With increasing personnel costs and a fully understandable casualty aversion every technical means possible of achieving superiority over the neighbours continues to be very expensively applied. In the same way naval forces apply the ‘does it work in a hot war’ test, so does the RAF.

This is the ‘hi-lo’ argument we have rehearsed many times in the naval subject area.

If we make the assumption that the majority (not all) combat missions the RAF will be involved in will be in a moderate to low air threat environment then do we actually need the world’s first or second best multi role strike fighter?

The operation after Afghanistan might not look anything like Afghanistan so we should make sure we retain the ‘high’ whilst thinking about the ‘low’ but could we supplement Typhoon with something cheaper and/or more numerous for those missions where close air support and ISR are the predominant type.

The cheapest type of aircraft is usually the one you have paid for and in the last few years we have divested ourselves of several Jaguars, Harriers and Tornados. The real costs, however, are those that you incur every day, crew, fuel, training, spares and maintenance etc. If the aircraft you have are expensive to operate then the keep or ditch calculation is not as simple as it might seem.

The key question is;

Would a cheaper to buy and operate aircraft that could carry out the most likely tasks the RAF needs to cover, be so cheap that it overcomes the cost penalty of having an extra type in service.

The cost of maintaining numerous types of aircraft that do similar things should not be underestimated and it is the RAF’s stated objective to move to as few types as possible but are there any candidates that would allow the Typhoon/F35 thoroughbreds be used less and therefore retained in service longer, there has to be a cost pay off or it’s not worth doing.

Are we missing the Jaguar, a cheap to operate, rugged and simple fast jet able to provide limited strike, close air support and ISR in low to medium threat environments.

There have been persistent attempts to breathe life into a Harrier III but the development costs would be very high.

There are many options including new builds, trainer derivatives and modernising existing types so rather than try and list all the options here are a few interesting options;

Gripen NG; The Gripen is the most capable of this group, a proper modern fighter! The NG has been designed to operate from austere locations with low costs but has a full range of modern systems and a very high performance for a single engine aircraft. It also has the same BK27 cannon as the Typhoon. A Sea Gripen has also been proposed that would provide CVF compatibility.

BAe Hawk ; arguably the easiest option, we have plenty of surplus and a new build would be a UK product. The T.Mk2 or Hawk 128 is the latest version with the Adour 951 engine and modern avionics and although this is highly optimised for the training role the basic Hawk design has proven adaptable and versatile. The Malaysian and Indonesian (Hawk 208/209) exports were multi role light fighters, fitted with a lightweight multi-purpose radar, in flight refuelling probe and an external payload of about 3,500 kg.

KAI FA-50; a derivative of the supersonic T-50 Golden Eagle trainer, its maximum speed is in the order of Mach 1.4 with a operating ceiling of nearly 15,000m and maximum payload of 4,600 tonnes. In addition to modern avionics it has full set of defensive aids and data links to support advanced weapon carriage and all weather/night operations. The radar is Israeli but the Selex Vixen 500E which is a modern AESA system designed for light fighters, an also be fitted. The T-50 from which this more aggressive model is derived reportedly costs in excess of $20 million with estimates for the FA-50 at around $25-30 million. It uses the same GE F404 engine as the Gripen and F18. For an even cheaper option, A-50 sits somewhere in between the trainer and light multi role FA-50. Crucially, given its export oriented design, its operating costs are said to be very low. Click here and here for more information.

AMX; If we were interested in a joint development with Brazil we might consider the AMX, an Embraer and Alenia joint venture. It’s quite an old design but there have been a number of proposals for updates including one with the EJ200 engine and the Brazilians are currently updating a number in conjunction with Elbit. High subsonic with a payload of about 4,000kg on 5 external hard points, it also has wingtip rails for AA missiles. More information here

It is worth considering the performance figures of these light fighters when compared to Typhoon, payload, range and endurance are of particular importance, especially in Close Air Support where endurance and the ability to carry multiple munitions to suit the target and a targeting pod. For example, an AMX has 5 hard points; by the time two drop tanks and a targeting pod have been added there are only 2 left for munitions. Even with multi weapon pylons this is a limitation and there range and endurance limitations would mean more required in the air to cover a given area with a greater number of tanker sorties.

My gut feeling is that the cost penalties of introducing and maintaining a new type, especially after getting rid of a couple already, would be prohibitive. It would be worth a serious study though, as a means of keeping our racing thoroughbreds in service longer.

## Other posts in this series ##

The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction

The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends

The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets

The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement

The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01

The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)

The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)

The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)

The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)

The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)

The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)

The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling

The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport

The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)

The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)

The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)

The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)

The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security

The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary

There is more to this, as ever, than meets the eye.

Anyone have any thought on whats between the lines?

Dear David

We are nearing the culmination of the work we promised to deliver on our approach to national security; the NSC meeting tomorrow is a key opportunity to set out the risk and consequences of that work for our NSC colleagues. This is not a letter I am copying to others ahead of tomorrow’s NSC but I wanted to let you know my views, which are shared by my Ministerial colleagues.

Frankly this process is looking less and less defensible as a proper SDSR (Strategic Defence and Strategy Review) and more like a “super CSR” (Comprehensive Spending Review). If it continues on its current trajectory it is likely to have grave political consequences for us, destroying much of the reputation and capital you, and we, have built up in recent years. Party, media, military and the international reaction will be brutal if we do not recognise the dangers and continue to push for such draconian cuts at a time when we are at war. I am very grateful to Peter Ricketts and Jeremy Heywood for the help they have given officials who have worked strenuously to bridge a gap that is, financially and intellectually virtually impossible. I am concerned that we do not have a narrative that we can communicate clearly.

On 22 July the NSC endorsed the ‘Adaptable Britain’ posture because we decided that it was impossible to predict what conflict or global security scenarios may emerge in the years ahead. That meant ensuring the maintenance of generic defence capability across all three environments of land, sea and air – not to mention the emerging asymmetric threats in domains such as cyber and space –with sufficient ability to regenerate capability in the face of these possible future threats were it required.

How do we want to be remembered and judged for our stewardship of national security? We have repeatedly and robustly argued that this is the first duty of Government and we run the risk of having those words thrown back at us if the SDSR fails to reflect that position and act upon it.

I suggest we start tomorrow’s discussion by asking whether we are really prepared to see Defence spending reduced to this level. The impact on capability, particularly in the maritime domain, would be more substantial than one might imagine from the paper.

Our decisions today will limit severely the options available to this and all future governments. The range of operations that we can do today we will simply not be able to do in the future. In particular, it would place at risk:

The reduction in overall surface ship numbers means we will be unable to undertake all the standing commitments (providing a permanent Royal Navy presence in priority regions) we do today. Assuming a presence in UK waters, the Falklands and in support of the deterrent is essential we would have to withdraw our presence in, for example, the Indian Ocean, Caribbean or Gulf.

Deletion of the amphibious shipping (landing docks, helicopter platforms and auxiliaries) will mean that a landed force will be significantly smaller and lighter and deployed without protective vehicles or organic fire. We could not carry out the Sierra Leone operation again.

Deletion of the Nimrod MR4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our Falklands reinforcement plan.

Some risk to civil contingent capability, including but not limited to foot and mouth, fire-fighting strikes, fuel shortages, flu pandemics, Mumbai style attacks and the 2012 Summer Olympics

The potential for the scale of the changes to seriously damage morale across the Armed Forces should not be underestimated. This will be exacerbated by the fact that the changes proposed would follow years of mismanagement by our predecessors. It may also coincide with a period of major challenge (and, in all probability, significant casualties) in Afghanistan.

Even at this stage we should be looking at the strategic and security implications of our decisions. It would be a great pity if, having championed the cause of our Armed Forces and set up the innovation of the NSC, we simply produced a cuts package. Cuts there will have to be. Coherence, we cannot do without, if there is to be any chance of a credible narrative.

Yours

Liam Fox

Why the concentration on matters naval?

Why get MRA4 wrong?

Why is it called a Strategic Defence and Strategy Review when the second S in SDSR stands for Security?

Whats the politics angle, we all know Liam Fox and David Cameron get on like

Is it a classic case of leak the worse options and make minor concession to put a positive spin on the whole thing

The question to ask is

Who leaked this and why

UPDATE

http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=14283

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8032102/Liam-Fox-letter-Government-in-chaos-over-defence-cuts-says-Bob-Ainsworth.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8031926/Defence-cuts-Dannatt-backs-Liam-Fox-saying-cuts-could-undermine-Britains-status-in-world.html

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/benedictbrogan/100056050/relax-david-cameron-wants-the-defence-debate-to-be-public/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

Liam Fox has issued a statement

Many of you will have seen reports today of a leaked letter I sent to the Prime Minister.

“It is entirely normal that Ministers should make representations to the Prime Minister during the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the Comprehensive Spending Review. That is an entirely proper part of the process of government. The Prime Minister is fully entitled to expect those representations to be made in private and kept private.

“I am extremely angry that this confidential communication has been made public. The SDSR continues. We will reach decisions in due course collectively as a Government in the national interest, and abide by those decisions collectively – a principle which I entirely support.

“It is totally unacceptable that a highly confidential letter from me to the Prime Minister should be leaked to the Daily Telegraph. I am utterly appalled by this breach of trust. I have agreed with PUS [Permanent Under Secretary] that an immediate and rigorous investigation must be undertaken and this is underway; it is being conducted urgently by the MOD Police.”

They have just posted an interesting analysis of the Conservative parties ‘A Resilient Nation’ paper.

Have a look

http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/03/26/britain%E2%80%99s-future-strategic-direction-4-%E2%80%93-reading-the-tea-leaves-of-a-resilient-nation/

The analysis is split over 10 posts

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Part 8
Part 9
Part 10

To summarise our opinion…

There are some excellent ideas, many are long overdue and others just plain common sense. It provides some assurance that an incoming Conservative government will get to grip with the security, defence and resilience issues facing the UK, many of which seem to have been relegated in importance by the Labour government or simply ignored.

However

Many of the suggestions amount to nothing more than fine words and platitudes that almost any party could have voiced or one might find in any security review.

It is understood that this is a green paper or statement of intent and in the run up to an election has to be seen in that context.

Other suggestions seem ill informed, naive and superficial.

The UK Armed Forces are not the paramilitary wing of Oxfam or some adjunct to a European collective and we should not be thinking in these terms.

Finally, it does not cover funding.

We all know that Private Do More with Less is going to have to get on parade.

The appendix on Afghanistan we will leave for another post.

It is also interesting to note the absence of any reporting or analysis of any substance in the mainstream media. This is an important document yet the reporting has tended to focus on the Security and Stabilisation Force proposal or the cyber defence issue.

The need to take a much more considered approach to the protection and long term resilience is obvious but has been severely neglected by the current government. The proposed systematic modelling of all related infrastructure and services is an idea that is well overdue but may need legislation as much of it is owned or administered by private sector and overseas organisations.

Once a thorough understanding has been obtained it will form a basis for legislation and the development of minimum national standards, again, another long overdue requirement.

Most of these industries have separate regulatory regimes and requirements so whether the standards would be developed and imposed through these or by some other resilience regulator is open for discussion.

The idea of a super regulator with responsibility for short and long term resilience should be pursued with some vigour.

The protection of critical sites by armed police for example, is currently split between a number of civilian and military constabularies. We looked peripherally at this with our post on military policing and any move to create a single guarding service is to be welcomed.

Energy and cyber security also come in for special attention in the report but the term ‘cyber’ adds an air of superficiality to what is a very serious subject. Energy security is an expansive subject and closely tied up with the climate change debate, it is slightly out of the scope of this post but the suggestion of linking overall security strategy to energy security is sensible.

In regards to electronic security across the internet, SCADA networks and telecommunications networks the UK definitely needs to do more but this should build upon works already done and expertise available in both the public and private sector. There is a large international element to electronic security because physical boundaries provide little protection and transnational criminal and intelligence networks are distributed. The EU and NATO have already done much work, supported specifically by Estonia and the UK should seek to support and enhance this in addition to strengthening national capacity.

One area that does not seem to be mentioned is that of electronic attack, almost as if that isn’t the sporting thing to do, instead concentrating of defensive measures.

As all readers will know, the most effective defence is offence. In any attack the likelihood of a smoking gun is remote but this should not deter the UK from developing a strong electronic attack capability and not being shy about letting the world know about it. This might even extend to being able to interdict physical infrastructure such as satellite or undersea fibre optic cables.

There is also the intelligence benefit of electronic intrusion that should not be overlooked in the rush to defend ourselves.

In addition to technical measures the UK, in the same manner as business continuity, has created a leading standard framework for information security management. The ISO27000 series integrates with BS25999 and other management standards. The existing public sector Security Policy Framework implementation needs robust enforcement and this should extend to external third party certification.

4.7 Striking the right balance – ensuring security while protecting civil liberties and social cohesion

The final section in the document makes the point that most of the terrorist attacks on the UK have originated in this country. The growing realisation that New Labour multiculturalism has made this country a more decisive place and the self evident erosion of many deeply rooted civil liberties has not created a safer society.

There is a great hope that an incoming Conservative government would take a more robust approach and restore ancient civil liberties, lets see shall we.

The paper states that effective border control is the first line of defence against the entry if unwanted persons.

A long standing Conservative commitment has been the creation of a robust and unified border policing capability. The current patchwork of the UK Border Agency, parts of HM Revenue and Customs, local police forces, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and many others has created an over complex, inefficient and largely ineffectual capability that a single unified agency or force would seek to address.

The commenters and authors at Think Defence have for some time supported the notion of a much stronger Coastguard with responsibilities for maritime security, search and rescue, pollution control and fisheries management.

4.5 A new focus on our capacity to deal with emergencies, including through the establishment of a new Permanent Military Command for Homeland Defence and Security

This section is prefaced with this comment…

Maintaining territorial integrity and safety becomes both more important and more difficult as terrorists and organised criminals evolve new modes of operation, and as natural hazards increase in scale and frequency.

Again, I instinctively dislike the term ‘homeleand’ because it sounds like we are aping the USA and this is a section where I think the Conservatives are simply behind the current state of reality, they make the assumption that we are on a precipice, unable to cope and cruelly exposed. Whilst there may be some grain of truth in this the reality is that the UK is one of the best provisioned and well prepared countries for ‘civil defence’ type disruption with an active emergency planning and business continuity sector that in many regards leads the world.

Military contribution to homeland security and resilience

The paper makes the bold claim that the military is best placed to provide agile and innovative command and control capabilities in support of the civil power where natural events are of such a scale, pace and danger that the emergency services cannot be expected to have adequate situational awareness and/or are in danger of being overwhelmed. Whilst this might have been true some years ago and was proven, particularly in the Mad Cow Disease outbreak, it is simply not the case anymore.

The publication of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, excellent work that has been carried out by the Emergency Planning Society, Civil Contingencies Secretariat and many many others means that the UK civil response capability is actually very good. Of course there is always room for improvement, the CCA Enhancement Programme is working to build on the work already done.

The military should always have a limited role but terrorism at home is a law enforcement matter and natural disasters are rightly in the domain of the emergency services and local authorities, not the military.

The paper makes two proposals; first, the establishment of a small military command or HQ for homeland defence security and secondly ensure there is a predictable regular armed force contribution to homeland tasks.

In the Joint Doctrine Publication 02 Second Edition (JDP-02) published by the MoD and distributed via the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat to emergency planning agencies throughout the UK the concept of the Standing Joint Commander (UK) is detailed. JDP 02 might be a rather dry document to read but it is plainly obvious that the MoD and SJC (UK) ‘has it covered’ so quite what the Conservative proposal seeks to achieve by co-locating it with Permanent Joint Headquarters and duplicating what is already in place is unclear.

With the TA and Regular units much of the equipment needed is now centrally pooled and in the case of Royal Engineers C Vehicles (Mobile Plant) is provided from a few depots via a PFI run by ALC.

Liaison with regional responders is already done by service Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLO) and works well.

As the paper quite rightly states, apart from a few niche response capabilities such as protection of offshore installations, anti terrorist and airspace control, the military contribution to civil tasks is contingent on them being available and not on military deployment abroad. This is of course a statement of the obvious.

However, the military is over stretched as it is, if there were yet another target to reach, having sufficient forces available in the UK to meet a non-existent need it will place even greater stress on an already over stretched force.

Personnel would be of little use without equipment, the armed forces as the Conservatives make great play of are already under resources so keeping not only personnel but their equipment in the UK will impact overseas operations, unless the man at the Treasury is going to open the cheque book, mmm, thought not.

What of the need…

In recent years the MoD has withdrawn from civil response for a number of reasons, firstly response to this type of disruption is a civilian affair and this has forced the responder community to properly plan, resource and put in place mutual and regional aid agreements for large scale disruption. JDP 02 makes this quite clear and in the few circumstances where niche military capability has been required the established common and control arrangements have worked well.

Local authorities have less of a need because they have to come to realise that many of the capabilities that they had relied on the armed forces to provide can actually be provided me economically and affectively by themselves.

Rather than relying on a shrinking military the UK should be increasing funding for local and regional civilian capabilities. The military will always be able to provide niche capabilities at short notice but these should be on a last resort basis, pretty much as the current situation.

Standards for emergency services

Achieving standardisation across multiple responders is an obvious common sense objective but again, much work has already been done.

Involving individuals, communities and businesses in building their own safety and security

It is clear the UK has looked to those in authority to provide increasing support whilst self reliance seems to be in decline. The overall objective is increasing self reliance and a contribution to safety and security is to be applauded.

This section of the document is long on platitude but short on practical proposals, provide better, tap local knowledge, foster corporate contributions etc etc

The National and Local Risk Registers is an area that needs improvement in legibility, accessibility and clarity, the proposal calls for improvement, great, how is this to be done.

The proposal to foster greater corporate contribution to emergency assistance and support for resilience interesting, stating that the insurance industry should incentivise companies through decreased insurance premiums if they comply with the business continuity management standard, BS25999.

This proposal sounds rather like a bit of state interventionism. The insurance industry will do as it pleases, as it should be.

Instead of tinkering and dabbling the Conservatives should ensure the public sector can actually meet the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act and have suitable continuity arrangements. Earlier in the document it talks of setting examples so rather than preaching to the private sector, which, by the way, are usually streets ahead of the public sector in resilience terms, it should simply ensure that all public sector organisations comply with BS25999, especially Part 2 of the standard which is verified by external audit. Nothing would sharpen the minds of the public sector like having to comply with a widely respected and adopted international standard like BS25999.

This would then trickle down through the private sector and massively improve resilience across both the public and private sector; the UK would then be much more resilient.

There has been a number of well publicised ‘issues’ between the MoD, DFiD and civilian aid agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the paper says ‘we need a step change’

The current arrangements of DFiD, MoD, FCO and NGN’s means that inevitably there are too many chiefs and not enough Indians and those chiefs are usually too focussed on procedure rather than outcome.

To say a more integrated approach is needed is the understatement of the decade.

The proposed strategy to take forward an integrated comprehensive approach includes;

• Unity of purpose and common strategies between military, police and civilian organisations
• Clear command and control within and between military and civilian agencies, both at national and international levels;
• The ability and willingness on the part of civilians to deploy and operate in dangerous environments
• Joint training facilities and exercises for military, police, intelligence and civilian personnel.

The core proposal in this section is to create a Stabilisation and Reconstruction force that is capable of operating in high threat environments, able to carry out crucial activities that create stability and win hearts and minds (I hate that phrase but it is in the document)

These activities might include bridge building, repairing power supplies and helping to create governance structures. The force would comprise military personnel, specialists from DFiD, FCO and a range of other government departments. There are large hints that it will be funded partly through the aid budget.

Enter stage left, a considerable wailing and gnashing of teeth from the aid and development industry (make no mistake, it is an industry) so as a sop to the righteous the document restates the Conservative pledge to increase overseas aid to the magic 0.7% of GDP (or more commonly known as a Bono)

The fundamental idea of using military capability such as water treatment, sanitation, building and civil engineering, enhanced with civilian expertise in areas such as policing, governance, economic development and farming is an obviously good one, but introducing yet another organisation into an already overcrowded space is simply a recipe for confusion and inefficiency, however much it is claimed that it will create the fabled ‘unity of purpose’

The ability to erect a structure out of Hesco or drill a well is a dual use capability. That structure could be used as a sangar or school, a well might be used to provide water for a village or water for a FOB. The strength of the Royal Engineers and other supporting units is their flexibility so by creating artificial distinctions we simply duplicate activity and create conflict, pleasing nobody and actually reducing capability at a time when resources are scarce.

Without security there can be no effective development so whilst the military are still deployed, by definition, there is a lack of security and it is not ‘post conflict’

Where the military is deployed then to create a single unity of strategy and command structure then the answer is plain, the military should be taking the lead with the ability to apply reconstruction effort as simply another component that supports the military and political objective. It may have advice from the FCO and others but if the aim is to create a single unified strategy then it requires a step change in military thinking.

The key to success is flexibility and simplicity.

Currently, the military do not have this capability yet it should be a key objective to ensure that it has both the resources and backing to create such a capability using what it already has. The Royal Engineers and other supporting force elements are eminently well suited; we should enhance where necessary and provide greater resources whilst ensuring that the detailed staff and planning expertise is put in place to support the capability. Anyone involved, with a few limited exceptions, should be in the military chain of command.

The reserve forces might provide this supplementary capability, operating as sponsored reserves in specialist units but firmly within the military chain of command. The TA and other reserve forces have a wide range of experience, these should be actively exploited and the private sector might also play an active part, telecommunications and utility organisations for example.

Obviously the Conservatives do not want to raid the ring fenced overseas aid piggy bank to pay for an increase in for example, military bridging, because this would infer dual use and draw away from the 0.7% holy grail.

Instead of having the political balls to say that we are not going to reach anything like 0.7% because, you know, we are at war and skint, the policy seems to engage in a spot of shifting wooden dollars between one spending department and another, keeping everyone happy but actually being ineffectual, divisive and overly complex.

Our proposal is very simple, when the military is deployed; it should be the military that does the reconstruction.

There has been a number of well publicised ‘issues’ between the MoD, DFiD and civilian aid agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the paper says ‘we need a step change’

The current arrangements of DFiD, MoD, FCO and NGN’s means that inevitably there are too many chiefs and not enough Indians and those chiefs are usually too focussed on procedure rather than outcome.

To say a more integrated approach is needed is the understatement of the decade.

The proposed strategy to take forward an integrated comprehensive approach includes

• Unity of purpose and common strategies between military, police and civilian organisations
• Clear command and control within and between military and civilian agencies, both at national and international levels;
• The ability and willingness on the part of civilians to deploy and operate in dangerous environments
• Joint training facilities and exercises for military, police, intelligence and civilian personnel.

The core proposal in this section is to create a Stabilisation and Reconstruction force that is capable of operating in high threat environments, able to carry out crucial activities that create stability and win hearts and minds (I hate that phrase but it is in the document)

These activities might include bridge building, repairing power supplies and helping to create governance structures. The force would comprise military personnel, specialists from DFiD, FCO and a range of other government departments. There are large hints that it will be funded partly through the aid budget.

Enter stage left, a considerable wailing and gnashing of teeth from the aid and development industry (make no mistake, it is an industry) so as a sop to the righteous the document restates the Conservative pledge to increase overseas aid to the magic 0.7% of GDP (or more commonly known as a Bono)

The fundamental idea of using military capability such as water treatment, sanitation, building and civil engineering, enhanced with civilian expertise in areas such as policing, governance, economic development and farming is an obviously good one, but introducing yet another organisation into an already overcrowded space is simply a recipe for confusion and inefficiency, however much it is claimed that it will create the fabled ‘unity of purpose’

The ability to erect a structure out of Hesco or drill a well is a dual use capability. That structure could be used as a sangar or school, a well might be used to provide water for a village or water for a FOB. The strength of the Royal Engineers and other supporting units is their flexibility so by creating artificial distinctions we simply duplicate activity and create conflict, pleasing nobody and actually reducing capability at a time when resources are scarce.

Without security there can be no effective development so whilst the military are still deployed, by definition, there is a lack of security and it is not ‘post conflict’

Where the military is deployed then to create a single unity of strategy and command structure then the answer is plain, the military should be taking the lead with the ability to apply reconstruction effort as simply another component that supports the military and political objective. It may have advice from the FCO and others but if the aim is to create a single unified strategy then it requires a step change in military thinking.

The key to success is flexibility and simplicity.

Currently, the military do not have this capability yet it should be a key objective to ensure that it has both the resources and backing to create such a capability using what it already has. The Royal Engineers and other supporting force elements are eminently well suited; we should enhance where necessary and provide greater resources whilst ensuring that the detailed staff and planning expertise is put in place to support the capability. Anyone involved, with a few limited exceptions, should be in the military chain of command.

The reserve forces might provide this supplementary capability, operating as sponsored reserves in specialist units but firmly within the military chain of command. The TA and other reserve forces have a wide range of experience, these should be actively exploited and the private sector might also play an active part, telecommunications and utility organisations for example.

Obviously the Conservatives do not want to raid the ring fenced overseas aid piggy bank to pay for an increase in for example, military bridging, because this would infer dual use and draw away from the 0.7% holy grail.

Instead of having the political balls to say that we are not going to reach anything like 0.7% because, you know, we are at war and skint, the policy seems to engage in a spot of shifting wooden dollars between one spending department and another, keeping everyone happy but actually being ineffectual, divisive and overly complex.

Our reaction is very simple, when the military is deployed; it should be the military that does the reconstruction.

If we can move away from the hand wringing yoghurt knitting left winged foreign policy of the Labour government then this will be a huge step in the right direction. The UK needs to understand the concept of national interest and stop trying to swan around the world stage, being a force for good.

In fact, the whole ‘being a force for good’ thing needs to be ruthlessly expunged from all strategy documents and replaced with ‘a force for the good of the United Kingdom and its people’

However, it looks like the Conservative proposal is to have more of the same, stating that our international role is not only of self interest or seen through the prism of a commercial balance sheet

Nonsense…

I simply cannot understand how this contributes to our security, the emerging nations such as India, Brazil and China are achieving power exactly because they have been singularly self interested and focussed on economic prosperity because with this approach, political power and influence follows.

The British Council and BBC Foreign Language Services are held up as key elements of our soft power policy but the Kinnock ‘clan’ at the British Council needs to be removed and a more focussed management team put in place. For some excellent analysis of the DFiD like incompetence and profligacy of the British Council readers might be interested in some excellent analysis at;

http://dblackie.blogs.com/the_language_business/british_council/
http://burningourmoney.blogspot.com/search/label/British%20Council

The UK has considerable soft power, more than we sometimes give ourselves credit for. Education, the arts, culture, engineering, diplomatic and commercial links with other nations must be co-opted for the security of the UK, although forcing the X Factor on Yemen might not yield the results we want!

We should be focussing on a foreign policy that places the prosperity and security at its heart, less wishy washy liberalism and more hard-nosed self interest.

4.2 Building a capacity for preventative action

Conflict prevention, early warning and rapid intervention are common sense and have been goals of the UK for a long time but aspirations have rarely met with adequate resources. The Conservative policy is to reaffirm this commitment to the concept.

A greater role for diplomacy

The paper highlights the gradual weakening of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office but the FCO today seems more interested in pursuing greater European integration than pursuing the interests of the UK. In return for greater resources and placing it at its rightful place in government the FCO needs to understand its role i.e. not the surrender of our sovereignty.

A wider range of government departments supporting diplomacy

A comprehensive approach is seen as essential in conflict prevention and the paper draws a direct line between poverty and radicalisation yet the 9/11 attackers were largely Saudi, not a nation known for its poverty. The attack this Christmas was perpetrated by a wealthy individual and the attacks in Glasgow were committed by doctors.

In stating that DFiD plays a central role in Millennium Development Goals, in conjunction with the MoD and FCO it maintains the notion that DFiD should be kept as an autonomous organisation.

Overseas aid should always come with either strings attached or be in direct support of the national interest so I think DFiD should simply be absorbed back into the FCO with an attendant reduction in the far left thinking, bungling inefficiency and dubious activity that has beset DFiD.

The days of the gravy train for the ‘third sector’ should be brought to an abrupt halt.

A greater role for the MoD is called for but defence diplomacy is but one of many competing requirements of the budget.

This is the substantial part of the strategy and our analysis.

The new, integrated approach to national security will, however, mean some major changes in the way we do business.

In particular, it will involve;

• A liberal Conservative attitude to foreign policy which champions an enlightened vision of the national interest
• Reducing the need for military intervention by building a capacity for preventative action, including a greater role for diplomacy led by the FCO and for contributions from a wider range of government departments
• A more integrated approach to post-conflict reconstruction – with a new Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force
• A new focus on key parts of domestic security which have been ignored to date, such as border security
• A new focus on our capacity to deal with emergencies, including a more structured military contribution to homeland security
• Much greater emphasis on the resilience of the country’s critical infrastructure, including a greater understanding of new threats such as climate change, the importance of food security and the security of our energy supplies
• Particular emphasis on cyber security; and a new concern with ensuring that security legislation does not compromise civil liberties, and with strengthening social cohesion

Probably too much for a single blog post so I will split them up

3. Some Fundamental Continuities

The new National Security Strategy, and the accompanying Strategic Defence and Security Review, will be built on certain solid foundations – most have been at the heart of bi-partisan policy over many years, including;

• NATO
• Maintenance of the nuclear deterrent
• EU cooperation
• Active involvement in international institutions
• Continued determination to prevent proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction
• Maintaining the security of the 2012 Olympic Games

No surprises here and nothing to be concerned over except that we think continued defence cooperation with the EU should be on a minimal basis. That said the Conservative policy is to only continue co-operation  with the European Security and Defence Policy (EDSP) if it can show that the capabilities being offered do not duplicate those available in NATO. It also pledges to strive for co-location of staff. I believe EDSP has changed its name to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CDSP) and it will be difficult to reconcile the natural eurosceptic nature of the Conservatives with the accelerating pace of EU integration post Lisbon.

The UK and Netherlands were scheduled to provide an amphibious brigade (the existing UK/NL structure) to act as as the EU ready brigade this year, whether this actually happens is another matter of course.

Troubled waters ahead here.

Reaffirming the primacy of NATO and committing to its reform is a positive move.

Whilst recognising that each of these alliances has problems but when taken as a whole contribute to the UK’s national security.

The report goes on to list a number of important commitments across a range of areas.

Nothing radical, just sensible modest proposals although good intentions will be difficult to implement.

To deal with the new world we need to link all the relevant parts of government…

The document strategy proposes three key new initiates, the establishment of a National Security Council, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

2.1 National Security Council

This has rather a USA feel to it and be responsible for all national security policy issues, replacing a number of existing disparate ministerial committees.

The NSC will;

• Agree a comprehensive, long-term National Security Strategy
• Supervise the attainment of strategic goals identified by the National Security Strategy
• Foster a culture of integrated policy-making on the national security agenda between colleagues and their Departments
• Manage crises affecting national security
• Have the capacity to decide on the creation of cross-departmental budgets for the delivery of national security policies

Fig 1 National Security Council

Fig 2 National Security Secretariat

All good stuff but the last point is perhaps one of the most interesting elements of the whole proposal because it will allow the NSC to dictate departmental budget priorities, as a committee that decision should of course be a consensus but expect conflict as vested interests and, empire building, career and other considerations to play their part.

Potentially, this injects a great deal of uncertainty into departmental budgeting processes which in the case of the MoD is the root cause of so many poor and short term decisions.

This assumes that the underlying structures will be maintained, MI5 will still be M15, MI6 will still be MI6 and the Department for International Development will still be the same. The Metropolitan Police will still be the lead agency for anti terrorism in the UK and

Given the state of inter departmental rivalry and political shenanigans as evidenced by the various inquiries into Iraq and self evident incompetence in development in Afghanistan, one can only imagine this will be like wading through treacle, wearing treacle slippers.

Whilst the UK has nowhere near the duplicated complexity of the US, the recent airline attack over Christmas has clearly shown what happens when one has too many agencies, each fighting for budget, influence and the kudos of ‘taking the lead’

Is the proposal just another layer in an already over complex situation and could we go some way to achieving the same goal by de-layering, not adding yet more red tape, although some duplication will be eliminated this is only at the governmental level. For example the existing Civil Contingencies Secretariat

A single unifying council has much to commend it, it is logical and would seem common sense but without any reform to the underlying maze of agencies and organisations it will be facing an uphill struggle from day one.

Perhaps this is a proposal that does not go far enough.

2.2 National Security Strategy

The National Security Council will be tasked with the creation of an overarching national security strategy and updating it at least once per Parliament. The NSS will set the long term framework across government for all security related work including the Strategic Defence and Security Review by;

• Defining and prioritising the UK’s national security goals and interests and the key risks to them
• Clarifying the strategic connections between different risks
• Focusing Departmental attention on these strategic connections and clearly identifying where cross-Departmental working is required
• Developing a cross-Government planning process that can be applied to each interest/risk and which brings together different national instruments
• Informing the development of sub-strategies within it (such as the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, known as ‘Contest’), by relating broad priorities and policies to them.

Sensibly it will start with a comprehensive and systemic risk assessment with all priorities and policies flowing from that.

The scrutiny and governance aspects are also to be welcomed.

2.3 Strategic Defence and Security Review

The second major task of the NSC will be to oversee and produce a long overdue Strategic Defence and Security Review. Ominously the report states that Equipment programmes cannot be based on wish-lists or the fantasy world of what we would like to do if resources were unlimited

So that’s CVF, JCA, A400, FRES and FSC, T3, FSC and a whole host of other programmes off the menu then.

This section seems to contradict itself

Twenty years ago the Berlin Wall fell, the Cold War ended and the last Soviet tank retreated from Afghanistan. Few defence experts predicted in 1989 that a thousand weeks later British troops would be fighting in Afghanistan, or that by 2001 terrorists trained in the ungoverned areas of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border would have turned airliners into guided missiles or that by 2005 young men born in Britain and trained in Pakistan would have killed themselves and many others on the London Underground.

This basically says that the world is an unpredictable place but then the report goes on to say

That means calibrating our role and our capabilities to the sort of conflicts which are most likely to arise in the next twenty years not the last twenty

So now it seems we can see into the future!

There is nothing wrong in this approach, even with the unpredictability of the world in mind a reasonable approximation of the future can be made but we must retain enough of the balanced capability to hedge against those things that we cannot see, that just might need something we have ditched.

It talks of Cold War capabilities yet it was these that brought success in Iraq and whilst one might think that fast jets are a throwback to another era the operation in Afghanistan would be impossible without them.

Stronger integration with partners, especially the US would seem to be an objective so this means that some capabilities will be reduced, i.e. we will not pursue a balanced force approach, playing to our strengths.

Without seeing the results the review it is hard to make any comment but our oft stated position is broadly the same, specialising in what we do best and over resourcing fewer capabilities yet still retaining a small but balanced capability as a hedge against the unforeseen, which we all know cannot be foreseen!

Reaffirming that the United Kingdom is an open, outward facing nation of considerable influence this sections covers the issue of how we might perceive our global role. After reading the section it is hard to see what is different from any other political party and it does not actually highlight any changes or solid proposals, mostly ‘is’ and ‘are’ rather than ‘will’

1.1 The response to changing threats

Todays threats are indeed more complex but have been so since the last strategic defence review in 1998. The substantive proposal is to ‘understand what is happening and respond sensibly’

Oh, that alright then

1.2 Labours record

As might be expected this is just a list of Labours failings, not sure what place this has in a strategy paper that is forward looking but why miss the opportunity of scoring political points, even if many of the things highlighted were either exactly the same under the last Conservative government or had their roots in Conservative government policies of old. The accompanying Green Paper does omit the Labour bashing section.

1.3 Conservative Solutions

This is simply a summary of good intentions and what changes will be put in place, more detail follows in the subsequent sections.

There will be a fundamental reorganisation of the relationships between foreign and domestic policy with regards to security and resilience.

This is long overdue and should be applauded.

Headlines include

Setting up a proper National Security Council to ensure that the Government’s preparations for and response to threats and hazards are co-ordinated.

Creating a new Permanent Military Command for Homeland Defence and Security to reinforce on our capacity to deal with emergencies in the UK.

Enhanced cyber security, including a Cyber Threat and Assessment Centre (CTAC)

As might be expected of a high level vision, David Cameron’s recent speech at Chatham House was long on strategy and short on tactics, fair enough. It has been followed up with the publication of the Conservative Party’s Defence and Security Policy documents on their web site.

http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2010/01/A_Resilient_Nation.aspx

After so many weak performances and half arrsed announcements from the Conservative defence team in the last year we were hoping for something substantive, here it is. Instead of slashing the MoD Civil Service or offering gimmicks they have come out with a serious and credible policy document.

In this series of posts we shall examine the detail and offer our usual half baked opinions!

We will have a look in more depth in a later post but for now, and in the interest of accuracy and fairness it is presented below in it’s basic form. with thanks to Chatham House.

Rt Hon David Cameron MP, Leader of the Conservative Party

‘It’s good to be back at Chatham House. Two and a half years ago Pauline Neville-Jones and I were here to launch the report from the Conservative Party policy group on national security. Today we’re here to explain how we would apply those ideas in government. It’s our plan for a world where there’s no neat split between domestic and foreign policy.

A world where droughts in the Arabian Gulf peninsula can spark terrorism and civil war where an outbreak of flu in Mexico can trigger a pandemic which races across the whole world and where cyber attacks aren’t just threatening companies but whole countries too.

This is the world we are in today.

But here in Britain we still look at this changed world through the lens of institutions which fundamentally haven’t changed since the end of the Cold War. So we’ve got a defence department which isn’t equipped to deliver homeland security, a development department which has been giving more money to the world’s fastest growing economy than to war-torn, poverty stricken, drought-hit Yemen and a Foreign Office which, despite our historic links with the region and the threads which run through our present problems, has simply not paid enough attention to the Gulf states. We can’t go on like this.

So today we’re setting out in detail our plans for a proper national security approach. Let me be clear. This isn’t some re-branding exercise, a nod towards new thinking, an attempt to paper over the cracks while time slips away.

I’m talking about one of the most radical departures in security policy we’ve seen in decades, doing away with the disconnected policies of the present and putting in place a new, connected approach for the future.

Machinery

Part of that is about new machinery of government. We were the first Party to call for a National Security Council. We were the first Party to suggest a Security Minister. And we’re the only Party that’s said we need a full-time National Security Adviser.

Over the past few years, there’s been some movement towards a more joined-up system. But it’s not gone anything like far or fast enough. So with these plans, we will set up a new, streamlined and decisive National Security Council, which will meet from day one of a Conservative Government and serve as a de facto War Cabinet for the duration of our Afghanistan campaign.

The Council will have its own staff, its own subcommittees, a full-time national security adviser, and the power to develop cross-departmental budgets for national security. It will be responsible for all decisions on national security, oversee a long-overdue Strategic Defence and Security Review and plan ahead for the future problems we might face.

Method

But this isn’t just about machinery – or even mainly about machinery. This is about a method, a way of doing things. Take the way we handle threats from abroad. For a start, we need to do much better at stopping wars from ever starting and that means really focussing on the causes of conflicts and then joining all that together to make sure that DfID and the Foreign Office deliver a really tight, tied-up, progressive approach.

We’ve also got to think through much more carefully whether Britain should get involved in a foreign conflict, and if so, how to cope with the consequences. And then if we do intervene and send troops to fight in a foreign country, there should be a proper reconstruction force ready and waiting to deliver a stabilisation strategy as soon as the fighting stops.

The same thinking also applies to the way we handle threats here in Britain. So there’s not much point having tougher laws to deport people who are a threat to Britain if at the same time we don’t have a proper border police force to stop unwanted people from coming in.

There’s not much point saying that the military need to be more closely involved in emergency planning if the police and fire services don’t know exactly how many soldiers they can count on when the time comes. And, as Pauline and Sayeeda Warsi have argued so powerfully throughout the past few years, if we’re serious about stopping extremism, we’ve got to make sure that our anti-terrorism legislation doesn’t clamp down on those freedoms we’re trying to defend.

But it’s not just about the people and the places which are a threat to us. It’s also about thinking about the kinds of things that could go wrong. We need to plan for pandemics, energy crises and water stoppages. And in particular for what I believe is a growing cyber threat. We know that there are hundreds of thousands of cyber-attacks and crimes against British businesses every year. Against government and the public sector, there may be many more. As technology and computers and the internet become bigger and bigger parts of our lives, the effect of cyber warfare will become more pronounced.

You only have to look at the so-called ‘Clickskrieg’ against Estonia in 2007 – which crippled the government and the banking sector and almost brought the entire country to a halt – for a sign of how serious a major attack could be. I want Britain to be prepared and proactive and ready to deal with all kinds of cyber attacks. So today we’re announcing plans for a new Cyber Threat and Assessment Centre to provide exactly that.

Trust

New machinery, new methods, a new way of thinking about national security. But there’s also another key ingredient of a successful national security strategy.

Trust.

We have to take people with us and make sure that people trust the system. But over the last few years, this has gone badly wrong. It’s hard to overestimate the damage that second dossier did to our political system. It’s made people suspicious of something they should frankly always be able to rely on:

Let me be clear: The Prime Minister will determine whether intelligence assessments should or should not be published. Political advisers will not be permitted to change intelligence assessments, and any publication of an assessment should only be done by the Joint Intelligence Committee, with the express clearance and approval of the JIC. And we will end the culture of spin by making sure that decisions about national security are taken formally, not on the sofa but round a table, and with all the right people sitting round the table

In the end though, there’s only so much you can do to create a water-tight system. So ultimately, the important thing is about the people you hire. And if you hire responsible people, people you really trust who want to lift politics up not stoop down to its lowest level, then you have your best guarantee against dodgy dossiers.

Conclusion

So the changes I have set out today will fix a lot of the problems we have seen in recent years.

A failure to weigh carefully the consequences of intervention and to plan for the aftermath. A failure to equip our forces properly when we send them into harm’s way. A failure to harness all the disparate resources of the government so they pull together rather than pull against each other.

Above all, a failure to tackle domestic and foreign security issues in the round.

It’s a big cultural change, and it will start on the first day of a Conservative government.’

Rt Hon David Cameron MP, Leader of the Conservative Party

15 January 2010

www.chathamhouse.org.uk

With General Sir Richard Dannatt on the team it is hoped that a number of solid policies would start trickling out.

Oh dear, how naive we have all been.

Plumbing new depths is the announcement that the Conservatives would award a university scholarship to all children of service personnel killed whilst on active duty.

Hold on you say, what is so bad about that?

On face value nothing, but what about the children of those service personnel who have  the damned poor grace to not get killed, back in line for you I am afraid.

What about the children of police officers, fire fighters or lifeboat crew, are they not deserving, have they not given their life in the service of their country?

Do service personnel who die in a range accident or car crash qualify, suppose someone who has done half a dozen active duty tours, comes home and dies in a car accident?

All this assumes the child wants to go to University, what if they want to be a plumber?

George Osborne estimates the cost will be £1.5m per year, Liam Fox talks of a duty of care to our service personnel.

Interestingly, the Conservatives, who obviously have a duty of care to Indian service personnel as well, have also recently announced that only NHS and Overseas Aid budgets would be ring fenced.

India receives around £40million per year in aid, a nuclear capable nation with record growth, a navy that is  larger than ours and ambitious spending plans for all three of their services.

The Conservatives have even floated the idea of providing aid vouchers to third world recipients so they can shop around for the best schools and other services.

So if you are in a third world country you can get, off a Conservative government, a voucher for private education but in this country, your mother or father has to be killed on a front line.

What service personnel in this country need are sound defence policies not gimmicks.

Bandwagon jumping of the worse kind.

C-

Must try harder

Afghanistan War Cabinet
David Cameron told The Sun ‘Our military is at war in Afghanistan, but quite frankly, Whitehall isn’t’

Going on to say he would form a ‘War Cabinet’ of senior ministers, military personnel and intelligence chiefs. Whether this would include the Chancellor was not discussed but one of the biggest factors in the quagmire that is Helmand is the insistence by the Treasury of having a say in almost every decision made. Churchill did not include the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his first War Cabinet and neither did Margaret Thatcher during the Falklands conflict, although John Major included Norman Lamont, the then Chancellor, in his Gulf War (Op Granby) cabinet.

Afghanistan Exit Strategy
In a very frank and realistic assessment, Liam Fox stated that the main political direction for Afghanistan will be driven out of Washington not London and reiterated the need for clear measures of success and a series of benchmarks, rather than a timeline, this seems a sensible way to progress.

We seem to have almost drifted into Afghanistan and there are no really good options but it’s good to see some political leadership in what has become a situation devoid of any, in this respect it’s a good move and should be welcomed but we need a greater clarity in the ‘what’s in it for us’ stakes because the price in blood and treasure is getting very steep.

Cuts in the MoD
I was quite disappointed by Liam Fox’s blunt attack on the MoD Civil Service this week. Although not mentioned in his speech it is believed the aim is to cut the cost of the MoD by 25%.

“We don’t believe that the MoD has got the balance right in terms of the amount of resources it devotes to the frontline and the civil service. On coming into office we intend to conduct a capabilities review to look at how we can get a better balance and achieve savings.”

That is a fair statement but many have taken this to mean a straight reduction in the numbers of civil service staff. In our previous post on civil servants we highlighted the distribution across the trading funds and top level budgets. It is not possible just to cut the numbers and leave everything else in place. Radical reform is going to be needed and the key to achieving efficiency is NOT a crude headcount reduction but to ensure that the right types of civil servants remain in post and the surplus to requirements civil servants are removed swiftly.

The tool for the job is not an axe, but a scalpel.

Liam Fox as a Future Secretary of State for Defence
David Cameron confirmed that Dr Liam Fox will be the next Secretary of State for Defence should the Conservatives be elected in the forthcoming election.

No doubt Liam Fox cares about the military, look into his background and you will see that, he was previously a civilian Army Medical Officer and much of what he has said in opposition has been sensible.

However, I do think he needs to sharpen his pencil because opposition is a lot easier than being in office and he will face many of the same problems as his Labour counterparts, perhaps even more so. The crude attack on the Civil Service in the MoD smacks of ‘playing to the crowd’ rather than an in depth and well thought through policy that shows a real understanding of his brief. Of course there is nothing unusual or indeed wrong with a politician trying to be popular but I hope there is more to his plan that simply slashing the civil service or our old friend, waste and efficiency.

General Sir Richard Dannatt
Perhaps the most controversial event of the week has been the announcement that the former Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, will be appointed as a Conservative Peer and act as a military adviser or junior defence minister.

I want to make one thing plain in the first instance, the General has earned the right to do as he pleases, having demonstrated courage in the face of the enemy (earning a Military Cross early in his career) and moral courage and integrity, very publicly in latter parts of his career., standing up for what he believed to be right and championing the cause of those in his charge.

One cannot have such a long career without making mistakes and errors of judgment, some have leveled a charge of tardiness at his door over the issue of protected patrol vehicles.

An extremely well respected and popular figure, of course it is no shock that a senior General has political sympathies with the Conservative Party but the general convention is that such senior figures if they enter politics, become cross benchers in the Lords, a partisan position places the current defence staff in a difficult position.

Constitutionally, the mixing of politics and the military is accepted by most to run counter to constitutional convention and there is the issue of Queens Regulations, he was still on the MoD’s payroll as a serving soldier when the announcement was made, this being completely contrary to those regulations. Good order and discipline require the even handed application of Queens Regulations so in flouting these, a dangerous precedent could be said to have been set.

On the other hand, it might be simply seen as a popular and knowledgeable ex forces person offering valuable and wise advice to a Conservative team that has little experience in this area.

On balance though, I think it is an ill thought through position to take.

The real value in his criticism of the Labour government and championing the Armed Forces is because it came from a neutral source, a military perspective not a political one. The move into politics diminishes the power of his opinion because he becomes easier to dismiss as being a party stooge.

That said, I can well understand the perspective of both the General and David Cameron and whilst the attacks will come forth and will be made by people who are not fit to lace the Generals shiny shoes, the blows will hit home.

Ultimately this will be to the detriment of those he seeks to provide advocacy for.

The real blame for the politicisation of the forces lies firmly at the feet of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown who have used and abused the Armed Forces for over a decade, what did they think would happen if you grandstand on the world stage, rely on the training, determination and can do attitude of the armed forces, basking in their reflected glory but then starve them of cash, be small minded on almost every issue concerning the military covenant, penny pinch in all areas and unleash smear and innuendo when one has the moral courage to stand up for his men and women.

Whilst the motto of the Yorkshire Regiment is Fortune Favours the Brave, it seems the motto of the Labour Party is You Scratch My Back, I’ll Stick a Knife in Yours.

A mistake has been made but good luck Sir, stay low and watch your back (again)