The drive to reduce costs leads to the conclusion that a low priced aircraft is the answer and Embraer have proposed the Super Tucano, Beechcraft the AT-6, Air Tractor with the AT802 and even Boeing have pitched in with an offer to restart production of OV-10 Bronco. There are many other proposals as well, such as the Piper PA-48 Enforcer (a modern P51 Mustang)

Super Tucano

P48 Enforcer

Hawker Beechcraft AT6B Prototype

Boeing OV10x

Commentators often cite the Vietnam era Skyraider as the perfect CAS aircraft and make the extrapolation that a modern era Skyraider is what is needed in the skies of Afghanistan. As our previous article by Richard Stockley correctly highlighted, the Skyraider was withdrawn in the face of first generation man portable air defence missiles.

The revival of turboprop combat aircraft seems to boils down to three arguments;

1. Fast jets aren’t that good for close air support, armed ISTAR or any of the other missions required in counter insurgency operations where air superiority is a given.

2. Fast jets are too expensive and sophisticated to provide Close Air Support in counter insurgency operations as characterised by Afghanistan and given the likelihood of being engaged in similar operations in the coming decades the cost argument is a no brainer.

3. Fast jets are too complex for emerging air forces that we can mentor.

None of these are arguments for turboprop aircraft but arguments against fast jets; it just so happens that the turboprop seems to offer an antidote for the ills of fast jets.

Fast Jets are no good at CAS/COIN
It is probably fair to say that Western air forces have concentrated on the exercise of air power as a separate strategic stream to ground and naval power with strike, interdiction, air superiority, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and air transport missions shaping both doctrine and equipment. Mission over the Balkans and Iraq has confirmed that the RAF and USAF have these capabilities in spades.

The nature of ground combat, particularly in Afghanistan, dictates the use of light forces with little armour and a distributed enemy. It is primarily a conflict of light infantry. To compensate for the lack of numbers the western forces in Afghanistan rely completely on indirect fires, mortars, artillery and close air support.

Close air support whilst available in the RAF and USAF at the beginning of the conflict was not as well practiced and only after several UOR’s has the RAF been able to provide such close air support as it does now.

One of the arguments driving the Turboprop CAS/COIN bandwagon is that fast jets are simply too fast to provide their pilots with sufficient situational awareness to provide effective and safe support to troops in contact.

With the advent of improving tactics, techniques and procedures, coupled with the new capabilities offered by the latest generation of targeting pods where the forward air controller can actively cue weapons or see the same information as the pilot, this argument simply disappears.

Whilst it might have been true in Vietnam it is not true in Afghanistan.

Advocates of the Turboprop CAS aircraft point to better endurance but whilst this might be true, crucially, they fail to recognise the advantages that speed brings. Afghanistan is a huge place and to respond to a ‘Troops in Contact’ request for close air support the aircraft either has to be near or step on the gas to get there quickly. Time to get on station will be significantly higher in a turboprop as well. Turboprops may be able to be based closer to operational areas and this may offset this to some extent but will require operations, maintenance and logistics to be equally distributed, costing more.

Fast jets can carry a massive load and in practice this means a range of weapons, all available on a single aircraft that the forward air controller can choose to deploy based on the prevailing conditions. Turboprops do not have this high load capacity and would therefore have to be more numerous, they do not have the speed, so again, would have to be more numerous to cover the same area.

Fast jets are not restricted by weather conditions like small turboprops and can be refuelled in mid air to extend the duration of a sortie or time on station.

Speed has its disadvantages but in addition to being able to respond quickly and cover a large area it also provides safety. Although the air threat in Afghanistan is generally low that does not mean it is completely safe. Close examination of pictures of some aircraft operating in theatre will reveal air to air missiles are often carried, to counter the threat of an Iranian incursion. The Iranians have shown their willingness to take hostages as amply demonstrated by the RN/RM HMS Cornwall incident and a defenceless aircraft that they claimed had incurred into their airspace would be easy to coerce.

Ground fires are a significant danger; all aircraft operating in theatre are fitted with expensive but effective defensive aids against man portable ground to air missiles that the Taleban might obtain from sponsor nations and when operating at low level automatic cannon or machine gun fire is a very serious threat.

A high speed aircraft can transit danger zones quickly, unlike a slower turboprop which would remain in the threat zone for longer or simply not enter them in the first place which would limit effectiveness or mean aircraft and aircrew losses.

Finally, an unglamorous but absolutely essential activity that is carried out by fast jets is the show of force/show of presence that is used to deter ground elements or influence their actions. If one has ever seen these in action they are very effective, a turboprop, however cheap, is not going to have the same effect.

Close air support is not the only mission required in counter insurgency air operations.

Afghanistan has also seen an explosion in the demand for imagery and other visual/non visual information. This has been provided by manned aircraft but is largely fulfilled by Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) such as the UK’s Predator’s, Desert Hawks and Hermes 450’s

Whilst of undoubted utility, UAS’s have a couple of big problems, situational awareness and bandwidth requirements.

Because the UAS operator looks at the world around them through an electro-optical sensor it can be compared to looking through a drinking straw or telescope. Wide angle, peripheral vision is not available and whilst work is underway to address this issue it remains a significant problem.

Although the bandwidth used to control the flight of a UAS is quite modest and most new systems have some degree of autonomy which means they don’t need to be ‘piloted’ but ‘directed’ the raw sensor feed has to be transmitted as is. Because no onboard analysis takes place by a skilled imagery analyst the bandwidth requirements are significant. This a difficult issue because the bandwidth available is limited by power restrictions, availability of secure bandwidth and plain old physics. Full motion video, even with advanced compression and only a medium resolution can require up to 20Mb/s, synthetic aperture radar, approximately 50Mb/s. Given that BOWMAN gets by with less than 10kbs one can begin to appreciate the scale of problem. The demand is increasing at a fast pace.

A simple way to visualise the problem is showing your friends those holiday pictures. Of course they are not interested in the vast majority of your pictures so you sort them and create a slideshow with only the best images. If you made your friends sit through all 3,675 images on your memory stick they would not be best pleased.

Imagery analysis therefore takes data and provides information.

If this analysis takes place on the ground then logic dictates that the analyst has to look though all your holiday snaps and he gets these via a saturated satellite link.

Put the analyst on the same platform that is capturing the imagery and you dramatically reduce the need for bandwidth as one only needs to transmit the edited highlights. Arm that platform and the response times to enable that information to be acted upon opportunistically are also reduced.

Weather is also a significant constraining factor on UAS’s which would be magnified greatly if future operations were out of dry and sunny places.

These constraints lead to the idea of Armed ISR aircraft.

Because there is less need in the armed ISR role for fast response, hard manoeuvring and low level operation the disadvantages of a turboprop become diminished so the argument for this type of aircraft becomes much stronger. The RAF have recently started taking delivery of the Beechcraft Super King Air 350 based Shadow R1 ISR aircraft to supplement UAS’s. It would seem a relatively simple task to arm them with Hellfire or CRV-7 rocket pods to enable them to provide short reaction time attack based on its own gathered intelligence.

Not CAS but armed ISR, they are completely different missions and have completely different requirements.

RAF Shadow R1

Fast Jets are too expensive
Maintenance requirements for fast jets are higher than for simple turboprops but this fails to take into account the effect of introducing a new airframe into an already stretched logistics, maintenance and training stream, all this would add up very fast.

Because one would need many more aircraft the spares holding would have to be vastly increased.

The costs of aircrew would also be significant, probably greater than any cost savings.

We already have Tornado and Typhoon, adding significant numbers of Super Tucano’s is not going to make the Typhoon and Tornado fleet any cheaper in the short term.

One fly in the ointment for using fast jets for intensive COIN/CAS work is that if airframe hours. Modern fast jets were simply not designed for sustained high tempo operations and are currently chewing through their airframe hours at a prodigious rate. This is bad from a airframe fatigue viewpoint and means that individual aircraft will likely have to be withdrawn from service far earlier than planned. The RAF for example, have recently started studies to examine options for extending the airframe life of the Typhoon, no doubt prompted by the reduced number of Tranche 3 aircraft they will be receiving. From a cost perspective, using a lower cost alternative to marshal and eke out airframe hours on more expensive types is a strong argument.

However, we think this is an argument for more fast jets or even a new build close air support aircraft that has the advantages of a fast jet at a reasonable price and none of the numerous disadvantages of a turboprop aircraft, maybe a new build two seat A10C (subject of a later post)

Fast Jets are too complex for indigenous air forces
It is undoubtedly true that something like an F15 or Typhoon is out of the reach of, for example, the Afghan National Army Air Corps who are still working up to operating basic transport aircraft and helicopters. The Iraqi’s have been operating King Airs and Grand Caravan’s in the armed ISR role with some success but when asked if they wanted to buy into the new cheap CAS/COIN aircraft, their answer was, no thanks, can we have some F16’s instead.

This is perhaps the greatest argument in favour of a cheap CAS/COIN aircraft, operating them in order to mentor indigenous air forces and help them transition to the more capable jet types but we must recognise the limitations and concentrate on skills and training because Close Air Support of troops in contact requires the highest level of skill.

Summary
Propeller based close air support was supplanted by fast jets for a very good reason, effectiveness and survivability. Nothing in any of the proposed solutions for so called low cost CAS/COIN aircraft convinces us that these reasons have changed.

Nothing beats fast jets for payload, endurance, versatility and effectiveness.

ROUND 1 TO THE FAST JET

However, they are expensive, really…

The idea of replacing a few expensive fast jets with more numerous cheaper types (numerous because as we have described, they are simply not as effective) does seem on the surface to offer a cheaper solution but this argument more often than not restricts itself to making a one to one comparison without any context. Of course a Super Tucano is going to be cheaper to operate and buy than Typhoon in a one to one, but as we have shown, one would need many Super Tucano’s to do the job of a single Typhoon and that is just capital cost; the really expensive element is support costs. Spares, maintenance teams and the most expensive element of all, aircrew, would produce a situation that we believe would increase overall costs yet offer nothing more in terms of effect; in fact it would have a lesser effect.

ROUND2 TO THE FAST JET

Fast jets are too expensive and complex for indigenous or emerging air forces so the argument for a cheap CAS/COIN aircraft is strong here

ROUND 3 TO THE TURBOPROP CAS/COIN AIRCRAFT

2-1 in favour of the fast jet.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Arm the RAF’s new R1 Shadow (Super King Air based) with Hellfire or other weapon and increasing their numbers would be a sensible move with many advantages for the armed ISR mission to supplement Predator and Watchkeeper and Apache Attack Helicopter.

2. Consider joining the US initiative for a COIN wing for training local forces. We have much to offer hear both from an individual skills basis but also doctrinally. We would need to ensure that precious resources such as trained forward air controllers which are always in short supply are managed correctly to avoid shortfalls in other areas.

3. Consider focussing resources on a medium sized force of dedicated jet based Close Air Support aircraft such as a new build (with better wing, avionics and engine) A10C in order to relieve airframe hour attrition on other types if this was shown to be economically advantageous in the long term.

The exception to this was evident during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan where the Stinger Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) were supplied to the insurgents by a sovereign state, the USA.  Due to the insurgents’ lack of sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons, the aircraft deployed against them can themselves be somewhat unsophisticated, and therefore significantly cheaper.  Given the recent deployment of RAF’s Tornado’s to Afghanistan, replacing the versatile Harrier, the question needs to be asked, ‘is the RAF using a sledgehammer to crack the erstwhile nut?’

Utilising such a sophisticated aircraft, especially when dropping a 500kg laser guided bomb on a relatively small target, seems to be all too reminiscent of the Vietnam Conflict, along with the associated risk of collateral damage.

To give the RAF their dues, they are somewhat limited in the type of aircraft they can actually deploy as they can only use what they have in their inventory.  Although the Tornado may be a versatile weapons platform, it is tied to a long runway and in-depth support facilities, in this sense it is not a true weapon for counter insurgency; Sniper Pod or no.

The successful COIN type aircraft evolved following the Second World War, these small, single-engined fighters had been relegated to ground attack due to the advent of the jet age.  These aircraft surpassed in this role due to their rugged construction, effective armament and grass field capability; aircraft such as the P-51 Mustang and the A-1 Skyraider.  The Skyraider, previously a carrier-borne aircraft, fulfilled a great deal of the criteria required of a COIN aircraft in that it could carry a large and varied weapons load, loiter on station for hours at a time, was highly manoeuvrable and could absorb significant levels of battle damage.  Unfortunately being large and slow, the Skyraider was unceremoniously kicked into obsolescence on the battlefields of Vietnam by the advent of the SA-7 Strela MANPAD.  In spite of this, the Skyraider was one of the key aircraft that defined the requirement of a COIN aircraft.

Skyraider A-1

Counter insurgency conflicts determine the type of aircraft that can be used due to their very nature, they, on the whole, tended to be located in countries with large rural areas.  If the insurgents followed Mao’s doctrine, the government forces had to spread their forces more thinly and over a larger area in comparison to a conventional conflict, hence the need for airpower to provide far-reaching fire support.  These countries also tended to be ex-colonial, less affluent and lacking a large scale industrial base, meaning they would have some difficulty in supporting highly expensive, state-of-the-art jet fighters from large, dedicated air-bases.

Therefore, like the Skyraider, a dedicated COIN aircraft needs to be robust and relatively unsophisticated so that it can operate from grass or dirt strips away from a dedicated support facility.  In reality, these aircraft would not be permanently deployed in the field, but operate on short term deployment, returning to their main base for interim servicing and repair.  They also need to have excellent range and endurance capabilities in addition to armour plating, self-sealing fuel tanks and a heavy and varied weapon load mounted on a large number of hard-points.  Cargo carrying capabilities would also be an additional bonus, allowing the aircraft to shift men equipment as well as drop ordnance on the enemy.

Before reaching for a fresh pen and a clean sheet of paper, the aircraft designer will accept that that a number of existing designs already exhibit many of these attributes.  However, due to the advent of the MANPAD, current designs will require a greater element of sophistication with regard to self-defence systems.  Fortunately, it is not too great an industrial task to graft these systems on to just about any existing aircraft of an appreciable size.

The first port of call for a COIN aircraft is the propeller driven trainer; the advantage here is that many of the types currently in production offer armed variants for weapons training.  The RAF’s current turboprop trainer, the Shorts Tucano, can be fitted with weapons hard-points, as a number of these were sold to Kenya, although this weapons capability is not utilised by the RAF.  This model has a more powerful engine than the standard EMB-312, but it is debateable whether this aircraft could cut the mustard in the harsh, hot and high environment of Afghanistan.  Also, its ability to carry a modest 1,000 lbs (455 kg) of ordnance on four under-wing hardpoints severely limits its attack capability, especially if carrying additional, necessary items such as drop tanks and armour plating.

This is in sharp comparison to the larger and more powerful Air Tractor AT-802U, a modified agricultural aircraft, which can carry an impressive 8,000 lbs (3,636 kg) of ordnance on eleven hardpoints; a modern example of Russian Sturmovik.  The AT-802U also has an in-built AAR-47/ALE-47 countermeasure system for use against MANPADS; although the addition of infra-red shielding around the jet-pipe would not go amiss despite the drag penalty.

Air_Tractor_AT-802U

Embraer, the parent manufacturer of the Tucano have recognised this lack of attack capability in the original model and have unveiled a larger, more powerful model, the EMB-314 Super Tucano.  This dedicated COIN variant can carry a variety of dumb and smart bombs, rockets and even sidewinder missiles in addition to its two inbuilt, wing mounted 12.7mm machine guns, which it has used on a number of occasions to shoot down drug smuggling light aircraft.  Embraer are not the only manufacturer to recognise the suitability of the armed trainer aircraft for combating insurgents.  Beechcraft are offering their Texan II trainer in combat guise as the AT-6, as are Pilatus and Korean Aerospace with the PC-9M and KO-1 Wong Bee respectively.

EMB-314 Super Tucano

Variations on the COIN theme can be seen with the Cessna 208 Caravan which, in addition to its cargo role can carry two Hellfire missiles.  This concept could be transferred to the RAF’s Beech King Air B200 aircraft, however, how successful this concept would be needs to be seen.  Hitting a target with a Hellfire at night from high altitude carries with it a certain element of safety as the enemy cannot see you.  Hitting one with rocket and cannon fire at low level during the day is different matter altogether, and inherently more dangerous.

Larger dedicated, twin-engined COIN aircraft are still available on the global market, aircraft like the FMA IA-58 Pucara.  Although still a viable airframe it demonstrates perfectly the limitations of deploying a COIN aircraft against large and well equipped conventional forces; the majority of the Pucara’s deployed by Argentina during the Falklands conflict were destroyed with the few remaining being captured.  Hence, one needs to remember why such aircraft became obsolete in the first place.

This situation also highlights why a dedicated COIN aircraft has yet to be adopted by the UK for use in Afghanistan, despite the obvious advantages of deploying such an aircraft; its role will be limited to the low intensity conflict.  The attitude of the MOD would seem to be that they prefer to have an aircraft that is flexible enough to operate within both a conventional and a COIN environment and unfortunately this means sticking with hi-tech, high cost jet fighters.  One of the most truly flexible aircraft currently in the UK inventory is the Harrier, although it is now in its final decade of operation.  Whether its replacement, the F-35B is up to the task and is capable of operating from a muddy field in Germany or a jungle clearing in Belize has yet to be seen.  But given the costs involved, it would appear to make better sense to operate a lighter and cheaper, dedicated COIN aircraft rather than a super-fighter.

Not for the first time has the MOD been accused of operating a Cold War mentality years after it ended, this is one of the areas where it appears to be guilty as charged.  In this sense whether it is just the MOD’s lack of vision and flexibility or the RAF senior commands’ reluctance to get away from their large concrete runways and air-conditioned facilities and actually get their knees dirty, is besides the point, the point is that there is an actual need for such an aircraft in our forces inventory.  COIN aircraft are not just a one trick pony, in addition to their primary role, such an aircraft can be utilised for weapons training, FAC, reconnaissance or just as a standard trainer, although in this role they wouldn’t be as cost effective as their lightweight cousins.

Given the diversity of aircraft currently on the market and their differing capabilities, it may be necessary to utilise two types of aircraft.  A single-engined Super Tucano type for daytime ground attack and a twin-engined, Hellfire armed, transport type for night attack/interdiction.

The RAF’s new Commander in Chief Air, Air Chief Marshall Sir Christopher Moran, may acknowledge that his service’s role has changed from that of fighting the Cold War to one of fighting a counter insurgency.  However, despite having fought a counter insurgency war in Iraq and now in Afghanistan, at this time the only dedicated COIN aircraft in the RAF’s inventory is a single captured Pucara sat in the RAF Museum at Cosford.

Until a squadron of COIN aircraft in RAF markings are sat on the dispersal at Kandahar combat ready, it will be difficult to believe that both the RAF and the MOD have truly stepped out of their Cold War mentality and accepted the realities and needs of fighting an unconventional war in the 21^st century.

Richard Stockley

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