But what alternative?

There isn’t really an alternative to the STVOL F35B, unless one considers a redesign of the Harrier a worthwhile venture, it is the only game in town if one wants the flexibility of short take off and vertical landing.

F35B would also allow the RAF and FAA to share training and logistics, recognising that flying off the CVF will not always be the mode of operation and expeditionary planning generally calls for the initial flying to be done with CVF with follow on operations moving the aircraft to land bases that can support more sustained operations. Sortie generation rates also favour the F35B and a recent runway closure at Kandahar in Afghanistan meant that the only aircraft that was able to provide CAS were Joint Force Harrier aircraft.

Although the F35B was always going to cost more than the conventional carrier take off and landing version this was amply offset by the cost of installing catapults and traps, the cost of maintaining them and more significantly, the cost of maintaining carrier landing skills.

These are extremely perishable skills and need an enormous amount of training to maintain safety.

If we want to extract maximum benefit from the significant investment in the fast jet fleet, STVOL is the most sensible option.

The worst outcome in terms of cost would be a separate RN and RAF jet fleet using 2 variants of the F35, CTOL for the RN and STVOL for the RAF. Add on the aspirations of the RAF for a Tornado GR4 replacement that might be  fulfilled by another F35 variant and the capital and through life operating costs start spiralling upwards.

Rumours abut interest in F18′s, Sea Typhoon and Sea Grippen continue to float around and of course the other option of sharing a carrier force with the French and therefore Rafale is also regularly hinted at.

Lack of ratification of the ITAR treaty, with the US clearly reneging on an agreement on technology transfer to allow the UK full sovereignty over its F35′s, continues to cast a long shadow over the programme. The Defence Select Committee covered this in a 2005 report

We fully support MoD’s position that the ability to maintain and upgrade the JSF independently is vital. We would consider it unacceptable for the UK to get substantially into the JSF programme and then find out that it was not going to get all the technology and information transfer it required to ensure ‘sovereign capability’. This needs to be sorted out before further contracts are signed and we expect MoD to set a deadline by which the assurances need to be obtained. If the UK does not receive assurances that it will get all it requires to ensure sovereign capability, we would question whether the UK should continue to participate in the JSF programme

We all know the MoD is absolutely strapped for cash, every option to save money is being looked at so read into this announcement what you will.

Converteam have made excellent progress with the EMCAT system and although only scaled for small UAV’s the intention was clear, at the end of the programme, this month, a number of challenges had been solved.

The F35B’s continued problems and uncertainty over costs mean that a Plan B makes a lot of sense.

£650k might seem like something the MoD loses down the back of a sofa but this was a significant investment and talking of its success sends a message to all concerned with the F35 and those wanting us to share CVF with the French

The door is still open.

General Sir Richard Dannatt

Speaking on the Radio 4 Today programme the former Chief of the Defence Staff discussed options for the future

“I think by anyone’s recognition we’ve got too many tanks, too much heavy artillery, too many fast jets.”

“The navy needs to look very closely at what it needs to be. And I think, particularly as far as fast jets are concerned, a number of contracts need to be looked at. One of which is the air-to-air refuelling contract, which was a shameful one, very, very expensive two years ago. “

“A new government has got a chance to look a number of contractors in the face and say ‘hang on, things have changed. We’re going to do it differently’. We can make a lot of savings on the equipment programme and still do what we need to do.”

“We need three separate armed forces that work superbly together on joint operations,”

In a separate Telegraph article Sir Richard expands on the issue, praising the formation of the National Security Council.

Nick Harvey MP

As the new government starts filling out its ministerial team, the Liberal Democrat MP, Nick Harvey, has been named as Minister of State for the Armed Forces.

Nick Harvey was the shadow defence minister for the Liberal Democrats and this continuity can only be a good thing. Both the Secretary of State and this minister have held Defence portfolios for quite some time and will no doubt have built up some experience. Replacing Bill Rammell the new minister told the North Devon Journal

“It’s a big job and a big honour to be asked, particularly at a time when we have got a major conflict in Afghanistan and the challenges of the strategic defence review.

“It makes for interesting times, particularly as it’s a coalition government.

“I have been very critical of about how the Labour government treated the armed forces, as were the Conservatives.

“I will try to do everything possible to improve the situation for the armed forces. We do so during an economic crisis.”

Nick Harvey has been a strong advocate of forces welfare and the military covenant but is vehemently opposed to a replacement of Trident and supports much greater integration with Europe on defence issues.

Here are a few other choice quotes from him.

• This report shows the shambolic state of the UK’s defence equipment programme
• It is exasperating to learn how pervasive the culture of denial and deception among MoD officials is when it comes to acknowledging the £21 billion funding gap in defence procurement
• Labour’s slow response to a clear shortage of helicopters in Afghanistan has been shameful
• The sad fact is that a lack of helicopters and armoured vehicles suitable for Afghanistan has persistently left our troops ill-equipped for their mission. Meanwhile, the Government has continued to fritter away vast amounts of money on Cold War projects like Eurofighter and Trident
• This is yet another example of the Government making empty promises to our Armed Forces. The brave men and women who have risked life and limb in service of our country deserve better
• Mine detection equipment is clearly a vital capability in Afghanistan. With IEDs now the biggest single threat our troops are facing, any failure to provide them with enough metal detectors is simply unforgivable
• Our brave service men and women have suffered enough as a result of this Government’s disastrous record on military procurement.
• The Government has presided over a decade of overstretch and spiralling costs without being straight with the public about the consequences
• If the Government is not prepared to resource our commanders properly, it should not be putting troops on the front line
• The military campaign cannot succeed without a political and civilian surge to win over moderate elements within the Taliban and regain the confidence of ordinary Afghans
• It is painfully obvious that when our frontline troops are desperately short of helicopters and airlift, we should not be pushing ahead with the costly, Cold War irrelevances of Trident and Eurofighter
• These aircraft are unnecessary Cold War relics. The Government has put Britain in a position where we are being forced to throw money at this massively expensive project while our troops on the front line are crying out for the helicopters and armoured vehicles they desperately need
• While there is a need for modernisation of our reserve forces, any cut in numbers could be like a slap in the face considering the massive contribution they have made
• This report is a damning indictment of the lack of leadership at the MoD. It is incredible that only 1 in 5 of MoD staff feel the department is well managed
• It is a dereliction of the duty of care owed to our service personnel and their families that they should have to face a battle over good standard accommodation on the home front
• It beggars belief that the MoD can blow so much on poor project management while our troops are risking their lives because of a lack of armoured vehicles and helicopters
• This report shows that the MoD is riddled with incompetence
• Unfortunately, the military price tag will not in itself bring success in Afghanistan. We need to see all NATO allies pulling their weight, alongside greater involvement of regional partners, including Iran, to create a stable Afghanistan
• The MoD’s Defence Planning Assumptions have been operating in a parallel universe for many years now
• When the Government’s terrible record on major IT projects is brought together with the MoD’s catalogue of failure on procurement, it is no surprise that we see this perfect storm of incompetence
• On this occasion, the lions in Afghanistan have been failed by the donkeys in Whitehall

And my personal favourites

• While the British nuclear fleet has a good safety record, if there were ever to be a bang it would be a mighty big one
• We must be sure that an economic downturn does not water down the support to the military particularly at a time of heightened threats

Over to you Nick.

The RFA logistics capability is a vital enabler; it does not attract much attention and certainly does not have the glamour of a sleek warship but make no mistake, the RN would simply not be able to operate without them.

It is a capability we neglect at our peril.

Towards the end of last year it showed signs of twitching back to life with the Afloat Support (AfSup) directorate in DE&S launching a pre-qualification phase for the Fleet Tanker element.

With a reduced fleet size in all areas the need for at sea replenishment self evidently becomes decreased.

The existing fleet is quite diverse.

Wave Class Fast Fleet Tankers, mainly fuel oil and aviation fuel but some dry and refrigerated stores are also carried and the aviation capacity is enough to operate a large Merlin sized helicopter. 2 in service

Rover Class, the smallest of the replenishment ships they are designed to support individual RN ships with mainly fuels. They have a helicopter landing pad but not hangar. 2 in service

Leaf Class, a large fuel only tanker with no aviation capability, 2 in service

Fort (I) Class, mainly used for dry stores with an aviation capacity, 2 in service

Fort (II) Class, arguably the jewel in the crown of the RFA, they are large multi-purpose vessels with extensive dry stores and liquids capacity. The aviation capacity is large and able to maintain and operate up to 5 Merlin sized helicopters. The large flight deck also supports a secondary aviation training role. 2 in service

	Wave	Rover	Leaf	Fort (I)	Fort (II)
Displacement	31,500t	11,520t	40,870	23,890	32,820
Liquid Cargo	19,500m3	8,500m3	28,00m3		12,500m3
Dry Cargo	500m3			3,500m3	6,200m3
Hangar	yes	no	no	yes	yes
Crew	85 RFA, 22 RN	54 RFA	56 RFA	115 RFA, 80 RN	140 RFA, 65 RN
MARPOL	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO

The replacement for Rover and Fleet Class has evolved over the years and it is likely that these will be replaced by a single design. The IMO pollution regulations, commonly called MARPOL, are a significant driver for the new designs. Although government owned ships are exempt the UK Government has always ensured that compliance with international and cascaded national maritime regulations is achieved in its fleet. None of the RFA fleet is compliant (double hulls etc) except the Wave class. The older vessels do not benefit from modern engineering and machinery so are likely to be significantly more expensive to operate than a new design.

The original project called for 6 vessels to replace the 4 Leaf/Rover class, subsequently reduced to 5, If CVF is cancelled the need for aviation fuel will be reduced so 4 may be a more reasonable number.

Latest Design Illustration of the MARS Fleet Tanker

BMT, BAe, Daewoo, Ficantieri, Rolls Royce and Hyundai have shown interest and the BMT Aegir family would, as Jed has stated, would seem like an excellent fit and is available in 3 sizes and 2 configurations.

The largest is the Aegir 26 (26,000 tonnes) and is a large fuel only tanker, with 24,000 cubic metres of cargo fuel. The smallest is the Aegir 10 (10,000 tonnes) with 8,000 cubic metres of cargo fuel.

The intermediate design is the Aegir 18 (18,000 tonnes) and is available in a fuel only configuration with 16,000 cubic metres of cargo fuel or a split configuration (18R) that has a cargo fuel capacity of 12,000 cubic metres and cargo stores capacity of 1,350 cubic metres. The 18R also has a large aviation capacity.

Aegir 18

4 Aegir 18’s would provide approximately 15% less cargo fuel capacity than the Rover and Leaf class but given the reduction in aviation fuel capacity this would be acceptable.

Another option to consider would be to purchase 6 of the 18R design to provide greater flexibility; these would offer more or less the same fuel capacity and be able to provide both refrigerated and dry stores capacity as well as some aviation capacity.

It is likely that single or small task group deployments are more likely to be the norm so 4 might be a reduction too far and recent experience with RFA vessels has shown that they can actually supplement or replace RN vessels in some deployments. Carrying a Lynx or two, a selection of fast attack craft like RHIB’s/CB90 and a small contingency of Royal Marines they can be effective in the smuggling or piracy interdiction role.

After the Leaf/Rover class go out of service the Fort class will follow, these will be hard to replace because they are extremely capable. The MARS programme originally called for these to be replaced with two classes of vessel (much like the existing Fort class)

The Fleet Solid Support Ship and Joint Sea Based Logistic Ship are primarily designed to support the CVF and amphibious group. At this stage the potential to extend the service life of the existing designs should be seriously considered.

Looking beyond that, designs such as the Joint Logistic Support Ship, as suggested by Jed in his earlier post should be seriously considered to fulfill both requirements although 4 may not be required if CVF is cancelled at the brigade ashore support capability is not realised.

RFA Argus is due to go out of service at around the same time as Ocean and is an usual vessel because she has two primary roles, in wartime the extremely modern 100 bed hospital meets the Primary Casualty Receiving role and in peace time the extensive aviation facilities are used for training. Because it is an RFA not RN vessel is very cheap to operate and has shown its versatility on many occasions, standing in for RN vessels in extremis.

RFA Argus

Operational medical care has been transformed during the Afghanistan operation with more complex and extensive medical capabilities being closer to areas of operation with extra treatment being carried out in the UK but this does not mean there is no longer a need for an afloat hospital facility.

Aviation training for deck handling, large and small vessel landing with everything from Chinook to Lynx and in all weather conditions is carried out on Argus. The US military use a smaller vessel for deck landing training, the IX-514 but they have the benefit of a much larger surface fleet for follow on or advanced training. The Royal Navy does not have that luxury so that makes Argus particularly valuable.

IX-514

In an earlier post we suggested a C2 design based on an offshore supply vessel supported by a Bay type support ship equipped with RAS equipment. The Dutch JSS is a larger version of this and is a very interesting design. With an obvious reference to the Enforcer class upon which the Bay class is based the JSS is a large ship, displacing some 28,000 tonnes. The Dutch wanted a versatile ship out of which they could squeeze maximum value, it has to be able to resupply vessels with fuel, weapons and dry stores, provide a secondary aviation capacity, have command and hospital facilities and carry significant loads of equipment for an embarked force.

It will have 2 replenishment at sea masts, an elevator and crane for up to 40 tonnes, 2000 lane meters of vehicle or ISO container storage, roll on/roll off (Ro-Ro) ramps and a well deck. A large helicopter deck can handle up to 2 CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, and the hangar will be able to hold up to 6 Merlin or even 2 Chinooks without the rotors folded.

Dutch Joint Support Ship

The RFA might not need the command facilities but being able to provide support for a range of vessels, replace RFA Argus is the aviation and casualty receiving role and also carry stores for an embarked force would be a valuable capability to have.

Dutch JSS

The contract value is for £320million and as Jed suggested, some collaborative funding arrangement with DfID may be worth pursuing given the types obvious advantages for the initial phases of a disaster relief operation.

It may even be worth reducing the fleet tanker numbers to obtain more of these versatile ships.

As an attempt at a more balanced fleet the suggestion on Think Defence was a slight increase in the Astute numbers to 8, keeping Type 45 at 6, a small quantity (6) fully specified C1 and a couple of novel C2/C3 concepts from a number of our contributors. Obviously with the loss of maritime fast jet aviation we would be out of the forced entry amphibious game although the combination of UAV’s, FLAADS/CAMM, Attack Helicopter and Type 45 might mitigate some of the loss of capability.

That is not to say that we could not still engage in amphibious operations because not all operations are in the teeth of advanced jet fighters so we should accept a capability reduction and recognise that future operations may have to be conducted in conjunction with allies that can provide the fast jet component.

To bring our FDR Maritime section to a close the next few posts are on amphibious/logistics capabilities and a look at a few innovative concepts.

The Royal Navy currently has 2 Landing Platform Dock (LPD), HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark and together with the Landing Platform Helicopter (HMS Ocean) form the forward element of an amphibious operation. Supporting assets are the 4 Bay class Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) and the RFA Point class RORO vessels (although these are not strictly amphibious in the truest sense of the word)

Bay Class LPD(A)

HMS Bulwark (Albion Class)

HMS Ocean

Hurst Point (Point Class RORO)

Taken together it is a reasonably sized and capable force although as can be expected, short in some areas.

The Albion class do not go out of service until 2033 and 2034 but HMS Ocean in 2022, acting in the auxiliary LPH role the 2 remaining CVS are also due out of service in 2012 and 2015. No plans have yet been made public for a replacement for HMS Ocean but it is widely thought that the second CVF will act in this role, although one might consider the QE class to be rather large.

If we are to cancel CVF there exists an obvious need to replace HMS Ocean.

There is an ongoing debate about the utility of specialist LPH and LPD versus the general purpose LHD. Many of the newer types of vessels coming into service with other navies seem to favour the general purpose LHD route with enhanced aviation and well decks; it is probably fair to say though that these are coming into service with navies that have smaller amphibious fleets than the RN so their vessels have to be jack of all trades. However, the RN is shrinking and these vessels will be operating alone more often than not so the flexibility offered by a LHD may well be worth accepting the inherent compromises.

With the inexorable rise in vehicle weight and volume as evidenced by the likes of FRES and PPV the specialist LPH becomes increasingly unable to support anything other than a light force. This light force would still be considered a Royal Marines area but even the Royal Marines have been subject to the weight trend. The Viking and Jackal being cases in point, both cannot be lifted by anything other than Chinook. This fact won’t change because there is a well deck, obviously, but the well deck means that a single vessel can support a more rounded and capable force alone, without the support of a Bay or Albion. The UK needs to get more out of its force so whilst the compromises imposed by having jack of all trades vessels are recognised, they are worth accepting.

The Spanish and Australian Navies have ordered similar designs in their Juan Carlos and Canberra class; at approximately 27,000 tonnes the Navantia BPE design is much larger than the Illustrious class and HMS Ocean. The design is inherently flexible and could operate F35B’s or helicopters; with hangar space for 12 aircraft, accommodation for over a 1000 troops, a well deck slightly larger than the Albion class, extensive hospital and command facilities. The design flexibility allows it to be used as an aircraft carrier although without the ability to generate sustained sortie rates or for an extended period.

Canberra Class

Juan Carlos Strategic Projection Ship LHD

If we were to replace to replace Ocean and the CVS class with a pair of these then the through life costs savings would be considerable, especially in crewing. As funds permit it might even be possible to obtain a third or fourth and operate them as a compact carrier with 6-8 F35B’s per ship, much less that the CVF of course but at least the RN could retain some fast jet aviation capability.

At a reported cost of less than 500 million Euros they would also seem excellent value for money.

The Bay class have proven to be exceedingly useful and versatile, they are relatively new so their replacement is somewhat out of scope for this post, perhaps more of the same would be useful.

Although strictly not an RFA asset the Point class, operating under a 25 year PFI, provide an excellent capability. Based on the Flensburger 2700 RORO design it has 2,700 vehicle lane metres, 10,000nm range and two access ramps. A total of 6 vessels are available for use, 4 manufactured at Flensburger and 2 at Harland and Wolff. Interestingly the project was completed 20 months ahead of schedule, the last of the class, Anvil Point, being launched in 2003.

Although the PFI concept seems to offer capability at a greater cost than outright purchase this one does show how they can be effectively operated, with little fuss or drama. The commercial charter market has seen significant shifts in the last couple of decades with the greater prevalence of the large and usually highly utilised pure car pure truck carrier, which cannot carry explosive cargoes because they do not have open decks (IMO regulations) so when the armed forces need vehicle and container shipping capacity the commercial market is less likely to be able to find suitable vessels.

As a part of this project only of 4 out of the 6 ships are used for the strategic joint rapid reaction force (JRRF) on a daily basis. The last two are chartered out on the commercial market but obviously available for MoD use when demand dictates. The Danish military have a similar concept (ARK), except they have a number of vessels on permanent charter.

The benefit of the UK approach is that the design can be dictated, for example the Point class have twin screws, rudders and bow thrusters which provide extreme manoeuvrability, have a shallow draught and reinforced and extended loading ramps for loading and unloading in a wide variety of locations. The double and strengthened hull increases build costs but given the monetary and operational value of likely cargoes mean this is a wise investment; something of note for those that seem to think that commercial off the shelf is always the answer.

As with the Bay class, their replacement is many years away.

Revisiting the F35B Joint Combat Aircraft and CVF theme, the true costs have which yet to reveal themselves but to date it is a rough estimate that we have either spent or contractually committed to spend about 3 to 4 billion pounds on the two programmes in design effort, materials, studies and initial purchases. The £2billion invested in the JSF programme is just that, an investment so even if we were to withdraw a healthy return would still be likely, unless of course that is the US cancels it.

Cancelling them both would be a enormous waste of that money but at some point there comes a time when you have to cut your losses and run.

No one knows the actual cost of the final, delivered version of the F35B, the preferred option to fulfil the joint Combat Aircraft for the RAF and RN future carriers. The initial number of 150 aircraft was predicated on a minimal increase in costs and a low price, the great white hope of an affordable airframe was the promise, yeah right, the cheque is in the post!

The final number will be determined by cost, not operational need so expect the numbers to go down, not up.

Estimates of the cost of the F35B are as numerous as lines of code but the range seems to be between £60-80million each. Will this include all the usual extras, again, this is not clear.

On top of the basic costs are weapon integration, last time I looked the USMC, USN and USAF do not use Storm Shadow, Meteor, ASRAMM, PaveWay IV, Brimstone or CRV-7 which means that the UK’s air launched weapons are going to have to be qualified separately.  This is a time consuming process but generally speaking usually proceeds with little fuss or drama, for example the effect the weapons release has on flight dynamics can be adjusted by physical or software modifications.

There is that word, software.

In a previous post we covered the issue of operational sovereignty and software, we thought we had a deal, Lord Drayson stating that “We have today received the necessary assurances from the US on technology transfer, which we would require to operate the aircraft safely and maintain, repair and upgrade it over its operational life”

One must assume that this means weapon integration but the US has now categorically stated that NO ONE will be getting such software access so to allow the JCA to have any weapons apart from a harsh stare from its pilot and maybe a 25mm cannon, the UK will pay extra for this integration. of course we would have had to pay anyway but who to, that is the key question now. The other alternative is to buy into the US weapons programmes like AIM-120C, JDAM or SDB but not even the MoD would be that foolish.

Costs will rise and numbers will fall

The US have indicated that it will set up a “reprogramming facility,” probably at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, to further develop F-35-related software and distribute upgrades. Another question is can that software be transferred back and forth between Florida and the UK electronically or will the aircraft have to be physically present in Florida. If physical presence is required then that is going to consume an awful lot of airframe hours, pilot time and aviation fuel, or they could go over as a job lot on the CVF, happy cruising.

Even if the software can be transmitted electronically the lack of flexibility is going to cost, and cost big.

Costs will rise and numbers will fall

There remains a very real prospect that only a bare minimum number aircraft will be obtained, numbers curtailed by  spiralling costs, maybe less than 40. When training and other requirements are taken into consideration it is likely that the CVF will deploy with less than a dozen aircraft, although they should be able to surge to the designed 36, if all aircraft have been maintained, none are being used for training, damaged, lost or not being cannibalised for spares etc.

Note, this is one CVF, don’t forget we are buying two.

The F35B was selected as the preferred option for CVF because of one reason and one reason only, cost.

There are fringe benefits around sortie generation rates and others but fundamentally the F35B design, whilst likely the most expensive in capital terms, offers the lowest through life costs. The ability to dispense with perishable skills like cat and trap operation, installing steam plant and maintaining that steam plant etc makes the F35B option joined at the hip to CVF. Other options might be considered like Rafale or F18 but realistically, when looked at through life, likely work out even more expensive.

As insane as it sounds, the F35B is the sanest choice.

The UK is facing the prospect of having a pair of huge aircraft carriers rattling around the worlds oceans with a very small aircraft compliment, shared between them and shared between ground operations. In order to get this capability compromises have had to be made, not only in the design of the CVF’s but also to its escorts numbers. Hopefully we will only be doing the ‘expeditionary warfare’ thing against second rate opponents because if anyone with a half decent submarine or aircraft force decides they are not going to follow the script and keel over but fight back, there might just be trouble.

It is about time we bit the bullet, grew a backbone, cut our losses or [INSERT YOUR OWN PHRASE HERE] and cancelled the whole lot, no tinkering around the edges with having just one hull or a smaller number of airframes, the whole lot.

Two or four billion Pounds (depends how you count it) is a lot of money to throw down the drain but the UK armed forces have much better things to be spending our scare defence funds on now and in the future.

In an ideal world the Royal Navy would have 3, each with a large compliment of escorts and logistics vessels.

The problem though, is we don’t live in an ideal world.

The grown ups in the Royal Navy have presided over its significant reduction whilst clinging to the promise of CVF, I assume the logic is to ‘get the boats in the water’ and everything else will follow, short term pain for long term gain.

The thinking is there is no way any government will countenance the embarrassment of having a pair of large aircraft carriers with only a handful of aircraft or tiny numbers of escorts, so once they are launched the governments hand will be forced and funding will follow, either new money or at the expense of the other services. Hope is not a good strategy but seems the prevailing one.

Other capabilities and equipments have been allowed to wither on the vine, sacrificed on the altar of CVF. To say that CVF is hovering up both financial and intellectual capital is an understatement.

CVF is a logical outcome of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review but with the world being a very different place the link to the SDR of 2010 must be examined. It is not too late to change course, if that is the outcome.

But, costs have risen and budgets have fallen.

What of the arguments…

Too Late to Cancel

Contracts have been placed, steel cut, equipment designed and delivered so many say that the CVF is simply too far advanced to stop. This doesn’t take into account that the main contractor (BAe/BVT/Carrier Alliance) more or less has 1 customer i.e. the MoD (unless you count a couple of patrol boats)

The MoD would need to grow a pair and give a lesson on who the customer actually is, after all the carriers actually represent a small fraction of the future build work for the Type 23 replacement, Ocean replacement and maybe even a part in the RFA replacements. Deal making needs to be the order of the day, sacrificing the CVF in return for a long term commitment to a steady drumbeat of other orders.

Money Already Spent

There has already been a great deal of money spent that would simply be lost should CVF be cancelled but this pails into insignificance compared to the through life and capital costs of the project.

We are an Island

The ‘we are an island’ argument is often used to justify a strong navy and by extension the CVF but they are not the same and it is often overplayed anyway.

The UK does rely on the sea for much of its wealth and food/fuel imports but examination will show that much of this is between mainland Europe and Eire. The same could also be said for other island nations without the means of mounting sea based expeditionary operations. Even mainland nations rely on the sea to a great extent, Rotterdam or Hamburg are testimony to this. I have yet to see any sensible arguments why an expeditionary first day strike capability is capable of defending our see borne trade, a strong surface fleet yes, a capable mines countermeasures force, even more so but not an expeditionary strike force.

Politics

We explicitly recognise that medium scale and up operations will be carried out in conjunction with partners in a coalition and generally, this means the US, NATO or at a push the EU. CVF would seem to be more about supporting others rather than providing the UK with an independent capability because that independent capability is somewhat hollowed out.

If we are involved in operations that need a full, multi layered air defence then this operation will almost certainly be in a coalition where the outer layer could be provided by others.

Carrier Capabilities and UK Carrier Capabilities

Despite the talk of secondary capabilities the main purpose of CVF is for expeditionary deep strike.

Host nation support cannot be guaranteed and the flexibility that a carrier brings is not in doubt but it is not as self contained as proponents would argue, any carrier air battle group will need land based aviation support, the two are complimentary not exclusive.

However, many of the arguments for the CVF seem to skip over the difference between carrier capabilities (as defined by the US Navy) the carrier capabilities that will be available to the UK. CVF is a sensible design with a sensible aircraft choice but in order to get the ships in the water the RN has had to sacrifice so much in other areas that they will in reality, have relatively little utility against all but the most weak opposition. Against a credible threat and directly because we will only have a small number of capable air defence destroyers available the proportion of the 36 JCA air wing that will have to be devoted to outer layer air defence would be high, leaving a less than stellar strike capability.

If you can’t afford to do something well, it should not be done at all.

The Falklands

Probably one of the more ludicrous justifications for the CVF is the notion of being able to retake the Falkland Islands should Argentina decide to reinvade; the Falklands Conflict was not a triumph for naval aviation but the lunacy of not spending a small amount on deterrence and a reasonable military capability in the area.

Argentina, the UK armed forces and the world is a very different place to 1982 and it is far more economical, both in blood and treasure, to stop any invasion in the first place. The Typhoon flight at MPA, the FI garrison and the threat of a Tomahawk armed SSN in the area should deter Argentina. Argentina has a much more stable political system, could not countenance ‘failing militarily’ again and the state of its armed forces is parlous to say the least.

Even if they still have designs on the islands the amount of time needed to muster anything like a credible force would be signposted well in advance, a couple of C17 flights worth of troops and additional Typhoons could be deployed in pretty short order.

That said, complacency should be avoided at all costs, the Falkland Islands have enormous potential but CVF is not the answer to protecting this potential.

There are other British dependencies but look at a map of where they are and try to predict possible threats and you come up with a very poor justification for the CVF

Summary

CVF will provide a large set of both unique AND complimentary capabilities across the board but do these capabilities justify the huge slice of the cake it will consume .

Fundamentally the decision comes down to cost and two aspects of cost.

The first is that I believe there are better value for money options within the maritime domain, options that provide greater security and utility.

Secondly, we are stretching to get CVF, a bit like buying a BMW but being unable to afford a decent sound system or alloy wheels. Yes, we might end up with a naval aviation capability but it will be a hollow capability with every single system pared down to the bare minimum on the basis of cost. The CVF will only ever be able to deploy a minimum air group comprising an aircraft that will have a minimum set of weapon integrations, the CVF will not have many more or less essential systems and it will be vulnerable against anything other than third rate opposition because in order to get it, we have gutted the escort and logistics capabilities.

Many people seem to think that saving the Royal Navy means getting CVF, I think the RN needs to be saved from itself and CVF/JCA cancelled.

Happy New Year by the way!

However I am also been a soldier, and as a life long plane spotter I am also a proponent of air power, so hopefully I can provide a balanced, although maritime centered viewpoint.

Threats

I started to cover the potential threats to the UK’s maritime interests already in my comments to this posting: http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/12/fdr-all-at-sea/

If the future defence review proceeds in a logical and sensible manner, the threats to UK interests should be discussed and determined and integrated with stated UK foreign policy.

OK, now we have the ‘fairy tale’ scenario out of the way, I will integrate some discussion of the threat into this paper, which is really based around of a view of capabilities and assets.

Major capabilities

What 2 major capabilities do we provide that most if not all of the NATO allied navies (except the USN of course) do not currently have ?

* Strike Carrier with fixed wing aircraft (only France has this capability)
* Major amphibious group including the Royal Marines (although France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands have amphibious capabilities, they are all smaller)
*SSN

All three of these major ‘capabilities’ are actually ‘systems of systems’ in that they facilitate the provision of multiple different effects as required by the ‘war fighter’ or in support of diplomacy.

So, if they are all expensive, which one should be cut ? Although I have made many arguments about why fixed wing air is good, and why the CV(F) would provide a great capability (flying Sea Gripens ?) I am also of the opinion that if money can still be saved by NOT building these carriers then they should be cut.

If contractual penalties would actually make it more expensive to NOT build them, then they should be completed, but some serious effort should be put into selling the hulls to India (!)

See http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/12/fdr-supporting-articles/

Why cut the carriers ?

Well because the US has them, the French has one, the Italians and Spanish have STOVL carriers, so in the NATO context we can rely on others to provide the naval air group. However other than the U.S.M.C.  in the shape of the Royal Marines, and the RN’s amphibious ships, the current amphibious capability is a far greater than that available to any other European navy, so we should nurture this capability, and develop it further as it is some thing ‘special’ that we bring to the ‘party’.

Also the FDR discussions on Think Defence so far seem to have a slant towards ‘strategic raiding’ versus long term ‘nation building’ campaigns, amphibious capability appears to be key to such ‘strategic raiding’.

The SSN’s are also a scarce capability, with only France sharing it within Europe. SSN’s are a major weapon of sea control in a major conflict and an very valuable intelligence gathering tool in ‘peace time’; and of course as the preferred launch platform for Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, they now have a valuable role to play in “limited conflicts”.

Finally of course, as long as we have SSBN’s then we need SSN’s to protect them, but more on that later.

So, to recap before proceeding, the CV(F) programme and its related JCA programme (F35) should be cancelled and the savings channelled back into the ship building programme, so lets examine that next:

Surface combatants

The work horses of the RN (or any ocean going Navy) are the frigates and destroyers. How many of them do we need ? Well if we have no carrier strike group to escort, we need ships to do the following:

* Escort the amphibious groups
* Fulfil global presence requirements – Caribbean, Persian Gulf, South Atlantic
* Fulfil NATO task group requirements – e.g. Anti-terrorist/people trafficking/anti-piracy
* Homeland security

Homeland security is a wide category, this could even include integrating T45′s into air defence (or even missile defence) of the UK, down to security of nuclear subs berthed alongside, nuclear weapons etc.

Instead of laying out a huge amount of analysis on this set of requirements, instead I will lay out what I think can or should be done on a limited budget in the context of what we have, and what we know of existing plans:

Type 45 is our primary air defence ship class

The programme various known at one time or another as the Future Surface Combatant is aimed at replacing:

* T22B3 with a highly capable vessel termed the C1
* T23′s with a less capable unit called termed the C2
* A multi-role vessel to replace MCMV’s / OPV’s and Survey ships termed the C3.

Lets examine each of these in turn:

Type 45 Air defence destroyers

The sunk costs are done and dusted, the building of the hulls is apparently now a very efficient process, so I would like to see at least two added to the build as an outcome of having no carriers, for a grand total of 8 – the current buy of 6 is just not enough.

If you have 1 in long term refit, 1 in short term maintenance, 1 on deployment,  1 on enroute to or from a deployment, then you might have 2 available to provide air defence of a major amphibious task group – not enough !

So a modest increase to 8 would ease things while not breaking the bank.

T45′s should be fitted with Phalanx mounts as T42′s are retired (preferably with SeaRam) and fitted with 8 x Harpoon’s as T23′s are retired.

T22B3 replacement – FSC C1

To lever the sunk costs of the T45 programme, the C1 highly capable ASW focused ship should be a T45 with different sensor and weapon fit. 8 ships without the expensive PAAM’s but with the same VLS suite for the shorter range Aster 15 missile (SAAM system)  with a cheaper radar such as the Thales APAR or the newer Herakles. Also there would be no need for the SM1850 (SMART-L derivate ) 3D surveillance radar.

The Navy Matters site has a page showing past suggestions of either shortened or lengthened variants of the T45 hull (see http://navy-matters.beedall.com/mvd.htm) however I would keep the hull identical except for any tailoring of the fan tail / quarter deck area required to fit the Type 2087 towed array sonar, as this would keep the manufacturing costs down.

As well as the standard fittings for the Merlin HM1 and the above mentioned towed array, I would fit a battery of 8 Harpoon missiles where the 3D surveillance radar is currently fitted. These missiles would again be taken from retiring T23′s.

T23 replacement – FSC C2

OK, time to get a little contentious, I would suggest licensing of the Danish Absalon Support Ship design to build the C2 ‘general purpose’ frigate. I would make some minimal changes to the design of the ship, getting rid of at least half of the ‘flex deck’ probably ending the flex deck at the forward end of the hanger.

The extra space could be used for a large and well equipped sick bay, a small ‘flag command’ area and additional communal spaces for the crew, as these assets are going to be ‘sweated’ with lots of long deployments !

The rear part of the flex deck would be retained, but to save money I am not suggesting the RN buy two Combat Boat 90E for each C2 frigate, but the rear boat launch and recovery facilites could still be used with large RHIBS (or for RHIB based MCM or ASW Unmanned Surface Vehicles.) The Danes have kept the costs of these ships and their Iver Hutfeild class ‘cousins’ down very well, by not gold plating them.

So the RN version would stick with the SMART-S as the main radar and could even use the same combat system as the Danish vessels. I would add the new Common Anti-Air Missile that is being developed as a Sea Wolf and Rapier replacement as the main anti-air and anti missile system, plus two Phalanx / SeaRam mounts, and 16 x KDA NSM3 missiles for anti-ship and land attack.

These ships have Chinook sized flight deck, a hanger sized for 2 Merlins and we could probably add a lift in the hanger down to the flex deck, so maybe additional small UAV’s (Scheibel Camcopter for example) could be carried.

The Absalon has a crew of 100 plus accommodation for an additional 70 crew, while I am not sure that the ships flight is included in that 100, if carrying two Merlins equates to a ships flight of 25, then 45 extra’s might include an platoon of RM, an RN ‘board and search’ team, a ‘Flag Command’ staff, additional medical staff etc, whatever is required for the mission at hand.

So, hopefully staying away from any gold plating, we could afford 12 of these ships.

FSC C3 – the ‘everything else’ replacement…….

The C3 is envisioned as a multi-role vessel that can do deployed MCM, take over the role of survey vessels such as HMS Enterprise, and also replace the OPV’s. The BMT Venator is an interesting design for this type of ship, and you can go and read up on it here: http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/Documents& Resources/?/188/2642/2642

Even if you don’t like this particular design, it does show what might be possible, and it also shows that the decline of the specific MCM ship is complete. This appears to be OK, as there no longer seems to be a discernible mining threat to the UK’s ports and waters (?). We might be able to afford between 9 and 12 of these ships ?

One note on these vessels – I would not equip them with a folding hanger and capabilities to operate the Lynx helicopter – I would buy MQ8B UAV’s instead. This would allow us to retire the Lynx and have a single type fleet based on the Merlin, as all the major surface vessels are big enough to carry and operate them. This would include buying new Merlins to be fitted with the radar from the SeaKing AEW & C aircraft.

Surface combatants totals

So we would end up with:

* 8 x T45
* 8 x T46 C1
* 12 x T24 C2

For a total of 28 major surface units – still less than the previous SDR mandated 32, but hopefully with no carriers, no F35′s and the use of existing designs, this could be affordable. It would certainly be a highly flexible force, with excellent accommodation facilitating long deployment cycles.

Amphibious shipping, 3 Commando Brigade and Support helicopters

To keep the budget down I don’t make any suggested enhancements to the amphibious flotilla, other than to ensure they are all fitted with better defensive armament capability. As noted at the beginning of this piece the amphibs and the Commando Brigade are a key capability that we poses that others don’t and in order to fully support the ‘real word’ use of these assets we must invest in helicopters, specifically in replacing the Sea King MK4 ‘Junglie”.

For commonality this should be a folding tail Merlin HC3 derivative.

It will obviously be declared to the Joint Helicopter Command and thus does not just impact on amphib ops, but on all deployed UK forces operations. However there must always be enough of them on hand to have at least 14 available to fly from HMS Ocean as required. As for the Ocean, I would ensure she gets the ‘service life’ extension or refits required to keep her in service.

Maybe we can replace with 1 or even 2 vessels when the budget is less constrained.

The one blue sky element I would suggest, is a little investment in hovercraft.

The UK has to major manufacturers of diesel hovercraft that are exported all over the world. Griffon Hovercraft provide the small Griffon 2000TD craft as used by the Royal Marines already.

However they have also supplied Sweden with the larger Griffon 8100TD wich has ballistic protection, NBC filtering, can carry a Viking armoured vehicle or around 80 fully equipped marines. See http://www.griffonhoverwork.com/products/8

Griffon have recently purchased (or merged with) British Hovercraft, so on the same site you can see their craft such as the BHT160 which are available in well deck configurations able to carry up to 20 tonnes, see: http://www.griffonhoverwork.com/products/11

So I think a modes investment in these vehicles would vastly improve our over the horizon amphibious raiding capability, our general littoral abilities, and even our ‘brown water’ ops if required.

In part 2 and 3 of this series I will examine the submarine fleet and the RFA support flotilla respectively.

JED CAWTHORNE

Editors note

In this post Jed pre empts many of the issues in the ThinkDefence FDR series, more to follow

In a previous post I proposed that the RAF revert to a single swing role fast jet, replacing the Harrier, Tornado and cancelling the JCA in favour of a slightly increased overall number of Typhoons.

I argued that the UK could do without the F35’s capabilities largely on the grounds of cost, losing some capability in this area in order to redeploy the significant resources that would be freed up, elsewhere.

If the RAF could do without the JCA then could the FAA, this would of course open up the huge can of worms that is the CVF but he principal argument against the CVF and JCA is simply their cost. The UK is facing an austere decade and defence will not be immune, the CVF and JCA combination is going to absorb a huge proportion of a finite and seemingly constantly under pressure equipment budget.

If the RN retained a small number of JCA/JSF then its cost would be disproportionate to the effect delivered but it would at least mean a small core of expeditionary naval fast jet capability was retained and the investment to date would not be entirely wasted.

In the context of when the decision was made the F35B represented the most sensible option to fulfill the JCA requirements, with a high sortie rate, commonality with the RAF for training and logistics, elimination of complex and expensive catapult and trap arrangements on CVF and a host of other reasons.

Today though, it looks like a high cost, high end capability that is vulnerable to the red pen treatment.

Are there lower cost alternatives?

A comment on one of our earlier posts caught my eye, the Indian Navy has issued a request for information on navalised fighters for its future indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC) project. Besides the usual suspects of Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Sukoi and Dassault joining the fray a few others have also chipped in with their own proposals.

Eurofighter , SAAB and HAL have all indicated that they could modify the Typhoon, Gripen NG and Tejas Light Combat Aircraft respectively to operate from a carrier.

Extreme short take off and landing without cats and traps has been proven before, the X31 demonstrator showed what is possible with advanced flight controls and thrust vectoring, slowing the approach speed, reducing the rate of descent and increasing the angle of attack opens up the possibility of carrier operation without the disadvantages that conventional carrier operations bring.

X31 VECTOR

Thrust vectoring has been proposed for the Typhoon and it actually quite a low risk option, much of the baseline work already having been completed.

Eurojet Thrust Vectoring

It’s a tantalising thought, having a future version of the Typhoon or even a low cost aircraft like the Gripen operating from the CVF is a very interesting option.

The accepted wisdom is that it is almost impossible and very expensive to modify a land based aircraft for carrier operations but does most of this wisdom come from those with a vested interest in F18’s, Rafales, Mig 29’s or F35’s

Subject for future discussion so feel free to post your comments and I will include them in the future post on the RN and specifically the CVF.

In the previous articles written by myself and the ThinkDefence teams we both independently came to the conclusion that the future of the RAF lay in the cost effective management of a single aircraft type as the ‘fast jet fleet’ and that the single type should be the Typhoon. We both advocated the early retirement of the Harrier GR9 and the cancellation of the UK’s commitment to, and interest in the Lockheed Martin F35 (Joint Combat Aircraft).

However this leads to an immediate problem. The UK Govt. finally ordered the two large deck carriers first promulgated in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, and open source information seems to suggest the CVF (Future Carrier) programme is now progressed to the point where it will be cheaper to build the two carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Queen_Elizabeth_class_aircraft_carrier).

So, if we are not going to cancel them because of contractual penalities, and we are not going to sell them (India being the latest rumour) because of pride and because the rest of the Royal Navy’s capabilities have been mortgaged to get them in the first place, then we better have something to fly from them !

Just for the record, even though I am ex RN and spent some time in the Fleet Air Arm, I am no ‘religious zealot’ when it comes to these ships, they were a good idea in 1998, but to honest I would be happy to seem them cancelled or sold if we replaced them with something more sensible (like the Italian Cavour class). However for all the reasons above that’s not going to happen, so what will consitute the airgroup of a Queen Elizabeth class carrier ?

1. Keep the Harrier flying – for now
The cheapest, interim option and one which I recommend and support just to keep a cadre of trained naval pilots, is to hand over all remaining Harrier GR9 and T12 to the RN Fleet Air Arm (FAA). However keeping these aircraft and updating them and keeping them in service as the only jets to fly from these carriers is not much of mid-to-long term option, as they are ground attack, close air support aircraft, with no radar. So if we want to fly a couple of squadrons of Harriers from the big deck carriers in support of Royal Marines, perhaps carrying a squadron of Italian or Spanish Av8B Harrier II+ for CAP and fighter sweep on coalition operations, then this truly would be cheap, but would not exactly offer the capability the carriers were designed to provide.

2. Not the JCA – too expensive.
If we are to ditch the LM F35 JCA for the RAF, it does not seem to make sense to buy a small number of the deck melting wonder plane just to equip the carriers. Their ultimate unit cost remains unknown, the deck melting issue is far from being resolved and while the aircraft is obviously a paradigm shift in capabilities for STOVL compared to the Harrier, how useful is it’s “first day of the war” stealth capability going to be for non-peer state ‘war’ against the current, or even project future foes ? Nope, I say ditch the F35 now, before wasting millions on it.

So if we are not going with STOVL, then we need to flex the design of the carriers and get catapults and arresting gear onboard during the build. They have been designed from the outset to take such modification. As I don’t seen the RN flying a small number of Migs or Sukhoi’s that realistically leaves two options for a conventional carrierborne airgroup: The Boeing F/A18E or the Dassault Rafale – I am suggesting we go with the Rafale.

3. Why not the F/A18E Super Hornet
According to open source information the inter-webs, the unit cost for an F/A18E is 55.2 million US Dollars, which converts to 33.49 million GB Pounds each. Similarily the Rafale M is qouted at 70 million Euros which makes it 63 million GB Pounds each – nearly twice the price. This seems a bit odd to me, and you might want to do your own research to confirm it, but I am guessing this is because of the volume of production for the USN, which is driving down the unit cost for the Super Hornet. So if its cheaper, and it is a decent aircraft (bomb truck, not much of a ‘fighter’ apparently……) why not go with is option ? Well because my choice of the Rafale is also tied to the way we run and use the two carriers.

4. The French option
There is no doubt the Rafale is a good aircraft. The Rafale M as used by the French Navy’s Areo-Navale has been in operational use from the FS Charles de Gaul since 2004, and is now available in the ‘full capability’ F3 standard. It is due to get the Meteor, it can carry U.S. Paveway guided bombs as well as French equivalents, it is integrated with SCALP, which is very similar to the Storm Shadow (same family of missilses), true we would have to pay for integration of AIM132 ASRAAM (or just use the IR Mica ?). It can carry IR/EO targeting and recce pods etc. By the time the carriers are accepted into service in 20015/16 the Rafale will be a very mature platform with 12 years of Naval service behind it.

However its not just the aircraft, we have to think of this requirement holistically, in the overall “big picture” of budgets and desired capabilities, and I think we can strike some good deals with the French (yes, I really did just say that……). The French Navy would like a second carrier, and we are buying two so that one will be available for operations at any one time. I think we should strike a deal so that for periods when the Charles de Gaul is in dock and unavailable, then one of the UK carriers is made available. The deal might be that the UK ship can only be used for training cruises, with French crew joining a core of RN crew, and a French airgroup embarked, to ensure they don’t loose their operational edge when the CdG is out of commission. Or we might go further than that and allow the French to use the ship on coalition operations to which both national governments have signed up. Lets face it, based on the last 20 or so years, its very, very improbable that the French will unilaterally decalre war on someone and want to use our carrier to hit someone we quite like ! Now if we were borrowing a French flat top, that might be different, but I digress.

The CVF carriers have a notional airgroup of 40 jets and helo’s, so a “full” airgroup for a major offensive operation might be 3 squadrons of 12 Rafale for a total of 36. The CdG also carries a maximum of 40 aircraft and the French Navy is buying 60. We should also buy 60, and establish a training presence with the French Navy at their main training base (with say 8 aircraft), with ‘normal’ deployment of 2 squadrons on the active carrier and 1 on the UK mainland as the OCU for ‘advanced training’.

Of course we could even extend the cooperation buy purchasing E2 Hawkeye AEWC aircraft for the new carriers, which are also flown by the French.

In summary, lets buy off the shelf, lets buy European, lets put defence cooperation into ‘realpolitik’ mode rather than just hot air, and at the same time provide a useful multi-role aircraft for our big shiny new flatops, because if we don’t we may as well rename them HMS White Elephant and HMS Flying Pig – but at least we would have the biggest helicopter carriers in the world !