In the previous articles written by myself and the ThinkDefence teams we both independently came to the conclusion that the future of the RAF lay in the cost effective management of a single aircraft type as the ‘fast jet fleet’ and that the single type should be the Typhoon. We both advocated the early retirement of the Harrier GR9 and the cancellation of the UK’s commitment to, and interest in the Lockheed Martin F35 (Joint Combat Aircraft).

However this leads to an immediate problem. The UK Govt. finally ordered the two large deck carriers first promulgated in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, and open source information seems to suggest the CVF (Future Carrier) programme is now progressed to the point where it will be cheaper to build the two carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Queen_Elizabeth_class_aircraft_carrier).

So, if we are not going to cancel them because of contractual penalities, and we are not going to sell them (India being the latest rumour) because of pride and because the rest of the Royal Navy’s capabilities have been mortgaged to get them in the first place, then we better have something to fly from them !

Just for the record, even though I am ex RN and spent some time in the Fleet Air Arm, I am no ‘religious zealot’ when it comes to these ships, they were a good idea in 1998, but to honest I would be happy to seem them cancelled or sold if we replaced them with something more sensible (like the Italian Cavour class). However for all the reasons above that’s not going to happen, so what will consitute the airgroup of a Queen Elizabeth class carrier ?

1. Keep the Harrier flying – for now
The cheapest, interim option and one which I recommend and support just to keep a cadre of trained naval pilots, is to hand over all remaining Harrier GR9 and T12 to the RN Fleet Air Arm (FAA). However keeping these aircraft and updating them and keeping them in service as the only jets to fly from these carriers is not much of mid-to-long term option, as they are ground attack, close air support aircraft, with no radar. So if we want to fly a couple of squadrons of Harriers from the big deck carriers in support of Royal Marines, perhaps carrying a squadron of Italian or Spanish Av8B Harrier II+ for CAP and fighter sweep on coalition operations, then this truly would be cheap, but would not exactly offer the capability the carriers were designed to provide.

2. Not the JCA – too expensive.
If we are to ditch the LM F35 JCA for the RAF, it does not seem to make sense to buy a small number of the deck melting wonder plane just to equip the carriers. Their ultimate unit cost remains unknown, the deck melting issue is far from being resolved and while the aircraft is obviously a paradigm shift in capabilities for STOVL compared to the Harrier, how useful is it’s “first day of the war” stealth capability going to be for non-peer state ‘war’ against the current, or even project future foes ? Nope, I say ditch the F35 now, before wasting millions on it.

So if we are not going with STOVL, then we need to flex the design of the carriers and get catapults and arresting gear onboard during the build. They have been designed from the outset to take such modification. As I don’t seen the RN flying a small number of Migs or Sukhoi’s that realistically leaves two options for a conventional carrierborne airgroup: The Boeing F/A18E or the Dassault Rafale – I am suggesting we go with the Rafale.

3. Why not the F/A18E Super Hornet
According to open source information the inter-webs, the unit cost for an F/A18E is 55.2 million US Dollars, which converts to 33.49 million GB Pounds each. Similarily the Rafale M is qouted at 70 million Euros which makes it 63 million GB Pounds each – nearly twice the price. This seems a bit odd to me, and you might want to do your own research to confirm it, but I am guessing this is because of the volume of production for the USN, which is driving down the unit cost for the Super Hornet. So if its cheaper, and it is a decent aircraft (bomb truck, not much of a ‘fighter’ apparently……) why not go with is option ? Well because my choice of the Rafale is also tied to the way we run and use the two carriers.

4. The French option
There is no doubt the Rafale is a good aircraft. The Rafale M as used by the French Navy’s Areo-Navale has been in operational use from the FS Charles de Gaul since 2004, and is now available in the ‘full capability’ F3 standard. It is due to get the Meteor, it can carry U.S. Paveway guided bombs as well as French equivalents, it is integrated with SCALP, which is very similar to the Storm Shadow (same family of missilses), true we would have to pay for integration of AIM132 ASRAAM (or just use the IR Mica ?). It can carry IR/EO targeting and recce pods etc. By the time the carriers are accepted into service in 20015/16 the Rafale will be a very mature platform with 12 years of Naval service behind it.

However its not just the aircraft, we have to think of this requirement holistically, in the overall “big picture” of budgets and desired capabilities, and I think we can strike some good deals with the French (yes, I really did just say that……). The French Navy would like a second carrier, and we are buying two so that one will be available for operations at any one time. I think we should strike a deal so that for periods when the Charles de Gaul is in dock and unavailable, then one of the UK carriers is made available. The deal might be that the UK ship can only be used for training cruises, with French crew joining a core of RN crew, and a French airgroup embarked, to ensure they don’t loose their operational edge when the CdG is out of commission. Or we might go further than that and allow the French to use the ship on coalition operations to which both national governments have signed up. Lets face it, based on the last 20 or so years, its very, very improbable that the French will unilaterally decalre war on someone and want to use our carrier to hit someone we quite like ! Now if we were borrowing a French flat top, that might be different, but I digress.

The CVF carriers have a notional airgroup of 40 jets and helo’s, so a “full” airgroup for a major offensive operation might be 3 squadrons of 12 Rafale for a total of 36. The CdG also carries a maximum of 40 aircraft and the French Navy is buying 60. We should also buy 60, and establish a training presence with the French Navy at their main training base (with say 8 aircraft), with ‘normal’ deployment of 2 squadrons on the active carrier and 1 on the UK mainland as the OCU for ‘advanced training’.

Of course we could even extend the cooperation buy purchasing E2 Hawkeye AEWC aircraft for the new carriers, which are also flown by the French.

In summary, lets buy off the shelf, lets buy European, lets put defence cooperation into ‘realpolitik’ mode rather than just hot air, and at the same time provide a useful multi-role aircraft for our big shiny new flatops, because if we don’t we may as well rename them HMS White Elephant and HMS Flying Pig – but at least we would have the biggest helicopter carriers in the world !

I started writing this article during my lunch hours after the ThinkDefence guys posted their article “FDR – the RAF and Airpower, Introduction”.

However they beat me to and posted their uncannily similar artilce, “FDR – Air (Fast Jets)” , so as our articles are not entirely identical, I provide this as a supporting article if the team decide to post it.

My possibly controversial hypothesis in this piece is based on an attempted balance between future capability and the reality of the defence budget. Anyone who works in the corporate world will probably be sick of hearing “do more with less” – but this is a real concept as far the British armed forces are concerned. The focus of the piece is the fast jet force, but as this does not exist in isolation, it does touch on other capabilities.

A single fast jet type for RAF

The basis of my suggested future for the RAF is that it should consolidate on a single type of fast jet combat aircraft as soon as is operationally possible. This single type, should of course, be the Typhoon. Before examining the why’s and wherefore’s of this suggestion, let us take a quick look at some historical figures. These figures are from open sources and one should take into account the difference between the amount of aircraft purchased and the amount available to the front line fleet, the UK seems to put about 25% of any type to one side for inclusion in the long term maintenance cycle and as attrition replacements. So for example if we bought 100 aircraft, 72 would be in 6 x 12 aircraft squadrons, with  2 or 3 trials aircraft and the rest in the maintenance reserve.

The 1998 SDR fleet numbers – 36 front line squadrons of:

Tornado Air Defence variant – 120
Tornado GR4 – 142 (142 modified to GR4/4A out of an original purchase of 228)
Jaguar GR1 – 75 (from an originally purchase of 202)
Harrier GR5 – 62 (plus 13 T10 trainers)

Total: approx 399

To this total, in 1998 we could add approx. 50 Sea Harrier F/A2 of the Fleet Air Arm.

According to Wikipedia (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_United_Kingdom_military_aircraft), now in 2009 the numbers are:

Tornado GR4 – 136
Tornado F3 – 59
Harrier GR9 – 40
Typhoon – 58 (delivered so far)

Total: approx 293

So we already have a large reduction in fast jet numbers over the last ten years of approx. 100 aircraft, or a quarter of the fleet.

The current plans for Typhoon would seem to suggest ending procurement after Tranche 3A giving a full fleet strength of 162 aircraft (some Tranche 2 having been transferred to Saudi Arabia), down from an original total of over 232. Current plans also discuss the requirement for 150 Joint Combat Aircraft in the form of the Lockheed Martin F35. So 232 Typhoons plus 150 F35 would have given a full up 2 type fleet of 382 aircraft, almost back to 1998 numbers, and unfortunately probably un-affordable and unrealistic in the current budgetary environment.

Therefore I independently come to the same conclusion as a previous posting by the authors / editors of ThinkDefence – a ‘single type’ fleet for RAF fast jet combat aircraft, composed entirely of Typhoons.

Just like the previous post, I would advocate levering the investment already made in what is a maturing platform with plenty of capability growth options. In fact if industrial participation allows I would suggest a ramp up of production for the Typhoon and an earlier draw down and retirement of both Harrier GR9 and the Tornado GR4/4A fleets.

For the exact same reasons also already stated in their previous post I would withdraw any commitment to purchase the F35 as the JCA. It may well turn out to be a marvellous aircraft, but is currently late, over budget, and definitely will not be delivered at the originally projected unit cost (the cost per individual aircraft). Indeed the F35 is intrinsically linked to the RN’s new big deck carriers (CVF) but that does not have to be, and more on that later.

So if we do not purchase the F35 to fulfill the JCA requirement and can show some real savings from early retirement, rationalisation of logistics support and training etc I would also advocate the return to committing to the full original total of 232 Typhoons including replacements for the aircraft transferred to the Saudi’s and what’s more I would add an additional 90 aircraft as the Tornado replacement.   This would give an overall Typhoon procurement structure that looks something like this:

Tranche 1 – 53
Tranche 2 – 67
Tranche 3A – 40
Tranche 3B – 48

Total – 298

Levering that investment in the Typhoon would also includes, as suggested by the guys in their earlier posting “investing to save” – some investment in enhanced capabilities that would allow the RAF to go to this single type fleet and yet keep the capability for long range strike, or battlefield interdiction and close air support. Principally there are a number of already existing programmes that could / should be speed up to see the capabilities fielded earlier:

·  Full helmet mounted site capability
·  Meteor missile (including an DEAD variant).
·  Conformal fuel tanks
·  Thrust vectoring nozzles for EJ200
·  Additional weapons integration (Storm Shadow and dual mode Brimstone)
·  Swashplate type AESA radar

It might be that for the Tornado replacement all the Tranche 4 aircraft would be 2 seaters, with the conformal fuel tanks making up for the loss in internal volume. Or it maybe that with the modern avionics two crew are not needed for the long range strike mission (delivery of Storm Shadow). However instead 2 crew members might well be more useful in the close air support / non-traditional ISR role (i.e. armed recce in an Afghanistan scenario) or acting as an air-borne JTAC (or Airborne Forward Air Controller to use the old terminology) – so perhaps the 48 Tranche 3B would be two seaters instead ?

Another question that arises is that over the future of the Tranche 1 aircraft. Even upgraded to full Block 15 state, these aircraft have some major difference to their later siblings, including electronic engine control computers and the lack of an ability to carry the Meteor AAM. Again, although it would require expenditure, I would suggest it is worth upgrading these aircraft to the full Tranche 3 standard in order to have a single standard across the fleet.

On the subject of the Meteor, although it is a little behind schedule, I would invest in a passive homing, multi-role variant that would combine the imaging IR sensor of the AIM132 ASRAAM and the passive radition homing sensor of the ALARM. Keeping the Meteors two-way datalink, long range and Mach 4 plus capability, this investment in an existing weapon programme would provide an excellent SEAD / DEAD weapon which would even potentially have air to air and anti-ship capability. As we won’t have stealthy F35 “first day of the war” strike capability, what we might bring to any coalition air ops would be this long legged and high spec replacement for ALARM and HARM.

So in summary, the biggest difference between what I had written here, and that which was posted earlier by the ThinkDefence team is that I think it is not unreasonable to not only fulfill the original project order for Typhoon, but to add some additional aircraft as Tornado replacements, although far less than on a one for one basis. Spend a little now, to save a lot in the future………

Of course the final question is, if we retire the Harrier and ditch any commitment to the JCA, what will we fly from our spanking shiny new carriers ?

This one will be discussed further in another article.

This proposal is a controversial one so we are going to get it out early!

In order to provide economies of scale, a streamlined training and logistics stream it is proposed that the RAF revert to a single, genuinely multi-purpose fast jet for strike, close air support, air dominance and other supporting roles, the Typhoon.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Harrier should be withdrawn from service as soon as possible and the Tornado phase withdrawn over the next decade as more Typhoons become operational and the Tornado reaches the end of its useful operational life. The exact timescale of this withdrawal would depend of many factors including aircrew, basing, logistics and availability of Typhoons.

This will achieve two things; massive savings and a large hole in the RAF’s capabilities but in the context of this overall proposal the reduction in capability is accepted. There are advantages to reverting to a single, swing role aircraft, training becomes much more streamlined and efficient and the type can be properly supported from an aircrew and engineering perspective.

To support this, the full originally planned purchase should be completed.

Full integration of all weapon types should also be carried out, for example Storm Shadow, Brimstone and others.

Electronically scanned radar and thrust vectoring (which has many more advantages than just combat agility) should be implemented as the technology matures and a clear needs case can be made. The existing CAPTOR radar is very capable and the agility of the Typhoon is not in doubt but as other aircraft come into service the Typhoon should not stand still.

Conformal fuel tanks should be fitted early into the Tranche 3 production aircraft because this will support longer loiter times or greater range. The existing capabilities programme should be extended to bring the earlier tranches to as common a capability as economically feasible.

It is proposed to form 9 squadrons of 15 aircraft each, either configured as air defence or swing role depending on the particular Tranche of the aircraft. Excess aircraft would form an attrition and fleet rotation group in addition to conversion, evaluation and other uses. Each formed squadron will also be allocated two in squadron spares.

5 squadrons would be allocated to UK air defence, Falklands air defence and Quick Reaction Alert obligations with the other 4 acting as our expeditionary capability. Some flexing between these roles may be feasible depending on prevalent threats.

Typhoon

From a full buy of 232 (even though we have only confirmed 160 in 5 squadrons)

Forward Squadrons = 135 (9 x 15)
In Squadron Spares = 20
Operational Conversion Unit = 24
Operational Evaluation Unit = 4
Falklands Flight = 4

This would leave only 45 airframes for attrition reserves and to manage usage across the fleet which is simply not enough if readiness and availability is to be maintained over its lifespan so additional purchases will be required although decisions on this would not need to be made immediately.

An unequivocal commitment to Typhoon will also contribute greatly to its export potential, export sales generate significant revenue for the UK and support the UK aerospace industry.

Arguments rage back and forth across the internet about the cost and capabilities of the F35 or Joint Combat Aircraft; it is in development so the actual final cost and capabilities are not known by anyone but there seems to be no doubt about two things, it will be very capable in comparison with the Harrier and very very expensive.

F35B STVOL Variant

There are many positives to the JCA but quite simply, we must spend our scarce budget on other things. The UK has made an investment of circa £2billion in the development of the F35 in order to secure a high level of work share and whilst the impact on the programme would be considerable it would not be catastrophic.

Cancellation of the JCA would also have significant impact on the Royal Navy future carriers, we will discuss these implications in other posts.

As the types and airframes are reduced it is self evident that personnel and base locations should also be reduced. The principles of basing should be a core location with at least one alternate in order to mitigate concentration risk. Quick Reaction Alert will also demand geographically dispersed basing but it is possible for training to be concentrated at a single location.

Additional airframes may need to be purchased in order to support this increase in planned fleet size.

Looking further ahead, developing a long range autonomous strike UAV system is a sensible goal and worth investing in as part of our long term strategy for a Typhoon replacement.

The one thing we never seem to achieve is economies of scale; this would go some way to achieving this and will leave the RAF with a single swing role fast jet combat aircraft. It is accepted that this single design approach carries risk and yes, this proposal has many compromises but we need the money elsewhere.

QUICK SUMMARY

1.  Cancel JCA
2. Withdraw Harrier as soon as possible
3. Withdraw Tornado when its out of service date is reached (circa 2018)
4. Consider extra Typhoon airframes to maintain availability
5. Continue with weapon integration and improvement programmes
6. Support ongoing development funding for UAV based strike platform
7. Consolidate basing and training

The drive to reduce costs leads to the conclusion that a low priced aircraft is the answer and Embraer have proposed the Super Tucano, Beechcraft the AT-6, Air Tractor with the AT802 and even Boeing have pitched in with an offer to restart production of OV-10 Bronco. There are many other proposals as well, such as the Piper PA-48 Enforcer (a modern P51 Mustang)

Super Tucano

P48 Enforcer

Hawker Beechcraft AT6B Prototype

Boeing OV10x

Commentators often cite the Vietnam era Skyraider as the perfect CAS aircraft and make the extrapolation that a modern era Skyraider is what is needed in the skies of Afghanistan. As our previous article by Richard Stockley correctly highlighted, the Skyraider was withdrawn in the face of first generation man portable air defence missiles.

The revival of turboprop combat aircraft seems to boils down to three arguments;

1. Fast jets aren’t that good for close air support, armed ISTAR or any of the other missions required in counter insurgency operations where air superiority is a given.

2. Fast jets are too expensive and sophisticated to provide Close Air Support in counter insurgency operations as characterised by Afghanistan and given the likelihood of being engaged in similar operations in the coming decades the cost argument is a no brainer.

3. Fast jets are too complex for emerging air forces that we can mentor.

None of these are arguments for turboprop aircraft but arguments against fast jets; it just so happens that the turboprop seems to offer an antidote for the ills of fast jets.

Fast Jets are no good at CAS/COIN
It is probably fair to say that Western air forces have concentrated on the exercise of air power as a separate strategic stream to ground and naval power with strike, interdiction, air superiority, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and air transport missions shaping both doctrine and equipment. Mission over the Balkans and Iraq has confirmed that the RAF and USAF have these capabilities in spades.

The nature of ground combat, particularly in Afghanistan, dictates the use of light forces with little armour and a distributed enemy. It is primarily a conflict of light infantry. To compensate for the lack of numbers the western forces in Afghanistan rely completely on indirect fires, mortars, artillery and close air support.

Close air support whilst available in the RAF and USAF at the beginning of the conflict was not as well practiced and only after several UOR’s has the RAF been able to provide such close air support as it does now.

One of the arguments driving the Turboprop CAS/COIN bandwagon is that fast jets are simply too fast to provide their pilots with sufficient situational awareness to provide effective and safe support to troops in contact.

With the advent of improving tactics, techniques and procedures, coupled with the new capabilities offered by the latest generation of targeting pods where the forward air controller can actively cue weapons or see the same information as the pilot, this argument simply disappears.

Whilst it might have been true in Vietnam it is not true in Afghanistan.

Advocates of the Turboprop CAS aircraft point to better endurance but whilst this might be true, crucially, they fail to recognise the advantages that speed brings. Afghanistan is a huge place and to respond to a ‘Troops in Contact’ request for close air support the aircraft either has to be near or step on the gas to get there quickly. Time to get on station will be significantly higher in a turboprop as well. Turboprops may be able to be based closer to operational areas and this may offset this to some extent but will require operations, maintenance and logistics to be equally distributed, costing more.

Fast jets can carry a massive load and in practice this means a range of weapons, all available on a single aircraft that the forward air controller can choose to deploy based on the prevailing conditions. Turboprops do not have this high load capacity and would therefore have to be more numerous, they do not have the speed, so again, would have to be more numerous to cover the same area.

Fast jets are not restricted by weather conditions like small turboprops and can be refuelled in mid air to extend the duration of a sortie or time on station.

Speed has its disadvantages but in addition to being able to respond quickly and cover a large area it also provides safety. Although the air threat in Afghanistan is generally low that does not mean it is completely safe. Close examination of pictures of some aircraft operating in theatre will reveal air to air missiles are often carried, to counter the threat of an Iranian incursion. The Iranians have shown their willingness to take hostages as amply demonstrated by the RN/RM HMS Cornwall incident and a defenceless aircraft that they claimed had incurred into their airspace would be easy to coerce.

Ground fires are a significant danger; all aircraft operating in theatre are fitted with expensive but effective defensive aids against man portable ground to air missiles that the Taleban might obtain from sponsor nations and when operating at low level automatic cannon or machine gun fire is a very serious threat.

A high speed aircraft can transit danger zones quickly, unlike a slower turboprop which would remain in the threat zone for longer or simply not enter them in the first place which would limit effectiveness or mean aircraft and aircrew losses.

Finally, an unglamorous but absolutely essential activity that is carried out by fast jets is the show of force/show of presence that is used to deter ground elements or influence their actions. If one has ever seen these in action they are very effective, a turboprop, however cheap, is not going to have the same effect.

Close air support is not the only mission required in counter insurgency air operations.

Afghanistan has also seen an explosion in the demand for imagery and other visual/non visual information. This has been provided by manned aircraft but is largely fulfilled by Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) such as the UK’s Predator’s, Desert Hawks and Hermes 450’s

Whilst of undoubted utility, UAS’s have a couple of big problems, situational awareness and bandwidth requirements.

Because the UAS operator looks at the world around them through an electro-optical sensor it can be compared to looking through a drinking straw or telescope. Wide angle, peripheral vision is not available and whilst work is underway to address this issue it remains a significant problem.

Although the bandwidth used to control the flight of a UAS is quite modest and most new systems have some degree of autonomy which means they don’t need to be ‘piloted’ but ‘directed’ the raw sensor feed has to be transmitted as is. Because no onboard analysis takes place by a skilled imagery analyst the bandwidth requirements are significant. This a difficult issue because the bandwidth available is limited by power restrictions, availability of secure bandwidth and plain old physics. Full motion video, even with advanced compression and only a medium resolution can require up to 20Mb/s, synthetic aperture radar, approximately 50Mb/s. Given that BOWMAN gets by with less than 10kbs one can begin to appreciate the scale of problem. The demand is increasing at a fast pace.

A simple way to visualise the problem is showing your friends those holiday pictures. Of course they are not interested in the vast majority of your pictures so you sort them and create a slideshow with only the best images. If you made your friends sit through all 3,675 images on your memory stick they would not be best pleased.

Imagery analysis therefore takes data and provides information.

If this analysis takes place on the ground then logic dictates that the analyst has to look though all your holiday snaps and he gets these via a saturated satellite link.

Put the analyst on the same platform that is capturing the imagery and you dramatically reduce the need for bandwidth as one only needs to transmit the edited highlights. Arm that platform and the response times to enable that information to be acted upon opportunistically are also reduced.

Weather is also a significant constraining factor on UAS’s which would be magnified greatly if future operations were out of dry and sunny places.

These constraints lead to the idea of Armed ISR aircraft.

Because there is less need in the armed ISR role for fast response, hard manoeuvring and low level operation the disadvantages of a turboprop become diminished so the argument for this type of aircraft becomes much stronger. The RAF have recently started taking delivery of the Beechcraft Super King Air 350 based Shadow R1 ISR aircraft to supplement UAS’s. It would seem a relatively simple task to arm them with Hellfire or CRV-7 rocket pods to enable them to provide short reaction time attack based on its own gathered intelligence.

Not CAS but armed ISR, they are completely different missions and have completely different requirements.

RAF Shadow R1

Fast Jets are too expensive
Maintenance requirements for fast jets are higher than for simple turboprops but this fails to take into account the effect of introducing a new airframe into an already stretched logistics, maintenance and training stream, all this would add up very fast.

Because one would need many more aircraft the spares holding would have to be vastly increased.

The costs of aircrew would also be significant, probably greater than any cost savings.

We already have Tornado and Typhoon, adding significant numbers of Super Tucano’s is not going to make the Typhoon and Tornado fleet any cheaper in the short term.

One fly in the ointment for using fast jets for intensive COIN/CAS work is that if airframe hours. Modern fast jets were simply not designed for sustained high tempo operations and are currently chewing through their airframe hours at a prodigious rate. This is bad from a airframe fatigue viewpoint and means that individual aircraft will likely have to be withdrawn from service far earlier than planned. The RAF for example, have recently started studies to examine options for extending the airframe life of the Typhoon, no doubt prompted by the reduced number of Tranche 3 aircraft they will be receiving. From a cost perspective, using a lower cost alternative to marshal and eke out airframe hours on more expensive types is a strong argument.

However, we think this is an argument for more fast jets or even a new build close air support aircraft that has the advantages of a fast jet at a reasonable price and none of the numerous disadvantages of a turboprop aircraft, maybe a new build two seat A10C (subject of a later post)

Fast Jets are too complex for indigenous air forces
It is undoubtedly true that something like an F15 or Typhoon is out of the reach of, for example, the Afghan National Army Air Corps who are still working up to operating basic transport aircraft and helicopters. The Iraqi’s have been operating King Airs and Grand Caravan’s in the armed ISR role with some success but when asked if they wanted to buy into the new cheap CAS/COIN aircraft, their answer was, no thanks, can we have some F16’s instead.

This is perhaps the greatest argument in favour of a cheap CAS/COIN aircraft, operating them in order to mentor indigenous air forces and help them transition to the more capable jet types but we must recognise the limitations and concentrate on skills and training because Close Air Support of troops in contact requires the highest level of skill.

Summary
Propeller based close air support was supplanted by fast jets for a very good reason, effectiveness and survivability. Nothing in any of the proposed solutions for so called low cost CAS/COIN aircraft convinces us that these reasons have changed.

Nothing beats fast jets for payload, endurance, versatility and effectiveness.

ROUND 1 TO THE FAST JET

However, they are expensive, really…

The idea of replacing a few expensive fast jets with more numerous cheaper types (numerous because as we have described, they are simply not as effective) does seem on the surface to offer a cheaper solution but this argument more often than not restricts itself to making a one to one comparison without any context. Of course a Super Tucano is going to be cheaper to operate and buy than Typhoon in a one to one, but as we have shown, one would need many Super Tucano’s to do the job of a single Typhoon and that is just capital cost; the really expensive element is support costs. Spares, maintenance teams and the most expensive element of all, aircrew, would produce a situation that we believe would increase overall costs yet offer nothing more in terms of effect; in fact it would have a lesser effect.

ROUND2 TO THE FAST JET

Fast jets are too expensive and complex for indigenous or emerging air forces so the argument for a cheap CAS/COIN aircraft is strong here

ROUND 3 TO THE TURBOPROP CAS/COIN AIRCRAFT

2-1 in favour of the fast jet.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Arm the RAF’s new R1 Shadow (Super King Air based) with Hellfire or other weapon and increasing their numbers would be a sensible move with many advantages for the armed ISR mission to supplement Predator and Watchkeeper and Apache Attack Helicopter.

2. Consider joining the US initiative for a COIN wing for training local forces. We have much to offer hear both from an individual skills basis but also doctrinally. We would need to ensure that precious resources such as trained forward air controllers which are always in short supply are managed correctly to avoid shortfalls in other areas.

3. Consider focussing resources on a medium sized force of dedicated jet based Close Air Support aircraft such as a new build (with better wing, avionics and engine) A10C in order to relieve airframe hour attrition on other types if this was shown to be economically advantageous in the long term.