fastraxx, a PFI provider owned by Kellog Brown and Root. The PFI will run for 20 years and provides 92 HET’s, trailers and sponsored reserve drivers.

The implications of FRES Scout on this PFI are uncertain.

Combined Articulated Vehicle Programme (CAVP)

The CAVP is the successor to the Future Light Equipment Transport programme that will look at providing a replacement articulated vehicle but how this integrates with the HET PFI is uncertain and the fact that it will replace the current Support Tanker which in comparison is new, is rather shocking!

Providing fuel and water distribution, the Oshkosh Close Support Tanker, another Oshkosh success story, are amongst the most mobile vehicles we have, based on the well proven MTVR.

The existing Seddon Atkinson tractor units will be replaced by this programme.

Last year, 20 Improved Mobility Trailers were obtained under a UOR for the Heavy Equipment Transporter. At a cost of £150k each, the trailers from Broshuis have greater ability in rough terrain i.e. Afghanistan, than the existing Trailmaster trailers which have now been withdrawn. Given the wholesale move from CVR(T) that can be carried on the back of a Foden DROPS or MAN EPLS, to an ASCOD SV which can’t, there is going to be a need a much greater number of HET’s and trailers.

Both Oshkosh and MAN have bid for this and the obvious choice would be Oshkosh but MAN have reportedly provided a converted a small number of HX chassis for trials purposes. Again, the future is unclear, do we go for commonality with the Oshkosh family or the larger fleet of MAN Support Vehicles?

Germany now selected the Rheinmetall MAN HX81 tank transporter unit so the competition would appear to be wide open.

Non Articulated Vehicle Programme (NAVP)

Formerly called the Heavy Load Distribution Capability (HLDC) programme this will replace the nearly 2,000 Leyland and Foden Demountable Rack Offload and Pickup System (DROPS) vehicles that have seen extensive service in many theatres. Although hook-lift vehicles had been used in the civilian market for some time we could argue that the British Army pioneered their military use, primarily in supplying artillery batteries with pallets of ammunition although the use has considerably broadened since then.

DROPS is a family of logistics vehicles that use a HIAB Multilift designed derivative of the Marel Corporation hooklift system, commonly used for waste containers. A research paper from the US in 1991 shows some of the thinking behind the DROPS and ISO Container system, click here to read, no seriously, do not proceed without reading it!

There are two types of vehicle – the Leyland Medium Mobility Load Carrier (MMLC), and the Foden Improved Medium Mobility Load Carrier (IMMLC). IMMLC is used primarily as an ammunition carrier in support of AS90 155mm self-propelled guns. MMLC operates solo, or towing a skeleton trailer. DROPS revolutionised logistics transport when introduced and continues to be the backbone of the Army’s transportation capability. Coming into service in 1994 the IMMLC (Foden) contract was for £75million and 400 vehicles. The earlier Leyland MMLC contract delivered just over 1,400 vehicles.

Project Barricade in 2008 converted 90 Support Vehicle 15 tonne 8×8 vehicles already on the production programme with the Enhanced Palletised Loading System or EPLS. Since Barricade an additional 87 vehicles with EPLS have been obtained, outside of the main SV programme, with 31 of those being used for training.

The main difference between EPLS and the DROPS system is that EPLS can lift standard ISO containers without putting them on a flatrack first, obviously providing much greater flexibility although flatracks are used quite frequently for non container loads like vehicles, trailers or other equipment.

There is absolutely no doubt, EPLS is a success story, more flexible than DROPS and delivered in double quick time, but it is not necessarily the best system for the medium to long term. Once the load has been deposited on the ground it needs a crane or similar to reposition, the centre of gravity can be high which reduces mobility and the departure angle can be disadvantageous to certain loads. The original role of DROPS, delivering huge quantities of ammunition to Royal Artillery batteries, may have diminished somewhat, but simply looking at a typical Combat Logistics Patrol in Afghanistan it is clear that the ISO container has completely penetrated the logistics system mwah ha ha mwah.

It might be assumed that SV and EPLS will be a shoe in to fulfil the NAVP programme but things are never this clear, who knows where the programme will end up but the in service date is expected to be somewhere around 2022.

It is not known if the NAVP programme will include a replacement for the highly capable Alvis Unipower vehicles used by the Royal Engineers for the Tank Bridge Transport and General Support Bridging equipment.

Operational Utility Vehicle Systems (OUVS)

This was a programme, now cancelled, to replace the plethora of smaller non logistic vehicles like RB44, Pinzgauer and Duro etc

Phil has written a few times on it, here and here

FRES (Utility Variant)

Despite putting a brave face on it, the MoD, does not have the financial ability to bring the FRES Utility Variant into service for some time.

It’s a woeful tale, detailed here and many many other times on Think Defence.

Whole Fleet Support

This has been in place for some time now but worth mentioning, it moves the majority of the vehicle fleet to a controlled humidity and temperature storage location to preserve the equipment. A separate training fleet is used and whilst the system initially met with some resistance I think it would be fair to say it has saved the Army a considerable amount of money.

A Sensible Future

We are in very real danger of actually having a fully coherent logistic vehicle fleet!

If we can just hold our nerve, specify the MAN HX81 as the vehicle for the CAVP programme, replacing the Oshkosh support tankers, also replace the HET PFI when it expires with HX81 and use a combination of SV’s for the NAVP DROPS replacement contract then for the first time ever the UK will have a common fleet of logistic vehicles that will provide a huge through life cost reduction.

The icing on the cake would be to replace the Alvis Unipower GSB’s vehicles with SV and pull back from the Iveco Trakker purchase by specifying the C Vehicle PFI utilises the same specification vehicles as the SV programme then ruthless commonality will have been achieved.

Replacing some of the specialist variants like the tippers, well drills and concrete mixers with a standard truck body and demountable payload combination would double the benefits.

As good as the Oshkosh vehicles are (and they are very good) I would trade the commonality benefits of a MAN fleet every day of the week and twice on Sunday.

It is within reach and even if we have to wait until the 2020 timeframe when most of the PFI’s expire it would still be a reasonable plan.

Instead of nine or ten completely different vehicle types we could have multiple variants of a single type, ruthless commonality in action.

Lower down the food chain is perhaps the more difficult issue to resolve.

Replacing the quite mind bending variety of light to medium weight vehicles is a serious financial and design challenge.

The most sensible and likely solution is to simply take into service some of the UoR vehicles, OUVS has been ceased and scraping together a theatre deployment fleet of vehicles may still be possible even accounting for the cost of refurbishment post Afghanistan. Some vehicles will be bought into the main equipment plan but some will inevitably fall out and find their way into the disposal agencies. Some may even remain in Afghanistan, recovery back to the UK potentially costing more than their disposal value.

Putting these vehicles through a refurbishment programme would still provide the Army with a reasonable fleet of vehicles that have been subject to considerable investment.

Instead of having a homogeneous fleet we will end up with several tiers of vehicles, those at theatre entry standard will be placed into environmentally controlled storage and broken out for the next overseas outing.

The huge costs will be hidden in current expenditure, easier to carry than the capital costs of any sweeping programme of rationalisation.

FRES UV will be formally cancelled or replaced with a selection of off the shelf vehicles like the RG35, which would seem to offer many benefits.

In the next post I am going to describe a less than sensible future so get ready for a selection of whacky hair brain schemes

The Future of the British Army Series…

The Future of the British Army 01 – Scene Setting

The Future of the British Army 02 – Tasks and Capabilities

The Future of the British Army 03 – Rank and Size

The Future of the British Army 04 – Structures

The Future of the British Army 05 – Heavy Metal

The Future of the British Army 06 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (01)

The Future of the British Army 07 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (02) A Sensible Future

The Future of the British Army 08 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (03) A Not So Sensible Future

The Future of the British Army 09 – Wheels (A Sensible Solution)

Supporting Articles

The Need to Rethink FRES

A Brief History of FRES

Medium Armour – what is it, and what does it mean for the post 2020 force structure?

FRES UV – A Modest Proposal

A Lightweight Supplement to a Medium Weight FRES

Future Army Vehicles

The Future of the British Army 06 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (01)

Think Defence — Sat, 18 Jun 2011 22:43:06 +0000

When it comes to reconnaissance there are many issues to look at, first of course is what does it mean, then, do we fight for information or do we sneak around looking for it, how is technology likely to impact the role, what about the secondary non reconnaissance roles that we have traditionally used the existing equipment for and that is before we get into the inevitable cap badge struggles between the chaps with red trousers and nice blazers and those that like to make loud bangs.

Before we even get to the weapons grade mother of all omnishambles that is FRES, there is much to consider. However, in looking at the general subject you cannot avoid FRES so I will weave it in as we go.

In Afghanistan, the Brigade Reconnaissance Force concept has seen a rapid evolution, integrating snipers, forward air controllers, the latest surveillance technology with lightweight vehicles and CVR(T) for example. This rapid evolution and experimentation is as we all know, nothing particularly new but the relative and changing emphasis of armour, infantry, engineers and artillery is interesting to note. The BRF initially gained traction within 16AAB and 3CDO and has since evolved to include a wide range of trades and larger size overall. In Afghanistan for example, it has a greater emphasis on interacting with the local civilian population and obtaining information from this source in addition to straight forward observation. Because of operating at some distance from existing units they tend to need a bigger punch than other similarly sized units, hence greater numbers of forward air controllers or mortars and the like.

More information from the MoD here and here

The Brigade Reconnaissance Force as constituted in Afghanistan clearly has a different composition to that of the Formation Reconnaissance units used in the liberation of Kuwait but the underlying concept remains the same, as reflected in the core role of the cavalry, mounted or dismounted depending on terrain and objectives. Armoured units have always had a dismounted element but flexibility, it would seem, is the cornerstone of effective reconnaissance and we are as likely to see a cavalry trooper in the dismounted sniper role as we are seeing one driving a Scimitar.

No news there then.

So we should be wary of too closely associating the concept of reconnaissance to equipment, especially vehicles. A future BRF may be based around a core of a traditional Formation Reconnaissance squadron with attachments from pretty much everywhere else in the Army.

Almost infinitely variable the BRF will likely draw capabilities from all corners but this becomes a challenge when those corners are in reduced circumstances.

An ISTAR Corps

We are no stranger to creating ad hoc formations of multiple trades and even equipment that work fantastically on operations it just that when the Army gets home it reverts to its comfortable regimental and corps structures, often forgetting the hard won lessons of others.

An operation comes around again and we often and expensively have to relearn exactly the same lessons learned at great cost before.

Would it be possible therefore to institutionalise this experience and create an ISTAR Corps or are the current ways of doing things good enough?

I tend to think instead of managing the problem we should be attacking the cause of our seeming lack of ‘corporate memory’ but for the sake of this post I would like to explore the concept of a multi disciplined ISTAR Corps.

This is also one of those ‘capability plus’ areas I would like to see over developed, we already do it brilliantly well, let’s build on that to leverage our technology and skills advantages whilst reducing pressure on personnel numbers. Whether it is simply a permanent grouping of multiple cap badges or something completely new and independent i.e. a Corps, is I suppose less important that what it does, but we should never underestimate the power of the old boy network, regimental associations and plain old fashioned conservative inertia when looking at new ideas.

The new Corps would have the full range of capabilities and able to operate across a range of terrain, fighting for information in an armoured thrust across open terrain to stealthy observation in urban terrain to working with local populations to provide enhanced intelligence for a coalition force.

This is a wide remit, difficult to create a coherent organisational structure that meets all requirements without having to resort to smash and grab from other units. For example, if an armoured formation needs to know which route is the optimal one for an objective it would be disastrous if that information came from a reconnaissance unit that had no appreciation of the requirements of a Challenger in terms of terrain. It might be a small detail but these things are important.

So this proposal is simply a set of loose ideas around structure, roles and equipment.

We would have to come up with a better name as well, let’s face the Royal Corps of ISTAR sounds cack!

Primary and Secondary Roles, Sneak Around or Fight It Out

A while ago I asked what did armoured reconnaissance actually mean and Sven ran a brilliant post in response, have a read here

Sven proposed categorising the tasks into three broad areas, traditional armoured reconnaissance, combat missions as light forces and other combat tasks by virtue of being in place.

With due acknowledgement to Sven I have reproduced them here;

Category I (The undisputed armoured reconnaissance core missions)

(a) Inform manoeuvre commanders about the situation out of the reconnaissance radius of his combat troops (& his own reconnaissance element). This is the biggest chunk and gets the most attention.

(b) Cooperate with air power and long range artillery (detection, tracking, identification, target designation, battle damage assessment).

Category II (Combat missions as auxiliary combat troops or at low force density)

(a) Defeat hostile reconnaissance elements when encountered (possibly hunt them down)

(b) Coups de main against establishing defensive positions, airfields, bridges, depots, combat (service) support troops, headquarters, SAM sites and radars

(d) Advance guard / vanguard

(e) Deception (attacks) – this is especially an option if armoured reconnaissance vehicles look similar to the combat troops’ vehicles

(f) Rear guard action

(g) Convoy escort

(h) (Last ditch) reserve in crisis (in a defensive battle) together with engineers

(i) Assault gun-like support of otherwise imbalanced (combined arms minus armour) efforts

(j) Skirmishing combat force for fighting in & control of terrain in low force density

(k) Engage (with surprise effect) not battle-ready hostile combat troops

Category III (“As you’re already there…”)

(a) Report air situation far forward (passive ground/air sensors)

(b) Pick up air crews who crashed or ejected

(d) Radio relay function

(e) Capture OPFOR equipment for technical analysis (especially rear unit’s equipment)

(f) Disable infrastructure (rail lines, land lines, dams, civilian radio towers, bridges, tunnels, power lines, fuel stations)

(g) Emplace/retrieve unattended sensors

(h) Destruction of crashed or emergency-landed aircraft (especially helicopters)

(i) Ambush hostile (hopefully unsuspecting) helicopters

(j) Intercept hostile supply convoys

Into this list you might include the roles currently being carried out by the BRF in Afghanistan, liaising with the local population, sniping and others.

Beyond the traditional role of reconnaissance the units in possession of CVR(T) have been used for a wide variety of secondary roles (category II in Sven’s list) in all manner of operations, so much so, that one might be forgiven for thinking that the secondary roles are in fact the primary ones.

So the two key questions are

Do we fight for information or rely on stealth and technology?

What is the mix between the primary and the secondary?

Two very large questions that have taxed many people with an infinitely better grasp than me, but still worth looking at

Fight or Sneak

To start this section I think it is worth looking at the experience of others.

In this day and age, long distance reconnaissance must be organized to fight in execution of its mission, to fight for time to send information in, and to fight for time for the main body to properly utilize the information sent in. . . . Reconnaissance capable of only observation is not worth the road space it takes

US Major General Charles Scott, 1942

In the aftermath of WWII several studies came to the conclusion that effective reconnaissance always required fighting for except in the rare situations where a stealthy infiltration was an option.

Yet despite this, British forces in North Africa proved the concepts of long range lightly armed reconnaissance, the Long Rage Desert Group and emergence of the SAS for example.

UK experience in the Gulf also confirmed the viability of lightly armed and stealthy surveillance as a means of obtaining information.

In the early nineties the ‘return to stealth’ became the accepted wisdom as the promise of technology was swallowed wholesale by all modern armies.

In common with their approach to learning lessons from combat, US forces conducted an extensive study of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including an in depth look at reconnaissance.

It reported on 6 themes, again worth repeating.

Theme 1 – Tempo Drives Reconnaissance, speed of operations demand that reconnaissance keep up both in physical and information terms

Theme 2 – Movement to contact is the most common type of offence, uncertainty required that detailed reconnaissance was carried out but because of Theme 1, this was more often than not impossible.

Theme 3 – Adaptive enemies often do not fit doctrinal templates, this is going to be especially relevant when fighting diffuse enemies that do not always have neatly delineated units that occupy defined boundaries. Size and equipment of opposing does not always relate to difficulty to overcome or combat effectiveness.

Theme 4 – Commanders require human intelligence more than imagery, the amount of UAV, satellite or aircraft derived imagery was often overwhelming but of dubious value. Information collected from individuals was often of much higher value.

Theme 5 – Most useful intelligence is bottom up, the report found that the most useful information came from within units rather than delivered from higher formations. Many interviewees were particularly scathing of JSTARS and satellite feeds were created as many false alarms as useful information. This was compounded by bandwidth restrictions.

Theme 6 – Lightly armoured scouts cannot high tempo operations, this was a particularly interesting find because it was in direct contradiction of the technology led conclusions of the early nineties. Lightly armed and armoured vehicles were simply outclassed, leading to their withdrawal and in many cases, M1 tanks were used, even in preference to the M3 Bradleys, let alone Humvees.

Whilst this study has relevance to fast paced advances some of the themes are less relevant to other kinds of operation. Afghanistan for example, is not a fast paced advance to an objective and so we have to look at things with different eyes.

Some are just as relevant though.

The study linked above concluded that when building a reconnaissance model the two main variables are operational tempo and battlefield density. Combat is always needed to obtain useful information unless time was available for passive observation and the general transformative impact of modern surveillance technology was often over stated.

Which is a roundabout way of saying the lessons of pretty much every recent conflict were reaffirmed!

The report has this to say, a key paragraph below

Lightly armored scouts survive on the battlefield by trading armor for stealth. Stealth requires timeone luxury tactical commanders can expect to do without in the future. Future conflicts will almost certainly occur above the threshold that allows for stealthy reconnaissance. Additionally, the evolving nature of the threat will make that passive reconnaissance less and less useful. If the enemy looks just like the population he is hiding among, then observing him from a distance reveals little information of use to a maneuver commander.

Effective reconnaissance in the future will almost certainly require fighting. Ultimately, someone must go forward into the unknown and make contact with the enemy. If that element possesses the combat power to survive that contact and the flexibility to react, tactical commanders can sustain the tempo advantage, understand the enemy based on his actions and react faster than the threat. This will be the key to victory on the future battlefield. To engage in combat beyond the supporting range of friendly forces, reconnaissance forces must have access to the full suite of combined arms critical to tactical success.

Apart from the shocking spelling of armour and manoeuvre I think that is a pretty good summary!

The answer to the fight or sneak question is closely tied to equipment evolution.

The British Army has in recent times chosen to take the stealth route when seeking information, hence the small, highly mobile but lightly armed and armoured CVR(T) series and collection of open top soft skin vehicles, culminating in Jackal.

We also tend to look at the problem through a CVR(T) shaped prism.

The change in emphasis to a more combative approach to carrying out the formation reconnaissance role is reflected in FRES Scout, replacing a 10 tonne vehicle with a 30 tonne vehicle. Protection and firepower have assumed a greater emphasis than tactical and strategic mobility. CVR(T) could be delivered by air, carried on the back of more or less any truck, self deploy on the road, easily carried in an ISO container, able to traverse very poor ground, use austere roads and bridges and go places that are simply off limits to any vehicle weighing in excess of 30 tonnes but it has survivability issues where its diminutive size weighs heavily against it.

Other nations are wrestling with similar problems and with the introduction of the Fennek, the German Army would seem to be going down the stealth route although Sven will be able to provide more details.

We should also look at the use of the CVR(T) Striker, equipped with Swingfire long range anti tank weapons. It was not, as many think, an offensive anti tank weapon but was designed to provide overwatch for Scimitar and Scorpion operating beyond the cover of the Chieftain and Challenger main battle tanks. So whilst Scimitars might have been sneaking around they certainly had a big brother watching out for them. In complex terrain, with increasing urbanisation, arguably the most likely we will encounter, we can no longer rely on this concept.

All that said, one cannot deny the success of the British model using CVR(T), a lighter vehicle and stealthy observation.

This brings us on to the second question, the effect of primary and secondary roles on subsequent structures and equipment.

I am now retired from the Army and embarking on my second career, but I spent most of my 22 years serving in CVR(T) and most of what has been written here has been discussed by the men that did crew them and still do!

It is a fantastic piece of equipment, years ahead of its time when designed and that very fact that there is literally nothing that can do what it does, on the market today, marks it as still being a unique and valued capability, that as was written in the article, we loose at our peril.

In the Falklands, it was 10 years old, relegated to secondary roles for fear it would not be able to traverse the terrain, well it did and in the post op reports, they wanted a Sqn, if not a Regt down there.

In Granby it was written off again because “it wouldn’t keep up” with Challenger/Warrior. Well not only did it, but it was proved that both in the Close and Formation Recce role, the need for the manned platform to FIND the enemy, FIX him and if it went pear shaped could stand up for itself till the big boys arrived, was as valuable as ever and the platform of choice?

In the Balkans, during the winter of ’93-’94, the only vehicle that could move over roads with inches of black ice, offer protection against IDF and traverse the steep, snowy terrain to get the job done was CVR(T).

During Telic 1 it was engaging and holding its own in fights with T55 while it’s human crew made the decisions to use Arty, Air or other ground units to out manoeuvre the enemy.

On Herrick with Mine blast Protection, ballistic protection and bar armour, not only does it mean the crew walk away from mine strikes and RPG strikes, I’ve seen it first hand, but in some cases the vehicle not only survives, but continues to fight! (But the extra protection does push it to 11 tonnes!)

Why is CVR(T) so good at what it does?

It has the perfect balance of Armour/Protection/Firepower but it is its size and weight that means it can go anywhere and do anything.

I for one, along with many other will shed a tear when it finally backs into the hanger for the last time.

Dean, a Think Defence commenter

An illuminating quote from someone with a lot of practical experience but what is interesting is that many of the operations mentioned were not traditional reconnaissance, in Sven’s terminology, Category II roles.

As I mentioned above, these seem to be just as prevalent as the traditional reconnaissance roles. For these some of the assumptions change, strategic and tactical mobility become of greater importance than combat strength.

This leads me to the conclusion that that the UK must retain the ability to carry out both, stealthy observation and combative acquisition of information.

A different set of compromises for a different set of requirements

A second conclusion is that those secondary roles are every bit as important and whilst we might sometime use the same equipment we should avoid being straight jacketed into assuming that one size fits all, because it doesn’t.

Next post will look at structures and tools.

The Future of the British Army Series…

The Future of the British Army 01 – Scene Setting

The Future of the British Army 02 – Tasks and Capabilities

The Future of the British Army 03 – Rank and Size

The Future of the British Army 04 – Structures

The Future of the British Army 05 – Heavy Metal

The Future of the British Army 06 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (01)

The Future of the British Army 07 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (02) A Sensible Future

Supporting Articles

The Need to Rethink FRES

A Brief History of FRES

Medium Armour – what is it, and what does it mean for the post 2020 force structure?