As the COIN theory seems to being discredited and replaced with whatever comes next it is interesting to note that it’s predecessor seems to be making a comeback. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) ushered in a new vision of rapid deployments, sensor fusion, information superiority and replacing mass with effect. This was a brave new world in which forces would be rapidly deployed by air, see the enemy before they left their mud huts, fix them with advanced sensors, arrive in a hail of air portable allyness, destroy the enemy (who would have obligingly decided to face us mano a mano) then build a few schools and be home in time for tea and medals.

New medium weight vehicles, airlift, massive information superiority and other very very expensive equipment would replace ‘boots on the ground’

We all know that this particular PowerPoint fuelled fantasy fashion was dealt a very real reality check in Iraq and Afghanistan but the expensive vision that underscored the expensive concepts like the US FCS and UKs FRES seems to be making a comeback.

In the bitch fight that the SDSR has seemingly descended into the argument between the Army, which is traditionally manpower intensive and the RAF/RN which tend to be equipment intensive are at odds.

RUSI, playing the part of the tailor of new clothes suggested that the UK could no longer maintain a balanced force structure and presented a number of options, strategic raiding, which was loosely translated as being centred on maritime capabilities. Supporters of the Royal Navy, in the SDSR debate, latched on to this as manna from heaven because it in one fell swoop provided cover for calling for the Army to suffer a disproportionate reduction. It was also useful in the fight against the real enemy, the RAF that is!

It was and is argued that a raiding strategy is much more appropriate because we are an island you know and no government would likely entertain another commitment like Iraq and Afghanistan any time soon. So, donning the emperors old RMA clothes and calling them new, the brave new world will see UK armed forces reconfigured to a maritime centric raiding force.

It’s all very neat and all too convenient because its gives us all a reason to keep spending on equipment, maintain a strong navy and rarely ever actually get involved in any shooty stuff. The hard and dangerous job of stabilisation and reconstruction would be carried out by those more expendable others, like UN forces, once we had obligingly kicked the doors in and retired back to Blighty. An avalanche of newspaper columns, blog posts, think tank reports and forum comments have followed, all supporting the maritime raiding position in preference to anything else.

The other services haven’t been slow to jump on the same type of bandwagons, the Army think every single conflict will be like Afghanistan, a war among the people. The RAF highlight every incursion into the North Atlantic by Russian strategic bombers as evidence of the need for 400 Typhoon’s.

In many cases, Strategic Raiding simply creates a problem for others and is counter productive. It is sometimes used to justify having a capability to regain lost territory, usually the Falkland Islands, instead of the sensible and cost effective (money and lives) garrison and diplomacy. We also take comfort in the certainty that we will actually be in some sort of control of the nature of conflicts we are faced in, if anything the last 30 years has shown, it is that the world is unpredictable so the widely held view that future politicians will look at Iraq and Afghanistan and think twice is simply, yet another fallacy.

Everyone is in an unseemly rush to look beyond Afghanistan, hold on a minute, lets finish that one before spending too much time/money planning for the future.

It seems that convenient military fashion has trumped the eminently sensible approach of maintaining a balanced force.

If we go too far in one direction or the other we will be unable to adjust in time or at a sufficient level, if our capabilities sit at the centre of the spectrum then whichever unforeseen eventuality occurs we will be able to flex up or down as appropriate.

There is a big ‘however’

We can’t afford this at a high level so might have to choose which capabilities to scale back. We might think it reasonable to cut back on air defence fighters, main battle tanks or frigates but not eliminate them.

I still think it is entirely feasible to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities, at a smaller scale, and then choose which areas of capability we can expand. These would be expanded to a degree that we become the natural choice where they might be used in coalition, medium scale and above, operations.

Which these might be is of course the key debate but the result must be based on what is achievable, what is relevant to the most likely operational context and what delivers the most practical benefit. One might argue, based on likelihood and history, that this is some sort of land based COIN/Stabilisation operation supported by the maritime and air elements.

Above all though, we should forget the emperors new clothes of strategic raiding.

The defence review is occurring at a time of extreme financial pressure at home and considerable military risk in Afghanistan. Yet it would be a grave failure if it attended principally – or worse, exclusively – to the clamour of those issues. The deepest principles of national security are silent. They explain why bad things don’t happen and they must be given voice. This article also argues that geopolitics prescribe a primarily maritime framework for any British SDSR, and that the core strategic challenges are naval. The Royal Navy, however, has become dangerously weak. Urgent steps must be taken to reverse this trend before it is too late

Its timing is of course related to the pre SDSR buzz but I hope it doesn’t get get labelled as Senior Service Special Pleading because its is very interesting and relevant.

Acknowledging the dire state of the public finances, but arguing national security is not a discretionary expenditure, the paper suggests the strategic need for more surface combatants must be met through reassessing the choice of ‘seriously cost constrained’ new ships, looking closely at examples from Denmark and the Netherlands that offer a modular, adaptable design at a quarter of the price of currently planned purchases.

The paper argues for a cost constrained general purpose class of ships that make extensive use of modularity. It argues for 12-15 of these to compliment a force of 12 to 14 Type 45 and Type 26 (that’s in total, not 12-14 each)

This is a strong argument, a return to the two tier constabulary nature of forward defence with the ability to surge highly capable ships into an area should it be needed. Although the numbers and capabilities might be different it is fundamentally in line with the Think Defence position, that of  a high capability core surrounded by lower capability but more numerous types.

Jed wrote a couple of great posts on this, here and here

I also looked at it from another angle with the C3 modular concept and other posts here and here.

The authors also published a similar paper in 2007 called ‘The Royal Navy at the Brink’, arguing for a 30 ship Future Surface Combatant (FSC) comprising a 10 C1, 20 C2 ratio but the new paper recognises the financial constraints we are in.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Anyone thinking that pallet dimensions would be coordinated with vehicle dimensions, aircraft hold dimensions and ISO containers is in for a shock!

We know that ISO containers are the desired method of shipping by road, rail and sea. Their large size and weight means the opposite is true for air transportation and for small loads ISO containers don’t really make much sense.

For air transportation and small break bulk loads, the pallet is the obvious and preferred option.
There are 2 main systems.

The 463L pallet is a military system that uses a flush pallet designed for easy handling using cargo aircraft floor rollers. The standard 463L is made of aluminium with a wooden core and has slots for forklifts. because it is of smooth and uniform construction there is nothing to snag on aircraft floors, this means they can be easily moved within the aircraft without mechanical handling equipment and shoved out of the back door when air dropping. Each pallet can have a maximum weight of approximately 4.5tonnes and is 2734 x 2235mm. The only problem with the 463L system is their great cost which means they are rarely used intermodally, loads that are delivered to an airhead by air will be broken down and transferred to other types of pallet or container. Because the 463L pallet has so many uses outside of the transport sphere they have a habit of going missing. The associated intermodal platform supplements the 463L by using an intermediate pallet, the AIP is placed between the 463L and the load and used for transfers, thus keeping the expensive 463L within the air transportation system.

For commercial airfreight the containers have to be very lightweight and conform to the hold dimensions and shape of the most common aircraft. the familiar aluminium notched rectangle is the most common and called the Unit Load Device.

The UK will be using the Airbus A330 as supplied by the Future Strategic Aircraft PFI from Air Tanker which commonly uses the LD3 version of the ULD although it will be able to take 463L’s as well.

For ground transportation the 463L and LD3 are impractical for a variety of reasons so the more familiar pallet types are used

Standardised Euro pallets come in 6 sizes but the most common are 800 x 1000 or 800 x 1200mm

ISO has 6 standard pallet sizes, 2 of which are the Euro pallet size and the other four are the most common types in other locations.

For military applications another standard us used, MIL STD 1660 is commonly used for ammunition pallets and designed for efficient ISO container packing. Amongst the many specifications the size is 1016 x 1219mm

To see the benefits of the metric system for scaling and utility one only needs to look to paper. The ISO 216 paper system has elegant simplicity, A4 = 2x A5, A3 = 2xA4 for example and when scaling up or down the multiplication factors are consistent multiples of square roots. It might be a bit geeky but the difference this makes to photocopiers and printers is significant. It is one of those things that simply makes sense.Bizarrely, North America is the only place that doesn’t use this eminently sensible approach and insists on using various combinations of imperial sizes, letter and legal for example. Toilet paper is usually in A6 format as well!

What has this got to do with military logistics?

I have just used it to demonstrate the logic of metric dimensions and the ease of which they scale and stack in multiples. 2 packs of A4 occupy the footprint of A3 for example.

The interlinking of metric and imperial measurements makes things immeasurably more complicated and as these different systems have evolved interoperability is still a problem. Equipment is built around one standard or the other, military airlift aircraft for example commonly use the 463L but civilian aircraft use the ULD.

Chinook internal cargo bay width, with the seats installed but folded, is approximately 2.1m and the length 9.1m which means the 463L cannot be used and if the MIL STD 1660 is used, there is wastage either side. this might not be a problem with a mixed personnel/stores load but it is not efficient.

Merlin internal cargo bay width is 2.4m and the length, a little over 7m. The width of the cargo bay means that it can use 463L pallets but there is some space left over lengthwise meaning only 2 can be carried.

Perhaps more importantly for helicopters, given they are likely to be at the end of the supply chain, is what can be done with those pallets once they have landed. 463L pallets are generally too expensive to be used in tactical roles unless air dropping and handling equipment is generally geared towards the smaller 1660 or Euro/ISO pallet.

As can be seen from this picture we tend to break bulk loads and rely on old fashioned manpower. The scene below shows a Merlin, blades running, at a HLS near a FOB in Afghanistan. this scene may be atypical but there are 6 personnel and 2 vehicles, a Quad and Springer involved with unloading a relatively small amount of stores, perhaps just personal equipment. No mechanical handling devices are used.

Merlin, Springer and Quad Bike

A recent story from the MoD about night time air dropping of supplies and a new system that makes the whole exercise much more accurate meaning less area to sanitise for IED’s is also interesting from a stores handling perspective.

The C130 is loaded using a mechanical handling vehicle

The pallets are air dropped

Broken down by hand, loaded onto Quad trailers and Springers

Broken down by hand, loaded onto Quad trailers and Springers

The stores are then driven to the FOB/PB or other waiting vehicles, perhaps in a number of round trips. The story quotes 60 tonnes needing 20 personnel and a nights worth of dangerous activity, perhaps with as many as 3 or 4 aircraft involved.

So whilst the problems of pallet interoperability will likely continue to be a an insurmountable problem, 463L, ISO, 1660 and Euro pallets are here to stay it would seem, are there any ways we can make this process at the sharp end more efficient?

Most loads some to comprise lots of small boxes, ammunition, ration packs, batteries, spares, medical supplies and other sundries so efficient packaging would seem to offer a great deal of benefits. Airdrop pallets need to of course be tough, they may hit rocks or turn over on impact and have to be rigged very carefully so any airdrop system would need to take this into account. Slinging loads underneath helicopters to assist with rapid unloading makes them fuel inefficient but is many cases it is too dangerous to hand around whilst stores are offloaded, box by box and at many FOB’s there are no mechanical handling vehicles available to assist.

Looking at those grainy green images one wonders of we have really progressed from Market Garden or Burma, we might be able to drop onto a smaller area but it still needs manual handling on the ground.

In a previous post on the Springer I asked if it was a retrograde step, the problem of retrieving stores from drop zones is not a new one and in what is a depressingly familiar tale, we have worked the answers out, deployed equipment and then got rid of it thinking we might not need it, only to have to relearn those lessons and start from scratch.

The Supacat ATMP can use a pallet loading trailer, the FLPT (Fork Lift Pallet Trailer) and SLLPT (Self Loading Lightweight Pallet Trailer) that are designed to reverse onto a pallet, hook it up in less than a minute and drive away. No breaking the pallet down, quick and easy.

These have all been sold now and whilst our soldiers are sweating it out transferring air dropped pallets by hand into the back of a Springer the trailers that might have actually been of some use are in civilian hands, transporting Rayburn cookers. The ATMP could even be fitted with a HIAB hydraulic jib if the trailers are not practical.

Another option may be simply to provide the FOB’s with a mechanical reach stacker. The C Vehicle PFI has provided 333 JCB 524-50 Telehandlers but these may not be suitable to cover the distance or terrain between the FOB and drop zone. We might call up those nice people at JCB and ask for several High Mobility Rough Terrain Forklift. The HMRTF can be underslung by a Chinook, carried in a 20ft ISO container and handle adverse terrain. Simply carrying a lightweight demountable forklift on the back of a truck would be yet another option and these are made by a number of manufacturers including HIAB, Loadmac, Manitou, Stonehall and Palfinger, as shown below.

One wonders if by using a a truck and forklift combination the recovery operation above might have been quicker and carried out with less personnel.

This caught my eye and I wonder if there are military applications.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is from a UK company called U Tail and although for military use it would need to be more robust I think it has potential.

The dimensions would have to be defined around the internal dimensions of the Chinook and Merlin. At approx 2m wide it could take 2 Euro or 1660 pallets and still fit inside a Merlin or Chinook. Lose stores could be pre loaded into the container.

Airdropping might also be a possibility as it would comfortably fit within the 463L envelope.

Instead of relying on manpower, something we are chronically short of, especially in Afghanistan, using simple, off the shelf or easily developed technology we can make the delivery of materials to forward locations much more efficient.

Afghanistan Images by Sergeant Keith Cotton RLC

The Army still seems to be enamoured with the medium weight concept with the recent announcements on the ASCOD FRES SV vehicles. If it is the intention to reduce both the heavy formations and lighter formations with a greater number of medium weight ones then impact on logistics is uncertain, what you take in one hand is given to the other. Operations in Afghanistan have shown that whilst dismounted operations against this type of enemy uses the same light infantry and small unit tactics that have evolved over centuries their means of transport is considerably weightier, for example Mastiff.

Other factors that might inform our vehicle choices is the knowledge that the current situation is unsustainable and we have to strive for standardisation, or to use the Think Defence term, Ruthless Commonality. As I have said before, this is about much more than neatness, we have to save money on driver training, spares, maintenance and integration by moving to as few types of vehicles as possible. I think I may be preaching to the converted here though!

The current drive must be to sustain what is in Afghanistan and when this operation ceases the Army will enter a period of recovery, during which time we must consider what to do with the hundreds of vehicles (and other equipment) purchased under UOR. Do we recognise that in the long term much of this equipment will not be suitable, or will the Army be told to keep it?

What about supporting our designers and manufacturers; BAe, Supacat, Creation, MultiDrive, JCB, Oviks, TMV, QinetiQ and Universal Engineering for example?

So many questions, none of which I am going to even attempt answer!

Instead, these are just some out aloud thoughts!

The tank is not dead and will not be in the future either so lets all stop calling them cold war relics, as ever though, they must evolve both in capability and organisational terms. I like the idea of organising tanks into smaller, more independent units, even down to independent armoured squadrons that have the full range of support equipment including recovery, combat engineering and recce. These squadrons could deploy in singles to support operations similar to Afghanistan or combine to create a larger armoured brigade. I think the days of having 2 armoured brigades are numbered. Their 120mm main guns are mainly for destroying other tanks so to improve utility in operations where they are being used to overmatch non armoured enemy forces we should be looking at creating an equivalent to the Russian BMP-T, armed with the 40mm CTA cannon and a range of missile armament, either Hellfire, CRV7-PG or the Lightweight Modular Missile for example. Maybe even a return of the 76mm, 90mm or 105mm main weapon is something we might consider for these lighter Challenger variants.

Whatever we do in the medium weight sphere, we still need to keep the Challenger 2, even in its main anti tank role but at a smaller scale.

Whatever the relative merits of CV90 or ASCOD I think we can all agree they are very similar and as far as the FRES concept goes it makes a lot of sense, only if it is followed through. In the medium to long term FRES SV should replace Warrior, Warrior variants and CVR(T). All the planned variants including the direct fire version should be introduced, in quantity.

Replacing AS90 completely with a combination of truck mounted modular 155mm cannon and GMLRS reduces the vehicle count even further.

Vikings should be retained with the RM and Warthogs, the Army.

I still think there is a gap for a small armoured vehicle, sub 10 tonnes so it can be lifted by a Chinook and more than one carried in an A400. Keeping to this weight also means they can be carried easily on railway flatbeds and trucks for extended reach. FRES SV is not strategically mobile because it will need a low loader, C17 or ship to deploy and on the battlefield can only move under its own power.

How about a derivative of Viking, leave off the rear module and replace the cab with a centreline protected capsule, mast mounted sensor package and remote weapon station carrying an ATK 30mm cannon or GMG/HMG?. It would be light enough to be airlifted, air dropped, amphibious and easily transported inter theatre.

Any takers?

The Terrier sticks out because it is only just entering service and will not have commonality with anything else. In an ideal world we would use ASCOD as a base for these types of vehicles but replacing it now would not be sensible so we should just accept it.

The IED is not going to go away any time soon so any new vehicles must take this into account. This reality means we have to accept that the Land Rover, Pinzgauer, Jackal and Panther should be withdrawn.

In the protected mobility and light logistics role we should go to a two tier fleet.

The Ocelot 4×4 PPV would replace the Land Rover and its many derivatives including WMIK, Snatch, GS and FFR. The modular nature of the payload bay makes this an attractive and versatile design. In non combat roles we should make more use of ‘white fleet’ vehicles like a Toyota pickup for example.

The Ranger would be a natural replacement for RB44, Pinzgauer (load carrier), Mastiff, Fuchs, Ridgeback, Panther, Wolfhound, Vector, Jackal, Coyote and Husky. Its approach to modular payloads is also attractive.

Both these can use the new common electronic vehicle architecture and have a growth path to the insertion of hybrid propulsion technologies.

The only fly in the ointment for Ranger and Ocelot is of road mobility, they don’t seem as agile in the rough stuff as Pinzgauer and Supacat families so perhaps there is a niche for a vehicle that has high mobility, relatively low weight a high degree of blast protection. This niche might be filled by an improved Jackal or even TMV 6×6.

With this, we couple replace the majority of the non logistics fleet with a small number of vehicle types, reaping significant benefits in training, logistics and ultimately, cost.

For the large logistics behicles we should simply keep on going with the MAN Support Vehicles except to convert the UBRE’s to containerised fuel distribution systems. The Royal Engineers Unipower 8×8’s should also be replaced with a containerised/flatrack bridging system. The C Vehicle PFI should be redrafted to that instead of Iveco Trakker trucks we

The Close Support Tanker is an interesting choice and is one of the most mobile vehicles we have but unless we are going to go for an articulated DROPS replacement then we might consider replacing the tankers with a tank container based system. Capacity might be lower which means more vehicles for a given delivery volume but this might be compensated for in other areas.

The Leyland/Foden DROPS replacement programme could simply use the existing EPLS system, bringing it into the main equipment programme and using SX rather than HX chassis.

An alternative to the traditional articulated truck might be an articulated dump truck type design that could combine a wide range of containerised/flatrack payloads with extreme off road mobility. The main problem with this type is the skid steering system and lack of on road legality in many countries, the Multidrive system might be a concept worthy of consideration.

By taking a holistic view of the entire vehicle fleet with a view to long term consolidation we can exploit design synergies and create a paradigm shift in vehicle provision.

To start off Part 2 I am going to look at a single vehicle type, the GMLRS.

GMLRS is a vitally useful system, highly precise, incredibly effective and with utility in all most spectrums of conflict. We don’t have that many though, so if one throws a track or its engine becomes defective not only is the vehicle out of action, crucially, so is the weapon system.

Modularisation has been talked of for some time and the Danish naval Stanflex system goes some way to achieving it but whilst the ability to quickly reconfigure a ship with one weapon system or the other is useful, in reality, less likely to be used than one might imagine. The real benefit of modularity is in the scenario described above. With a modular payload, another vehicle could be quickly bought to the stricken one and during the recovery process, the weapon element simply swapped. The broken down vehicle goes for repair and the weapon system carries on its way.

Weapons and their controlling systems (UAV’s ground stations for example) are becoming more expensive yet we still insist on physically connecting them to vehicles whose technology has not fundamentally changed in decades. If the cheap vehicle is damaged or breaks down, more likely because if moving and wear components, it impacts adversely, the very expensive system it is carrying. We therefore negate our investment in hi technology weapons and associated systems because of problems with low technology and cheap vehicles.

This approach of splitting the payload from its carrier is epitomised by targeting and recce pods carried by strike fighters like Tornado or F16’s. The rapidly changing and expensive targeting pods can be carried by a number of different aircraft, swapped as needed and sweated for maximum utilisation by the simple expedient of not making them integral to the aircraft.

In pre deployment periods, whilst a force was being assembled, the most effective and relevant modules could be selected from a central location and either mounted onto donor vehicles or simply carried to theatre separately.

Modularity therefore, is a central part of any approach to vehicle coherence.

Start with the modules and build the vehicles around them.

If we are really serious about the concept we can also use the modules in the maritime environment. If we can assemble a CAMM module for use on land, why can’t exactly the same module be carried on a ship?

Part 2, therefore, will look at these modules; Part 3 will look at the vehicles that wrap around them.

To start the discussion on modules should be some consideration of weights and dimensions, in some areas these are critical considerations because they dictate the degree of strategic mobility. If we cannot lift a particular module using a Chinook for example, then is it of any utility. Traditional weapon systems design often tries to create a lightweight system that incorporates BOTH the vehicle and its payload, this often results in compromise so whilst it would not be the default position, systems may be split and transported separately. This of course means 2 very expensive journeys but when taken in the round the payoff between a higher lift cost and utility or effect may be worth it.

The natural starting point for a module would be the ISO container, nominally the 10ft, 20ft and 40ft size. The world’s logistic system is built around these dimensions, roads, ships, railways and means of transport. Being able to utilise existing civilian transport resources in theatre, again, largely configured for moving ISO containers, also provides many advantages including cost, speed and the unrealised potential of disguise.

At the smaller size, the ISO container dimensions might be less than optimal so whilst using the ISO container size as the foundation, we should also be flexible enough depart from these when necessary.

Some modules would be very weight sensitive because of air portability issues so whilst we should use the ISO container form factor, conventional steel construction would not always be the preferred choice. Whatever the construction, any container we develop should still be able to be handled as if it were a standard steel ISO container.

The civilian ISO container handling infrastructure has evolved considerably but is largely based on predictable pathways and favourable conditions. These will not always be available in the kind of austere locations military forces operate in so some consideration must be given to handling, especially the larger containers.

Despite the weight and handling challenges, the benefits on offer outweigh any disadvantages.

I have looked at containerisation and modularity in previous posts on logistics vehicles, ship to shore logistics and the RN C3. The real value with this approach is looking at in an end to end fashion, from the UK to theatre, sustainment and recovery back to the UK. At each stage we should consider the issues of transport, handling and tracking. In some circumstances the theatre in question may be at sea or in the littoral but the value proposition must extend to all services.

There is already an expeditionary camp infrastructure team at the MoD that does excellent work and already has much of this covered.

Modules would consist of 4 types; cargo, accommodation, weapon & complex systems and logistic support, here are a few suggestions…

Cargo

These are of obviously the simplest of all. Available in 10, 20 and 40ft lengths they would consist of flat racks, standard containers, lightweight containers (possibly including the folding Cargoshell design), curtain side and liquid tanks where there was no metering or pumping equipment. All must be stackable.

Conventional ISO containers are often called ‘Dry Vans’ and beyond the standard 10,20 and 40ft range are also available in high cube and extended length for certain applications.

10 foot; dry weight 1.5 tonnes, length 3.05m, width 2.44m, height 2.89m

20 foot, dry weight 3.25 tonnes, length 6.06m, width 2.444m, height 2.89m, payload 28.65 tonnes

40 foot, dry weight 4.06 tonnes, length 12.19m, width 2.44m, height 2.89m, payload 28.65 tonnes

Refrigerated containers are called reefers and come with integral refrigeration equipment, external and self contained power.

Liquids tank containers are simply a cylindrical steel tank contained within an ISO container compliant framework. By keeping to the ISO container size and configuration they can use exactly the same intermodal transportation resources as conventional containers. In industry, these are used to transport foodstuffs and industrial chemicals and come in a variety of insulated, non insulated and compartmentalised variants. In a military context, the most likely payloads would be water, lubricants or fuels. A typical 20 foot uninsulated tank container can carry 26,000 litres with an empty weight of approximately 3,500 to 4,000kg.

These would be the cheapest of the 4 types but must all be fitted with RFID tracking chips and appear on central logistic management systems.

These are available off the shelf with more or less no integration work and we already have many of them but an increased stock holding of these versatile and adaptable types would be desirable.

Accommodation

It is probably easier at this stage simply to list some of the possible variations;

Stores, i.e. containerised G10, Personnel, Ablutions, Kitchen, Guard tower/Sangar, Washroom and even kennels have been and should continue to be used.

One possible innovative unit would be a self contained multi service unit for forward units. This is not about providing hot and cold running waitress service but a system that can provide small units with basic washing, toilet, shower, battery charging, power generation and hot water production for cooking. We might look at the environmentally friendly solutions on the market because their desire for low or zero water usage and ease of maintenance are objectives that would be compatible with expeditionary camp infrastructure. Using a combination of wind and solar power with backup diesel generation and battery storage will reduce the need for shipping precious fuel to these forward locations. A single 10ft ISO container could service the needs of a single platoon.

Logistic Support

Again, we already use many of these;

Medical facilities, water storage, fuel storage and pumping/dispensing, workshops, armoury, ammunition store, power generation, bottled gas store and waste compaction are obvious applications.

Water purification and bottling is a subject we covered in a previous post and these would have obvious dual use for international emergency response.

Extending the concept into bridging and engineering applications like a tipper body, well drilling, aggregate/rock crushing, bitumen and dust suppression will allow a reduction of specialist vehicles

Weapon and Complex Systems

The most radical use of the modular/container concept is in the weapons and complex system realm. Again, we already use containerised image receiving stations for ASTOR as an example of complex systems but these are based on non standard containers that are not as quickly demountable as they might be.

CAMM, Loitering Attack Munition and a GMLRS launcher would be obvious systems to use the containerised concept but we could also extend this to mortar, UAV ground stations, communications, command and control, ECM, NBC recce, weather sensing, air traffic control, radio/TV production and transmission, aerostat, surveillance tower, mine warfare (maritime) and diver support.

The possibilities are endless.

One of the main advantages we could realise is portability between sea and land. Using a containerised GMLRS pod means the same system can be mounted on the back of a truck on land or simply fixed to the deck of a ship to provide long range naval gunfire support.

All the money should go into the weapon system, not its transport.

The list goes on and on, so the end result of more vehicle types is quite simply, a ballooning of costs.

It might be stating the obvious, this is ‘not a good thing’

Due to a number of factors, the current situation, to be charitable, is a dogs breakfast, an understandable and entirely reasonable dogs breakfast, but a dogs breakfast nevertheless.

This is not news of course, it is well recognised by all concerned and several programmes have sought to reign it in, but the combination of a lack of cash, other priorities and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have put paid to most of these.

Whilst the MoD and its civilian and military staff can be rightly proud of the manner in which Urgent Operational Requirements have been fulfilled, the failure of the MoD and Army to provide adequate vehicles in the main equipment programme is an illustration writ large of all that is wrong with our system of acquisition.

We should not let the success of the UOR system compensate or somehow obscure the fact that a UOR is a fundamental admission of failure to provide equipment for largely foreseeable needs. The majority of UOR vehicle types (but not all) have been a reaction to the proliferation of IED’s in Iraq and Afghanistan, whilst the MoD might say this came as a surprise, it wasn’t, and the fact that UK forces have been dealing with mines and IED’s for decades and has a vast corporate knowledge of the issue, makes it even harder to stomach. The very fact that UOR’s can generally be fulfilled with ‘off the shelf’ solutions indicates that someone had already foreseen the problem sufficiently early to put the said solution on their shelves for us to buy.

Short term economic expediency has resulted in a vehicle fleet that was and still is, limited in capabilities and so varied the logistic overheads are huge. PFI’s and overtly political decisions have made things worse.

Several years ago we selected the the MAN SX/HX to fulfil the Support Vehicle requirement but also selected the Oshkosh MTVR derived Close Support Tanker and Heavy Equipment Transporter, instantly creating a two manufacturer supply chain where with a longer term view on logistics commonality, we might have had one.

Compounding the problem is the C Vehicle PFI. The logical solution would have been to stipulate in the contract that the MAN HX/SX range would have to be provided for plant transport and as a base for a number of specialist vehicles like concrete mixers and tippers.

But no, it wasn’t.

The C Vehicle PFI is an availability contract, we don’t specify equipment types but instead concentrate on capabilities, the provider is, within the realms of the performance criteria, able to fulfil that requirement with any vehicle they like.

Consequently, ALC, the C Vehicle PFI provider, have introduced the Iveco Trakker 6×6 truck.

Because it is provided under a PFI availability contract, ALC pick up the maintenance tab, but the reality on operations is somewhat different to the predictable environment of the UK and Germany. There still needs to be separate driver training and there needs to be an in theatre logistics support operation for yet another vehicle type.

There is nothing wrong with the Trakker but there is nothing unique about it either, there is no practical reason why the MAN HX/SX could not have been specified. One suspects it finally came down to a cost argument but this is penny wise, pound foolish. ALC cannot shoulder any blame for selecting the Trakker, no doubt they are rightly approaching this from a narrow contractual perspective, meeting the contract terms and that is all that matters. Ironically, one of the objectives of the C Vehicle PFI is to reduce the number of types in service. Where we used to have Volvo, Terex, JCB, CAT, Hydrema and others; we now concentrate on a few number of manufacturers. The Royal Engineers, for example, now have to work with 3 truck types; SV, Trakker and the Unipower that are broadly comparable and I haven’t included the legacy types that will still be in service for some time in that number either. Integrating weapon systems, BOWMAN, armour and ECM is expensive and instead of doing it once, we have paid in triplicate, although I haven’t seen any pictures of the Trakker in Afghanistan with ECM and armour the principle remains.

If one has two basic truck types in Afghanistan, no matter what the contract arrangements, two sets of spare windscreens, indicator arms or fuel pumps have to be shipped to theatre. Given the tremendous logistical challenge that Afghanistan presents, the impact of this, either in operational or cost terms, should not be underestimated. Any vehicle has thousands of parts that can all go wrong and if any form of vehicle availability is to be maintained, spares are needed at the point of use.

These were not UOR decisions, where capability is more important than logistics or coherence and it is simply not god enough. As any reader of Think Defence will know, one of our recurring themes is ‘ruthless commonality’ and if this costs in the short term it will reap enormous cost savings and operational benefits later.

The situation is the same in the wheeled and tracked world.

At the top end we have the Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank which is supported by the Challenger derived armoured engineering vehicles Titan and Trojan. Supporting the armoured regiments are the armoured infantry where there is a mix of Warrior and FV432’s, it would have made sense to replace the FV432 with Warrior derived variants but this is not the case. Although there are Warrior observation post and recovery variants, there is still a number of FV432’s in the communications, command, ambulance, signals, mortar and other roles. AS90 uses a unique chassis (although with some component commonality with others) and the GMLRS uses a completely different chassis to anything else in service, apart from the recovery variant.

CVR(T) was and is an elegant piece of thoughtful design commonality with many variants sharing the same basic chassis and the Stormer HVM and Shielder vehicles are simply a growth version of the basic CVR(T) design. Currently in service are the Scimitar, Sampson, and Spartan types. The adaptability of CVR(T) is a credit to its designers and is something we should aim for in other areas, as we know though, they are going out of service to be replaced with the ASCOD 2 FRES vehicles.

The mechanised infantry are still nominally equipped with the unloved, Bedford derived, Saxon. Acting in the light gun limber and other roles is the equally despised RB44 that has the turning circle of a super tanker. The Pinzgauer (4×4 and 6×6) and Mowag/Bucher Duro are used in a number of specialist roles, Watchkeeper, Sentinel, ECM and EOD box bodies for example. The familiar Mastiff and Ridgeback will also be supplemented with with the Wolfhound logistics vehicle, based on the Mastiff.

Various flavours of Land Rover like the ambulance, GS, WMIK and Snatch, Iveco Panther, Husky and Coyote are in service across the Army. These will be joined by the Light Protected Patrol Vehicle which is set to replace Snatch, although its utility should see it adopted in other roles.

The Royal Marines have the Viking BVs10 armoured vehicle which will be replaced in Army service, but not RM, with the ST Kinetics Bronco, called the Warthog in UK service.

A number of specialist vehicles bring up the rear including the Kalmar rough terrain container handlers, Alvis Unipower 8×8 BR90 trucks, ATMP, Springer, Supercat Extenda, Fuchs NBC recce vehicle, Thales Bushmaster, Buffalo EOD vehicle, JCB HMEE, Terrier armoured engineering vehicle, Yamaha quads, Artic Cat quads, motorcycles and the Leopard tank derived Hippo Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicles.

Lets not even get into engineering plant, its enough to make ones head spin.

We need a long term strategy for coherence to reduce the logistics and training tail of our current vehicle fleet.

The current situation is not sustainable and is being held together by the daily miracles performed by The Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and Royal Corps of Logistics, largely out of the spotlight. We do not help their cause by shovelling new vehicle types into the pipeline at every opportunity and whilst the understandable and entirely proper UOR purchases are serving their purpose, beyond current operations the drive for commonality must become an obsession.

One might look back at the lost opportunities and legacy of a disappearing industrial base with some melancholy, but we are, to coin a phrase, where we are.

That said, let’s not be too pessimistic, the UK is not short of automotive design experience and expertise by a long way, we lead the world in motorsport design for example and have a number of innovative designs such as those from Supacat, TMV, Multidrive, JCB, QinetiQ and Universal Engineering. Combined with the large programme management and integration expertise of BAe/GD/DSG and various component manufacturers such as Marshalls and Hiab we have the building blocks on which to base such a long term approach that not only serves the Armed Forces but the nation as a whole. Let’s not forget we used to make military vehicles for many overseas forces and there is no reason this cannot be the case again.

As operations wind down in Afghanistan the Army will, barring emergencies, enter a period of consolidation and without the pressure of high intensity operations both the Army and the MoD will have the breathing space to step back and realise a sensible strategy for vehicular coherence that delivers tangible capability improvements and significant cost reductions.

We should even look beyond vehicle commonality and delve into components, why should one vehicle or another have different steering wheels, indicator bulbs or batteries? We might even be able to extend this to major components such as wheels, engines or gearboxes. We already do this in the aviation world, using the same engine in the Merlin and Apache yields huge cost advantages.

Part 2 will look at a number of strategies for achieving the desired end state of more capability, at a lower cost and in a package that is exportable.

The Army is generally moving towards a rational and coherent fleet of logistic vehicles. The old Bedford MK’s and TM’s are slowly going out of service to be eventually replaced by the MAN Military Trucks Support Vehicle (SV) range and whilst the Foden DROPS are being hammered in Afghanistan they will eventually be replaced by the HLDC programme. The Oskosh Close Support Tanker is performing extremely well, one of the most mobile vehicles in theatre and although operating under a PFI, the Heavy Equipment Tractor (HET), also from Oskosh, has proven to be a great success.

Future programmes include the Light Equipment Transporter, General Support Tanker and the Articulated/Non Articulated Vehicle Programme but not much is in the public domain about these, or what direction they will take.

Support Vehicles (Trucks)

The MAN Support Vehicles (SV) comprise a number of weights and types and will eventually replace the 4, 8 and 14 tonners in addition to a number of recovery variants. Total fleet size should be about 6,600 vehicles for £1.3billion, the numbers having been continually revised down from about 7,200 in initial news releases.

Wonder if the price has gone down?

The order attracted significant controversy as the competing offers seemed to offer better value for money and the European integration aspect of the decision allegedly trumped other considerations. Despite this, they are an excellent design with a long heritage, but if the Oshkosh offer was taken for example,  the commonality advantages between the Heavy Equipment Transporter, Close Support Tanker and whatever trucks were taken to fulfill the SV requirement, would have been very useful.

We are where we are though.

MAN Military Trucks produce two variants, the SX has a stiffer chassis and coil springs so has much greater mobility, the HX is the lower specification variant, which of course we have ordered many more of.

HX Chassis

SX Chassis

There are 3 HX variants, the 2 axle SX60 which replaces the 4 tonner, the 3 axle HX58 which replaces the 8 tonners and finally, the HX77 which replaces the 14 tonner. The SX comes in two variants, the 4 axle SX45 Recovery Variant and 3 axle SX44 Unit Support Tanker and Cargo.

Man SV SX45 Recovery Variant

We don’t call them HX or SX though, instead preferring titles like Medium Mobility, Cargo Vehicle Heavy Medium Mobility and Improved Medium Mobility!

The theatre entry specification includes armoured cabs, weapon stations, run flat tyres and many other enhancements. The 288 recovery vehicles are partnered with 69 recovery trailers, each vehicle weighs 32 tonnes and can lift 15 tonnes, much more than the old Foden ‘wreckers’

Instead of the old bench seats or trying to find a comfortable place to sit between cam nets and stores the SV’s will have the option to use dedicated rollover protected seating from Roush, health and safety legislation means the sight of soldiers hanging out of the back of a 4 tonner will be a distant memory!

C Vehicles (Trucks)

The C Vehicle PFI incorporates engineering plant, cranes and other equipment. Awarded to the Amey Lex Consortium (ALC) in 2005 after a lengthy bidding process and is a 15 year deal, valued at approximately £600million. Equipment is centrally pooled in a number of locations and when units use the equipment they are in effect, hiring it. VT have subsequently acquired Lex Defence and are now part of the Babcock organisation. On contract commencement, ALC purchased the MoD’s equipment although it is rumoured that acceptance criteria was so stringent the MoD had to spend considerable sums getting equipment ready for the handover and for the same costs it could have bought new. This legacy equipment was to be phased out and replaced with new equipment as the agreement progresses, most of this has already happened.

Although the scheme includes operator training, surely it would have been logical to use the same equipment as the rest of the Army?

Not in crazy PFI land it isn’t, despite nearly 500 of the MAN Support Vehicles being fitted with jibs the C Vehicle PFI has provided similarly equipped Iveco Trakker units. There is nothing wrong with the Trakker but another vehicle type that overlaps completely with existing vehicles but provided as part of the PFI means yet another training requirement at a time when we should be consolidating equipment types, funnily enough, one of the core objectives of the C Vehicle PFI, the halving of equipment types.

The PFI has provided a number of 6×6 Trakker vehicles, total chassis order was 206, variants include Self Loading Dump Trucks (SLDT), Medium Dump Truck (MDT) tippers fitted with the Thompson Loadmaster tipping body, Nurock volumetric concrete mixing plant, Truck Mounted Loader with an Atlas Terex lifting arm and even well drilling rigs.

Iveco Tracker - Nurock Cement Mixer

Iveco Trakker - Medium Dump truck

Iveco Trakker - Self Loading Dump Truck

Iveco Trakker - Truck Mounted Loader

The MAN SV is a proper military truck with a long heritage and has been designed specifically with expansion in mind, it can be fitted with a protected cab for example, without modification. The Trakker vehicles in theatre appear not to be protected to the same degree and the quantities seem to be very low, the SLDT and MDT will be obtained in quantities of around 70 each for example.

It is not clear whether the recent UOR purchases of protected engineering plant has been obtained through the PFI.

I remain to be convinced about the operational usefulness and value for money of PFI schemes especially given the fact that those with the information to illustrate value for money have a vested interest in not releasing it. Ideally, all military trucks in UK service should be based on the MAN SV base designs.

DROPS

DROPS is a family of logistics vehicles that use a HIAB Multilift designed derivative of the Marel Corporation hooklift system, commonly used for waste containers.

There are two types of vehicle - the Leyland Medium Mobility Load Carrier (MMLC), and the Foden Improved Medium Mobility Load Carrier (IMMLC). IMMLC is used primarily as an ammunition carrier in support of AS90 155mm self-propelled guns. MMLC operates solo, or towing a skeleton trailer. DROPS revolutionised logistics transport when introduced and continues to be the backbone of the Army’s transportation capability. Coming into service in 1994 the IMMLC (Foden) contract was for £75million and 400 vehicles. The earlier Leyland MMLC contract delivered just over 1,400 vehicles.

Leyland DROPS

Foden DROPS

A research paper from the US in 1991 shows some of the thinking behind the DROPS and ISO Container system, click here to read.

The Enhanced Palletised Load System (EPLS) is designed to supplement the existing DROPS vehicles because there are of course not enough of them, by fitting a number of HX77 chassis, which were on the production line, with a HIAB Multilift hooklift system. EPLS is a UOR, the original SV programme did not feature a DROPS replacement and it has pulled vehicles from the existing pool, they are not extras. The main difference between EPLS and the DROPS system is that EPLS can lift standard ISO containers without putting them on a flatrack first, obviously providing much greater flexibility although flatracks are used quite frequently for non container loads like vehicles, trailers or other equipment.

EPLS

There is absolutely no doubt, EPLS is a success story, more flexible than DROPS and delivered in double quick time, but it is not necessarily the best system for the medium to long term. Once the load has been deposited on the ground it needs a crane or similar to reposition, the centre of gravity can be high which reduces mobility and the departure angle can be disadvantageous to certain loads. The original role of DROPS, delivering huge quantities of ammunition to Royal Artillery batteries, may have diminished somewhat, but simply looking at a typical Combat Logistics Patrol in Afghanistan it is clear that the ISO container has completely penetrated the logistics system.

The low cost option would simply bring EPLS into the main equipment programme, so this is what is likely to happen, but in the medium term we should be moving towards a more comprehensive and flexible solution.

A key question is, should the system be mounted on the chassis of a truck, on an articulated trailer or both. The second question is the design, a simple hooklift or more complex but more flexible sideloader.

A trailer mounted system would likely be towed by the Close Support Tractor unit and if chassis mounted, the MAN SV would be the obvious donor vehicle.

The sidelift or side loading arrangement provides maximum flexibility that loads, unloads and stacks ISO containers using two hydraulic arms at either end of the chassis or trailer. Sidelift was developed in the sixties by Klaus Transport-systems, who were ultimately purchased by Steelbro in New Zealand and the system developed further. Other manufacturers include Hammar and Swinglift. Advantages include reducing the need for container handling cranes or fork lifts, the flat load/unload profile is advantageous for some loads and the ability to stack containers can also be very useful. A single sidelift trailer could be used to offload an entire convoys worth of containers and can be telescoped to handle 10, 20 or 40 foot ISO containers or flatracks.

The RLC do use sideloaders but only in a niche role, the Rail Transfer Equipment (RTE) Klaus Kranmobil uses a semi trailer design for transferring containers from railway flat beds to road vehicles. The Simple Rail Transfer Equipment (STRE) is mounted onto a modified flatrack and operated from the DROPS vehicle

DROPS or EPLS would need 2 vehicles to transport 2 containers, those 2 vehicles would need 4 crew. The cost of 4 crew members must include training, wages, health cover, pension and a myriad of other ‘capitation’ costs. The 2 vehicles need maintaining, spares holding, training courses and of course all these need personnel, expensive personnel.

If we could replace 2 DROPS/EPLS with a single system that can handle 2 20ft containers then the personnel reduction alone would result in a significant cost saving.

See the video below for the operation of a 40 foot system

Click here to view the embedded video.

Sidelifters are in use with the Army but only a very limited basis.

Trailer mounted units may not have the mobility required and a chassis based design is relatively top heavy, which again limits mobility because of the tip over hazard.

In an earlier FDR post I proposed using an articulated loader as a base for a protected vehicle family. The front cab would be armoured and a variety of swappable modules forming the payload. Payload modules could include personnel carrier, command, mortar, ISR or other weapon systems. By making the payload separate from the transport vehicle we increase flexibility and reduce overall cost.

In a logistics role these articulated loaders could use a side lift system, the mobility advantages of an articulated loader are apparent in the video below.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Because of the relative advantages and disadvantages of articulated loaders, rigid chassis and trailer mounted units it would seem obvious to use all three options.

Others

The Oskosh Global Heavy Equipment Tractor (HET) is teamed up with a number of trailers from King Trailers and Broshuis, the King trailers being used mainly for very heavy equipment like Challenger and the Broshuis for Warrior sized and below loads (max 45 tonnes). The HET is a version of the US M1070 HET.

Heavy Equipment Transporter with King trailer

Earlier this year, 20 Improved Mobility Trailers were obtained under a UOR for the Heavy Equipment Transporter. At a cost of £150k each, the trailers from Broshuis have greater ability in rough terrain i.e. Afghanistan, than the existing trailers. Given the wholesale move from CVR(T) that can be carried on the back of a Foden DROPS or MAN EPLS, to an ASCOD SV which can’t, there is going to be a need a much greater number of HET’s and trailers. The HET’s are provided by Fastraxx, a PFI provider owned by Kellog Brown and Root. The PFI will run for 20 years and provides 92 HET’s, trailers and sponsored reserve drivers.

The implications of FRES Scout on this PFI are uncertain.

Broshuis IM Trailer

Providing fuel and water distribution, the Oshkosh Close Support Tanker, another Oshkosh success story, are amongst the most mobile vehicles we have, based on the well proven MTVR.

Close Support Tanker

Completing the stragglers is the Alvis Unipower 8×8 vehicle used for carrying the Royal Engineers General Support Bridge. In the interests of logistics commonality we should transfer the bridging and launch/recovery equipment to an SV chassis.

Alvis Unipower GSB

Containers and Modules

Combat Logistic Patrol - 19 Combat Service Support Battalion

As can be seen from the image above, the ISO container is here to stay.

Based on a standard 20ft ISO container the Deployable Machine Shop (DMS) from Marshall SV has recently been purchased and will equip the REME, RM and RAF. 44 have been purchased for £5.8million, hold on, that over £130k each. In 2008, the MoD purchased 25 fuel tank containers from WEW Westerwalder for £4million to provide static and mobile refuelling points. WEW have a long track record in defence and provide tank containers to numerous military forces. General Dynamics have provided the container based Bulk Medical Storage Facility (BMSF)  and the RAF have also joined the rush to containerise with the Tactical Reconnaissance Deployable Imagery System (will leave you to work out the acronym!) made from recycled hospital containers (which were pretty rubbish by all accounts)

Deployable Machine Shop

Bulk Medical Storage Facility

TARDIS

WEW Fuel Container

The march of containerisation should continue, their all round usefulness has been well proven in Afghanistan.

The Oshkosh PLS Engineering Mission Modules are a good illustration of what can be achieved and these would go some way to achieving commonality with the C Vehicle fleet.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Container handling equipment includes everything from simple dollys to complex rough terrain handlers. There have been a number of interesting studies on improving the C17′s ability to handle ISO containers and this work translates to other aircraft.

ISO reach stackers are available from a number of manufacturers such as Fantuzzi, ISO Loader and Atlas Terex but the most common type in military service is from Kalmar Rough Terrain Container Handler, often called the ‘wretch’

In April this year I published a post on lightweight vehicles in which I wondered if we could extend the concept of containerisation and DROPS to non logistics applications, more combat oriented but in a smaller package.

In what was probably a coincidence, great minds thinking alike, the Cameleon MMS concept was launched in May, featured in the July edition of G3 and at DVD10

The MMS uses an Iveco 4×4 Daily as the donor chassis and has a small capacity DROPS like system to load and unload various mission modules.

Cameleon MMS

It is clear that the Army has fully embraced the ISO container for logistics and combat service support but we should be thinking ahead and realising the advantages that containerisation, modularisation and quick handling provide into non logistics roles, as ably demonstrated by Oviks

Summary

Short Term

• Continue with SV

Medium Term

• Independent investigation into value for money and operational effectiveness of C Vehicle and HET PFI’s
• Coherence between SV and C Vehicles
• Sidelift DROPs replacement on range of trailers, SV and articulated loaders
• Move towards a modular demountable architecture

The NAO report stated

“Despite action by the Department to improve its asset management and accounting, the issues I have identified are systemic and deep-rooted.  The level of control exercised by the Department is not yet sufficient to enable me to provide an opinion on a significant proportion of assets reported in the financial statements.”

Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office, 26 July 2010

One is left wondering if some of the problems are a result of the fragmentation of responsibility for logistics and equipment accounting to various military, MoD agencies and civilian organisations.

The post of MoD Commercial Director was created as a result of the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy was to take the lead in shaping the departments relationship with industry and future strategic commercial arrangements.

The first post holder came from an accounting background and was a partner at PriceWaterhouseCoopers, upon joining he said

“I am very pleased to be joining a dedicated group of professionals in the Ministry of Defence. I will work hard to lead, support and develop the commercial team in MOD, to build strong relationships with industry, and, working with both, to help deliver good results for our armed forces, the taxpayer, and business.”

So who was the first post holder

Say hello to Mr Amyas Morse, forging relationships with industry, the people who bought us JPA, JAMES and numerous other IT systems that always seem to deliver less than they promise. For another view on the impact that Amyas had on the MoD, click here and our take on JPA, here

Perhaps Mr Morse knows too much!

This might seem like something that only concerns the bean counters, those paper clip empire building bureaucrats that the mainstream media like so much to vilify but it has very real operational impact. If you do not know where something actually is you will not be able to use it when you need it, on operations for example. Equipment is no longer disposable, the value of almost everything in the inventory has risen and as we look to upgrading rather than buying new we absolutely have to know where equipment is at any given point.

To further highlight the very real issues of supply chain management have a read of AVM Jock Stirrups evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, especially with regard to body armour.

The MoD claim that the BOWMAN equipment hasn’t been lost, its just can’t locate exactly where it is, anyone who has ever been charged for a diffy tent peg on their 1033 might find this defence rather amusing.

I will keep this one short, just a set of basic suggestion without much background because, to be perfectly honest, I don’t know that much about the subject, please ignore my ignorance

• Create a new joint service mega Corps to manage all Combat Service Support functions, merging the RLC, AGC and REME into a single integrated support group.
• Transfer the RLC Pioneers to the Royal Engineers
• Embed a CSS cadre with all combat and combat support units to ensure an effective end to end supply chain, as low as squadron or battalion level if needed to support sub unit QM’s. This would replicate and enhance the existing REME Light Aid Detachment function and extend into logistics issues.
• Transfer all RAF and RN logistics functions into the new group, including catering and engineering (maybe a bit too far but included as a talking point)
• Instead of the piecemeal and poorly integrated system we have now, invest in a proper end to end logistics management application with the appropriate tracking equipment and training. Above all though, despite the differences in between the services, it must be a single system.
• Reconsider the use of consultants; partner with worldwide logistics organisations for skills transfer or simply develop expertise in house
• Consider moving all transport and logistics equipment into the tri service CSS Corps, including the RFA and RAF transport. Support helicopters might even be included in this. This will create a truly seamless, joint logistics organisation that has control of all the means of delivery of fuel, ammunition and others stores (OK, even more wild than above!)
• A serious, independent review of DSDA and its integration with other MoD supply chain and accounting functions

One of the problems with the RLC is that it is too large, too diverse, too many roles and ultimately too diffuse. Transportation, logistics management (this is not transportation), ammunition storage, postal services, fuel operations, port operations, pioneers and field catering.

How can the delivering post, rustling up an egg banjo and disposing of IED’s sit within one organisation?

In some respects though, it makes sense for the Combat Service Support elements to be under one roof, it is a difficult issue to reconcile.

To make matters worse, or better depending on your viewpoint, we also have duplication of very similar functions across the three services

I am going to break this post up into a few parts for ease of reading

Counter IED

This is a difficult subject to write about whilst so much sterling and incredibly brave work is going on in Afghanistan, but it is still worth discussing.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal is a broad subject with a long history but in the modern context has evolved as much by a combination of historical accident as anything else, the need to excavate to deeply buried German bombs needing the obvious involvement of a field engineering force, the Royal Engineers, for example.

The Joint Force IED arrangement we are now seeing are a result of both the changing nature of the IED threat and the sheer volume of devices, but the underlying structures have remained. Evolving from the WWI Ordnance Examiners of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps the modern Explosive Ordnance Disposal capability traces much of its history back to the Blitz, having to deal with both unexploded ‘duds’ and devices that used time delay fuses. The ongoing ‘measure’ and ‘countermeasure’ struggle between the German designers and those tasked with clearing them continued throughout the war and this experience was disseminated widely to other nations like the USA.

Modern EOD arguably evolved from here.

The use of sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IED’s) in Northern Ireland lead to the creation of specialist units in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, now RLC. The Royal Navy Mine Warfare Diving Branch and Royal Air Force 5131 Bomb Disposal Squadron can also trace their histories back decades.

This has led to a situation where to counter conventional and improvised explosive devices we have 2 units from the Army and one each from the other services.

This may seem wasteful but to understand why, one simply has to look at their respective missions. The Royal Engineers (33 and 101(V) Regiment) are responsible for specialist search and conventional explosive ordnance clearance. 11 EOD Regiment RLC are responsible for counter terrorist bomb disposal, explosive ordnance disposal and the recovery and safe disposal of conventional munitions which can include anything from small arms ammunition to battlefield rockets. The RN clearance branch is attached to the mine countermeasures capability and is responsible for explosive ordnance disposal underwater (RE divers also have this role) and the RAF EOD Bomb Disposal Squadron is responsible for airfield clearance operations. There is sound logic for this distinction, the RLC C-IED operators are drawn from the technical ammunition trade and this specialist knowledge is an advantage when dealing with the wide variety of devices found both on and off a battlefield. Specialist expertise takes a long time to develop, career structures are very different from the RE EOD personnel.

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have focussed on the IED but the other skills and capabilities must not be neglected. However, whilst the UK armed forces were large it could support these specialism’s but there are obvious crossovers and duplications that might be unsupportable in a smaller force.

IED’s have gone from a specialist weapon used by terrorist organisations in Northern Ireland to a mainstream weapon that will feature in probably every future conflict and we have to ask if the existing arrangements are efficient or sustainable.

With the increasing use of direct to user delivery of ammunition from the manufacturer and more complex ammunition that needs REME support the demand for the traditional role of ammunition management might be less. It hasn’t and won’t go away though because the cost effective management of all types of ammunition is still a highly skilled and essential activity and to counter the manufacturer to user argument there is an increasingly onerous legislative environment and much more insecurity of supply. One could argue either way about the need for specialist ammunition/explosive specialists.

With a reduction of the trade from which High Threat C-IEDD operators are drawn this will inevitably reduce career opportunities and mean a greater demand on those actually able to carry out this extremely difficult task, a sustained demand for manual approaches will inevitably mean those individuals are going to suffer. The highly specialist and technical approach to IED disposal as perfected in Northern Ireland may not always be appropriate in an environment like Afghanistan, a range of response capabilities are therefore needed that operate at different levels of risk. One wonders if the current casualty rate is sustainable and if the high threat C-IED operators are both in short supply and high demand is freedom of manoeuvre being compromised?

Whatever we do, we must recognise that the often irrational animosity between the RE and RLC has to stop, the growing and evolving threat, likely greater use of technology and reducing resources demand that inter service and cap badge politics is stomped on from a great height. There are very real and practical barriers to creating a single tri service organisation beyond the current ‘joint’ but still separate arrangements but we must tackle them decisively.

A completely new EOD Corps may be the ideal end state and could amalgamate the 4 entities currently involved and be responsible for all clearance activities. A separate Corps would be large enough to sustain a variety of career paths across a number of related trades, sustainability is one of the key issues that would need to be resolved.

A much greater use of technology should also be part of the new unit, the UK has yet again, given up its clear technical lead in related technologies, especially in robotics. Talisman is a clear step in the right direction but me must continue with this and expand it.

Traditional assault minefield breaching would be retained with the Royal Engineers and the ammunition technical trades transferred to a new function within the RLC, merged with the REME (more on this later)

In addition to the non assault clearance activities the new EOD Corps would also be heavily involved with demining activities in post conflict zones as part of a comprehensive overseas aid/emergency response package (this is going to be detailed in a future post) that includes elements of military and civilian capabilities.

With the increasing use of modular mine warfare equipment, especially in our C3 proposal, it might even be possible to task this new corps with underwater mine clearance as well.

This is only a tentative suggestion, one possible way to create and perhaps more importantly, sustain, a range of capabilities in the face of likely increasing/changing demand both at home and abroad. By creating a dedicated corps that takes responsibility for all munitions disposal activities across the three services the overall workload creates the need for a larger unit, in a larger unit there will be greater career opportunities for those hard pressed operators to move within.

The challenge in such a unit would be to increase the capability whilst maintaining quality and safety, a thorny issue currently being wrestled with by the professionals in all three services.

UPDATE 1

One of the commenters took offence to me calling the Pioneers grave diggers. I thought I should apologise for any offence but simply say it was a bit light hearted, banter, no offence intended whatsoever.

UPDATE 2

Have sense of humours sharply declined?

Think Defence is not in the business of upsetting or insulting people so once again, if the grave digger comment was out of order I apologise.

It has been removed and by way of penance, if any serving or former Pioneer wishes to send me an article on your past, present or future then I will publish it

Artillery has had a mini renaissance in Afghanistan with the continuing and increasing use of GMLRS, the 70km sniper, 105mm and even the humble mortar. With likely future conflicts taking place over a wider area there is a trend for greater range.

Man Portable Mortars

Although not artillery in the traditional sense, they are in the infantry not Royal Artillery, mortars remain a wickedly effective and versatile weapon. Whether being used to suppress, nuetralise or provide smoke and illumination their greatest attributes are simplicity, speed of reaction and portability.

The venerable 51mm mortar has now been replaced with a Hirtenberger 60mm obtained under UOR and is providing a valuable improvement over the 51mm, even if it is a little heavier. This should be bought into the main equipment programme and provides an invaluable compliment to the 40mm UGL.

The L16 81mm Mortar, in service with infantry battalions since 1956, has now upgraded to the A2 model that provides a number of improvements including a new Target Locating Equipment (TLE) package. The only other improvement I would like to see is the introduction of a multi fuse for 81mm bombs like the L3 M734 or Junghans PX581 which uses optical technology to reduce costs and eliminate the threat of fuse jammers. In most mortar missions its dispersion is a positive advantage and whilst a more accurate mortar round would be useful, I would doubt the value for money. Logistics are the real problem with mortars, they demand a great deal of support, a standard pallet for example would have over 120x 81mm bombs but only 60 odd for a 120mm so despite the many calls to upgrade infantry mortars to the 120mm their lower speed of deployment and significant logistics overhead quickly diminishes any advantage they might have.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Vehicle Mounted Mortars

In a modern conflict, where counter mortar radar will be in use, simply plugging away with mortars from a fixed location will be a very dangerous pastime, vehicle mounting a mortar is used to support rapid fire and move missions.

The UK also uses the 81mm L16 in this role, fitted to Bulldog armoured personnel carriers although they can also be used in a dismounted mode.

In the vehicle mounted role, the heavier weight of 120mm bombs are arguably less of an disadvantage, a vehicle can carry the extra weight and manage the increased recoil forces.  Being vehicular borne also lessens the logistics problems although of course, the underlying issues remain. Many argue that 120mm mortars are simply poor mans artillery but providing infantry or armoured infantry with a more lethal system, retained within its organic chain of command would be valuable.

If we accept the argument that 120mm in the vehicular role is worth pursuing then the choice of available weapons is the next argument.

There are a number of systems on the market, from the traditional towed systems to modern automatic loading devices and all points in between.

At the high end is the AMOS twin barreled and NEMO single barreled systems, but these are complex and expensive, although the direct fire capability might offset these.

To keep things simple, the two systems I think worth considering are the Soltam CARDOM and the STE SRAMS.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The CARDOM is battle proven and is in service with a number of nations but we would have to get over the objections of the yoghurt knitting class and buy from Israel. Although the SRAMS looks very interesting the CARDOM has a number of very useful innovations like the ability to quickly dismount, automated rapid fire control and can even use an interchangeable 81mm barrel. The interchangeable barrel improves versatility and eases logistics problems, which as we have said, will be greater than with an 81mm system. In the lighter brigades it could be mounted on 4×4 or 6×6 vehicles like the Ocelot or Jackal and in the medium weight brigades, a mix of FRES SV or whatever wheeled vehicle is chosen.

If we are to buy into this type of system, we should absolutely make sure they remain with the Infantry.

Guns

The 105mm L118 Light Gun has seen widespread service with the UK and many other armed forces. Its apparent simplicity belies its sophistication and superlative design, the 105mm Light Gun, like the 81mm mortar, derives its effectiveness from its rate of fire, portability and speed of operation, with the addition of accuracy. Weighing less than 2 tonnes, it can be lifted into position by many helicopters, towed by a range of light vehicles (including the new Wolfhound Tactical Support Vehicle) and in extremis, moved by hand. The famous Roshan Dragon story from the MoD shows just how versatile and portable the Light Gun can be and the effectiveness, even in rather old fashioned direct fire mode, is not in doubt.

Click here to view the embedded video.

With the relatively recent mid life upgrade the Light Gun has many effective years left in it, in service with three regiments.

The self propelled AS90 is another brilliant system, rumour has it the design spec was less than 2 sheets of paper and the contract awarded in double quick time. Despite being a bit long in the tooth it is still an effective weapon but the lack of precision/insensitive natures and shorter range than many comparable systems means it is ripe for investment. This is unlikely to happen though and it could be argued that other systems have eclipsed it.

Some of the AS90 regiments have re roled to Light Gun for Afghanistan but AS90 officially it equips 5 field regiments (1  RHA, 3 RHA, 4 RA, 19 RA, 26 RA) and in order to realise short term savings we should consider reducing this to 1 regular regiment and 1 TA, a significant reduction but these are tough times. With 1 regular and 1 TA regiment we still retain a core of this very useful system and the ability to regenerate should we need to.

In the medium term and with whats left, we might have another go at upgrading to a 52calibre barrel, introduce insensitive and guided rounds but this would not be a high priority and the cost would have to be spread across a small number of systems, making it not cost efficient. The US Excalibeer rounds have already been trialled on the AS90.

A more radical medium term solution might be to withdraw AS90 completely and replace it with one of the many 155mm wheeled or lightweight systems on the market. The cost of operating 155mm weapons on a tracked and armoured chassis is considerable, a wheeled system not only radically reduces cost but also results in greater strategic mobility by road and air (air transport by C130/A400 instead of C17 for example)

For years the Royal Artillery have been itching to get their hands on the BAe M777 155mm Ultra Lightweight Field Howitzer, as sold to the US  and created the Lightweight Mobile Artillery Weapon System (LIMAWS) programme to equip the proposed medium weight FRES brigades. LIMAWS consisted of a rocket and gun based system, the gun being the M777.

LIMAWS was cancelled in 2007 but it is worth having another look at as a medium term replacement for AS90, maybe taking elements of the long term programme to replace the AS90 and Light Gun post 2020 called FIFS.

In addition to the Supacat HMT Portee system the NEXTER truck based CAmion Equipé d’un Système d’ARtillerie (CAESAR) was also trialled for the requirement but since then other systems have come onto the market including the  BAe Archer, Soltam ATMOS and Denel T5. Using 52 cal barrels they all have significantly greater range than the in service AS90 (especially the Denel) and can use the various NATO standard extended range and guided munitions. Although the Archer is sophisticated it is expensive, a truck mounted systems might be more appropriate.

We might buy off the shelf or combine the M777 and a MAN SV medium mobility truck, this is should not be a complex engineering challenge

In the short term then, we should reduce our AS90 regiments significantly and in the medium term, replace them with a truck based 155mm system.

Rockets

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) was proven in the Gulf War but with the introduction of the cluster bomb treaty, its future was uncertain. The systems were subsequently upgraded to accept the guided rocket, GMLRS. These have gone on to perform sterling service in Afghanistan where they are nicknamed the 70km sniper because of their extreme range and hyper accuracy, they have even been used to drop into a large well that was being used by the enemy.

The armoured chassis weighs in at about 27 tonnes and is tracked which means strategic mobility is limited but the twin launcher means they can deliver a massive weight of very accurate fire, as the video below

Click here to view the embedded video.

The rocket version of LIMAWS was also designed to equip the medium weight brigades and was very similar in concept to the US HIMARS with a single launcher on a very lightweight Supacat HMT chassis that kept the whole system below 9 tonnes, to allow sling loading by a Chinook. Given the range of GMLRS it is difficult to see the value in making the system this lightweight, with the additions of the whole range of theatre entry specification it would be very difficult to achieve this in practice so in order to achieve some commonality with the future 155mm gun system it should be mounted on the same Support Vehicle truck chassis.

Rather than create a wheeled vehicle based system where the weapon and transport are one and the same we should create a common modular launch system, based of course on a 20ft ISO container, that can be carried on a variety of flat bed or DROPS vehicles and even naval vessels like the Think Defence C3 concept.

This container becomes hugely strategically mobile, extremely flexible and can be used for a variety of weapon systems by merely swapping the payload.

Payloads could be the existing 6 pack GMLRS, Fire Shadow, CAMM or other future systems.

Whilst I am on the subject of the Fire Shadow loitering munition, I am not convinced and would consider cancellation.

Apart from the air mobile and amphibious units, the Royal Artillery will then largely go to work in the same vehicle, regardless of system to provide obvious logistics, maintenance and training benefits.

To reduce reliance on Storm Shadow and Strike Fighters (F35 and Typhoon) for deep strike we might also consider the value of buying the Lockheed Martin ATACMS tactical rocket. This would of course stray into inter service politics but when compared to the alternatives is actually extremely cost effective. If we can break out of the inter service rivalry and stovepiped thinking that characterises much of our procurement decisions we could provide the Royal Artillery with a serious deep strike system and allow cost savings to be made elsewhere, elsewhere being the Typhoon and JCA fleets.

Click here to view the embedded video.

At just under 300km range the ATACMS missile compares favorably with the range of the Storm Shadow, can even be fitted with the same BROACH warhead as Storm Shadow and costs less than $0.75million each.

What’s not to like.

As a justification for CVF/JCA we keep hearing that the majority of the worlds population is within 100km of the shoreline. Putting an ATACMS module on a Royal Navy vessel sitting 100km offshore  puts them within easy reach, of course I am not suggesting ATACMS can replace CVF/JCA but it is food for thought and worth considering as part of the force mix.

GMLRS, Storm Shadow, ATACMS and submarine launched Tomahawk are overlapping and complimentary but taken together, would be a powerful capability and if we can achieve some commonality with naval mounting of the GMLRS and ATACMS then the overall costs can also be managed.

Other Systems

I will cover air defence in a future post and in a previous post UAV’s have been discussed

MSTAR, MAMBA and COBRA should be retained as is, counter artillery is a very complex task that is about much more than technology

Summary

This is not a particularly revolutionary proposal but takes existing systems and applies selected enhancements whilst reducing the number of heavily armoured systems to improve strategic mobility and reduce cost.

Organisationally, we also need to resolve ongoing cap badge and service rivalry in the delivery of indirect weapons and their supporting services, ISR and UAV’s being the primary source of these disagreements that make the argument over who controls mortars look tame in comparison.

As the cost of providing close air support and deep strike from aircraft rises the lower cost of artillery starts looks increasingly attractive. A series of overlapping layers provides a cost effective means of reducing the need for expensive air delivered strike/CAS.

Note I said reduce, not replace.

Short Term

• Obtain new proximity fuse for the 81mm mortar
• Bring the 60mm mortar into the main equipment programme
• Retain 81mm in man portable and vehicle mounted role
• Retain 105mm Light Gun at 3 regiments in the light role
• Disband 4 regular AS90 regiments and transfer 1 Regiments worth of systems to the TA
• Retain GMLRS at existing level
• Cancel Fire Shadow

Medium Term

• Introduce 120mm vehicle mounted mortar
• Withdraw AS90
• Introduce truck based 155mm system
• Consider guided 155mm ammunition
• Develop common weapon container and modules for land and naval use
• Transfer GMLRS systems to truck based carriage using common modular payload container
• Invest in ATACMS

We all know that the forthcoming review is going to be nothing more than an exercise in slashing costs with a thin veneer of strategic direction.

• Objective 1 – Short Term cost savings and Afghanistan
• Objective 2 – Long Term plans based on the idea of investing to save, coherence and a standardisation strategy that enforces the Think Defence mantra of ‘ruthless commonality’

We know that Objective 1 is the most pressing but in swinging the axe we also have to ensure that a range of capabilities can be regenerated or built up as the financial climate improves.

It’s a far cry from grand ambitions of defining our role in the world, punching above our weight and other equally redundant platitudes and rooted in reality.

I read this article in the Guardian that I thought actually quite brilliant in some regards, the comments are both interesting amusing but the fundamental point I take out of is this.

Stop messing about grandstanding about our role in the world and start thinking what is in the British interest?

Of course, I think it is in the British interest to maintain a strong military capability to be applied in support of our wider economic and political strategy, but on what basis?

The most famous post-war assessment of Britain’s international position came in 1962 from the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who observed: “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.” Acheson’s words suggested not only uncertainty about Britain’s role but also its decline in international status.

If the government does not actively choose, structure and fund our military as some form of expeditionary force, we will by default lose our autonomous defence function and the associated skills, probably permanently. The penalties in terms of international power and influence will be profound. It is unlikely, in that case, that we will ever contradict Acheson’s assessment of our place in the world.

Read the full article here

A cynic might think that getting rid of cold war relics is simply a smokescreen, hiding budget driven cuts behind a veil of forward thinking modernity, but are any journalists challenging the Government on this, of course not, as we posted in our quick resume of the last piece of drivel from the Telegraph.

When was the Cold War anyway?

There might be many points during which one could have declared the start and end of the cold war but for arguments sake lets just say it was between 1950 and 1990, so any weapon system that was either introduced or conceived during this period is therefore a relic and ready for withdrawal.

The term is also characterised by those types of equipment or forces that would have supported the United Kingdom’s primary missions during a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, anti submarine, nuclear weapons, armoured formations and deep strike fighters plus a bit of amphibious and cold weather capabilities.

Royal Air Force

Typhoon, the Eurofighter Typhoon first flew in 1994 which was after the end of the cold war but clearly it is a product of that era. Designed to replace both the Tornado Air Defence variant and Jaguar (journalists take note, Jaguar was a ground attack aircraft) it has been in service since 2003.

Last seen, defending the UK and Falklands airspace

Tornado, the Panavia Tornado first flew in 1974 the Tornado was one of the first multirole aircraft with varied missions but one of the main ones were air defence and low level penetration of enemy airspace to deliver anti runway cratering munitions.

Last seen, providing close air support and ISR for UK and ISAF forces in Afghanistan, did the same in Iraq and the Balkans

Harrier, first flew in 1967 and had a classic Cold War mission, operating from austere airfields in Western Germany because the main ones would have been destroyed the Harrier was to provide strike capabilities in support of operations to defeat or slow down an advancing soviet force.

Last seen, providing close air support and ISR for UK and ISAF forces in Afghanistan, did the same in Iraq, Sierra Leone, the Falklands and the Balkans

Sentry AEW1, in service since 1996 after the much commented Nimrod AEW was cancelled it provides an airborne early warning and battlespace management function in addition to acting as a communications hub.

Last seen, supporting operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans

Sentinel R1, entering service in 2008 it has its origins in the CAPTOR programme of 80′s and provides a ground scanning radar set that provides enhanced battlefield surveillance.

Last seen, providing ISR for UK and ISAF forces in Afghanistan, especially in the Counter IED mission

Nimrod, introduced in 1969 the latest variant is due in service this year and provides maritime surveillance, anti submarine and other capabilities in support of the Trident carrying submarines.

Last seen, providing communications, maritime surveillance and ISR support for UK and ISAF forces in Afghanistan, did the same in Iraq, the Falklands and the Balkans, not forgetting providing extended range air sea rescue and protection of UK offshore assets

Chinook/Puma, Chinook and Puma were first introduced between the seventies and eighties they obviously provide vertical lift and transport for personnel, vehicles and stores.

Last Seen, in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans

Hercules, the RAF have a number of versions introduced over a long period

Last Seen, in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans

Last Seen, in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans

Royal Navy

HMS Ocean and Invincible Class, based broadly on the same hull form the Invincible calls are due to be replaced with CVF

Last Seen, in operations off Iraq, and Sierra Leone

Type 22/23 Frigate, entering service from 1979 the frigate provides surface and sub surface warfare capabilities

Last Seen, in operations off Iraq and various standing parols

Trafalgar Class Submarine, entering service in 1984 the Trafalgar class SSN is being replaced by the new Astute class

Last Seen, supporting the initial stages of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

Army

Challenger 2, replacing the Challenger 1 main battle tank which was in service in 1983 the Challenger is one of the most powerful tanks in the world

Last Seen, in operations in Iraq and the Balkans

Warrior, supporting the Challenger 2 in armoured infantry regiments it entered service in the early 80′s

Last Seen, in operations in Iraq, Balkans and Afghanistan

Armoured Recovery and Engineering, Titan and Trojan are armoured engineer and bridging vehicles but they replaced earlier Chieftan based vehicles.

Last Seen, in operations in Iraq, Balkans and Afghanistan

CVR(T), a range of light armoured vehicles in the formation recce role, first introduced in the seventies

Last Seen, in operations in the Falklands, Iraq, Balkans and Afghanistan

AS90, replacing the Abbot self propelled artillery vehicle the AS90 uses a 155mm cannon

Last Seen, in operations in Iraq and the Balkans

What to Cut

It should be clear from the above that most of the major equipments in all three services have seen action in multiple conflicts since the end of the cold war, so the notion that we have loads of cold war relics just sitting idle in storage sheds is, like much of the output from the mainstream media and the new government, is, I am afraid, complete and utter bollocks!

If we really want to look at what capabilities we can reduce then lets me honest that it is being driven by costs and look properly.

I might be guilty of over simplification here, there is no doubt that in the context of a declining budget and changing operational and strategic outlook we need to seriously look at what capabilities are useful and adjust accordingly. There is a case for a reduction in heavy armour, attack aircraft and frigates but not too deep a cut because there is no doubt that those legacy capabilities everyone and his ill informed dog are baying for tend to be rather useful in all spectrum of conflict.

He starts by evoking the memory of Richard Haldane and his reforms in the early 1900′s, making reference to the fact that he was a liberal politician, lets brush over the fact that Lord Haldane became a Labour Party member in 1923 and served in a Labour Government for many years.

What else did he say?

the Conservatives proposed a Strategic Defence and Security Review – an SDSR. We proposed a Strategic Security and Defence Review – an SSDR. But coalition is all about give and take so we got electoral reform, and an SDSR it is!

Ha, ha, I am sure the ranks of the armed forces ranged out in front of him that are looking at cuts in capability and numbers thought that was hilarious and were rolling in the aisles laughing.

We have to fulfil our operational commitments in Afghanistan, but we must also adapt our Armed Forces to face the changing international outlook and the future character of conflict, making a clean break from the mindset of the Cold War.

I hate the term Cold War in this context because it casts a sneering and ill informed gaze over capabilities that might be inconvenient or an easy target because we might not have used them that often recently. The Tornado is a good example of such a Cold War relic, designed to penetrate Warsaw Pact air defences at ultra low level and deliver anti runway munitions and other strike weapons yet what is it doing today?

Providing ISR and Close Air Support to forces in Afghanistan. It delivered air defence, strike and CAS in Iraq and other operations, so far from being a relic it is actually rather useful. The same might be said of those unseen SSN’s that were designed to protect the Trident submarines from Russian submarines for example, today they can deliver precision strike on land or stand off and provide vital intelligence information in support of a raid on a terrorist location.

It is a fundamental and quite deliberate obfuscation to provide a platform for cuts.

Of course there are capabilities that can be de-emphasised, as they always have been but lets not start spouting this ridiculous nonsense.

Sadly, the speech didn’t recover from that point

After 12 years without a defence review, when our Armed Forces have at times been overstretched, with legacy equipment programmes from the Cold War that are of less relevance today, and in our current economic and financial circumstances, an SDSR is long overdue. I’ll come on to the SDSR later, but let me be quite clear from the outset: change is coming.

Quoting Liam Fox he highlighted five key ways in which the world has changed since the last review

Economic power and opportunity shifting to countries like Brazil, India, and China; the widening circle of international decision making; the increased complexity of protecting our security; the changing nature of conflict; and the emergence of a networked world. These five changes will shape our clear, focused, and effective foreign policy, and will also shape the role for Defence and Security

Creating a strong link between Foreign and Security policy is of course eminently sensible

I would like to share some of our early thinking.

Taking forward the work of the Green Paper published under the last Government, the early indications are that our Armed Forces will need to be:

• More agile and adaptable.
• More mobile – strategically, operationally, and tactically.
• Better integrated across land, air, and sea with improved access to ISTAR.
• Better integrated with the other levers of national power and influence, at home and abroad

But they will also have less emphasis on weight, and more on accuracy of firepower. They will need to be less focused on scale when contributing to multinational operations, with the emphasis moving to quality. And we should have less duplication of capabilities held in large numbers by our NATO allies.

Like world peace and an end to the Coke v Pepsi debate, we would all like our forces to be more agile and adaptable but I would argue that the armed forces are incredibly adaptable. We have Royal Navy personnel serving in Afghanistan, soldiers acting as aid workers and RAF personnel training Afghan helicopter pilots.

Pretty adaptable and agile I would say, what else would you want them to do, shove a broom up their arses and sweep up the Houses of Parliament as well?

More mobile; you or I might think that this would mean more transport aircraft or ships but in the context of a cutting review this simply means a reduction in systems that are difficult to move, no matter how useful they might be.

If you work in a Armoured division, best start looking for another job. Hang on a minute, they are in Afghanistan, not driving Challengers but driving Mastiffs, could we class that as agile and adaptable?

Given the MoD has just let a £500million contract for FRES Scout, a 34 tonne vehicle that is due to replace an 11 tonne vehicle one might wonder what the term mobile actually means. FRES Scout may be many things but it is not strategically mobile.

Here is another thought, instead of making our forces lighter and therefore more strategically mobile but less useful, why don’t we as a really novel idea, improve our transport capabilities?

Better integrated with improved access to ISTAR, yes, again of course this is a good idea but this must be more than simply creating tri service functions and issuing better binoculars.

Less emphasis on weight and more accuracy of firepower is as interesting as it is nonsensical.

More accuracy of firepower, what does that mean, more precision guidance perhaps?

If you look at all three services the instances of non guided weapons are reducing all the time. There are in fact very few systems, in all three services, that don’t have guided options. Small arms, crew served automatic weapons, 60/81mm mortars and CRV7 rockets are the only ones that spring to mind so unless the Government plan on developing a guided underwater knife fighting systems the only thing left in that argument is naval guns and 105/155mm artillery.

Less emphasis on weight means in a nutshell, a shrunken armed forces.

One might argue that one of the reasons we had so many problems in Iraq and are currently having the same problems in Afghanistan is precisely because we don’t have the weight needed and no amount of accuracy is going to change that.

Reduction in duplication with NATO allies, which conveniently of course, includes our EU partners, is another transparent way of saying we will be having less things that France and Germany have.

Hello EU Defence Integration

Now bear in mind the audience, there will have been lots of Admirals and other naval types so there will of course been an element of playing to the house. No doubt at the next conference on land or air operations there will also be subtly nuanced arguments, remember speeches will have been poured over by special advisers and every word will have a target.

I got bored with reading it after that, its just the same old horseshit as the last SDR and the one before that.

It will be a great read, full of the right words that everyone can agree with but at the end of the road will be a reduction in capabilities, service personnel clutching brown envelopes in one hand and their OSM in the other and finally, a greater integration with the EU and the emasculation of foreign policy.

It’s all quite depressing really.

• Air defence
• Indirect fire and air land integration
• Close combat (inc small arms)
• Base infrastructure
• Logistics
• Communications
• Strategy and Learning & Development of Doctrine
• Combat Engineering
• Integrating civilian aid into the military matrix

Has anyone got any more subject ideas?

This is an abridged version of a speech given at the DVD 2010 show on 23rd June 2010

Our first priority must be ensuring that those we deploy on operations, and therefore those exposed to greatest risk, are provided with the best possible tools available.

Our second priority is the responsibility we have to ensure that we are as ready as can be for whatever future operations come our way.

Work on the Strategic Defence and Security Review – the SDSR – is the means by which we will achieve this.

Meeting these twin challenges requires some firm principles.

So we will ensure that our Armed Forces receive the equipment they require, when they need it, at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer.

We will provide the Defence industry with a firm basis for planning its work, through the work of our Strategic Defence and Security Review, and then by developing a new Defence Industrial Strategy.

We will support Defence jobs by maximising exports because exports can help reduce our own acquisition costs.

And we will ensure that our policy for the Defence industry underpins Britain’s strategic relationships.

We regard our Defence relationship with the United States as particularly important, and increased co-operation with France on acquisition is a high priority.

To meet these four objectives, we will test any future equipment programme against five criteria:

First, capability: we have a bad habit of talking about equipment programmes as if they exist in the abstract when we should be talking about capability: does this piece of equipment enable our Armed Forces to fight effectively and win on the modem battlefield?

Second, affordability: can we afford not only the initial procurement costs but also the through-life costs?

Third, adaptability: how can we get the greatest flexibility in the equipment we buy while ensuring that as many potential roles as possible are fulfilled?

Fourth, interoperability: will this piece of equipment allow the British Armed Forces to take part in Combined and Joint military operations with our allies, specifically NATO?

Fifth, exportability: is this piece of equipment one that will have a high export demand which may, in the long term, reduce our own acquisition costs, create jobs at home, and more broadly help the British economy?

Of course, while Afghanistan remains our top priority, the international outlook we face is sobering, the environment challenging and the threats growing.

So our second priority is a long-overdue, cross-Government, SDSR. This will be policy-led, resource-informed. It will balance the demands of the mission in Afghanistan against the need to plan for other potential conflicts.

And it will be “environment blind”, instead looking at capability and effect; scalability and flexibility, not the badge on a person’s uniform.

What it will not be is a “salami-slicing” review.

We have to bring Defence policy, commitments and resources into balance, so it will be a step-change, not some exercise in tinkering at the edges.

The Defence Secretary has summed up our approach to the SDSR in three words: relevance, realism, and responsibility.

First – Relevance – our posture and capabilities must be relevant to the world we now live in.

This is our opportunity to dispense with much of the legacy of the Cold War.

Second – Realism – it’s clear the years of plenty are over and we face lean years; Defence is no exception.

We cannot insure against every imaginable risk so we will need to decide which we are willing to meet and which we are willing to take.

Third – Responsibility – as a nation, we have a duty to give the brave men and women of our

Armed Forces our full support in return for the selfless service and sacrifice they are prepared to make in our name.

We expect that the Defence section of the SDSR will report in the autumn, which will coincide with the outcome of the Comprehensive Spending Review on 20 October.

We face some tough choices: there are competing priorities, risks to manage, and budgets to square.

And as the Defence Secretary has said, “It is inevitable that there will be the perception of winners and losers as we go through this process.”

But he also said that we are not in the business of managing decline.

If we can come back to a more balanced budget with better predictability over the longer term, we can bring better management of unpredictability, and that will help industry plan for the future, Industry will need to help us, and become genuine partners in this.

The quid pro quo is our reinvigorated agenda for British defence exports, which we hope will again boost industry’s profitability.

The prize for us all is a safer Britain, with secure interests, and a sustainable defence programme able to address the needs of today and prepared for tomorrow.

My Comments;

Sounds like a lot of sense but a cynic might say, so have the last umpteenth defence reviews that have over promised and under delivered.

A new Defence Industrial Strategy will be published after the review

A focus on defence exports when looking at equipment programmes, hallelujah, we used to sell things people wanted, now we seem to produce boutique systems that only the UK has.

A commitment to NATO, the USA and interestingly on a procurement basis, with France.

Watchwords of the SDSR will be relevance, realism and responsibility. The last one is perhaps the most emotive because from the opposition benches the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats relentlessly lambasted the Labour government for not properly looking after service personnel. Now they are in office they have to put their (or is it our) money where their mouth was. So to start the responsibility to ‘our brave boys’ they announce a wage freeze, softened with an increase in operational allowance, and the prospect of likely redundancies.

Wonder if accommodation and food charges will also be frozen, given they are provided by private organisations?

Click here to view the embedded video.

The word tough choices makes an appearance, best get ready for more

I have a great deal of hope for the SDSR, lets hope it lives up to the billing.

H/T UK Defence Forum

Its time for a quick recap.

Purpose

The stated objective of Think Defence is to simply get people talking about defence issues and if we can get 1 person to take an interest where previously they might not, then that’s job done. I certainly have no illusions that we are going to inform the debate or make people listen to our deranged ambling.

Plus of course, I enjoy it!

One of the questions I posed a short while back, as prompted by a couple of comments, was what should be the Think Defence position?

Do we carry on regardless, advocate an increase in spending, discuss ways of meeting the coming budget reductions or stand on the sidelines moaning about them when they do come?

I think the conclusion was, there is room for all views, it’s only a blog after all.

There are actually two issues in play, how to get through the current budgetary problems and how to put defence on a sustainable path for the future.

General Position

The Think Defence general position on the future of the UK armed forces can be summarised in four bullet points;

• The UK defence establishment needs not only more money but much much better spending
• We are not Belgium
• The UK needs to have the confidence to innovate in defence
• We need to once and for all get a grip on equipment costs

There seems very little chance of more money, in fact there is likely a 4 to 5 year reduction of up to 25% if the budget report is to be believed. Our 8 months of deliberations have made the assumption that spending would remain rather static, the announcement today is somewhat of a game changer.

We are not Belgium, the UK is a powerful sovereign nation with overseas obligations, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and a wide range of political , commercial and other interests around the world. We should not retreat from the top table, even if we have to share that table, or even our seat, with others.

The UK has a proud history of military innovation and commercial military success but both these have evaded us for too long. We need to get back in the business of making things other nations actually want to buy and this means innovation.

Finally, because everything is based on money, we need to get a grip of defence costs and if this means a radical reappraisal of the link between politics, industry and the military then so be it.

The RUSI Question

In parallel with my feeble efforts those frightfully clever people at RUSI have also been running an FDR series and one of the fundamental questions they raise seems to revolve around how we configure our forces for the future. Do we go for  maritime based strategic raiding, land based global guardian (COIN) or a contributory approach where we concentrate resources in a range of capabilities.

Another option might be to spread the pain equally and reduce all three services in equal quantities, this seems to be a suggestion in the latest RUSI paper.

There is also another option, the Think Defence option.

That is, actually recognise that medium and large scale operations will be carried out in conjunction with others and configure our forces based on the contributory model. This does not mean that we completely dispense with the ability to mount an all arms full spectrum sovereign operation but this will be at a small scale. Retaining these capabilities at this small scale also provides a hedge against emergent strategic threats and retains core skills that would be very difficult or impossible to rebuild within any reasonable timeframe.

So if I had to describe the Think Defence position in RUSI terms it would be a fudge.

A small but strong central core of strategic raiding surrounding by a larger contributory outer based largely on global guardian plus key niche capabilities.

To Do

Still on the ‘To Do List’ is the remainder of Land Combat (including one on close combat and weapon calibres), logistics, training, acquisition and a few other miscellaneous subjects.

I am going to summarise my thinking on actual capabilities in a future post, its quite a big job to summarise a rambling 50 odd posts plus comments.

My thinking has also changed since starting the series so perhaps it is time for a coherent reappraisal.

In the paper, Malcolm Chalmers, looks in more depth at those well worn ‘hard choices’

Putting the paper in context he suggests that a 10-15% budget cut over the next six years is a plausible scenario. As readers of Think Defence will appreciate, I want more money and I want better spending but there is also a grudging acceptance that budget cuts are inevitable, however unjustified.

Things may be different later today, as the Budget is unveiled but the Coalition Government has only ring fenced the Health and somewhat bizarrely the Overseas Development budgets. This means the savings burden is going to fall heavily on the MoD, although it has managed to avoid any early cutting.

2011 onwards will be grim, no mistake about that.

A real cut in budget combined with defence inflation means a deep cut.

In previous papers, Malcolm Chalmers has presented a number of choices, strategic raiding, global guardian etc and suggested that the UK must choose, not muddle through with a traditional British ‘fudge’

There is, as the paper quite rightly points out, a golden opportunity to put the MoD back in balance, unhindered by obligations of the past government but do they have the balls to make those decisions?

The single service briefing has already started and there is no reason to think it will not intensify as the SDR starts to pick up the pace over the summer.

The report makes the point that we should be realistic about Afghanistan and not allow the SDR to be viewed through ‘Green Zone’ shaped goggles, this is a sensible position, for no other reason than we will be out of there in a year or two. However, if we are serious about confronting Islamic terrorism wherever it pops up, the capabilities as found in Afghanistan are those that will be useful in Somalia or the Yemen.

In contract to earlier papers, this one suggests an all round reduction rather than throwing away capabilities that would be impossible to get back.

Difficult Trade Offs

Personnel – The paper states, rather obviously, that pay and conditions are an obvious aid to recruitment but does not say anything about retention, personnel churn is the real source of personnel cost and it is this area that we need to ensure pay and conditions of service are improved in comparative terms. Failing to see the impact of retention and saying that high pay is needed for recruitment is an obvious flaw.

Service personnel do not join the armed forces for the pay, but as they start families and start thinking about buying a house, they leave for lack of it.

It warns that paying too much attention in this area in order to keep numbers artificially high at the expense of equipment will erode our advantage. The trade off between personnel and technology is a wider argument and without a certainty of outcome. In some instances, personnel have a disproportionate impact when compared to equipment or technology.

Equipment Adaptability – Accepting equipment that is 80% capable is described as a possible means of reducing the cost of equipment but completely misses the point that exquisite capabilities are only part of the reason why our equipment seems to be so expensive yet often fails to deliver. The real reason for cost inflation in defence equipment is not just its specification, but political and industrial interference.

So we can still have 100% or near 100% solutions without the huge cost if we completely reappraise the political and industrial aspects of defence equipment acquisition.

Moving capabilities that are little used into so called extended readiness is also discussed but the paper warns of the time delay between the point of need and the point of reconstitution.

A Balanced Scenario

In the penultimate section of the paper, Malcolm Chalmers describes one possible scenario of retaining a balanced force by describing a range of possible reductions across all three services making the point that the relative reductions could be changed depending on preferences or spread evenly.

The paper does not actually endorse this even handed approach or even say that it is likely but presents it as a balanced baseline reality check.

The assumption on which the proposals are made is that the MoD will be hit with a 12% cut between 2010 and 2016 followed by a modest annual rise.

Land – A 20% reduction in manpower, the Army going down from 98 battalions to around 80, reduction in armoured, armoured infantry, armoured engineers and armoured artillery. Reductions in MoD estate and the move back to the UK of British Forces Germany. The underpinning rational is that Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that full on state building is too difficult and expensive so we would be better served by selective use of air power and special forces in containing unstable states and our European partners have large quantities of armoured and infantry resources (lets hope they don’t decide to cut as well)

Air – A reduction in aircraft from 760 to 550. If anyone thinks we actually have 760 serviceable and theatre entry specification aircraft then I want some of what they are smoking!

Yes, DASA may say that they are in the forward fleet but the reality is somewhat different and these figures fail to take into account the reductions in Lynx, Gazelle, Nimrod, the FSTA PFI and the MFTS PFI. All these will push the active fleet numbers right down, especially in the case of the PFI’s where we are contracting for a service, not numbers of aircraft.

The paper righty states that planners will need to decide the relative priorities between combat and combat support roles and the impact on UAV’s (or Remotely Piloted Air Systems in the current buzzword culture)

Front line aircraft, predictably, will be the focus for reduction.

Sea – A reduction in major vessels from 57 to around 45. Conveniently the figures include SSBN and RFA in those totals. I have noted before a rather maritime bias. The RFA vessels, SSN and Destroyer that are planned to reduce anyway, the reductions could therefore be achieved with little extra pain.

The paper shines a light on the carriers, noting that should a reduction in combat aircraft be the result then the relative priority given to the carriers should be examined. Other carrier nations have only one and the CVF capability will be second only to the US. It notes that the second CVF may be used to replace Ocean and act as a UAV carrier, not sure what a UAV carrier is or what will fly off them and CVF should not need reroling to either, it is a flexible design. If this trend to quality rather than quantity were to be realised the paper notes we would have to rely on others for sea security against piracy for example. The RN would still probably be the strongest fleet in NATO apart from the USA.

Leaving the Top Table

In the final section of the paper it is argued that there is room for further cuts and that military capability should be measured in relative capability, not absolute. The scale of cuts described will still leave the UK in broad comparative terms with France but deeper cuts would be a different matter.

In the light of a rising China and India he argues that this may create tensions not only in the east but also in Africa and other areas. This may be managed by strengthening multilateral cooperation but the prospects of an arms race between China, India, Japan and the USA remains a possibility.

Quick Analysis

Another interesting paper from Mr Chalmers but there seems to be some fundamental lack of appreciation of the possibilities for disruptive change. He assumes that reduction in numbers will reduce capabilities and that the traditional types of capability will remain the same. There is no appreciation of the fundamental shift that will be bought about by unmanned systems or anti access technologies or the changing nature of security threats.

I also think it represents the least pain for the RN, perhaps a little biased.

The Think Defence Future Defence Review will continue soon, looking at other land capability areas but before then, I might do a ‘story so far’ post to summarise where I am.

Are we seriously considering getting rid of infantry battalions, cutting back on T3 and putting the CVF in doubt when we have the Red Arrows, 20 odd military bands and lots of ceremonial duties to attend to.

Would you trade the Red Arrows or lots of ceremonial duties for…

Fill in the blanks.

Personally, I think the very first thing to go would be display, bands and ceremonial

Fires and Support Craft

One of the operational feedback lessons from littoral operation in Iraq was the need for more armour, this resulted in the Offshore Raiding Craft with their clip on Dyneema armour panels that provide basic small arms ballistic protection. In order to retain high speed, manoeuvrability and air portability the ORC relies on speed as much as armour for protection. The open top design also provides superb situational awareness which also contributes to protection and the ability to rapidly return fire with a range of automatic weapons clearly makes attacking an ORC a difficult proposition.

That said, attackers may naturally have the element of surprise and with the proliferation of guided anti tank weapons and RPG’s the vulnerability of the ORC may be exposed, situational awareness, speed and firepower may not be enough. The same might also be said of the hovercraft, feedback showed that whilst the Griffon 2000TD’s were able to withstand greater small arms damage than imagined the crew were exposed, the newer 2400TD LCAC(L)(R) feature armoured panels and bulletproof glass.

There are operational parallels, the US brown water navy in Vietnam faced similar challenges and came up with the concept of the heavily armoured and armed monitor. These including a broad range of types even including those that had water jets for literally washing away shore based fortifications.

So my thinking on this is that there might be a need for a heavily armed and heavily armoured fire support platform.

In a previous post I thought there was not a great need for replacing the existing LCVP Mark 5B landing craft but on further thinking I think there might be some justification (see later on in the post) and this would free up a number for conversion. It might be argued that a dedicated design might be more appropriate but in these bargain basement times I am trying to squeeze capabilities out of existing kit for little money.

LCVP-Mk5

How could any conversion proceed?

The existing craft can carry a payload of about 3 tonnes, which is not very much for a fire support platform. Additional buoyancy will be required and possibly additional fuel/engine power, this was the route taken for the US river monitors. If one looks at pictures of these 1960’s vintage craft and a a Mastiff (for example) one can see the bar/slat armour on both. Apart from wondering about the circular nature of armour developments and the fact that military organisations seem doomed to learn and forget the same lessons that their forebears have, the logic for additional protection is clear. Armour technology has of course improved in the last 50 years but so have offensive capabilities. As a minimum the wheelhouse, engine and fuel areas should be heavily protected against small arms, light canons, RPG’s and ATGW’s. There is of course a balance to be struck and practical limitations but as a general principal, the purpose of the craft is to go into harms way so protection trumps speed and manoeuvrability.

The fire support variant of the Offshore Raiding Craft moves the console to the middle of the craft to allow a weapon position to be placed towards the stern. Creating an armoured wheelhouse towards the centre of the craft will allow all round arcs of fire but if this is not possible due to equipment or machinery placement than a lightweight weapon mount like the Kongsberg Sea Protector should be fitted, to provide this greater coverage, perhaps on the wheelhouse roof.

In the well deck could be fitted a series of weapon or support modules, based on the standard ISO container. The modular concept is not new, it has been used in naval and ground vehicle equipment for some time, examples include the Danish naval STANFLEX or German/Dutch Artec Boxer armoured vehicle. The modular approach allows a wide variety of equipment fits to be utilised, there are many graduated firepower options.

In the direct fire mode one springs immediately to mind, the MSI Defence Systems DS30M mount (Automated Small Calibre Gun) is already fitted to Royal Navy vessels for close in protection against small craft and is a remotely operated system equipped with an ATK  Mk44 Bushmaster 30mm cannon.

DS30M

For logistics commonality this would be the favoured option, especially if the air bursting ammunition (based on the AHEAD design) is taken. As an alternative, If commonality with the Apache gunship ammunition is favoured, the ATK M230LF might be fitted.

MSI have also produced the Stablilised Integrated Gun/Missile Array (SIGMA) A2 design that adds a 7 cell launcher for the Thales Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) system. A laser-guided missile powered by a Roxel two-stage solid propellant motor and carrying a 3kg blast/fragmentation warhead, the LMM is small and highly accurate, using components from the Starstreak system it has a maximum range of 8km. Designed for mounting on a wide variety of platforms including surface vessels, UAV’s and vehicles it is likely to fulfil the Future Air to Surface Guided Weapon – Light (FASGW(L)) requirement.

If greater firepower is needed a modified armoured vehicle turret could be utilised, either manned or unmanned. Recoil might be a problem so a low recoil weapon would be sensible, for example, one of the CMI Defence 90mm or 105mm weapons I thought might be a possible contender for the FRES Fire Support variant. Ordinarily a more traditional naval mount would be the preferred option but these tend to have a significant deck penetration or height and this might not be suitable. Vehicle turrets and mounts tend to have a lower profile although the stabilisation might not be as effective as a naval mount, compromises might have to be made.

To provide indirect fire support another obvious choice would be the Patria Nemo, a 120mm rifled mortar that has been successfully trialled on the Marine Alutech M12 landing craft.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Counter battery fire against a mobile platform such as this landing craft conversion would be very difficult and the 120mm mortar can use precision natures in addition to the usual HE, smoke and illumination. They could sit off the effective range of RPG’s and anti tank missiles, providing sustained, distributed and effective fire support from a range of up to 10km. The Nemo can also provide direct fire so the previous module might be superfluous, depending on performance and detailed requirements. In later posts I will be looking at artillery and indirect fire support, there might a place for the Nemo to be used for the RM, fitted to a Viking.

Patria NEMO, M12

The front ramp might need to be reduced in height to provide clear arcs of fire for a weapons module. Other modules might include diver support, command and control or communications. It might even be used in the plain old logistics role, just better protected and armed than normal.

The key to this proposal is protection and modularity, they will be required to go in harms way and speed and maneuverability only go so far. Modularity adds flexibility.

Landing Craft

Because the existing LCVP Mk5’s have all been converted (in this proposal) there exists an obvious need for a replacement landing craft. We might simply replace like with like, after all, there is very little actually wrong with them.

However, additional performance is never a bad thing!

The QinetiQ partial air cushion catamaran (PASCAT) demonstrator has recently been launched and although this 30m demonstrator is LCU Mk10 size the design might be scaled for the smaller requirement.The demonstrator sits slightly below the Mk10’s in terms of payload and weight. To be compatible for the davits and other machinery on various RN/RFA vessels the size and weight should be the same as the Mk5’s.

PASCAT is an innovative concept that seeks to provide easier beach handling, greater payload and speed for landing craft. The demonstrator has been created by QinetiQ in conjunction with BMT, Aluminium Shipbuilding and of course, Griffon Hoverwork. The specification for the demonstrator is predicated on transporting 5 Viking armoured vehicles from ship to shore, rather than a Challenger 2 so maximum payload is 55 tonnes. PASCAT is not a solely military technology and was originally developed by the Independent Maritime Associates for a European Commission Study into transport options for European waterways. Additional studies for the USMC, USN and German MoD have also been carried out.

If the PASCAT technology cannot be scaled down to Mk5 size then a simple one for one replacement would be the lowest risk option.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Summary

The expanded assault squadrons of the Royal Marines, in this proposal, should be relatively flexible organisations (as they are now) able to integrate with a variety of other units/capabilities and support a wide range of missions.

The greater in number and capability equipment as proposed in this and the previous post can only enhance their utility.

The next and final post in this series will look at logistics and a larger, offshore and littoral combat ship.

The FDR littoral series of posts is summarised below;

Part 1 – Introduction

Part 2 – Hover and Raiding Craft

Part 3 – Fires and Support Craft

Part 4 – The C3

Part 5 – Ship to Shore