Why Things Don’t Happen – Royal Navy underfunding

Out today from RUSI is a paper from Vice-Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham KCB and Gwyn Prins from the LSE that makes a case for spending on the Royal Navy

The defence review is occurring at a time of extreme financial pressure at home and considerable military risk in Afghanistan. Yet it would be a grave failure if it attended principally – or worse, exclusively – to the clamour of those issues. The deepest principles of national security are silent. They explain why bad things don’t happen and they must be given voice. This article also argues that geopolitics prescribe a primarily maritime framework for any British SDSR, and that the core strategic challenges are naval. The Royal Navy, however, has become dangerously weak. Urgent steps must be taken to reverse this trend before it is too late

Its timing is of course related to the pre SDSR buzz but I hope it doesn’t get get labelled as Senior Service Special Pleading because its is very interesting and relevant.

Acknowledging the dire state of the public finances, but arguing national security is not a discretionary expenditure, the paper suggests the strategic need for more surface combatants must be met through reassessing the choice of ‘seriously cost constrained’ new ships, looking closely at examples from Denmark and the Netherlands that offer a modular, adaptable design at a quarter of the price of currently planned purchases.

The paper argues for a cost constrained general purpose class of ships that make extensive use of modularity. It argues for 12-15 of these to compliment a force of 12 to 14 Type 45 and Type 26 (that’s in total, not 12-14 each)

This is a strong argument, a return to the two tier constabulary nature of forward defence with the ability to surge highly capable ships into an area should it be needed. Although the numbers and capabilities might be different it is fundamentally in line with the Think Defence position, that of  a high capability core surrounded by lower capability but more numerous types.

Jed wrote a couple of great posts on this, here and here

I also looked at it from another angle with the C3 modular concept and other posts here and here.

The authors also published a similar paper in 2007 called ‘The Royal Navy at the Brink’, arguing for a 30 ship Future Surface Combatant (FSC) comprising a 10 C1, 20 C2 ratio but the new paper recognises the financial constraints we are in.

Pallets and Containers

Completing our look at logistics I am going to delve into the complex world of pallets.

Anyone thinking that pallet dimensions would be coordinated with vehicle dimensions, aircraft hold dimensions and ISO containers is in for a shock!

We know that ISO containers are the desired method of shipping by road, rail and sea. Their large size and weight means the opposite is true for air transportation and for small loads ISO containers don’t really make much sense.

For air transportation and small break bulk loads, the pallet is the obvious and preferred option.
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FDR – Land (Towards Vehicle Coherence Part 3)

Any discussion on vehicle coherence should logically be proceeded by the finalisation of doctrine and their resultant structures; do we go down the medium weight path as envisaged by FRES, are square armoured regiments supported by armoured infantry still relevant, are the multi equipment brigades the way forward or do we simply have lots of light infantry supported by a range of vehicles depending on the operational scenario?

The Army still seems to be enamoured with the medium weight concept with the recent announcements on the ASCOD FRES SV vehicles. If it is the intention to reduce both the heavy formations and lighter formations with a greater number of medium weight ones then impact on logistics is uncertain, what you take in one hand is given to the other. Operations in Afghanistan have shown that whilst dismounted operations against this type of enemy uses the same light infantry and small unit tactics that have evolved over centuries their means of transport is considerably weightier, for example Mastiff.

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FDR – Land (Towards Vehicle Coherence Part 2)

In Part 1 of this series I looked out the disadvantages of having too many types of vehicle fulfilling similar roles and with similar capabilities.

To start off Part 2 I am going to look at a single vehicle type, the GMLRS.

GMLRS is a vitally useful system, highly precise, incredibly effective and with utility in all most spectrums of conflict. We don’t have that many though, so if one throws a track or its engine becomes defective not only is the vehicle out of action, crucially, so is the weapon system.

Modularisation has been talked of for some time and the Danish naval Stanflex system goes some way to achieving it but whilst the ability to quickly reconfigure a ship with one weapon system or the other is useful, in reality, less likely to be used than one might imagine. The real benefit of modularity is in the scenario described above. With a modular payload, another vehicle could be quickly bought to the stricken one and during the recovery process, the weapon element simply swapped. The broken down vehicle goes for repair and the weapon system carries on its way.

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FDR – LAND (Towards Vehicle Coherence – Part 1)

The desire to consolidate the Army’s vehicle fleet is about more than mere neatness, the more vehicle types we have, the more we need vehicle mechanics to be trained and when they are on a training course who is actually doing the spanner bashing, the more spares we need, the more contracts we have to manage, the more driver training, the more driver training course course development, the more driver course instructors, plus their trainers, the more ECM and communication integration (this is very expensive) and the more logistics planning activity that needs to be undertaken. Each military MoD civilian or military person in this chain has pension obligations, travel expenses and administration overheads.

The list goes on and on, so the end result of more vehicle types is quite simply, a ballooning of costs.

It might be stating the obvious, this is ‘not a good thing’

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FDR – Land (Logistics and Combat Service Support #3)

In the last of the series on logistics I am going to look at containerisation and trucks, sorry it’s a bit long

The Army is generally moving towards a rational and coherent fleet of logistic vehicles. The old Bedford MK’s and TM’s are slowly going out of service to be eventually replaced by the MAN Military Trucks Support Vehicle (SV) range and whilst the Foden DROPS are being hammered in Afghanistan they will eventually be replaced by the HLDC programme. The Oskosh Close Support Tanker is performing extremely well, one of the most mobile vehicles in theatre and although operating under a PFI, the Heavy Equipment Tractor (HET), also from Oskosh, has proven to be a great success.

Future programmes include the Light Equipment Transporter, General Support Tanker and the Articulated/Non Articulated Vehicle Programme but not much is in the public domain about these, or what direction they will take.
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FDR – Land (Logistics and Combat Service Support #2)

The Royal Logistic Corps is making a huge contribution to operations in Afghanistan, however, the overall MoD wide management of supply chain accounting has come in for some severe criticism, the NAO releasing a fairly damning report on equipment accounting procedures.

The NAO report stated

“Despite action by the Department to improve its asset management and accounting, the issues I have identified are systemic and deep-rooted.  The level of control exercised by the Department is not yet sufficient to enable me to provide an opinion on a significant proportion of assets reported in the financial statements.”

Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office, 26 July 2010

One is left wondering if some of the problems are a result of the fragmentation of responsibility for logistics and equipment accounting to various military, MoD agencies and civilian organisations.

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FDR – Land (Logistics and Combat Service Support #1)

The Royal Logistics Corps is not nicknamed the Really Large Corps for nothing; it is the single largest element of the British Army and was formed in 1993 by amalgamating Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Royal Pioneer Corps, Army Catering Corps, Royal Corps of Transport and the posties from the Royal Engineers.

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FDR Land – (Artillery)

For clarity, I have decided to call this post ‘artillery’ rather than anything trendy like joint fires or air land integration.

Artillery has had a mini renaissance in Afghanistan with the continuing and increasing use of GMLRS, the 70km sniper, 105mm and even the humble mortar. With likely future conflicts taking place over a wider area there is a trend for greater range.

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A New Approach to our FDR Posts

In the final few FDR posts left before I start a consolidation and presentation exercise (which will resurrect the Wiki) I am going to structure them in two sections where relevant.

We all know that the forthcoming review is going to be nothing more than an exercise in slashing costs with a thin veneer of strategic direction.

• Objective 1 – Short Term cost savings and Afghanistan
• Objective 2 – Long Term plans based on the idea of investing to save, coherence and a standardisation strategy that enforces the Think Defence mantra of ‘ruthless commonality’

We know that Objective 1 is the most pressing but in swinging the axe we also have to ensure that a range of capabilities can be regenerated or built up as the financial climate improves.

It’s a far cry from grand ambitions of defining our role in the world, punching above our weight and other equally redundant platitudes and rooted in reality.

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We Have to be Ready For Anything

An interesting article from Alexander Woolfson in the Standpoint Magazine

The most famous post-war assessment of Britain’s international position came in 1962 from the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who observed: “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.” Acheson’s words suggested not only uncertainty about Britain’s role but also its decline in international status.

If the government does not actively choose, structure and fund our military as some form of expeditionary force, we will by default lose our autonomous defence function and the associated skills, probably permanently. The penalties in terms of international power and influence will be profound. It is unlikely, in that case, that we will ever contradict Acheson’s assessment of our place in the world.

Read the full article here

Gonna Get Me Some Cold War Relics

What with the massed ranks of analysts, defence journalists and coalition politicians gunning for those thousands of cold war relics we have sitting idle just waiting for the chop, it’s time to see what they mean.

A cynic might think that getting rid of cold war relics is simply a smokescreen, hiding budget driven cuts behind a veil of forward thinking modernity, but are any journalists challenging the Government on this, of course not, as we posted in our quick resume of the last piece of drivel from the Telegraph.

When was the Cold War anyway?

There might be many points during which one could have declared the start and end of the cold war but for arguments sake lets just say it was between 1950 and 1990, so any weapon system that was either introduced or conceived during this period is therefore a relic and ready for withdrawal.

The term is also characterised by those types of equipment or forces that would have supported the United Kingdom’s primary missions during a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, anti submarine, nuclear weapons, armoured formations and deep strike fighters plus a bit of amphibious and cold weather capabilities.

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Nick Harvey Opens His Mouth

Some choice quotes from Nick Harvey MP speaking at the RUSI Future Maritime Operations Conference today.

He starts by evoking the memory of Richard Haldane and his reforms in the early 1900′s, making reference to the fact that he was a liberal politician, lets brush over the fact that Lord Haldane became a Labour Party member in 1923 and served in a Labour Government for many years.

What else did he say?

the Conservatives proposed a Strategic Defence and Security Review – an SDSR. We proposed a Strategic Security and Defence Review – an SSDR. But coalition is all about give and take so we got electoral reform, and an SDSR it is!

Ha, ha, I am sure the ranks of the armed forces ranged out in front of him that are looking at cuts in capability and numbers thought that was hilarious and were rolling in the aisles laughing.

We have to fulfil our operational commitments in Afghanistan, but we must also adapt our Armed Forces to face the changing international outlook and the future character of conflict, making a clean break from the mindset of the Cold War.

I hate the term Cold War in this context because it casts a sneering and ill informed gaze over capabilities that might be inconvenient or an easy target because we might not have used them that often recently. The Tornado is a good example of such a Cold War relic, designed to penetrate Warsaw Pact air defences at ultra low level and deliver anti runway munitions and other strike weapons yet what is it doing today?

Providing ISR and Close Air Support to forces in Afghanistan. It delivered air defence, strike and CAS in Iraq and other operations, so far from being a relic it is actually rather useful. The same might be said of those unseen SSN’s that were designed to protect the Trident submarines from Russian submarines for example, today they can deliver precision strike on land or stand off and provide vital intelligence information in support of a raid on a terrorist location.

It is a fundamental and quite deliberate obfuscation to provide a platform for cuts.

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Upcoming FDR (LAND) Posts

Whilst we are still discussing FRES SV, a quick heads up for some of the articles/posts coming up

• Air defence
• Indirect fire and air land integration
• Close combat (inc small arms)
• Base infrastructure
• Logistics
• Communications
• Strategy and Learning & Development of Doctrine
• Combat Engineering
• Integrating civilian aid into the military matrix

Has anyone got any more subject ideas?

Defence Acquisition and the SDSR

By Peter Luff MP, Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology

This is an abridged version of a speech given at the DVD 2010 show on 23rd June 2010 Read more…