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]]> http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/01/the-unstoppable-peace-process-in-nad-ali/feed/ 3 http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/11/ieds-pakistan-and-fertiliser/ http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/11/ieds-pakistan-and-fertiliser/#comments Thu, 17 Nov 2011 21:41:57 +0000 Think Defence http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=12255 There was an interesting story in the news recently that described a startling fact.

Eighty percent of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted in Afghanistan (resulting in 90% of all U.S. casualties) are made with components that come from just two legally operating factories in Pakistan.

It would be fair to assume that a similar figure would be true for UK forces.

There is no doubt that the IED is the single largest casuse of casualties and serious injuries for UK forces and the UK has devoted an enormous multi agency effort to reducing the impact of IED’s and defeating them.

Surely after nearly a decade in theatre, hundreds of casualties and several billion Pounds direct expenditure and just as much spent on aid to Pakistan would it be a reasonable expectation that the issue of legally produced ammonium nitrate fertiliser coming from just 2 factories would have been resolved.

The report goes on to say

Each year, the two factories each pump out about 400,000 metric tons of ammonium nitrate—a common fertilizer used by farmers—and about 1% of that makes it to insurgents, Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero, head of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), said in a breakfast meeting with defense industry representatives this morning. While NATO forces have a lock on where the fertilizer comes from and where it goes upon initial sale, “what we don’t understand is how this ammonium nitrate gets from these factories to the insurgents,” he said 

 This is not a new story.

Writing in the Daily Telegraph in September 2009, Christopher Booker wrote

In the same month US Marines captured a vast cache of IEDs made from agricultural ammonium nitrate fertiliser in 25 kilogram bags indistinguishable from the thousands of tons of fertiliser supplied to Afghanistan under Western aid programmes. It has long been obvious that many of the roadside bombs used to kill British and other Western troops are made from fertiliser paid for by UK and other Western taxpayers.

Overlooking for one moment the influence of the Pakistan government are there are any alternatives to Ammonium Nitrate to stop it turning into Ammonium Nitrate Fule Oil (ANFO) explosives?

I looked at this when the story in the Telegraph was published, the MoD issued a press release stating that steps were taken to ensure the convertible ammonium nitrate was not supplied by it or DFiD in its projects but this obviously misses the point that the volume provided by the UK to Afghan farmers is minute in comparison to the total amount used.

In the Think Defence post I looked at a Honeywell product called Sulf N.

What is a non explosive fertiliser and what is an explosive fertiliser?

The real problem in interdicting supplies of ammonium nitrate based explosives is the fact that ANFO explosive is in widespread commercial use, as are ammonium nitrate fertilisers. From above, there are 2 large factories in Pakistan churning out tens of thousands of tonnes of the stuff.

Used as a high nitrate fertiliser it is produced by a number of industrial and small scale processes and usually packaged in bulk or in bags as small pellets or prills. Although it is not explosive in itself it is an oxidising agent and has been the cause of many industrial accidents, for example an explosion aboard an ammonium nitrate loaded ship in Texas City that killed over 500 people. Subsequent investigations have resulted in a number of storage recommendations and regulations that cover issues such as nitrate percentage, storage conditions, bulk and other conditions. In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive issues these regulations.

It is probably fair to say that in conflict zones, such best practice and regulations do not exist or are not complied with.

Ammonium Nitrate can be induced to decompose explosively by detonation and it is this that makes it attractive as both a commercial and improvised explosive. ANFO type explosives are the largest type in commercial use, mostly in the mining and construction industries. This commercial product is often mixed on site and is considered to be very safe. With an ever keen eye on cost reduction, the mining industry has now worked out how to utilise waste oil in slurry explosives.

When used as an explosive it needs a booster charge to initiate explosive decomposition and in large quantities can be incredibly destructive. The Oklahoma and Bishopgate bombs were reported as using ANFO or ANFO variants.

Ammonium Nitrate based fertilisers are widespread and therefore difficult to control, they remain a common and effective means of creating improvised explosives even though increasing regulation has reduced the demand.

Recognising the commercial potential benefit of a non explosive alternative Honeywell has developed Sulf-N-26 that fuses ammonium nitrate and ammonium sulphate.

From the Sulf-N website

• Sulf-N® 26 technology fuses ammonium nitrate (a fertilizer and explosive) with ammonium sulfate (a fertilizer and fire retardant)
• The result is a “double salt” matrix with two AN molecules for each molecule of AS
• The AS in the Sulf-N® 26 matrix dampens the rate of AN combustion
• When used as a supplementary fuel source for high explosives, Sulf-N® 26 is less effective than sugar or sawdust
• When mixed with a sensitizer (as in AN/fuel oil bombs), Sulf-N® 26 is as ineffective as sand

Tests have shown that the product has a number of agricultural benefits and is effectively inert.

Because Sulf-N-26 is a patented product its widespread use is likely to be retarded by cost and licencing issues.

For the Trillions of Dollars in aid and military spending and tens of thousands of lives and limbs lost to IED’s are we aksing too much that some of that be diverted to persuading/funding the Pakistani government to licence Sulf-N and build out a couple of factories? 

Can one imagine the transformative impact of having a low detonation potential fertiliser flooding the market in Afghanistan, cheaper than conventional products?

Click the link and have a read, its a good article from Thomas Harding

Has this anything to do with the vehicle though?

I suspect that vehicle design has its part to play but much more important is the underlying doctrine and resultant tactics, driven through by soldiers who know a thing or two about mounted close combat. It is the Royal Armoured Corps that have delivered this success, the vehicle is merely a tool that lets them get on with their job.

This tells me a few things;

• Its always about the people
• Being mobile on the battlefield is as valuable today as it ever has been
• The shock factor of armoured vehicles, moving at speed and deploying supporting infantry is potent

Neither did I until ISAF released a few photographs of the Boxer, about to start operations in Afghanistan (click the images to see more)

How very civilised and the perfect antidote to the doom and gloom around today

I think the committee have produced an excellent report that the Army, MoD and government will duly file in the round filing cabinet. This is a shame, if anything, it should be the touchstone on which a serious and fundamental review of the way we go about our business should start.

The flaws it so eloquently exposes, without a hint of emotion, should be seared into the minds of every politician, senior officer and senior civil servant, past, present and future.

On the 17th of July I published a holding post, listing the reccomendations of the committee.

The main issues I see from this report are as follows;

• A woeful lack of helicopter support, despite Senior Officers telling anyone who will listen that all is well, nothing to see here, move along. When are we going to wake up and realise support helicopters are more important than fighter bombers and aircraft carriers?
• A hugely strained air bridge held together by good will and harry black. The protracted delays and quite ridiculous restrictions imposed on the capability by the insistence on a PFI, again a poor prioritisation of intellectual and financial capital
• Arrogance, pettiness and keystone cops buffonery at the very highest echelons of the Army and MoD civil service mixed together with a huge dose of financial and political interference created a toxic brew that cost good men and women their lives, limbs and mental health. Who is actually going to take some responsibility?
• Dysfunction and old fashioned fuckwittery in the intelligence services, DFiD and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, they were supposed to support the overall strategy but only served their own agendas. Has the SDSR described national security council and national security strategy solved any of these issues?
• A complete lack of strategy and a general confusion of tactics and strategy leading to a disastrous period that put the overall campaign back by ten years

After tens of thousands, perhaps even millions of words have been written about how to link up ends, ways and means we still got it badly wrong and if the leadership of the Armed Forces and politicians involved do not look at this with open and honest eyes then quite frankly, they need sacking.

Afghanistan, as ever it would seem, is involved in a power struggle between Pakistan, China, Iran and India with an interest from others. The game is still great, the seats have shifted around a bit though.

Where is our role in this, its difficult to see or defend a security angle for our continued involvement but a precipitous withdrawal would harm our interests just as ISAF is on the cusp of achieving, if not a win, but an acceptable score draw. It is impossible to draw any sensible conclusions about who is winning or losing because the nation of Afghanistan and the conflict in the general area is so fiendishly complex. We take a step forward in one area and then two steps back in another, trends are hard to see but there are plenty of signs that just maybe the means of delivering the overall strategy of a graceful exit and acceptable level of stability/security is an industrial demolition of the Taleban is beginning to pay dividends.

Its a subject we have touched on before, getting back to the fundamental truth that the way you win any conflict is by destroying ones enemy, not building women’s peace parks, it’s long overdue.

The fundamental problem we now face is how to sustain this operational tempo against a tide of calls for early withdrawal and an indifferent or hostile public opinion.

This is going to be difficult, we are spending money we can ill afford and neglecting areas of actual defence importance, to say nothing of the likely toll on our brave and stoical service personnel.

A question arises, is it more important to stay with the job to the end and hope we prevail, or cut and run and take the consequences, not an easy decision to make.

What the armed forces need now is a level of stability that gives them clear line of sight to a strategy on Afghanistan, whichever that might be.

However, beyond that, we desperately need a Haldane or Childers figure to cut through the senior leadership of the MoD and Armed Forces with a great big axe because between them, for the last decade, they have failed the nation and failed their subordinates.

No amount of success in the next 5 years will change that basic fact.

The business of defence needs a serious kick up the arse, delivered by an outsider with a pair of balls big enough to not to wilt at the sight of a chest full of bling and miles of shiny gold braid.

Lets also not forget the role of successive politicians in this piss poor display of strategic leadership and competency, we are limited in what sanctions we can apply but history should judge the likes of Tony Blair, Geoff Hoon and Gordon brown very harshly indeed.

Very harshly

To view the report, click here, with additional evidence here.

Reaction from the media…

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/17/mps-report-condemns-helmand-failures

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/8642521/The-real-scandal-is-not-hacking-but-Helmand.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8642525/Armed-Forces-too-weak-to-defeat-the-Taliban.html

The report is pretty damning but those hoping for a Cardwell or Childers moment are in for a surprise, this report will create a flurry of activity, an avalanche of letters to the editor and no doubt lots of comments on here and many other defence websites but until the government recognises it has to match commitments to funding and the armed forces/MoD recognise the need for serious reform (not just tinkering) then the next report will contain the same issues.

Yet again we see the MoD not being frank with the Select Committee and if you have ever watched an evidence session in which senior officers and civil servants refine the art of sneering disdain you will see the report specifically castigates the MoD for failing to provide sufficient information, after all, the grown ups at the MoD are doing so well.

Expect a response from the MoD which includes how much they have spent on helicopters, protected vehicles and counter IED capabilities, its a classic tactic, well used by the previous government, triple counting and confusing the amount spent with actual capabilities

What I want to know is, what structural changes has the Army and MoD made since many of these mistakes were made?

It’s no good raking over the past and apportioning blame, as interesting as it might be, the real task for the Army and MoD is to recognise there are fundamental issues that need resolving.

Only then can we have another Childers or Cardwell, a meaningful root and branch reform.

Please take the time to read the report but the conclusions and recommendations are reproduced below

Introduction

1.  We wish to pay tribute to all the British personnel, both military and civilian, who are currently serving or have served in Afghanistan but, in particular, to those who lost their lives in Afghanistan, and the many more who have sustained life-changing injuries as a result of the conflict there. We also express our deep gratitude for the vital contribution made by the families of Armed Forces personnel. We are mindful that some of the conclusions in this Report, because they are critical of the actions of successive Governments and their senior military advisers, may be interpreted as a criticism of the men and women who have served in extremely hazardous, hostile and difficult conditions. We wish to place on record that no such criticism is made. The Armed Forces and civilian personnel in Afghanistan have our full support in tackling the challenges before them. (Paragraph 1)

2.  Communicating with the UK population about the purpose of any mission involving UK Armed Forces is crucial. We have found that the Government’s descriptions of the nature of the mission and its importance to UK interests have varied throughout the campaign, lacking a consistent narrative. Whist MoD polling data has shown some limited improvement in the public’s understanding of operations in Afghanistan, we have observed some confusion in the communications on Libya which reminded us forcefully of earlier stages in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 14)

3.  We disagree with the MoD decision not to give us sight of documents which are now over five years old. Refusal hinders our Parliamentary scrutiny of the MoD. (Paragraph 15)

4.  In future, we expect MoD to come to give evidence to the Committee briefed and prepared to be frank and open about matters where the provision of information would not put the Armed Forces at risk. (Paragraph 16)

Operations in Helmand in 2006

5.  Given the demanding nature of the situation in Iraq, we do not consider that the implications of the decision to move UK Armed Forces into the South of Afghanistan in early 2006 were fully thought through, in particular, the potential risk to UK Armed Forces personnel. We consider that this criticism applies equally to the international decision to deploy into the South, in that all decisions made at such a level inevitably involve tensions and delay, which contributed in this case to the difficulties subsequently encountered. (Paragraph 28)

6.  Notwithstanding our recognition of the limitations on intelligence in situations such as Helmand in 2006, we are concerned that the MoD did not anticipate that the presence of the Armed Forces in Helmand might stir up a hornets’ nest especially as much of the intelligence was contradictory. We consider that if, because it was essential to support improved governance in Afghanistan, the deployment could not have been deferred or delayed until the end of the fighting season in 2006, senior military advisers should nonetheless have raised serious concerns about the unpredictable nature of the conflict on which they were embarking. This briefing should have drawn clear attention to the need for force levels to be sufficiently robust to cope with an unpredictable conflict. We believe that such concerns as were raised by the Armed Forces were inadequate at best, and that they were not raised, as they should have been, to the very highest levels of Government. (Paragraph 36)

7.  Whilst we recognise that senior military staff have a role in determining the level of resources needed on specific operations and that this might mean moderating the demands of commanders in the field, nonetheless, we are disturbed by the fact that the Secretary of State was being told that commanders on the ground were content with the support they were being given in Helmand when clearly they were not. We regard it as unacceptable that hard pressed Forces in such a difficult operation as Helmand should have been denied the necessary support to carry out the Mission from the outset, and that this shortage had not been brought to the attention of Ministers. (Paragraph 41)

8.  We consider it to be unlikely that this fundamental change to the operation was put to Ministers for a decision as to whether to proceed. We cannot be more certain on this because we have been denied sight of the relevant minutes (see paragraph 15). As the change put the lives of Armed Forces personnel at much greater risk, it should surely have gone to the Cabinet for endorsement. Subsequent to the decision, the new Secretary of State was told in retrospect but we do not believe that senior military advisers briefed their Ministers with sufficient force as to the strategic implications of the operational change which had already been made. The MoD should tell us how relevant lessons have been learnt. (Paragraph 55)

9.  The significant transfer of such senior key personnel, both political and military would increase risks in the administration of the Armed Forces at any time but, in 2006 at such a crucial stage in both the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it gave rise to unacceptable risks. We conclude that these risks were realised. We recommend that the Government should avoid moving so many senior military personnel at a time when Ministers are being moved as well. (Paragraph 56)

10.  What is particularly worrying is that the much increased requirement for additional resources and support, in particular for additional troops and helicopters, was not acted upon quickly enough. Whilst we accept that it is not possible to prepare and train soldiers quickly to reinforce those on the ground when circumstances change, we are, nonetheless, concerned that no strategic reserve had been trained and prepared in order to be readily available, particularly as this Mission had been planned for some considerable time. There should always be a contingency reserve available with the resources to support it. If it is used, immediate plans to restore it should be in place. (Paragraph 62)

11.  Armed Forces personnel achieved the best tactical outcomes possible in very difficult circumstances in no small measure due to the high quality and training of the troops themselves. But it must be acknowledged that the force levels deployed throughout 2006, 2007 and 2008 were never going to achieve what was being demanded of the Armed Forces by the UK, NATO and the Afghan Government. We view it as unacceptable that UK Forces were deployed in Helmand for three years, as a result of a failure of military and political co­ordination, without the necessary personnel and equipment to succeed in their Mission. (Paragraph 67)

Military operations since 2009

12.  We welcome the adoption of the counter-insurgency strategy by the coalition and recognise that, for UK Forces, it was a continuation of its previously adopted strategy although this had been badly under-resourced. It seems to us that the two crucial aspects of the revised strategy are the decision to put the security of the local population at its core and the acceptance of the need to hand over responsibility for security to the Afghan Government and the ANSF. We also recognise that the McChrystal Strategy could not work without the accompanying surge in troop numbers. (Paragraph 71)

13.  We consider that it is vital that NATO, ISAF and UN Missions and the international alliance succeed with this latest strategy in both political and military terms. We note the progress already made and that training and support arrangements may have to continue for some time after the withdrawal of combat capability. [See Part 6 for further discussion on withdrawal and transition arrangements.] (Paragraph 78)

14.  We welcome the introduction of the role of the UK National Contingent Commander and the “two star” headquarters for Regional Command South. We also conclude that the command and control arrangements for operations in Afghanistan in 2006 were deficient. Following the review of the operational role of PJHQ, we require a clear description of the revised command and control arrangements for Afghanistan including the role of the PJHQ and its relationship with headquarters in theatre. We recognise the importance of having a readily available and capable “two star” headquarters for these types of deployments and are concerned about the reduction in the number of such headquarters following the SDSR. (Paragraph 88)

15.  We recommend that the MoD make greater efforts to reduce breaches of harmony guidelines for all personnel and take these breaches into account when deciding which trades and groups of Armed Forces personnel should be subject to redundancies. (Paragraph 90)

16.  The MoD does not record centrally how many Armed Forces personnel have been on multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and other operational theatres. Such information is vital to allow the Armed Forces to judge the load on individual personnel. We recommend that this information is collated and should be considered alongside breaches of harmony guidelines when judging the pressures on the Armed Forces, and on individuals when deciding on posting. (Paragraph 91)

17.  We look forward to seeing the results of the work being done to improve the effectiveness of the airbridge. In the meantime, we recommend that the MoD negotiate with allies to permit the use of their resources to plug any gaps in the airbridge. (Paragraph 93)

18.  We recognise the importance of close air support and the skill and bravery of those providing it. We would like confirmation from the MoD that the Armed Forces in Afghanistan now have access to sufficient and timely close air support. (Paragraph 95)

19.  We are conscious that our predecessor Committee was told in previous inquiries that UK Forces have enough helicopters only to discover subsequently that this was not true. We are not convinced that UK Forces yet have access to sufficient helicopter hours. We recommend that, in response to this Report, the MoD set out how the new helicopters delivered into theatre have impacted on the availability of helicopter hours, any outstanding delivery of helicopters and how much reliance and use we are making of helicopters from the USA and other countries. (Paragraph 97)

20.  We recognise that the Taliban continues to change its tactics and methods and that the extent of the use of IEDs has changed and developed since 2007. However, we believe that the MoD did not respond quickly enough to these challenges as they developed. We continue to be concerned about the time taken to get a suitably capable vehicle fleet into theatre. Protecting Armed Forces personnel is a critical duty of the MoD. We recommend, in its response to this Report, the MoD explains how current equipment levels are providing the Armed Forces with the necessary protected vehicles, body armour and counter-IED support. The MoD should prioritise the protection of personnel when considering the funding of such needs that emerge in the future. (Paragraph 102)

21.  We recognise that civilian contractors provide valuable support to the MoD. We require that the MoD should monitor and report on casualties of contractors working on behalf of the UK Government. (Paragraph 103)

22.  It seems to us that the convention under which all additional costs of operations should be met from the Treasury reserve has been breached with the introduction of the concept of ‘urgent defence requirements’ and the requirement to pay back expenditure on UORs over the estimate. We recommend that the classification of UDRs be dropped permanently and that the MoD be not required to pay back expenditure on equipment needed on operations. We would like confirmation that all additional costs for Afghanistan are being met and will continue to be met from the General Reserve. We seek a similar confirmation for the costs of the Libya operation. (Paragraph 105)

23.   Whilst we recognise that the MoD cannot calculate accurately the full cost of operations, we nevertheless ask the MoD to provide us with a broad estimate of the total costs of operations in Afghanistan. We also ask the NAO to do a study into the level of costs of Afghanistan. (Paragraph 108)

Training of the Afghan National Security Forces

24.  There have been significant improvements in the training of the ANA but there is much progress yet to be made before the ANA is ready to take over responsibility for security in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. We welcome General Richards’ assurance that the aim of a sustainable ANA is being aggressively pursued but the MoD must maintain its focus on training the ANA, in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. (Paragraph 116)

25.  There is much progress yet to be made before the ANP is sufficiently reliable to take on its share of the responsibility for security by the end of 2014. The UK should continue to insist that the international coalition maintain the momentum on training the ANP and, in particular, on reducing the level of corruption in the ANP. (Paragraph 122)

26.  We recognise that much hard work has gone into the training and partnering with the ANSF, in particular, in enabling the physical and conceptual components of fighting power but we remain concerned that the training and development of what the British Army calls the moral component—leadership, discipline, culture, ethics and anti-corruption—is crucial to ensure the long term professional capability of the ANSF. (Paragraph 125)

27.  We are of the opinion that the ANSF will require significant support after the transition. We await with interest the assessment of the success of the transition of the first seven areas, in particular that of Lashkar Gah. (Paragraph 126)

The impact on the civilian population

28.  We welcome the reduction in the number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF and ANSF Forces despite the increase in operational tempo. We recommend that UK Forces maintain their focus on reducing civilian casualties whether these are caused by ISAF or ANSF Forces or by the insurgents. We require that the MoD should monitor, or encourage NATO to monitor, civilian casualties caused by insurgents as well as those caused by ISAF or ANSF Forces. (Paragraph 130)

29.  We recommend that the MoD ensure that information and influence operations are sufficiently resourced both in Afghanistan and in future operations. Influence operations in Afghanistan should make extensive use of the informative reports commissioned by the US Forces on the Afghan population in specific areas of the country. If no such reports are available for relevant areas, UK Armed Forces should commission reports independently. (Paragraph 133)

30.  Generally, polling data on the views of the Afghan people does not present a coherent picture over time although some indications are that the local population are seeing some improvement in security. (Paragraph 134)

31.  We recommend that the MoD put into place proper planning for language skills in theatre for future operations. (Paragraph 135)

32.  We accept that it would not be possible, even were it desirable, to turn Afghanistan into the type of modern democracy to be seen in Europe. It would be preferable —and more likely to be successful—to build on local traditional structures which are accepted by the people of Afghanistan. These structures are not for ISAF to determine. (Paragraph 146)

33.  We understand that the relationship between the UK PRT and the US Forces took some time to bed down and we commend all parties for making this work. (Paragraph 148)

34.  The UK-led Helmand PRT has been held up as a model of how a PRT can work. We commend the work of the PRT and the way in which civilian and military personnel have worked together. We also look to the MoD to continue to provide the appropriate resources and capabilities in support of the PRT and to prepare for a smooth transition in transferring PRT responsibilities to the Afghan authorities. (Paragraph 150)

35.  If Afghanistan is to become a stable and even partially functioning society, it is vital that women are involved in the process and feel they have a stake in it. If, as feared, women are largely excluded from peace negotiations, coupled with the re-engagement of the Taliban in government, then the progress made so far could easily unravel. UN Resolution 1325 requires that in all peace negotiations in regions affected by conflict, women’s voices must be heard to ensure the long-term stability of any negotiated settlement. Afghanistan is no different. (Paragraph 151)

36.  We recognise that progress in the development of the role of women is important to the evolution of a democratic state in Afghanistan even if the form of democracy it takes is one more suited to Afghan traditions than to Western models. (Paragraph 155)

37.  We do not think that the MoD has taken the needs of women in Afghanistan as seriously as it should. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government provide a progress report on the number of female engagement officers currently in Afghanistan and on the development of relevant pre-deployment training on cultural awareness including the role of women. We recommend that the MoD takes a more comprehensive view of the issues relating to women when it develops its training. (Paragraph 157)

Transition and withdrawal

38.  We are concerned that, as any refocusing of US Forces is planned, any redeployments should be properly sequenced with UK planning for the withdrawal of UK Forces in the South of Afghanistan, and that UK Forces are not left exposed. (Paragraph 168)

39.  The Government’s room for manoeuvre regarding the number of troops that could be withdrawn from Afghanistan as part of an immediate transition is necessarily limited. The withdrawal of a few hundred troops in support roles is feasible and would not significantly affect the combat capability of those remaining. A more significant drawdown, however, would have to involve a complete battle group. Weakening any battle group to withdraw numbers would be a dangerous move. A troop withdrawal that involved numbers in the low thousands, therefore, would depend on a geographical reorganisation of the battle groups and the withdrawal from combat duties of at least one of them.    (Paragraph 169)

40.  We believe that the NATO ISAF “conditions-based approach” to withdrawal is a suitable one. Withdrawal must have due regard to the circumstances at the time. There are still many challenges facing the ANSF and Afghan Government before proper transition can take place. (Paragraph 170)

41.  While we recognise that the Government believes that the UK public would like certainty as to when UK Forces will be out of danger, we also recognise that some level of uncertainty is inevitable. It is important that the Government’s clear determination to withdraw combat forces should not undermine the military strategy by causing the Afghan population to fear that the international coalition might abandon them or by allowing the Taliban and others to think that all they have to do is bide their time until ISAF Forces withdraw. (Paragraph 171)

42.  We recognise that much progress has been made towards the development of governance arrangements but have yet to be convinced that the arrangements are sufficiently robust, transparent or accountable in terms of their capacity to take on the full range of responsibilities that will fall to them after 2014. Added to this is the uncertainty as to how these governance arrangements will develop following the end of the second constitutional term of President Karzai. It is essential that a comprehensive approach is taken to the transitional arrangements that will need to be put in place leading up to 2014 and beyond. UK Government Departments other than the MoD will also have a part to play in helping to build the capacity necessary to ensure that stability is maintained under Afghan control. We have seen some evidence of such a comprehensive approach but feel that more emphasis needs to be placed on capacity building within the political system if long-term success is to be achieved. (Paragraph 172)

43.  We expect the Government to set out in a timely fashion, the milestones it expects to reach and the progress it expects to make against them as 2014 approaches. We will continue to scrutinise closely developments in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 173)

Spotted these over at Circulotrubia, they seem to show a Warthog recovery in progress

Any spotters know what the recovery vehicle is, uniforms and flag would suggest its not UK, maybe Canadian perhaps?

If you look closely it also seems as if there were two vehicles stuck in water.

Seem like a job well done but Warthogs don’t float anymore then!

A tip of the flat cap to Circulotrubia

TES(H) updates and brings these together in a single package;

• A flexible modular armour system that can be adapted to meet changing threats and reduce vehicle weight
• Enhanced seating design and cushioning to further improve mine protection and comfort
• An improved driver vision system with an increase from one to three periscopes, providing a wider field of vision and a night-vision capability
• Increased low-speed mobility and climbing performance, enabling the vehicle to tackle tough terrain and get closer to a target or destination
• Motorsport-derived carbon fibre brakes, providing significantly reduced stopping distance
• Improved air conditioning for troop comfort in hot and harsh environments
• Wire cutters to protect the driver, commander and equipment on the vehicle from obstacles.

The roll-call of British sub-contractors on the programme includes Allen Vanguard (Tewkesbury), Astrum, Remown (both Co Durham), Caterpillar Defence Products (Shrewsbury), Dana Spicer (Birmingham), GKN Driveline (Telford), Icon Plymer (Nottingham), MTL (Rotherham) Thales Optronics (Glasgow), Thyssen Krupp (Birmingham), Tinsley Bridge (Sheffield) and W A Lewis (Shrewsbury)

The additional weight of the upgrades puts the Warrior into the 40 tonne plus bracket so many of the modifications are designed to improve reliability and mobility.

Left a bit

The new vehicles have been transported to theatre in RAF C17′s, note the load spreading planks to protect the floor of the aircraft

Warrior in Afghanistan

1st Battalion The Royal Irish Regiment (1 R IRISH) has conducted a huge air assault operation in Helmand province, overwhelming an insurgent safe haven and leaving the enemy unable to respond

More information here

What part of clear, hold, build is this then?

You might also want to have a read of this

The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan

And then if you really want to confuse yourself, pop over to the Guardian

What is going on in Helmand?

In the recent post on the future of tactical transport I covered the runway extension at Bastion/Leatherneck

The runway at Bastion has been continually improved, quoting from my favourite magazine,concrete monthly;

A small team of British Army Royal Engineers is getting close to the end of an ambitious 10-month project to build a second runway at the Task Force Helmand Task Force’s logistics hub, Camp Bastion, in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan.

The new 7,710-foot-long runway, due to be completed in December, will enable the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) C-17A Globemaster aircraft to fly direct to Camp Bastion from the United Kingdom, greatly increasing the speed of the onward distribution of freight and supplies throughout the province. The C-17A Globemaster is the latest addition to the RAF’s fleet of transport aircraft and is capable of rapid, strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main or forward operating bases anywhere in the world.

The new runway will replace the temporary gravel landing zone constructed by the 39th Engineer Regiment in March this year. Currently C-17A aircraft can only land at Kandahar Airfield because of the gravel runway at Camp Bastion, so Hercules C-130 aircraft are used to ferry freight between Kandahar to Camp Bastion. The Hercules C-130 aircraft will also benefit from the new runway as they will be able to carry more weight on landing – be it troops or supplies.

October 2007 Issue

From 2008 Operation MERGE was initiated to improve the facilities again, in order to support the USMC deployment to Helmand, notably the Camp Leatherneck 1, 2 and 3 phases. As part of this operation and in order to operate the largest of aircraft like the AN-124 , C5 Galaxy and commercial aircraft like 747’s the runway at Bastion has been supplemented with a new build. This new 11,500ft runway will run parallel to the one mentioned above, which will now operate as a taxiway. When completed the new runway may also enable direct flights usingTristar’s rather than them flying into Kandahar, 25 odd times per month.

Now the second runway or flightline is fully operational no time has been wasted in getting the larger aircraft in, in fact, the largest aircraft in the world.

From the RAF operational update for March 6th

With both the new runway and ATC Tower now complete, Camp Bastion has been able to host a variety of interesting visitors. On 4 Mar 11, Bastion received its first visit from an Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft and on 7 Mar 11, the larger Antonov AN-225 flew into theatre. Whilst the ‘smaller’ version can carry a payload of up to 150 Tonnes, this is dwarfed by its 6-engine bigger sister. The only one in the world of this model, the AN-225 has a wingspan of 88m (290ft) and carry up to 250 Tonnes of freight.

[slideshow]

Perhaps the best quote is from Captain Jeff Steele, the director of safety and standardization for US Marine Aerial Refueler Transport squadrons deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan

What they’ve built here is a commercial class airport, without the terminal

My off the cuff starter for ten;

1. Politicians should think once, twice and seventy five times before committing the armed forces. We have drifted into an extended conflict with little practical gain that has been extremely costly in blood, treasure, international reputation and influence. Our principal objective now seems to withdraw with as much of our tattered military and political reputation intact as possible, every soldier killed, limb lost and pound spent between now and the cessation of operations will be because we failed to think enough about the consequences.
2. Show me the strategy, confusion about selection and maintenance of the aim of operations in Afghanistan means that every strategy in fact becomes a tactic. All talk of COIN this or containment operations that, is conflating the day to day means of realising a non-existent strategy because we did not and still do not have a realistic objective. One day it was the defeat of Al Qaida, then it was education for girls, human rights, drugs interdiction, preventing the Taleban provide a safe harbour for terrorists and so on. A clear objective for future operations is as vital as item 1
3. Listen to the armed forces but don’t be afraid to ignore them, military advice is not always correct. Politicians need to improve their knowledge of strategic and operational matters so they can make informed decisions and have the conviction to drive them through. Political leadership is every bit as important as military.
4. If committing the armed forces then do not place shaped handcuffs on them, yes we know very few UOR’s get declined put political limits on force composition, force protection issues, manning and other operational matters makes the job of achieving what little clarity in aim that much more difficult. These are restrictions are generally tied to the cost of operations or how things might look in the press so in short, politicians need to accept that military operations are very expensive and dangerous but meddling will make things worse. This might seem contradictory to item 4 but it is about different things
5. Unity of command is important, yes of course it is important to have a multi agency approach but the FCO doing one thing, DFiD doing another and the military stuck somewhere in the middle is a recipe for chaos
6. You can never have enough helicopters, spare parts or soft toilet tissue. Availability of equipment and more than enough logistics back up is something that should never be subject to debate, we need to get better at supporting what we have even if this means fewer new toys
7. Relying on Urgent Operational Needs to supply the vast majority of equipment is not big or clever and will cause untold problems post conflict. Whilst many hail the UOR system as a of success, and in some respects it is, it is not guaranteed to deliver adequate equipment and is fundamentally an admission of a failure to plan for and resource lots of what might be called ‘basic equipment’ like uniform, body armour, protected diggers and night vision equipment
8. Each conflict is different, using one as a template for another is rarely a recipe for success and we need to have the institutional agility to learn from past conflicts but recognise when those lessons are not applicable. Rapid adaptation is the hallmark of many successful organisations and we need to put in place a structure that in effect, gets rids of a lot of structure!
9. Information operations should be core to military ones and vice versa. The internet and its Twitter/Facebook/Blogging/YouTube offspring is rapidly changing how people at home, in theatre and around the world perceive what we do. We need to recognise this and maximise these tools to our advantage.
10. The final one is up to the commenters to fill in

With the sale of DERA/QinetiQ and reduction in technical skills in favour of management skills, the MoD becoming a commissioning entity rather than a systems developer, the costs are only starting to become clear now.

The example I used in the previous post was the humble ladder, much used in Afghanistan for small gap crossing and getting onto a compound roof.

Defense News ran with a story describing how when faced with a requirement from Afghanistan for a portable short gap crossing system (thats a ladder  to you and me) instead of calling on the resources of its 22,500 employees it outsourced the job to BMT.

Responding to an urgent operational request from the frontline to come up with a better method of crossing ditches and scaling walls than a conventional ladder the Ministry of Defence turned to BMT Defence Services to provide an answer.

In the space of five weeks this summer the Bath, England-based consultancy conducted a survey of possible solutions and completed a competition involving more than a dozen bidders from the U.K. and overseas.

Eugene Morgan, the director of systems at BMT Defence Services, says the consultancy team running the project spoke to designers ranging from a supplier of ship gangways to a Formula 1 racing team in order to find the best possible solutions.

Morgan said recommendations on the top three or four designs for the 3 metre bridge requirement was submitted to the MoD last month.

I suppose it’s a good thing that the requirement was met in double quick time but when ministers talk up the UoR process as a triumph for the MoD, how it is responding to need, being flexible blah blah do they actually mean

‘ we just pay someone else to do it for us because we are tooo busy buying aircraft carriers’

Is this another indicator of something we covered earlier, it’s not the numbers of civil servants that count but the types. If DE&S doesn’t have the bandwidth to run an acquisition exercise for what is more or less an upgraded ladder, then we need to be concerned.

A year after BMT submitted their recommendations the MoD has released details of the resulting product.

Short Gap Crossing (Not a Ladder)

Short Gap Crossing (Not a Ladder)

Short Gap Crossing (Not a Ladder)

Roger Pidgeon, the DE&S team’s project manager for the short gap crossing, said:

“We received an urgent request for an ultra-lightweight and man-portable short gap crossing capability.

“In the first instance we looked to deliver a commercial off-the-shelf solution, but none was immediately available on the market.

“BMT’s engineering knowledge helped us to reach specialist suppliers in the motorsport and aerospace sectors who have extensive experience in lightweight aluminium, carbon fibre or composite structures.

“Our requirement was turned into a bespoke design solution by BMT in just four weeks.”

The bridges designed by Alpha Composites can be carried by each member of a patrol. Troops can also use the system as a lightweight assault ladder, replacing the bulkier, heavier in-service equipment. Alpha Composites are a market leading company in hi technology materials and I wonder if any of the trials team or IPT managed to blag themselves a gucci briefcase !!

What does this tell us?

First, there is valuable and cutting edge capabilities within the UK manufacturing sector that we absolutely need to exploit so the MoD/Automotive sector partnership that was started a few years ago has to be nurtured and expanded.

Second, whilst BMT are no doubt an excellent organisation, this kind of facilitated access to manufacturers and technical evaluation role should be a core MoD function. If the MoD and DE&S is going to improve its woeful record on buying equipment for the armed forces it needs to bring back in house the expertise it hastily discarded.

Finally, here is an excellent example of not buying off the shelf, not going with the 80% or ‘good enough’ solution. However, given the quite staggering loads being carried by infantry soldiers in Afghanistan it is equally an example where insisting on something other than good enough and developing a bespoke solution was absolutely the right thing to do.

Those advocating more of the former might perhaps like to carry those extra kilograms in 40 degree heat.

Of course we don’t know if it is any good or substantially lighter than the traditional alternatives.

Maybe it really is a Short Gap Crossing and definitely not a ladder!

This is another shift that signals a further escalation in the aggressive tactics signalled by the replacement of General Stanley McChrysta with General David H. Petraeus. Special forces missions have seen a rapid increase and the formerly restrictive rules of engagement that saw Close Air Support being increasingly difficult to use have been relaxed. With the deadline for significant troop withdrawals in sight, it seems ISAF is going for a ‘shit or bust’ strategy. It is clear that this uplift in operational tempo has been making serious inroads into the capacity of the Taleban and without getting too excited, the recent mumblings about negotiating with the Taleban may just be the result of cause and effect.

It is a measure of how just how timid and afraid of bold actions we have become that there was a request several years ago to deploy Challenger 2 to exactly the same area that the USMC Abrams tanks will now be deployed

The head of the Army, General Sir Richard Dannatt, asked the Ministry of Defence to deploy Challenger Two tanks – acknowledged as one of the best weapons in Britain’s armoury – in Afghanistan two years ago, military sources have claimed. Despite his request, the Government decided the terrain in Afghanistan was not suitable for the Challenger

The Independent newspaper

The MoD of course denied there had ever been a request and in all fairness, there probably wasn’t a formal request but that’s not quite how these things work, as we all know.

In 2007, in response to a written parliamentary question, Des Browne, the then Secrtary of State for Defence, replied

There are no plans to send Challenger tanks to Afghanistan at present.

In December 2009, in a parliamentary debate, another Labour Secretary of State for Defence, Bob Ainsworth, assured the house that

We will not require the Challenger in Afghanistan because it is not suitable for that theatre.

Since then we have deployed the Challenger 2 based engineering vehicles, the Trojan and Titan, and also CVR(T) and Warrior.

Our allies have also deployed main battle tanks although in different terrain, Canada and Denmark being notable in their deployments. The French have also put their 105mm canon armed AMX10- RCR’s to great use. Of course the Taleban don’t have any of their own tanks but that is a fatuous criticism. Main Battle Tanks provide protected mobility and massive firepower that can, although it is a cliche, deliver shock and awe.

The precision and firepower of a tank can also reduce the need for indirect offensive support from artillery and close air support jets or helicopters.

The lessons learned during Operation MEDUSA by the Canadian Army leadership included the importance of maintaining heavy armour as part of a balanced force.

Beginning in December 2006, the tank squadron and armoured engineers featured prominently in all major combat operations undertaken by the Canadian Battle Group, including at BAAZ TSUKA and ACHILLES, working side by side with Afghan National Security Forces, American Special Operations Forces (SOF), and ISAF troops. The Battle Squadron was initially responsible for establishing attack-by-fire positions in support of infantry companies and in forming the nucleus of a Battle Group counter-moves force capable of responding throughout the entire Canadian area of operations. Many Taliban insurgents learned the hard way of the capabilities of the Leopard’s main gun during the following years when attacking Canadian strong points with rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and indirect fire.

During these operations, the tank squadron proved its ability to conduct sustained combat operations at great distances from the re-supply nodes at each of the forward operating bases (FOBs). Additionally, Leopard mine ploughs were used to clean up an old Soviet minefield. Since May 2007, the tank squadron has fought almost constantly alongside Canadian and Afghan infantry in close combat with the Taliban.

Supported by the artillery, combat engineers, attack aviation and fast air groups, mechanized combat teams from the 2 RCR BG have achieved decisive victories against insurgents in the Howz-e- Madad, Nalgham and Sangsar areas of Zhari District where vineyards and imposing compounds render wheeled vehicle movement particularly difficult. Leopard tank crews have extensively used the 105 mm High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) round to eliminate insurgents attempting to attack dismounted soldiers. More importantly, tank rollers and ploughs have continued to mitigate risk to coalition soldiers by clearing routes of pressure-plate detonated IEDs while providing intimate support and a breaching capability to dismounted infantry companies

Danish Leopards have supported the British led Helmand Task Force, even in the Green Zone, where they have provided overwatch.  Operation Sond Chara and Abbi Toora made extensive use of the Danish contingent.

Op AABI TOORAH began with the pre-positioning of the Danish tanks, previously used on Op SOND CHARA in December to great effect. At the same time the Danish Leopard tanks were in an overwatch position on high ground to the north and west and were used throughout the battle to engage, from range, the well dug-in enemy positions.

What is most galling about this is that UK forces requested the deployment of Challenger 2 several years ago but this was denied on cost and ‘political’ grounds. Whilst the terrain and infrastructure might not be conducive to operating main battle tanks in all operational areas there is no doubt that our allies, notably the Danish forces in our task force, have made great use of their tanks and supported UK operations.

Danish Leopard MBT, Sond Chara

Perhaps the Danes provided just enough but should we really be relying on allies for capabilities we have?

One is left wondering if this seemingly timidness is down to external cost restraints or a dangerous misreading of the need for high tempo operations coloured by ‘the Northern Ireland’ experience. It also makes the pledges of all the politicians about giving the troops what they need somewhat hollow.

16 Air Assault Brigade formally took over as the lead formation of Task Force Helmand from 4th Mechanized Brigade on Sunday 10 October 2010 and begins Operation Herrick 13

This article from the Australian caught my eye recently

The best Taliban commanders are dead or captured. Their men are harried and subject to constant attack and betrayal. They are under-equipped, overwhelmed and demoralised. In a word, the Taliban are losing.

In Britain and the US there may be doubt and confusion over the future of the Afghan war, but in southern Afghanistan the description of the Taliban insurgency by senior figures at the forefront of the fighting is bold and unequivocal.

The troop surge is working, they say. The Taliban is at breaking point and an Iraq-style watershed, when momentum is shifting in a favour of the NATO coalition, may be nigh. It amounts to a ray of hope for NATO aims as the war begins its 10th year today.

“The Taliban are getting an absolute arse-kicking,” said one top-level Westerner deeply involved with Operation Ham Kari, the latest big push by US and British forces in Kandahar. “It’s been their worst year since 2001-02. We’re taking them off the battlefield in industrial numbers. We’re convinced that the initiative has really shifted.”

Echoing the Australian article is a commentary from the Washington Times

Gen. Keane told The Times he has witnessed in Afghanistan the same shift in fortunes: Taliban fighters are changing sides, villages are being cleansed of the enemy and protected, and intercepted communications show flagging Taliban morale.

“Overall, we can see now that the surge forces are starting to make a difference,” he said. “And you have to be encouraged by some of the progress that’s being made. All that said, we’re in a tough fight, and I believe we will continue to gain momentum.”

Gen. Keane offered two observations as evidence. First, most commanders with whom he spoke said they are encountering Taliban who want to stop fighting and reintegrate into Afghan society. “That’s a big deal,” he said.

Second, “There’s evidence of erosion of some of the will of the Taliban. We pick it up in interrogations, and we also pick it up listening to their radio traffic and telephone calls in terms of the morale problems they’re starting to have,” Gen. Keane said.

A military officer in the U.S. who monitors the war confirmed that Taliban radio chatter sounds a bit frantic.

The largely left wing UK mainstream media has long since confidently predicted a humiliating defeat for ISAF so are any positive signs being deliberately under reported?

It’s easy to be cynical or doubt the outcome but confidence is a large factor in any resolution and I wonder if the last few months may have heralded a turning point that may be built upon by 16 Air Assault Brigade and other ISAF forces?

Using the latest figures from the UK Defence Statistics the RAF has 106 GR4′s in the Forward Available Fleet.

So with ten in theatre, that is less than 10% of the available fleet and if one included the Typhoons, Harriers of JFH and (rather unfairly) the Tornado F3′s that is less than 5% of the available fast jet fleet.

This isn’t an RAF bashing exercise and there are very good reasons, as we all know, why the f3 is not suitable, why most of the Typhoons aren’t suitable, what other contributions the RAF makes, what other duties the aircraft are needed for (QRA, FI etc) and available infrastructure in theatre but in an enduring operation like Afghanistan is deploying 5% of your combat power acceptable.

In the SDSR should we be aiming to improve the RAF’s deployability

There are any number of theories floating around as to why he did this; vanity, a push for political power with an eye on the Presidency, a sneaky means of disentangling himself from the wreckage of his own/President Obama’s failed strategy or simply a good old fashioned cock up.

So depending on your point of view, the General is either relaxing today with a mission accomplished grin or packing up the wreckage of his career after the official ‘interview without coffee’

Of course he had to go but was he any more successful than his also sacked predecessor, General McKiernan, and will he be missed?

Apart from asking serious questions why a General in charge of something as serious as operations in Afghanistan has time for left leaning magazine interviews or why the cult of personality around an operational commander was allowed to grow, the real question is not why it happened but what happens now.

To some extent, we know what happens now, Lt Gen Nick Parker takes over interim command until General Petraeus is formally appointed by NATO/ISAF (there are niceties to observe you know)

The whole point of a military command structure is that it is resilient and can absorb losses. Elevating the commander to rock star status means commentators often lose sight of this point.

In one way, there should be absolutely no change, the strategy that has been decided by the military and civilian leadership team should simply be executed. Self evidently, the existing team was dysfunctional and its deliberately created ‘creative tension’ did not work as planned so the management of an already decided strategy is the issue at hand.

President Obama has said that despite the personnel change, the strategy remains the same. Whilst demoting/re assigning General Petraeus may be a sign of political strength and savvy in reasserting the primacy of the civilian in the civilian-military relationship, there are problems ahead. The ball may be firmly back in the military’s court but they will still have to deal with a corrupt Afghanistan government, diminishing support within the ranks for the softer COIN strategy and a lack of focus from the State Department. There may be some short term gain for the President but long term, he is still going to have to account for the success or failure of the mission in Afghanistan and he is running out of fall guys.

Is the strategy right then?

To steal a quote from Sir Winston, however beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.

After 18 months of the new McChrystal approach there are some isolated signs of progress but the Taleban still hold the momentum and numerous other issues continue to erode our capability to defeat the Taleban. The restrictive rules of engagement and legal briefings before every operation do not seem to have had much impact except make a difficult job even harder. The new regime may actually be more like the old one, a loosening of the ROE and greater use of indirect fires. Despite the PR and high hopes of the COIN theorists, Marja was an all too predictable disaster and one wonders if the upcoming and oft delayed operation in Kandahar is going to be equally ineffective?

Much like the UK forces tried to apply the lessons of Northern Ireland in Basra, ISAF is applying the lessons of Iraq in Afghanistan. With our Westernised way of doing things and concern for the population we simply create opportunities for others to exploit. The ANSF are being trained in a Western style and not for their own environment and culture, ultimately dooming them to failure. We certainly have not won of the majority of Afghan population and when we are sacking our own political envoys because they don’t agree with the current US strategy then there is cause for concern about our strategy.

As I mentioned in a previous post, the Afghans seem to enjoy the status quo and milking the Western tit for as long as possible. We are being played and need to recognise that our security interests lie elsewhere. The reason the Taleban seem to enjoy so much influence is partly because we attribute it to them, when in fact they are irrelevant in the wider scheme.

There is nothing quite like being told you are irrelevant to knock the wind out of ones sails.

Most of the ‘Afghanistan is the  graveyard of empires’ talk is ridiculous hyperbole and the comparisons with the Russian occupation show very little association with fact, the Russians lost 26,000 personnel and had less in theatre than do ISAF and the Afghans had an estimated one million casualties. If there are any lessons to learn, perhaps we should look up the tactically flawless withdrawal of Soviet forces.

I have no doubt we could eventually prevail with the right strategy, sufficient resources and unity of purpose but the key question is, why do we need to prevail.

This is an opportunity missed, to have a serious rethink about Afghanistan, what are our objectives, is there unity of purpose/effort, are resources appropriate, is the strategy the right one and finally, is it worth the cost in blood and treasure?

Much of the talk is about the military desire to ‘crack on’ or wanting to win at all costs, without recognising that strategic withdrawal to go and fight somewhere more important is a valid military option.

I used to think that a precipitous withdrawal would be a big mistake, nature abhors a vacuum and the resultant inrush would pull in all manner of malignant factions, the final outcome being difficult to predict, but maybe we just have to recognise that Afghanistan needs an Afghanistan solution. We might worry endlessly about the results of such as withdrawal; an emboldened Iran, the break up Pakistan or Pakistani nuclear warheads falling into the hands of Al Qaida but if we try and hedge against every eventuality then we will be led by the nose from one engagement to the other and get suckered more and more until we have no blood or treasure left to give. Those with an interest in the outcome; India, China, Russia and Iran are all conspicuous in their absence, being forced to address the prospect of radical islamist terrorism being exported from Afghanistan to Chinese Sianking, the southern former Soviet ‘stans’ and the central Indian states might focus minds somewhat. Instead, they are happy to play games whilst the West walks all the hard yards.

The prospect of all that potential mineral wealth might also galvanise regional diplomacy.

Rather than grandiose ambitions building a nation in the mould of the West; a focussed provincial approach, supported by aggressive special operations and lots of hard nosed political deal making may be a more suitable way to find the exit door.

As we debate the finer points, yet more ISAF/Afghan soldiers and civilians are being killed and wounded, cash we don’t have is being poured into the desert and the real threats to our collective security go underfunded because of the cash hoover that is Afghanistan.

There are any number of threats that are being ignored or underfunded; the Falkland Islands, home grown Islamic terrorism, energy/water/food security, piracy on the high seas, drug smuggling, cyber attack and that is before we even look at the economic situation.

Take your pick, but they are all more important than creating a stable Afghanistan with clean water and education for girls, however laudable that goal is.

So whilst we all concern ourselves with the man, shouldn’t we actually be looking at the strategy, or more fundamentally, what are we trying to achieve with that strategy?

That strategy comprises of two broad elements

1. Get the fuck out of dodge

2. Pretend it was a victory

After years of failure in Afghanistan the new strategy will be to come up with a sensible disengagement. Lets face facts, we have failed.

The government has failed, the MoD has failed and the senior military leadership has failed.

It might be fashionable to blame crusty old Cold War Generals or penny pinching Treasury officials but the truth is, they are all equally responsible. Trying to undertake a complex operation with the absolute minimum of everything was never going to work and that is making the assumption that it was worth making work in the first place.

That should be Labour’s epitaph, ‘what’s the minimum we can get away with’

With confused strategic objectives that ranged from cutting opium production one day to sending Afghan girls to school the next the real strategic objective has been to coat tail the USA. There is nothing wrong in standing by the USA if we are honest about it but the dishonesty that the current argument of ‘reducing terror on the streets of the UK’ is patently ridiculous. How many British Citizens have been killed in the UK by Islamic fundamentalists and how many have been killed in Afghanistan?

The Afghan population is unwilling to actually do anything other than sit on the fence and wait and see, whilst squeezing every last drop of money out of pockets of Western nations tax payers back pockets.

The execution of the operation has been and continues to be deeply flawed, under resources and plagued by delusional optimism. It has taken the academic and free thinking US forces to come and show the supposed master of COIN how to do it. The student has become the master. Apart from the usual suspects, our NATO partners have been dragged kicking and screaming into a conflict that they perhaps quite rightly judged to foolhardy.

We have lost nearly 300 killed and countless wounded, the cost to the public finances are simply huge and on the ground, despite good news stories from the MoD, there is very little progress.

A cynic might suggest that the current government, having spent many years in opposition complaining about underfunding will have an entirely different perspective now they are in government and might have to stump up the money to do the job properly.

Better to blame those Cold War Generals.

Facing a very real defeat in Iraq we chose to use the line of ‘supporting the Afghanistan mission’ as an excuse, providing a fig leaf for the failures in Basra.

We always seem to fall back on our our successes in Malaya, Oman and particularly Northern Island as the model for this type of operation, without recognising that each is different. Look at the force levels in Northern Ireland or the tactics in Malaya, there are no parallel with Afghanistan. We have failed to apply even our own experiences.

Out of the wreckage of Afghanistan and Iraq the British Armed Forces and Great Britain itself has to recover some of it’s reputation.

I don’t buy into the ‘no one has ever won in Afghanistan’ arguments but it is really difficult to see how we can make any real difference now.

Do we double up and put enough resources in to actually make a real difference or cut and run?

Whatever the strategy…

However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results

Winston Churchill

PS, sorry for the sweary bits!

Speaking about the role of UK troops in Helmand, Dr Fox said:

“I think that we should be having our forces deployed where they are going to have the greatest effect in terms of the overall strategy of the coalition and I don’t think we should be precious about that.

“Our troops have done a wonderful job in Helmand, talking to American commanders there. They are extremely impressed now that they’re on the ground in Helmand and seeing the difficulty of the conditions. They’re very impressed about how bravely and professionally the British forces have operated.”

Reading between the lines (and possibly getting it hopelessly wrong!) that means UK forces are off to Kandahar Province to replace the Canadians who will be leaving in 2011 and the Dutch who will be leaving neighbouring Urōzgān this year.