Think Defence » FRES

40mm or 90mm, or maybe even 105mm

Think Defence — Mon, 02 Jan 2012 03:24:39 +0000

Both FRES Specialist vehicle Scout and the new and improved Warrior MICV will be fitted with the CTAI 40mm cannon. There are a number of debates about this, does the cased telescoping ammunition offer enough of an advantage to justify the cost, will we ever field advanced natures, is the calibre too high when everyone else uses 25mm to 30mm and will this unique system provide any export potential but instead of these an interesting question to pose is why an automatic cannon and why not a large calibre systems like 90mm or 105m?

With the Warrior, the weapon will primarily provide supporting fire for disembarked infantry and to destroy enemy MICV. In a typical armoured manoeuvre operation it will be joined by automatic 7.62mm and 12.7mm machine guns, 40mm GMG, supported by dismounted Javelin anti-tank missiles (we no longer have an under armour ATGW, which is another issue entirely) and the 120mm of the Challenger 2. In addition, indirect fire will be provided by 81mm mortar, 155mm artillery, GMLRS and even close air support from fast jets, Apache and unmanned systems (almost makes one sympathise with the enemy)

In another scenario, like Afghanistan for example, the Warrior might not have 155mm available or 120mm direct fire (at least not from the UK) but have 60mm mortar and the 105mm light gun.

Infantry weapons like underslung grenade launchers, the various tube launched anti structure munitions and the new NLAW can also be used.

So from this it can be seen that it operates in a complex matrix that is ever changing depending on deployed forces and other variables.

FRES Scout in its traditional CVR(T) replacement role will, in many situations, be operating beyond the forward CR2 where the anti-armour performance will be of greater importance than its ability to supress infantry, especially given the old Striker/Swingfire combination of anti-armour overwatch will no longer form part of the FRES family. The TRACER programme had this capability and most of the early incarnation of FRES likewise, but it has been quietly dropped.

Another factor worth considering is that both CVR(T), FRES and Warrior have and will be used outside of their neat doctrinal boxes, often acting in the role of light tank or infantry fire support. I looked at these secondary roles in a number of recent posts and came to the conclusion that in many operations these seem to assume a primary role.

This also opens up the natural questioning of the need for a proper light/medium tank but enought of that for now!

A medium calibre main gun was last seen in UK service on the Scorpion and Saladin, the 76mm L23A1 in the Scorpion was a development of the earlier L5A1 in the Saladin. Ammunition natures included HESH-T, illuminating, smoke, HE, canister and various training rounds. The Scorpion was withdrawn many years ago but the same turret on Canadian Cougars saw service in the Balkans.

In export models, the CVR(T) has been sold with the Cockerill 90mm medium velocity cannon and there were even concepts for a vehicle called the Sagita that Alvis proposed for the US Army Mobile protected Gun System (MPGS) based on an evolved Stomer chassis. Three models were proposed, one with the 76mm L23A1 with twin TOW launchers, another with a two man turret equipped with the 75mm ARES high velocity automatic gun and a final variant fitted with a higher calibre weapon, either the Cockerill 90mm Mk III, the Rheinmetall Rh105-11 or a new design from Royal Ordnance.

With other systems and in the context described above the 25-40mm automatic cannon would seem to offer an excellent and relevant set of capabilities and therefore the withdrawal of the 76mm weapon entirely vindicated but in an operation like that in Afghanistan would something similar provide an additional set of capabilities that would make an investment worthwhile?

Javelin has proved invaluable, long range, highly accurate, portable on small vehicles and powerful but the principle problem is that of cost. At approximately £70k each their use becomes problematical in an extended campaign. There is a view that it doesn’t matter what they cost, if a weapon system can be used to kill an IED emplacer then that is an effective operational and economic use. This is a persuasive argument and from one perspective entirely valid. But we have seen that there is no unlimited pot of gold and decisions in one area of defence have implications in other. Javelin also has a relatively long flight time at range when compared to a gun launched round.

Relying on close air support delivered from UAV, helicopters or fast jets is also hugely expensive and subject to delays caused by both availability and rules of engagement.

Indirect fire support from organic infantry mortars can be extremely fast into action and hugely effective but the lack of precision matures makes them not suited to many situations and adding precision guidance negates many of the advantages of mortars as well. Artillery and GMLRS are also not without their own problems.

When Challenger is not deployed, as in Afghanistan, or there is a need for a higher elevation angle, the largest calibre vehicle mounted weapon will be the 40mm CTA cannon. Looking into the crystal ball and the future character of conflict, urban environments would seem to be highy likely.

The question therefore is, is there a gap in firepower, somewhere between the 25-40mm automatic cannon and 120mm high velocity system on the Challenger 2 that is not filled by Javelin, infantry weapons and indirect fire in these secondary roles that seem to be utilised more often?

One of the commenters made an interesting and very valid point about first deciding what you want to do and then go shopping, not before.

The first thing to say is it would not be needed to act as a tank, defend against them perhaps but it would be used more often for fire support and anti light/medium armour.

Other roles would be immediate fire support, wall breaching, destruction of obstacles and road blocks, clearing large areas with canister and numerous others where it’s large round and very low reaction times would be invaluable. Of course, low reaction times and rapid time between firing and effects appearing on the target would also be achievable by an automatic cannon so the key difference would be the effects on target delivered by a small number of large rounds versus a larger number of smaller rounds.

There might even be a psychological advantage in some situations, a big gun looks scary and the noise has its own impact as well.

Would the advantages offered by a larger calibre main gun on FRES and/or Warrior be compelling enough to negate the cost of introducing a new system?

It is interesting to see how our US cousins look at these things and worth noting that the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams do not utilise an automatic cannon armed Stryker variant, there is none. Although their doctrine is completely different the Reconnaissance Vehicle is only armed with a 12.7mm machine gun but they do have the Mobile Gun System variant that uses an automatic loading 105mm M68A1E4 cannon.

After initial problems (a new systems with problems seems acceptable) the MGS started to receive rave reviews in Iraq and was viewed as a battle winning system.

The official description for the MGS is;

The Mobile Gun System (MGS) supports dismounted infantry and engages the enemy in close combat in order to clear opposition and permit rapid movement allowing the force to maintain the initiative, defeat strong points, and occupy and/or secure key objectives.

I suspect any criticism of the MGS had more to do with the implementation rather than concept. It only has 18 ready rounds and a relatively complex automatic loader for example and some of the ergonomic issues remain. The initial stories about not being able to fire on the move or being knocked over by the recoil proved to be completely incorrect.

If we accept that there is a gap, and this is far from certain, there exists a few interesting off the shelf systems worth considering.

The first would of course be the same system as used on the US MGS, this has the advantage of being a mature system with the wrinkles ironed out and obvious commonality with a major ally.

The ASCOD was trialled with this system, the drawings must exist somewhere!

More realistically, the ASCOD Light Tank has been supplied to the Royal Thai Marine Corps. This is equipped with an integrated manned turret with a 105mm main weapon from LIW, now Denel Systems. The main weapon is the 52 calibre GT7 which is capable of firing the full range of 105mm natures available from a wide variety of manufacturers. 105mm is still a hugely popular calibre. An interesting feature of the GT7 is that it doesn’t have a muzzle brake and thus avoids some of the problems with injuring surrounding infantry that such equipped weapons can sometime suffer from. The GT-7 is derived from the venerable Royal Ordnance L7 with a new recoil system.

ASCOD LT-105

The LMT-105 turret, a development of the 76mm Rooikat, is also equipped with a full suite of advanced set of fire control and electro optical sensors, is fully stabilised and has a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun.

Other turrets/guns could also be used such as those from Oto Melara HITFACT or CMI Defence CT-CV

If a smaller intermediate weapon was required the Cockerill 90mm MKIII is still available from CMI and would allow a greater number of rounds to be carried.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The CT-CV is interesting, not because of the Falarick gun launched missile because it also offers a high elevation of 42 degree for use in urban environments although it only has 15 ready rounds, more would be carried on the vehicle and loaded into the automatic loading system under armour.

CT-CV has been fitted to the General Dynamics Pandur armoured fire support vehicle, General Dynamics of course being the manufacture of FRES Scout and the Polish Anders armoured vehicle has also been integrated with the turret.

Pandur II with CMI Defence CT-CV Turret

When we look at these it does not have to be an either or, would, for example, 1 in 3 FRES Scouts fitted with one of these turrets offer an increase in capability worthy of the extra capital and through life cost or are we fine with what we have?

An interesting question.

CTA 40mm Cannon Brochure

Think Defence — Sat, 24 Dec 2011 23:44:35 +0000

Information on the new 40mm cased telescopic cannon that will be fitted to FRES SV Scout and Warrior

ZD Scribd iPaper

FRES – British to Its Boostraps – Part 3

Think Defence — Wed, 09 Nov 2011 19:38:16 +0000

It might be mischief making but I can’t resist keeping track of the General Dynamics FRES SV programme and the statement from the head of GDUK that FRES SV is ‘British to its Bootstraps’

Building from previous posts.

Commenting on the deal, Dr Sandy Sandy Wilson, President and Managing Director of General Dynamics UK said.

The ASCOD SV programme is British to its bootstraps

ASCOD SV is the latest generation of a proven European design

Proven, by being in service with Spain and Austria with a few of the Spanish ones being deployed in Kosovo for a while, proven can have many meanings. The ASCOD2 is sold via General Dynamics European Land Systems (GDELS) that comprises 4 companies; Steyr-Daimler-Puch Spezialfahrzeug GmbH (Steyr-SSF) in Austria; MOWAG in Switzerland; Santa Bárbara Sistemas in Spain, and General Dynamics European Land Systems – Germany. The ASCOD2 is being manufactured in the Spanish facility. Although the Scout is said to be able to grow to a weight of 42 tonnes the specification sheet on the Steyr web site states a maximum combat weight of 31 tonnes although one must assume the other variants already in production are in excess of this.

thanks to a modern, proven drivetrain

That would be the Renk 256B then, manufactured in the very British town of Augsberg

without the need to upgrade its engine

The MTU 8V 199 TE20, MTU being the world famous British manufacturer of diesel engines located in Friedrichshafen, part of the Tognum group.

Its turret is designed by Lockheed Martin UK INSYS

Lockheed Martin, another famous British company headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland. The turret in question will use the 40mm CTA canon from CTA International, a joint venture between BAe and Nexter in France.

Other partners that including such obviously British organisations as Curtis Wright, Rheinmetall and Moog as partners, headquartered in Parsippany New Jersey, Düsseldorf and East Aurora, New York .

An announcement today added further to the Britishness of FRES

Kortrijk, Belgium, 12 September 2011. Visualization pioneer Barco is proud to announce that General Dynamics UK, the prime contractor for the British Army’s Scout Specialist Vehicle (Scout SV), has selected Barco’s 13” rugged extreme displays for the program, following a competitive bid.

Barco, another famous British Company headquartered in Belgium!

Another FRES SV Video

Think Defence — Mon, 07 Nov 2011 13:38:25 +0000

Just seen this, thought it was interesting

Click here to view the embedded video.

Plus, another video of Scimitar 2 (H/T Snafu)

Click here to view the embedded video.

FRES – British to its Bootstraps Part 2

Think Defence — Thu, 20 Oct 2011 04:55:37 +0000

Does anyone remember last year, following the announcement that General Dynamics had been selected for the FRES Specialist Variant, the phrase British to its bootstraps?

At the time I did question this, given the vehicle was to be based on the ASCOD and have most of the main components provided by non UK organisations, creating a post on just that subject. Click here for a refresh.

In the General Dynamics press release, archived here, a number of claims were made by Dr Sandy Wilson (President and Managing Director of General Dynamics UK), for example;

the best value for money for the British taxpayer and the best deal for the UK Industrial base.

and

The ASCOD SV programme is British to its bootstraps, delivering a Military off the Shelf vehicle with British design by British engineers to the British Army while safeguarding or creating 10,600 jobs for British workers

Lord Peter Levene weighed in with;

a decision we believe will sustain the British tank industry for future generations

With me so far, ASCOD is the savior of the British tank industry, will secure thousands of jobs and is absolutely British to its bootstraps.

Now all this sounds excellent but a Parliamentary Answer to a written question tabled by Ben Wallace, the MP for Wyre and Preston, ex Scots Guards Officer and former director of QinetiQ would seem to be backtracking.

Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North, Conservative)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what obligations his Department has placed on General Dynamics to manufacture and assemble the Scout Specialist Vehicle in the UK.

Given the bold statements above, the answer is a bit of a shocker.

Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)

The Ministry of Defence has placed no contractual obligations on General Dynamics UK (GDUK) to manufacture the Scout Specialist Vehicles (Scout SV) platforms in the UK. GDUK has, however, indicated that a significant proportion of the activity may be conducted in the UK.

In addition, the contract allows for the transfer of the assembly integration and test work on the platforms from off-shore facilities, to the Defence Support Group in the UK. A value for money decision on whether to transfer this work will be taken later in the programme, closer to production. An enabling arrangement for industrial participation has also been put in place with General Dynamics, that will see work being carried out in the UK, or assistance being provided to UK exporters to Spain (assembly of ASCOD, the base vehicle for Scout SV is currently conducted in Spain)

Have I missed anything?

Welcome to the Future of FRES?

Think Defence — Thu, 22 Sep 2011 02:13:31 +0000

It will be a real shame if FRES gets cancelled but in an age of real austerity, a worsening economy and likely future cuts can the MoD afford it?

Click here to view the embedded video.

Could more of these, plus a handful of upgraded Warriors, a mix of lighter vehicles, UAV’s and a a multi cap badge Regiment of dismounted specialists be the future of Formation Recce?

Hardly ideal, but in the context of the whole of defence spending is this a compromise we will be forced to make, and if so, will it be such a bad one?

FRES Scout at DSEi

Think Defence — Fri, 16 Sep 2011 04:17:49 +0000

Thought you might be interested in this video

Click here to view the embedded video.

Did Sandy just say 11 people in the back?

Also, check out the rear.

Second Hand News

Think Defence — Fri, 29 Jul 2011 16:44:29 +0000

You know that £500 million that we are paying General Dynamics to create 7 FRES SV demonstrators, the same FRES SV that is based on a 20 year old design where all of the variants are already in service with Spain and Austria?

Yes, that one that is ‘British to its Bootstraps’

Here is a photograph of the the first test vehicle, the pithily titled PT3 Mule, with the EDU turret fitted.

Does that chassis look a bit, well, used?

This from General Dynamics

The mule base unit, known as PT3, is based on a mature ASCOD vehicle already in service with the Austrian Army. The 1.7 metre race ring, specifically designed by General Dynamics UK for Scout, was integrated onto the vehicle by General Dynamics European Land Systems at its Simmering facility in Austria. The vehicle was then transported to General Dynamics UK’s Pershore facility in Worcestershire, UK, to undergo a series of tests and prepare it to accept the EDU turret. It was then transferred to Lockheed Martin UK’s facility in Ampthill, Bedfordshire last week for the integration of the turret.

In parallel, the first EDU turret was being built at Rheinmetall Landsysteme in Gersthofen, Germany. Rheinmetall Landsysteme designs, develops and manufactures the Scout SV Turret Structure for turret design authority Lockheed Martin UK. Following a successful first build of the turret, the mandated CT40 Cased Telescoped Cannon System was integrated into it and fired for the first time in May, five months ahead of schedule. It was also subsequently transported to Ampthill where it has been undergoing extensive testing and preparation for integration with the PT3 mule base unit.

So have I read that correctly, for £500 million, we can’t even have a new build?

What do you think the best tabloid headline would be for this?

Full story here

FRES – What Might Have Been

Think Defence — Fri, 29 Jul 2011 10:00:51 +0000

We have covered FRES in much painful detail but one of the notable ‘le grande cock ups’ was the UK’s decision to invest in the MRAP programme, then pull out after investing hundreds of millions and finally to put the resultant vehicle (Artec Boxer) through the subsequent FRES Utility Variant (trials of truth)

Of course it wasn’t selected, it wasn’t quite exactly what we wanted, there were no ex senior civil servants and officers working for Artec and the usual reasons for not selecting something that actually delivers a reasonable capability at a reasonable cost in a reasonable time frame came out in full force.

One of the nations that stuck the course with MRAV, Germany, has in last few weeks transported 4 Boxers to Afghanistan, ready for a deployment in August

Whether you agree with the concept or design is not relevant to this discussion but the fact that we are still farting around with FRES whilst others defined their requirements and stuck with them should be a lesson on how to develop vehicles.

We used to be good at this stuff as well

Images from Flickr: kumpulan foto Bundeswehr-Fotos Wir.Dienen.Deutschland

A light weight supplement to a medium weight FRE SV

Jed — Sat, 16 Jul 2011 21:31:43 +0000

A guest post from Jed, currently enjoying Florida I think!

In his article “A need to rethink FRES” our friend Monty provided a number of alternative designs for a light weight tracked armoured vehicle to supplement the ‘heavy’ FRES SV in the shape of the GC ASCOD II Scout.

The idea was that these designs were options for a CVR(T) Mk II – that is a highly mobile armoured recce vehicle.

In TD’s original article and in the comments to Monty’s article we discussed the difference between vehicles that can “fight for information” and those that can “sneak around”.

Smaller, low profile and quieter are the kind of attributes for a sneaky vehicle, but with protection and offensive armaments sized for what is basically as self protection requirement.

Other commentor’s seem some what hung up on the operational utility of having a vehicle that can be slung under a Chinook for air-mobile ops. I had suggested that both the planned (?) WMIK version of the new Foxhound, and perhaps a dedicated recce variant my fill these needs, however there were many answers that tracks might be better than wheels, in order to traverse really adverse terrain, and thus use it to our advantage.

So, our requirements then as I understood them were these:

Tracks – for good tactical mobility
Small size – a small volumetric footprint aids strategic (ship and air) and tactical mobility, and to some extent visual ‘stealth’ – so if possible a similar footprint to the original CVR(T)
Protection – armour and active defenses if available, but only at a level commensurate with keeping the weight down and the mobility up !
Commonality – if possible be based on a vehicle already in use, for logistical simplicity
Recce smarts – sensors and comms kit essential to the role.

Taking these suggested requirements into account , I present to you my modest proposal for a non-developmental, off the shelf replacement for the CVR(T)

The Front Module of a Warthog !

Warthog

Click here to view the embedded video.

Yes, that’s right, lets just chop the articulated armoured personnel carrier in half, and use the front bit !

OK, now bare with me for a while, its not as daft as it sounds……..

As we all know the Warthog is an up-armoured / better protected variant of the ST Kinetics (of Singapore) Bronco All Terrain Tracked Carrier (ATTC). It has been introduced into British Army use for in Afghanistan as a better protected replacement for the BAe BVS10 (originally purchased as an amphibious APC for the Royal Marines).

The STK Eng PDF brochure for the Bronco family is available here

The Army guide page for the Bronco is here

Basically I am suggesting simply ditching the rear module, because we don’t need it in this application. As such the same 350bhp engine is going to be well capable of driving the vehicle over all terrains, even loaded up with mission role kit. The engine is mounted at the rear of the front module, and the fuel tanks are in the front module too, which is how we can do without the rear module.

The front module is rated for 1200Kg load

The open source info says the Bronco is armoured against point blank 7.62mm ball, and artillery / mortar shrapnel. However we know the Warthog has enhanced ballistic and IED protection, but we don’t know to exactly what levels, as this is an operational secret. However I would suggest if it’s good enough for the APC variant for Afghanistan, it is good enough for my scout vehicle.

IBD of Germany are said to provide a “passive” (armour ?) upgrade, and they have also marketed their active RPG / ATGW defense system for the Bronco family:

IBD Active protection

Adding this is a must for me, more expensive than slat armour, but keeps the dimensions down, and does not interfere with amphibious capabilities.

The front module of the Bronco can hold 6 crew, and I don’t know if that holds true for the Warthog, but I would drop it down to 4 which should give weight and space margin for Bowman comms kit, EW electronics, (and even a boiling vessel for brewing up).

The British Army doesn’t appear to like / trust transparent armour and the passenger door vision blocks / windows of the Bronco are removed in the Warthog – well I would re-instate them, as I think the additional situational awareness provided to the crew is a good idea in a Scout / Recce vehicle.

With a crew of 4, consisting of driver, vehicle commander / gunner and two “Cavalry Scout’ dismounts, the later two can jump out and belly crawl up to the ridge line for really stealthy recon !

The ST Kinetics RWS brochure is available here

The RWS with (1?) weapon and ammo only weighs in at 350Kg.

I would fit a 40mm GMG with 7.62mm co-ax. The GMG with HEAT rounds should be able to contend with enemy light armoured vehicles, and the 7.62mm can take on dismounts. Of course if we give STK some more cash, maybe they could add 1 or 2 Javelins to the mount

I think there would be space on the rear portion of the roof (above the engine compartment ?) for a Redback 40mm Grenade Launcher, which provides a second set of optronics, and 4 barrels each with 4 stacked 40mm grenades.

Redback Grenade Launcher

So, that is my modest proposal for a CVR(T) mk II, based on (half) of an in service vehicle, with excellent tracked driven tactical mobility and a small weight and volume foot print (compared to an ASCOD II SV) – I am not sure, but it may have enough buoyancy to be amphibious without the rear module attached.

Even the STK brochure does not split the dimensions and weights into the two modules, but as the whole vehicle is 8.6m long, I would guess the front module is no more than 4.3m long by 2.3 m wide with a gross laden weight of 8 tonnes. This compares well to the CVR(T) which is 5.8m by 2.1m and 8 tonnes (basic) according to Wikipedia.

Is a 40mm GMG as good as 30mm Rarden – well it depends what you want to do. I don’t really want to be advancing to contact and fighting for information in this class of vehicle, but would it more tactically mobile and better protected than a Panther CLV, or as yet non-existent Recce variant of the Foxhound ?

I think it would.

Add to this the logistics commonalities, and the modest survivability enhancements, I think this is a good example of an off the shelf option to fulfill a specific requirement – but what do you think ?

FRES, Here’s One We Made Earlier

Think Defence — Fri, 08 Jul 2011 17:25:40 +0000

In all the best TV cookery shows the presenter does a spot of preparation and then swiftly opens the oven and with a ‘here’s one we made earlier’ statement, out pops a fully formed dish, ready for serving.

As we know General Dynamics UK have been awarded a £500m demonstration phase contract for FRES Specialist Vehicles to include 7 prototypes. Reconnaissance Block 1 of the FRES programme consists of scout, repair, recovery and protected mobility vehicles, roughly analogous to the CVR(T) Scimitar, Sampson and Spartan.

Despite my significant reservations about its weight and bulk creating serious strategic and tactical mobility issues, the vehicle will be good news for the Army, finally replacing the 40 year old CVR(T) that is definitely showing its age.

What causes more concern is the cost of developing 7 prototypes.

£500m and not a production vehicle in sight.

Just to repeat that, £500 million for 7 prototypes.

To put that £500 million into perspective;

In 1996 Spain ordered the first batch of the Pizarro (Spanish version of the ASCOD), a total of 122 Pizarro fighting vehicles and 22 command post variants for the grand total of £207 million with the order completed in 2002

In 2003, Spain ordered the second batch of their ASCOD Pizarro’s, 170 IFV’s, 5 command post, 28 forward observer, 8 recovery vehicles and 1 engineer variant, total cost of £454 million (different web sources cite slightly different numbers)

Even taking into account variations in numbers and costs from different web sources this still looks like a good value for money deal, Spain has a fleet of about 350 armoured vehicles of various types, including upgraded batch 1 vehicles, for, lets call it it £800 million, give or take the odd 40 or 50 million.

And this was for a vehicle developed from scratch along with multiple variants.

If General Dynamics were developing a brand new vehicle from scratch, chock full with the latest automotive and electronic technology then fair enough, but it is not.

There are no elevating sensor masts, no hybrid propulsion and no composite construction for example. It really is a design that shows so little design ambition it is pretty depressing when one looks at the advance that CVR(T) made 40 years ago and the massive advance that TRACER was striving to make 10 years ago. Successive programme failures have knocked the innovative zeal out of the MoD and FRES SV represents a low risk solution that will be better than what we already have, but not that much better.

ASCOD, on which FRES SV is based, started its trials 20 years ago next year.

That’s right, our brand new vehicle is based on a 20 year old design.

This of course, matters not one bit if the vehicle meets requirements but back to £500m for 7 prototypes.

From the General Dynamics website

The demonstration phase will see the development of seven prototypes for the Scout reconnaissance vehicle and supporting variants built on the ASCOD SV Common Base Platform, as well as providing associated training equipment.

It is not very clear what the ‘supporting variants’ will be but it has been reported that the demonstration contract consists of three Scout with the balance being made up of protected mobility (common base platform) and repair/recovery

Ambulance, command, direct fire and bridgelaying may come in later.

Whats new?

To justify the significant cost in developing the UK variant of the Pizarro/Ulan then surely it must be a new vehicle.

FRES Scout will use the General Vehicle Architecture, a brilliant concept that seeks to create a unified vehicle electronic and electrical architecture but much of the work for this has already been done.

The sensor systems appears to be military off the shelf, the engine, transmission and track systems likewise.

The 40mm CTA cannon has been in development for a long time, it’s certainly paid for.

Lockheed Martin INSYS will be providing three turrets as part of the demonstration phase, a new turret perhaps?

Not really, it will be based on a modified Rheinmetall LANCE turret, another off the shelf design.

Engineer variant, in service with the Spanish Army

Recovery variant, already in service with the Spanish Army

Direct fire variant, already in production, development costs paid for by others. Take your pick from Denel or Oto Melara turrets.

The Royal Thai Marines will be taking delivery of 15 ASCOD variants equipped with the Denel LT105 turret. They will also be receiving the Command and Recovery variants as well.

Protected mobility variant, not in service but here is a picture of one GD made earlier

Fancy a hybrid drive version, Renk and General Dynamics have already worked out the details, here is a picture of one on a test rig.

Training vehicle, already developed

But aren’t we getting a more powerful engine and transmission capable of dealing with the extra power?

Yes

The Austrian Ulan is powered by an MTU 8V 199 TE20 8V-90 diesel engine developing 721 hp at 2,300 rpm, or 530kW in new money.

The transmission is the Renk HSWL 106

FRES SV will be fitted with the Renk 256B Transmission and the MTU 8V 199 TE20 engine but a version that develops 600kw or 815hp.

It is worth noting that the dimensions of these two engine variants are exactly the same but the 256b transmission is larger, it is still commercially available, straight off the shelf.

What are we getting?

There is no doubt FRES SV will be a superior vehicle to Pizarro/Ulan, FRES SV is definitely not the same as a Pizarro; new turret, better weapon, more power, more advanced sensors and an open electronic architecture but are these changes really worth half a billion pounds to develop?

We must be very careful to recognise that ASCOD is not the same as FRES SV but given the start point, are we getting value for money?

In fact, are we getting upgraded military off the shelf at boutique, bespoke development prices?

If you fancy a look at brochures from GD, here is a set for ASCOD variants and here for FRES SV

The Future of the British Army 08 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (03) A Not So Sensible Future

Think Defence — Sat, 02 Jul 2011 00:44:13 +0000

If we cast our gaze back to the Future Family of Light Armoured Vehicles (FFLAV) study that ultimately spawned TRACER and MRAV it is as relevant today as it was then.

It came to the conclusion that what was needed was a three tier vehicle fleet

As per the previous post, a sensible solution is to make do with what we have and existing plans, that is a combination of ASCOD2, Jackal, Foxhound and a small number of new build CVR(T) but where would be the bloody fun in that!

Roles and Requirements

Form must follow function but form might also dictate function.

In the previous post I listed the roles and responsibilities of formation reconnaissance (the list from Sven) so depending on the formation that is being served, the vehicle and its associated systems, technologies and personnel must match its needs.

Lighter units whose ability to move rapidly may have different needs to others and the secondary roles may take on a greater importance. A light armoured vehicle may be compromised when acting in support of an armoured brigade but might be just the ticket for a light role rapid reaction force.

With FRES SV and Protected Patrol Vehicles like Mastiff we have become increasingly ‘weightier’ and this will inevitably have an impact on operational tempo and agility around the battlespace. If all we think we will be doing is counter insurgency and peace enforcement type operations then this might not be all that bad but losing agility means predictability and that is never a good thing.

The ability to quickly move a light force, equipped with a modest degree of protection/firepower, is still a capability we should strive for and enhance. Whether this is air dropping or more likely by helicopter is to some extent, detail. In the teeth of increasingly competent air defence systems this might seem an anachronism but mobility and agility allow one to advance from unpredictable locations, cut forces off and apply decisive combat power to rear areas for example.

This means that some equipment has to fit in the payload and space envelope of helicopters and aircraft.

The underlying theme is the maintenance of a range of vehicle types/weights that can perform the primary role of reconnaissance and the plethora of secondary ‘light armour’ roles that always seem to be needed more than the former.

Issues – Mobility and Transportability

Accepting the premise that the overwhelming vast majority of fixtures will be away matches the issue of transportability becomes relevant and when engaged on operations, mobility around the battlefield is an obviously important characteristic for any vehicle

GETTING TO THE POINT OF ENTRY

Getting to the point of entry is arguably the easiest to tackle and the majority of time it will be via a combination rail, sea, and possibly, air.

Rail; for most vehicles the limitations placed on rail travel are not considerable although the weight of main battle tanks usually requires heavy duty flatbed wagons. Unless operations are to be conducted in Europe rail transportation of vehicles is unlikely, even though the British Army operate rail transportation systems in Germany and Canada with specialists from The Royal Logistic Corps and the Royal Engineers.

Travelling first class

Air; when discussing vehicles most people tend to dismiss air transportability as a secondary consideration, arguing that if a vehicle is going to be operating alongside heavy armoured forces there is very little point in moving them expensively by air where they will sit and wait until the big fellas arrive. There is much common sense in the position but there are certain limited circumstances where deploying by air a modest armoured force can be decisive. Rapid intervention with light forces, reinforced with light/medium armour, can be very effective. The original FRES concept was predicated on moving a medium weight intervention force by air direct to theatre by air. As we all know this was flawed in many aspects not least the amount of aircraft required but there is still some value in the concept and the weight limitations of available aircraft should be considered when designing equipment.

For the UK, those relevant aircraft are the A400, C17 and occasionally chartered Antonov 124’s.

The C17 can lift about 70 tonnes and whilst the UK has never transported Challenger 2 by C17 other nations have done so with their main battle tanks, the capability is proven even if we don’t practice it. It’s not generally recommended though and certainly not a practical exercise for austere locations. Vehicles between 20 and 40 tonnes could be carried comfortably and the UK has transported Warrior vehicles to Afghanistan using C17’s. In pitching a vehicle at the 20-30 tonne level, 2 are transportable per C17 or at a much lighter weight and depending on dimensions; up to 6 may be transported.

The A400 has yet to fully demonstrate a maximum load but the UK requirement is for 30 tonnes and the A400 website lists a maximum of 37 tonnes. Payload inevitably impacts on range and the same website lists a strategically significant range of 2,450nm at 30 tonnes and 3,450nm at 20 tonnes. The ability to move such payloads at range is one of the significant performance features of the A400, even if it will be concrete runway to concrete runway for most of the time.

A vehicle with a weight of 15 tonnes means 2 at a time or 30 tonnes means one in an A400 or 2 in a C17, there are a number of combinations that can be tried.

To fit into an A400 and C17, the width of a vehicle needs to be less than 4m wide and 3.85m high.

Sea; the most common form of getting to theatre will be by sea, at least for any sustained or operation excluding the light role rapid reaction units. Whether by civilian ships, the Point class RORO PFI or amphibious shipping the main limitation is vehicle length and availability of ports and offload facilities. By using RORO ships heavy equipment can be driven straight off a boat and onto waiting road or rail transport for movement to the area of operation.

Using ISO container flatracks to move vehicles removes reliance on RORO vessels or RORO port handling facilities and allows a deployment to take advantage of the global ISO container logistics system, ISO flatracks can utilise widely used lighterage and barge systems to move inshore.

The value of this should not be underestimated.

Standard intermodal flatrack usage would tend to restrain width to 2.3m. Length of a single TEU is about 6m and a weight limit of 30 odd tonnes. Height is also about 2.2m but this is less critical as they can be double stacked.

Road; as with rail, there may be limited circumstances where we can deploy directly to the point of entry via road, renewed conflict in the Balkans for example. Road transportability is also important for training and UK movements, abnormal load regulations are fiendishly complex, click here, but loads (including tractor and flatbed trailer) over 44 tonnes or 2.9m width require special permissions and notifications. Driving to a European theatre is again possible but with obvious limitations. Outside the UK these restrictions might not apply but moving from the port or point of entry via road will be the norm so road and bridge classification and the availability of suitable transport is an issue concern.

GETTING TO THE AREA OF OPERATION

In some locations the point of entry might also be the area of operation, Sierra Leone being a good example, but in others the area of operation might be some distance to the point or port of entry. This might also vary depending on the means of transport. If a vehicle is flown direct to Bastion it does not have a long way to get to the area of operation but if the said vehicle goes by a Point class RORO ship that disembarks at Karachi it has a very long and hazardous road move ahead.

Generally speaking, the same options exist except perhaps for rail although it should never be completely discounted.

Air; in a typical hub and spoke operation, strategic aircraft will bring in personnel and supplies (sometimes vehicles) to a strategically located main operating base location and tactical airlift aircraft will bring them forward to smaller airfields, Kandahar to Bastion being a good example, at least until the new runways at Bastion were built. There are a wide variety of scenarios here that might affect vehicle design but with the A400 and C17 being more or less capable of both strategic and tactical airlift operations this hub and spoke arrangement might not always be the best model.

The same issues as above therefore apply.

If we have ambition for air dropping vehicles then weight considerations will be influenced by the capacity of the Medium Stressed Platform successor, likely the Type V from Airlift Technologies, this limit being about 19 tonnes. Making a vehicle compatible with the 463L pallet system would constrain the vehicle to just under 2.4m

Road; there are two options, self deploy or catch a lift. Self deploying significant distance for tracked vehicles is fuel intensive, causes a great deal of track wear and therefore they tend to be carried to the area of operation on a low loader. Wheeled vehicles can self deploy much greater distances although segmented band tracks on light and medium weight vehicles can reduce the impact somewhat.

The UK has a small fleet of 96 Oskosh Heavy Equipment Transporters operated under a 20 year, £290 million PFI with Fasttrax. The original trailer used for transporting heavy vehicles was from King Trailers but given the poor road infrastructure in Afghanistan a number of Broshuis rough terrain trailers have also been obtained to allow the HET fleet to operate.

Warrior and FRES Scout will need these

A lighter vehicle, like CVR(T) can be easily transported on more or less any truck, civilian or army. A simple jib can lift it onto the truck bed and move it long distances, even though CVR(T) can move quite effectively on road. DROPS have also been used quite often for deploying small vehicles including CVR(T), the Balkans especially made use of this method.

Spot the difference

Click here to view the embedded video.

One of the implications of replacing CVR(T), which can move forward under its own steam or on the back of any truck, with the 30 tonne plus ASCOD SV is that road moves forward will not be possible with anything but one of the 96 Heavy Equipment Transporters and specialist trailers. If we are only buying a handful this might not be so bad but given the numbers envisaged, unless we significantly increase the HET and trailer numbers in the PFI then we might have difficulty assembling a sufficiently strong force in reasonable time, this could lead to vulnerabilities as speed of deployment to a forward area is reduced.

TACTICAL MOBILITY

Freedom of movement on the battlefield is critical to effectiveness. Although absolute weight is often less important than ground pressure it is still important, especially for bridges and road surfaces.

The NATO standard means of defining the ability of a surface to bear particular weights is called the Military Load Classification (MLC) system and common break points are 30 and 70 tonnes, we use Class 30 and Class 70 trackway for example. If we use heavier vehicles then not only do we deny ourselves freedom of movement, channelled by road and bridge load bearing capacity but we also increase demand for combat engineering support and once the weight goes over 30 tonnes, Class 30 trackway becomes too weak and above 35 tonnes the Air Portable Ferry Bridge also disappears from the menu.

Increasing weight has very real mobility consequences.

Other tactical mobility issues include the ability to cross gaps, climb slopes and traverse soft ground at speed. Tractive force is important for obstacle breaching and rapid acceleration can help in many circumstances.

If we set ourselves to helicopter portability the realistic limit for a Chinook sling load is less than 10 tonnes and if anyone listen to my suggestion of moving to the CH53K this can move up to 15 tonnes. Internally transportable vehicles for either the CH53K or Chinook are dimensionally challenging although the German Wiesel manages it for the CH53.

Chinook and CVR(T)

OTHER FACTORS

Other mobility factors include reliability and fuel consumption.

Fuel consumption is particularly important when advancing at speed and rear echelon capacity must be carefully matched to vehicle fuel consumption. This is another possible issue with FRES SV, when compared with CVR(T) total fuel burn will be significantly higher and the tactical fuel supply systems might struggle to keep up.

TRACKS v WHEELS

At this point the tracks v wheels debate hove’s into view and there are a number of factors to consider.

Deployability – Wheeled vehicles can self deploy from the point of entry so do not need transporters, for many scenarios, this is a major advantage

Survivability – Wheels are considered to be more vulnerable to shell fragments and small arms fire than tracks but if survivability includes the ability to move after damage then a wheeled vehicle has the advantage. If we consider manoeuvrability as a means contributor to survivability then tracks have the advantage, vulnerable points can be avoided for example. However, the scope for utilising the additional mobility capabilities afforded by tracks can be limited in some terrain where no amount of ground mobility will make a difference.

Mobility – a wheeled vehicle will generally have a much greater ground pressure than a tracked vehicle of the same weight, ground pressure being a determinant factor in mobility and because tracked drivetrains are lighter than wheeled, to carry the same amount of armour and payload, a tracked vehicle can be lighter, driving down the ground pressure again.

Higher speed on roads is generally easier to achieve with wheeled vehicles.

In difficult off road conditions, tracked vehicles can usually achieve greater speeds. Large vehicles like Mastiff are heavy and no matter how many wheels or centralised tyre pressure management systems are added mobility going to be significantly greater and traction significantly poorer than for a comparable tracked vehicle.

As armour is added to improve protection against direct fire then this issue becomes acute, higher ground pressure and a limit on wheel size means there is a practical ceiling for wheeled armoured vehicles off road mobility even though this is improving.

Artificial obstacles in urban areas such as barricades, walls and cars etc present challenges to wheeled vehicles, not always insurmountable challenges but tracked vehicles, with their greater surface area on the ground, power to weight ratio and traction can more easily overcome these obstacles. The infamous US operation in Mogadishu showed that even old fashioned tracked vehicles like the M113 (driven by the Pakistani Army) could deliver winning effects in an urban environment, pushing through rubble and other obstacles.

Tractive force

In the aftermath of the special forces capture in Basra, Operation Thyme was mounted against the Serious Crimes Unit in Jamiat police station. The outer wall was breached by a Medium Wheeled Tractor of 38 Engineer Regiment and through/over the resultant rubble a number of Warriors from the Staffordshire Regiment entered the compound. The shock delivered by this breach might have been impossible to conduct with a wheeled vehicle, instead of going through a breach a wheeled vehicle might have had to go through the entrance. In the video below the Warriors can be seen entering the compound and pushing other vehicles out of the way.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Large wheeled vehicles are unable to execute changes of direction in close confines easily, requiring a ’23 point turn’ unlike a tracked vehicle, that can turn on the spot. Some modern wheeled combat vehicles can perform an on the spot turn but they are not common. 8×8 wheeled vehicles like the Boxer for example, have a high centre of gravity, meaning high speed turning or evasive manoeuvres can be hazardous. After several accidents, US Stryker’s are now speed limited.

The video below shows a very impressive off road mobility demonstration for an early model LAV. Although the tests involving the removal of wheels have those axles conveniently chained in the up position it is still a striking video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

But in videos below, the extra weight of turrets, additional armour and electronic systems imposed on a similar chassis design, by later models, degrades mobility even in what might be reasonably considered to be only mild off road conditions

Click here to view the embedded video.

And here

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is worth bearing in mind that there are relatively old designs but here is a clip of a Canadian unit in Afghanistan (skip forward to 2 minutes 40 seconds)

Several decades of studies have mostly concluded that the mobility advantages of tracks tend to trump the other advantages of wheels even though the gap has closed with modern wheeled systems.

Low ground pressure is not an automatic ticket to mobility though, many other factors come into play, as shown by the image below

Track development has not remained static either, advances in segmented band tracks from Diehl, Astrum and Soucy are addressing some of the traditional disadvantages of tracks. The vehicle weights at which band tracks are being proven is steadily rising and whilst they are not the automatic choice for all vehicles, up to 20 tonnes now seems to be perfectly feasible.

CV90 with band tracks

Weapons Platform Suitability – For small calibre weapons such as machine guns and automatic grenade launchers there isn’t any real difference. In the protected mobility role, light automatic weapons are all that is needed. However, when large calibre weapons are fitted the stability and low centre of gravity of tracked vehicles favours them. Large weapons on wheeled vehicles create recoil handling problems from both an accuracy and service life perspective. These problems aren’t insurmountable though, especially with advanced low recoil weapons.

Growth Potential – The ability to up armour, add extra weapons, communications or sensor equipment is now seen as a key requirement for combat vehicles. There is no real difference between wheels and tracks on this but in general, tracked vehicles have more space for a given set of dimensions, because of the simplicity of drive train and transmission for tracked vehicles.

Support – Fuel consumption is an increasing concern, with asymmetric conflicts the need for combat logistics as opposed to logistics becomes a greater demand, absorbing valuable combat power. Every litre of fuel or spare part places a considerable strain on logistics and support arrangements. The larger protected patrol vehicles have increased fuel consumption enormously over previous types. Tracks generally have poorer fuel economy than wheeled vehicles but as soon as difficult terrain is encountered or in stop start activity this is reversed. Run flat tyres are very expensive and the US experience in Iraq with Stryker’s demonstrated that running costs are more expensive for wheeled vehicles than tracks (fuel and tyres).

If operated on hard surfaces for extended periods metal tracks tend to heat up and expand, requiring constant maintenance or running the risk of throwing a track.

The inherent complication of an 8×8 like drive train might need more maintenance than the very simple arrangements of a tracked vehicle, as shown by the diagrams below, but, vibration from tracks causes many problems so whilst the wheeled drivetrain might have more parts and be more complex it isn’t necessarily more maintenance heavy.

Wheeled drivetrain

The traditional disadvantages of tracks; noise, road damage, low speed and maintenance are being addressed by segmented rubber band tracks and equally, the disadvantages of wheels; mobility and weight are also being tackled.

For an interesting take on a hybrid solution, click here and here

There are no simple answers to this deceptively simple question.

Issues – Weights and Measures

One of the burning issues with vehicle design is to what extent we let aircraft payload factors dictate design.

There are two competing thoughts, keep to aircraft weight limitations and take what protection fits within that envelope or design a vehicle with the desired protection levels and buy aircraft to suit.

As with road and bridge classification there are a number of break points and multiples. The table below shows weight as the deciding factor (volume, floor loading and sling point load considerations are ignored)

	Merlin	Chinook	CH53K	A400	C17
5 tonnes	1	2	3	6	12
10 tonnes		1	1	3	6
15 tonnes			1	2	4
20 tonnes				1	3
30 tonnes				1	2
40 tonnes					1
60 tonnes					1

Other considerations are road transportation, landing craft and recovery capacity

	Class 30 Trackway	Air Portable Ferry Bridge	LCVP	LCU	Road Special	ISO Flatrack
5 tonnes	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
10 tonnes	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
15 tonnes	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
20 tonnes	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
30 tonnes	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
40 tonnes	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
60 tonnes	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO

Stacking ISO flatracks is constrained by weight, a typical flatrack such as those manufactured by Domino can stack 9 high but only with a maximum weight of 24 tonnes, a tare weight approx 4 tonnes. ISO flatrack carriage will constrain vehicle width to just over 2.4m. The A400 has a 4m width cargo hold, the C17, 5.5m, Chinook, 2.3m and CH53K, 2.7m.

Domino flatrack for CVR(T)

Keeping a vehicle less than 2.4m provides the best combination; it could be carried on an ISO flat rack, the A400, CH53K and 2 abreast in the C17.

A narrow vehicle also allows it to get places out of bounds to larger vehicles

Try this with a FRES Scout

By keeping a vehicle within the constraints of a 20foot ISO container/flatrack we can not only utilise the huge civilian infrastructure used to move them on the ocean but critically, also the intermodal facilities of ports and trucks. The main reason the UK entered into the Points Class PFI was because the international shipping market was consolidating on larger and fewer vessels, particularly pure car pure truck carriers (PCPT), availability of RORO shipping for expeditionary operations was becoming tenuous. Whilst the agreement provides for 6 vessels the flexibility and additional capacity in the civilian container shipping market could be exploited.

The sub 5 tonne weight bracket is basically for quad bikes and vehicles like the Roush LAS100, Supacat ATMP and stripped down Land Rovers.

10 tonnes is the key point for Chinook lift and 3 in a single A400 or 6 in a C17, 2 abreast

If we were to step up from the Chinook to the CH53K the 15 tonne point becomes available, 2 in an A400 and 4 in a c17. Given length issues, 2 in an A400 might be more feasible than 3. There is a constant pressure to improve helicopter lift capacity and the US and others have several studies and exploratory programmes, an evolved Chinook may be the result but ultimately, 15-18 tonnes is the likely end point for heavy vertical lift helicopters after Chinook.

Keeping a vehicle below 20 tonnes allows it to be carried on a C130 or some of the newer C130J class aircraft under development, the Embraer C-390 for example.

Beyond 20 tonnes the A400 only carries in singles and beyond 30 tonnes we start seeing mobility issues; ISO flatrack, DROPS, special load, bridges and trackways for example.

With tunable protection these hard limits can be bent a little. The German Puma, for example, uses a modular armour concept, the base vehicle is designed to be transported in the A400 with additional armour carried in follow on aircraft. It is most unlikely that a vehicle will speed down the aircraft ramp and get stuck in straight away so allowing some time to assemble the armour add-ons is a sensible and pragmatic decision. The US M8 AGS used a scalable armour system and some of the newer Warrior UOR’s have worked on this principle.

The categories below may seem heavily biased to air transportation and when this is compared to actual airlift it might seem ludicrous but if the UK is to maintain its expeditionary capabilities we must carefully tailor equipment to available lift capacity and factors such as bridge classification or surface transportation will also be significant. Modular protection allows air transportability weight limits to be maintained whilst providing for improvements in protection when rapid transportation is not such an issue.

I know I go on a bit about ISO container constraints but if we are at all serious about moving stuff from A to B, the civilian intermodal container ecosystem has much greater capacity than any military logistics system.

With this in mind I think the following is a reasonable weight distribution (assuming we start with weight and not other requirements such as survivability or payload)

Category A; 7.5 tonnes maximum weight, this allows 1 to be sling loaded by a Chinook, 2 from a CH53K and 4 in an A400 or 8 in a C17 (volume permitting). Air droppable, easily carried on civilian trucks or DROPS and able to traverse most if not all bridges and trackway.

Category B; 15 tonnes maximum base weight with the capacity to handle an additional 5 to 7 tonnes, this allows a base configuration to be slung loaded from a CH53K. 2 could be carried in an A400 or if 4 A400’s were used, the combined payload would be 6 vehicles and 6 additional 5 tonne protection kits. A C17 could carry 4 base configuration vehicles or 3 with the protection kits already fitted. Can be carried on standard ISO flatracks, utilise all RE trackway and vehicle bridges and be carried on the back of a standard truck or DROPS. Can also be lifted by the RE Terex AC35 crane and recovered using the SV recovery variant.

Category C; ideally this would be 30 tonnes base configuration with 5 to 10 tonne additional protection kit, 1 to be carried on A400 or 2 per C17. Additional protection kits would be available but this would reduce aerial transportation to C17 only.

However, this might seem too close to Category A and not deliver enough protection whilst still being constrained by the same deployment issues as the heavy equipment it will be supporting. Weight therefore becomes less of an issue because at 30 tonnes plus it is still a special load, borderline for ISO carriage and bridges and at a maximum for A400 carriage.

So for this category I would be inclined to worry less about weight and concentrate on protection and firepower, true to the concept of stand up knock down fighting for information in a high threat environment as per many of our recent discussions.

If you need to get the odd one or two into theatre by air, for whatever reason and however rare, as long as it is below 50-60 tonnes it can be carried by C17.

Issues – Protection and Weight Reduction

The original FRES concept eschewed protection for agility, situational awareness and active protection systems. Active protection systems showed great promise at the time but only recently have they been deployed. It is often assumed that the emergence of RPG’s and IED’s meant that the need for greater protection assumed a higher priority but should this have come as any surprise. In WWII armoured vehicles had spaced armour and even bedsprings to protect against HEAT warheads and if one looks at picture of armoured vehicles in Vietnam the use of slats was widespread. Even more recently, battlefields across Africa and the Middle East confirmed that the RPG and ATGW remained a potent threat. The tackling of mines and IED’s by South African and Rhodesian forces in the seventies and eighties with the emergence of v shaped hulls and other anti mine/IED design features is also food for thought. Even explosively formed projectile IED’s were encountered in Northern Ireland in the seventies.

Sometimes we seem destined to painfully relearn lessons from other periods or places.

The degree of protection must always be balanced by the risk that it impairs the operation at hand, forcing personnel into armoured citadels insulates them from the surrounding area and may in some situations actually increase the danger levels. That said, there can be no doubt that modern protected vehicles have saved numerous lives.

There seems to be a move towards greater protection and whether this is driven by political expediency, the desire to have bloodless wars or the other factors, protection is a key design driver for any vehicle.

But, protection from what?

There are a wide variety of threats on the battlefield, large IED,s conventional mines, small arms, artillery fragments, large calibre automatic weapons, RPG’s, missiles, kinetic energy tank rounds and many more.

Protection levels against a number of threats are defined in the various STANAG standards (mainly STANAG 4569) and extensive testing can demonstrate proof against these standards. Typically they include explosive weight under wheels and vehicle centreline, direct protection against artillery fragments, small arms and automatic weapons.

With modern materials and innovative design features the old adage that protection always equals weight is not applicable anymore and there has been a huge international research programme to find materials and design features that provide protection and/or improve survivability (not the same thing) using blast chimneys, crew pods, hull shaping, composite armour, exotic metal and ceramic materials like super bainite, fabrics, electric armour, perforated armour, sacrificial components blast attenuating seating. The new Foxhound has demonstrated how old fashioned great design can improve survivability without making it weight more than a Challenger.

Since our last attempt at replacing CVR(T) with TRACER a decade ago, materials technology has moved at a staggering rate. There are a wide variety of innovative approaches to armour and yet FRES Scout will utilise the same armour technology as that has been used for decades.

It might come as a surprise but many of these developments are UK originated.

Developed by Corus, Bodycote, DSTL, QinetiQ and the University of Cambridge, perforated Super Bainite steel armour not only improves ballistic performance it reduces weight, comes in at a fraction of the price of conventional armour steel and provides a sovereign production capability. Flash Bainite makes some very bold claims, stating that it is cheaper, lighter, higher performing and easier to work with than conventional aluminium armour.

DSTL have demonstrated an electric armour that is uses fast acting super capacitors to disrupt shaped charges.

Aluminium encapsulated ceramic tiles from CPS Technologies have demonstrated an improvement near ceramic tile edges and better protection against kinetic energy rounds.

BAE have developed a shear thickening liquid so called bulletproof custard that is more likely to be used in body armour but may have utility for vehicle armour.

DERA/QinetiQ built the Advanced Composite Armoured Vehicle Platform, the so called plastic tank, which was the world’s first monocoque armoured vehicle chassis that used composites instead of metals for load bearing and protection. Advantages included a 15% reduction in weight, reduced thermal and radar signature, improved protection and resistance to corrosion (especially in salt water)

Good background information here

Click here to view the embedded video.

At 24 tonnes it had frontal protection against 30mm AP and 14.5mm protection elsewhere and the weight could be reduced by using band tracks, a more compact power pack and hydro pneumatic suspension.

It is now in the Tank Museum which is somewhat ironic given that the all new FRES will be a generation behind it in terms of materials technology.

Currently in service with British forces in Afghanistan, the UK manufactured Amsafe Tarian is a lightweight fabric based system designed to protect against RPG’s and either replace or supplement conventional bar or rod anti RPG cages. A few months ago the MoD placed a large follow on order.

Looking further ahead, carbon nanotube materials are showing enormous promise, increasing protection and delivering yet more reductions in weight.

The latest active protection systems like Trophy and Iron Curtain are also capable of providing high degrees of protection against ATGW and RPG’s although they are not without some disadvantages.

Protection is also derived from mobility, effective tactics, situational awareness and good intelligence; we should not forget these simple principles because of experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. I will look in more depth at these issues in a future post on protected mobility vehicles but as this is primarily about reconnaissance and the timescale and requirements are subtlety different. In a typical enduring operation where protected mobility will generally favour the protection aspect fast flowing combined arms operations will take a more balanced look.

Therefore, the protection afforded to a vehicle in each category will be what can be achieved within the space/size envelope and balanced with firepower, sensors, fuel, communications equipment and other payloads like UAV’s or personnel.

In short, we work back from size and weight not forward from protection levels. This may result in protection being just below a specific threat, an armour piercing 7.62mm round for example but instead of compromising on weight/size we should compromise on ether design features.

There are no easy answers here because the demands will ALLWAYS be for more of everything but we should be realistic about likely threats and the ability of technology and good design to improve protection.

In addition to reducing weight by utilising advanced materials and active protection systems there is scope in a number of other areas for additional weight reduction, using plastic optical fibre instead of copper cabling, common bus based electronic distribution systems or segmented rubber band tracks to name but three.

Issues – Power and Propulsion

Modern combat vehicles have an insatiable demand for electrical power to support communications, sensors, ECM, display systems, onboard computing, weapon systems and offboard supply for dismounted personnel. As weights rise the need for more powerful engines is the simple result, more powerful engines weigh more and use more fuel, another penalty of increasing weight.

The massive global research programme in hybrid engine technology has far outpaced that in the military domain and yet again we saw a valiant attempt at introducing this technology with TRACER and some of the early FRES work. TRACER demonstrated the viability of lithium ion battery technology in a 20 tonne vehicle a decade ago and battery technology a decade ago is almost unrecognisable compared to what is available now.

Sumitomo Electric are developing a low temperate molten salt battery that is ten times cheaper than lithium-ion and only this month have announced the development of a porous aluminium compound that will allow a battery with the same capacity to be reduced in volume and weight by up to two thirds.

MIT researchers have shown that silicon nanotube anodes can store 10 times as much power than graphite electrodes in lithium ion batteries.

The US company Levant Power have developed a shock absorber that recovers energy to reduce alternator load and improve fuel consumption.

Hybrid engine technology is now commercially viable, even for large vehicles; solutions are available from Rolls Royce and others

British motorsport engineering is second to none and they are also embracing hybrid technologies, OakTec being a notable example. It is not just the engine/battery combinations that are being developed either, high speed flywheel systems are being used to supplement acceleration and sustain reduced fuel consumption.

Williams Hybrid Power have also have developed an innovative flywheel system.

Even the humble diesel engine is being subjected to a spot of innovation, Navistar (the manufacturers of the Husky, have teamed up with Ecomotors International to develop an opposed cylinder engine which eliminates the cylinder head and vale train resulting in a much more compact engine that improves fuel consumption.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Cella Energy are working on a hydrogen based artificial fuel that uses micron sized beads but can be introduced into existing technology without modification.

QinetiQ demonstrated some years ago their Hybrid Electric Drive vehicle.

QinetiQ HED

The point I am trying to make is that we are awash with innovation, much of it British and yet after millions of Pounds investment in research, our new project uses none of it.

Issues – We Used to Own the Night

The proliferation of night vision equipment is accelerating and Western forces traditional monopoly in ‘owning the night’ is under threat. Technology is not of course, the only aspect of night fighting but any vehicle must pay particular attention to signature reduction and management features.

In high temperatures the surface of armoured vehicles can reach 75 degrees centigrade with obvious performance, habitability, reliability and signature issues. DSTL are currently conducting a research programme to look at peelable coatings to reduce temperature and results have been promising but Saab seems to be the current market leader in signature control and thermal management, or clever cam nets depending on your point of view.

Printable electronic ink is an exciting technology that may also provide adaptive coatings.

Issues – No Man is an Island

A reconnaissance vehicle self evidently must operate within the combined arms battlespace and with the increasing network connectivity afforded by satellite and advanced communication systems it is becoming increasingly complex.

A reconnaissance vehicle might enhance the product from a UAV, supplying contextual information or an additional viewpoint or it might utilise a live video feed from a UAV in order to better carry out its task.

Superb communications facilities are a prerequisite and this might include a modular VHF, HF, UHF and satellite fit.

The German ‘Move-It’ programme has developed a number of concepts for vehicles with integrals unmanned air and ground systems. Using a modified Wiesel 2, which can itself be remotely controlled, the vehicle has a small ‘garage’ at the rear of the vehicle for a Telemax unmanned ground vehicle and a section on the front glacis plate for an Air-Robot quadcopter.

This is an interesting concept that might in some ways compensate for a lack of mobility in the heavier vehicles and enhance the survivability of the lighter ones.

They do not necessarily have to be carried by the operating vehicle but command and control of short range aerial and ground UAV’s is an exciting concept, relevant especially in close and urban terrain.

The ability to dismount and use the vehicles facilities is an important consideration.

Issues – Recce by Facebook

Don’t laugh, I am being serious.

The world and his dog are using geotagged imagery, posting images from mobile telephones onto Twitpic and Facebook and this is only likely to increase. On a traditional battlefield we might exploit in an intelligence context, obtaining street level imagery for example that cannot be obtained by aerial or satellite means. If we don’t already do this then we should be but I suspect it forms part of the intelligence community toolkit.

Not all future conflicts will be carried out in the sticks were the internet is not available, simply look at mobile telephone penetration in Africa or how the Libyan rebels are using Facebook, Twitter, blogs and other social media for trends. In fact, NATO planners have reportedly been taking advantage of social media in target planning.

The difference between mining this information for preparatory information prior to operations or air strikes and using it in real-time is not as distant as you might think.

It is also likely that non conventional or hybrid enemies will use social media as a command and control tool in addition to information operations. We might look on these means in the traditional sense of ‘warfare’ denying the enemy the means to exploit them but we should step back and realise there are many benefits of exploiting our enemies exploitation of the internet and social media and reconnaissance is one of them.

I am not advocating a dismounted reconnaissance team whipping out their laptop and start surfing Facebook but the means of collating geographically relevant and useful data, converting that into useful intelligence and rapidly disseminating it in an easy to use format must be central to the reconnaissance effort.

This snaps into the wider intelligence fusion and dissemination subject we looked at when discussing DABINETT.

After the cancellation of the Soothsayer project the state of Electronic Support Measures is uncertain, most effort recently has been directed to the counter IED effort. It remains a fundamental part of the reconnaissance mix.

In many locations there will be a complex and well utilised electromagnetic spectrum to exploit. Everything from mobile networks to Bluetooth and WiFi to VHF military radios will be in use and likely to be carrying ‘traffic of interest’

Beyond the conventional direct finding and classification of emitters that might be carried out by any number of ground and aerial platforms the short range of WiFi and mobile networks means the collection antenna must be in relatively close contact if aerial collection is not an option. Tapping into physical network transmission cables might also yield useful information.

Asymmetric enemies will seek to use commercial networks so exploiting or denying them to others is no doubt a handy capability to have.

Whether the forward reconnaissance vehicles are used to simply collect and transmit for analysis or collect and analyse would be dependent on technology choices and available bandwidth, plus of course the argument between the Royal Signals and Intelligence Corps!

The demand for high bandwidth communication links is outstripping supply and there is a growing awareness of ‘bandwidth dependency’ because we have not yet faced an enemy with the means to deny parts of the electromagnetic spectrum to us.

Adaptive communication technologies that piggy back on any available bearer (Wimax, Wifi, 3G, GSM etc) is also a technology that may yet revolutionise military communication, all stuff for another post but I have put it here for completeness.

Issues – Industrial Confidence

Of course the problem with a lot of military projects is that they take a hopelessly over ambitious approach to technology maturity but there are times where it is absolutely right and proper to seek a step change rather than timidly clamouring for everything to be off the shelf.

The reason we have taken the current approach to FRES is because we seem afraid of technological innovation, almost lacking in confidence, made worse by an approaching out of service date for CVR(T) without anything to show for two or three attempts at replacing it.

One of the underlying root causes of this lack of confidence is a basic lack of expertise, since selling off public sector development organisations, failing to invest in research and development and having an incoherent and grossly underfunded approach to defence industrial issues the dwindling UK expertise in defence vehicle engineering is telling.

Given the UK’s world renowned expertise in automotive engineering that has actually provided some benefit to the defence sector recently as a result of a number of initiatives, it might be reasonable to suggest the expertise have simply transferred elsewhere and not entirely gone away.

Despite our lack of military vehicle technology strategies we also still have a number of world leading innovators in transmissions, suspension, engines, tracks, armour, sensors and other areas so all is not lost.

Instead of appointing one of the majors as an apex contractor is it really beyond the capacity of the subject matter experts in DSTL and DE&S to run a design project, once the design has been finalised it can go out to production tender.

Maybe it’s time not only to innovate but have the confidence to do so.

Issues – Other Factors to Consider

Mastiff availability has been as low as 20% and when going from 30 to 35 tonnes, an unmodified Warrior suffers a 40% reduction in mean distance between failure, so although we tend to wonder why so much emphasis is placed on upgradability that inevitably drives up cost and time into service there are good reasons for it.

I tend to think we often look too far into the future but it’s a difficult balance to strike.

Reducing the logistic footprint of any vehicle is also important, commonality of spares and in the field repair techniques being two significant factors. If we look at the Foxhound and its modular load system, this will greatly improve vehicle availability because they can be repaired in the field without recourse to back loading to the UK.

Although the need for a more survivable vehicle, defined by the need to fight for information (as per the previous post) and the greater threats on modern complex battlefields is entirely understandable, this extra weight does not come free.

Whilst we might be able to achieve more with a single modern FRES Scout than with multiple 40 year old CVR(T)’s individual vehicle fuel consumption can have a large impact on operational tempo.

The UK does not have any armoured fuel delivery vehicles so those in the rear echelon will need to expose themselves to hostile fire more often. This will be exacerbated in a fast moving operation where fuel rather than ammunition is the greatest logistic concern.

Thoughts on Design – Category A

Category A was sub 7.5 tonnes, fit on an airdrop pallet, be slingable by Chinook or 2 by a CH53K and narrow enough to fit on an ISO Flat Rack. If we don’t ultimately move to a heavier lift helicopter then it might make more sense to accept a single sling load either way, so 10 tonne it should be (although the maximum payload of Chinook is slightly higher)

In this category, protection is limited by the need for mobility.

We actually have the ideal vehicle in service although not in the main equipment programme, the Supacat Jackal 2 of course. The base vehicle is approximately 7.5 tonnes although additional armour and equipment takes this higher.

Click here to view the embedded video.

An alternative that is in service with special-forces is the Supacat HMT Extenda, similar to the Jackal but with the ability to add on a extra axle assembly called a hamper. The variable height air suspension, key to its excellent mobility, also allows the ride height to be lowered so the vehicle can be carried internally in a Chinook.

Supacat Extenda inside a Chinook

Supacat Extenda, Chinook and a tight squeeze

The extra axle module can be separated to support slinging and fitted quickly once on the ground.

Supacat Extenda 'hamper'

A wide range of sensors and communication equipment can be fitted; the Jackal ISTAR mounts a ROTAS sensor on an elevating mast for example. ROTAS incorporates an advanced ‘Catherine’ thermal imager from Thales, daylight TV camera and laser rangefinder that are linked into a navigation system for precise positional information. Combined with handheld sensors these can be used for cueing offensive support from artillery, attack helicopter or fast air, a potent combination.

Jackal ISTAR

Jackal ISTAR, ROTAS and RWS

Armament options include pintle mounted 7.62mm GPMG, 12.7mm HMG and 40mm GMG and it should be possible to fit a demountable Javelin launcher. If more firepower is needed we might consider one the various Nexter 20mm automatic cannons. These have been fitted to a wide range of vehicles and the ammunition provides a significant uplift in lethality over 12.7mm, this might be a sensible wider replacement for the M2 HMG.

Going up a notch, is the ATK LW25 Bushmaster lightweight 25mm chain gun which has been demonstrated on a Kongsberg Protector remote mount and has a range of different ammunitions natures benefitting from years of US investment. It can also be fitted into the Palletized Autonomous Weapon System (PAWS) for ease of mounting on various vehicles.

Another and perhaps final option for a vehicle of this size is the ATK M230LF 30mm automatic cannon that is a link of variant of the electrically operated M230 weapon used on the Apache attack helicopter (ammunition and many components would be common) mounted in a Nobles Manufacturing Viper Gun Mount.

Click here to view the embedded video.

A remote weapon station could also be fitted for stabilised fire on the move; again the Jackal ISTAR has demonstrated integration with a Kongsberg Protector or a simple ring/pintle mount used instead, like the many we use from Platt Mounts. Some of the Coyote variants of the Jackal have been fitted with remote weapon stations.

A simple short range micro UAV like one of the many quadcopter designs would provide additional capability at modest cost, they do not need to provide imagery reach-back up the chain of command but provide a simple ‘over the hill’ view.

A medium term technology insertion programme should be initiated to enhance the Jackal platform with a hybrid drive system, these are rapidly maturing, extra range, limited silent running and off board power generation are especially useful for reconnaissance vehicles. Reducing fuel use is also emerging as a core objective across the whole of defence.

A final alternative is the Foxhound which would be desirable from a commonality perspective but the Jackal’s cross country mobility is hard to beat.

Category A therefore, is what we already have, bought into the main equipment programme and enhanced with a handful of minor additions and a medium term technology insertion programme.

Thoughts on Design – Category B

Category B is 15 to 22+ tonnes, less than 2.4m wide and overall dimensions within the envelope of a 20ft ISO container to provide a slingable CH53K (or equivalent post Chinook heavy lift helicopter), 2 or 3 in a C17 and multiples in an A400 package, where each aircraft either carries a vehicle or collection of protection kits and support stores/personnel.

This is clearly a compromise but with a more even balance of mobility (strategic and tactical) and protection but as I mentioned above, the ability to move rapidly around the battlefield, be helicopter liftable, rapidly deployable by air and utilise all manner of civilian transport infrastructure is a fair trade off against other capabilities.

In Monty’s previous post he described a number of possible vehicle configurations, variations on engine placement, manned and unmanned turrets and tracks or wheels.

It might also be worth looking at a few existing or older designs to compare.

The sixties era M113 based Lynx was an interesting design. Although only Canada and the Netherlands purchased them I think they were pretty advanced for their time. With a crew of three and a weight of less than 9 tonnes, each one was only lightly armed with 3 heavy machine guns but the sensors were top notch, including radar, thermal imaging and image intensification that were also capable of being dismounted and used remotely from the vehicle. Later versions included improved weapons. Smaller than a standard M113 its engine was rear mounted, unlike the standard vehicle, and this provided excellent mobility.

Click here to view the embedded video.

A more modern vehicle is the Panhard Sphinx (Secret Project for High Intensity and New Conflicts), at 17 tonnes it will be equipped with a CMI turret sporting the same 40mm CTA cannon as FRES Scout and planned upgrade to Warrior. The Sphinx has been designed to meet the French AMX10RC replacement project called Engin Blindé de Reconnaissance et de Combat (EBRC). It is a conventional design reminiscent of the Alvis Saladin with the driver positioned centrally between the wheels rather than sitting over them as in a truck derived design, this has obvious IED/Mine protection benefits.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Protection is said to be STANAG 4569 Level V, pretty impressive for a vehicle with a weight of less than 20 tonnes.

Panhard SPHINX

There is a good image here, illustrating the size difference between it and a conventional wheeled armoured personnel carrier but it still looks too much like a Ferret 80!

Ferret 80

The Jordanian King Abdullah Design and Development Bureau has recently purchased all of Belgium’s stock of CVR(T)’s with the intention of upgrading and selling them. KADDB have carved out an impressive niche in applying sensible and effective upgrades to legacy equipment and the Scimitar upgrade is no exception. The upgrade removes the RARDEN and replaces it with a 30mm 2A72 canon equipped with a dual ammunition feed mechanism and host of other improvements.

The Stormer might be a good starting place

Stormer 30

Something old and something new, plus of course CVR(T) and an upgrade, all showing how different design choices, constraints and technology can combine to create very different vehicles, all arguably tasked with the same job.

We could always put in a call to these guys!

One design that would seem to fit within the general characteristics of Category B is the old SIKA and LANCER TRACER.

Because of merger activity Bae ended up in both competing consortia (go figure)

SIKA comprised BAe, Lockheed Martin, Vickers Defence and Genera Dynamics

LANCER comprised BAe, Alvis, United Defense and Raytheon.

The resultant Future Mobility Platform looked conventional but was anything but.

The base vehicle was manufactured in the USA and shipped to the UK for fitting of the Alvis turret. The pictures below show the base vehicle and turret mockup.

There aren’t many pictures of the actual turret fitted to the base vehicle about the interwebs but this one seems to be it.

The crew sat in a hull down pod, driver in front and gunner and commander behind and to the sides. Like the recent Puma design, this sacrificed a little situational awareness for smaller dimensions, better protection and improved collaboration between crew. The turreted version mounted the 40mm CTA cannon and a 7.62mm machine gun. The commanders thermal viewer was a direct lift of the M1 MBT but the main sensor was a new design, mounted on a 5m elevating mast that when not in use, allowed the sensor head to be retracted beneath armour. The elevating senor allowed the vehicle to remain in dead ground or behind cover. The hybrid electric drive provided 500kw of lithium ion/diesel engine power that could accelerate the vehicle to just under 50kph in 9 seconds and achieve a top speed of 90kph. When the silent mode was engaged, the battery capacity allowed it to travel 6 to 10km and the total range was 650km. The base protection package resulted in a vehicle weight of 19 tonnes.

An impressive vehicle by any measure

Sula systems helped to develop the overwatch anti tank guided weapon mockup. This could carry four 50kg weapons in an elevating turret and was designed to accommodate a mix of Brimstone and Hellfire II with the option to take a tri mode variant. Integrating with the Apache Attack Helicopter Longbow radar it could team up and provide a non line of sight anti tank overwatch capability. This is a capability still don’t have.

The old hull is still here, perhaps we should ask nicely for it back.

So a decade ago, TRACER was demonstrating hybrid electric drive with lithium ion batteries, modular open architecture electronics and command system, an elevating sensor mast, integrated optical, acoustic and radar sensors and rubber band tracks. Low fuel consumption, excellent situational awareness, limited silent running and rapid acceleration were all on offer.

But then the FRES dream came in and messed everything up, TRACER is the ultimate ‘what could have been’

We have to note that many of these technologies, whilst demonstrated, were not mature, but this was 10 years ago.

How have we gone from cutting edge innovation to a warmed over 20 year old design whose greatest claim to fame is that it will use CIDS and have an ambulance variant!

My hair brained scheme for Category B is therefore a new design drawing heavily on the LANCER TRACER and BAe SEP

To get to the base vehicle weight target of 15 tonnes the original 19 tonnes demonstrator would have to go on a diet, is this actually achievable, who knows, but what is certain is that 10 years of materials and automotive science and technology have relentlessly improved performance and driven down weight. Technologies that were a little cutting edge in TRACER are now commonplace and available off the shelf.

The basic configuration would be similar, a single crew compartment protected to a higher level than the rest of the vehicle and a split hybrid electric drive system with segmented band tracks. The choice of engine location towards the rear has some advantages but means the payload space becomes constrained. With compact engines this might not be such a large problem but the now defunct BAe SEP (Spitterskyddad Enhets Platform) mounted the engine at the front, traditional APC style.

Click here to view the embedded video.

At a base weight of only 11.5 tonnes, its combat weight could rise to 17 tonnes with 8 infantry and because of its decoupled suspension and band tracks internal noise was comparable to civilian cars. Protection up to 7kg of TNT under the track came as standard and additional protection kits were available. SEP also had the same modular payload system as the Boxer vehicle and a maximum range of 600km. SEP is a good starting point but because the Category B vehicle does not need to carry 8 personnel in opposing rows, its 2.9m width can be reduced to 2.4m

BAE SEP

The starting point, or base vehicle, is therefore a cross between LANCER TRACER, BAe SEP and Stormer. A rear mounted demountable payload module would allow easier repair and reduced maintenance, it is this modularity that is one of the main strengths of the Boxer and Foxhound. By separating the base vehicle from the payload module design and integration is simpler and hopefully cheaper.

If it is possible to combine all the recent technology advances to pull the weight down to the target figures of 15 tonnes then a modular protection pack might be a feasible means of increasing the inevitable compromise in protection, if this could be kept at about 5-10 tonnes the total vehicle weight would still be transportable in an A400 and C17.

Variants as follows;

Protected Mobility; in addition to 2 crew the protected mobility variant would carry 4 personnel and a remote weapon station with a GPMG or similar. The third crew seat (gunner) would normally remain unfilled although could be used for an extra passenger if needed.

Scout; the scout variant is the main event and equipped with a remote turret, something similar if not identical to the GIAT TOUTATIS that mounts the 40mm CTA in a 1.5 tonne package, details here, here. The turret carries 68 rounds in three natures with an elevation of -10 to +45 degrees.

Behind the turret would be an under armour elevating mast mounted sensor such as the Thales ROTAS on the Jackal ISTAR would supplement the turret mounted sensors. A more robust mast might also be used to mount acoustic, radar and NBC detectors. The ability to utilise the vehicle sensors and communications from off-board should be considered a key capability and a small quadcopter type UAV would enhance sensor coverage and allow the vehicle to stand off potential hazard zones.

Overwatch and Fire Support; this role seems to have been dropped from the new FRES variants but if we are to operate in moderate to high threat environments the lighter weight scout and protected mobility variants that will still need some form of anti armour overwatch. This might be provided by a combination of attack helicopter, fast air and even something like future concepts like the Fireshadow loitering munitions. However, against a competent enemy or in extreme weather these might not be available or effective so organic fire support will be needed. The original overwatch TRACER concept of 4 Hellfire class weapons still has value and this might be supplemented with the Lightweight Modular Missile for variable effects and non line of sight operation.

A more robust elevating mast like that from Falck Schmidt might be used to loft both a sensor payload but also a low recoil automatic weapon. Instead of an elevating mast we might even make use of the innovative articulating boom lift platforms used for work access, these have the advantage of not just going up and down. The ability to elevate a sensor or move it laterally are obvious in an urban environment but combine this with a weapon for plunging fires makes it particularly interesting in this context.

RMK30 Recoilless Cannon

Combat in urban areas will be increasingly challenging as our infantry numbers decrease.

An even more interesting thought for an elevated mast mounted weapon is the Rheinmetall RMK30 recoilless revolver cannon. Firing 30mm ammunition it has been trialled on the Wiesel and even proposed for a mast mounted weapon for submarines.

Electronic Support, in the section above I mentioned the possibility of exploiting civilian satellite, private mobile radio, cellular, Wimax and WiFi networks that will inevitably remain in use during most stages of an operation. Because these networks use relatively low power transmissions and if an airborne platform is not available the best method of intercept is to be in relatively close proximity. This means stealth and the ability to power collection and analysis systems like Roke Resolve. The MoD has purchased a number of portable systems from Roke, based on the Resolve system, under project SEER for electronic surveillance and electronic attack.

Based on the protected mobility version this would support space for two operators and analysis workstations.

Others; if you look at pictures for the original FRES or SEP concepts it seems the designers have let their imaginations run riot with everything from tethered aerostats to ambulances. From a standardisation perspective this of course makes a great deal of sense but in many other ways, there are too many compromises. If we look, for example, at repair and recovery, the small size compromises capacity and capabilities. Would it make sense for the more combat oriented versions to use the common base platform but the secondary roles carried out by another vehicle?

This other vehicle would be Warthog derivatives; load carrying, ambulance and recovery. In split configuration they can still be carried by Chinook and we now have support systems in place. They have a high degree of mobility and good protection but not as well suited to the other roles. In addition to those already in service, a load carrying, command and mortar version should be introduced. Both are available off the shelf although introducing a 120mm mortar or not is subject of a future thread.

Bronco Recovery

Bronco load carrying

Operating a mixed vehicle fleet may seem anathema to effective support and logistics but would it be so difficult?

Thoughts on Design – Category C

After spending all our money on son of TRACER the question comes to what might we use to slug it out, fighting for information as per the experiences of the USA in Iraq that were detailed in our introductory post on this subject.

This is of course where it gets interesting with regards to FRES Scout because at 30 tonnes plus it is neither strategically mobile as a 15 to 20 tonne vehicle would be, or as survivable as a Challenger 2.

In the descriptions above I noted that Category C does not need to be constrained by weight so the simple question is, why not Challenger 2 for this role.

Challenger 2 - Fighting for Information

Equip them with an elevating sensor as above and perhaps a satellite communication fit and jobs a good un.

We are scaling down the number of armoured regiments meaning that a number of hulls will become available for re roling and because of the nature of likely operations we would not need to have that many.

Therefore, cancel the existing FRES Scout

Organisation

Previously, I suggested an option to retain and develop expertise in the various disciplines of reconnaissance and surveillance might be to form a dedicated Corps or ISTAR (New Name Required cus’ that is crap)

An alternative suggestion is to improve on our already well practiced ability to form and reform ad hoc groupings by creating a simpler organisation structure of building blocks.

We also discussed the merits of carrying out reconnaissance using organic or non organic units, the different reconnaissance needs of varying size formations and implications for equipment.

As the conversation moved back and forth what became pretty clear was a need to have flexibility of approach, appropriate skills and a range of equipment depending on the nature of the operation and the level at which the reconnaissance force was operating.

Whether we simply seek to improve reconnaissance capabilities in existing units, reinforce the existing formation reconnaissance regiments, create a ‘school of ISTAR’ or create a dedicated ISTAR Corps is to some extent irrelevant but it is an interesting discussion that should take place before getting on to equipment choices.

If we accept there is a need for diversity of equipment the question then moves to how best can they be organised.

The more diverse equipment types and roles we inject into a single grouping the more complex its service support becomes and more diffuse its training. Incidentally, this is one of the challenges the Multi Role Brigade faces. Each Brigade will have within it everything from Challenger 2 to quad bikes and everything in between.

Like a number of hair brained schemes put forth in the ‘future of’ series of posts I am not entirely convinced of them myself but use them as anchors to hang the discussion off. The Royal Corps of ISTAR (New Name Required cus’ that is crap) is one those.

There are many alternatives and none of them are right or wrong but for administrative neatness I would propose the ISTAR Corps organised on the basis of independent squadrons and deployable regimental HQ functions that can plug into the larger brigade or divisional formation. It would be rare that an ISTAR squadron/s would be deployed alone but entirely possible.

Organising the ISTAR squadron also presents a few questions, should they be set up as self contained multi-equipment multi-role or dedicated to a particular role and equipped accordingly?

One view would see an ISTAR squadron configured with a light, medium and heavy troop and another would see light, medium and heavy distributed within a single neatly self contained squadron but multiplied by 3.

There are pros and cons for each approach, having multi-role and multi equipped squadrons increases flexibility and ease of rotation in and out of operations but adds a heavier support/service support burden as attached REME and RE units (for example) would have cover the full span of equipment. The jack of all trades approach also inevitably leads to them not deploying as such anyway if the operation at hand does not need that full span of capabilities.

The discussion on this mirrors the discussion on Multi Role Brigades and that one seems to be running and running so there are no easy answers.

Another option might be to accept that a Formation Reconnaissance regiment needs a range of vehicles that it selects prior to deployment. Instead of creating and organising units based on what they drive we create them based on what they do and provide a range of tools that they select as appropriate. As the debate about providing infantry units with an armoury chock full with different weapons moves on, is the same debate applicable to vehicles?

I am actually sympathetic to this concept, it’s the people that make the difference and with the right focus on training would it be impossible for a reconnaissance squadron to go one operation with

In the Heavy Metal post I suggested forming the Armoured Regiments on a square basis, 2 armoured and 2 armoured infantry. The extra Challengers and Challenger Support Variants as proposed, could carry out some of the reconnaissance tasks as currently carried out by CVR(T), in line with the suggestion that formations could provide for their own reconnaissance needs using equipment organic to that formation. One of the reasons I suggested creating a heavier equipped and denser organised armoured regiment was to provide both flexibility and resilience to loss but it also supports the concept of organic reconnaissance where appropriate.

Where additional capability were deemed necessary, they could be detached from the ISTAR Corps and operated in addition to the heavier Challenger based organic reconnaissance.

This is back to the institutionalising the Lego brick modular concept, again, not necessarily right or wrong, just something different to discuss.

Maybe the future is as per the MoD concept

The Future of the British Army Series…

The Future of the British Army 01 – Scene Setting

The Future of the British Army 02 – Tasks and Capabilities

The Future of the British Army 03 – Rank and Size

The Future of the British Army 04 – Structures

The Future of the British Army 05 – Heavy Metal

The Future of the British Army 06 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (01)

The Future of the British Army 07 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (02) A Sensible Future

The Future of the British Army 08 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (03) A Not So Sensible Future

Supporting Articles

The Need to Rethink FRES

A Brief History of FRES

Medium Armour – what is it, and what does it mean for the post 2020 force structure?

The Need to Rethink FRES SV

Think Defence — Fri, 24 Jun 2011 14:46:52 +0000

A guest post from Monty

After reading your excellent article on FRES, I think we have every reason to question the suitability of the ASCOD 2 vehicle that has been selected to replace CVR(T). It is as large as a Warrior IFV but doesn’t do anything that a Warrior couldn’t do if it were to be upgraded. I accept that ASCOD 2 is a more modern vehicle, but it seems no more than a Warrior replacement through the back door. What your article convinces me of is the need to find a proper and more appropriate CVR(T) replacement.

Thinking about the requirements of such a vehicle, we need to make a number of important trade-offs:

Mobility versus protection versis firepower
Wheels versus tracks
Protection against IEDs versus low weight
Cross country mobility versus strategic mobility
Ease of transportation versus additional weight of adequate protection
Future upgradeability versus the need for something now
Size and height versus crew capacity
Cost versus quality

Rather than discuss all of these in detail, I thought it might be more interesting if not helpful to provide a variety of vehicle concepts that illustrate how different trade-offs would affect the type of vehicle we choose. The following drawings show different ways of achieving user requirements and hopefully each one is self explanatory.

In essence, we need something that is as close as possible to the dimensions and weight of the CVR(T) but that offers increased protection, particularly against IEDs, as low a weight as possible for rapid deployment, increased firepower, better engine and transmission for increased mobility and reliability and as a small a signature as possible for reasons of stealth.

We are rapidly reaching a point where wheeled vehicles can provide equivalent cross-country mobility to that of tracked vehicles. This is not my view, but the collective wisdom of military commentators suggests so. If you strongly believe that the day when wheeled vehicles offer better off-road performance than tracked vehicles has not yet come, have no doubt that it will come, because ultimately the significantly greater strategic mobility offered by wheeled vehicles means that we will invest in them more than we will in tracked vehicles. So perhaps the wheels versus tracks debate has already been won. Maybe.

The most relevant observation in your FRES article is that IEDs have been a real game changer. This is undoubtedly true and any would-be terrorist organisation who has observed events in Afghanistan would make the use of IEDs a core pillar of any future strategy. Behind this point about IEDs is the reality that insurgent uprisings do not respect traditional battle lines and rear echelon troops are now as vulnerable as front line units – if indeed there is a front line any more.

The new reality of IEDs requires a paradigm shift in the types of vehicles we use to deploy troops. It also requires massive expenditure.

The US Stryker Brigades used in Iraq suffered heavy IED casualties – these vehicles were conceived before the IED threat was fully understood. The German / Dutch Boxer is different and includes many enhancements that contribute to better protection. The Boxer may well define what future APCs look like. We’ll know once they deploy in Afghanistan later this year.

In the meantime, here are a number of future CVR options that offer different sets of advantages. While they are relevant to the conflict in Afghanistan (and possibly to potential conflicts arising from the Arab Spring), they were also envisaged to be relevant to a more traditional medium recce role.

With kind regards to all,

MONTY

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The Future of the British Army 07 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (02) A Sensible Future

Think Defence — Thu, 23 Jun 2011 23:01:34 +0000

In the previous post I looked at a few issues that might influence equipment and structure decisions. Do we employ stealth or fight for information, have organic or non organic reconnaissance units and what is the relative importance of secondary roles that reconnaissance units tend to get used for.

If the answer to the first question is to use stealth then this will result in a completely different set of equipment than if we chose the fight for information route. The resulting equipment will also likely be used for secondary roles, probably more often than pure reconnaissance, so the answer to question one is even more important.

The problem here is that often, the ‘model answer’ for one question results in an unacceptable compromise for another.

If we attempt a one size fits all approach we inevitably over complicate matters by trying to meet diametrically opposed requirements, this drives price up which inevitably reduces quantities. The time taken to come to a conclusion drags out the process, making it vulnerable to the latest military trend and that is before we start the process of taking pen to paper.

Welcome to the wonderful world of FRES, where a C130 transportable vehicle would have the protection of CR2 and cost the same as a Land Rover.

I am of the opinion that until someone invents anti gravity plasma drives we cannot produce a single vehicle that does it all and must therefore accept the very simple notion that a single vehicle cannot possibly meet every single requirement.

As much as I think CVR(T) is a brilliantly executed concept that has proven itself time and time again, the FRES Scout approach is more relevant for many situations. I do not however, think the CVR(T)’s combination of tactical and strategic mobility be discarded so lightly, if only we had those plasma anti grav generators.

The answer to this conundrum is simple; accept there exists a need for a range of vehicles with varying levels of mobility and protection that be deployed as the situation dictates.

To repeat a phrase from an earlier post;

One job, one tool

To carry out effective reconnaissance we need everything from a shanks pony to a Challenger tank and to carry out those all important secondary roles we need an equally diverse range of equipment.

The arguments about fighting or sneaking become irrelevant, because you need to do both, is this unrealistic in light of fiscal constraint, arguably, yes. But as with all the ‘future of’ posts I have tried to shift the funding levers to reduce some capability areas to free up funding for others.

This is one of the ‘others’

Despite the complete discrediting of the FCS/FRES/RMA PowerPoint fest about information being a substitute for old fashioned concepts of combat effectiveness the impact of timely information and the rapid dissemination of usable information should not be underestimated.

ISTAR is an area where we can leverage our technological superiority at the expense of personnel numbers where continuing cost pressures will drive them down.

A Sensible Approach

If we look at the current approach it is entirely logical.

FRES Specialist Vehicle will create a family of vehicles based on an Infantry Combat Vehicle, the GD ASCOD2. Protected mobility, scout, repair, recovery, command, ambulance variants are planned with bridge laying and a direct fire variant using a common base vehicle.

These will replace CVR(T) and some FV432’s although the final make up and distribution of variants amongst the planned Multi Role Brigades is still ‘work in progress’ and therefore anyone’s guess.

Because of several decades of frankly scandalous incompetence we have found ourselves in a position where instead of an innovative vehicle industry that could create a decent vehicle with export potential we have had to settle for a gold plated version of an in service foreign vehicle that first started trials 20 years ago.

By 2017 when the first FRES SV comes into service the base vehicle will be a quarter of a century old.

£500 million will buy us 7 prototypes which whilst I understand things are expensive it is still difficult to comprehend, no matter how clever GVA and CIDS are, how the concept phase will cost this much.

FRES Scout is in many ways a conservative design, technologically mature concepts throughout. Whilst TRACER was proposing hybrid electric drives, survivable crew capsules, remote main weapon, acoustic sensors, band tracks and silent running FRES Scout will be conventional in almost all aspects.

Whilst the electronic architecture will be modern, reflecting the current norms of the automotive industry, it will feature conventional tracks, a diesel engine, flat bottomed hull, conventional layout and manned turret. TRACER took an innovative approach to crew survivability, the three sitting in a single capsule with the driver at the front on the centreline. ASCOD has the driver over to one side, near the tracks.

Reading the tea leaves and having a wild stab in the dark the FRES SV will eventually replace CVR(T) and some FV430’s. Eventually they will also replace Warrior so we will end up with a pretty common vehicle fleet.

To keep the short term costs down Warrior will be retained but have a very similar set of overall characteristics to FRES so the direction of travel should be obvious.

At the lighter end of the weight scale the new build Spartan/Scimitar hybrid will continue to provide a tactically and strategically mobile light armour support capability for 3CDO and 16AAB, supplemented by various combinations of Jackal, Foxhound, Viking and even Bronco until the promised land of FF2020 extra money comes up with something new, maybe based on OUVS.

Who knows

So a sensible future might just be exactly what it is planned.

Of course, budget pressures may result in the complete cancellation of the FRES programme (this has been signalled in various rumours in the press) and if this happens I would expect to see Warrior and CVR(T) continuing their double act. The Warrior upgrade programme and purchasing a few CVR(T) Mk2 may well be the accepted alternative.

In the next post I am going to look at a less than sensible future, which I actually think makes more sense!

The Future of the British Army Series…

The Future of the British Army 01 – Scene Setting

The Future of the British Army 02 – Tasks and Capabilities

The Future of the British Army 03 – Rank and Size

The Future of the British Army 04 – Structures

The Future of the British Army 05 – Heavy Metal

The Future of the British Army 06 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (01)

The Future of the British Army 07 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (02) A Sensible Future

Supporting Articles

The Need to Rethink FRES

A Brief History of FRES

Medium Armour – what is it, and what does it mean for the post 2020 force structure?

A Brief History of FRES

Think Defence — Wed, 22 Jun 2011 23:45:25 +0000

As a warm up for the next ‘Future of the British Army’ post in which FRES will of course feature this is a brief(ish) look at the rather shabby history of the omnishambles that is the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES)

Some of this content has appeared before on Think Defence but this is an amalgamation of some of the older posts, updated with new material.

To understand how the UK has got to the point of ordering a 34 tonne vehicle to replace an 11 tonne vehicle one first has to look back several years into what is without a shadow of a doubt, one of the most convoluted, confused and wasteful equipment procurement debacles of modern times.

1960′s and 1970′s

The Armoured Vehicle Reconnaissance project is started in 1960 to replace the Saladin. A couple of designs were proposed by the Fighting Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (FVRDE), one tracked and another wheeled. The latter wheeled variant was to be available in turreted and turretless variants mounting either a 76mm gun, 105mm gun or anti tank missiles.

Unusually, the wheeled variant was designed to use skid steering.

Although not proposed as the AVR, a 20 tonne test vehicle called the TV1000 introduced a number of concepts that were to appear in the final design. The TV1000 was powered by a Rover Meteorite V8 petrol engine rated at 535 bhp. The skid steering system caused many problems, tire wear and poor stability at speed and poor turning performance on soft ground, the vehicle never progressed beyond being a test bed.

TV1000 Image Credit: The Tank Museum

Some time later the TV1000′s wheels were replaced with a Bonmartini track system for testing.

TV1000 with Bombardini TRacks, Image Credit: The Tank Museum

Because of the weight issue, beyond the air transport limits of the time, the AVR project was cancelled and a new set of requirements issued that crucially did not specify wheels or tracks. The emerging concepts went on to become CVR(T) and CVR(W) or Scorpion and Fox in the earliest versions. Proposals set out a range of vehicles including one that mounted a semi automatic 120mm recoilless gun, maybe the origin of the famous ‘belt fed WOMBAT’

These concept of a series of lightweight tracked vehicles were developed using the TV 15000 vehicle, aluminium armour, lightweight track and the front mounted engine were to later be incorporated into CVR(T)

In parallel the UK joined the USA, Canada and Australia in a joint design study that subsequently collapsed because of weight issues. FVRDE were authorised to produce two mobile test rigs using the CVR(T) design. The transmission was a scaled down variant of the Self Changing Gears Ltd Merritt Wilson TN12 as used in the Chieftain, so far ahead of its time that the designer reportedly had a nervous breakdown trying to figure out how he did it!

TV 15000, Image Credit: The Tank Museum

In 1967 Alvis were awarded a contract to produce 30 CVR(T) prototypes based on the FVRDE design

First CVR(T) Prototype

The CVR(T) design was to face significant challenges.

First was the use of aluminium armour to save weight. Although the US M113 used aluminium armour it was the heavier and much easier to weld 5083 aluminium manganese magnesium type, CVR(T) needed to save every ounce of weight so the very latest and difficult to weld 7039 aluminium zinc magnesium alloy was chosen instead. Air portability was a key requirement, the thinking at the time was during the withdrawal from empire a rapidly deployed vehicle was essential. This was demonstrated in 1970 when a Scorpion prototype was lifted by a USMC S-65 helicopter.

A maximum width of 2,1m was specified so that CVR(T) could move between rubber trees in plantations in Malaya and negotiate narrow tracks, this is the same width as the US HUMVEE by the way. Steering geometry and track width to length ratios determined hull width and in order to squeeze the driver in when wearing winter combat gear the resultant narrow engine compartment width meant engine choice was limited, the Jaguar XK was the only suitable off the shelf engine that would both fit and provide sufficient power although integrating the M113 diesel engine was also trialled.

Many other novel design features were implemented to keep weight and noise down.

pre production Scorpion

The Scorpion prototype was accepted1970, with an order awarded to Alvis in May and entering service with the Blues and Royals in 1972.

In August 1974, Scorpions from A Squadron 16th/5th The Queen’s Royal Lancers, were transported by C-130 Hercules to Cyprus, to protect the British Sovereign Base Areas during the Turkish invasion showing off its deployability credentials.

Scimitar was a variant that used the 30mm RARDEN cannon firing high velocity APDS rounds designed to defeat the Russian BMP’s. Other variants include recovery (SAMPSON), anti tank missile (SWINGFIRE), ambulance (SAMARITAN), command (SULTAN) and armoured personnel carrier (SPARTAN).

Click here to view the embedded video.

Whilst the first vehicles were coming into service, the soldiers using them might have driven a Morris Marina or listened to ‘All the Young Dudes‘ by Mott the Hoople.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Check out them flares and platform shoes!

Mott the Hoople in 1972

1980’s

The CVR(T)’s light weight, exceptional mobility and ease of deployment meant they were deployed to the Falklands in 1982 with B Squadron the Blues and Royals, both Scorpion and Scimitar provide infantry fire support and a solitary Sampson provided recovery capabilities. The CVR(T) was well suited to the boggy terrain of the Falklands because of its very low ground pressure, less than a booted squaddy. A Scimitar was damaged by a mine but was recovered by the sole Chinook in theatre, repaired by the attached REME section and returned to service in short order.

Moreover, there are some pieces of equipment that provide you with that flexibility, such as a medium mortar of the 81mm size, light artillery of good range and mobility, and light armour. It is significant I think that seventy-three of the seventy-four deployments have involved light armour at some stage in the campaign. Initially, light armor is used in the reconnaissance role for the protection and development of the lodgement area, beach head or air head, and also in subsequent operations, of course, not forgetting the pacification phase of an operation or stabilization or whatever you like to call it, when, again, (particularly) wheeled or light tracked armoured vehicles have been extremely useful. So there’s flexibility derived from both these characteristics of light forces, without which you know one could be really pushed about.

Colonel Neville Pughe, Parachute Regiment

I quite agree, and it is significant that the two most important areas of concern of the several areas that have been singled out for more work in terms of the characteristics of 3 Commando Brigade, as a result of our experiences in the Falklands (and we had the whole brigade down there) were the absence of any light armour in the 3 Commando Brigade and also the absence of air defence. There was light armour down there as you know, but it didn’t belong to us. We are now looking for both of those things to enhance the capabilities of 3 Commando Brigade, without making us into a heavy brigade which loses all of its light infantry advantages.

Colonel Andrew Whitehead of 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines

Some more background on CVR(T) in the Falklands can be read here including…

The Blues and Royals went ashore at San Carlos without incident and were quickly incorporated into the defence, protecting the build up phase of the operation. During this phase, the CVRs were used for hauling supplies and for air defence using their coaxially mounted 7.62-mm machine guns. One Scimitar claimed credit for downing an A4 Skyhawk at a 1,000m with its 30-mm gun. After the build up phase, the CVRs moved south to assist with the landings at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. The CVRs accompanied 3 Para and 45 Commando (both are light infantry regiments) on their 50 mile march, ending up the only vehicles capable of making the cross country journey.

The sensation of driving across the water logged surface was described as similar to driving on a water bed. At Bluff Cove the CVRs were again pressed into air defence service. Civilians observing the air attacks on the Sir Galahad and Sir Tristan at Bluffs Cove claim to have seen one of the CVRs hit its target. In spite of losses, the British forces continued their move toward Port Stanley.

Battles fought across the high ground above Port Stanley were planned to take place at night and involved close direct and indirect fire support. The first phase-attack was opened by 3 Para with their assault on Mount Longdon. Initial surprise was achieved in the darkness, but the enemy were soon alert and resisted fiercely with heavy accurate fire. 4 Troop provided valuable direct fire support with their 76mm, firing HESH. The battle for the eastern sector of Mount Longdon was to last 6 hours and, for the western half, 4 hours. The enemy positions were captured by a process of calling for very close fire support, at times within 50 meters of the leading British troops.

Two techniques used by the British employing the CVRs proved very successful. The first involved a diversionary attack on the night of 12 June. In the attack, the Scots Guards employed 4 Troop in a reconnaissance role and then a direct fire role insupport of the diversionary assault. The impact of the use of the CVRs was instrumental deceiving the enemy.

The Argentine commander later admitted that “…he had been entirely deceived by the diversionary attack into thinking it was the main attack on his position”

The other technique employed by the CVRs is known as “zapping”: …the CVR crew would engage the Argentine position with a brief burst of machine gun fire provoking a response, which was promptly silenced by the main gun. The 30mm RARDEN cannon, with its high velocity and great accuracy, was much favoured for this technique.

Few Argentines felt able to reply after being zapped.

Armour, played key roles during the Falklands War performing reconnaissance, security, and support of dismounted manoeuvre missions. The presence of the CVRs during the initial build up phase provided a degree of security otherwise not available had an attack been launched by the Argentineans, particularly if they had used their 90-mm gun equipped Panhards (wheeled armoured vehicles). Once again, armoured vehicles surprised their supporters and silenced the critics with their great mobility in terrain considered unacceptable. When employed in support of infantry, the CVRs provided critical direct fire, especially with their passive sights during the hours of darkness. Additional roles of air defence and aiding the logistics only enhanced the primary fire support role provided by the CVRs.

The two troops deployed provided fire support for the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment during the Battle of Wireless Ridge and for 2nd Battalion Scots Guards during the Battle of Mount Tumbledown

Scorpion CVR(T) in the Falklands in 1982

Click here to view the embedded video.

Production of the Stormer vehicle started in 1982, a larger variant of CVR(T). It was selected in 1986 to carry the Starstreak anti aircraft missile and Shielder minelaying system.

The CV90 project started its development phase in 1985, a joint venture between Hagglunds and Bofors called HB Utvecking AB obtained the order and Hagglunds created the first 5 prototypes in 1988.

Production of the Warrior began in 1986 and by the end of that year the UK had taken delivery of 1,863 CVR(T), 313 Scorpions, 89 Strikers, 691 Spartans, 50 Samaritans, 291 Sultans, 95 Samsons and 334 Scimitars.

In 1988 15 British companies entered into a collaborative deal with Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment to develop an integrated fighting vehicle electronics system for demonstration purposes. Known as VERDI (Vehicle Electronics Research Defence Initiative), this resulted in the showing at BAEE (exhibition) of a Warrior tracked vehicle configured for the reconnaissance role equipped with two VERDI consoles (or big tellies as more commonly known).

Even at this stage we had recognised the potential of electronic systems and the Warrior in the reconnaissance role.

Also in 1988, the CVR(T) was upgraded at a cost of approximately £50million with a new Cummins BTA diesel engine and other improvements under the Life Extension Programme.

In 1989 the Future Family of Light Armoured Vehicles (FFLAV) study identified a number of roles that would eventually inform the CVR(T) replacement and identified 13 roles and fifty sub roles with a weight range of between 3.5 and 24 tonnes.

FFLAV marks the start point for CVR(T) replacement, remember the year, 1989, by which time CVR(T) had been in service about 18 years.

FFLAV was a fully coherent and sensible look at the future and its requirements, of course, with something as sensible it was doomed to failure.

There were three phases to the FFLAV

Phase 1, carried out by the MoD Design Authority contractors, covered a study of the current fleet to ascertain how closely current vehicles meet, or can be upgraded to meet the FFLAV requirement
Phase 2 covered the proposals from industry
Phase 3 was the assessment and analysis of all vehicles and proposals from Phases 1 and 2

The FFLAV was first revealed in 1987 and since then requirements have been identified by the British Army and the total number of vehicles needed has increased from around 5500 to as many as 7000. The first of these were required to be in service from the mid-1990s.

FFLAV settled on three families, heavy, based on a tank chassis, medium weight vehicles and lightweight reconnaissance in addition to something called the Multi Base Armoured Vehicle (MBAV).

1990’s

The CVR(T) saw action in Operation Granby, the liberation of Kuwait, after a series of urgent upgrades were implemented.

CVR(T) Scorpion Iraq 1991

In 1992, the ASCOD prototype began trials

Also in 1992 VERDI had completed all its milestones and shown considerable promise.

In 1993, production of the CV90 started at Hagglunds in Sweden as the CVR(T) began a long engagement in the Balkans.

In 1995, all Scorpions were withdrawn from service.

In response to the FFLAV study, Mowag of Switzerland and GKN teamed up to create the GKN Piranha, Hagglunds proposed their CV90 and others such as Alvis with a CVR(T) derivative, Panhard with their VBL and the Krauss-Maffei with the Puma, all pitched in as well.

After disappearing without trace the project reappeared in the ISTAR capability pillar, along with Watchkeeper and the new TRACER programme, or Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (back then they always came up with better acronyms as well)

Three UK industrial consortia participated in a joint MoD/Industry study that was initially due to report in 1994.

In the same period, the US Army started looking at a replacement for its Bradley M3 in Cavalry squadrons and the M1114 HMWWV in scout platoons in a programme called, the Future Scout Cavalry System (FSCS)

The TRACER and FSCS programmes were subsequently harmonised and a joint project created, national requirements would be met by a single vehicle; the Armoured Scout and Reconnaissance Vehicle (ASRV) which was specified in a Memorandum of Understanding, signed by both governments in July 1998, the original Operational Requirements Document having being agreed in December 1997.

By the end of 1998 the MoD has spent £7.3million on TRACER.

Contracts were signed for an initial study phase with two consortia in January 1999. At this early stage the UK and US had slightly different requirements but the project was still initiated amid hopes of a rapid introduction and reduction in costs.

TRACER was intended to not only to provide intelligence, but also to act as a deterrent, monitor opposing forces, help maintain freedom of movement and provide a credible offensive capability by directing direct and indirect fire onto enemy forces.

The two competing consortia were SIKA International (British Aerospace, Lockheed Martin, Vickers Defence and General Dynamics) and LANCER (Marconi, Alvis, United Defence and Raytheon)

The studies progressed well and planned to go through affordability review in early 2001, after which a number of subsequent options would be open for discussion, including completion and report in 2002.

Estimated cost at this point was £118million at 1999 prices.

At about the same time the UK and other European nations started the process of creating the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation, as is usual with these things it wasn’t called OJAC but the French translation, Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d’armement or OCCAR, go figure as they say.

Although created in 1996 it wasn’t legally constituted until January 2001 and one of its lead programmes was the Multi Role Armoured Vehicle or MRAV. This was a joint programme between the UK, Germany and France.

MRAV is our entry ticket to OCCAR because one cannot simply take part without bringing cash!

France left the programme in 1999 to create the VBCI.

To recap, FFLAV became TRACER (reconnaissance element) and MRAV (medium weight element) and had they been successful, would have replaced CVR(T), Saxon and FV432.

2000

In February 2000, the estimated cost of the UK’s participation in TRACER was reduced to £90 million

Rumours surfaced that the US was about to terminate the programme and in the same month Mr Quentin Davies MP tabled a question about the consequences of the US withdrawing. Yes, that is the same Quentin Davies that crossed the House in 2007 and became Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, responsible for Defence Equipment and Support, oh the irony!

In response to the question, the estimated cost had risen to £130million, up from £118million only a couple of years before and different to a parliamentary answer given only months before.

2001

In April 2001, a statement to the House of Parliament revealed that the future of the US FSCS is in doubt, describing how the new Future Combat System (FCS) vision as envisioned by General Shinseki and others in 1999 will need funding and some previous programmes will be cut to make room for it, one of these is the follow on engineering development phase of FSCS/TRACER.

A number of small scale studies introduced the FRES concept.

At the DSEi show in London in September a SIKA representative stated

Rumours that the project had stalled completely and was about to be overtaken by FRES are grossly overdone, the project continues to meet its milestone development phases and we have already started cutting metal on the first prototype

In October 2001 an announcement was made in Parliament that in a joint US/UK decision, the TRACER programme was to a close in July 2002 at the end of the assessment phase with the information gained used to inform FCS and FRES respectively, both programmes were to effectively absorb TRACER and FSCS.

Total costs to the UK were confirmed at £131million

Thales were awarded the contract for the Battle Group Thermal Imaging (BGTI) programme which replaced the thermal imaging systems on Scimitar and Royal Engineer Spartans.

The selection process started for the Future Command and Liaison Vehicle, a competition that was to result in the BAe/IVECO Panther vehicle being selected. FCLV replaced a number of CVR(T) and other tracked and wheeled vehicles in British service.

The competition was very controversial because the shortlisted vehicles did not include the Panther (Iveco LMV) but consisted of the RG31, RG32M, Alvis Scarab and the French AMCAT. Panther was inserted after the short listing process had concluded, some say because of a desire for a common European design for the European Rapid Reaction Corps.

It is was reported that one of the acquisition members of staff at the MoD subsequently went to work for Iveco in a repeat of the familiar revolving doors scenario between industry and the MoD.

The Netherlands joined the MRAV programme.

2002

The TRACER technology demonstrations took place towards the end of the programme in June and July 2002 which involved the prototype vehicles from each consortium.

They were widely regarded as impressive vehicles and included many advanced concepts such as a hybrid electrical drive that provided a limited silent running, band tracks from Soucy , a mast mounted elevating sensor head, unmanned turrets, open electronic architectures and the just off the drawing board 40mm Cased Telescopic Ammunition (CTA) cannon from CTAI (in the SIKA version), the very same weapon that will equip the Warrior CSP and FRES Scout.

They are only demonstrators of course and many of the technologies are nowhere near mature enough for deployment but they showed considerable promise and innovation.

LANCER TRACER

SIKA TRACER

Later in the year, BAe, at the request of the FRES IPT in the MoD, formed a relationship with Alvis, whereby Alvis were to contribute the AFV domain knowledge and skills and BAE Systems would manage the System Engineering for FRES.

A non-competitive contract was let to Alvis in September 2002 to determine plans for the Assessment Phase of a FRES programme with a target ISD of 2009.

2003

The BAe contract was terminated in July 2003 by the DPA after the Procurement Strategy for a non competitive approach was not approved by the Investment Approvals Board, incredibly the contract was cancelled by the very same organisation that let it in the first place.

The UK ordered 401 Panther’s from Alvis Vickers, with final assembly (a new roof that is) in Telford. They were designated the Future Command and Liaison Vehicle or CLV when in service. , the winning vehicle was the Iveco LMV, to be called Panther. 401 were to be supplied, all armoured and 362 equipped with the Selex Galileo Enforcer overhead weapons station with 7.62mm GPMG. Panther was to be deployed in 15 role specific variants as a command vehicle for anti tank/mortar platoons, Royal Engineer recce/liaison, armoured/armoured infantry regiment liaison officer and radio rebroadcast. Users were to be Royal Armoured Corps, Infantry, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and the RAF regiment. The programme was intended to replace the Ferret but as this has been out of service for some time these roles had been variously carried out by Land Rovers, Saxon, FV430 and CVR(T)

Even at the time it was difficult to see this as a logical or coherent acquisition given the status of FRES, the background of Iraq and as they entered service it emerged that the already very expensive capital cost (£193million) was to be inflated even more, by £20million, as the ones designated for service in Afghanistan (less than 70) needed extensive modification for theatre entry, with the remainder being retained for training roles and secondary roles.

The whole thing seemed rushed.

CVR(T) went into combat in Iraq, again. The initial force contained the 1st Queen’s Dragoon Guards and D Squadron, the Household Cavalry, both equipped with CVR(T

Scimitar - Operation Telic

The UK withdrew from MRAV in 2003 to pursue FRES, citing the weight of MRAV, at around 31 tonnes, as far too heavy for the medium weight rapidly deployed FRES concept.

Lord Bach, the Defence Procurement Minister said

“The SDR (Strategic Defence Review) New Chapter, and our experience on recent overseas operations, have shown the need for lighter armored vehicles that can be quickly sent by air to a trouble spot when a crisis breaks”

During this period the US Future Combat System (FCS) and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was postulating that a lightweight but rapidly deployed force, with networked information superiority can afford to sacrifice armour weight and do the job of a 60 tonne tank in a package no heavier than 20 tonnes.

Germany and the Netherlands were left as sole partners in the MRAV programme.

The cost of the UK participation in MRAV was reported as £48million in 2003 money, from which we obtained zero benefit, although this will rise in subsequent reporting

The prototype Dutch command version was completed.

2004

In August 2004, Atkins were confirmed as the chosen Systems House to lead the 2 year initial Assessment Phase (iAP) for FRES.

Atkins were also tasked to let the competitive Technology Demonstrator Programme contracts to industry as part of a FRES Integrated Technology Acquisition Plan (ITAP).

BAE Systems created a dedicated FRES team in September 2004 in response to the MoD’s burgeoning FRES vision.

This period is characterised by the world and his dog falling for military fashion as embodied by the medium weight dream, in which forces would be deployed by air, see the enemy before they left their mud huts (we tended to concentrate on African type enemies rather than the politically sensitive Arabic type), fix them with advanced sensors, arrive in a hail of air portable allyness, destroy the enemy (who would have obligingly decided to face us mano a mano) then build a few schools and be home in time for tea and medals.

Of course, Iraq and Afghanistan intervened in that PowerPoint fuelled fantasy.

In December 2004 a number of ITT’s were issued to industry for nine technology demonstrations including 2 chassis (SEP and AHED) concepts, gap crossing, stowage and capacity, hard kill defensive aids, 2 electronic architectures, electric armour and integrated survivability.

FRES was going to be one hell of a technology fest, kerching!

Meanwhile, back in the real world, UK forces in Iraq were still using Snatch Land Rovers but nothing is allowed to stop the FRES juggernaut.

The demonstration phases were won by BAe, Insys, General Dynamics, Akers Krutbrug, Lockeehd Marin, DSTL (i.e. the MoD) and Thales, jam for all.

In all fairness, some good work was done, still no CVR(T) replacement though.

The initial FRES requirement called for a vehicle to fit within the C130 load profile, i.e. around 17-18 tonnes, much less than the MRAV which at over 30 tonnes was deemed far too heavy.

OCCAR placed a contract with ARTEC for the continuing development of MRAV.

2005

The Defence Industrial Strategy was published in December 2005 and included this, in Chapter 3

“The most likely solution (for FRES) will be a team in which national and international companies co-operate to deliver the FRES platforms, including the required sub-systems, led by a systems integrator with the highest level of systems engineering, skills, resources and capabilities based in the UK.”

“We expect to see a significant evolution of BAE Systems Land Systems both to deliver AFV availability and upgrades through life, and to bring advanced land systems’ technologies, skills and processes into the UK. If successful in their evolution, BAE Systems will be well placed for the forthcoming FRES programme”

The MoD indicated that FRES would likely to be for approximately 3,500 vehicles at an estimated total cost of £14 billion.

BAe was awarded an £84 million contract to upgrade approximately 500 FV430 vehicles to the Bulldog standard, for use in Iraq, a singularly good value for money deal that provided a genuine uplift in capability and showed what can be achieved if one takes a sensible attitude to platform upgrades.

2006

Although BAe are often maligned they made considerable investment in FRES and the activities needed to fulfil on the DIS, including a Platform Development Centre at Newcastle and a Systems Integration Laboratory in Leicester.

The initial phases concluded in 2006 but before then it became clear that the MoD favoured an 8×8 wheeled vehicle to fulfil the first tranche of FRES, not as one might think the Scout, but the Utility variant. Unfortunately BAe did not really have anything in its portfolio to fulfil this requirement except the Swedish SEP programme (since cancelled) being worked on by BAe owned Hagglunds.

The Spitterskyddad Enhets Platform (SEP) vehicle was an advanced concept that used a modular chassis available either in a wheeled or tracked variant with hybrid propulsion. BAe invested their own funds, again, to spin out of the SEP programme a conventionally powered 8×8 demonstrator for FRES.

Click here to view the embedded video.

At the end of 2006, the MoD announced that the acquisition strategy for FRES would take a three tier approach, with a Systems of Systems Integrator, Platform Designer, and a Vehicle Integrator/Manufacturer.

Whatever possessed the MoD to entertain this fundamentally flawed, complex and impossible to manage approach was not quite clear but I bet some consultants somewhere are still enjoying their villas in Tuscany off the back of it.

In evidence to the Defence Select Committee in December 2006, Sir Peter Spencer (Head of Defence Procurement) defended TRACER and MRAV against accusations of being abandoned with nothing to show for it.

Sir Peter Spencer: Neither was abandoned halfway through. Both were abandoned because the end user decided, in the case of the Americans TRACER was not what they wanted and we were left stranded, and in the case of Boxer the British Army decided that against the evolving threat this was going in the wrong direction and was not the right vehicle for the medium weight force, so from a procurement point of view we responded to that and we exited from that programme and then we ramped up the work on FRES.

So we were abandoned by the US, great.

It is accepted wisdom that TRACER was cancelled because the US pulled out but this is not the case, the bidding consortia were required to produce a vehicle design that could be supplied, regardless of quantity, for less than $3 million each.

The Dutch and Germans approved a production order for 472 vehicles between, for the Boxer (MRAV) at a rough cost of £2.25 million each (a number of variants and including all the support/training costs that mask the actual vehicle cost)

2007

In response to the select committee’s report, the MoD, in February 2007, stated that the UK cost of TRACER and MRAV was £188million and at this stage, specific pull through into FRES had been limited. Of course ‘has been limited’ in MoD speak means more or less nothing, except some nice drawings and the confirmation that heavier vehicles with more armour are generally more survivable.

The immortal phrase, ‘lessons have been learned’ makes a grand entry in the MoD’s response to Point 5 in the committee report.

Around this period the MoD finally realised what everyone in the programme knew from day 1, that the weight limit imposed by insisting on C130 transportability was too low for a vehicle to be survivable in an 8×8 conventionally designed armoured vehicle form. The weight range was raised from 17 tonnes to between 27 and 30 tonnes, for the Utility Variant.

This was still within A400 weight limits so although it might not have been as rapid to deploy as if it were in the more numerous C130 (at the time) at least it would still be air portable. The R is FRES stands for Rapid, deployability that is, not time from concept to reality.

The response concluded that

Transportability by A400M is recognised as a risk to the programme but is being carefully managed with appropriate mitigation strategies.

An appropriate risk mitigation strategy; that’s a good one, must remember that for later.

As Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the reality is that the dream of networked sensors providing enough protection is nothing short of fantasy against an enemy who might be simple but is smart enough to realise the way to fight this concept is not by entering into an unwinnable technology race, but to deploy simple countermeasures and rather unsportingly, fail to play by our rules.

The IED is proved to be a game changer that despite all efforts by the defence establishment, was not realised until much time, effort and money has been wasted on the medium weight sacred cow, FCS or FRES, depending on where you live.

Continuing with the response, the MoD at this point underwent a sea change.

We agree we should not pursue unrealistic levels of capability for FRES. We are seeking a pragmatic solution that delivers, at the earliest opportunity, the capability that the Army needs with the potential for further improvements through life.

The question of the relative priority of force protection in theatre and air deployability has been resolved. Whilst both are important, protection in theatre is a higher priority than air deployability by A400M/C17.

Our intention remains to pursue the delivery of the FRES UV at the earliest possible time while providing significantly improved capability and sustained operational effectiveness through life in comparison with relevant vehicles in the current fleet (eg the FV 430 Series and SPARTAN).

It is interesting to note that the priority was the introduction of the Utility Variant to replace the Saxon, FV430 series, which were even older than CVR(T) and Spartan. Is this because the Panther (as it is now called) had been introduced and US forces have introduced the Stryker, we wouldn’t want to be seen falling behind our cousins.

In the same response to the Select Committee the MoD made it clear that it will take a consistent line on intellectual property and design authority.

Absolute clarity on the ownership of Intellectual Property Rights and technology transfer issues will be essential in ensuring we can upgrade FRES vehicles throughout their life, thereby securing operational sovereignty. Agreement that all intellectual property and design authorities should reside in the UK is a pre-requisite for companies participating in FRES competitions.

The so called ‘Trials of Truth’ for the Utility Variant were planned to take place in the summer of 2007, and were to involve the General Dynamics Piranha, Nexter VBCI and ARTEC Boxer, yes, the same Boxer we rejected a few years earlier.

It was rumoured that the head of DE&S, Lord Drayson, wanted the VBCI because it will be quickest into service, getting kit to ‘our brave boys’ in the light of the continuing Snatch controversy was an obvious political influence. The slowest into service would be the General Dynamics Piranha Evolution, the favoured military option because it had a very good steering system, all other things being equal. Of course Pirahna V Evolution was not actually in the Trials of Truth because it existed only on paper, so we had to make do with a previous version.

After a series of reported ‘blazing rows’ Lord Drayson resigned.

The MoD seemed to be overly concerned with upgradeability, noting that all platforms were required to accommodate increases in armour, sensors and weapons over their lifetime. This was the principal factor in rejecting off the shelf solutions because they did not offer this growth potential.

With Lord Drayson out of the way the MoD announced General Dynamics were the preferred bidder i.e. winner.

Despite the statement in the MoD’s response to the Defence Select Committee the deal and whole Utility Variant programme collapsed in a hail of acrimony after it emerged that the MoD and General Dynamics cannot come to agreement on intellectual property issues.

One might think it would be reasonable to get these things sorted before announcing a winner but this is the MoD we are talking about. The MoD quite rightly came in for serious criticism on this issue, how the competition could have proceeded without this being absolutely crystal clear is nothing short if incredible, and not in a good way, perhaps it was a deliberate attempt to kill the process because we were not in a position to place orders?

Despite agreement on IP being a pre requisite, GD were still allowed to compete.

One has to wonder if they were allowed to compete because the prospect of having a competition that involved a French and Dutch/German company was politically unacceptable, especially given that the UK had wasted £31 million on MRAV after we rejected it because it was unsuitable and here it was, possibly the best choice in the Trials of Truth.

The alternative would have been a French vehicle that also came out of the MRAV programme.

The escalating conflict in Afghanistan needed considerable resources at DE&S to manage the introduction of a wide range of UOR vehicles and equipment, in response to various needs, the most pressing being the threat of IED’s and in the meantime the Mastiff and Bulldog had been introduced for service in Iraq to great effect, both platforms showing considerable utility.

Things go quite on the FRES front.

BAe were awarded a £28 million contract for support services on the Panther vehicle, to provide better availability and lower costs. The Panther is reported to be a maintenance intensive vehicle with very poor availability.

2009

CVR(T) received a £19million upgrade package for 100 vehicles to incorporate a number engine and armour enhancements so they can better cope with the demands of Afghanistan. Additional upgrades include ECM equipment and an AEI Odin one man turret for the Spartan

Scimitar in Afghanistan

After the debacle over the Utility Variant the next in line for the MoD is the the FRES Specialist Variant which comprised three blocks of reconnaissance vehicles, Medium Armour and Manoeuvre Support. Up to 1300 were still being reported as the total requirement.

Recce Block 1, which consists of Scout, Repair, Recovery and Protected Mobility variants, is the largest and seen as the highest priority.

It was announced that the two contenders to for Recce Block 1 were CV90 and ASCOD2 from BAe and General Dynamics respectively, both variants of off the shelf vehicles.

Both were to involve elements of offshore manufacture and UK based integration work and each bidder of course made various claims about jobs and the industrial benefits of their respective bid.

In other news, Mott the Hoople reunited for two concerts in London, have the years been as kind to CVR(T)

Click here to view the embedded video.

Mott the Hoople Reunion Tour 2009

2010

A leak in the Financial Times reported that the GD ASCOD2 was likely to be the winner,

The BAe option was a shortened CV90, fully developed and available in the flesh, although to what extent readiness extended under the skin was not clear. The basic vehicle was to be constructed at Hagglunds in Sweden and shipped to Newcastle for final assembly and integration. It would feature a stabilised main weapon and a number of advanced sensors. The CV90 has been sold to six countries and is currently in service in Afghanistan.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The General Dynamics offer was based on the Austrian-Spanish Cooperative Development or ASCOD vehicle which is in service with Spain and Austria, as the Pizarro and Ulan respectively.

Click here to view the embedded video.

After a small period of speculation General Dynamics were declared the winner with a contract awarded for the demonstration phase

The demonstration phase is for 7 prototypes and a total value of £500 million.

Yes, that £500 million for 7 prototypes, it’s not a spelling mistake.

Inflation eh, the last time we tried to replace CVR(T) with something new, the TRACER programme less than a decade ago, it only cost £131 million and that was for a similar development phase but with two manufacturing consortia and two separate designs.

Commenting on the award, Peter Luff MP, Minister for Defence Equipment and Support said

Military commanders have stressed the importance of having a wide range of vehicles from which they can select the most appropriate for specific tasks.

“This contract is a major step towards providing an additional fleet of combat vehicles, capable of undertaking operations in the most demanding terrain and fully incorporating lessons from current conflicts.

Work on this phase of the programme will go ahead alongside the wider Strategic Defence and Security Review which will make sure that the capabilities that we are investing in are those best placed to provide the security we need for the future.”

The Chief of Defence Materiel, General Sir Kevin O’Donoghue, said:

“Today’s announcement is the result of months of hard work by a wide range of stakeholders across MOD and General Dynamics UK enabling us to reach this point, ahead of the original plan.

The work that has been done has been, and continues to be, subject to the most careful scrutiny to ensure the decision is the right one for the long-term needs of the Army.”

Master-General of the Ordnance, Major General Bill Moore, said:

“This is a very good moment for the Army. Scout will provide a much better capability to find and track the enemy, so necessary for the successful prosecution of operations in the 21st century.

Scout will also deliver improved situational awareness, increased firepower, more protection and enhanced mobility, and it will be a key capability for land operations over the next few decades.”

The project trials will start in 2013.

Arguably one of the real innovations in the design is the Core Infrastructure and Distribution System (CIDS), this is an electronic ring main that sensors, monitoring equipment, displays, controls, power connectors and other systems can plug into. Another innovation is an open electronic architecture that surrounds CIDS. This combination is a real innovation that would be difficult to retrofit into an existing vehicle.

One could be uncharitable and say this might have been driven by the torrid time GD UK had with upgrading the vehicle fleet for BOWMAN!

It was rumoured that the Army preferred the BAe option and the Treasury the GD option but rumours being rumours, who knows?

Anyway, here are some pictures to be going on with because whilst based on the established ASCOD, FRES Scout is still a paper design.

ASCOD FRES Protected Mobility

ASCOD FRES Scout

The end result will be nowhere near as innovative as even the TRACER concepts of nearly a decade ago

In April Janes reported that CVR(T) production would be restarted

Negotiations are under way between the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and BAE Systems to restart production of hulls for the British Army’s CVR(T)

2011

A small number of CVR(T) were subsequently reported to be in production to mitigate fatigue problems and reducing hull numbers. Pictures emerged on a number of web forums showing what appears to be a Scimitar turret placed on a Spartan hull, perhaps to address space issues as much as anything else.

In May, the National Audit Office publish a stinging critique of the MoD’s approach called the Cost Effective Delivery of an Armoured Vehicle Capability, clearly the NAO have a sense of humour.

This describes FRES SV as having an in service date of 2017, comprising 1,300 vehicles with an estimated cost of £7.6 billion

Costs

It is difficult to estimate the costs FRES to this point because the published figures only show a small proportion of the true costs.

TRACER, published figure, £131 million

MRAV, published figure, £57 million

FRES UV, £133 million

These are easy to tot up, £321 million in non inflation adjusted terms.

But on top of that are a basket of additional costs, upgrading CVR(T), buying FCLV, various UOR’s, additional Vikings, Broncos and other vehicles.

Plus of course, the eye watering £500m for the Specialist Vehicle demonstration phase.

Just under a billion pounds with precisely ZERO fielded vehicles

This is a conservative figure based on carefully defined published figures, the real cost will be much more, how much more, who knows but would anyone take a bet on it being less than double that?

If you look at the NAO report mentioned above, on page 27 and page 28 it provides a very handy timeline spending comparison for upgrades and UOR’s to core and existing vehicles. The total spend on vehicles for Iraq and Afghanistan has been £2.8 billion and whilst only the most optimistic would conclude that all of these could have been avoided if only we had done things better I think it would be fair to assume that the figure would have been dramatically reduced.

Summary

The UK has made several ham fisted and very expensive attempts at replacing CVR(T) yet it is still in service, fighting in Afghanistan.

These programmes have been hampered by combinations of inappropriate acquisition strategies, hopelessly clinging to military fashion, inability to rapidly change, planning far too far in advance, changing too often, suffering at the hands of our allies, indecision and confusion.

Meanwhile, users of CVR(T) will have to wait even longer to see a replacement, 2017 as at the latest information, thus pipping the post at over 45 years hard service.

This also assumes FRES survives the latest round of cost cutting, which is not a certainty by any stretch.

A driver of the original CVR(T) might have joined the army, progressed to Warrant Officer, retired at the 22 year point, been replaced with another Trooper that has also since gone on to serve his 22, and commissioned as a Late Entrant officer, who may well retire before any meaningful replacement is actually in service.

World War II was 6 years long during which time we progressed from biplanes to jet fighters, it’s a good job there isn’t a war on, oh, wait a minute.

We have been forced to settle for a relatively conservative design that will rapidly show its age and have limited export potential, how different things must have looked to the TRACER designers.

At the end of the trials phase the UK will have engaged in the FFLAV, TRACER and FRES programmes, spent in excess of one billion pounds on these and past/future upgrades to CVR(T) and still not have a single production replacement for a vehicle which will by then be over 43 years old and still in service.

This must rank as the single most inept procurement programme of all time.

The most embarrassing thing of all though is that despite all this, the replacement for CVR(T), at least until FRES actually gets into service, is a new build CVR(T)

Now that is irony, or maybe aluminiumy!

Perhaps we shouldn’t be as grumpy, it’s progress after all and the turret demonstrator has completed its phase on time.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kU1VW5WWb1w

Why FRES UV Still Matters

Monty — Wed, 13 Oct 2010 04:56:27 +0000

There are numerous UK examples of worst-in-class defence procurement. SA80, Nimrod AEW 3, Chinook Mk3 and Bowman C41 tactical communication system immediately spring to mind. While Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) have enabled limited purchases of new weapons and equipment to be fast-tracked, such as Osprey body armour or the L129A1 Sharpshooter rifle, we still seem to get major programmes wrong. The £320 million(1) spent to develop a new family of rapidly deployable, multi-role armoured vehicles, without a single actual vehicle being fielded, has already been described as a cock-up of epic proportions, but, despite official investigations and reports into what went wrong, there are still no concrete plans to procure a suitable new family of vehicles.

With the Strategic Defence & Security Review (SDSR) looming, it would be easy to conclude that the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES), is no longer needed or important. The aim of this article is not to understand how or why the FRES programme went so disastrously wrong, but to look ahead. FRES is a crucial new asset that represents a vital revitalisation and reinforcement of the Army’s capabilities to deliver effective force wherever it is needed. There are three reasons why it cannot be delayed let alone cancelled:

The need for increased mobility as well as protection. As the war in Afghanistan has amply demonstrated, the requirement for armoured infantry personnel carriers that provide adequate protection against Mines, IEDs and RPGs remains paramount. The Army also needs high mobility vehicles with an offensive capability so that it is equipped to deal with a full range of threats, rather than just asymmetric ones. Existing heavy protected patrol vehicles, such as the Mastiff, are neither fast nor agile and have limited potential for mounting heavy weapons. FRES would satisfy all of these requirements.
The need to deploy rapidly anywhere in the world. With the end of the Cold War, Britain’s Army has increasingly assumed the role of a global force. Whether this is in service of the United Nations, NATO, the Commonwealth or protecting Britain’s own overseas interests, the need to rapidly deploy highly mobile forces across the globe is an obligation that stems from our alliances and relationships with other members of the United Nations Security Council. Even if we were only concerned with defending mainland Britain or Europe, the ability to respond quickly would still be essential.
Our current fleet of armoured vehicles is all but worn out. The need for new vehicles has existed for more than 10 years. Our current fleet of armoured personnel carriers has been in service for almost 40 years. Delays to the replacement programme have forced us to make a series of UOR acquisitions resulting in a diverse range of vehicles, adding cost and complexity to the logistics burden and sucking £700(2) million from the budget. Further delays could seriously compromise our future ability to respond to an unforeseen situation requiring the deployment of British troops beyond the borders of Europe.

Although the original plan to buy more than 3,000 vehicles is likely to be scaled-back, the next generation of armoured vehicles is set to be the largest and most important procurement programme in British Army history. Therefore, this is something we have to get right.

By the late 1990s, the time had already come for the UK to replace its ageing fleet of GKN FV432 tracked armoured personnel carriers and the Alvis CVR (T) family if light tracked vehicles, both of which are more than 40 years old. There was also a need to replace the GKN Saxon 4 x 4 wheeled APC. LSOR 1, the MoD branch responsible for AFV procurement, had originally planned to rationalise the future fleet into three types of vehicle: Heavy AFVs based on a tank chassis; medium utility vehicles and light reconnaissance vehicles. When the Cold War ended, an evolved future requirement was explored by two studies: the Future Family of Light Armoured Vehicles (FFLAV) and the Multi Base Armoured Vehicle (MBAV). These led to two definitive programmes: the Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle (MRAV) to fulfil the requirement for a new utility vehicle / APC and TRACER to fulfil the requirement for a new scout / reconnaissance vehicle family (in conjunction with the USA).

The US Army and USMC had already developed its own family of Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) which provided an excellent balance of mobility, firepower and protection. The MOWAG Piranha was used as the basis for an 8 x 8 wheeled armoured vehicle family able to take advantage of the global network of metalled roads now in existence. It also provided an improved off-road capability versus previous wheeled vehicle types, so could be deployed in combat theatres where there were only rough roads and tracks, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The basic APC version was complemented by an anti-tank vehicle equipped with a large gun (a kind of wheeled tank), a mortar vehicle, an ambulance, a command vehicle and other variants.

The UK aspiration was to take the basic LAV concept and improve upon it. Since Germany and France had identified a similar vehicle requirement, it made sense to team-up with our allies. In 1999, Britain, France and Germany agreed to develop a new multi-role combat vehicle (MRAV). This was called the Boxer. It was an advanced modular design that enabled the vehicle to switch roles quickly and easily. Britain additionally wanted a vehicle that would be air-transportable in a Lockheed C-130 Hercules and Airbus A400 aircraft.

By 2003, the war in Iraq had highlighted the threat posed by IEDs and RPGs. This mandated future vehicles with a higher level of protection, so the original MRAV requirement evolved. Instead of a vehicle weighing less than 17 tonnes, the necessary additional armour increased the weight to 25-30 tonnes, which meant that the Boxer was no longer air-transportable in a C-130 Hercules. Britain insisted on maintaining conflicting requirements for low weight and heavy protection.

One of the factors that made the MoD unwilling to compromise on MRAV specification was that the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory’s (Dstl) research of new types of lightweight armour, including electrically charged armour. It convinced the MoD that it could deliver new technology that would combine low weight with maximum protection. Germany was infuriated by the UK, because it felt that such technology was still in its infancy and would only delay the MRAV programme. When no agreement could be reached about MRAV specifications, the UK withdrew from the Boxer programme. France also left to pursue its own vehicle design, the Nexter VCBI.

The parallel TRACER programme similarly failed to yield a winning design that satisfied the requirements of both the USA and the UK. Again, the MoD’s inability to compromise on design requirements stalled the project. Constantly moving goalposts made it impossible to sign-off on a final design and agree the production process. By the time MRAV and TRACER were cancelled, they had cost the UK taxpayer £188 million(1).

A new light AFV programme was initiated in 2004. Called the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES), it generated a requirement for two separate vehicle families: FRES Utility Vehicle (UV) and FRES Scout Vehicle (SV). With the need for increased protection now well established and advanced armour still being researched, the requirement for FRES to be air transportable in a C-130 Hercules was dropped. For the FRES UV, three vehicles were to be evaluated: the French Nexter VBCI, the MOWAG / General Dynamics Piranha V and, surprisingly, the ARTEC Boxer.

The winning design was meant to have been announced in November 2007 but was delayed until May 2008. The Piranha V was finally selected as the FRES UV with General Dynamics Europe as the preferred bidder, but no production order was forthcoming. Worse still, when the contract was awarded the only vehicles tin existence were modified Piranha IVs, not the intended Piranha V. The project was further complicated by adding an additional layer of management (and cost). An impartial System of Systems Integrator (SOSI) was appointed to assist the MoD in the selection of vehicles and cross-vehicle systems. While arguments about IP rights and production seem to have delayed development, when the credit crunch hit late in 2008, the project was put on-hold. By this time, a further £132 million (1) had been spent, increasing the total future vehicle project costs to £320 million (1).

Although the FRES UV programme stalled, the FRES SV programme continued independently with the MoD evaluating two contenders: the General Dynamics ASCOD 2 and the BAE Systems CV90. Again, General Dynamics won the bid with the winning contender announced in March 2010. FRES SV detractors believed that the requirement was a relic of the cold war and not now needed, or, if it was, that the same role could easily be performed by re-allocating upgraded Warrior MCVs to the role. A further school of thought suggested that reconnaissance role could be fulfilled by a combination of Apache AH-64 attack helicopters supported by small wheeled vehicles (e.g. Supacat Jackal). Whether FRES SV survives the Strategic Defence & Security Review (SDSR) remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, the Bundeswehr and Dutch Army have started to take delivery of the production version of the Boxer. It has been hot-weather tested for operations in Afghanistan and will shortly be deployed there. The German Government, for whom political survival depends on the avoidance of casualties in Afghanistan, believes it has acquired a high value asset that offers better protection against IEDs and RPGs than any competitor. In particular, the Boxer has been favourably compared to existing Piranha variants (used by US Stryker battalions in Iraq) which were criticised for not offering sufficient protection(3). The Boxer also offers superior mobility to Britain’s Mastiff and Ridgeback protected patrol vehicles. Many heavier protected vehicles simply cannot cope with the road conditions in Afghanistan. The German view is that if a vehicle is off-the-road due to a cracked axle or broken suspension, as many UK protected patrol vehicles often are, this represents a fundamental failure to fulfil basic mission requirements(4).

If Boxer proves to be as successful as the Bundeswehr believes it will be, then the UK MoD will look even more incompetent for its indecision and delay, as well as for wasting money that has benefitted our allies rather than our own army. If we were now to select Boxer as the FRES UV, we would adopt it years after we could have had it and it is likely to cost us more than if we had remained a development and manufacturing partner from the outset. Hubris may well prevent the UK from recognising Boxer’s worth, but, if we reject the Boxer again, merely out of fear of further censure, our credibility will hit rock bottom. The Germans have an outstanding track record for producing best-in-class armoured vehicles.

As things stand, Britain still needs a multi-role wheeled armoured vehicle. According to the MoD, the FRES UV programme is meant to recommence in late 2010 and the Strategic Defence Review is expected to greenlight the project with a new expected in-service date of 2017(5). Based on what our allies have chosen and the current limits of technology, the FRES UV requirement is likely to be a vehicle with the following characteristics:

In fairness, the UK MoD and its NATO allies now possess a much greater understanding of future threat scenarios and thus future vehicle requirements. Recent experience has also guided the ongoing development and refinement of Boxer, Piranha and other 8 x 8 vehicle designs to improve the breed. In particular, the ability to add different levels of armour to suit mission requirements offers the best possible protection, increased flexibility, ease of air transportation and future development potential. The 8 x 8 is now firmly established as the primary next generation infantry APC. As the market for this type of vehicle matures with an increased number of competitors producing them, there is a good chance that acquisition costs, vehicle weight, and size will be reduced, while protection, mobility and firepower should also improve. Perhaps the UK’s hesitation to ensure it selected the right vehicle with the best blend of characteristics will yet prove to be a wise move?

If 8 x 8 vehicles are now ideally suited to asymmetric campaigns, the question that needs to be asked is whether they can also become wheeled MCVs suitable for all types of conventional warfare? In other words, could all-wheel drive vehicles replace tracked ones? Tracked vehicles tend to be larger, heavier, more complex and require more maintenance than their wheeled counterparts. They’re also significantly more expensive. The latest 8 x 8 vehicles designs provide superb off-road performance thanks to highly sophisticated transmissions, suspensions and tyre systems. Tyre pressures can be controlled centrally to reduce ground pressure when negotiating soft ground. All-wheel steering provides a tight turning circle with some vehicles almost able to turn on their own axis. If a tracked vehicle loses a track, it becomes immobile; but 8 x 8 vehicles can limp home even when they’ve lost three wheels or an entire axle. Highly compliant suspensions with long travel also provide a much more comfortable ride for troops inside(6).

The counter view is that 8 x 8 vehicles have become so advanced that they are as complex and expensive as any equivalent tracked vehicle and require as much if not more maintenance. The experience of US Stryker Brigades suggests that their wheeled LAVS are easier to operate than previous M113 or Bradley M2 tracked vehicles, offer better protection, simplify training, less prone to reliability issues and, most important of all, improve the fighting capabilities of infantry on the ground(7).

The only real compromise with wheeled 8 x 8 vehicles is that they are ultimately less agile across country than a tracked vehicle, which means that any wheeled FRES UV might not be able keep pace with a Challenger 2 MBT on the battlefield. For this reason, it is unlikely that FRES would replace the Warrior MCV.

As we consider future armoured vehicle options, we cannot predict the types of conflicts that will take place, only plan for a variety of possible scenarios. Therefore, we need a balanced Army that is flexible enough to perform a variety of combat roles. These have been widely discussed elsewhere, but can be divided into the categories below

To be fully prepared for every situation would require a massive standing army. We can only prioritise the most likely threats and so need a balanced force to ensure a flexible and rapid response. In any event, it makes sense to retain a reasonable number of main battle tanks and tracked infantry combat vehicles, so that we are equipped to defend ourselves against any conventional threat. We are unlikely to need the same high number of armoured regiments as we had at the height of the Cold War, so perhaps a single tracked vehicle armoured division would suffice? If a corresponding rapid response division of 8 x 8 armoured vehicles could support a fully mechanised armoured division, providing protected mobility for both conventional and asymmetric warfare operations, then it would give us the necessary increase in capability to deliver troops to wherever they were needed quickly and safely.

Ultimately, the 8 x 8 Future Rapid Effects System vehicle family will be much more than a battlefield taxi. It will be capable of aggressive action and defensive support in a variety of situations. It will provide unprecedented levels of protection, mobility and firepower. As such, it should be viewed as a welcome and highly suitable replacement for FV432 and Saxon, but an asset that complements Challenger 2 and Warrior rather than succeeding them.

If the Government cancels the FRES programme altogether, what will the Army get instead? All we will have is decrepit fleet of clapped-out armoured trucks and unserviceable APCs.

Sources:

(1) RUSI: The Disgraceful saga of armoured vehicle procurement by Peter Flach (June 2010)

(2) RUSI: FRES Alive but not quite kicking by Oliver Gorilla (June 2009)

(3) The Kevlar Coffin, Washington Times, November, 2009

(4) German Defence Ministry Report (May 2010)

(5) General Dynamics Europe

(6) Krauss Mafia Wegmann

(7) US General Accounting Office Report: US Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and M113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles (May 2003)

What Does a CVR(T) Replacement Look Like – Part 1

Think Defence — Sat, 21 Aug 2010 20:13:17 +0000

As we have seen in previous posts there seems to be some uncertainty about FRES Scout, whilst there is no doubt it will be an improvement over CVR(T) in terms of protection, sensors and survivability, this comes at a significant cost.

It is significantly heavier and larger.

This means we can only deploy it by sea or C17, it cannot be lifted by Chinook or A400, will be restricted by bridge class, cannot use the Air Portable Ferry Bridge or Class 30 trackway, will not be as capable of traversing soft ground, it’s width will restrict movement and to move it into position, it will require the services a heavy equipment transporter, one of the 79 currently in service.

Hardly Rapid

Jackal, Coyote and WMIK have also been pressed into service in the recce roles. Viking and Warthog have also been used in the high mobility manoeuvre support roles.

If we are thinking about a CVR(T) replacement, Jackal, Coyote, Viking and Warthog have to be considered

The. Jackal family of vehicles are very well regarded by their users and voicing any criticism is tantamount to heresy!

They have very good mobility, long range, high speed and are a stable platform for the HMG, GPMG and GMG but as you can see in this video are vulnerable to direct and indirect fire and are a little top heavy.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Supacat Extenda, in use with special forces, can also be carried internally by Chinook, extending the range of the Chinook considerably.

Viking is a protected mobility vehicle but because was it vulnerable to IED’s is now being replaced in Afghanistan by the 19 tonne ST Kinetics Bronco, or Warthog in UK service.

Click here to view the embedded video.

So before we get into weights and measures, weapons and sensors, tracks and engines, we must first consider if, in the light of the Jackal and Warthog, we actually need a replacement.

CVR(T) and the Jackal or Warthog are apples and oranges and we should be cautious about using Afghanistan as a template for the future.

In making the case for a CVR(T) replacement that is broadly similar I thought a few quotes from others better qualified than I might do the job…

Moreover, there are some pieces of equipment that provide you with that flexibility, such as a medium mortar of the 81mm size, light artillery of good range and mobility, and light armour. It is significant I think that seventy-three of the seventy-four deployments have involved light armour at some stage in the campaign. Initially, light armor is used in the reconnaissance role for the protection and development of the lodgement area, beach head or air head, and also in subsequent operations, of course, not forgetting the pacification phase of an operation or stabilization or whatever you like to call it, when, again, (particularly) wheeled or light tracked armoured vehicles have been extremely useful. So there’s flexibility derived from both these characteristics of light forces, without which you know one could be really pushed about.

Colonel Neville Pughe, Parachute Regiment

I quite agree, and it is significant that the two most important areas of concern of the several areas that have been singled out for more work in terms of the characteristics of 3 Commando Brigade, as a result of our experiences in the Falklands (and we had the whole brigade down there) were the absence of any light armour in the 3 Commando Brigade and also the absence of air defence. There was light armour down there as you know, but it didn’t belong to us. We are now looking for both of those things to enhance the capabilities of 3 Commando Brigade, without making us into a heavy brigade which loses all of its light infantry advantages.

Colonel Andrew Whitehead of 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines

I am now retired from the Army and embarking on my second career, but I spent most of my 22 years serving in CVR(T) and most of what has been written here has been discussed by the men that did crew them and still do!

It is a fantastic piece of equipment, years ahead of its time when designed and that very fact that there is literally nothing that can do what it does, on the market today, marks it as still being a unique and valued capability, that as was written in the article, we loose at our peril.

In the Falklands, it was 10 years old, relegated to secondary roles for fear it would not be able to traverse the terrain, well it did and in the post op reports, they wanted a Sqn, if not a Regt down there.

In Granby it was written off again because “it wouldn’t keep up” with Challenger/Warrior. Well not only did it, but it was proved that both in the Close and Formation Recce role, the need for the manned platform to FIND the enemy, FIX him and if it went pear shaped could stand up for itself till the big boys arrived, was as valuable as ever and the platform of choice?

CVR(T)

In the Balkans, during the winter of ’93-’94, the only vehicle that could move over roads with inches of black ice, offer protection against IDF and traverse the steep, snowy terrain to get the job done was CVR(T).

During Telic 1 it was engaging and holding its own in fights with T55 while it’s human crew made the decisions to use Arty, Air or other ground units to out manoeuvre the enemy.

On Herrick with Mine blast Protection, ballistic protection and bar armour, not only does it mean the crew walk away from mine strikes and RPG strikes, I’ve seen it first hand, but in some cases the vehicle not only survives, but continues to fight! (But the extra protection does push it to 11 tonnes!)

Why is CVR(T) so good at what it does?

It has the perfect balance of Armour/Protection/Firepower but it is its size and weight that means it can go anywhere and do anything.

I for one, along with many other will shed a tear when it finally backs into the hanger for the last time.

Dean, a Think Defence commenter

Some more background on CVR(T) in the Falklands can be read here including…

The Blues and Royals went ashore at San Carlos without incident and were quickly incorporated into the defence, protecting the build up phase of the operation. During this phase, the CVRs were used for hauling supplies and for air defence using their coaxially mounted 7.62-mm machine guns. One Scimitar claimed credit for downing an A4 Skyhawk at a 1,000m with its 30-mm gun. After the build up phase, the CVRs moved south to assist with the landings at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. The CVRs accompanied 3 Para and 45 Commando (both are light infantry regiments) on their 50 mile march, ending up the only vehicles capable of making the cross country journey.

The sensation of driving across the water logged surface was described as similar to driving on a water bed. At Bluff Cove the CVRs were again pressed into air defence service. Civilians observing the air attacks on the Sir Galahad and Sir Tristan at Bluffs Cove claim to have seen one of the CVRs hit its target. In spite of losses, the British forces continued their move toward Port Stanley.

Battles fought across the high ground above Port Stanley were planned to take place at night and involved close direct and indirect fire support. The first phase-attack was opened by 3 Para with their assault on Mount Longdon. Initial surprise was achieved in the darkness, but the enemy were soon alert and resisted fiercely with heavy accurate fire. 4 Troop provided valuable direct fire support with their 76mm, firing HESH. The battle for the eastern sector of Mount Longdon was to last 6 hours and, for the western half, 4 hours. The enemy positions were captured by a process of calling for very close fire support, at times within 50 meters of the leading British troops.

Two techniques used by the British employing the CVRs proved very successful. The first involved a diversionary attack on the night of 12 June. In the attack, the Scots Guards employed 4 Troop in a reconnaissance role and then a direct fire role insupport of the diversionary assault. The impact of the use of the CVRs was instrumental deceiving the enemy.

The Argentine commander later admitted that “…he had been entirely deceived by the diversionary attack into thinking it was the main attack on his position”

The other technique employed by the CVRs is known as “zapping”: …the CVR crew would engage the Argentine position with a brief burst of machine gun fire provoking a response, which was promptly silenced by the main gun. The 30mm RARDEN cannon, with its high velocity and great accuracy, was much favoured for this technique.

Few Argentines felt able to reply after being zapped.

Armour, played key roles during the Falklands War performing reconnaissance, security, and support of dismounted manoeuvre missions. The presence of the CVRs during the initial build up phase provided a degree of security otherwise not available had an attack been launched by the Argentineans, particularly if they had used their 90-mm gun equipped Panhards (wheeled armoured vehicles). Once again, armoured vehicles surprised their supporters and silenced the critics with their great mobility in terrain considered unacceptable. When employed in support of infantry, the CVRs provided critical direct fire, especially with their passive sights during the hours of darkness. Additional roles of air defence and aiding the logistics only enhanced the primary fire support role provided by the CVRs.

And if that isn’t enough, listen to Arnold Judas Rimmer

Click here to view the embedded video.

Before I move on to discussing the characteristics of a replacement, here are a few videos of CVR(T) in action

Click here to view the embedded video.

CVR(T) – What are we losing?

Think Defence — Wed, 18 Aug 2010 08:12:02 +0000

In many armed forces the role of formation reconnaissance is carried out by heavy armoured vehicles, either Main Battle Tanks or modified infantry combat vehicles actually fighting for information instead of being stealthy. The real stealthy role is often fulfilled by very small wheeled vehicles and there are a number of competing doctrines that dictate the design of such vehicles.

Whatever the underlying doctrine, CVR(T) has performed a wide range of roles in its long career but as it is replaced by FRES SV it might be worth asking what we are going to lose by replacing an 8-11 tonne vehicle with one weighing in at 40 odd tonnes. Most of the discussion on FRES has revolved on what we will be getting rather than what we will be leaving behind.

FRES Scout

In 1982 Scimitar and Scorpion played a decisive role in the Falklands Conflict, especially the Battle for Wireless Ridge and they have been successfully used in almost every conflict the British Army has been involved in since it was introduced in the early 70′s. In this operation they were not specifically used as armoured reconnaissance but as mobile fire support for very light forces.

Having a vehicle that is below the magic 10 tonne mark allows that vehicle to be underslung by a Chinook, carried on a DROPS flatrack, air dropped and carried in multiples by tactical airlift aircraft. It is likely that the C130 will be leaving RAF service in the medium term so looking at the A400, it would be able to carry three such vehicles or a pair of them for long range flights. Scimitar could also be carried on an ISO flatrack container and its exceptionally low round pressure and narrow width means that it can go places simply denied to other vehicles. Scimitar could also move at serious speed on road surfaces and self deploy without the use of a flatbed truck.

Looking at FRES SV and comparing;

Chinook, NO

DROPS/Standard Truck, NO

C130, NO

A400, NO

Deploying even short distances will require a Heavy Equipment Transporter, which we have a mere 79 of and they are operated as a PFI.

What about gap crossing?

At 8-11 tonnes CVR(T) can use a wide variety of existing bridges, FRES Scout will be limited in the bridges it can use. The Air Portable Ferry Bridge, at Class 35, will be out of bounds, as will Class 30 Trackway.

One has to ask if the decision to go from 10 to 40 tonnes has really been thought out in the context of strategic mobility.

To see how much this degrades usability simply look at a couple of scenarios and calculate how many CVR(T) versus FRES Scout can be delivered to an airhead in a given period of time.

Using an A400, zero for FRES and 3 CVR(T) on a single flight

Using a C17, 1 for FRES and 10 for CVR(T) on a single flight

One might argue that we do not intend on deploying armoured vehicles by air, that a large vehicle is needed for survivability or that 1 FRES is worth many CVR(T) and these are all valid points, but the difference is stark.

It gets even worse when deploying from a port to area of operations, at a push CVR(T) could self deploy i.e. drive there itself or failing that be transported on the back of almost any military or civilian truck. With FRES we either have to wait for one of the very small number of HET’s we/KBR have or try and find civilian low loaders that can handle 40 tonne plus loads without special dispensation or ‘heavy load’ restrictions. It is probably fair to say that low loaders like HET’s operate at crawling speed in comparison with standard trucks.

Whilst in the area of operations we could in some circumstances, air lift CVR(T) as an underslung load by Chinook or even air drop them to support light forces and carry out flanking, envelopment, interdiction or deep strike operations. When engaged in amphibious operations a Chinook operating from HMS Ocean would be able to move CVR(T) inland instead of having to rely on our limited number of LCU’s.

None of these will be possible with FRES SV and in a strategic deployment context, I am struggling with the Rapid part of Rapid Effects.

The ‘answer’ to these mobility challenges seems to be defaulting towards Jackal because that is what we have been using in Afghanistan. Jackal is no doubt an excellent vehicle but is open topped, vulnerable to small arms fire and shell fragments, has no NBC protection, has limited firepower, limited sensors (even the gucci ones with mast mounted surveillance systems) and in soft terrain like mud or snow also has limited mobility when compared with the 40 year old CVR(T)

Going back to the first question, do we really need such a lightweight and multi role vehicle, what is the underlying doctrine and mission requirements?

If the answer to these questions is yes and we need a vehicle that is sub 10 tonne, has a reasonable level of protection, firepower and mobility then what can meet those requirements.

The elephant in the room is IED protection, CVR(T) is very vulnerable and this is a large part of the decision to ‘go heavy’

I suppose the most obvious answer is CVR(T), perhaps a development rather than a few re-manufactured hulls using the latest in lightweight armour and propulsion systems. This doesn’t address the IED issue though.

If not that then, how about a Think Defence hair brain scheme?

Take the front hull of a Viking and replace the body with a V shaped 2 seat crew pod, arranged in tandem like Apache. Fit a remote weapon station and mast mounted sensor pod. The weapon station could use anything from a HMG to 30mm ATK 30mm cannon or the Lightweight Modular Missile. This would still come in at sub ten tonnes, be amphibious and highly mobile in both a tactical and strategic context. I have conveniently forgot the transmission tunnel but come on, these are just ‘details’

If not that, are there any designs available off the shelf that can match the sublime blend of mobility, protection and firepower that is CVR(T)

The German Wiesel is an interesting class of vehicles, Sven might be able to shed some light on their deployment to Afghanistan whilst they are incredibly mobile, perhaps too small to be survivable in the age of the IED.

I still think there is a need for small and highly mobile vehicles that can support a wide range of missions and provide something better than wheeled vehicles but as I said, the elephant in the room is the IED, maybe its just not feasible.

CVR(T) – The Sequel

Think Defence — Sun, 02 May 2010 11:18:46 +0000

Jane’s are reporting that the MoD are in negotiation with BAe to re-manufacture CVR(T) hulls.

WTF

When I looked at the history of the CVR(T) I described how the programme had its inception in the 1960 Armoured Vehicle Reconnaissance project which turned into Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance. First prototypes were produced in 1967 and accapted into service in 1970.

40 years later and despite hundreds of millions of pounds being spent on replacement programmes from Future Family of Light Armoured Vehicles (FFLAV) to Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) and culminating in the FRES Scout it seems the answer is more CVR(T)

Not sure what the base model will be, the Scimitar, flatbed Stormer or any of the other variants.

What is the nature of the reported manufacture, is it just a few hulls to see us over an attrition gap between now and the introduction of FRES Scout or something more specialised?

Anyone know?

Quick, Spend It Now

Think Defence — Mon, 22 Mar 2010 22:23:26 +0000

So, General (BOWMAN) Dynamics have been named as preferred bidder for the demonstration phase of the Specialist Vehicle Recce Block 1. The Common Base Platform will also form the basis for a range of other variants.

Conveniently forgetting the last 20 years of MoD bungling, Chief of Defence Material, Sir Kevin O’Donoghue, commented on the MoD’s performance;

To have reached this point in a complex programme so soon after the assessment phase began in summer 2008 reflects highly on the Defence Equipment and Support staff involved

It may well do but please let’s stop blowing smoke up our frocks and suggesting that this is anything but a rushed, back to the wall decision, based on running out of time due to what is possibly one of the most inept programmes in the MoD’s sorry history.

Making such a significant decision so close to an election and Strategic Defence Review is ridiculous. Another few months will not make any difference in the grand scheme of things.

At least it looks like the term FRES has been quietly dropped, perhaps an MP might table a question to inquire about the total cost of the programme, including delays and UOR’s as a result.

The vehicles will enter service, as long as the assessment phase goes according to plan, some time in 2015. Given that GD have yet to actually produce the Scout variant, unlike BAe, does anyone on this planet have any confidence that this date will actually materialise.

No word on contract value yet either, expect this to leak out once contracts have been placed but it is expected to be in the order of £2billion, or about £33 million a piece, although this figure will also include various additions such as logistics, training and other support elements.

We should remain hopeful, at least a decision has been made and the vehicle may well turn out to be the best option.

In other spending news, the MoD has also agreed to buy 3 Rivet Joint aircraft to replace the Nimrod R1’s which are being withdrawn from service in, 2011, in fact 1 has already been withdrawn. The R1 and 51 Squadron were a serious ‘go to’ capability that the UK led the world in.

Again, with no credible alternative the MoD has been forced to buy ‘the last chicken in the shop’ because there was no coherent or credible replacement for an aircraft that’s almost exactly as old as CVR(T)

Before the end of the week, expect more, possibly for the next phase of the Future Surface Combatant.

Getting these orders in before the election sets the Conservatives up, should they win the next election, for a honeymoon period kicking from a newly in opposition Labour party, should they chose to cancel post SDR.

It totally compromises the next strategic defence review and smacks of politics, rather than sane and sensible equipment planning.

Perhaps we should be grateful for at least some investment. Normally, we would be singing from the rooftops but can’t help feeling that the armed forces are being used for political gain.

Some things change, some things stay the same.

This was out 300th post.