Two good articles from DoD Buzz and Atlantic Sentinel (click the image to read) highlight the recent trip the the US of Secretary of State for Defence, Phillip Hammond MP

 This of course makes perfect sense, we will be sharing the same aircraft, the F35C, unless my outside bet comes to fruition and we buddy up with the French for a Rafale/CVF swapperoo and the Royal Navy have only distant memories of operating conventional aircraft carriers.

I thought this was interesting

This is not to say that is how things will pan out but the American encouragement of British plans to expand capabilities like force projection and sea basing are surely not done out of the goodness of Secretary Panetta’s heart. The United States will surely benefit from a friendly carrier out doing the same job as the US Navy, especially one operating the same aircraft, speaking the same language, with officers and men who have worked with the US Navy and with equipment using similar supply chains to the US Navy and allowing American aircraft to land on a conventional carrier deck.

If we look back through various policy statements, evidence to select committees and actual events it should be clear to all the CVF/JCA is deeply rooted in being the partner/bitch of the USN, one would hope that our interests always converge.

I have no doubt whatsoever that service personnel will crack on and make a good job of the transition but as per my previous post, this is not going to be cheap and if we are all honest, the true costs of the conversion, the true impact on all three services and the real outcome in capability terms are still not known.

A leap in the dark it may be but at least we have our cousins to help.

Nice.

Let’s remind ourselves of defence planning assumptions, so easily overlooked in conversations about sortie rates, being a proper Navy, reach back payloads, tail hooks, cost inflation and stress fractures.

For a long time and reinforced by every single defence review since the 1998 SDR the UK needs to retain a full spectrum capability, or the ability to operate alone, only at a small to medium scale, which taken in context means a Sierra Leone, Non Combatant Evacuation or Falklands type operation and everything else will be in a coalition.

Whether it is a Libya, Afghanistan, the Balkans or Iraq type operation these will be in conjunction with others. Who those others will be is a separate and related discussion but more or less it means the USA, NATO and European Union in that order, with the last one being a very distant third. As the US very obviously and entirely correctly looks towards the Pacific it is less likely that the US will be a natural partner in operations around the periphery of Europe, North Africa and the Arctic being the obvious examples so this would point to a need for a greater capability within Europe across the spectrum of need but if Libya proved anything, it was that Carrier Strike was a nice to have, arguably more efficient in some areas, but hardly indispensable. If there is one thing that Europe is not in short supply of it is 10,000 foot long runways. Libya yet again, as all recent operations, sowed there is a general shortage in NATO of enabling assets, logistics, ISTAR and communications, not fast jets.

It is through this lens that CVF/JCA should be viewed.

It is also absolutely clear that CVF/JCA is about the projection of power, defence at arms-length or bullying other nations for dubious strategic gain, again, take your pick.

All things being equal, CVF and JCA would be considered an essential capability but the huge elephant in the room is that all things are not equal.

The ongoing financial crisis and static or declining defence budget means that project CVF, including the fast jets to fly off them, will take an increasing share of that budget. If it were a small budget item there would be few arguments against it but the simple fact is it is not. The manpower, capital and other through life costs of the combined ship and aircraft is huge and will be a significant proportion of the defence vote so the question should be, in order to have CVF and a bunch of fast jets…

what are we prepared to sacrifice?

It is this question that no one seems to want to address despite it making its presence felt in every year since CVF and JCA was born.

Quite simply, the Royal Navy has sacrificed its surface and sub surface fleet on the promise of CVF and the Royal Air Force has sacrificed the utility of Typhoon and a whole host of those short supply enabling assets to pay for the jam tomorrow promise of the F35.

CVF will not improve the value of the RAF and RN because it will not be a rounded capability as a whole, a sharp but brittle spear only of use in limited scenarios without the depth or breadth in other enabling areas to make it useful.

I am a strong supporter of the F35 and think that on the whole it will evolve past its current development woes into an effective aircraft but I don’t want to sacrifice the rest of the armed forces on the altar of sensor fusion and stealth because in pure terms, we are unlikely to need those capabilities in anything other than the large scale coalition operations.

Make no mistake, we are heading down a path that will see capabilities across all three services cut back, withdrawn, placed into extended readiness and not purchased because the RAF and RN are insistent on maintaining what for many is a vanity project, completely out of tune with actual defence needs.

I say ‘will see’ when in fact; it is obvious that we have already seen this happening.

But what about sunk costs, industrial benefits and prestige?

£4b of sunk costs were ignored when we binned off Nimrod MRA4, arguably a more important capability than CVF/JCA because we are an island and all that and the cast iron rule of decision making, however difficult it may be from an emotional perspective, is that sunk costs should always be ignored.

Industrial benefits; is defence for defence or the benefit of BAE. We need to seriously examine this question but whatever the arguments for a strong defence industry and there are many good ones, they don’t trump defence NEEDS.

Prestige or cock waiving, depending on your perspective, is arguably what has gotten us into this mess. The UK needs to take a very long hard look at defence needs and stop obsessing about our glorious past (although glorious it surely is) and start being pragmatic.

The SDSR did not make any really difficult decisions, it did not examine defence needs at all, that is a complete fallacy spread by the self-regarding politicians, civil servants and military chiefs who were responsible for the tawdry, shambolic mess it descended into. What it did was start from a list of future projects and worked back from there. They were prioritised and what cash was left over was split across everything else, realising there was not enough cash to match aspirations with wallets a whole spread of minor projects, capabilities, welfare and every other part of defence was cut.

A little here, a little there, what’s it called again, that thing the SDSR was touted as not being, yes, that’s it, salami slicing.

When as a nation, we are mothballing bridging assets or selling hard working and hugely useful vessels like the Bay’s, imposing pay cuts, making people redundant and deferring improvements in service family accommodation, driving around afghanistan is 40 year old vehicles and rationalising having fighting ships putting to sea with 4 missile onboard then surely someone somewhere must realise we are in danger of becoming all fur coat and no knickers.

Lots of cutting edge, shiny and sexy new toys but a dangerously hollowed out force of limited utility against the UK’s real threats.

It’s about time we had a proper defence review and stopped these vainglorious projects that deliver prestige but not much else, at least not much else of what we need.

WANT is not the same as NEED

Rosyth councillor Douglas Chapman told the BBC Scotland news website:

“I am very grateful that the police have confirmed that nobody has been hurt during this blaze. When the fire has been put out I am sure Babcock will be launching a serious inquiry into how the blaze started. Also I hope there are swift assurances this incident won’t hinder the progress of the overall building programme.”

A number of rumours have been circulating including one that it was an elaborate scam by the MoD to put in an insurance claim for fire damage and thus fill the budget black hole. Reports that the Chief of the Air Staff and Chief of the General Staff were seen having a crafty fag near the outbreak have also been strenuously denined :)

The MoD seems unable to get it’s story straight on the conversion to conventional carrier aircraft operations and is increasingly looking like it doesn’t know it’s arse from it’s elbow.

A recent Parliamentary answer confirmed the ‘official position’ that basically seems to be that no decisions have yet been made, with the final decision coming out of an 18 month study carried out by Aircraft Carrier Alliance (MoD, Babcock, Thales and BAe) and Naval Design Partnering (NDP) team.

The date that the operational Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier enters service with the Royal Navy will depend on which ship will be converted to operate the carrier variant Joint Strike Fighter. This in turn will inform when fast jets will be deployed from the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. We expect firm decisions to be taken on carrier conversion in late 2012 and it remains our intent to deliver a carrier strike capability from around 2020.

The generally accepted position is that QE will be commissioned as the worlds largest helicopter carrier and PoW will get the modifications to support the F35C, although it must be noted main gate for the Joint Combat Aircraft has yet to be finalised so the selection of F35C is not certain, even if it remains the preferred option. When PoW enters service, QE will be placed into extended readiness or sold, again, no decisions have been finalised.

The Carrier Alliance have been provided with funding to get the study to October, after which additional contracts will be let.

This initial funding is for £5 million

Then up pops Gerald Howarth in an interview with the Portsmouth News

The SDSR concluded we needed one carrier but clearly that has its own limitations in availability and clearly the 2015 defence review gives us an opportunity to look again in the prevailing economic conditions and see where we go from there. Clearly, all of us would like two aircraft carriers because that gives us the continuous at-sea capability.We’ve had to take some pretty tough decisions but we’re hoping to be in a position to recover that one in 2015

We endlessly debate the dogs breakfast that is the CVF programme but there seem to be a pair of immutable laws

1. We really haven’t got a clue what we are going to do, how much it is going to cost or what will be involved in the switch
2. Costs only ever rise

Until that point though, there is a constant stream of news, good or bad, depending on your viewpoint of degree of weary slope shouldered cynicism.

The latest group of individuals to throw another log on the fire is the National Audit Office, the taxpayer’s financial watchdog. The NAO does have teeth but in general, are roundly ignored by successive governments who think they either know better or alternatively, see their output as a means to bash the last lot with.

In its latest report, snappily titled Carrier Strike, it brings the financial and risk decision making process up to date on this unhappiest of projects.

It doesn’t tell us much that we either didn’t already know or could have made reasoned guesses about but there are some interesting snippets.

The first thing is the title; it’s nothing to do with defending the fleet but expeditionary strike. Beyond the semantics this is telling but what the report does not do is match the capability offered by CVF/JCA based carrier strike with defence planning assumptions.

The Cost of Cancellation

David Cameron, Liam Fox and the government maintained that it would be more expensive to cancel than proceed and that cancellation was not an option. The report comprehensively rubbished this claim which to my mind puts under severe doubts anything that comes forth from those very same people.

I have always maintained that cancelling CVF was always an option, even if we wanted to maintain shipbuilding skills. What the alliance wants is to build ships, not a specific ship, in other words it doesn’t really care whether it is building Type 45’s or CVF’s, work being work.

Timing might have been an issue but if we treat the shipbuilding industry as a strategic asset, which we do, why should the nation not fund this gap, we could have funded a comprehensive training and reorganisation programme that could have seen the industry emerge as a genuine global specialist shipbuilding industry.

There were many options but much easier to try and blame those big boys over at BAE, political cowardice of the worst kind.

The report states cancelling one would save £200m and both £1.2 billion, somewhat at odds with the comments from the Government. These savings might be offset by the costs mentioned in the letter from BAE but they would still be substantial

i.e. we could have saved money by cancelling

The Cost of Uncertainty

Yet another factor that has concerned me about the costs of the switch is the fact that the MoD made the decision on the basis of not having the first clue how much it would cost.

We can argue the details but the fact remains, the MoD made the switch based on a guess.

For the NAO, this risk is the most serious of all the issues, and let’s face it, the MoD does not have a good track record in predicting future costs, in fact, in this regard, you wouldn’t trust the MoD to hit water if it fell out of a boat.

It notes quite correctly that the MoD will be in a poor negotiating position when it comes to buying electromagnetic catapults, or in other words, we will be bent over a barrel and given the good news by a supplier who knows you have no choice.

The report notes it will take 2 years for the MoD to have a full understanding on the implications in cost, manning and operational issues of the switch.

2 years in which pennies will be dropping every day, confirming what an unmitigated disaster the decision will turn into.

Recent developments in autonomous carrier landings have been seized upon by those who simultaneously deny there is a training overhead, and thus a cost overhead, in maintaining carrier operations and at the same time point to technology developments that will negate those costs, just in case they actually exist.

We have to accept that CATOBAR operations impose a significant training penalty, it is not a skill one can pick up in a few days and must be constantly practiced to remain safe. With STOVL, the exact is true, land based pilots can quickly transition to all weather carrier operations with relatively little training, this being proven many many times over the years. Whilst the latest synthetic training systems may reduce this burden somewhat it is not likely for some time that it will be eliminated.

Likewise, the developments in autonomous landing systems, the recent US trials were an outstanding success and show the way for autonomous operation of UAV’s aboard a carrier. These systems may well be used to support carrier landings for less experienced aircrew, thus reducing or even eliminating the training penalty mentioned above, but, and this is a big but. There is a world of difference between using a system on an unmanned platform and a manned platform, the same manned platform where the pilot will be completely reliant on the system. It would take a significant degree of safety intensive integration, allied to lots of certification and equipment redundancy both on the aircraft and carrier that will allow someone, it is always a person, to sign off on the safety case.

Who knows what the future holds with reliable and safe autonomous landings aboard a pitching aircraft deck, but I think we should temper natural enthusiasm to leap upon this as the magic bullet that kills off the training penalty of CATOBAR with a degree of scepticism about the reality of taking a pilot and asking him to entrust his life to a system such as this.

The switch to CATOBAR or F35C is still a controversial decision.

The reason why the F35B was the preferred option for a decade or more was ALWAYS about more than just the aircraft itself. If the only factor was the aircraft itself then the B is possibly the least best solution, it costs more, has less performance in all areas, is more complex and difficult to maintain.

The MoD always knew this to be the case

So why would anyone want STOVL?

Quite simply, because it offered the most flexible option for the lowest cost, across the whole of the defence sphere, not just on an aircraft by aircraft basis.

We must remember that the UK has the most experience in operating STOVL aircraft aboard ships and drawing on this deep well of knowledge the costs were well known and articulated, with uncertainty risks at an absolute minimum.

STOVL allowed the CVF air wing to be surged with land based pilots thus reducing carrier operations currency costs, eliminated the cost of catapults and arrestor gear with their attendant capital and significant through life costs, provided for an increase in sortie rates, allowed operations to continue in extreme weather (amply demonstrated in 1982)and significantly improve operating location flexibility.

With CATOBAR aircraft the only place they can operate from at sea is another CATOBAR compliant carrier. This means alternate at sea landing locations have to come from elsewhere, it was always going to be unlikely that we would operate a pair of CVF’s together. If a returning F35C is low on fuel its options are limited should CVF be unavailable due to enemy action, bad weather or malfunctioning arrestor gear. An F35B could feasibly land on a T45, RFA vessel or one of the amphibs, this would of course be in extremis but at least the pilot and very expensive aircraft could be recovered.

The original operating concept for JCA called for it to operate from CVF and a soon as possible, transition to austere land bases was also enabled by STOVL, again, this option is now unavailable for the preferred JCA design. We have demonstrated the value of this flexibility a number of times, in 1982 Harriers used an austere forward operating base at Port San Carlos and in Afghanistan, when the runway at Kandahar was restricted by an aircraft fire, Harriers were the only land based coalition aircraft able to operate and provide reactive close air support until the runway was cleared and repaired. It is fair to say that F35B requires a greater level of ground based facilities than Harrier but these are not insurmountable problems.

CATOBAR operations also means that to protect the aircraft and pilot against a fuel intensive missed landing (bolters) there is a means to provide fuel to them. STOVL aircraft do not suffer from this problem and therefore a buddy buddy refuelling system was never specified. This has now changed and the MoD is actively looking at how this can be provided, the simple answer is of course to buy the system that will be developed by the US Navy, probably from Chobam but was this means is yet more capital and through life cost and out there in the real world, when operating aircraft we will have to dedicate two or three airframes aboard CVF as on deck recovery alert aircraft, this is fine when you have a CVN full to the gunnels with aircraft but CVF is no CVN and out of the likely air wing of 12 JCA we will have to dedicate a significant proportion of them to this task. His will reduce sortie rate so for the same given effect we will have to have more aircraft. Given that it is unlikely that we will routinely operate in this manner, the reality is F35C degrades capability in some areas.

So whilst the range, maintenance cost, payload and other performance improvements of F35C are to be welcomed, there is a price to pay.

Sortie rates have been reduced, the report notes that CVF will generate about 20 sorties per day from 12 aircraft and this is before the implications are fully known, see above about buddy buddy refuelling.

CVF is not a fast ship, but with F35B this didn’t really matter, with F35C and CATOBAR, speed is a vital aspect. The risks of being unable to launch the F35C because of being unable to achieve a high enough speed, would be a tad embarrassing.

It was rumoured that the decision to move to F35C was a surprise to those working on the project, who knows if this was true but given these issues it is credible.

The current forecast cost of £6.24 billion for 1 fully fitted and functional carrier, the other being stunted by its lack of catapults. We might of course use the second as some hugely expensive LPH, replacing HMS Ocean but this would be both operationally inadequate and hugely expensive.

This 1 carrier will be available for operations for 150 to 200 days.

Moving to F35C allowed the previously cancelled Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability requirement to be covered, thus pulling a billion pound of costs but I am rather sceptical of this and it smacks of typical voodoo MoD economics. Could this requirement have been met with Typhoon or even the F35B, maybe not as well as the F35C.

The F35B is the most troubled of the trio and it is fair to say that in balancing risks it might have seemed the sensible thing to do but I cannot conceive of a realistic scenario in which F35B is cancelled. That said, the F35B has been doing rather well of late.

A Secondary Capability

In all the debates we have had on the subject I have consistently said that carriers are useful but in the context of a declining defence vote and competing priorities they are not essential, at least not as envisaged by CVF/JCA.

Whilst the originators of Project CVF were quite accepting of the need to sacrifice capabilities to keep the carrier project alive more recent senior officers at the MoD have taken a different line, reality has bitten and it seems that they wanted to cancel CVF in order to protect the amphibs and surface fleet.

The report is crystal clear in this, if the government had allowed the MoD to cancel project CVF, they would have done so.

Maybe I have been rather harsh on the current RN leadership!

Being Opaque

Perhaps the biggest issue is that the NAO were denied access to crucial information, this very worrying because the NAO are one of the few truly independent means of oversight.

The Defence Secretary and MoD threw their dummies out of the pram because the NAO chose to publish without agreeing the final text with the MoD, perhaps they should have been cooperative with the NAO, you reap what you sow

So I think I can be Mr Smug Bastard, I do believe I have stated several times that cancelling was always an option and that the switch has repercussions yet to be fully realised J

Whatever, CVF is a salutary lesson in incompetence, political shenanigans and financial short termism that will be studied in business schools for decades to come.

Interoperability and the Real Reasons for the Switch

Another reason given for the switch was to improve interoperability with our allies.

This is curious because STOVL aircraft can operate from any flat top, Italian, Spanish, US or French for example (plus the non carriers with sufficient space in extremis) but the reverse is not true. The switch to CATOBAR actually significantly reduces our ability to utilise allied shipping. Our most likely operating partner, the USMC (officially no longer our friend) will also be denied because they have quite rightly seen the operational benefits of STOVL.

Interoperability is a two way street though and it is here that the true reason for the switch reveals itself.

It has nothing to do with the USN for a couple of reasons, first, they have more than enough carrier resources thank you very much and second, with a gradual move in strategic focus west, the US will increasingly become less involved with the UK.

France and the EU is entirely a different matter.

There are two reasons for the switch.

The first is the desire to save even more money than the F35B, joint force combination could deliver.

The second, and related but more pressing reason is the obvious desire to increase asset sharing with the French, leading to dependence and reinforce a political Europe wide defence posture built around the UK and France.

By switching to CATOBAR we can share training with the French but we can also share ships, not in a physical sense but in a virtual sense.

The Queen Elizabeth will be sold to France and Prince of Wales will be receive the modification. QE will go to France for conversion and together they will form a UK/French EU carrier force that will be the lynchpin of an EU Navy.

Whether we eventually go for F35 or have some Rafale’s in lieu of payment for CVF Number 1 is an interesting point.

Given that the terms of the contract for F35 expressly decouple industrial participation from amounts ordered it is quite feasible the UK could receive a sizeable return on its £2bn investment in the JSF programme and not buy a single one.

The report notes some uncertainty about JCA, Rafale and interoperability, is this pushing towards the Rafale perhaps?

A CVF/Rafale swapperoo is truly the lowest cost option and whilst we would sorely miss the capabilities of the F35 those that think this is an outrageous proposition clearly is no student of history!

It’s only a guess but my prediction, in best Mystic Meg style, is that the UK and France will each operate a single aircraft carrier of CVF design, training and aircraft will be pooled, maintenance likewise.

A single fleet of Rafale will be the order of the day.

On operations if two are available, we will operate separately and if not, we will cover for each other, i.e. a loss of sovereignty during refit periods, this being judged to be a risk worth taking.

The writing is on the wall so all talk of costs, extra range and bigger bomb bays is just piffle designed to distract from the true intent.

So for one carrier and a half completed one that might be sold off or not the UK taxpayer will likely be paying in excess of £6 billion and if I were a betting man I would definitely have a punt on the final cost going beyond lucky number seven.

And this is without a single aircraft.

Clearly, it is not a good example of acquisition best practice and is a stark reminder of how we should never again let equipment dictate strategy rather than strategy dictating equipment, or, commonly known as the SDSR approach.

Despite this, in many ways the project has been steaming along very nicely indeed, the blocks continue to be built, contracts are being placed and progress is self evident. When all said and done, CVF is actually a relatively simple, relatively low risk design.

We should draw a distinction between factors internal and external to the project, fiscal and political issues are largely beyond the control of the project and yet responsible for the overwhelming majority of cost inflation and delays.

The root causes of the problems on Project CVF have been politics and financial ‘short termism’, can we really blame the MoD and Royal Navy for all these, I don’t think so, but, they must shoulder some.

Squabbling between service chiefs and yes, cock waving, have also joined the supporting cast.

After the 1998 SDR in which CVF was announced, it took several years to place the order and this order was conditional on bringing former competitors together into an uneasy industrial alliance. As the MoD equipment budget experienced more and more pressure, as other projects ballooned in cost and budgets remained static, the need to balance the yearly budget overspend led to a whole raft of short term decisions, delaying projects and de scoping them allowed a short term budgetary crisis to be averted but inevitably pushed additional costs out the following years.

The impact of this was well known so it should have come as no surprise to anyone when another billion and a half was added to the bill for project CVF. The NAO has made several stinging criticisms of the MoD for this practice, paying more by paying later and the practice, commonly known as whistling and hoping the problem will go away, seems to be very common, arguably one of the more widespread causes of project cost inflation.

It might be seen as unfair to blame the service chiefs for these problems but they were willing accomplices in the jam tomorrow strategy, instead of changing projects they settled on a strategy of wishful thinking and all three were guilty in this respect.

It is the current government that has ‘called time’ and for this, despite the uncomfortable results, they should be roundly congratulated.

Because of this cost inflation and at a time when the Army was experiencing serious equipment shortages in Iraq and Afghanistan is it any wonder that carriers were starting to come under severe pressure, the debate/argument/slanging match between the services about the relative slice of the defence budget intensifying as costs rose.

This reflected both poorly and somewhat unfairly on the project team but amplified the distortion to the Royal Navy equipment plan caused by CVF. And distort the plan it has, self evidently, the Admiralty have traded off ship after ship and capability after capability in order to retain CVF in its original form. As costs have risen the need to make ever deeper cuts has been the painful result, making cut after cut in return for jam tomorrow put the RN in a very poor negotiating position with the Treasury and other services, others knew full well they could ask the First Sea Lord to wave his tackle at the cameras in Downing Street in return for CVF and he would more or less have to do it.

By continually failing to budge on CVF, the Royal Navy paid an ever more expensive price to do so and in what some might see as irony, the very fact that the RN has no carriers and carrier aircraft to offer Operation Ellamy is precisely because of the desire to have CVF shaped carriers and FAA insignia bearing carrier aircraft.

One might reasonably argue that the inability of the Royal Navy to see any future at all without CVF and a reluctance to consider alternatives has led them to mortgage off the rest of the fleet in order to get the carriers and rebuild from there.

The strategy it would seem; is the get CVF at any cost and rebuild around there in the long term, again, equipment tail wagging strategy dog.

Personally, I think it was a poor strategy and has resulted in a much reduced surface and sub surface fleet, a fleet that is arguably more relevant to UK security and more useful in the majority of operations the UK and Royal Navy will be involved.

There is also a less visible effect of rising cost, as night follows day, the subsequent reaction to a politically or fiscally induced cost over-run is to get out the red pen and start deleting line items from the design shopping list.

In practice, what this means is a gradual de-specification of the design and unfortunately it is a well trodden path. At the end of that path lies an expensive white elephant that flatters to deceive. It may well give the impression of being world beating but scratch the surface and the reality becomes only too apparent. These deficiencies may be rectified at a later stage but it will be several times the cost of doing the job right in the first place.

There have been numerous design compromises, deleting credible self defence systems, having a smaller than desirable hangar and a lower than optimal speed are just three examples that are paving the way to the end of that elephant width path.

But to repeat an oft repeated phrase, we are where we are and CVF in one form or another is a reality.

Conversations now should be all about how we maximise value on our not inconsiderable investment.

To do this we have to remove any trace of sentimentality or desire for prestige and look across the whole of the defence landscape, paying particular attention to the joint capabilities on offer.

CVF is not a Royal Navy vessel in isolation, it is part of a complex tri service defence capability set and it is in this context which it must be viewed.

Far too many people view it as an isolated maritime capability or as a way of preserving independence, being in the top league, punching above its weight and assorted other sentimental nonsense.

This attitude has no place in modern defence planning and to those that think this way, I would simply say, please, get with the reality of modern joint capability planning.

I am not going to suggest another defence review where the RAF is raped and pillaged and the Royal Navy gets all the toys, throwing a few consolation prizes like support helicopters to the Army Air Corps, I don’t suppose any of you will be expecting this from me but I thought I would set the scene.

I also still think we should have cancelled CVF a long time ago and instead had three or four smaller vessels to replace CVS, Ocean and the LPD’s but the opportunity for that has long since passed.

In the next paragraphs I am going to explore how I think we can derive maximum benefit for an acceptable cost, not rehearse the reasons for or against maritime aviation, a maritime strategy or why we should have binned Tornado and kept Harrier.

The Strategic Landscape

Most arguments for and against CVF tend to gloss over the strategic landscape and more importantly, completely ignore fiscal and political reality. Instead of some vague notions of sea lanes, punching above our weight, being in the top division and we are an island; CVF must be firmly rooted in reality.

The first reality is a fiscal one, after Nimrod, FRES, T45, Astute, A400, Typhoon and numerous others the government would seem to be in no mood for special pleading from the MoD. The fact is, the MoD needs to regain and retain some measure of fiscal credibility. The scope therefore, for significant extra money for new projects, is limited, however much we promise that this time it will be different.

The second major reality is a strategic planning one, it was quite clearly stated as far back as the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 and reiterated in the SDSR that the direct military threat to the UK is very low and that the future nature of operations would be expeditionary and largely collaborative.

Working in partnerships and coalitions will be the norm.

The UK should be still able to undertake a small scale focussed intervention without external assistance but anything above that scale or for a longer duration will be in conjunction with others.

This applies equally to air and land forces as well, just in case anyone was wondering, so we must carefully select capabilities and maintain them at a scale that delivers influence in such operations without impacting our obligations and requirements in other areas of defence.

Some might view maritime fast jet aviation as one of those capability areas that delivers this influence in a coalition but I am sceptical and would not prioritise it above other areas, at least not disproportionately.

Looking into the medium term, carriers do provide some hedge against uncertainty because of their inherent flexibility but a reasonable assumption would be that CVF is more likely than not to be engaged in operations against non peer or proxy nations and in a coalition with others. The location of these most likely future scenarios will be in the Middle East and Africa although as a system, it has to be able to operate anywhere because it might be argued that equally as likely is conflict in the polar regions.

So, setting the strategic landscape we must then consider how it could be used and for what purpose because it all informs equipment and design choices.

Usage

When considering the what’s and how’s of carrier missions the first thing we must ask ourselves is what do we want to achieve. Only then should we determine if a carrier is the optimal method of achieving that objective and if the answer is yes then equipment and others questions would need answering.

We should not be afraid of lateral thinking, if the requirement is first day strike then are aircraft necessarily the best means of delivery. Perhaps a containerised Storm Shadow that could be carried by any number of surface vessels might be a more cost effective means of fulfilling that requirement, I am not arguing for or against but saying that alternatives can sometimes be attractive and worthy of consideration.

CVF was originally a pure strike platform, optimised for attacks against land targets.

Our thinking around how we could use CVF should be centred on building up a capability that we already have and the obvious strength in this context is littoral manoeuvre from the sea or amphibious operations. We already have a strong capability in this area and CVF offers the possibility of improving this to an even greater degree if we put to one side notions of it being used a single minded strike platform with 36 fast jets. It also fits in with my thinking about the UK’s future approach to defence, this being the maintenance of as many capabilities as sensible at a small enough scale to satisfy the unassisted small scale focussed intervention as per SDSR, supplemented with a number of ‘capability plus’ areas that deliver influence in coalition operations and provide for a greater security by virtue of regional engagement and intelligence gathering.

In the recent ‘future of the Royal Navy’ series of posts I suggested that the Royal Navy retain a small but effective striking force or Single Task Group but supplemented it with a greater forward presence to build regional security and provide better intelligence.

The proposal to repurpose CVF is entirely in keeping with this approach.

Recent operations in Libya, particularly the joint USN/USMC TRAP operation to recover the downed F15 aircrew have demonstrated the value of being close and having responsive forces. It also demonstrated the complementary nature of land and naval aviation. In UK parlance, the Joint Personnel Recovery mission is one which we are relatively poorly resourced for. I would like to see this change; the value of downed aircrew, special-forces, conventional forces, journalists and NGO personnel etc to a terrorist group or opposing regime is significant. Capture, torture and manipulation of them to change the strategic direction of an operation is a very effective tactic and one to which the UK has very little in the cupboard to counter. This is not an area that I think we should or could rely on others to fulfil.

Unpredictability, choosing an entry point that suits you not the enemy and speed are can provide significant results in a range of operational scenarios. It should come as no surprise that in the forthcoming series on Land forces I will place a great emphasis on rapid reaction forces.

[Don’t let that lull you into a false sense of security though, I am not going soft on Strategic Raiding!]

This also allows the UK to exploit the size of CVF, space provides flexibility (a good argument for size if ever there was one) and the ability to embark a capable force from a large deck in a single hop i.e. speed.

Some missions will be aviation centric but these are likely to be less frequent and as would be the norm (operating in a coalition) other nations can carry out these roles, France and the US being the most likely partners.

A reduced emphasis on fast jet aviation, strike, interdiction, close air support and defensive/offensive counter air changes the requirement for JCA, reducing numbers and reducing cost. JCA would still be needed at the scale and capability for the small scale focussed intervention but that would be the baseline, anything above that becomes discretionary.

What does this mean for CVF?

First, it recognises that CVF has value, a lot of value.

Second, it means that to maximise that value the role of CVF should be changed.

Rather than prioritising fast jet aviation and using it as a strike optimised platform it will become more multi-purpose in nature. Operating with a mix of aviation and embarked forces. Many will say it can do this anyway and in some ways they would be right, CVF is designed to offer a secondary LPH capability, but this would mean CVF becomes more akin to the USMC America Class, aviation optimised amphibious vessels.

Strike and high intensity counter air become secondary roles, modifications and the fast jet air wing would reflect this.

Rotary

Whether it be Apache Attack Helicopters, Merlin/Chinook Support Helicopters or whatever comes after there are many options for a blend of rotary wing aircraft.

MASC/ASaC/AEW or whatever we are calling it this week is an area where people assume that just because we might use catapults it is an automatic shoe in for an E2 Hawkeye but again, we must smack those sweet shop bound fingers with a bit of fiscal and strategic reality. It is unclear if there even exists any funding for a Merlin based solution, post the withdrawal of Sea King in the 2016 time frame. To start with, the baseline must always be a small scale focussed intervention. For this, a helicopter based solution would seem to be perfectly adequate. There have been a number of proposals to palletise and transfer the equipment from the existing Sea Kings and lift and shift into a small number of Merlin airframes. This is a low risk and relatively low cost solution that still provides an adequate level of capability, in fact the existing Sea Kings are seriously underestimated.

Although flexibility is the watchword, a typical aircraft load would be 6 to 12 JCA and 24 to 30 helicopters (mix of Apache, Merlin SH/Chinook, Wildcat, Merlin ASW and Merlin ASaC)

We all know the UK is light on vertical lift capability but there is never enough money to pay for, the respective services have never given enough priority to helicopters. So how we do get the money for more, simply have less fast jets.

Fast Jets and the Joint Combat Aircraft

Some missions might require no fixed wing aviation at all and there is no shame in operating CVF without a compliment of JCA, put your teeth back in now!

Once you get beyond the aircraft carrier sometimes with no aircraft theme it is logical, but a normal (if there is such a thing) compliment of JCA would be in the region of 6 to 12. The America Class has 10 as its standard compliment for example, the Juan Carlos 1 and Cavour a similar number. Of course CVF is larger than these vessels but that is not the point and being larger than these alternatives provides excess space for stores (meaning greater un-replenished endurance), accommodation and the ability to surge up should needs dictate.

In defensive counter air and in conjunction with Type 45, Merlin ASaC and with support from land based aircraft in some instances should still be able to provide adequate protection against the scale and capability of likely opposition in the SSFI scenario. If there is a greater threat we would still have the option to surge or simply rely on others in the more likely coalition instance.  Offensive counter air might also involve land attack, much better to destroy the ability of opposing forces on the ground than in the air and this opens up a number of options, particularly with cruise missiles.

Interdiction, recce and close air support would still be at a high enough level for SSFI, even with 8 to 12 embarked aircraft and again, the ability to blend air delivered munitions with those delivered by long range land based UAV’s, ship/submarine launched loitering munitions and cruise missiles allows a reduction in overall aircraft numbers for a given delivered effect.

Thinking in a joint context and with multiple means of mission delivery logically reduces the aircraft count.

The current preferred option to fulfil the Joint Combat Aircraft is the F35C but it has yet to reach Main Gate so that means almost anything is possible!

When looking at JCA it is important to understand the word joint is there for a reason, both the Fleet Air Arm and Royal Air Force will be operating a common aircraft type for joint missions, the services and MoD grasping the ruthless commonality nettle.

I think this is the reason for so much vitriol, the grown-ups at the MoD imposed an aircraft choice based on sound operational and financial factors, sweeping away service centric concerns and I wonder if either service really wanted the B model. The Fleet Air Arm wanted the C model and RAF the A model, why, because looking at the issue in a service centric stovepiped manner logically leads to a two type fleet.

The B model is a compromise, it is neither perfect for the RN or RAF but that is exactly the point, it was supposed to be the perfect solution for the UK.

The STOVL F35B was therefore the outcome of studies about how the JCA would most likely be deployed, initial operations on board followed by a transition to land bases for the sustainment phase.  Not only that, it would allow CVF to dispense with catapults and barriers, thus significantly reducing capital and through life costs of the vessel. It would also neatly dispense with the training overhead of maintaining carrier operation currency for flight crew.  To safely operate from conventional carriers requires a high level of skill and that skill is perishable. This means regular training and having to use a greater proportion of the aircraft fleet for this training, adding yet more cost.

By using STOVL, this continual and regular training requirement would be dramatically reduced, as regularly demonstrated with the Harrier achieving proficiency for carrier operations could be achieved in days by RAF aircrew. Of course it would be better to maintain and enhance these skills for all pilots but the ability to quickly surge or reinforce the carrier capable aircrew for the most likely operations was seen as a compromise worth taking because of the cost savings.

What this decision did was impose some order on the squabbling children at the heads of the RAF and RN, no more stovepipes, no more empire building and no more needless duplication. By sharing, the overall fleet size could be reduced and money saved.

This much sanity was doomed to failure.

This was the stated position for a long time until a couple of things happened.

The F35 and especially the STOVL B model started to have ‘problems’ and the keys to Number 10 changed.

Announced in the SDSR was a switch to the F35C or conventional carrier variant, an obvious design change to the carriers (even though they  really wanted to cancel them) and a bit of wishy washy uncertainty about what would happen to the second carrier on order.

Explaining the switch, Liam Fox and David Cameron stated that it would provide better interoperability with allies, cost less to buy and offer better performance.

So F35C it is then.

In subsequent parliamentary questions the MoD has made it absolutely crystal clear that it does not yet know the full cost implication of the switch and given the widely acknowledged fact that SDSR was rushed I suspect when pennies start to drop and spreadsheets start to have more detail the MoD is going to be in for a rude awakening.

For the purposes of discussion, I am going to have a look at alternatives to the existing position.

Option 1 – Carry on Normal Jogging with the F35C

Why, I have to admit I was perplexed by the switch to F35C, it annoyed our principal expeditionary operations partner, the USMC and resulted in yet more delays and costs but I can see the logic in a service centric and more importantly politically expedient fashion.

Cost, the reality of F35 is that no one really knows how much they will cost despite the millions of words and countless spreadsheets but it is a reasonable assumption that the C model will have a lower price tag than the B model. The real costs, those inconvenient through life costs, have yet to be fully realised. The other truth about the F35C is that the MoD does not know how much extra the non aircraft costs will be. It may well be within their cost model boundaries but when did the MoD ever make a cost estimate that was worth the paper it was written on?

Additional costs include delay costs, which we know run into the billions and the modifications to the design of CVF, principally for catapults and barriers. The electromagnetic catapult design has not yet been selected, whether it will be the US or UK designs is not certain but one this is certain, they will not be cheap.

Putting the capital and delay costs into the shade will be increased through life costs.

Again, this is a complex set of equations, the B model is more complex than C and will logically cost more to maintain but in looking at the operating costs as published in Parliament of a Harrier and Tornado, there isn’t that much difference. Twin engine v single engine or conventional v STOVL makes an interesting cost comparison exercise for spares and maintenance but the F35 will be single engine in all variants. The B model lift fan will require extra maintenance but the C model also has additional systems and the airframe gets a maintenance intensive battering every time it takes off and lands, however gentle the electromagnetic system will be.

There is also the not insignificant maintenance requirement for the catapults and barriers themselves.

So whilst the differences between the C and B model in terms of maintenance may yet turn out to be fewer than expected the real cost differences lie in pink things.

To manage the catapult and barrier system will require additional staff in the DE&S Integrated Project Team, another set of contracts to manage and additional maintenance personnel to pay for. These are recurring costs whether we fly a single mission or not. The deck crew will need expanding also and training courses changed/added.

Each extra crew slot requires pay, housing, welfare, healthcare and pension payments that will need to be maintained for longer as people grow older.

Behind those extra crew are the logistical and management tail, even an extra course for catapult operations and maintenance will require staffing.

It is personnel costs that are growing in proportion to their number, in short, personnel are getting more and more expensive which is exactly why western nations do not carry out labour intensive manufacturing and are automating as many tasks as possible.

Military forces are no different and yet we have made a decision to increase personnel.

Risk, the C model has a lower risk than the B, some think that the B model may be cancelled and it is on probation in the eyes of the US Department of Defence. Risk might have been a significant factor in the decision

Capability, no doubt, the C model beats the B model in terms of performance so in this regard it is a sound decision

Industrial, no change really, yes we have the development programme B models but that is not entirely wasted and too much is made of this by the press. Whichever model is chosen the defence industrial benefits to the UK are significant.

Politics, this is I think the principal reason for the switch to the C model because it allows the Royal Navy to resource share with the French. There has been a strong move to greater military cooperation with the French and short of buying Rafale, a switch to conventional carrier operations means that a CVF could form part of an interchangeable and shared carrier force. The fact that there was a CTOL F35 variant is a happy convenience that means we don’t have to upset the US by switching to Rafale and yet can still also keep the Anglo/French alliance satisfied by sharing CVF. I think it is likely that the second, unloved and unwanted CVF, will be sold to France at cost and the UK and France will maintain a joint carrier strike group, one nation sitting in the hot seat on a rotational basis and covering each other’s refit periods. The Charles de Gaulle will be withdrawn as soon as this becomes a practicality.

So with this politically driven, resource sharing background, switching to CTOL makes perfect sense.

Option 2 – Cancel F35C and develop a carrier capable Typhoon

Why, isn’t it obvious, cost and commonality but it would be a significant development effort for a small number of airframes with little export potential.

Cost, the great conundrum when anyone suggests navalising Typhoon, perhaps the Tranche 3 aircraft and that is the cost. Whether the chosen option is to turn Typhoon into a conventional carrier version for use with cats and traps or a STOBAR design with a ski jump and barrier assisted landing system the cost of either option is uncertain. If it is feasible within an acceptable technical risk boundary then the cost benefits of having a single type with as much commonality as possible, should be obvious to all. It is an attractive proposition from a cost perspective, no doubt.

Risk, the detractors of Sea Typhoon tend to deride the very notion and dismiss it out of hand but I do wonder if those doing the laughing are the ones with most to lose, the RN and RAF, because they would no longer be getting the keys to the shiny new F35. As we have seen, both services are keen to get their hands on the F35 and the perception is that a Sea Typhoon would be a retrograde step. Hard facts are very difficult to obtain about the feasibility and therefore technical risk, some say combining advances in modern avionics, thrust vectoring, the QinetiQ work on F35 SRVL, older work on the Rockwell MBB X31 and the inherently strong Typhoon airframe would allow a STOBAR derivative to be developed within a sensible risk fraction. Others say the idea is barking mad and would result in a complete waste of money.

Capability, we know Typhoon is a sophisticated aircraft and when combined with the full range of UK weapons would be a formidable capability.

Industrial, swings and roundabouts, we may (possibly) lose some of the F35 work, although the F35 development MOU splits the numbers bought from industrial participation, it would be difficult to envisage a situation where the UK purchased no F35’s but carried on with the industrial participation, stranger things have happened though. On the other hand there would be considerable work accrued from developing a STOBAR Typhoon.

Politics, it would be difficult to manage the impact with the US of withdrawing from the F35 programme but would leave the Anglo-French CVF ‘sharing’ deal in place.

Option 3 – Cancel F35C and buy another carrier capable aircraft

Why, if we make the assumption than an F35C alternative is worth pursuing because of cost issues and a Sea Typhoon is not feasible then a number of alternative options open up.

F18, Rafale, Hal Tejas, Harrier III and Sea Gripen all sit on a three way capability/cost/risk matrix, each with different advantages and disadvantages.

Cost, whatever the cost of any of these alternatives, they would have to be significantly cheaper than the F35 to make it worthwhile, especially given the relatively small numbers in this proposal. Cost is the only reason for even looking at these non Typhoon alternatives and when the ‘small print’ costs like weapon integration are added I am sceptical that the cost savings would be significant.

Risk, some, like the F18 and Rafale M are very low risk, existing aircraft with only weapons integration to complete. Others like the Sea Gripen or Harrier III represent an unknown quantity and might not be available within the required timescale.

Capability, compared to the F35B one might argue that the F18 or Rafale do not fall far short in capability terms and bring different qualities to the mix. The others would offer a greater shortfall in capability but it would all come down to cost. Suffice it to say, most of these alternatives would be good enough for the majority of the mission requirements for the majority of time, whether they would meet the JCA requirements is another matter.

Industrial, a difficult one to answer but likely less than either the F35 or Sea Typhoon

Politics, interestingly, most of the alternatives would offer something positive in political terms

Option 4 – Switch back to F35B

Why, it was originally selected as the preferred option for the Joint Combat Aircraft requirement for very good reasons and I think we have allowed ourselves to get spooked at the technical issues and rising costs whilst succumbing to inter service machinations.

Cost, by switching back to the F35B we would still of course be liable for the additional capital costs. These costs are rising and they is no point trying to hide that fact but I also think that some of the hype surrounding the F35B costs are over played. A switch back would also instantly eliminate the additional capital and significant through life costs of going for the catapult options.

Risk, a slightly risky option because there is a chance that the F35B will be cancelled but I do think this is a slight risk. The USMC aviation strategy is built upon the F35B and even though they have bought into the C model I can’t see this changing.

Capability, in some aspects, the F35B has the lowest performance of the options but two things must be remembered. The F35B originally met the JCA specification and it will still be a step change in capability from the Harrier and Tornado. Reduced signature design and the sensor fusion on offer will mean it will remain relevant for a long time and despite a number of issues with what might constitute and austere location it has the greatest flexibility.

Industrial, the existing industrial participation arrangements will be retained and although the share may come under some pressure as the overall order is reduced the agreement more or less states that order volume has no relationship to the industrial share of the programme, it is the development cash we stumped up (£2b) that counts.

Other, it would be embarrassing flip flopping

Politics, instead of being interoperable with the French and US Navy we will be interoperable with the USMC and all the former Harrier operators that will eventually buy the F35B.

Option 5 – Unmanned

There are various unmanned options such as the X47 development and even the Anglo French programme that might eventually come out of Taranis but it is unlikely they will be practical options for several years and the cost seems to be rather open ended.

An unmanned system might also require significant satellite bandwidth, even with the advances in autonomous operation and onboard processing, satellite bandwidth that we don’t have.

It is also unlikely that an unmanned system would be able to fulfil the counter air role for several decades.

Unmanned systems are usually characterised by very long range which kind of negates many of the advantages of carrier launch.

In the introduction to this post I wondered if we could actually carry out some of the penetrating strike role with cruise missiles, maybe we can.

Finally, unmanned systems sound far too much like expensive jam tomorrow and the RAF is already trying to ditch yesterday’s news, the Typhoon, in favour of the shiny new model.

A Proposal

I actually think CVF does has a lot of potential, I know you lot might be surprised by this but my objections have always been on cost grounds. This proposal is one possible method of squeezing maximum value for the investment in the most likely missions it will be required to fulfil.

• Switch back to the F35B for JCA
• Obtain enough to maintain a minimum of 6 on board permanently so that we can maintain a littoral manoeuvre capability and more importantly, the skills to do so, on an enduring, always available basis
• In addition, obtain enough to maintain a minimum of 6 on an enduring land based operation (rotating with Typhoon as necessary) to support the deployed multi role brigade. the Typhoon would be more numerous and therefore find itself deployed for longer
• This allows for continuous cover for an enduring land operation of Multi Role Brigade strength whilst still maintaining enough capacity for the rapid reaction force to be available at short notice without impacting the enduring operation
• Total aircraft and crew numbers would be determined once maintenance and force generation factors become known
• For a one off, short duration operation the non deployed force could be used, STVOL supporting greater basing flexibility (land or sea)
• The RAF should stop dreaming about hordes of F35’s and get on with the job of deriving maximum benefit from the eye watering and defence budget distorting entity that is Typhoon. We need to start sweating our assets, not always looking over the fence
• Equally, the Fleet Air Arm and Royal Navy should stop dreaming about having a mini me CVN and concentrate on creating a credible entry from the sea capability with a much greater vertical lift capability, reductions in F35 purchase would provide the funding for this change in emphasis
• The FAA would cease operating fast jets and the aboard aircraft would be RAF operated. We can’t afford two air forces and the largest one, the one that can achieve some economy of scale and is focussed on managing fast jets, should have primacy
• Invest in greater platform diversity for Storm Shadow and TLAM
• Complete both CVF with one maintained as an in service spare to cover refit periods
• Investigate role of reserve forces to maintain second CVF at a level of readiness sufficient to provide some measure of resilience and refit cover
• Do not replace Ocean, the role to be covered by CVF
• If funds allow, the in service spare could be bought into full service
• Redesign CVF to have an enlarged hangar, at least big enough for Chinook, CH53K and V22 across the FULL width and length of an enlarged space. Also, improve command and control and embarked force accommodation facilities
• Invest in a Merlin based ASaC which is sufficient for the role

Some might say the JCA number is too small but I would ask too small for what?

If we accept the result of the SDSR then it becomes the baseline, a similar number of aircraft support (6-12) currently support operations in Afghanistan for a much larger force than envisaged in SDSR. 6-12, with a minimum of 6 would still deliver a credible capability and remember, the F35 will be incredibly effective and versatile.

Even if we stuck with the F35C then the numbers aboard would remain but the numbers behind would increase as training and currency issues would demand a larger fleet and the overall cost would rise because of it, it would not be the end of the world though and the additional performance of the C model would be very welcome. This option would need both CVF fitted with cats and traps so the B model saves again and retains the ability to maintain a continual CVF presence.

By keeping the numbers to a realistic level (6) then we afford an opportunity to maintain that fleet on continuous joint training with the RM and other services, something that is currently lacking. If we find a few quid down the back of the sofa then yes, lets have more, but it is a balancing act and we have to be realistic.

In effect, we have 2 small squadrons or large flights of 6 aircraft each. One more or less permanently on board CVF and one more or less permanently in a rotation pool with Typhoon for enduring deployments. If there is no enduring deployment then the training pool becomes larger, hours are preserved or more is available for one off operations. Of course the aircraft and crews rotate in and out of those slots on a normal deployment schedule, the details of which and total fleet numbers would be dictated by aircraft availability etc. I have pegged these numbers for convenience, reality means that the numbers will flex up and down anyway but it gives us some measure of scaling.

The inherent deployment and operational flexibility of the F35B means this scalability can be maintained much easier than with the C model, whatever its other virtues.

I am agnostic on the FAA operating fast jets, its not an idealogical issue, purely cost. Logically, the larger force, a force dedicated to the art of operating aircraft, should be more efficient and therefore lower cost. Whilst the US can afford four air forces the UK cannot, now, if the FAA can prove they can operate F35 cheaper for the same effect than the RAF then fair enough, but duplication and resource waste should be our enemy.

Summary

There are many options for maximising investment and getting the most out of what we are about to have. For what it is worth, I think the route to that end state is to turn CVF into as multi-purpose a capability as possible, building from a position of strength (amphibious) and not building from a weakness (fast jet maritime aviation)

This means littoral manoeuvre from the sea in the theatre entry phase of any operation i.e. an oversized LPH with the ability to operate a modest fast air wing with the ability to flex up should the occasional need arise.

Switching back to the F35B is my preferred option for the reasons outlined above; it allows both CVF to enter service, reduces through life costs, still keeps a fifth generation aircraft in the inventory, still keeps us in the largest combat aviation programme of modern times and provides interoperability with a number of important allies.

CVF becomes an air optimised amphibious assault ship pair, combined with the LPD pair in service and the LSD(A)’s.

The two sections brought together will form the mid section of the hull up to the hangar deck and is referred to as Lower Block 03.

On completion, the block will weigh about 9,300 tons and stand over 23m tall, 63m long and 40m wide.

Click the image for a larger view and take a closer look at the ringed text on the section.

CVF

Exactly

In much of the debate around carrier strike there is an absence of strategic context and an incredible amount of hyperbole. There are many good arguments for and many against, inevitably any judgement is simply a view on the relative priorities of those advantages and disadvantages.

Supporters of CVF and carrier strike point out that the most compelling advantage is the ability to operate independently, without host nation support and without the complication of seeking approval for over flying.

When we look at this subject it is absolutely critical to note the difference between the theory of carrier strike and practice as characterised by CVF and the Royal Navy, the two are certainly not the same. Proponents of a UK carrier strike capability often conflate the general theory with actual practice when discussing the advantages and disadvantages but we must look beyond theory and explore hard-nosed practicalities.

The Royal Navy is not the US Navy.

I am going to look at the contentious issue of carrier aviation across a number of areas

[toc="2" title="Table of contents"]

Overfly Rights

It seems to be the generally accepted view that the need for overfly rights magically disappears when flying from an aircraft carrier but one look at a map confirms this is simply not the case, it very much depends on where and when. When is important because overfly permissions can change depending on political expediency and specific access may be limited to non offensive operations, as has been the case in several recent operations.

The US attack on Libya in 1986 (Operation El Dorado Canyon) is good example of the mission type having a direct impact on permissions. The nature of the operation and need for simultaneous attacks to maximise operational effectiveness meant that the combined power of 2 USN carriers was not enough so land based F111’s were needed to supplement the carrier strike package. The F111’s needed a round trip flight from the UK that was 5,500 miles long, lasted 15 hours and multiple in flight refuelling operations per aircraft because Spain, Italy, Germany and France refused overflight permission and/or basing rights. These were NATO or other allies and yet local, regional and other political considerations meant that they judged denial of airspace for this particular mission worth the damage to relations with the USA.

The only time overfly rights will not be needed for carrier aviation is if the approach and target are in alignment i.e. a direct vector from sea to target with nothing in between or where we might not care too much for the country we are transiting (an unlikely proposition but worth pointing out anyway, you don’y always actually need permission if you are OK with the consequences)

To illustrate the complexity of over flight issues, how about a flight of fancy (see what I did there)

We decide that after years of provocation the bloody French are avin’ it but the Spanish don’t wish to be involved, so we decide to launch our aircraft from the Queen Elizabeth operating in the Bay of Biscay.

No overfly rights are needed, point proven, carrier aviation doesn’t need them.

As the operation proceeds the French decide to transfer all their forces to Andorra for a spot of skiing, we need to launch a deep strike, but wait a minute, France has just deployed a new version of their experimental laser death ray so the only accessible route to Andorra is via Spain.

Bloody Spaniards want Gibraltar and Wayne Rooney in return for granting permission.

Bugger, there is no way Sir Alex would agree.

Of course, this example is ridiculous; the French would never go skiing in Andorra!

More likely Middle East or African scenarios throw up similar contradictions, some potential areas would be much easier to access from the sea but others less so.

Carrier supporters often make the point that a high percentage of the world population is within a few hundred miles of the sea but this statement, whilst true, fails to take into account politics and the vagaries of geography when applying it to target access.

Therefore, depending on the situation, overfly rights can affect carrier borne aviation every bit as much as land based aircraft and for some locations, access from land bases may actually be easier to achieve, closer or offer a better political situation.

However in many cases, there is no practical alternative from an access perspective, than to use carrier launched aircraft.

Host Nation Support Introduction

Host Nation Support or access is defined by many organisations but in this context it means the availability to mount the full spectrum of air operations from an ‘friendly’ facility (air base), these friends and allies may choose to be directly involved in combat operations, offer qualified support or completely deny assistance.

The three main constraining factors for useful home nation support are availability, suitability and vulnerability.

Host Nation Support – Availability

Availability is the first issue to address, if geography or the will of the host dictates that operations cannot be conducted from any given facility then there is very little point considering the others. Operations in the South Atlantic in 1982 are an excellent illustration of the geographic availability issue, there were simply none available within a reasonably short distance for the type of tactical strike fighters needed. Geographic availability tends to be the exception to the rule although if we envisage future operations in the south Atlantic this may not always be the case.

A much more likely availability constraint is the issue of politics and this is a landscape filled with shifting sands. In 1982, Chile might have offered land bases all things being equal, but they had to balance the politics of long term regional relations and national politics, clearly, offering the UK host nation support was not a realistic option. Turkey is another example, containing Saddam Hussein and the enforcing the Northern no fly zones to protect the Kurdish population was in their interests and political acceptability but offering a northern route for land based forces to invade Iraq was not, Turkey was and is a great supporter of NATO but local politics came into play for an arguably non UN mandated mission. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a huge and complex mission but whilst the execution was impacted by HNS issues, the outcome was not.

Afghanistan in 2001 is another great example that proves nothing!

The early combat missions were carried out by naval aviation but they would have been impossible to carry out without land based AAR/ISR and extensive overfly rights. The initial carrier strike missions were also joined by land based bombers, ISR and transport aircraft.  Today, a significant proportion of CAS is provided by carrier based aircraft but this is not on an enduring basis even with the richness of resource that the USN enjoy and there might be very good reasons and some not so very good reasons why this is the case; having a dog in the fight is as useful for the USN as it is for anyone in a world of budget scrutiny.

The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East is as fraught as it gets but in more or less continuous operations for the last 20 years in the area, air basing has always been available. Of course there have been complications, upsets and compromises but the reality is, HNS availability has not been a significant strategic problem and if there is any region on the planet where it is likely to have been a problem, the Middle East is it.

Real Politik means that we should consider the issue of HNS availability but be aware it is not the defining justification for carrier strike. You could also argue that for out of area operations, if the neighbouring countries are not sufficiently engaged with the operation to offer host nation support, we shouldn’t be there anyway or at least strongly question our approach.

Looking at potential future operational areas it is clear that the complex patchwork of geography and politics will combine to most likely provide HNS availability.

The published SDSR stated that HNS had been secured for the decade or so in between the withdrawal of the Harrier and introduction of the F35, what is likely to happen beyond that decade that has changed the equation.

Nothing, that’s what,

As with over flight rights, the HNS issue clearly favours in an abstract sense, the carrier. But, in a real world sense, as demonstrated by ACTUAL operations it is much less convincing. Obtaining HNS is difficult, complex and generally laden with conditions but it will most likely be the most realistic option.

Host Nation Support – Suitability

If political and geographical barriers can be overcome the issue of suitability has to be considered.

Suitability has many variable factors, runway length, apron space, facilities for air/ground crew, logistics capacity , defencibility and a myriad of other considerations play their part in determining whether a particular location is suitable for sustained or even intermittent air operations at the desired scale.

No matter what statistics are provided by biased sources there is simply no way that any UK carrier would be able to match the sortie rate on a sustained basis of a modern conventional air base and it is fallacy to suggest otherwise. Carriers can peak and sortie generation can sometimes exceed land bases for short periods but this is self evidently dependant on weather and the capacity of the air base/carrier in question.

Specious comparisons are often made with the notional sortie rate of a 36 aircraft CVF and the fact that the RAF can ‘only manage’ 8 or 10 aircraft in Afghanistan. This is a completely false argument, force levels in theatre are dictated by need and political force limits i.e. cash. The RAF have maintained high peak levels and sustained expeditions at short notice for a long time, simply look at the simultaneous operations in over the last couple of decades. Anti RAF diatribe aside, deployability should always be something that we look to improve though. The issues with the Tornado deployment to Afghanistan highlighted potential shortcomings in rapid airbase augmentation and expeditionary support.

Where carriers have the clear advantage in capacity terms is where limited support infrastructure exists at the host nation airbase. If the RAF is to deploy to a working military airbase that location will likely have all the fuel, munitions handling, communication, force protection, accommodation (no Hilton jokes please!) and myriad of other facilities required for modern air operations. It is also worth noting that an in theatre air base is often used for command and control, logistics transit and as a base for other air assets that may be closer to the area of operations than a carrier.

Therefore, if the host nation air base is well provisioned for aircraft, deployment will generally be much quicker for land based than carrier based aviation, Mach 2 being quicker than 30knots!

Where this rapid deployment by air does not apply is if the location(s) in question is austere or carriers are already in the area, poised ready for operations.

Extra aircraft can be surged onto a waiting carrier, reinforcing the embarked force if necessary and equally obviously, the carrier has everything it needs to initiate and maintain offensive air operations from that point.

No build up is required.

Building a functioning air base from scratch or austere beginnings is going to take a great deal of time and expense. Runways might need to be extended or repaired, fuel storage facilities improved and filled with fuel on an ongoing basis, weapons, crew and other consumables, plus all their combat support/combat service support have to be established and maintained.

This is no small feat but over time as less airborne refuelling from distant carriers is needed and support infrastructure is established and improved, a land based facility will easily exceed the capacity of a carrier and at a significantly lower cost.

Carrier proponents argue that a carrier can stand offshore and poise more or less indefinitely, continuing operations on an enduring basis. This statement is true except for the indefinite part, ships and crews must be rotated so for enduring operations we would need at least three carriers. It is the same argument for continuous at sea deterrent, to absolutely guarantee availability, 3 are needed; this drove the decision for 3 CVS and because of a higher risk factor, the need for 4 Vanguard class submarines.

There are also competing arguments for logistics reach-back issues, some argue that the logistics chain to an embarked carrier is less constricted and has more capacity than that for land operations, citing Afghanistan as a good example. Again though, politics and geography come into play and despite a number of issues, operations in Afghanistan which are conducted at a high tempo, have not been adversely impacted. With carriers even simple things such as food have to be transferred at sea, a land based air base can simply buy locally.

In recent decades the world has seen a significant increase in the number of airports and an improvement in their facilities. The availability of civilian infrastructure should be factored into availability/capacity calculations and pre-positioning stocks of weapon and other material may mitigate some of these early entry barriers.

Again, quite clearly, the suitability argument is nuanced, favouring neither but depending on individual circumstances.

The unique characteristics of carrier borne aviation become absolutely indispensible if capable land facilities are not available during the early phases of an operation but diminish as land based facilities are established and improved.

Host Nation Support – Vulnerability

There are different types of vulnerability, land bases might be vulnerable to an insurgents truck launched mortar or conventional enemy’s ballistic missiles but a carrier may be equally vulnerable to an enemy submarine or truck launched anti ship missile.

Vulnerability is another complex issue.

Air bases are large and easily identified by anyone with Google, even relatively unskilled image intelligence and analysis can reveal aircraft storage areas, entry roads, pipelines or the precise coordinates of the runway mid-point. Against a sophisticated enemy with access to long range missiles conventional air bases are vulnerable but this can be mitigated with force protection measures like dispersal or anti missile systems. Against a less sophisticated enemy, air bases can be shut down for short periods by short range rockets and mortars. Long range anti tank weapons and even anti material sniper rifles can severely disrupt operations or even destroy increasingly expensive aircraft so a large area must be sanitised requiring manpower intensive ground operations. Force protection issues may be less of an issue though if the host nation is adjacent to the area of operations and might offer the force protection assets required as part of any deal.

This means for many operations where land bases are either in hostile locations or within range of such, extensive force protection measures must be taken. These are expensive and manpower intensive; soaking logistics capacity and potentially, turning the base into a ‘self licking lollipop’

Carriers on the other hand can use the vastness of the oceans to effectively disappear but this might only be possible against a poor quality enemy without access to imaging and other ISR resources whether for itself or using proxies. A competent enemy might is likely to have anti surface missiles, a range of large and small vessels and even submarines. The surface threat can be mitigated with distance and offensive operations against the enemy navy in advance of operations but it forces the carrier further offshore, increasing reliance on shore based airborne refuelling and decreasing effective sortie rates.

The submarine threat is arguably of greatest seriousness. Many nations are acquiring modern and extremely quite conventional submarines and the capability of these means that the high value assets become so high value they soak up huge amounts of surface and sub surface force protection resource, again, the self licking lollipop scenario hoves into view.

This is especially acute with UK carrier aviation, where plans are for 1 or put another way, a massive concentration of risk. Given that CVF will also likely embark a number of Merlin HM2 helicopters the number of strike aircraft will decrease, in the absence of alternatives, the delivered effect becomes very limited.

Force protection issues for land and sea based air are both the same and different, they can both be mitigated but these mitigation measures are not without operational and financial costs.

Usefulness – Coercion

There is no doubt that a fully tooled up carrier battle group sends a clear message but whether that message is heeded is debatable.

No doubt, there are examples where the deployment of a large carrier air package has de-escalated a situation but these are very few and far between and mostly from well before the last several decades. If even a US carrier could not deter the Serbs, Saddam or the Taleban then what chance will a CVF?

Real life operational history is replete with examples where a carrier alone coerced precisely nobody; the only thing that has altered anyone’s intentions and actions is going ashore with land forces, in strength and in a sustained manner. The Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan all enjoyed carrier borne fast air but the mission was not completed until land forces went ashore in depth and sustained for a period of time beyond a few weeks. This by the way is why the strategic raiding concept is deeply flawed but that’s for another discussion.

Usefulness – Flexibility

An aircraft carrier is not just an aircraft carrier; it can act as an operational hub for a wide range of missions and unlike most land and air forces can be rapidly re-tasked, switching missions and locations as required with relative ease.

Carriers can be used to protect sea lines of communication or routes into an area in any build up phase, again a unique capability unless resources from land air bases are allocated to the this role, less likely during the initial build up phase.

Against a competent adversary they also introduce an aspect of unpredictability, able to attack from a number of less predictable vectors.

Summary of the Need

Continual operations for the last 30 years have demonstrated that carrier aviation, FOR THE UK, has been essential ONCE (Falklands). Every other operation has seen carrier strike play a role but that role has not been decisive or indeed essential.

This is a simple fact.

However, in these operations where it has not been essential it has certainly been useful and, there is always tomorrow.

So for certain operations in certain locations at certain time points there is no substitute for carrier aviation.

But, it often cannot operate without extensive support from land based aircraft and lacks the capacity for extended operations without a significant logistic effort. If the aircraft carrier is conveniently sited it can provide extremely short response times but if not, transit over long distances will be slow. The need for overfly rights is not automatically eliminated just because one is flying from carriers and to claim any other is clearly ridiculous but being able to approach from the sea provides a greater choice of routes, if, and only of the target can be directly approached by sea.

CVF can deliver air power from locations and in timeframes that would challenge land based air but once this land based air, especially logistics support, has reached a sufficient mass in a suitable location (assuming one is available), it becomes much more efficient for sustained operations. This is where the decision on STOVL is particularly sensible because it allows the aircraft to be deployed from CVF in the early stages and redeployed to a more suitable land base in a sustained operation. Of course you can do this with any aircraft but STOVL reduces the training bill so it becomes the economically sensible thing to do.

Therefore, carrier air is not a replacement for land based aviation but a valuable adjunct, essential in some scenarios and for early operations (given certain conditions) but not in most, as has been proven many many times in real operations.

Nothing has changed in this.

People tend to be polarised on the issue of CVF but the arguments are often made by comparing apples and aardvarks, conflating carrier strike theory with UK realities and inflating relative advantages/disadvantages.

My take on the situation is this, there is a clear need for carrier aviation because it occupies a number of niches that it and only it, can fill but It cannot replace land based aviation either, the two ARE COMPLIMENTARY.

The argument therefore, is about the shape and size of such a capability in the context of possible future operations, our financial reality and any strategic context we care to put them in.

Decisions Past

Since the 1998 SDR the UK has made the planning assumption that for small operations we should retain the capability to act alone.

The terminology has changed in the 2010 SDSR but the result is the same.

By definition and this should be abundantly clear to everyone, anything above that small scale all arms, full spectrum operation, is DISCRETIONARY.

Our previous failing has been to completely ignore this assumption and try and create both width and scale, or put another way, silk purse from a pigs arse.

The RUSI paper that described the various strategic options had some measure of this but failed to crystalise the grey areas, presenting them as discrete and exclusive when in reality they are more complex.

We absolutely 110% must retain an all arms, full spectrum capability. We are a great power and must have the means to operate independently in defence of British interests but we also have to recognise there is a limit to the scale.

What am I saying; we do recognise it, we have recognised it since the 98 SDR but we have singularly failed to do anything about it, head in the sand, fiddling whilst Rome burns, pissing in the wind; pick your own metaphor!

Beyond this small scale independent operation we have also recognised that we will always be in a coalition; whether this is NATO, the US or even the EU is in some ways irrelevant but we need to really, actually, for definite this time, recognise this fact and act accordingly.

Therefore, we need as a minimum, carrier aviation capability for a small scale focussed intervention, the latest trendy jargon.

Beyond that, despite all the hyperbole about sea lanes, punching above our weight, imports and energy, the simple choice is what capabilities, because we can’t do them all, we bring to a coalition.

You can’t say to NATO or the US or even the EU, we will bring a little bit of everything because that means you bring a little bit of nothing, in fact, you become a burden and an impediment to forward planning because your little bit of everything is constantly under budget pressure.

If we go down this road we end up with an inability to act independently and useless in a coalition.

The least of all options

What drove the CVF design?

Experience with the Illustrious class and numerous studies and simulations defined the size of CVF, it is without a doubt a most efficient design when considering crew, displacement and projected costs for its intended role.

The problem was and is; its intended role.

During the post 1998 SDR period and when interventionism was the in thing, the design was based on a requirement for a strike role, in this it excels. The designers have produced an innovative design of which they and we should be proud.

However, with the benefit of special bloggers hindsight goggles we should have realised that the specialism as embodied by the distinct amphibious and strike vessels would lead to escalating costs and an increasing and desperate need to chip away at the edges to justify them.

Some might say that it was Admirals vanity, getting one over the French or merely trying to compare tackle with the USN that drove this single minded approach but I think it is simply a reflection of the unrealistic 1998 SDR and wishful thinking about being a force for good that has infected political and military planning in the last decade.

What we should have done was lowered our sights and realised that dreams of a mini USN carrier battle group with 36 aircraft each were unattainable and modified the design. CVF design was not frozen until the 2004/5 so there were plenty of opportunities to reconfigure CVF to be more versatile, able to comfortably operate as a so called ‘Commando Carrier’ with a mix of helicopters, F35B’s, landing craft, accommodation for a good sized embarked force, command facilities and their equipment.

This would have been a compromise solution, no doubt, trying to operate a sustained CAP whilst embarking assault helicopters would be difficult but when operating in a pair or in part of a larger grouping it would be possible and this eventuality would be the exception rather than the norm. These could have easily been scheduled to replace CVS and Ocean and arguably this would have represented a more versatile solution. By holding out for the gold plated solution we have painted ourselves into a corner and trashed any notion of a balanced fleet.

The idea of halving the displacement of a ship resulting in a 50% reduction in cost is completely false but for the cost of 2 CVF’s and their 36 apiece air group we might have been able to obtain 3 or even 4 Cavour type vessels with 8 F35B’s each.

These would be politically and economically achievable, keep the RN in the carrier strike business and meet all the requirements for independence. With a smaller crew they would be more economical to run and are designed to be much more multi-purpose than CVF. They could be fully interchangeable as an amphibious LPH, command and control vessel or others. Although 3 or even 4 Cavour type ships would be less capable when acting together than 2 CVF, the resilience and versatility arguments are compelling. A more numerous class also contributes to forward presence and defence diplomacy missions. The Cavour is a modest design even though in many ways is better equipped than CVF, Aster 15 missile system for example. Able to embark 8 F35B’s or a smaller number if helicopters are included this would still provide a viable capability for protecting an embarked amphibious brigade and with the second available in surge, provide a modicum air defence. This might not offer a great deal to a larger coalition but that is in line with the Think Defence doctrine of selected contributory ‘capability plus’

Alternatively, we may have chosen just one or two such smaller vessels and spent the money elsewhere depending on how we scaled the RN to meet the actual maritime security needs rather than the expeditionary force for good approach that has not served the nation well.

But I hear you say…

But for a mere couple of billion more than a Cavour we can have CVF and look at the power that gives, the difference is massive?

This argument is at the root of the MoD’s problems, we aim high, fall short and end up with very poor value for money.

We aimed for 2 CVF with 36 FJCA each and ended up with one of a smaller design than originally envisaged, with fewer capabilities, a massive ‘routine 12 aircraft’ airgroup and a 10 year capability gap.

No wonder other nations our sniggering behind our backs!

The defence, therefore, rests.

Still, we are where we are and CVF was the chosen option.

SDSR Decisions – Aircraft and Carriers

With the withdrawal of the Harrier GR9 there is little point having an aircraft carrier without any aircraft so HMS Ark Royal will be immediately decommissioned and HMS Illustrious retained as a landing platform helicopter if the decision is to withdraw HMS Ocean (one of the two is going)

Despite the SDSR making great play of the uncertainty in the future it makes a bold prediction that says in essence we don’t need a carrier strike capability for the next ten years but will after that.

Eh, what complete and utter nonsense. Not even Mystic Meg would make such an outrageously ridiculous statement about the future but given the recent revelations about the industrial aspects of CVF the SDSR is quite clearly providing a figleaf for the real decision, yet another illustration of the lack of strategic thought or vision in the SDSR.

The CATOBAR F35C will require catapults and arrestor equipment to be fitted to the carriers. This will require extensive redesign (whatever they maintain about it being adaptable design), additional capital costs and most significantly, the through life costs of maintainers and deck crew will be high. For example, pension payments accrue as personnel change over the lifespan of the ship. So at the end of the in service period, for each nominal position on the ship, we will have accumulated multiple pension costs, as people are living longer those pension costs snowball so at the end of the CVF’s life, for each position on board we will be paying a number of pensions, not just one. This is why every position has a disproportionate impact on the calculation and why forces in the western world are leading a headlong dash to automation and personnel reduction.

CATOBAR means extra people which quite simple means extra cost.

The initial estimates are that an additional 50 crew will be needed, this doesn’t sound like much but they will have to be aboard whether there are aircraft embarked or not and 50 onboard means many many more ashore, in training, on leave etc. An additional 50 crew also means 50 less for something else.

Balancing those extra costs is the potential for less aircraft maintenance costs and a lower capital cost per aircraft.

With the final cost of the F35 being a rather movable feast the calculations are quite evidently nothing more than educated guesses but one thing that is certain is that every single study the MoD had carried out before the change of Government a few months ago, consistently pointed to the STOVL model being the cheapest through life.

It is also certain that the cost of modifications is equally uncertain!

In a recent parliamentary question/answer, the government confirmed that they don’t actually know how much extra it will cost to install the catapults and arrestor systems beyond ‘a range of estimates’

Given our rather poor track record of estimating it is almost a certainty that any final figure will be to the expensive end of that estimate, if not greater.

The recent build time extension for CVF added nearly a billion pounds so the delay due to a redesign and more complicated deck infrastructure to accommodate catapults and arrestor systems is going to be anyone’s guess in cost terms, are there any takers for an additional billion.

This drives a coach and horses through the F35C = cheaper argument because we simply do not know. With the F35B we have had many years to work out the human costs in minute detail; with the F35C we are taking a leap into the dark on costs.

I therefore remain extremely sceptical about the F35C being cheaper than the F35B but acknowledge that I don’t really know for sure.

The only logical conclusion I can draw is that the interoperability argument i.e. joint carrier strike capability with the French has trumped all others. I therefore maintain that the decision to go with the F35C is to support the capability sharing agreement with the French with a hope for the best on costs and a light sprinkling of extra capability left to provide a thin justification.

In pure capability terms the F35C offers more than the F35B but how significant this difference is, is open to debate. Whilst it is easy to say the F35C has better range and payload one might equally say the F35B can operate from shorter runways ashore, in more severe weather and generate higher sortie rates. Detractors of the F35B point to the dead weight of the lift fan, but the carrier variant has a great deal of extra weight in structural strengthening and enlarged control surfaces.

Things are never black and white, however, I think I am on safe ground saying it will significantly increase costs in the short term.

The sortie generation argument is equally interesting, the size and configuration of the STOVL CVF deck arrangement means that it would be very flexible with launch and recovery operations interleaved, especially with SRVL. Going CATOBAR means deck launch and recovery operations become cyclical and more vulnerable to break down or damage of the catapults and arrestor gear. If the arrestor gear is damaged or denied in any way there will be nowhere for any still airborne aircraft to land. With STOVL, a pilot has a number of options, even a Type 45 or RFA vessels helicopter landing pad would support an emergency recovery. Of course a second CVF or nearby allied aircraft carrier/land base would provide such a secondary recovery facility but we will not likely have a second CVF and may not always be operating with allies.

Given the additional training burden of conventional carrier operations, these skills are very perishable and need constant practice to remain safe, it is difficult to see how the FAA and RAF can sustain a reasonable availability with such a predicted small number of aircraft. Modern synthetic training environments may significantly improve things here though.

One of the stated reasons for going CATOBAR was interoperability with allies, the French and US, both of whom operate conventional aircraft carriers. This means that UK aircraft will be able to operate from these other aircraft carriers but if we are on a joint operation will they be deploying without their own air wing?

The number of conventional aircraft carriers is actually quite small but the number of amphibious ships that the STOVL B model could comfortably operate from is much greater and this number is IN ADDITION to the conventional carriers which can operate the F35B with some small limitations (no ski jump)

In going CATOBAR we are losing the ability to operate from the Italian Cavour, Spanish Juan Carlos, US America Class and Australian Canberra class, a huge reduction in flexibility for joint operations. US and French aircraft would not be able to use CVF but the USMC, Spanish and Italians are planning F35B purchases so its swings and roundabouts, pick your interoperability partners.

So we have a ten year capability gap, during which the Charles de Gaulle will undergo a 2 year refit, which will see the UK without any organic maritime fast jet capability. CVF supporters think 10 years is OK because it keeps the RN in the fast jet business and one might be thinking that is all that is important.  Ten years seems rather an optimistic time span and even if it were to be so there is no way the Fleet Air Arm can maintain a training pipeline for that long. A few exchange programmes with the US or French forces is not going to change that. Keeping the pipeline flowing until a STOVL F35B/QE came into service was one thing but the F35C is quite another. The F35B is having a few development niggles but they are just that, niggles. The F35C is still likely to be the last of the trio in service which means the Italians and Spanish are likely to have a more capable maritime aviation component for the next ten years than the Royal Navy, because the Royal Navy will have none.

Having only one means that CVF will be a part time capability, best not need it whilst it is in dock.

Oh, hang on, we can rely on our allies, the French.

All across defence there has been capability reductions but the Admirals insisted on an increase, 2 CVF with 36 strike fighters each was the vision and despite having ample opportunity to scale back these opportunities have never been taken until we got to the crunch point and it was too late.

The aircraft ownership issue remains to be resolved, as do a number of other issues, yet again the SDSR was light on detail. A personal opinion is that the Fleet Air Arm will cease to be in the fast jet business, the time delay is too great to sustain a career stream for air and ground crew and the fleet size means no economies of scale will be achieved across a small service that is part of a larger service whose business is not flying. I am neutral on this issue but can see the benefits of a single fast jet force. The argument that RAF personnel don’t join to go to sea has some truth but as the new engagement model starts to build and new personnel join it would not be impossible to include time at sea in the engagement model for RAF ground and air crew.

UCAV’s favour a conventional take off and landing configuration so this might have had some role in the decision to switch but one of the defining characteristics of unmanned aircraft is extreme range and endurance, so the need for operating them from carriers becomes weaker to a degree.

The stated intention is to have 2 CVF with one in extended readiness or sold, a far cry from initial plans.

Decades of STVOL operational training and expertise has been cast aside and we are going to have to relearn skills we discarded a very long time ago.

Contracts are going to have to be renegotiated, equipment in build like the ‘ski jumps’ and production B models stopped midstream, expensive and risky developments entered into (catapults etc)

The painfully obvious lack of knowledge about the actual costs of converting to CATOBAR will become clear in the next year or two and these will be seen as increasingly unaffordable, putting yet more pressure on a programme that represents a capability we have decided we can do without for a decade.

We have the difficult task of persuading the US that we are a reliable industrial partner and have been shown yet again to be impossible to do business with.

No wonder BAE stitched up the CVF build contract, can we really blame them.

Summary

The unmitigated disaster that is CVF has been chewed over by everyone but suffice it to say, it is a weapons grade cock up that puts the Chinook HC3’s, FRES or Nimrod AEW into the column marked, outstanding success.

There are many unanswered questions and the future is still uncertain; how many, who will the aircraft be flown by, how much integration with allies are we actually talking about, what might this mean, what about the second one and many more. I still feel that the F35B will be cheaper to operate, in the round, than the F35C and the switch to CATOBAR was motivated mainly by political considerations.

Building CVF in its current form, over a barrel, suits no one. Yes BAE get to complete but the sour taste will linger affecting their long term relationship with the MoD and the decision to swap to CATOBAR is going to result in a series of uncomfortable conversations with the US.

The ten year capability gap is simply ridiculous and beyond rational thought.

There is no doubt that carrier strike is a capability that can be justified in the context of an adaptable expeditionary posture, it is not as versatile or useful as the most rabid of its supporters would have you believe, but for the UK, essential nevertheless, in the most likely strategic context.

The real question is scale.

I think a smaller ambition and reduced scale would have been more appropriate as it would have afforded a more robust, balanced and versatile force structure able to meet real maritime defence and security needs and support expeditionary land operations, but here we are in 2010 with very little room to wiggle.

It’s hard to see any positives; we are going to have a part time capability that will cost a small fortune, suck the life out of the RN budget for decades yet offer a relatively low level of capacity and significantly less flexibility than envisaged. Current plans seem to be for a normal deployment of 12 F35C’s, which is fewer aircraft than the CVS it is replacing, admittedly the F35C is a step change from the Harrier but nonetheless, it is food for thought given the huge cost and impact CVF has had on other capabilities.

The chiefs and previous governments ambition and unrealism has resulted in us being backed into a corner, left with very few alternatives.

A sensible alternative would have been a proper sit down negotiation with BAE, not just exchanging angry letters.

Out of these negotiations would have sprung a revised design more suited to our needs and if this meant subsidising the BAE yards to more or less do nothing whilst this redesign and build up took place then that would simply have been a price worth paying to get something that we actually need and want.

The Treasury have released a letter from the Chief Executive Officer of BAE Systems addressed to David Cameron on the issue of military shipbuilding and CVF in particular.

In defence of BAE, they are a commercial organisation that have a legal duty to their shareholders, they are not a charity.

The MoD was as usual, trying to dabble in private markets and drafted a Frankenstein agreement, smashing together two competitors into a happy smiley consortium. The Defence Industrial Strategy tried to achieve some public sector husbandry of a private sector defence industry. In light of this, one really has to question the approach and the competency of the MoD legal team that sleep walked into this agreement.

I also have to question the Governments position in accepting at face value the obvious and not even veiled threats so obvious in the letter.

The day industrial concerns directly impinge on the ability of our armed forces to execute their tasks is a day we must seriously question the value of maintaining defence skills and industrial capacity as a strategic capability.

It is also worth noting that the seeds of this dismal affair were sown in the Conservative government of Mrs Margaret Thatcher. De-nationalisation in the mid 1980′s resulted in only two producers, BAE and VT, who between them owned the three remaining construction yards. Subsequent initiatives like smart acquisition, the defence industrial strategy, through life management, integrated project teams and a defence acquisition change programme have all resulted in more heat than light but a small mountain of PowerPoint’s! Driven by the Defence Industrial Strategy, the MoD insisted that a condition of the CVF contract was that the two competitors, BAE and VT, formed joint venture to build them. BVT Surface Fleet was the resulting organisation but VT subsequently sold their share to BAE. In return for significant investment by BAE it negotiated a long term workstream, 15 years to be precise. Having had its fingers burned by the MoD several times (FRES for example) the board of BAE will have quite rightly requested a quid quo pro from the MoD.

I also see a spot of public relations spinning at hand here, the letter is obviously confidential, did BAE agree to its publication?

If not, there is a serious issue of trust in the customer/supplier relationship with the Government clearly looking to embarrass BAE and the previous Government. There has been too much ‘it was them big boys over there that made me do it’ this week. It is time for the Government to call BAE’s bluff and realise who is the customer in this customer supplier relationship.

Maintaining industrial capacity and skills is one thing, but this is clearly another.

Remember those sacred cows we were going to cull, it’s about time we sharpened the knife and took it to the DIS.

We can’t blame BAE, its the MoD and previous Government that brokered this ridiculous deal and the current Government that has a backbone made of jelly.

The carriers are an obvious case in point. Since their inception it was always a firmly held view that the STOVL F35B offered the lowest cost of ownership. Study and study confirmed that whilst it would always be the most expensive capital option, over the lifetime of the aircraft the savings would be significant when compared to the more traditional CATOBAR arrangements as found on US and French carriers.

Nothing in this has changed despite the SDSR confidently predicting that the F35C will offer a cheaper solution. Given the half baked costings and vague notions of saving money, the SDSR does not inspire any confidence in this at all so those assertions will have been largely based on best estimates, or guesses to you and me. The UK has almost no reliable data on which to base such decisions, it has been more than 40 years since we operated CATOBAR carriers/aircraft.

In an interview with BBC Scotland during a visit to the Govan shipyard, Liam Fox said:

“There are estimates of the cost, ranging upwards from £500m. There are a lot of studies going on, which will determine exactly what system, what costs and where”

So yet again, we are adding more cost into the programme but aren’t really quite sure about how much

What has suddenly changed?

The switch to the CATOBAR F35C has absolutely nothing to do with saving money and nothing to do with specifications; it is all about European and Anglo French politics. The SDSR mentions interoperability with allies as one of the driving factors for the switch but this provides absolutely no benefit for the UK.

Whilst we are busy flogging off the Harriers to the Indians or Americans, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy will meet in London tomorrow to confirm and announce the details of greater military cooperation.

French defence minister Hervé Morin, speaking at the Euronaval 2010 conference last week, confirmed that greater cooperation concerning the two nations’ carriers was being investigated.

“Beyond joint exercises, we are in favour of sharing the accompanying of aircraft carriers, a British frigate could perfectly well participate in the protection of the Charles de Gaulle and vice versa. I’ve asked our military command to consider the feasibility of stationing British aircraft on our aircraft carrier and vice versa. The British have decided to equip their aircraft carriers with catapults, we can have joint exercises, but also arrange to have a Rafale squadron make use of the British platform”

Earlier this month it was suggested that French nuclear facilities could be used to maintain the warheads on the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent. The French are also said to be offering the UK use of their Bréguet Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft following the announcement that the Nimrod MRA4 would be scrapped.

Morin said restrictions on sharing carriers “in the case of a conflict or crisis where our respective interests diverged” were likely, and any treaty agreed during Cameron and Sarkozy’s meeting must cover the difficult issue of how and when the UK and France might deploy shared carriers.

I think a deal on the FSTA transport and refuelling aircraft is also on the horizon and suggested this some time ago.

Other likely outcomes will be shared training and maintenance for the A400, nuclear warhead maintenance, carrier maintenance and even a joint brigade.

Writing in the Telegraph, Liam Fox said

It makes little sense for the two most powerful armed forces in Europe to be spending more than necessary on duplicate capabilities which could be delivered in a more cost effective manner

It makes perfect sense if we are a sovereign nation with control over the means of our defence, we are Great Britain, not Europe.

The spin will be that this is an arrangement with France not the EU but we all know where this is going.

The reality is, the UK and France have many shared interests and greater resource sharing on non combat capabilities (maintenance and training etc) is not wholly unreasonable but a joint brigade and almost symbiotic relationship on carriers is a step too far.

The 1998 SDR was lacking in any form of commitment to making a clear choice between NATO, the US and Europe in matters of defence. It fudged the issue but still crept closer to Europe, trying to maintain the illusion that we could be all things to all men. This simply does the same but yet again, actions and words are not the same thing, we talk about the US and NATO but edge ever closer to Europe.

This makes the decision to change from the F35B to the F35C look 100% political and the operational and cost issues can go hang, the important thing is to secure a joint UK/French, and by extension, European, carrier capability.

We are on the glide path, it starts with cooperation, then a spot of common capability sharing, then joint equipment programmes and before you know it, we no longer have independence and have therefore arrived at a de facto EU Defence Capability.

Too expensive to cancel

Will be heard

What

Complete

and

Utter

Bollocks

There have been contracts placed but every day in the real world contracts are cancelled, organisations sit down and work through the issues and usually a compromise is reached.

Where a compromise cannot be reached then one party is in breach and the other party may resort to legal remedy.

In this case BAe would be facing the MoD in a court room whilst major decisions on other programmes that BAe are involved with are still to be made.

It beggars belief that BAe would put in jeopardy their entire future UK defence portfolio on potential losses from one project.

The capital costs of CVF pail into insignificance against their running costs and especially the running costs of her aircraft when measured over the next few decades.

Are we really saying the the UK Government is being bounced into a bad decision because it is scared of facing BAe in the High Court, is this really what decisions on military and security capability are being based on these days?

If the reports are true about one CVF with a handful of aircraft in a decade or two then this must go down in the annals of the worst government defence decision, since the last one.

What we should be doing is working out a strategic plan (remember that word) for the Royal navy with BAe that ensures both parties benefit in the long term.

This ridiculous decision makes no sense for either party.

Reported in various news sources is the confirmation of 2 CVF, with QE having an austere helicopter capability with PoW going the cats and traps route and QE coming up to the same specification at her first refit.

What is painfully evident is that the First Sea Lord and associated grown-ups in the Admiralty will sacrifice almost anything to keep CVF. I can see their logic, get the hulls in the water and worry about the other stuff later, after all this time and so much sacrificed it would be silly to think otherwise or so they think. By 2015 we will be largely out of Afghanistan and they are gambling that the 2015 SDSR will confirm the largely maritime strategic raiding concept, slash the Army and transfer funding to the Royal Navy to build up aircraft numbers on CVF and crucially bring the Type 26 into being in quantity.

It’s a big gamble.

We keep hearing about how they will allow us to punch above our weight but in sacrificing the rest of the fleet they turn into paper tigers. Specifically look at the escort fleet, destroyers and frigates.

If the rumours are true the Royal Navy will come out of the SDSR with 15 escorts, now depending on how this figure is viewed (if it is indeed true) that could mean a number of variations.

15 in the short term might just not include the 4 Type 45’s that will be entering service in the next few years, the last one being launched only last week) so 13 Type 23’s plus 6 Type 45’s equals 19 in total, down 5 from the 24 today. I have assumed the Batch 3 Type 22’s and Type 42’s will be cut immediately.

Another interpretation of 15 might be 15 including the 4 new Type 45’s, resulting in a medium term TOTAL of 15. This would mean the complete withdrawal of the Type 42’s, 22’s and 4 Type 23’s.

A total of 19 is a reduction of still in excess of 20% and if it is to be 15 then that is a reduction of well over a third and about 1,500 sailors.

So is 15 surface combatants such a bad thing, that would depend on what is around them and how they are deployed but another thing the pro CVF supporters often make is how it will keep us high in the world rankings of naval power, it’s a notion that I think is somewhat illogical because I don’t care what other forces have as long as ours meet our needs but it’s a useful yardstick.

Looking at other countries and ignoring Corvettes (which can in many ways equal the combat power of a frigate) the figure of 15 stacks up like this.

The figures are approximate and the definition of the vessel types can be contradictory in places but its a good approximation. It obviously takes no account of quality or effectiveness either but as Royal Navy supporters know, ships can’t be in two places at once.

Table 1 – ordered on Total 1 (Destroyers and Frigates)

Table 2 – ordered on Total 2 (Destroyers, Frigates, Offshore Patrol vessels and Corvettes)

What this shows is that the Royal Navy will become massively and dangerously unbalanced, slipping to joint 11th in our table on Total 1 and joint 15th on Total 2. If the outcome is 19 not 15 then things get better, but not by much, 10th on Total 1 and 14th on Total 2.

It might be argued that the smaller offshore patrol boats and corvettes are suitable only for second class forces but the importance of presence should not be underestimated.

How has it come to pass the Royal Navy might have fewer surface combatants than Turkey or South Korea?

The pro CVF lobby constantly talk about power projection, protecting vital sea lanes (we are an island you know) and overseas territories but how is it going to be possible to do any of this when we have such a paltry number of surface vessels, some of which will be in maintenance or other places i.e. of limited use when needed.

Compounding the reduction the surface fleet are the rumours of the CVF aircraft handling configuration and aircraft.

If Harrier is withdrawn before its Out of Service date of 2018 it will leave the existing CVS, Illustrious and Ark Royal, without any fixed wing aircraft, regardless of ownership.

Queen Elizabeth, again, according to the rumours, will be introduced in a cut down cut down configuration for helicopters only. This means she will be unable to operate the rumoured choice of F35C at all until her first refit, some years after Prince of Wales is introduced into service.

If we then go with either Rafale, F18 or F35C (preferred) then it will have to wait for the Prince of Wales to come into service. The additional design and construction costs of converting to catapults and traps will have to be borne relatively early, estimates vary but this does not seem likely to come in at any less than half a billion pounds. Additional crew will also be required to maintain the system and the training obligations for perishable conventional carrier operations. That might be OK if we had loads of crew and loads of aircraft but that doesn’t seem to be the case, with figures of 40 aircraft being bandied about. Of those 40 aircraft some will have to be allocated to training, thus compounding the training problem so it is unlikely that any CVF will ever go to see with any more than a squadrons worth, despite the capacity for much there.

The ownership of the 40 aircraft is also up for grabs; the plan of a joint force with F35B’s seemed a sensible approach as it allowed operations from ships, austere locations and conventional air bases in a very flexible manner, basing moving in line with the operational timeline. The Fleet Air Arm (despite their victimhood status) have been sustained by the good will of the RAF, an uncomfortable truth for many but a truth nevertheless. The current FAA pilots on exchange with the USN are being covered by what service I wonder, if the FAA have to go it alone with F35C the training and sustainment issues will be significant unless we have some serious sharing with the US and French Navies.

CVF and FJCA will continue to suck the funds out of the RN’s budget, important upgrades will be slipped, maintenance budgets cut, training curtailed and the prospect of C2/C3 seems to be but a distant pipedream. The Admirals dream of a temporary decrease in surface numbers in the short term followed by a new programme in the medium term to increase numbers in line with a maritime centric strategy will remain just that, a dream, in the absence of a major strategic threat, force levels will only decline.

We also have to address the de specification of CVF in order to ‘get them through’ such as a lack of adequate air defence missile system and a limited hangar height.

If these rumours are true, the Government have taken the easy decision by keeping going on a broadly similar path yet slicing all around, a bit here and a bit there. By pandering to the vanity and zipper measuring of the Admirals, successive governments have dodged tough decisions because it was on the path of least resistance.

I get the need for maritime fast air but I stand in amazement that the grown-ups have allowed these white elephants to proceed knowing full well it would cause massive damage to the wider navy and other capabilities, it really does beggar belief.

Let’s just hope the rumours aren’t true.

*Apologies to Richard Thompson for nicking the name of his best album

HMS Ocean is a Landing Platform Helicopter and whilst many complain that she was built to commercial standards and therefore not a ‘proper warship’ the reality is, she has been tremendous value for money and will be a tough act to follow when decommissioned towards the end of the decade..

Here recent voyage shows just how versatile this type of vessel is, providing a significant effect for a relatively modest outlay.

The first stop was Exercise Auriga in the USA, a spot of amphibious training with the Brazilian marines then a hop across the Atlantic to take part in the Nigerian fleet review, hosting the odd treaty signing and repairing a school.

Of course, if we do end up with the second CVF acting as an Ocean replacement we will have to settle for not having any embarked landing craft or rear loading ramp (when it works that is!)

Exercise Auriga and Kearsarge – USA

AURIGA is the major Royal Navy deployment of 2010, exercising on the Eastern Seaboard of North America and in the Western Atlantic. There were many more vessels other than Ocean taking part but these are just about Ocean, I have even excluded the RAF and their deployment aboard HMS Ark Royal.

Click here to view the embedded video.

C2X Task Group Show of Force

As if that wasn’t enough, on Saturday 10th July a team of Royal Marines from 9 Assault Squadron, based on board HMS Ocean, helped save an American fisherman whose boat was on the brink of sinking.  The eagle-eyed marines spotted the boat while conducting a routine patrol in their Landing Craft.

LCVP Boat Crew Rescues American Civilian 12 Jul 2010

Caribbean

In August she deployed to the Caribbean to provide contingency support to British dependant territories during the hurricane season and take part in anti drug smuggling operations.

During the deployment the crew also managed to raise several thousand pounds for charity

HMS Ocean crew in a charity fund raiser

Brazil

After leaving the Caribbean the next stop was Rio de Janeiro. Activities included hosting a trade agreement signing ceremony and exercising with Brazilian Marines.

HMS Ocean entering Rio de Janeiro - 9/9/10

HMS Ocean entering Rio de Janeiro - 9/9/10

Brazilian Marines from the 3rd Infantry Battalion, Amphibious Division joined  HMS Ocean and the Royal Marines of 539 Assault Squadron for a three-day training exercise.  They practised amphibious drills and shared experiences from recent operations. Meanwhile, sailors from the Brazilian warship BNS Rio De Janeiro embarked on board HMS Ocean to continue to build understanding and co-operation between the two navies.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Royal Marines also gave their Griffon TD2400‘s and Offshore Raiding Craft a good run out.

After the exercise HMS Ocean returned to Rio De Janeiro to host a UK Trade and Industry exhibition, a reception for local dignitaries and a bi-lateral security seminar culminating in the signing of a UK/Brazil Defence Cooperation Agreement and a formal dinner for 150 guests onboard.

During the week in Rio sailors and Royal Marines from the ship helped with a number of community projects.

Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea

Timed to coincide with the 50th Anniversary of independence the next visit was to Nigeria where HMS Ocean and her crew took part in a number of training and goodwill missions.

HMS Ocean during the Nigerian Fleet Review

HMS Ocean's hovercraft

The Presidential Fleet Review was part of activities for the nation’s 50th independent anniversary celebrations.

After Nigeria was a short stay in Sierra Leone and on the way back will be a number of cooperative operations around Cape Verde with their law enforcement teams.

Summary

What a superb example of combining training with defence diplomacy and standing patrols.

This is defence diplomacy done right; let’s not sacrifice this on the stone cold altar of CVF.

This will see 3 Apache attack helicopters operating aboard including their supporting personnel including 120 engineers and maintainers. As well as it being a relatively new experience for the three aircraft and ten pilots, there is also a support crew of 120 engineers and maintainers from 4 Regiment Army Air Corps onboard the Portsmouth-based aircraft carrier.

What struck me about this, although perhaps nothing unusual in itself, was the fact that a number of complex land based aircraft can be bought aboard and operated in an almost self contained manner.

What does this say for the FAA and RAF operating the F35B on CVF?

Could we operate the F35B in the same way, the RAF fully owning them and moving aboard en-masse with all their associated support and operations crew?

If so, it makes the cost of operating the CVF/F35 combination look a little more palatable.

The RN spin machine is being put into high gear, much like the other service spin machines, it must be said.

As soon as you question the CVF you are instantly labelled a Royal Air Force stooge because it’s taken as red that anything anti CVF is automatically a dastardly plot by the RAF to get rid of the Fleet Air Arm.

I hate inter service politics with a vengeance but I do sometimes wonder if it overplayed outside those that are serving, operations have a tendency to drive out politicking and we should give people more credit. It beggars belief to think that the RAF is basing its, and the nations, future plans on the degree by which those plans do in the RN/FAA. Despite this, there are a number of naval biased think tanks, web sites and others that continually make the case for their own service, funnily enough, CVF is always the answer; whatever the question and it is always ‘those other boys’ that should bear the brunt of any cuts, we are a bloody island you know!

To be a ‘CVF denier’ is to attract scorn, especially at Think Defence, given the many eloquent and knowledgeable Andrew that frequent the comments section!

I am going out on a limb here fellas, we have to continually ask; can we justify the expense such a capability. We must be rigorous in looking at everything in defence because however much we would want more money, it is not likely to appear. Wish lists of nice to have equipment that are incongruous with our foreign policy objectives/aspirations and size of the trouser must be eliminated if we are to have a military that is effective for the most likely roles we might ask them to carry out.

Wishing for more money is not a practical strategy, to steal a quotation from the film Bad Santa;

Wish in one hand and shit in the other, see which one fills up first

Before we get into question of aircraft the decision to proceed with CVF has to be justified.

Justifying CVF

The talk today is of small Scale Focussed Interventions and acting in coalition with others for anything else. This is nothing new and has actually been the case since the 1998 SDR.

Given that we have very few overseas territories and there are more economic means of protecting them the decision on CVF then rests on what those contributory capabilities need to look like. We might argue the nature of what a small scale focussed intervention is but what it doesn’t absolutely require is 2x 65k tonne CVF and 150 JCA, the capability is clearly in the optional column.

Therefore, if we proceed with CVF/JCA it is out of choice, not necessity.

If I could turn the clock back I would have selected a smaller scale naval expeditionary air capability more in line with the Spanish and Italian forces. This would still have provided a small scale capability for focussed interventions but would have allowed the allocated funds to be spread across a wider range of defence capabilities but with CVF and JCA so advanced it would be a wasteful decision to cancel now.

The penalty clause issue is often highlighted but this fails to recognise the commercial realities of the UK defence mono culture. It would be a brave politician to cancel the lot now but whilst we are still in the ‘blame it on Labour’ mode it remains a possibility. No matter how much it would waste now, that figure pales into insignificance when measured against the cost of CVF/JCA over the next 40 odd years.

In its favour, CVF will not be a one trick pony, the design is extremely versatile and its significant size increases that versatility to an even greater degree. It will be able to provide outer layer air defence, support embarked forces with close air support, carry out deep strike, ISR and a number of secondary roles such as a helicopter platform, non combatant evacuation and disaster support. Despite the acknowledged all round flexibility of a ship like CVF its supporters sometimes tend to over emphasise usefulness, making spurious claims and dubious comparisons with the RAF.

In seeking to justify CVF, the two fundamental mistakes are in comparing it with others and over stating the issue of host nation support.

‘CVF will put the RN into the first division, only behind the USN’ or other such comments are often heard. Frankly, I don’t care how we compare with anyone; this is not a competition in a pub toilet. We have to measure what capabilities it brings to UK defence.

The second mistake people often make is to confuse the utility of carrier borne air in general terms, usually framed by the USN, with that to be delivered by CVF. The USN and RN are not the same and as soon as we all recognise this, the better. The lynchpin on which the argument for carrier air rests is host nation support. Overfly rights may be denied so access from the sea enables an operation to proceed, fixed air bases are vulnerable to attack so an offshore floating base is the most survivable option.

This makes a number of assumptions, that the over water route will always have overfly rights or not need them and that host nation support is always not available. History tells us that host nation support has been generally available except for a very few instances. There are examples of operations where naval aviation was the only option but they are limited and this might be an inconvenient truth but it is a truth nevertheless.

What carrier delivered fast air provides is short duration, early entry air power and organic area air defence. As operations progress, land basing generally becomes more established and ground based aircraft closer to the area of operations become the most efficient means of delivering air power. Many operations have a deliberate build up phase as the necessary political pieces are slotted into position, this means time for land based air power to deploy and establish.

Many carrier operations will also require support from land based aircraft, ISR and AAR for example.

The RAF have shown they can deploy in numbers and sustain operations, we might seek to improve this of course but the facts remain, the RAF has a comprehensive expeditionary capability.

The reality is this…

Land and carrier based fast air is complimentary, it is not an either or argument and should not be presented as such.

I am a supporter of carrier aviation but I like to think I can view it dispassionately and without bias.

There is a strong case for CVF but I am concerned about its impact across the naval and wider defence budget and this leads me down the road of maximising capability whilst minimising cost.

One or Two

I have heard many people say they would rather have none than only 1 CVF but this seems to be an irrational argument given that the capability for force projection remains a discretionary one.

Yes, of course with only 1 we could not guarantee availability and whilst the one and only CVF was in refit a requirement might pop up, sods law comes into play. The argument in favour of 2 also rests on the number of contracts placed but this is a simple cost v risk scenario, can we hedge against the risk?

We should not look at CVF in isolation; they will always be operating in conjunction with other assets and a number of interesting options can be considered.

Option A is to simply plough ahead with 2, operate them with a full complement of JCA each and replace HMS Ocean with a new design. This is of course the favoured RN option but not supportable in terms of cost.

Option B is to still build the pair and put one into immediate reserve. This would save operating costs and reduce crewing requirements but with sufficient notice would still be able to provide some capacity in response to emerging strategic threats. Operating the ship with some elements of Royal Navy Reserve or Sponsored Reserves might also be worth investigation.

Option C is to link CVF with a replacement for HMS Ocean. Ocean has been excellent value for money but it has had more than its fair share of problems. By still putting 2 CVF’s into the water and operating them as flexible platforms, optimised for mixed loads of JCA, helicopters and soldiers/marines we could reduce overall crew and maintenance requirements. This is the most likely option given a reduced buy of JCA but operating a CVF in the role of LPH is not ideal because of its size and value.

Option D is to build one CVF but pair it with an early Ocean replacement, a design based on the Spanish Juan Carlos I and Australian Canberra, these are multi role LHD that still provide capacity for an STOVL JCA. Refits could be aligned so that at all times, for those non discretionary SSFI, we had a capability available for both helicopter and fast jet operations. There would not normally be interchangeable and if only one were available then the nature of operations that could be performed would be limited. A CVF and LHD pair provides some degree of hedging against the availability issue and whilst of course it is not ideal, in this financial environment we have to accept compromise. In due course, HMS Albion and Bulwark will need replacing and at this point we might also consider a follow on LHD order so the RN will eventually have 1 CVF, 3 LHD and the 4 Bays; still a formidable capability.

I think Option C is the most likely but D is also an interesting longer term option for maximum cost savings.

What Aircraft

With that in the bag we have to consider the aircraft, there is little point having an aircraft carrier with nothing to fly off them. The first aircraft onboard should be the Harrier’s, unless the SDSR retires them early, in which case there will be an embarrassing period where we have an aircraft carrier and no aircraft!

What aircraft to buy is the several billion pound question.

The first thing I would say on this is that bloggers and commenter’s are not in possession of the full facts and even those in a position of knowing everything aren’t actually in that position at all, especially because the actual final cost of any F35 variant is an unknown. The MoD has repeatedly carried out various studies and estimated that the F35B offers the most cost effective aircraft that meets requirements, over the total lifespan.

Considering other options though…

Switching to CTOL

Whilst it is true that the CVF is an adaptable design with allowance made for catapults etc at this stage the ‘drawings’ would have to be redrafted and appropriate changes made to the production schedules. The first of the class is well advanced so this would simply add extra cost and time delays. The last time we slowed down the build rate it cost a billion pounds.

If we did change to catapults we have three choices, go straight for steam, buy into the US EMALS or develop EMKIT/EMCAT into a useable system. In terms of risk, steam is probably the lowest but we would be buying into an obsolete technology that is incredibly maintenance intensive. The US EMALS is probably the most mature of the electromagnetic systems and will likely be production ready by the time we need it but the costs are not insignificant. The EMCAT from Converteam offers a sovereign solution at an unknown cost and risk. In addition, would be a deck landing and arrestor wire system.

All three options carry significant capital costs, x2

On top of the capital costs are the costs involved with operating CTOL aircraft and this is where they are likely to be significant. One of the overwhelming drivers of increasing costs in the defence sphere are people, armed forces across the western nations are facing increasingly high personnel costs and this is resulting in pressure to reduce crewing by the use of automation.

Each extra position on board needs more than one person to fill it and each person will need paying, have food and accommodation costs, pension, healthcare, training and many other costs that go with employing a military person. CTOL will require extra deck handling and engineering personnel. A whole rank structure will exist around these extra positions and each one will need training, training means course development, e-learning modules, simulators and trainers, who will of course, need paying etc etc.

Every single extra position on board and ashore will be sitting on top of a pyramid of other people.

Another point that people often ignore is the churn rate in personnel, individuals come and go and whilst we are only paying for one at a time whilst they are in service, over the life of the ships we will be paying many instances of pensions. Like a snowball rolling down a hill, pension costs accumulate, there is a reason we are sitting on a public sector pensions time bomb and this is it. CTOL operations require rapidly perishable skills and for safety reasons have to be maintained at a high level, even if operations are largely ground based, Afghanistan for example. This creates an additional burden and will mean greater numbers of aircraft and aircrew.

CTOL also adds significant weight to the deck and surrounding structure and lets not forget we would need to invest in a training aircraft just for deck operations, yet another type with all that this entails.

The big question is, do these additional capital and ongoing costs come in at a figure less than the capital and ongoing cost of the F35B. We cannot hope to know and there remains a degree of uncertainty in any calculations but several studies within the MoD have consistently shown the additional costs of CTOL to be significant enough to outweigh the relatively modest increase in capability that the F35C might offer or capital cost savings from something like the F18.

If we did opt for CTOL there are basically three choices, the F18, Rafale or F35C and each has a range of advantages, disadvantages and costs. The F35C would be the favourite in this group and might still be a long term option but the lure of cooperating and sharing costs of training and maintenance with France makes the Rafale a dark horse.

The F18 is certainly proven but is at the end of its development life and would likely to need replacing sooner rather than later.

Whatever the various performance, political issues or other advantages of these alternatives the cost, when measured as joint capability (not just to the RN) is less than F35B.

What about STOBAR

A intriguing possibility is short take off but arrested recovery with the proposed Sea Gripen giving everyone something to think about, but whilst we could reduce the capital and running costs associated with catapults it would still need a high degree of deck and aircrew training and questions remain on useable loads once the extra weight of a more robust undercarriage and tail hook is added. The Gripen is a much underrated and robust aircraft but the Sea Gripen is still at the drawing stage and costs are unknown, would it really be suitable and have any longevity in the JCA role?

The F35B

The STOVL is currently the preferred option to fulfil the Joint Combat Aircraft requirement; we have purchased 3 as part of the design and development phase and are currently heavily involved with the flight trials.

Let’s be frank, things aren’t going particularly well with the B variant, lagging behind in terms of development schedule with ongoing issues on component reliability, exhaust issues and weight. However, these problems are often over stated and show me any other advanced weapon system that has managed to avoid development problems.

I am sanguine about the development snags, for I think they are just that, snags. The swirling controversy on price estimates means that realistically, no one really knows exactly how much the things are and there is very little point trying to pin down a figure.

When ready for deployment we will be getting a system of systems that is a generation ahead of anything we have, an aircraft with masses of growth potential and a massive global supply chain and logistics capability. We need to step away from comparing it to others in pure kinematic performance terms because its sensor fusion, low observability and situational awareness will enable it to carry out its missions much better than the alternatives.

The performance difference between the C and B model is noted, in some respects the C might be a better solution but we have to balance a number of factors and the additional costs involved with the C, even considering a difference in capital costs, do not compensate. There are other advantages with STOVL like sortie rates, poor weather operations and the versatility of operating on constrained runways on land. These enable transition to ground locations before that location might be capable of fully operating conventional aircraft.

I don’t want to gloss over the historic and ongoing problems but cutting and running at this stage simply would not be sensible.

Plans seem to be for an initial purchase of between 40 and 50 which again, seems sensible.

What About UCAV’s

UCAV’s would favour a CTOL design but the path which UCAV’s are going down is not certain and any useable design is many years away. Ultra long range and optionally manned F35B’s might even be part of the future solution mix so as these uncertainties remain, trying to second guess them is not productive, it will simply lead to more delay and more cost.

AEW

One advantage of going CTOL is that it opens an opportunity to operate the E2 Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft but this would be an even greater cost and whilst it might be superior to a Merlin based solution, again, the increase in capability does not offer a clear enough advantage to justify the massive extra cost.

Sweating Ones Assets

Ignoring the emotions of what could have been and without going over old ground, if we accept that CVF and F35B is the sensible and likely way ahead from this point how can we maximise our investment.

It’s an obvious statement to make but we must make every penny count and be single minded.

Can we really afford two fast jet forces?

No.

This means that an F35B squadron must be self contained whether it is operating from a land base or CVF, the same aircrew, the same maintainers, armourers and others. The people go wherever the aircraft go. It is simply not true to say that RAF personnel do not want to go to sea and if it is in the interests of defence then, retention issues permitting, they must go where they are needed.

If that means a ship or an airbase then that is what it is. Operating in a larger pool of personnel means that harmony guidelines become more achievable, even on an enduring basis. Putting people into 2 smaller organisations reduces flexibility, career prospects and impacts retention. The aspiration of having a full compliment of strike aircraft is simply unaffordable and a waste of a very flexible resource, as I said above, we are not the USN.

This means the FAA completely lose the fast jet role to the organisation that is wholly concerned with operating aircraft, the RAF.

Another option we might explore is joint operational conversion training with the USMC or possible European operators like Spain and Italy. This reduces the requirement for training vessels and possibly aircraft, delivering obvious economies of scale.

Summary

CVF remains fully justified in whatever strategic stance we take.

The F35B would seem to provide the greatest flexibility and capability at the lowest cost.

Options still remain on numbers and how it is operated in a wider context, such as turning the CVF pair into a multi role air/amphib or disbanding the FJ element of the Fleet Air Arm

It’s a rehash of the F18/Rafale/F35C story from a few weeks ago and therefore likely complete nonsense, but in the pre SDSR news vacuum any bit of tat qualifies as ‘insight’

I do wonder why our defence journalists just repeat tittle tattle rather than ask questions, like these for instance

• How does changing the design and construction of CVF at this late stage save money
• How does adding several hundred million pounds for catapults save money
• How does maintaining those catapults for 40 years save money
• How do the extra catapult maintainers wages, pensions and other costs over 40 years save money
• How does the extra cost of maintaining perishable carrier operations skills save money
• How does scrapping the 3 F35B’s we have purchased as part of the operational evaluation phase save money

I am puzzled how adding cost reduces it, either in short term or long term.

Am I being thick?

I hate inter service rivalry with a passion, it is responsible for many of the problems we face today.

Make no mistake, it is the grown ups in all three services who must shoulder equal amounts of blame with those devious ministers and unfeeling civil servants the mainstream media like to vilify. It seems to be an unwritten rule in defence reporting that civil servant/minister = BAD and anyone in uniform = GOOD.

Quite ridiculous of course but back on topic.

One can almost guarantee in any justification of spending on CVF or any other naval system the immortal words ‘we are an island you know’ will not be far behind.

In a neat one two, the island argument is  swiftly followed up with a light dusting of statistics, 95% of our visible trade is reliant on shipping or the majority of our food arrives by sea etc.

The Royal Navy provide some excellent background reading here

Behind the headlines though, is an interesting picture of spin, de-emphasis and obfuscation.

Visible Trade, yes, but what about invisible trade, for example financial services or tourism. The service sector is about 75% of UK GDP, financial services is 32%.

Traffic, the overwhelming vast majority of maritime trade is between European ports, not far off places. 70% of export tonnage and 66% of import tonnage is with Europe. When North America, Africa and South America are included the figures rise even higher.

Value, values are roughly in line with volumes, the majority is with Europe.

Shipping Industry, the industry is often touted as the third largest sector in the export economy but how much of this is shipping insurance and chartering?

Food, most of our food arrives by sea, so certain quarters would have you believe, raising the spectre of starvation without a strong Royal Navy, but this ignores our food exports, a growing proportion of air transport and the originator of these imports, Europe again. Out of the top 20 export countries, 15 are European. Imports from Europe account for roughly 70% of inward food trade. We are 60% self sufficient in all foods and 74% self sufficient in foods that can be grown here. It is estimated that we could become self sufficient if exports were stopped and certain foods not consumed.

Fuel, Food production is highly reliant of energy, as is the vast majority UK economic activity. We are oil and petrochemical products net importers and increasingly are importing large quantities of gas from Qatar.

Goods, trade with the Far East is primarily for manufactured goods but as China evolves it may well move away from being the low wage economy that has driven its growth, manufacturing output may well move to Africa and other low wage countries.

It is obvious that maritime security is important for the UK, but, and it is a BIG but, does it justify an expeditionary Royal Navy, centred on CVF and the amphibs?

What is the best way to provide security for a maritime dependant UK?

I am all for a strong Royal Navy, but please, let’s base it on sensible arguments instead of scaremongering.

In many ways, we are as dependant on the sea as France or Germany, Samsung plasma TV’s sold in Berlin still arrive via sea.

Looking at the above and other possible strategic futures one could argue that there are other, non defence, things to spend a finite budget on to secure food, energy and economic security. Increasing gas storage, new nuclear power stations, research in nuclear technology, agriculture, improving the resilience of gas pipelines, deep sea oil exploration and many other non defence areas might contribute to actual security more than an expeditionary naval capability.

This may seem strange coming from a defence blog but defence should always be seen in the wider context of security.

Our overseas territories should also be considered, Cyprus SBA, Gibraltar, the Pitcairn’s, various Caribbean islands and central and the south Atlantic but of these the only ones requiring a strong naval element is the South and Mid Atlantic, which would also include Africa, especially Nigeria for oil products and others for food. The Falklands and Antarctic may be important sources of food and energy.

Given the actual nature of sea trade and its importance to the UK an argument for stronger defences against asymmetric threats to European ports, pipelines and offshore energy installations could be made. Mines or suicide attacks against these could have a serious effect on UK and European short sea trade and energy distribution.

In the future, oil products may increasingly be obtained from deep sea and non Middle East sources, should infrastructure protection be taking a larger slice of the defence pie.

In an increasingly telecommunications and IT system dependant world, cyber defences will make increasing demands on the security budget, where is the money for this coming from?

Drugs interdiction, fisheries protection and anti piracy/seaborne terrorism are likely to be enduring requirements, some might argue for a stronger coast guard and there would be some merit in the argument but a Royal Navy better equipped for these challenges would be equally valid.

The Royal Navy is the training partner of choice for many nations, should we be expanding this and the broader defence diplomacy role.

This leads me to question the capability that the RN is mortgaging it’s other capabilities against, CVF and the air wing.

As the Royal Navy contracts to what is by default a surge expeditionary capability, rather than one based on forward presence, maybe it is time to address our real maritime security needs.

The recent speculation about a possible F18 buy, instead of the planned F35B, has sparked an avalanche of comment. Of course, a cynic might suggest it was a typical ‘float and see’ idea to gauge reaction, strengthen a position or simply cause trouble. In the febrile pre SDSR atmosphere, almost anything related to the armed forces will come under intense scrutiny.

Not wanting to be left out, it’s time for another look!

I will start this post by saying I am not 100% convinced by the need for CVF at all and think the huge cost of it and the embarked aircraft could have/be better spent elsewhere but if we assume they are going to happen it is important we get the decisions on equipment around CVF, absolutely right.

We also need to STOP thinking about single service loyalties, they might have been interesting in times of plenty but make no mistake, hard times are coming and instead of working against each other, the service chiefs have to be pragmatic and realise that duplication and non standardisation needs to be relentlessly and ruthlessly eliminated.

Time for something radical.

I don’t want to get into discussion on purchase costs, turn rates, ranges or weapon loads because real information is thin on the ground and what is there, is surrounded by so much ‘smoke’ it is impossible to see through it.

Suffice it to say, all the options on offer would be good choices in terms of capability and largely similar in capital cost, cheaper alternative airframe costs balanced by the cost of cats/traps.

The real deciding factor, however, comes down to through life costs; it’s not sexy or a readily obvious subject but make no mistake, it is critically important.

Rafale, F18 or anything else will make the through life costs of the F35B look like pocket change.

Why is this?

Quite simply because of the cost of people, with their expensive pensions (made worse by longer life expectancy), increasing wages, healthcare and training costs. Armed forces the world over are facing massive increases in personnel costs so the trend is to do more with less, people that is. Automation and smart systems may be expensive to develop but have a huge payoff in reducing personnel numbers and the subsequent cost.

Going to a cat/trap system means extra people and running costs. Going for F18 over like Rafale means more aircrew and more frequent upgrades.

Therefore, for cost reasons, the F35B is the right choice.

The F35B will be a superb aircraft, no doubt, much much better in most respects than Rafale or F18 so given the extra through life costs of the latter two, why would we want to go with something that is both more expensive over the long run and clearly inferior ‘now’, let alone in the future?

There is no logic to this.

My position on this has changed over time, wavering between one position or the other, but if we must have CVF, we must have F35B.

Although the F35B and Typhoon are in reality, swing role aircraft, the Typhoon can concentrate on air dominance with secondary strike, CAS and ISR roles and the F35B majors on strike, SEAD/DEAD and CAS with a secondary air dominance and ISR role. The two are naturally complimentary and will in the long term replace the current 3 type mix of Harrier, Typhoon and Tornado.

In the short term, withdrawing either the Tornado or Harrier force may actually be counter-productive cost wise, we have just spent a fortune on them both and are currently rather useful in hot sandy places. But beyond Afghanistan, they should go sooner than planned if we are to stand any chance of saving meaningful amounts. The Harrier GR9’s are more valuable in this short/medium term timeframe, they are better at CAS and can operate from the CVF in the gap between completion of CVF and the in service date of the F35B. The Tornado is also massively maintenance intensive, the GR9 is therefore more relevant in the time before CVF and F35B achieves full capability.

Suggestion 1; confirm our commitment to F35B and implement an aggressive withdrawal schedule for Tornado after Afghanistan, followed by Harrier when the F35B enters service.

Crewing for the F35B is also an area for cost saving, the UK cannot afford two organisations that manage fast jets. Therefore we should make the F35B solely the responsibility of the RAF and disband/transfer the naval strike wing. This is a controversial decision but the FAA does not have the critical mass to maintain F35B squadrons at an economical level, whatever advantages there may or not be, duplication is simply unaffordable.

Suggestion 2; disband the Naval Strike Wing and Joint Force Harrier and transfer existing Harriers and future F35B’s to the RAF.

As for CVF, their new watch word must be adaptability. Fortunately their large size supports this and it was a wise choice to go for such a roomy design.

To maximise their adaptability we should also look at how they may be deployed. The traditional structure of a separate strike and amphibious group is not affordable and instead we should configure the Royal Navy so that it can provide a single scalable and adaptable intervention package built around CVF. This reflects the reality of likely deployments and means the status of existing amphibious assault ships have to be examined.

Between Ocean, Bulwark, Albion and the 4 Bay class the UK amphibious capability can accommodate (non overload) about 2,800 personnel, 6,000 lane metres for vehicles, 12 LCVP, 12 LCU and 12 transport helicopters. Ocean is maintenance intensive and due for replacement soon and although it has actually provided sterling service there is little scope for a like for like replacement. If we accept the loss of the rear loading ramp and LCVP davits from Ocean, CVF can be used in this role. Transferring the command facilities from the Albion class allows them also to be withdrawn.

So, the two CVF replace the Illustrious class, Ocean, Bulwark and Albion.

The intervention package can vary from all strike to all amphibious and all points in between.

In an ‘all amphibious’ configuration; about 800m of vehicle lane is lost, personnel accommodation is roughly the same, helicopter lift dramatically increased and landing craft also significantly reduced.

In an all strike configuration; 72 F35B’s could be operated, these do not necessarily have to be all UK F35B’s and could be Italian, Spanish or from the USMC.

The norm however, will be somewhere in between. The intervention force, however configured, would still be massively capable.

There are compromises in this approach, a reduction in amphibious capability and a loss of much of many of the landing craft but we have to be realistic about what is achievable within budget realities.

There is a rough saving of 1,000 afloat crew members and three hulls. Translate this to cash and it is a massive saving.

Suggestion 3; reconfigure existing carrier and amphibious groups into a single scalable intervention force, centred on a pair of adaptable CVF’s

If we are to interoperate with others, especially the USMC, this adaptability is invaluable and in order to improve capabilities in this area we should make sure the hangar height, accommodation spaces and other facilities are compatible with USMC aircraft and equipment, CH53 and CV22 especially. It might be tempting to add davits for LCVP but this is likely to mean significant alterations and at this stage in the design and build process may be a change too far. It might be possible though, and if the hanger height is an issue, for CH53 for example, then we should be bold enough to change, even at this late stage.

Suggestion 4; be bold enough to change the design of the CVF in respect of interoperability with the USMC, especially hangar height.

Looking a little beyond this force, there is also an implication for the RFA replenishment and RN escort fleet. With a single deployable intervention force the number of anti air and anti submarine escorts can be consolidated. The 6 Type 45’s should be retained and the proposed Type 26, limited to 6 or 8. The RFA MARS requirement could be completely recast and the existing vessels may well be sufficient for the medium term.

Suggestion 5, reduce replenishment ships and escorts in line with the change.

It has often been my view that the UK needs to retain its high end fighting capabilities but concentrate them in a smaller harder hitting core, concentrating capability in a smaller force but surrounding this deployable core with a larger number of workaday platforms for the unglamorous but none less vital missions that we can’t afford to do when all we have are ‘superb’ weapons.

A real two tier approach is needed.

Suggestion 6; accelerate funding for such a C2/C3 type for general patrol and presence taskings, the Think Defence PSV based C3 proposal for example

F35B numbers, we started at 150 and this has been chipped away at continually. For the initial operating capability, purely for cost reasons, we should be aiming for between 40 and 50. This allows a full strike package to be assembled with enough for training, conversion and attrition spares. We might increase this when funds allow.

Suggestion 7; aim for between 40 and 50 F35B’s in the initial package, increasing as funds permit

But what alternative?

There isn’t really an alternative to the STVOL F35B, unless one considers a redesign of the Harrier a worthwhile venture, it is the only game in town if one wants the flexibility of short take off and vertical landing.

F35B would also allow the RAF and FAA to share training and logistics, recognising that flying off the CVF will not always be the mode of operation and expeditionary planning generally calls for the initial flying to be done with CVF with follow on operations moving the aircraft to land bases that can support more sustained operations. Sortie generation rates also favour the F35B and a recent runway closure at Kandahar in Afghanistan meant that the only aircraft that was able to provide CAS were Joint Force Harrier aircraft.

Although the F35B was always going to cost more than the conventional carrier take off and landing version this was amply offset by the cost of installing catapults and traps, the cost of maintaining them and more significantly, the cost of maintaining carrier landing skills.

These are extremely perishable skills and need an enormous amount of training to maintain safety.

If we want to extract maximum benefit from the significant investment in the fast jet fleet, STVOL is the most sensible option.

The worst outcome in terms of cost would be a separate RN and RAF jet fleet using 2 variants of the F35, CTOL for the RN and STVOL for the RAF. Add on the aspirations of the RAF for a Tornado GR4 replacement that might be  fulfilled by another F35 variant and the capital and through life operating costs start spiralling upwards.

Rumours abut interest in F18′s, Sea Typhoon and Sea Grippen continue to float around and of course the other option of sharing a carrier force with the French and therefore Rafale is also regularly hinted at.

Lack of ratification of the ITAR treaty, with the US clearly reneging on an agreement on technology transfer to allow the UK full sovereignty over its F35′s, continues to cast a long shadow over the programme. The Defence Select Committee covered this in a 2005 report

We fully support MoD’s position that the ability to maintain and upgrade the JSF independently is vital. We would consider it unacceptable for the UK to get substantially into the JSF programme and then find out that it was not going to get all the technology and information transfer it required to ensure ‘sovereign capability’. This needs to be sorted out before further contracts are signed and we expect MoD to set a deadline by which the assurances need to be obtained. If the UK does not receive assurances that it will get all it requires to ensure sovereign capability, we would question whether the UK should continue to participate in the JSF programme

We all know the MoD is absolutely strapped for cash, every option to save money is being looked at so read into this announcement what you will.

Converteam have made excellent progress with the EMCAT system and although only scaled for small UAV’s the intention was clear, at the end of the programme, this month, a number of challenges had been solved.

The F35B’s continued problems and uncertainty over costs mean that a Plan B makes a lot of sense.

£650k might seem like something the MoD loses down the back of a sofa but this was a significant investment and talking of its success sends a message to all concerned with the F35 and those wanting us to share CVF with the French

The door is still open.

General Sir Richard Dannatt

Speaking on the Radio 4 Today programme the former Chief of the Defence Staff discussed options for the future

“I think by anyone’s recognition we’ve got too many tanks, too much heavy artillery, too many fast jets.”

“The navy needs to look very closely at what it needs to be. And I think, particularly as far as fast jets are concerned, a number of contracts need to be looked at. One of which is the air-to-air refuelling contract, which was a shameful one, very, very expensive two years ago. “

“A new government has got a chance to look a number of contractors in the face and say ‘hang on, things have changed. We’re going to do it differently’. We can make a lot of savings on the equipment programme and still do what we need to do.”

“We need three separate armed forces that work superbly together on joint operations,”

In a separate Telegraph article Sir Richard expands on the issue, praising the formation of the National Security Council.

Nick Harvey MP

As the new government starts filling out its ministerial team, the Liberal Democrat MP, Nick Harvey, has been named as Minister of State for the Armed Forces.

Nick Harvey was the shadow defence minister for the Liberal Democrats and this continuity can only be a good thing. Both the Secretary of State and this minister have held Defence portfolios for quite some time and will no doubt have built up some experience. Replacing Bill Rammell the new minister told the North Devon Journal

“It’s a big job and a big honour to be asked, particularly at a time when we have got a major conflict in Afghanistan and the challenges of the strategic defence review.

“It makes for interesting times, particularly as it’s a coalition government.

“I have been very critical of about how the Labour government treated the armed forces, as were the Conservatives.

“I will try to do everything possible to improve the situation for the armed forces. We do so during an economic crisis.”

Nick Harvey has been a strong advocate of forces welfare and the military covenant but is vehemently opposed to a replacement of Trident and supports much greater integration with Europe on defence issues.

Here are a few other choice quotes from him.

• This report shows the shambolic state of the UK’s defence equipment programme
• It is exasperating to learn how pervasive the culture of denial and deception among MoD officials is when it comes to acknowledging the £21 billion funding gap in defence procurement
• Labour’s slow response to a clear shortage of helicopters in Afghanistan has been shameful
• The sad fact is that a lack of helicopters and armoured vehicles suitable for Afghanistan has persistently left our troops ill-equipped for their mission. Meanwhile, the Government has continued to fritter away vast amounts of money on Cold War projects like Eurofighter and Trident
• This is yet another example of the Government making empty promises to our Armed Forces. The brave men and women who have risked life and limb in service of our country deserve better
• Mine detection equipment is clearly a vital capability in Afghanistan. With IEDs now the biggest single threat our troops are facing, any failure to provide them with enough metal detectors is simply unforgivable
• Our brave service men and women have suffered enough as a result of this Government’s disastrous record on military procurement.
• The Government has presided over a decade of overstretch and spiralling costs without being straight with the public about the consequences
• If the Government is not prepared to resource our commanders properly, it should not be putting troops on the front line
• The military campaign cannot succeed without a political and civilian surge to win over moderate elements within the Taliban and regain the confidence of ordinary Afghans
• It is painfully obvious that when our frontline troops are desperately short of helicopters and airlift, we should not be pushing ahead with the costly, Cold War irrelevances of Trident and Eurofighter
• These aircraft are unnecessary Cold War relics. The Government has put Britain in a position where we are being forced to throw money at this massively expensive project while our troops on the front line are crying out for the helicopters and armoured vehicles they desperately need
• While there is a need for modernisation of our reserve forces, any cut in numbers could be like a slap in the face considering the massive contribution they have made
• This report is a damning indictment of the lack of leadership at the MoD. It is incredible that only 1 in 5 of MoD staff feel the department is well managed
• It is a dereliction of the duty of care owed to our service personnel and their families that they should have to face a battle over good standard accommodation on the home front
• It beggars belief that the MoD can blow so much on poor project management while our troops are risking their lives because of a lack of armoured vehicles and helicopters
• This report shows that the MoD is riddled with incompetence
• Unfortunately, the military price tag will not in itself bring success in Afghanistan. We need to see all NATO allies pulling their weight, alongside greater involvement of regional partners, including Iran, to create a stable Afghanistan
• The MoD’s Defence Planning Assumptions have been operating in a parallel universe for many years now
• When the Government’s terrible record on major IT projects is brought together with the MoD’s catalogue of failure on procurement, it is no surprise that we see this perfect storm of incompetence
• On this occasion, the lions in Afghanistan have been failed by the donkeys in Whitehall

And my personal favourites

• While the British nuclear fleet has a good safety record, if there were ever to be a bang it would be a mighty big one
• We must be sure that an economic downturn does not water down the support to the military particularly at a time of heightened threats

Over to you Nick.