Think Defence is not set up to write a post on every single item of defence related news because we simply don’t have the time, but given our stated intention is to get people talking about defence issues who are we to stop people bumping their gums!
Please use the comments to discuss any matters that we haven’t done a post about or indeed anything that you want to.
824 Comments
Does anyone know if Sea Viper is actually working on the Type 45s? The last I heard there was a successful test against a drone but that hardly seems a confirmation that its full capabilities have been shown to be reliable. Has it ever really been put through vigorous tests?
breaking news, americans have gone for the boeing air tanker proposal oh quelle surprise there!!!!
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/PAAMS?wasRedirected=true
Hmmmm – powered by Windows 2000 and they had problems…
Does anyone now if the French/Italians have had any problems?
I think – and I certainly hope I am right, that Windows 2000 is only used as the OS of the actual consoles. It’s still Windows 2000 because MS had that put through the major security certifications (and to be honest, it was pretty solid).
I presume, that the actual ‘command system’ including the radar and other sub-systems use a ‘proper’ real time OS such as QNX or something similar.
It was a bit disconcerting to see Windows running on the consoles in Dauntless’ ops room. You would think the MoD would get GCHQ to knock up a HMG OS based on something nice and secure like BSD.
BFBS to be contracted out
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/25/fears-objectivity-british-forces-contract
Hi Paul g,
RE ” gone for the boeing air tanker proposal oh quelle surprise there!!!!”
- yes, how many times did they have to stop and restart the process, to get the “right” result
Hi x,
RE “You would think the MoD would get GCHQ to knock up a HMG OS based on something nice and secure like BSD”
- it was not that long ago when the company in Europe with most software developers was… UBS, not SAP
- look what happened to them (the former)
- better to stick with the core mission, and not get diverted/ distracted?
@ TD
Please don’t do that again!! The words Guardian and unbiased shouldn’t be used in the same sentence.
It is rather interesting that BBC can run foreign language services for 3/4 of the globe. Yet they aren’t responsible for BFBS….
Nice to know we can afford the BFBS, but our license fee can go to fund broadcasts to Iran.
All for the want of £20m…….FFS.
I am annoyed now.
RE BFBS,
From the selfish side, I will miss the music beamed from Gib to the rest of southern Spain.
But I can see what is going on here, as in “The MoD is also believed to be unhappy with the coverage of the rapid decommissioning of military planes, ships and hardware in the recent defence review.”
- sometimes I feel like a spy, trying to find out what actually is going on (what a waste of time, I would rather just express my opinion)
- the manipulative media techniques, of letting out “rumours” first, to test for the reaction (where else than on the Telegraph) does not measure up to the openness that is being pushed e.g. re: local gvmnt (which is not all “held” by the current gvmnt)
Nice to have this “ranting” page available
- if the bin wars return, I will start to call the gvmnt a fascist-stalinist dictatorship… a term that I have so far reserved for the previous one
- at least both the fascists and stalinists were “strong” on defence; not much more to say for them (as a history note)
Actually, Windows is used even on the SSNs, and probably in part of the SSBNs systems too. It does not come as a surprise at all: it is so far cheaper to use it than develop all new software for not directly combat-system related tasks.
Sea Viper is now operative, anyway, and later this year there should be new firings from Type 45 destroyers. For what is known, everything is fixed.
As to Italian and French PAAMS, i’m not aware of failures with it so far. Everything was fixed in June 2010 with a combined series of test firings from the UK Longbow barge, from the french Forbin and Italy’s Andrea Doria destroyers.
Dauntless and Daring both fired their missiles already and validated the system, and Dragon might do it later this year.
As to Boeing win in the tanker contest… Did anyone really think it could happen differently? The A330 is the best tanker out there, but it is not american.
And we know what free market means: Europe must freely and preferably buy american. America buys american too. And when it does not, it makes the thing it buys an american thing, no matter the expense.
Not fair, in a word. But that’s how it works.
@ ACC
Dude it was thin end of the wedge when NAAFI shoreside became SPAR…
Hi Gabriele,
A good point “And we know what free market means: Europe must freely and preferably buy american. America buys american too. And when it does not, it makes the thing it buys an american thing, no matter the expense.
Not fair, in a word. But that’s how it works.”
- someone, in last few days had a good point about industrial off-sets for major deals
- we must be the biggest customer (Israel gets most of their stuff, rather than buy it) who do not insist on any such off-sets… we get intelligence instead (anyone with an idea of its worth!)
Anyone given a thought about how the forces will provide security during the 2012 Olympics?
Just a thought.
Hi Mike,
For Athens NATO mobilised… I think we can manage?
“we get intelligence instead (anyone with an idea of its worth!)”
Well f*ck knows how many satellites the yanks have floating around up there and how many geeks they have sitting in holes in the ground around the globe keeping an eye on anyone who so much as farts. I would say it’s worth a fair bit as we nor anyone else really could reasonably afford to match it especially as we’ve no idea how much is off the books. Of course we don’t get free reign but we do get to play with their toys more than the other children but it’s getting tighter as we cuddle up to Europe more.
*returns to lurking*
A Euan sighting! Wizard.
Mike,
Not sure how MACP is supposed to play out next year, though its one of the sorts of things that interests me so I’ll try to do some digging. Montreal ’76 (post-Munich) and Seoul ’88 (next door to the loonies) were probably the high water marks in terms of that sort of security, whatever the post-9/11 Games may claim for themselves.
TD,
Love the bloke on the link to this thread (and the open thread’s just what was called for re: Gareth’s original question/suggestion.) Best of British wierdos. Should have him up on every open thread, unless you can top him. Hyde Park Corner’s good that way.
Any thoughts on what effect SDSR will have on recruitment after 2015? And has there been any noise from the Ministry as to how they think they will cope?
On one hand, less posts to fill, and those posts that are left may well be quite safe and stable; on the other hand, once a very long period of conflict has ended, equipment has been off-loaded, and the forces have shed thousands of uniformed jobs, a military career could seem like something of a dead-end option.
Without an effective public relations plan covering this period, the MoD could hit a sticky spot with manning.
You make an interesting point Brian, recruiting is not a problem now, far from it but as you say, post 2015 when Afghan is hopefully done with and things are shrinking it might seem less attractive
There are always ‘events’ though
5 years is a fair way off yet
“those posts that are left may well be quite safe and stable”
I assume this is a joke?
The following is an extract from Robert Gates speech to students at west point Its good to know we in the UK are in the process of doing the exact opposite. Generals always prepare for the last war I guess.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/26gates.html?_r=3
“In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it,” Mr. Gates told an assembly of Army cadets here.
That reality, he said, meant that the Army would have to reshape its budget, since potential conflicts in places like Asia or the Persian Gulf were more likely to be fought with air and sea power, rather than with conventional ground forces.
New Link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12588947
Hey Jackstaff nice to see you to:)
Admittedly it’s probably been all over the 6 o’clock news. To say a few words on recruitment I don’t think there will be a problem unless the economy bounces back in a big big way and the government get a handle on immigration. Even then there will still be those who would join up as people always have done for Queen and Country although I doubt many modern youths still have or will have that mentality. We will also probably still be sending folk around the world on aid missions and training etc which might still attract those seeking a bit of adventure or who want to travel that is until someone works out the CO2 generated.
Mark, thanks for that post really interesting stuff and one of the things i like about Gates is he speaks what he knows is happening although others would rather ignore the facts.
RE ” a military career could seem like something of a dead-end option.”
- won’t this be especially true for officers as really there is no point of joining without reasonable promotion prospects?
I have the highest respect for the current Defence Secretary, but no other guy (than Donald H. Rumsfeld)has managed to lose two wars for a superpower – and I’m not including A-stan. Well, one and a half, as others turned it around in Iraq.
Michael, re: “safe and stable”.
I mean surely, whatever is left of the armed forces at that point must surely be an absolutely essential military requirement; not something likely to be given up in the [then]near future.
I can be hoplessly wrong about these kind of things.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/8348752/The-defence-review-should-be-reopened.html
Or alternatively we could throw a coup d’etat.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Phil_Jackson.pdf
It may be opptomistic asking this before the system is fully operational but what do people think about enhancing Sea-Viper to BMD standard? and do we have plans to purchase the land based version?
To be fair on the tanker issue, the Airbus would be too big to use all of the airfields the USAF wanted it to, and when carrying similar loads, its fuel consumption would have been significantly higher than the Boeing’s. The Airbus offered more capacity, but the USAF decided that they didn’t need that. Personally, given the enormous size of the order, I think it would have made sense to divide it, but there you go…
Gareth, I don’t think the MoD has plans to purchase anything very much (except that which it is contractually obliged to) and we haven’t had any land-based SAMs bigger than Rapier for many decades.
Tony – interesting point, some aviation blogs are suggesting US might throw Airbus a bone in the shape of the smaller KC-Y competition to provide a larger aircraft to replace the KC10
what do people think about enhancing Sea-Viper to BMD standard?
The T45s carry Aster 30 missiles as part of the Sea Viper system; these are already ABM-capable.
@x – the World Service always used to be funded by the FCO, but I think it’s now been transferred to the licence fee as a “hidden” budget cut like transferring MUFC into the RN budget. But I’m all in favour – the Farsi service does more to support our strategic interests than a hundred tanks, albeit in a less Top Trumps fashion.
@JS – all the envelope testing of the Aster missiles was done with the French/Italian version of the radar etc, so all that needed to be done on our part was to test that it had been properly wired up to Sampson etc. So I wouldn’t worry too much about the lack of apparent testing with Sampson, although obviously the more testing the better.
@GJ – thanks for the link, useful. I think all you can say is that we have no money, but BMD is where SAMs are heading, and that Blocks 1/1NT/2 of Aster will all fit the existing tubes on the T45. Block 1 has already shot down Scud-alikes, so the programme seems to be on track, and no doubt we’ll get it eventually.
TD hasn’t done the actual link to the admiral’s latest letter to the Telegraph, just the article about it.
Lots of innuendo and FUD, for instance they reckon we can buy F/A-18′s for US$30m/plane rather than the US$100m it cost the Aussies. At least they admit that the Harrier fleet isn’t up to doing the current tempo of ops in Afghanistan – but they’re probably right in that if we only want 6-8 planes there and can afford to give up the anti-IED recce mission, then Harrier is the cheaper option.
I’d not seen that Sharkey Ward now has his own blog, where he’s in full flow against the perfidious crabs :
http://www.sharkeysworld.com/2011/02/rafs-fight-for-survival.html
PS Thanks TD for setting this thread up, I’d been meaning to suggest it for a while myself. You might want to think about archiving it every month or something?
@a – the standard Asters aren’t ABM capable. The new Block 1 variants have limited ABM capability, they can shoot down tactical BM’s with no manoevring capability – the classic example being the Scud. That link GJ gave gives some idea of the roadmap for development – the key thing is that it’s all being planned to fit in the Sylver A50 launchers. It also seems to hint that there may be some advantages in the T45 radar layout over the Horizon for this mission?
@ Euan
A serving ex-cadet applied to join my unit’s staff. On his forms he put his employer as HM Queen.
What seems to happen is that they aren’t monarchists when they go in but a good proportion seem to become persuaded to that point of view. And not in an unquestioning way (“The Queen, God bless her!” but with quite a developed political sense of reason.
Just an observation.
El Sid, those clowns in high places suggest in that letter that a squadron of 18 F18′s will cost £360 million or £20 million each.
Need I say more
Tony
Actually the airbus tanker requires a shorter take-off and landing distance than the boeing tanker with a higher MTOW. So the Pentagon picked the least capable across the board. This has nothing to do with cost or capability all to do with senators from the pacific north west seeing lots of job losses. The 787 is not going well and they may need to sell over 600 a/c before turning a profit, the a380 is eating into sales of the next generation 747 which also isnt going well and on the military side the c17 line is closing with the f18 line following shortly after. The way their bodging the tanker together I see a US equivalent of Nimrod on the horizon. The airbus a/c is available now the boeing one is still on the drawing board.
TD
24 hornets are costing the aussies 4.6 bil dollars with 10 years support. In my view the current carrier strike capability is very limited and was the right decision to remove it. It should be replaced with the proper carrier capability expected. They should have perhaps kept the ship as a helicopter platform thou at least until lusty and ocean are thru their refits.
Hi El Sid,
RE “shoot down tactical BM’s with no manoevring capability – the classic example being the Scud”
- where we need to get to is the Chinese ship(carrier)-killer that manoeuvres akin to a Pershing, in its final stages
- I think the Americans have had some disappointments in their Standard 3 testing, but so much of this stuff is kept under the wraps… who knows
@ ACC – I was once told (no sources, so I’ll class it as hearsay) that they tested the PAAMS against a artillery shell – similar to the famous Sea Wolf test – at first they thought it had missed but when the shell was recovered (solid dummy I assume) it had a huge gouge down one side. Now this was test conditions (if it happened) but would indicate a high level of accuracy, so BMD shouldn’t be that much of a stretch…?
@mark
my local paper carries quite a lot on airbus as the wings factory is nearby, just made 212 contractors permanant and ramping up shifts, i know it’s not centric to the thread but i’m surprised in these dark times it’s not shouted by the govt PR bods. I remember there was arumour flying round that some USAF bod put in a suggestion that they make an A380 into air force one as it was perfect for putting on loads of extra stuff, I’d ask him about the response he got but i’m not to fond of alaska!!!
ps new composite facility for the 350 wings is coming on well should make UK important part of airbus
@ACC – read Gareth’s link to Phil Jackson’s presentation, stuff like that is on the roadmap. It’s not just the likes of the DF-21 with its terminal manoevres, just manoevring earlier in the flight (like some of the Iranian Shahabs I think) can confuse those ABM systems which work on the assumption of a purely ballistic flight.
X, February 28, 2011 at 6:23 pm.
I’m the only person I know who has a portrait of the queen on my living room wall (all be it a small one).
People generally think it’s a bit unusual, but she is our head of state.
Perhaps a topic to ponder during the army posts…
Does the army need to retain an expensive, parachute capable brigade?
So far, the one and only operational parachute landing conducted by the Parachute regiment since the end of World War II was by 3 Para, in 1956 during the Suez campaign.
However, while 3 Para had jumped during Suez, 2 Para landed by sea; 2 Para also landed by sea in Anguilla in 1969; and 2 and 3 Para formed part of 3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands War in 1982.
Other notable parachute-free Parachute Regiment operations include 1 Para flying into Sierra Leone at the head of a naval task group, and 1 Para’s helicopter assault during the Kosovo War.
Also, looking back at the Suez campaign; the Suez area was not suited towards parachute landings. Narrow strips and spits of land with sea on either side of the drop zone, requiring dangerously low level jumps (particularly for the French) to avoid dropping fully laden soldiers into water.
Things have moved on since 1956, and were that operation being planned today, the El Gamil airfield solution would likely call for a heliborne assault from ship to shore rather than a parachute drop (in the context of 16AAB, Parachute Regiment by helicopter, followed by other brigade units disembarking from C130, and accompanied by sea landings).
So the only British operational parachute landing since World War II did not utilize a full parachute brigade, half the Para force landed by sea, and helicopter capability has since advanced beyond the point of making the tactics used in 1956 obsolete.
So does today’s army need to retain an expensive, parachute capable brigade?
What advantage does a parachute capability give over the use of Chinooks? – Perhaps one of increased range, but are we ever likely to want to send three battalions of light infantry so far forward that it requires a parachute drop rather than a helicopter landing?
Names such as Caen and Arnhem are in part so well known because those operations over-reached the airborne forces, leaving lightly equipped troops isolated and exposed to heavy and sustained attack.
Given the utilization of the Parachute Regiment since the end of World War II, and its likely use in the future, would the UK be just as well off with an army commando regiment that had no routine parachute capability?
Jump training could be retained for Special Forces only, or provided only to those individuals who served with either the SF or SFSG.
The Parachute Regiment traces its roots back to World War II, 2 Commando, and the combined operations Special Service Brigades – primarily coastal raiding and assault brigades (after the original 2 Commando was assigned to parachute operations, 2 Commando was reformed and led the St Nazaire Raid).
Is it now time to assign parachute operations (other than very small scale SF tasks) to the history books? Or, in times of an acute financial squeeze, is an expensive, parachute capable brigade still a must-have for the British army?
A Para is, to a greater extent, defined by his ability to pass the pre-parachute selection course, rather than his ability to perform the expensively gained but largely unused skill of succumbing to gravity.
Interesting point BB. Talking of which, there’s been some coverage this week of the delivery of a VR parachute training suite, another of those toys that got ordered just before the election :
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/NewVirtualRealityParachuteTrainersForArmedForces.htm
(Reading comments as I type this)
In response to the comments on Sea Viper or Aster 30 and its BMD capability currently its capability in this field is theoretical AFAIK but it would probably be capable of the role with modification. The later blocks as pointed out have been built with some sort of BMD capability in mind but who knows if we will have the money to deploy them as such. As for land based air defence we don’t have any current plans and are never really likely to have plans to purchase anything above and beyond land based CAMM.
Jed, that’s the thing what does airbus have that is sufficiently larger than the B767 to replace the KC-10’s? the A330 although larger than the B767 is a not a great deal larger. Personally I think the USAF could have went with a single fleet of A330’s or what makes sense to my mind now is a split fleet of B767 and B777. Oh and please folks lets not turn this into another which is best B767 or A330 flame war.
X, I’m perhaps a bit like that myself I’m not a monarchist but I do tend to lean towards it at times but I would hope that in a wider sense my political sense of reason and outlook is reasonably balanced. I’m also Scottish so being right of centre and a supporter of the Royal Family is not really the norm where I live.
Brian Black, nice comment on the Para’s. “A Para is, to a greater extent, defined by his ability to pass the pre-parachute selection course, rather than his ability to perform the expensively gained but largely unused skill of succumbing to gravity.” I think you are bang on the mark with that line I agree we should just make the Para’s essentially an Army Commando brigade. Members of the SFSG as well as the actual special forces should then be the only folk who are fully qualified to succumb to gravity as you put it.
@ Brian Black – I see your Army Commando Brigade and I give you an entire Airborne Army!
http://www.combatreform.org/VKarman_FutureAirborneArmies_C5.pdf
@Brian Black
Yes jumping ahead but I also think the Parachute/Commando battalions will be re-organised in the next SDSR. There has already been talk of enhanced special forces support so I would not be surprised to see 2 x para and 1 x commando battalions forming the SFSG brigade. The 3rd para remaining as part of the infantry to pass on skills or added to 3 Commando brigade as an airborne capable battalion.
Re-focusing of aid – http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12599969
Major defence redundancies announced on BBC News 24: no links on the website yet , will post as soon as I get it.
10,000 jobs to go from all forces, 2 Tornado squadrons to go…
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/TornadoSquadronsToBeDisbanded.htm
Finally! – http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12609173
Paul G @ 1038
Yes airbus are incredibly busy at the minute indeed the whole uk civil aerospace industry is very short staffed in most engineering position. The wings are designed and manufactured all over the uk from Prestwick to Belfast to IOM to Southampton civil ones are assembled in Broughton with a400m at Filton as well as most of the tech guys. The Germans have been eyeing this for years and want it back the government needs to be wary.
Gareth
How about the return of the 1st special service brigade maybe find a new Lord Lovat for command
@mark
i’ve got a few friends in the firm,on the civil production side, in fact on the design side i had to put in a 1gig fibre link for them that’s how much info just one small part needed! However and somewhat linked to this site and your comment, when the UK were humming and harring about staying in the A400 programme those shifty manuel types were plotting to gut the filton factory and do the wings in madrid, had all the plans ready, bastards!!!!
Paul g
I had the pleasure of working on the a400m design team for a couple of year
and you can never have enough band width for model transfer so keep up the gd work
More a question than a comment.
I make no bones about my ball deep support of belting people in the back of the head with a metal bar and legging it, cleverly disguised as “Strategic Raiding”.
But at best, that idea seems to have only convinced about half the posters on here.
Now, fair enough, different folks, different strokes, but I’ve done a lot of looking, and I cant find ANYTHING out there thats argueing the case for “Global Guardian” in any detail.
I realise TD is going to start hitting the subject shortly, but, be prepared and all that.
Is there a body of work out there I’ve just missed, and if not, dare I ask why not?
Hi GJ,
AS per El Sid “@GJ – thanks for the link, useful. I think all you can say is that we have no money, but BMD is where SAMs are heading, and that Blocks 1/1NT/2 of Aster will all fit the existing tubes on the T45″
- I did not read it at first as I have a permanent link the the manufacturer’s site
- but that pdf filled in at least two years more (and had the UK-specific perspective as well)
BTW, if we are going anywhere near Iran (not that I recommend that), we better buy the land-based version as well
@ Brian and Euan
The modern British are wonderfully ignorant about monarchy. A Medievalist would see a royal dynasty as a transient. It is only by a serious of accidents we ended up with our “current” royal family. Monarchy is just another political system. Then again like all peoples the modern British live in their own time. For many of us the Queen is the only monarch we have known, and I bet many, many youngsters wouldn’t know the name of her father let alone his father (new film not withstanding!) Um. I think continuity is the strength of monarchy; isn’t it a good thing that the head of state is beyond the political realm? Do we really want a President Blair or President Branson? Monarchy is a good system as any, if not better than most.
@ Mark – Funny you should mention that. I have been thinking of a concept, borrowing heavy from other sources, for special Brigades/battalions. I was going to wait till TD started his Army series but will put something together quickly tomorrow and see what people think… Crazy idea warning!…
Good piece over on USNI blog, ref “no fly zone” over Libya, to sum it up, not without US CVN’s we dont……
http://blog.usni.org/2011/03/01/no-fly-zone-in-libya-not-without-the-usn-cvn-you-wont/
Whether you like or dislike the Yanks, there is some mileage in the argument that European NATO which generally does not even like to spend as much on defence as the UK relies to much and too often on the availability of US forces.
Having said that I personally firmly blame both Wall Street, the White House and the U.S. “I want it all now” 110% mortgage culture for the current economic downturn…..
The MoD has “Set a strategy” for the T-26 programme. They are officially combining the requirements of the previous C1 and C2 platforms with trade offs against the original requirement and a reduction in size from 6,100 tons to around 5,000 tons. Seems to me we will be getting a super C2 rather than cutting edge C1 which isn’t a bad thing in my opinion.
Jed @ 0100Z,
Very much agreed with your last sentence, and although there were others guilty of the same sins (I’m looking at you, Iceland …) the US had by far the most skin in the game. And thanks for the USNI article. Unless the USAF, or RAF, can suddenly spare their tanker fleet, it’s really whatever the Italians’ little clutch of new tankers can bear or (shock, horror) carriers.
Lord Jim @ 0244Z
That’s probably a very good thing. Now if they were just sane instead of BAe (anyone for a Royal Dockyards public corporation for surface builds — there’s more than one nationalisation model than the old-fashioned British model) they could sell off the five non-Sonar 2087 Type 23s and get 1) “Dubious” and “Doubtful” (the two axed 45s), 2) a class of about a dozen sloop copies of the Norwegian KV Svalbard (the original was about $50M, I imagine better radar and a 35mm Millenium gun in the back, even at British prices you might get the whole class for a billion quid or so), and 3) four stretched long-endurance cruiser models of the Type 45 (with the “flex deck” intended for the big Type 26 and at least a pair of Merlins.) But after thinking of all that they upped my meds and now I’m much better :)
Brian Black, Gareth, and Jim Sweeney in the mid-afternoon,
Brian, there was a loose post (part of the SDSR series, maybe? Or on its own) on airborne operations. And you and Gareth posted some interesting stuff there (nice to read the Suez info again.) Since this is the best milblog talking shop I know I’ll throw in my five quid (I ramble too much for tuppence ….)
No one but the US even has the resources to do a brigade drop (or, close enough to home like the OPLAN for Haiti in 1994, a drop-surge-drop two brigade operation) of paratroops any longer. (Well, maybe if all the mechanics are sober that day the Russians could drop a VDV brigade in the “near abroad” ex-SSRs, and ten years from now if they’re not busy and buy their whole tranche of A400Ms the French could just barely.) So let’s set that aside. Is there a place for that sort of operation? Well, yes, a few. Helicopter, unless you have quiet LZs which means you’re working against time depending on the nature of your operation because you have to get to the objective, is actually a very dangerous way to mass-move troops for forced entry. Dozens of battles in Vietnam, several engagements by both Israeli and Egyptian forces in ’73, Russian ops in Afghanistan, Mogadishu in ’93, and several cases in Iraq and Afghanistan, point to this. If you have good air cover and some element of surprise or misdirection, than a mass-drop of paras (ie more than a small detachment) actually lets you hit the ground fast and close with the enemy. And depending on the terrain where you do it, whether or not there’s a proper airfield (seizing airfields is often a distraction for ops that have the urgency to demand the airborne option) you can airland behind them. (For that there is the dear old Hercules, helicopters, or the potential of large-capacity rigid hulled airships.)
Where is it useful to do that? Some good examples are the French drops at Suez, the Americans’ “Junction City” op in Vietnam (where a brigade drop outflanked substantial North Vietnamese units with far greater speed and many fewer casualties than slower-moving heliborne options), Grenada (dog’s brekfast though it was because of the total lack of planning, the idea of hitting fast with large numbers by parachute, rather than slower helicopters that were riddled with AA around the beaches, was sound), Kolwezi (a coordinated Franco-Belgian operation would have been truly overwhelming), and Panama. Neither the Army nor RAF will ever have the numbers for a big drop, but something more like a Kolwezi/Grenada/Sierra Leone-minus-the-UN is a plausible scale.
This hits a tangent with the whole question of “SF support.” Making a fetish of special forces tends to degrade both their mission profile and their quality (partly because governments and their militaries decide no one else will do for SF-style missions, and bloat them.) They’re great if you have a very small, discreet black op, or want to hit the Jebel Akhdar without anyone knowing you’re coming, or use uniquely skilled operators to free hostages of high strategic value from a specific, self-contained location. Otherwise, most real-world mission profiles are too mess to require a constant PERSTEMPO of underwater knife-fighting ninjas. What you need instead, as the US Marine Corps has sussed for some time (and, to their unexpected credit, both the French paras and Italian amphibious forces), is “special-operations capable” units which combine something like line-infantry numbers and structure with, as Jim and Brian each pointed out, the skills of the old wartime Commandos. Perhaps two-thirds the spec-ops capability of operators like the Sassmen and SBS, but the “economy of scale” to deal with larger, messier situations across a range from, say, Kolwezi in 1978 to Tora Bora in 2001. They should also be a primary instrument of initial-entry for bigger operations.
What sort of force would do? Well, based on a variety of successful postwar airborne operations, something about battlegroup size is a baseline requirement. And since we’re talking about a specialist force, there’s no reason it should be ad-hoc rather than a single, organic, integrated command. Also, it needs two kinds of “force multiplication” over typical airborne units (especially the stunted American “seize and hold” model), namely better fire support and better transport. So here’s a fag-packet model for a new kind of Parachute Regiment:
- Headqarters & Headquarters Company
- A large support company including para-qualified Really Large folk, a small mobile surgical unit, etc.
- Para engineer company, including a CBRN platoon (you send these folks into real messes, they need to be prepared)
- Four line para infantry companies (each bearing the historical honours of 1-4 PARA respectively, and rotating the role of having a company reserve heavy mob for the SAS when operations that are actually scaled within SAS’s capacity, like Op Barras, need a little something extra)
- One Commando company (sherwood green beret with the Para cap badge, bearing the Army Commandos legacy, with a bit more of that “special-operations capable” training, an elite within the elite like the French GCP or the American and Italian recon marines)
- One transport mini-company (A platoon of drivers, and a big maintenance platoon) manning a dozen low-velocity airdrop Ridgebacks (best place to keep them in service, and perhaps one can LVAD the big bastards from A400M or C-17, a heavy MRAP transpo capacity that can motorise an infantry company at a time)
- One artillery battery (legacy of 7 Para RHA) with a new little out-of-the-box critter, NEMO mortar turret mounted on a Stormer body. Two platoons of four, nearly the range and better weight of shell and ROF than 105mms, and you can also use it as an assault gun (*not* a light tank, but a bloody good assault gun)
My guess is that with 18 A400M and about a dozen C-17 you could actually load and drop such a force (c. 1400-1500 pax) in one go. All part of a single unit rather than a battalion with support, commanded by a Brigadier because of its importance (it and the green death are the national rapid-response capability) and to ensure seniority with other rapid-deployment detachments.
Late night madness … I look forward to Gareth’s take in the AM.
Some interesting comments on the Paras there.
As for the helicopter part of 16AAB, If the RM Commandos and Paras are reformed into some other set up, there should perhaps be the formation of a new, joint service Aviation Brigade.
It’s seems disingenuous to claim that we have an Air Assault Brigade over here, and a Multi-Role Brigade over there, if in reality they share the same air assets.
A combined Aviation Brigade comprising attack helicopters and utility helicopters (maybe some classes of UAV and other light aircraft too) from all services would reflect the way that those assets have actually been used in the past. Helicopters have been routinely pooled into a joint Support Helicopter Force for many years now.
A seperate Aviation Brigade would be more practicle than assigning individual squadrons to each Multi-Role Brigade.
Thanks Jed @ 1 am,
Great link; I had just “wasted” a couple of hrs (when you posted)to find out the same on the internet (but where did he get a map that spells Sigonella wrong?).
There are NFZs and NFZs.
- if you put one on the eastern part of Libya, it replicates what was done for the Kurds (out of Turkey, then)
- if you put it on all of the country,
1. you violate sovereignty, rather than protect people who clearly have (achieved) autonomy
2. more importantly, you will have to take out Libyan air defences and the more formidable part of it “is not flying” and therefore not in violation of whatever the UN(SC) might be willing to stretch to (to authorise)
Hi LJ,
RE “Seems to me we will be getting a super C2 rather than cutting edge C1 which isn’t a bad thing in my opinion.”
- that is still much better than “going OPV” only
- I initially liked the Dutch design, but having looked at that detail, there is only capability to 1. support land, by housing a helo, 2, give chase to pirates and the likes with RIBS, and 3. have a degree (not 360) of self-protection with ONE automated gun… i.e not much for a lot of ship
- why do I mention that particular design? Because the dimensions are the same as what was deemed optimal by a UK consulting study, for global deployability: Length: 108.4 metres (this one being the exact match), and then coming with it
Beam: 16 metres
Speed: 21.5 kts
Range: 5000 nm @ 15 kts
@ Jackstaff – very interesting idea and not an 100 miles from my own. The spam filter is blocking my post so will attempt to post in parts.
Return of the skirmisher to the Battlefield?
This concept borrows a lot from other online sources, milblog commentators and watching too many episodes of “Sharpe”!
The original idea was a large regiment of Sharpshooters/designated marksmen which could be divided between Infantry /Army units to enhance their firepower and scouting or used en masse as a new form of skirmishers, the idea to disrupt and degrade the enemy rather than stop it out right. My research in this arrear brought up three similar concepts.; Carlton Meyers “Guard Battalions”, James Morningstar’s “Javelin Skirmishers” and Salvador M. Zuniga’s “Light Dragoons”
http://www.g2mil.com/Rearguard.htm
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA323568&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Salvador M. Zuniga’s “Light Dragoons” doesn’t appear to be on-line anymore; at lest I can’t find it! But I saved a copy long ago and will quote the important aspects. Please note, he lays out the danger of an opfor having this ability before advocating this for the US, hence his focus on Russian weapons, etc.
A NEW CONCEPT IN WARFARE The Return of Light Dragoons By Salvador M. Zuniga
“The basic organization would be the Infantry battalion. Three companies of light infantry with a strength of 110 men. One heavy weapons company, a recon and intelligence gathering platoon, a 120mm-mortar battery, and a headquarters and support company. A combined strength of just over 500 men. “
“…their main tank-killing weapon at the platoon level is a “fire and forget” man-portable ATGM like the Javelin, a Chinese variation, or the Russian AT-15 Khrizantema.”
“At the platoon level, troops will have two of these ATGMs per squad; the command launch unit (CLU) will also act as thermal sights for the squad, and all of the troops in the squad will carry 1 reload. The squad will have one squad automatic weapon either belt or magazine fed, and two grenadiers in addition to the five assault rifles with rifle launched or M203 type launchers
The units will move around the battlefield in 3X3 wheeled vehicles little larger that the ATV used by hunters to traverse long distances, amphibious, small with a very easy to conceal thermal signature (with the use of thermal blankets) and requiring little maintenance, they will serve as the primary means of moving troops and material. These vehicles would also have trailers that could carry up to 1800 pounds of gear to maintain the unit. Makeup of the platoons would be 3 trailers per platoon and one trailer per company headquarters.
These vehicles would be the prime movers for the Battalion, the unit itself would not require a large support element, these vehicles float, are airborne and airmobile, move through restricted terrain, and carry firepower that could be dismounted and emplaced into prepared positions for defence or ambush.
Each platoon would have 3 squads with two ATGM launchers per squad with 3 squads per platoon and 3 platoons per company. That is a total of 18 launchers per company with three companies, that is 54 launchers, not including the Heavy Weapons Company which provides 3 platoons with 6 launchers a piece. The Heavy Weapons Company does not have the Infantry assigned to it, the AT platoons consists of 12 man platoons, two men per launcher and 6 reloads.
INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT AND ADA SUPPORT
The two 81mm mortars will organic to the companies, and two man portable SAMs (SA-18, British StarStreak or Javelin, Stinger) will provide Air Defence Support for the companies. The enemy will be overly aware of our helicopter assets, and UAVs, and it will be important to take defensive measures against the Air threat. Concealment will be through the use of thermal blankets/radar absorbing camouflage netting, making the battalion very hard to spot. The recon and intelligence gathering platoon uses the 3 3X3 vehicles and 3 six man teams to set up forward observation posts. The 120mm-mortar battery assigned to the Battalion will be able to fire the standard range of ammunition, and will be able to fire the smart ammo like the British MERLIN round. The Russians have this capability and this is no doubt that it is on the open market, the KESTREL. This system is very similar to the Copperhead in the sense that it is terminally guided by either laser designation or by an internal guidance system. The smart round would be guided to targets like tanks to immobilize, to destroy M1068 or Stryker command vehicles, support and maintenance vehicles. One round, one vehicle, one kill, the mortars will be mounted on the 3X3 mules and use on the market GPS, counter-battery against these will be extremely difficult because of the small signature and high mobility with shoot and scoot, technology. This system should be regarded as a poor man’s Paladin.”
“COULD WE ADOPT A RETAIL FORCE OF OUR OWN?
The answer is yes, the force would be cheaper to stand up due to the fact that the technology exists already. The force would be highly strategically mobile and retain its tactical mobility once on the ground. The Idea of using M113 Gavin’s and an armoured gun system are great but the US Army has already gone down the LAV road and will definitely not go back on that decision until something goes wrong in combat. Not only that, the LAV requires too much precious Airlift which the Air Force has little. Heavy Forces need at a minimum 1 month to get to the theatre, Airborne Units now are too light to fight and MANUEVER once on the ground. While this retail force could jump, air assault, or be flown in after Special Operations or Rangers have seized an air field. The Javelin exists and is combat proven. This retail force could be stood using the Light Divisions existing already. A two manoeuvre brigade division like the 10th Mountain or even an enhanced National Guard Brigade could be organized into this retail force.”
Two key elements common to all these concepts are transport for the Infantry and the ability to call on fire support from artillery, aircraft and even naval gunfire. First the question of the vehicle; I believe that Zuniga’s 3×3 ATV, although excellent for normal infantry support will be too slow/vulnerable in this role. I would like to see a light tracked vehicle for enhanced cross-country mobility but this might limit the number which can be air/helicopter lifted. Phil West of the Scrapboard site suggests a modern version of the Schwimmwagen. Its retro so appeals to me!
http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/lrv.html
I believe the readers of TD will be more familiar with current British vehicles than me and might be able to suggest a suitable mount.
The second point is forward observers. This will be key to the concept; the skirmishers will be able to temporary “fix” the enemy but realistically it will take more serious firepower to cause “war winning” damage.
http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/solutions/lldr/assets/LLDR.pdf
http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/solutions/lldr/assets/LLDR.pdf
As you can see we have moved away from the original concept of modern day chosen men. However, a Anti-material rifle per squad would greatly enhance the firepower of the Brigade/Battalion for little extra cost , made practicable by the use of vehicles transport. It would enable ATGM to be saved for “hard Targets” and give a scout-sniper capability to the unit. 12.7mm would be the logical choice for commonality with the rest of the army but maybe something a little bigger would be useful?
http://www.vincelewis.net/20mm.html
If we go even further we could have longer ranged weapons on the vehicles themselves.
http://www.g2mil.com/40mm.htm
40mm seems like over kill to me particularly as the British Army already has an excellent large calibre “sniper” weapon in the RADEN 30mm cannon. With the retirement of the Scimitar, can the cannons be re-cycled in an open mount ? For some support I give you a link from Anthony Williams website. Scroll about half way down and you will see a trailer mounted 27mm cannon .
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/Eurosat08.htm
So what are we talking about here? Well it appears to be a Brigade of airborne trained, helicopter borne capable light but heavy armed infantry equipped with vehicles mainly for transport/re-supply support but with some intended for Anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and anti-vehicle roles. Main roles will be as scouts, modern skirmish line to degrade and delay an enemy advance, raiding, peace-keeping and possibly NEO. A recent supporting example might be this action on the Northern front of the GW2. Instead of a “stand up fight” a fighting retreat might have been just as effective?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Debecka_Pass
Hi jackstaff,
Re the latter part of your post – great, so many of my “thoughts” in it.So let me just try to insert something around the edges:
Great that someone remembers Kolwezi: the take-away ” urgency to demand the airborne option[)] you can airland behind”
- so airborne & airportable, together, rather than the first as a tactical option and the latter just a “strategic mobility” thingy/ fetish
“Sierra Leone-minus-the-UN is a plausible scale” – not sure what you exactly meant, but for me
- spearhead intervention
- with the spear to follow (UN, EU, W. African…)
” fag-packet model for a new kind of Parachute Regiment”
- great thinking
- v much in line with what the French have in their Light Division (it has a number, but more importantly it incorporates the main parts of the Foreign Legion, ie. those not permananetly or semi-permanently posted plus some SF like Navy para-divers etc, sprinkled in for “good effect”))
- no light (wheeled) armour? Except as for my favourite combination, the Stormer + Nemo (I doubt the chassis can handle the AMOS double set-up (3.5 tonnes all in)and in either case ammunition carries (plenty of Stormers in storage and they are not ancient for their mechanics)will need to be separate to SUSTAIN the op somewhere far away and and initially cut-off even at unit level (ref. Kolwezi, if you don’t give chase, the enemy will regroup.
“a dozen low-velocity airdrop Ridgebacks” – can they be airdropped? We should not scrap one Pinzgauer, regardless of 4 or 6 wheels on them (and not that many, altogether… comms, ambulances etc. airdropped, until the airland happens.
Finally, except for the initial airdrop, wrong unit of account:
” with 18 A400M and about a dozen C-17 you could actually load and drop such a force (c. 1400-1500 pax) in one go. All part of a single unit”
- tonnes (as dimensions must be allowed for in the design, not at the time of fielding the force)
Hi Gareth,
Good piece, first I thought that I am reading about an OpFor arranged as the standard Finnish light infantry bn:
- 3 x 144 plus supporting arms, depending on mission/terrain = 600-900 in all
- however, what is described is so anti-tank heavy, what else can it do ?
- 3 x 3′s have been much experimented with; in the case I refer to they are used by recce platoons. In the UK none of them have ended up as weapons platforms, and the adoption has been low in general (first-line supply role?)
So, RE: “it appears to be a Brigade of airborne trained, helicopter borne capable light but heavy armed infantry equipped with vehicles mainly for transport/re-supply support but with some intended for Anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and anti-vehicle roles. Main roles will be as scouts, modern skirmish line to degrade and delay an enemy advance”
- no need for airborne-trained
- good if you have the helos to move/ insert it
- kit would point to a role “to degrade and delay an enemy advance”, but even if they are helo-inserted to do that, they still would need to be able disengage. Without organic transport (other than the modern “pack mules”) that would not work without heavy Apache or the like cover for the quick re-wind of the helo operation.
- so the whole concept is only partial in my mind, and too close to what 16 AAB evolved from ( and has been left behind, mainly due to the change in circumstances)
Actually, what that “Retail Force” reminds me of is Hezbollah.
@ ACC – Good points. I will take the liberty of quoting Phil West from his LRV article:
“Rather than a TOW-equipped AT Troop as shown here the Guard Battalion would have a unit equipped with FOG-M launchers for long range precision strike capability. The Light Cavalry Squadron as depicted includes its own battery of field artillery. During rear guard actions brigade and divisional artillery are likely to be some of the first units withdrawn so it would be useful if the Guard Battalion has an organic artillery element such as a light MBRL Battery.”
Long range Fibre optic guided missiles would allow a greater stand off distance while perhaps some integrated artillery would allow units to “break contact”. I believe TD did a post about light MBRL. I will know return to my hobble and ponder this further…
Gareth and ACC and Jackstaff
As you seem to be pre-empting TD’s post SDSR army series I will try to keep the comments short.
Jackstaff – I am broadly supportive of the idea in a rather more realistic change of role for the 3 Parachute Regiment Battalions that remain. Something similar to US Army Rangers, or Belgian Para-Commando’s, and as in fact UK Commandos were originally an army formation, Para Commandos is probably a better name than ‘Rangers’. They would however absolutely fill the role as “Special Operations Forces” i.e. one step down from “Special Forces” – the Paras are already considered an elite light infantry formation with additional skill sets over ‘line infantry’ but I would bump the training further towards RM style, almost creating a 3 battalion brigade with the skills of the Pathfinder platoon.
I would constrain our planning ref para drop. Not something you can do against a near peer with good air defense, so it’s a capability for raids, non-combatant evac (possibly under fire) etc. For that, and remembering that these are now ‘special operations forces’ we might need to scratch together a full battalions worth of currently para certified individuals and the aircraft to drop them. We may no longer need (?) para artillery, signals, engineers etc that were needed to support a full brigade size para capability.
Overall with the SF group (SAS / SBS) 3 x Para Commando (Rangers), 3 x RM Commando and the SRR, we would have a very healthy ‘limited intervention’ capability.
Gareth – ref Mr Zuniga’s Light Dragoons, is the 3 x 3 ATV not the Supacat which we have been using for years ?
I am not sure what the main role of the Light Dragoons is, what kind of threat you want them to take on, and how you would employ them ? I am with AAC in that it seems to be suitable for the old cold war conops for 11 Air Mobile Brigade (pre-cursor of 16 AAB) a light, blocking anti-armour force. Any UK “light role” Infantry Battalion can be a modern “skirmisher’ force, but we must be careful how we apply our history lessons, for while either Sgt Sharpe or even Major Sharpe would probably be quite at home patrolling in Afghanistan, that does not mean we should return all the battalions of the Rifles regiment wholesale to the 7.62mm DMR role.
JS&ACC,
on the point of the NEMO, if we are scaling down the armd brigades, then would it not make sense to divvy up the warriors some become armd amb,and some to become the nemo chassis, either 1 or 2 attached to each inf coy as it states on wikki that the nemo can supply as much as one battery. I only suggest this as then in your armd set up all non mbt tracks are on the one chassis and being ex REME i can say that would make life a lot easier just in spares deployed alone!!!
Why stop at nemo there is a bridgelayer stormer in service, again put it on a warrior and more independance for the unit, I think the original figures for the turret upgrade (now highly doubtful) left a couple of hundred spare hulls, better to use them up to the proposed 2025 OOS date than sell them for peanuts to a civvy auctioneer who then in turn makes a profit. oh and to further your cause on the 120mm take a look at this link with ref to the US now deploying GPS 120mm mortar rounds in the sandpit.
http://www.gizmag.com/gps-guided-precision-mortar-rounds/18027/
obviously armd recce would be a different system as well as MBT, my mistake!! ps lightweight 120mm mortar? how about the weisel with the germans massively downsizing, might be able to pick some up cheap.
Paul G – I started drafting an article on “what does Medium Armour” mean last night, which of course includes 120mm mortars (I am a ‘fan boy’ as everyone here knows….). However poor old TD must be busy as he has not posted the last two articles I sent him yet – I guess he has a day job or something… :-)
X, Indeed Monarchy is as good a system as any because they all have their flaws :) I agree that continuity is its strength as the monarch can stand as a beacon amongst the confusion and mess that is politics. I think if we are to change the political system to one that is going to see a more or less endless line of coalitions the monarch is going to have more work to do keeping things under control.
Jed, Thanks for the link to the USNI post I had been on Google earth doing that exact same thing when a no fly zone was mentioned on the news and they are correct there cannot be a NFZ without the USN. Also i wouldn’t mind a read of anything you’ve written although it might be a bit out of my depth. euan_mish_mosh@hotmail.co.uk
Also Gareth excellent thoughts on the Para’s, special forces etc.
@ Jed – my thought process is far too crazy to be written down but I will try. Firstly, I was trying for a worthwhile sized and armed rapid reaction force which could be air dropped/mobile to support allies, etc, that wouldn’t end up being a “speed bump” for armoured forces. If, or when heavy reinforcements arrive, the unit then becomes the scout/light cavalry aspect, finding, degrading and “fixing” in place the enemy for the Heavies/air power/artillery. Alternately, it could provide the mobile reserve as the Germans/we planned during the Cold War, as has been pointed out.
Such a force wouldn’t be ideal for all occasions; eg it would probably be too light for COIN if IED’s are heavily used.
Just an idea to try and get around the “too light to fight” and “too heavy to get there” divide we appear to have in the West. Probably a load of old tosh…
Hi Jed, (and comments on comments are compounding, so pls read this as such),
RE “almost creating a 3 battalion brigade with the skills of the Pathfinder platoon”
- after having proved their worth so tangibly, the Pathfinders were actually (!) abolished after WW2, and after their worth had been rediscovered, it has been a struggle to work the numbers up from platoon to company strength… so I am all for it, but…(a brigade is a much bigger number!)
RE “I would constrain our planning ref para drop… so it’s a capability for raids, non-combatant evac (possibly under fire)”
- what are you taking about??
- assume Tripoli, as of today
– all tanks are pointing (positioned) outwards
– how do you go in, to neutralise the center?
1. go in there, right in there
2. deploy enough force, by surprise, to take it
3. have enough firepower to take out any tanks turning their direction; demonstration effect on a couple might be enough
– what does that take = enough Apaches, Warthogs, Harriers(?), fast jets, to be on station to fire if required, but only, if required
Well, a few kind words to the FOC & MoD (the latter obviously only following the wisdom)
Hi Paul,
RE “obviously armd recce would be a different system as well as MBT, my mistake!! ps lightweight 120mm mortar? how about the weisel with the germans massively downsizing, might be able to pick some up cheap.”
- no mistake(other than the Warrior; don’t confuse the down-pressure from firing a mortar with its overall weight); let’s try to work it out for 1. cost, 2. weight, 3. for available numbers, to match with he required formations,4. weight, per unit of available lift, 5. what else the many-many available frames could do (some mentioned already), but as for commonality… is there a need for any other airland’able armour, other than FRES Scout, arriving when an airfield big/ solid enough is there to take there delivery?
ACC – sorry confused by your last, if your saying we should have a big enough airborne brigade to undertake a drop into the middle of Tripoli, I would just ask how the all the C130′s and C17′s required would get past all the SA6, MANPADS, AAA ???
That not what I was think of by my comment on evacuation of civvies.
If you want to air drop IN TO Tripoli then the Air Defences have to be suppressed; surely this is a job for an on-station Carrier, winning at least temporary air supremacy and local SEAD/DEAD? The navy may be able to land a force itself but more the merrier?
Sorry guys,
I must have confused you with what I recommend for permanent formations (and what they should be constituted) and what could, not perhaps(?) should be done with them, right now?
Art of the possible, who was it, to attribute to?
At the same time, military action is the extreme end of diplomacy (when it the latter failed).
Problems with expeditionary warfare; basically slates my light but well armed rapid deployable force concept…:(
http://www.ausairpower.net/DT-Expeditionary-War-2008.pdf
Any ideas how we square the circle?
@ Lord Jim – Re: Type 26. A super C2? What are we taking about in layman terms? Similar to Type 21? Type 22? Type 23?
If its a GP Frigate with added capabilities what ones will they be?
Just found this interesting suggestion; a bit old but I like it… You have to scroll down to the bottom.
http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=808188
@ Gareth Jones re frigate
Something like an Anzac, but looking more like a Formidable should do…………
@jed
it certainly looks the way ahead those yank gps bombs are accurate to 6m at 6k! we have a stack of warthogs, ST kinetics do a 120mm mortar platform for it plus a 5ton drops trailer as well. BAe do the nemo, plus there’s a single barrel(amos) for a lighter chassis (foxhound 6×6 perhaps?)
cheap subsite for arty support and a same calibre system that realistically can go from foot mounted team (ie standard 120mm inf mortar team) up to twin barreled armd delivery.
before i’m corrected, nemo is lighter single barrel, amos twin barrel. i’m giving myself burpees as i type!!
paul g,
Nice thoughts about armoured fleet modification and management. Very nice. My favouring tests of LVAD for Ridgeback rather than a modified Warrior (turretless since it would then be a taxi service for paras? And the US has done LVAD tests with some bloody big cargo, the constraint is tonnes against viable flight distance as ACC reminded me, and the fact that until C-17s they prefered to LVAD from limited-capacity C-130s) was the IED issue. That also applies to Wiesels but shouldn’t rule them out, I like your thinking b/c they’re useful little critters in the right role. Maybe with whatever heliborne light role units remain, some of that covering fire for disengagement ACC wanted to see? Good to be reminded you and Jed are 120mm fanbois too.
Gareth and ACC,
Nice discussion about the light-role forces. My own fag-packet “pocket division” over in the “Unbalanced?” thread roped a light-role outfit like that (and unlike Jed I did see equipping most of that single bn, rather than the two in the Future Army (Next Steps) brigade model) humping the L129A1 because of that airmobile, harrassing, scouting role in combined-arms ops with the heavier outfits. And really a good model for a unit like that may be either the “insatsstyrke” units of the Norwegian Home Guard or the Finnish Jager regiment model.
Jed,
“Special operations capable” all the way. And thank you for pointing out my glaring omission of the Belgian Para-Commandos who were running and training the SOC model long before it was “in.” They were very much on my mind. Yes, this is definitely a “strategic raiding” (shh, TD might hear) force of various types, and together with the green death the main initial entry force. Beyond that I’d like a robust combined arms force like my “pocket” model or a properly-thought-through FA(NS) brigade as something deployable enough (Point class plus, if we’re in an alternate reality since 9/11, let’s have some bloody airships!) to get there relatively fast and take up the job. Yes, 11e Bde Parachutistes is another very good example of roleing SOC units into your formation. My preference for the organic battlegroup-sized force was partly to do as you say, putting limitations of scope on airborne ops, and also dealing with the monetary and logistical realities of running enough jump training and deployment exercises on a budget.
Brian,
Yes, Kolwezi very much in mind (part of my reason for Ridgebacks, get out and follow up with as much protection as you can manage against booby-trapped lines of enemy retreat.) I would say it’s a good preview of one end of the small-scale nightmare scenario spectrum, an amped-up variation on Kolwezi. And I do actually remember the news reports as a kid. Since that’s a point of mutual interest, I recommend a pair of nearly-books (very long research papers) by an American army staff officer (who was actually their liaison man in Rwanda in ’94 and a longtime Africa hand, one of the few in the U.S. Army.) The first is about Stanleyville in ’64, and despite the atrocious job some lance corporal (sorry, PFC) did transfering it into HTML (typos, font issues) it’s a pleasure to read. The successor paper is on “Shaba II,” the FNLC invasion of Katanga/Shaba that set off the Kolwezi crisis. He’s very much in the Belgians’ corner in both cases, but does an excellent job setting out the several involved governments’ decision-making processes and foreign/defence policy cultures.
Here’s a link to the Stanleyville paper:
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/odom/odom.asp
and to the Kolwezi one:
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/odom2/odom2.asp
Demented anorak that I am, I find them almost as relaxing and engrossing as bedtime reading as reading about Jackie Fisher’s fleet reforms, or what a pleasure CVA-01 would have been.
Hi GJ @ 11:13 yesterday,
Missed some of the detail in your contribution (when it was chopped up by the spam filter). RE:
“The second point is forward observers.”
- in the UK/US context it is often the SF who do this (ordnance delivered from air more often than not)
I also know of an army that has invested heavily in this concept, to make optimal use of the scarce resource (hint: it is the one that wiki says has the most “tubes” in western Europe). Observer teams are all lead by an officer (small teams, cfr platoons of say 30).
- Great results
- A bi-effect: the highest proportion of officer casualties relative to total casualties anywhere (except in the 6-day war when Israeli tank commanders could only get a 360-view by fighting with the hatch open)
Hi again Gareth (@11:15 yesterday),
Great link to the NTW-20mm rifle. The manufacturer’s statement is that the bipod can be adjusted for any terrain
- wrong, not for soft/ deep snow
- that’s why the Lahti LS39 20mm rifle (also featured) had a bipod that looked like a pair of skis: not for dragging it, as the blogger speculates, but to hold it level on such a surface
… only slowly catching up today
Okay, suppose for the sake of a flight of fancy we had Liam Fox’s job.
Take as a given we are where we are, and unless the Lib Dems quit the government there is no chance of raiding the foreign aid budget. Nor is there much chance of Dave and George doing a U turn on public finances. We are on a set course to reduce defence spending with the low coming in around 2015 when the army will suffer another reduction and Sentinel goes.
There are hopes of real increases after 2015, but ‘after’ can involve a very long wait, if at all. Also while there may be real increases in funding but there may also be real increases in cost, the Trident replacement for example, that spoil whatever you might be hoping for.
Liam’s historic mission is, as well as preserving the Realm, is to preserve for the nation effective military forces on a tighter budget. He has to free up as much inefficient money as he can to pay for the extra breadth and depth of resources we need to have.
I don’t have any better insight than anyone else but here’s a few ideas:
With procurement scarcely a day goes by without someone saying the MoD is useless at procurement and that needs to be fixed. What might the fix be:
- Break up cosy relationships with a closed shop of suppliers and let other, possibly cheaper, suppliers in. Definitely – it will force the closed shop to reduce prices as well as seeing what other people can offer given a chance.
- Prioritise procurement decisions across all three Services so the nation gets what it needs most, not what the most vocal Service lobbied for. This inevitably means that procurement decisions are centralised.
- Don’t over specify what you want. If one pound buys ‘good enough’ don’t spend two pounds on the luxury version that you’ll probably never or only rarely need.
- Once committed don’t let people meddle and change the specifications on order. Invariably any change after the contract is signed comes at a high price.
- Bureaucracies can’t run projects. Have a real person charged with delivering the project on time, on cost and faithful to the original objectives. The fear of being seen to fail can focus minds wonderfully.
- When buying technical equipment don’t buy the first equipment off a production line. The first model will be the one the manufacturer rushes into production to get some income. The second generation version will have all the refinements added and bugs sorted out, that were thought of, but didn’t make it into the first tranche.
- When looking at new technology, unless it’s an UOR, wait two or three years to see what the market does. All manner of people and suppliers can produce things and the market tends to drive prices down. Often the better and cheaper solutions come from the rival supplier who copied and improved someone else’s design.
- Avoid getting into development projects as much as possible.
> - Simply stepping into the technological unknown invites cost over runs and late deliveries.
> - Being the sponsor or lead customer means you will pay the development cost. The guy who buys the same item from someone else’s development programme when the manufacturer is looking for follow-on orders to keep the factory open will get a much better deal. You can bet the RAF Typhoons cost a whole lot more than the ones the Saudis bought.
> - Being locked into your own development programme means you can’t (or shouldn’t) change your mind if someone else brings a better product to market.
> - Recognise that low production runs for the UK alone will inevitably be uneconomic.
> - Recognise that not every problem has a technological solution – don’t try to build what can’t be built.
Operations
- Think twice before you retire old kit or put another way don’t buy replacements before you really need them. Obviously the less frequently you replace your kit the less the ongoing replacement cost. How many perfectly useful aircraft has the RAF retired over the years only because there was something else available they could buy to replace them with. The navy declares its ships passed their used buy date at 20 years, and passes them on to Chile and India who then use them for another 15 years!
- Don’t wait to be told, to economise on what you really don’t need – music schools, attaches in embassies (250 of them and their families apparently), horses, bases that are not needed, etc, etc.
- Regrettably the same logic applies to personnel unfit for service.
- Look at the balance of the regular army and the TA. For example, if a TA soldier costs half a regular soldier in terms of annual cost then if your funding runs to 80,000 regular army you have a range of choice between having an entirely regular army of 80,000 or an entirely part time army of 160,000. Probably neither extreme is desirable but there is quite a lot of room in the middle for choice.
- Consider putting some assets into a TA reserve. For example if you think you would have three months notice of wanting to deploy heavy armour, why not hold a small portion at high readiness and put the bulk into a TA manned reserve.
Someone said the MoD wastes 2 billion pounds a year. If that could be found that would go a long way to help.
Hi Jed @ 3:33 yesterday,
RE “I started drafting an article on “what does Medium Armour” mean”
- I am looking forward to this one
- especially when I subscribe to the view that the medium-tank is dead (of course “armour” does not equal “tank”)
Hi Gareth @10:26,
Dr Carlo Kopp seems to be an expert on everything? His views on Integrated AAD and the value (=cost effectiveness) of stealth in dealing with it are very informed.
- he (or his team) even quote from primary Russian sources, which does not happen often enough
So I’ll read the piece with interest and get back to you.
Hi RW @ 12:48,
Excellent prescriptions, but help me with this one:
“Prioritise procurement decisions across all three Services so the nation gets what it needs most, not what the most vocal Service lobbied for. This inevitably means that procurement decisions are centralised.”
- McKinsey came in, not oce, but twice
- wasn’t the end result just what you call for?
- it is a different matter that the organisational model has not been functioning as its design would lead one to expect
- the nomination of B.G. may change that (he is in sole charge, of course with the ministers who on their own are too many), but it is too early to tell
Oh! no 3 Cloggies have been captured by the Libyans,i do wonder what will happen now.
RE “i do wonder what will happen now”
- not what happened in Rwanda, when 11 Belgian paratroopers got lynched
- the Belgian gvmnt sent a sqrn of Starfighters armed with napalm, said that “mess us again while we say good bye” to you, we will burn a sufficient number… and waved good-bye
But, the longer you let the bad guys run amok, the more they think of how to limit your future options
This idea was originally posted in the Small Calibre Debate Thread but it was suggested this would be a more suitable home.
I wade in to this debate with trepidation due to the vast amount of knowledge on display but thought I’d bring up an idea I came across: saboted ammo.
The Russians have developed a 9x39mm round by “necking up” their 5.45/7.62mm rounds. They use it in a “super Sub-machine gun/Micro Assault rifle”; IIRC twice the range and three times the energy of pistol 9mm rounds.
Now could we (and would we want to?) Develop a saboted round of between 6.5 -7mm to fire from the 9mm barrel? Pro: you can have one rifle/LMG that’s good at both CQB and distance shooting simply by changing the magazine. Con: you’ll need to supply two types of ammo and have to make tactical choices on what proportion of the sections load will be which. NB: obviously NATO rounds are not x39, so we’re probably taking x45? What do people think?
Gareth,
Saboted rifle ammo has been on commercial sale for decades: it’s known as the Remington Accelerator and is used to fire 5.56mm hunting bullets at very high velocity from a 7.62mm case. A version has even seen military service – in a Swedish sniper rifle. I’ve even got a 5.56×45 in my collection which is experimentally loaded with a dinky little saboted bullet!
I have debated on other forums the possibility of necking-out the 5.56×45 case to something like .338 calibre (about the maximum) which would give a lot more short-range punch, complemented by a saboted loading for long-range use. It could theoretically work, although the different ballistics would require two different sight settings and the gas operation might need to be clever to cope with the very different pressure/time characteristics. Also, accuracy with saboted bullets tends to be poor.
Our friend Leiws Page has been on about the Typhoon again in the light of the NAO report:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/03/eurofighter_nao_analysis/
Any thoughts? Not sure about his analysis, perhaps more capable observers than me can comment/ correct?
Oh and Can we have some Absalons please?
@ Tony – Thanks for the info! Probably more trouble than its worth then… Oh well, moving on.
@acc 2.37 (and GJ to an extent) the paratroopers in rwanda were sold down the river, guarding the president they were told that thanks to negotiations (can’t remember if it was belgium govt or UN,sure i was told it was UN) That if they walked out minus weapons they would be taken to the airport to be flown out. I can tell you lynching would’ve been a godsend, they were tortured and their death was hideous. As a footnote while we were on compo and dumping in holes in the ground “advisers” were living it in aircon fresh food and bar-b-ques every friday, officers had bbq invites, he location the “belgium village”
started to read the LP report couldn’t get past page 1 particularly liked the bit where he has worked out that eurofighter will cost significantly more than the F-22 raptor. i am prepared to be educated if he is right and his anti raf rants make any on here look tame!!
Hi George,
The blogger on the Register (as per the link provided in your contribution) has done a good job unearthing this foot note (3, it is): “To be fair, the MoD now plans to transfer some of the equipment onto newer jets: but £85m was spent fitting it to the Tranche 1s, and presumably a similar amount will go on transferring it to the later aircraft. The decision to put ground attack kit on Tranche 1 at all remains almost unbelievable, given that most of the planes will go out of service never having been flown by a pilot capable of flying ground attack missions.”
- I did not know this; always thought the capability was “only coming with” the later Tranches
I think the article could have benefited from a distinction between Ground Attack and Deep Strike… but then again the RAF itself is throwing the terms around as if they are interchangeable
Paul I’ve always found Lewis Page to be rather anti-military all together basically taking the point we are so small we may as well buy everything in and we should basically bin the military and find a hole to crawl into. Not that I totally disagree with either of those but somewhere in the middle is where we should try and get to. I read that register link all 4 pages and all I can say is :rolleyes: and no more.
George Re: Absalon well all I can say is LOL, Welcome to the club you might know me and Jed banged on about it for long enough.
Euan: I think you’re confusing “anti-military” with “anti-British defence industry”. I challenge you to find a quote of LP suggesting we should basically bin the military. But when buying in offers a better solution quicker and cheaper, it’s difficult to argue in favour of home-grown products.
I had a thought about Eurofighter. If we can’t cancel the orders perhaps we buy them and let the Australians fly a squadron or twos worth. I know it is fashionable in these Eurocentric days but we do owe them. Not exactly a F111 replacement but………
RE; the guard battalion concept, is this a task that could be performed by the TA?
@ Gareth Jones
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.450_Bushmaster
A, sorry yes your description would be more apt, however he does suggest things like destroyers and frigates are more or less useless or something along those lines and I mean beyond the deserved BAE slating. I will however acknowledge that he dislikes the leadership of the military both uniformed and civil which I may be getting confused with contempt for the military as a whole but I know he respects the blokes at the sharp end. Hence the book title and the content of Lions, Donkeys and Dinosaurs which is a reasonably good read I would say.
For something completely different I have recently read that Argentina have ordered F-15s and landing craft (air cushion). I cannot remember where I READ this was but what could they possible want with landing craft and air superiority fighters?
Lewis Page has always been a Typhoon hater, however some of the comments in the article on the Register are sensible, and to be honest it just shows the Continued myopic, short term tactical thinking of HMG. IF the RAF could be funded appropriately in order to do a decent job of fleet management then we could have 160 Typhoons of the same upgraded standard. However the F35 is the elephant in the room, absorbing more budget. Yes it offers different (better ?) capabilities in some scenarios (e.g. “stealth”) but if we are seriously so skint then we should be using our cash on a single type fleet, because that would save money on training, maintenance and some other elements of operating costs.
Bottom line though, as ever is politics, would you rather have job cuts and slightly longer waiting lists in the NHS, or more Typhoons – because apparently you can’t have both.
RichardW at LunchtimeZ,
Excellent points all round, and good detail. Current “project management” are the death of many things most of all cost control, since HMG managers want to guarantee budget share for their unit and draw out the leverage/promotion-boosting authority of a big job, while corporate managers (looking at you, BAe) look at maximizing the amount of stock boost (modern “profits,” especially to offset cost-inflated R&D) and have to part with various bits of budget to keep up that protection racket for “investors” which means that even if they’re good actors, things take longer. British-only projects need to be done by low-overhead outfits (many, smaller, and agile, or publicly-owned so not having to cream off operating funds to repay investors), or not at all. Down the line a useful Type 26 like the one mooted now (more C2 than C1, with enough C1-iness to be an escort like the T23) could see a number of foreign orders and licensed buy-ins (Aus/NZ, Canada, Brazil, Chile when their one T22 and M-class get old, etc.) to lower costs. But many other projects could benefit more from TD’s mantra — commonality and a domestic focus on “capability plus” while being willing to share or buy off the peg elsewhere on cost grounds — than the uniformed services themselves. Now I would like, and do think, that a British defence industry could be rebuilt on a smaller, more varied and versatile scale (it existed in a state of managed decline even into the 1990s) but you’d need a different set of anti-trust laws to break up BAe for starters (having them effectively own AlvisHagglunds, VT, Yarrow, etc. in order to suck dry their extant contracts without having to start from scratch is a bad model.) That and walking on F-35 might put the fear of god in, encourage the idea that smaller, nimbler outfits should put bids in, and keep the decent (not great, but decent) larger actors honest. BAe was a sad fate for an outfit as capable and robust as Hawker-Siddeley.
Jed,
Yup, common fleet or bust. Sad (ironic?) thing is that it seems the government’s worst qualities — desire to placate local constituencies on jobs, the lure of Indian wealth (some supplied by DFID …) on a dual-service Typhoon contract, and the wish to appease the Square Mile by slashing spendthrift contracts like the F-35 — that are nudging them that way. Oh, and I’m with whoever it was over in the zombie F-35 thread (it’s alive! And was it ACC? Phil Darley? Gareth?) who suggested Tempest instead of “Seaphoon.” Another good old name from what was once joint-third biggest aerospace industry in the world ….
Gareth,
It may be misattributed with LP, but as I’ve said elsewhere here I loathe that “we’re so little” BS. Britain is jockeying for second-largest population in the EU! (If it was down to what that fascist weasel Le Pen thinks are “true French,” there’s no contest on population growth.) “We’re just a wetter Belgium,” besides being a noxious cocktail of not enough Vitamin D in the diet to make up for grey weather and coming down off too much caffeine and booze (when you crash on PG Tips and the Cream of Manchester, it mimics depression) which, at a continent’s remove, I do think accounts for quite a bit of Southern-Poof grumpiness, the whole “we’re just a wetter Belgium” line of crap only works if you think “Britain” is a unit of measure outside East and South London but inside of Reading and the Watford Gap.
ACC @ March 3, 1.38
Sorry, don’t know a great deal about McKinsey so can’t comment.
What I’m getting at is that making all three Services draw from the same procurement budget, with decisions made by a non partisan board and oversight, should result in a situation where the most important procurements to the country are given priority to funding irrespective of which service they relate to.
Compare that with the current three separate Service budgets where you have people buying their pet projects ignoring that that money might be better spent somewhere else.
Hi RW,
RE “making all three Services draw from the same procurement budget, with decisions made by a non partisan board and oversight, should result in a situation where the most important procurements to the country are given priority”
- until about 3 months ago I was “banging the drum” for that kind of idea, on various threads
- since then I have been waiting for the Defence Reform Unit thread to emerge for it
- the only difference I can pinpoint , at his very general level, is that I was promoting not a Board (the Defence Board has its March meeting soon, having skipped the reserved Feb date due to the difficult nature of decisions to be taken)but putting Capability Managers – they exist today, but are wedded to the respective Services – into a not-just-integrated, but also independent unit, responsible directly to the single Head of Procurement, or even the Minister that as the holder of one of the junior portfolios has been tasked with oversight of equipping the Armed Forces.
The idea being
1. to avoid overly fast rotation (no accountability at project, or the next-up, levels
2. and more importantly, working as a semi-permanent team, being able to evaluate and propose the trade-offs between capabilities that more often than not overlap to some degree
RW and ACC,
Thanks for the chance to read these two really good comments. That seems like a way to save the MoD and help keep HMT from constantly gaming it with divide-and-conquer methods of funding. The only caveat I’d add is the “most important projects” line. If that stays in the hands of politicians who aren’t forced to commit strategy and would rather benefit jobs for constituents at all costs or stock rises for companies where the rest of their golf foursome are on the board, then “most important” gets skewed. But if you have a complimentary body looking at strategy, subject to debate in the Commons, this could actually make some headway.
India to increase defence budget by 12% – google it.
So, they obviously don’t need aid from us then, so channel some of that DfID cash back to defence……
Seriously, overly simplistic analysis aside, India can do this because they don’t have a national health service, social welfare state. I work with Indian colleagues, I have been there once, I know people who have been there a lot. You would be gob smacked at the raw poverty of a lot of the populace. However as a nation they are not ashamed to spend the benefits of economic growth on prestige projects such as their space programme instead of improving life for their impoverished citizens. I am not judging – but I am thinking we could sell them two carriers which would be better than anything they could get from Russia……..
Hi jackstaff,
A capability on its own is worth nothing, say 100 Dreadnoughts doing only lilo for 50 years, unless there is a mapping against the (likely) threats, as in your “complimentary body looking at strategy, subject to debate in the Commons, this could actually make some headway.”
Heyy Jed.
RE “. I am not judging – but I am thinking we could sell them two carriers which would be better than anything they could get from Russia”
- we did sell Hermes to them
- just came out of long refit, not counting that time, 50 years of active service behind it
- will probably retire at 65; why don’t we get get refits on the way to retirement?
I am confused by all this Typhoon Tranche 1,2,3 business and what does what, what’s going out of service, how many squadrons are actually flying Typhoon……..
I am just so confused…………
x,
Ref: Typhoon,
Keep your eye on the Lady, gents, eye on the Lady, round she goes ….
ACC @ 1638Z,
I’m sayin’,
For anyone interested,
Since we are, in this thread and a couple of others, back onto the subject of strategy mapping, and we have to deal with the issue of “walking in/around the big boys’ footsteps” (US and China and India oh my, etc.), here’s a long and interesting paper from the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute on where they think things are/are headed:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1036
Anyone want to take a crack at it, besides reading for pleasure? (JBT ? ACC ? RichardW ? Anyone?)
On the same note as that paper, another that’s much shorter (hallelujiah) but inbetween the bureaucratese hits some important points for thought (same broad source set, trying to figure out what the Yanks are thinking ahead to now.) The following paragraph, while it’s about potential threat landscapes for the States, could be echoed in London, Paris, Rome, Amsterdam, even (whether they want to deal with it or not) Madrid, Rome, and Berlin. (And for those values of interests, on his global laundry list of new conflict regions, simply “Africa, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Caribbean” would do to flummox.)
Here’s the quotable quote:
“What if, for example, the terrorist threat remains at the level it is today — lethal mischief; necessitating unrelenting low-visibility pressure to keep it so but certainly not mass? What if the few U.S. partners that may face a classical insurgency exhibit little interest in large-scale commitment of U.S. combatants or trainers? What if the sources of future consequential, irregular land-based threats transcend the Middle East and South Asia and involve Latin America, Northeast Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Pacific Rim as well? Finally, what if the United States faces a significant threat to foreign interests under conditions where indigenous political authorities have lost complete control over outcomes and, therefore, extend none of the benefits associated with credible partnership? Worse still, what if this occurs in a state where U.S. intervention is unavoidable and where both the population and remnants of the former regime are hostile?”
Crumbs, forgot the link.
http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/relatedpubs/documents/Small_Wars_2.0.pdf
FWIW, I don’t think that last sentence is code for “let’s go ashore in Somalia,” or even meant to reflect much on the Stan even though it sort of does. My own perception is the author’s focused more on a Yemen-becomes-Somalia, collapse of Liberia translated to a more strategically valuable African locale, collapse of some overstressed Mesoamerican state, etc., scenario.
Last volley on that subject: I’d give the above author’s audience (he seems to “get it” a bit with references to structural deficiencies in America’s State Department) that strategy is about much more than figuring out what and where to bash with your military, and should often be about figuring out how to achieve results that let you avoid force. But to my eye he’s thinking about real issues/possibilities. As we sit here discussing the impact of Libya, Geddes Axe 2: This Time It’s Personal (personnel? :), and the 2015 SDSR in advance, seems interesting to read some ruminations from the Cousins.
Well, I said last, but … :)
This nearly unpronounceable but yet very quotable nugget from that second report:
“For now, the twin realities of an inevitable small wars future and the certainty of flat or declining defense resources and manpower should push DoD away from a COIN-based force, optimized for serial employment in the Middle East and South Asia, and instead toward a robust, expeditionary force focused on rapid entry/punitive campaigns and limited opposed stabilization worldwide. Forcible entry, rapid force build-up, precision lethality, and immediate full spectrum effects are valued more in these two archetypes than is the capacity to extend operations indefinitely.
While the current full-spectrum mantra championed by land force leaders may in part meet some capabilities needs in these two archetypes, a fuller appreciation of the worst-case environment suggests the need for more innovation in force structure, employment concepts, and enabling capabilities….. the force should generate more early entry combat forces and enablers that can fight and stabilize immediately on arrival with no requirement for reconfiguration or specialized reinforcement.”
Put down your bullshit bingo cards for a moment (I think we’ve all mostly scored a multiple-bingo on a blackout card no less, breaking the bank in Weston-super-Mare) and translate that into the Queen’s. What sort of strategic outlook does that sound like? :)
Hint: if you think “the Yanks have discovered strategic raiding,” Noel Edmonds will be ever so happy.
Sorry about the odd page break there in the block quote.
And, yes, plenty of serving flag officers in the States will then think “ooh — we need new toys!” Rather than, “we need to realign force structures and start teaching a different breadth of operational art to the Ruperts.” But with the constraints of budget might the UK, for example, manage a bit more of the latter with some prodding?
As a corrective to where Freier gets unexpectedly rosy at the end, the last three paragraphs of this:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/this-week-at-war-the-jawbreake/
Finally some clarity (Parliamentary Q & A):
” intention to transfer the Merlin Mk 3/3a [DOES THAT MODEL MAKE THEM THE RAF MERLINS?] helicopters to the Commando Helicopter Force to replace the Sea King Mk 4 helicopters which go out of service by 2016 on current plans.
The force’s fleet of Lynx helicopters will be replaced by Wildcat attack helicopters [ARE THE CURRENT NUMBERS HIGHER THAN THE 4 ORDERED?...how ridiculous: one per bn, sorry Commando; better than nothing, though]
Also, what good value the NATO ABM seems to be ! (same source)
Hi jacstaff,
Week end saved! with your reading list… just a detail, about where you break your list: ” echoed in London, Paris, Rome, Amsterdam, even (whether they want to deal with it or not) Madrid, Rome, and Berlin.”
- Madrid and Rome: both have built a very capable out-of-area deployable force (ok, you have Rome on both lists, but just for argument’s sake)
- Berlin: a whole airportabe division (SF make up part of it) if they haven’t dismantled it yet…seven Wiesels per commercially chartered 747 and floor reinforcement kits at the ready)
hi jackstaff,
RE ” we need new toys!” Rather than, “we need to realign force structures ”
- there are some interesting summaries of the planned transformation of USMC, exactly on those lines… so no more storming of the beaches on a divisional scale
- I lose the links as I download the stuff, but they have even had a full scale exercise (test) with a transformed force against a much bigger conventional force (in California)
- “kit” is only 10% of the transformation; BTW 3 Commando Bde is often cited as a(n enviable)reference
@ACC – yes, the Parliamentary answers always refer to the Merlin HC3 (ie the RAF transports) as Mk3′s, and the RN’s HM1 and more recent HM2 as Mk1 and Mk2 respectively.
On Wildcats per battalion – aren’t you making brave assumptions about how many battalions will be left when this is all over? :-)
RE ” aren’t you making brave assumptions about how many battalions will be left when this is all over?”
- yes, sorry!!
- and I even counted the roulement bn in
Typhoon only air force is a good idea up to a point. If we go this way they we dont do carrier aviation i just dont believe sea typhoon is a realistic capability.
X there is only 2 full operational squadron and one squadron standing up currently in scotland. These 3 are covering all QRA in Scotland and the Falklands we are dangerously low on numbers. 160 is min typhoon requirement in my eyes but should more than 5 squadrons to stand up. Total fast jet numbers should not be allowed to Fall below around 220-240 total if we wish to offer a meaningful overseas capability.
Hi Mark,
If I put together what the top RAF guys have said in interviews (down to 5 Sqn’s of Typhoons) and the NAO/ Flight Global number of 107 when T1 is withdrawn, that leaves .78 over each one in service (not counting OCU as “in service”).
If I do the same calculation for F-35 and assume 40 and 2 Sqn’s), then there will be .66 over each in front line service.
The fact that these figures come so close to each other leads me to believe that THAT is the plan.
And… if that is the case, I would be deeply greatfull for some clearer operational concepts from the RAF than “deep strike” and “GA” being one and the same (throw in CAS for good measure)
- may be I have just not looked in the right place?
ACC
I agree with your numbers. I don’t think that will be enough though. If typhoon T1 is withdrawn in (currently set for 2019 unless they update them or change plans) then it leaves some big questions as T1 contains most of the 2 seat trainers how do we train pilots also a very small deployed capability. My choice would be to update the T1 to tranche 2 spec and accept the slighly reduced spec and reduce tornado numbers quicker to compensate. 160 aircraft could support a 8 squadron force assuming 12 a/c each.
Initial F35 numbers and pilot requirements will also need to be known soon as OCU squadron will need to stand up around 2015-6 to allow carrier capability in 2019-2020
great stuff, Mark! for the “all at sea, or a managed transition” -theme
“leaves some big questions as T1 contains most of the 2 seat trainers how do we train pilots …
F35 numbers and pilot requirements will also need to be known soon as OCU squadron will need to stand up around 2015-6 to allow carrier capability in 2019-2020″
Now that we got to the carrier aspect, it is a pity that there is no way to cross-reference with the posts on “too good to” thread – no point duplicating
@Mark
Err – the T1′s are the 2-seat trainers! Sorry, I’m just picking up on something that’s bugged me for a while, please can people stop using T1 and T3 as abbreviations for Tranches 1 & 3? For one thing, those are mark designations for the training versions (as opposed to F2 and FGR4), so it’s confusing when you’re talking about the trainers in any case. But more generally – the Tranches are purely financial designations relating to how the planes are ordered, they don’t designate a particular capability which is how people tend to refer to them. Yes, originally the tranches each corresponded to three Blocks each of capability, but since Change Proposal 210 in 2007 the whole idea of Blocks has been more or less dispensed with, Block 8b was the last “official” one. Probably the last main “common” capability level will be the Phase 1 Enhancements corresponding to the old Block 10, giving the main development path the “austere” Paveway capability among other things (the RAF’s Block 5′s have P1E, but on older hardware). After that, the emphasis will be on bringing in new weapons via software releases, so you’ll see people talking about SRP12, 14, 16 etc corresponding loosely to the year of introduction. Upgrading “Tranche 1″ hardware like the Block 5′s to “Tranche 2″ hardware just ain’t going to happen, although P1E means that they will have the same capabilities in software.
As has already been discussed, an outcome of the SDSR appears to have been that the fancy new glass-cockpit Hawks will take over a lot of Typhoon training – it costs £10k/hour to run a Hawk and £70k/hour to run a Typhoon, so you can see the financial logic even if it’s obviously better to train pilots on the Typhoon itself. The trainers account for about half of Tranche 1, so binning the remaining Block 5 aircaft is less of a hit to frontline availability than it appears.
BBC4 8pm
Oops- that last line is meant to be a reminder to TD to set his video/PVR, there should be something of interest on BBC4 at 8pm tonight, although apparently it’s a repeat.
Hi El Sid,
This “The trainers account for about half of Tranche 1, so binning the remaining Block 5 aircaft is less of a hit to frontline availability than it appears” is good to know
How about that GA (FGR) update that was paid for but does not have “anyone” trained on it over the life of Tranche 1?
- true or not true?
- while we have so many Tornados, it does not really matter, but there is far too much “white noise” around this topic, so clarity on that one would be good
OK, I’ll mix my G&T 5 to and get a comfy chair
RE “reminder to TD to set his video/PVR”
EL Sid
Your are absolutely correct I was referring to the Tranche 1 aircraft but was lazy and just wrote T1. If we are going to use the new hawk for training then the rumour being reported that the UK will bin 1/3 of them almost immediately as result of reduced pilot requirement really makes you wonder whos dreaming all this up.
El Sid if/can the software update for Tranche 2 aircraft were applied to the Tranche 1 block 5 aircraft would this allow them to release the less heavy AG ordnance or meteor cause if it did they could use up there life standing QRA or in the Falklands
Yes ACC lots of crossover. There is a lot of political points/change agenda scoring/ slight of hand going on over all big ticket defence items at the minute both sides of the Atlantic and a lot of issues are being blown out of all proportion.
Hi Mark,
RE “being reported that the UK will bin 1/3 of them almost immediately as result of reduced pilot requirement” how is the 100% of the Hawk fleet made up? Glass cockpit vs. traditional? In other countries, what they are used (useful?) for varies accordingly
@ACC – we’re in the middle of phasing out the old T1 in favour of the 128 (aka T2), I would have thought the T1′s have just about gone by now.
@Mark – I would guess that the retirement of the Tonkas has made a big difference to our need for new pilots, and in the near future there’s obviously going to be a surplus of FJ pilots who don’t need basic training, so I’d guess our “underlying” need for Hawks has gone down to 40-50% of what it was (at least in the near term) but then ditching the Typhoon trainers increases demand for Hawks up to 66% of the original Hawk-128 plan. I’ve made up the numbers, but you get the general idea.
I’m not an expert on the technical stuff, but I think the problem is that although you probably could run a lot of the newer software releases on Block 5 hardware, it would count as a separate software pathway, and would need to go through a separate lot of testing. Which the RAF would have to pay 100% of, and it’s not really worth it for just 30 or so single-seat B5′s. Personally I’d be happy for them to use up the hours of the B5′s on QRA/training, we’ll see what actually happens. It seems that the Treasury were planning PR11 on the assumption that the Oman deal would go through (hence the sudden need to save a few more £100m’s) and so I guess that any noises made about the Typhoon in the immediate aftermath of the SDSR are now hopelessly out of date.
Just as an aside – people casually talk about sending low-spec Typhoons to the Falklands, I’d have thought that 1435 has more use for fancy ground attack than most.
Might I suggest that if people need to abbreviate the tranches, they use Tr1, Tr2 etc to distinguish from the trainers? More accurate to use block numbers though.
@ACC – on the infamous CP-193 that led to the RAF fast-tracking – yes it hindsight it looks a terrible decision. But there is some logic to it.
According to the plan at the time, the RAF were going to acquire 2 squadrons to cover QRA South, 2 squadrons for QRA North, plus a few for the Falklands. These could all afford to be air-to-air only. But Typhoons acquired after that would be going to the “deployable” squadrons and would need to be multi-role, certainly if they were to go to Iraq or Afghanistan. That all worked within the original Typhoon delivery timetable but then that started slipping and it looked like the early Tranche 2′s would be air-to-air only as well. So the RAF instigated CP-193 to make sure that basic Paveway integration at least would happen at the time it was originally planned, but on more primitive Tranche 1 hardware.
So what was the rush? I have a bit of a theory that someone wanted the option, at least, of dropping Paveway on Iran. There’s quite a bit of evidence that Bush came quite close to attacking Iran towards the end of his presidency, things like the disposition of the carriers, and it’s interesting to view CP-193 in that light.
However then Gordon Brown noticed he was massively in debt even during the boom, and he had two wars to pay for, so 72 Typhoons got sold to Saudi. These were the aircraft that were pencilled in for QRA North and the early multirole squadrons – in other words, the ones that CP-193 was intended for. Instead, those squadrons will get Block 8 and 10 aircraft that will get ground attack capability as part of the main development pathway.
You could also view CP-193 as something that was initiated in order to secure the Saudi deal. “Look Saudis – Typhoon has A2G capability already!”
Whatever, the Saudi deal meant that CP-193 was obsolete as far as the RAF were concerned, and training pilots to use it would have been pretty much a waste of time and money when we only had two squadrons on QRA South and a couple in the Falklands. You could have just about justified it for the Falklands pilots I suppose, but Paveway isn’t really what you want for the likely targets down there, you want something longer range if you’re attacking an Argie fleet.
El Sid just above,
That was a wonderful accounting. For a non-RAFphile that was very good on useful accounting of the situation, and the factors that have led most directly (leaving aside the downright archaeological study of the whole Eurofighter project) to the current shower. I stand by what I’ve said elsewhere about a late-stage (probably 1500s or so) knightly class; high-end combat aircraft design has led itself, nearly worldwide, down a cost/benefit cul-de-sac. Of course the RAF, who can make the just about reasonable defence that they’re hamstrung by a treasury that may have the most dysfunctional state-within-a-state power in the Western world (other than the wierdly quango US Federal Reserve), has some particularly bad habits. (Reading somewhere that the original plan for 232 aircraft was to field, maybe, nine squadrons out of that number, drove me right to the front end of a very nice bottle of Tallisker.) I’d like someone round here, who has knowledge from those days, to talk about the ratio of total aircraft inventory for given types (at that time Phantom, Bucs, Jaguar, etc.) to numbers-in-squadron for the service in, say, the late 1970s-early 1980s against now. My uneducated guess is it’s not pretty and has a lot to do with the (in engineering/economic terms) exquisite nature of the current birds. That and the profoundly frakked-up public/private procurement relationship that escalates cost, but I don’t think that’s as total an explanation as our blog boss sometimes does, because other countries have or are catching the disease as well.
Nice discussion of turning CP-193 into a marketing feature for shunting the other would-be British Typhoons to Saudi.
On the day snakes ice-skate and political reform breaks the back of HMT’s iron grip on the British state, my own (again, n00b’s eye) view is the RAF should have 200 Typhoon in inventory, at least half to two-thirds worked up to FGR4 or similar capabilities, with an ironclad demand that they consistently field 9 X 12 in squadron (that includes a full half-squadron of six for Mt Pleasant and the other six of that squadron-sized force on a short string to fly south and reinforce.) So you run your fleet into the ground sooner? Well, damn. Have to either develop a small and steady consistent aircraft industry (either based on more compact company/ies who can deliver effectively or under public control — state as last guarantor of its own defence) or buy from others who can and aren’t named “Lockheed Martin.” (Really? We collectively let the biggest multi-national combat aircraft project since the F-16 “Deal of the Century” be run by the folks who birthed the F-104? Really?)
ACC,
Sorry to be so lazy getting back wrt your enthusiasm for those articles. I’ve set Jedibeeftrix on the same track (he’s been an enthusiastic reader of the shorter one) and between the two of you expect some very interesting and educational takes on them. And thanks for helping kick off this round of the Typhoon talking shop. V useful too.
It might be old news but I have just read a couple of articles that state that the RAF is making a case to retain the Merlin HC3s and for the Commando Helicopter Force to be disbanded. Another nail in the FAA coffin?
Hi El Sid,
Fascinating stuff , all of it, but I would be inclined to believe this one:”You could also view CP-193 as something that was initiated in order to secure the Saudi deal. “Look Saudis – Typhoon has A2G capability already!””
The (military) aviation press often notes that the RAF has been one of the slowest to transition to multi-role fighters (probably because the Lightning, in its day, was so bang on for its role). The Saudis, likely, were reluctant to take a step “backwards” if you think about what else was on offer?
On this Hawk business, your made-up example blurred the drift (?) as -40% from the original strength and then a new requirement of +66% on top of that gives a total change of 0.4%
- or did the message just “fly past” me?
Hi jackstaff;
“knightly class; high-end combat aircraft…”
- no one (on this blog at least) seems to have noticed the lecture Robert Gates delivered in the Air Force Academy soon after his “head examining” in West Point? He talked about the need to keep the Air Force transformation as achieved in the 10 years in A-stan to be kept going, but was sure that after the “withdrawal” the conservative thinking would prioritise the white-scarfed profession over “troops-operating-from-the-back-of-a-truck options.
“…the RAF, who can make the just about reasonable defence that they’re hamstrung by a treasury that may have the most dysfunctional state-within-a-state power in the Western world”
- agreed, as Central Banks are supposed to be independent, but Trasuries NOT the second gvmnt (REF: other than the wierdly quango US Federal Reserve)
@ACC – my example was down to 40-50% of original strength and then back up to 66% of OS. We’ve ordered 28 new Hawks, so that would be down to 12 and up to 19. However, I think some wires have been scrambled here. I’ve found this good piece looking at RAF training post-SDSR, and their quote is a reduction of 40% in the _requirement_ for new pilots, not a reduction in the number of aircraft. So it looks like we potentially need 17 Hawks rather than 28, but Hawks #18-28 will now be used to replace the Typhoon trainers. Hope that’s clear?
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/02/14/353131/uk-mfts-programme-gears-to-train-first-students.html
On the fighter-only thing, to be fair to the RAF, they have a strange role compared to most airforces, which expect to be up close an personal to the front line, so they will be facing enemy aircraft and ground troops close to home. So they needed short-range aircraft that could swing between the two roles. Geography gave the RAF a nearly unique mission in the Cold War, where the prime threat to the homeland was long-range bombers. So they’ve needed long-legged interceptors to loiter over the Norwegian Sea for long periods of time at high altitude – the Tornado F3 was brilliant for this – and it’s hard to square that mission with low-level ground attack. You could argue that purely for homeland defence, the F3 is a better aircraft than the Typhoon, despite its inability to pull tricks at airshows or on Top Gear.
However, it’s worth looking at this Flight article from 1978 which is talking about what became Typhoon, an interesting read. The RAF are reported as wanting a 50:50 split between air superiority and ground attack, the French 40:60-ish and the the Germans 60:40-ish. Fun reading about the ideas for Super Jaguars and Mirage 3000′s.
Hi El Sid,
That “So it looks like we potentially need 17 Hawks rather than 28, but Hawks #18-28 will now be used to replace the Typhoon trainers. Hope that’s clear?” is what I thought you meant, anyway.
And the non-glass cockpit Hawks go with the airframe fatigue, in any case, if not all gone already. There is even a 2nd-hand market, to squeeze the remaining hours out of those airframes that, due to the cuts in the next-up numbers have become surplus to one airforce, get passed onto the next one – nothing unusual, except that in these penny-pinching times even the trainers are now counted individually, rather than by the dozen.
- interesting though, the UK has gone down the PFI route even in training, when there are pooled efforts for training (Hawk level (N Europe); F-16 level (Italy, sure for F-16 only, being the mainstay of so many smaller NATO nations)running between the air forces
Viable alternatives to Depleted Uranium ammunition.
Is Tungsten a viable alternate? Not my area of expertise unfortunately, but would be interested in anyone’s opinion on the matter.
I volunteered that the UK 11% participation to the NATO ABM shield was good value… then I read this (DID) and it reminded me of the Polish Defence Minister saying to the US that when they agreed to be part of it, they thought they would get armed missiles on the ground… Now
” USA’s Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program uses land-based missiles to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in the middle of their flight, outside the atmosphere. The missiles are currently based at 2 sites in the USA: 4 at Vandenberg AFB in California, and 20 (eventually 26) at Fort Greely in Alaska.
The well-known Patriot missiles provide what’s known as terminal-phase defense options, while longer-reach options like the land-based THAAD perform terminal or descent-phase interceptions. Both can be used against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), but their sensors and flight ranges are best suited to defense against shorter range missiles launched from in-theater. In contrast, GMD is designed to defend against ICBMs. It depends on tracking that begins in the boost phase, in order to allow true mid-course interception attempts in space, before descent or terminal phase options like THAAD and then Patriot would be tried. In order to accomplish that task, GMD missiles must use data feeds from an assortment of long-range sensors, including the naval SBX radar.”
-as there was the back-pedalling on the deal the Poles signed up with, what is this NATO ABM shield actually?
- I have contributed a piece that gathered together the ABM exercise that stretched from Romania to Israel
- BUT that does not say whether the interception will be within the athmosphere, and more importantly, what is the coverage actually
- the Gulf States very quickly bought a lot of the stuff (at least ordered it), but Romania, 6th Fleet, Israel, and more… where does that leave us?
ACC: Ref “-as there was the back-pedalling on the deal the Poles signed up with, what is this NATO ABM shield actually?”
The Ground Based Interceptor was failing test, the Russians were really, really pissed off with the though of GBI in Poland (go study the Russian nationaly psyche for 10 years at Uni and report back to us….) and Standard Missile fired from ships is working well.
Therefore win win solution was – bin the Ground Based Interceptor in Poland, calming Russians and paving the way for overland access through their territory to Afghanistan; while making tactical ABM operations a largely naval operation with AEGIS / Standard.
“Where does that leave us” – it leaves el cheap Euro-NATO countries relying on the USN, that’s where it leaves us…. :-)
The Germans had developed some very effective Tungsten APFSDS rounds (DM12 & DM53) as an alternative to DU. The latter together with the 120mm L55 the performance is very good able to penetrate over 800mm of RHAe at a range of 2000m
Hi Jed,
Only teasing out “the right answer” – and you’ve got it! Only part, though, as the fact that the missiles are on ships (mainly) is a reflection of Obama Administration signing up to where the real threat comes from (moving* the ships there, as and when needed).
And that 10 years at the Uni – a thousand years of experience; not personally, my grand father only went to three wars with the Russians.
__________
* the right answer to 11% of something being such a low number (for the UK to pick up as the bill) – we can afford it! The Poles can afford it, too! The Romanians probable will get it for free? Nice jump-up positions for the Middle East, forget about those pesky Turks that did not co-operate when it was their chance to do so
OOhhh – this open thread is so good:
- some real geopolitics coming out!
.. they do have an influence on the UK defence posture, or may be not?
Was listening to William Hague answer questions earlier (luckily for me I had a spreadsheet open when my boss walked) and he was asked given that we no-longer have a carrier, where we could base a helicopter to provide CSAR for a pilot if he was downed. William Hague provided a non-answer (he is a politician after all) but it got me wondering.
Would the best way to provide CSAR in Libya be to position RFA Argus 20 odd miles of the coast, and use a pair of Chinook HC3′s to provide CSAR? If my sources our correct the HC3′s have better range than H2, and you would need a pair, one to land and rescue the pilot’s and the other to provide over watch. Plus you have the bonus that Argus is set up with medical facilities. Does what I outline sound like the most likely way to provide CSAR?
Tubby,
Argus was certainly used for a variety of utility roles like that in the Adriatic (evidence of her limits helped push the purchase of Ocean and eventual mods on Lusty) and CSAR is probably one she could continue to perform well without much pushing the envelope on her typical role (under the Geneva Convention, which then gives special protections to such a big target) as a hospital ship. If it were up to me, I would “Argus-ize” the Fort Victoria design (an extra hangar or two, hospital facilities at least on the scale they can containerize on the Absalons) and use that as template for a Joint Support Ship-ish replacement x 3 for the four Forts. Argus and the two newer Forts are gems in the crown that haven’t been stripped and sold yet so Their Nibses in the bond market can keep up appearances.
Only argument against HC3 (I like your thinking) is their lift is needed in the Stan and the twin rotors make appealing targets in a hot LZ.
Thanks Jackstaff, you learn something new every day, I did not realise there were restrictions on attacking hospital ships though I should have if I thought through.
I know that the RAF have some Merlin crews trained in CSAR but the Chinook’s are being used currently as medical transport’s in Afghanistan.
Tubby,
Might be good, then, to rope some Chinooks into dual use (at least in crash zones considered “lower risk” around a fluid battlefront) since they should have experience operating with Argus’ setup? Definite point to you. And thanks. Don’t know I have much to teach but very glad it was useful info. Conventions aside, mostly it just means “mess with our hospital ships and we’ll *really* do you over.”
RE: Hospital Ships. I believe there are very strict rules on what qualifies as a “Hospital Ship”. All white paint job except for large crosses, absolutely no armament or combat stores what’s so ever, and I think a civvie crew. Probably a lot more…
The RN/RFA do not have any “Hospital Ships” in the Geneva sense, instead they have a number of vessels, including Argus, fitted out to operate as “Primary Casualty Receiving Ships”. However, as has been pointed out the foes we’re currently fighting would probably not honour the Geneva convention, even if they had heard of it…
Gareth,
This mostly seems, in the case of Argus specifically (since she’s also able to work as a helicopter flight trainer and, in her salad days, a SHAR garage), deliberate treading into a grey area in order to keep the ship multi-function. She has in the past worked on some specific assignments in the hospital capacity (mostly as a nicety to the UN or other international partners) but it’s been a while; fiar point, and a good reminder on both counts (the PCRS label, and the fact most thoroughly modern enemies don’t give a rat’s wedding gear.)
@ Tubby and Jackstaff – Hang on, I’ve just had one of my crazy ideas! Borrowing TD’s “funded by the DfID” Bay Class for Humanitarian support concept, what about creating a true “Hospital Ship” from the (refitted?) Fort class due to be scrapped? “Medical Diplomacy” has been increasingly used by the US and now China to win friends and influence people. We (the DfID) could send the Med Fort on global health cruises, projecting soft power and have it available for major conflicts. The Argus is due to retire soon (?) and the RN has been talking about a replacement PCRS for sometime…
http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/18/china%E2%80%99s-hospital-ship-in-a-box/
And the starter, for ten, goes to Swansea ….
Hi jackstaff and Tubby,
RE “Might be good, then, to rope some Chinooks into dual use”
- if there is any take up for this idea, it is my understanding that the under nose/ belly automated turret for Osprey was exactly developed (by BAE) to clear hot LZs on CSAR missions
- surely that could be added on something big (like a Chinook, which do not have side doors, if I remember from the photo images)?
Seriously, after Basra, can we be any more flammin embarrassing in our ineptness ?
http://defensetech.org/2011/03/07/were-those-sas-troops-really-on-a-diplomatic-mission/
Jed,
I can’t remember which embittered postwar American author said “you can never underestimate the intelligence of the American public” (in the literal, sardonic sense of that sentence.) Pretty much the same rules work here I’m afraid. The blokes in that photo are hanging their heads somewhere.
ACC and Jackstaff for helo armamemts
Have a look here
http://www.chinook-helicopter.com/chinook/gunsagogo.html
and here
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/01/the-future-of-the-raf-11-%E2%80%93-istar-05-manned-airborne-istar/
I was just doing the sums earlier on, and it’s quite impressive just how long a Tornado could stay on CAP over Tripoli without needing tanker support, even from somewhere like Gioia del Colle. Designed for large bodies of cold grey water.
@ Richard Stockley and Lord Jim on DU ammo replacements:
The traditional alternative has been tungsten carbide, which IIRC delivers maybe 80-85% of the penetration of DU and lacks the pyrophoric effects which give DU-cored projectiles their incendiary capabilities.
The latest tank gun APFSDS penetrators have adopted more exotic alloys of tungsten to try to close the penetration gap with DU, with all sorts of heavy metals included, making the whole package almost as toxic as DU for a lot more money.
With the discussions recently on this forum regarding a balanced force etc and what sort of deployments the UK could sustain on a short and longer term deployments, I think that looking at the forces deployed in Afghanistan is very revealing.
The original SDR set out the requirements to deploy two seperate brigades on a short term basis or one brigade on an enduring basis. However, the UK forces in Afghanistan – which definitely constitutes “enduring” – are way above brigade level. There are six battalions deployed whereas the SDR was based around 3 battalion brigades for the most part. In the invasion of Iraq, 7 Armoured Bgd fought with 3 battalions, 16 AAB fought with 3 battalions and 3 Commando brigade with 2 commandos. That’s a total of 8 battalions for what we described as a divisional deployment. Ok the back up and support elements were far greater in Iraq, but are we kidding ourselves if we think of Afghanistan as a brigade level deployment?
I think this is relevant as it goes to heart of planning assumptions. If the UK planned to have the capability to deploy one brigade on an enduring basis but have managed to do nearly double that, should the very nature of the planning process be put under the spot light?
I welcome my lay observations being put right by those with more insight and experience on this forum!
More Chinese Medical Diplomacy links; check out the wider site, very interesting articles.
http://conflicthealth.com/plans-hospital-ship-and-public-diplomacy/
I have updated an older post on IED’s and Talisman if anyone fancies a read
It’s a long un
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/06/is-talisman-too-little-too-late/
Australian article prompted by SecDef Gates last speech – “What is the Australian Army for ?”
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/03/08/Whats-the-Australian-Army-for.aspx
A question we should be asking too !
interesting article Jed, cheers.
Jed,
What JBT said. And I can’t wait to see what he makes of it over at his shop, also those think-pieces from the Yanks. The folks in Oz seem to be having the deepest and most thoughtful strategic debate (maybe because they have a trio of superpowers on their watery doorstep — US, China, India — instead of taking the European approach of insular, “lets just rest on our history in suburban backyards, it’s someone else’s problem” hobbitry) but maybe the US is catching up. You’ve probably already seen it since you know the site well, but there’s this over at Information Dissemination:
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/03/bold-alligator-2012-ba-12.html
Looks like Adm. Harvey has woken up to the notion that many of these strategic reappraisals, and the reality of situations like Libya (or a collapsing Nigeria or as you suggested a Yemeni blowup or — hey, it’s my thing — a Greco-Turkish shootout with Cyprus as the international front, etc.), that one of these days someone may have to do an opposed landing against a decently armed foe after all. And the reading list is good stuff.
Tony Williams and Lord Jim,
Thanks for that, I saw a documentary on the environmental and physiological effects of DU and wondered about the alternatives. I’m sure the A-10 still uses a DU round or is it just MBT ammunition?
Hello i hope admin is ok with this but i thought i would let folk know that Play.com has the BBC TV series “Sailor” for sale on DVD.
Jackstaff i think if there was a ‘Greco-Turkish shootout’ the Turks would have it especially after a few years of Greece being absolutely skint. Add to that the ongoing Turkish military modernisation i think the odds would be in their favour. Although the political ramifications for Europe and NATO if 2 powerful NATO members started going nuts would be huge so i doubt it would go as far as a shooting war.
Another Euan sighting! :)
I hope you’re right. But we also hoped Gaddafi would go quickly in a coup a la Ceaucescu and that, after the Slovenian revolt, things would calm down in a collapsing Yugoslavia. I agree the Turks have enormous advantages, but that’s never stopped Greek nationalism, especially with tacit support (and probably volunteers) from folks like the Serbs. What *kind* of shooting match it would be that’s up for plenty of debate and I’m happy to concede it. But each of them has substantial vulnerabilities to collapse (Turkey ethnic/religious, Greece economic) and that doesn’t bode well for good behaviour. What’s definitely true is that it’s eminently preventable, if the EU and US get their act together about soothing the trends towards collapse and desperation, rather than just finger-wagging.
How much are they doing the complete run of “Sailor” for? :)
Hey Jackstaff, Play.com are doing it for £15 including delivery although it might take a while as it says allow 1-2 weeks for dispatch. I’ve always wanted a copy but trying to find it for a sensible price was pretty hard but I managed to pre-order it before it was released on the 7th so hopefully it should appear soon.
As for Libya etc, our expectations are always out on things like this as you never know what folk are going to do especially crackpots. I personally thought the whole Libya, North Africa thing would be more serious than it is but the journalists have not yet donned their nice blue protective gear and from what I gather it’s not turned out to be bad as I thought.
I think any conflict between Greece and Turkey would ultimately be decided in the air due to the short distances involved although naval power would of course play a major role. In the air I would say the Turks would have it as they have superior AWACS capability and more aircraft when it comes to attrition. From a strictly clinical standpoint it would be interesting to watch it unfold both militarily and politically as it would really show if the EU was willing and capable of truly working together. Also not forgetting what our response would be if this was happening over Cyprus with our history there and the current sovereign base areas would it be 1974(?) all over again and could we actually do anything.
Just read on the news that Cameron said: “Britain is leading the way on a No Fly Zone over Libya.” Oh dear………….
i too have just seen on the news that a) canada have said no to a joint ship programme, point to note the first thing the spokesman quotes is canada wants the right price and to build in canada. BAe trying to do one of their nimrod/CVF contracts on the canadians perhaps?
b) the F35c has flown faster than the speed of sound for the first time, apparantly this is important for data gathering on how the aircraft reacts, flutter is the technical term.
oh ho thought this might interest people, trials using UAV’s for AAR for other UAV’s quite clever really
http://defensetech.org/2011/03/09/darpa-testing-global-hawk-drones-as-aerial-tankers/
@ Richard Stockley
The US uses DU in a number of calibres. There is a 25mm round used on the AV-8B together with the 30mm used in the GAU-8 on the A10. I think the 25mm round is also used on the Bushmaster on the Bradley and LAV-25.
Cheers LJ, DU is a lot more widespread than I thought. Has anyone thought about going around Afghanistan and Iraq with a geiger counter and seeing how bad the contamination is overall? Doesn’t sound healthy.
The problem isn’t really fallout as such, but when rounds hit a target a large amount of very fine DU particles are release which are VERY toxic.
I originally thought the radiation in DU was at an absolute minimum, but if the documentary I saw was correct it still holds around 60% of its radioactivity. It also highlighted the fine particles you mentioned and that vehicles hit by DU rounds have to be properly decontaminated. If this is true then the quicker we get DU off the battlefield the better, for soldiers, civillians and the environment alike.
RE ” when rounds hit a target a large amount of very fine DU particles are release which are VERY toxic” I bet the US Army does not require inside examination of knocked out tanks’ battle damage, for potential survivors, anymore?
@Lord Jim,
Yes, the M242′s 25mm M919 APFSDS shot is DU, although there are tungsten alternatives developed for export.
DU is not a problem if it remains outside the body – the radiation it emits is very weak, and stopped even by a coat of paint. The health risk (other than that caused by having a DU projectile hit you at extremely high velocity…) comes when the powder is inhaled or ingested. Once inside the body, it’s nasty stuff. Although I should point out that heavy metals used as an alternative to DU can be rather toxic too.
Just been watching a progrsam on Sky Discovery channel. I think it was “The Enforcers”. Anyway is was about three black bank robbers in Tampa Bay Florida. The really amazing thing was that some of the SWAT team were wquipped with SA80s. Yes, really SA bloody 80s I even paused the picture to check. I had no idea they had sold any outside the UK, with the exception of Jamaica.
Well, Jamaica is notorious for its crime rate, so maybe it was realistic….
That’s nothing anyway. If you’ve been watching the BBC’s SF serial ‘Outcasts’, you will have noticed that despite being set on another planet in the distant future, the explorers are armed with…..yup, SA80s. The MoD’s support for the gun is obviously for the long term.
RE “Jamaica is notorious for its crime rate, so maybe it was realistic…”
- or just more “cool” for the US audience when they don’t immediately recognise the hardware ?
paul @ 11:32 and 1:15,
I wouldn’t even want to take your money on BAe trying to shaft Canada on the deal, for any number of reasons from corporate maneuvering (trying to offload startup costs on Canada to keep the costs high but “reasonable” for HMG in case no other deals go through) to the fact that they’re cretinous flim-flam men. (If they wanted a carrier consortium, why in God’s name did they put BAe in charge? Talk about foxes and henhouses.)
And that’s very interesting about the AAR with UAVs (three-letter acronym scrabble is always fun :) Welcome to the new aerial cavalry, putting numbers and loss-replaceable versatility back in the skies.
Anyone have any in depth knowledge on the Fairey Rotordyne? I was wondering if anyone knew how Tip Jet powered rotorcraft fared in hot and high conditions since they don’t rely directly upon engine power to get them up in the air.
I suspect that the tip jets might lose power due to the shortage of oxygen.
Even if the rotor can still be spun at the same speed, it will presumably have less lifting power in the thinner air.
A field trial for one of the FRES contestants:
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a64f315d1-3d39-4046-97b3-1b4b5f394473&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest
the boxer was in the “trials of death” (Yes they did actually call it that)!!! an yet the GD entrant won, it’ll be interesting to see how this fares particularly with RPG and IED threat. (not wishing injury to anyone i hasten to add)
Hi paul g,
When I read more about it, they are actually sending 4 (!) to M. Shariff, which I understand to be quite peaceful (when I was there it was full of the bearded hey man – peace on you -types).
So I am afraid we won’t hear much about withstanding RPGs and all that…
Why did the Dutch not send their Boxers but bought a 100+ Bushmasters instead?
ACC, i see and 4 isn’t a great number, still when something is used 24/7 for a long period rather than 2 weeks under a controlled conditions (ie exercise) you still get a better understanding of the equipment and make changes as/if required
Hi paul g,
Agreed. What we will probably learn more about is the Swiss (Oerlikon has now been bough by the Germans, though) base (as in air base, would work for any, but a tad expensive) defence system, based on containerised 35mm naval guns
- they are supposedly able to shoot down anything, including incoming mortar rounds
Two ordered, I think the Germans only need to defend one base in A-stan. The system has been fielded already.
Were we not involved in the Boxer programme? why did we leave?
@ ACC – is that the Sky Guard system? I agree, looks interesting; if successful do you think it would compliment the proposed CAMM’s system?
we put about 200million into a european wheeled apc programme (not sure on the 200m need to look it up) and then pulled out to go alone with the FRES, one of the reasons stated was the project vehicle (now known as boxer) was too heavy for airlift and didn’t fit in with our rapid response requirements. Yet again a clusterfudge of the highest order!!!
GJ
It was all part of the FRES F*ckup, that was roling program of constantly changing specs and requirements, which must have driven the manufacturers bonkers.
EG Boxer cancelled because it was too big; but we end up trying to order Pirahna 4 which is frankly the same size weight etc!
FRES just need to go away now. Weve spent a billion quid and got nothing in return. FRES scout at 40tn is beyond belief. Quite simple tell the army either you pick a vehicle already in production or already in service for a wheeled APC or you get nothing. If we can develop something like oscelot for this requirement then great but it will need to be a realistic spec and one that is set in stone.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/mar/10/royal-navy-trevor-soar-interview
Thanks for the info – what about this Ukrainian vehicle for our Scout requirement?
http://www.minotor-service.com/en/2t-stalker-combat-vehicle-reconnaissance.html
ACC posted this in another thread (at my request i should add);
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/mar/11/navy-contingency-plans-libya
Does anyone have any more info on what ships are in this RFTG and what its intended role was/is?
Hi Gareth
Interesting interview I guess thats what were calling the amphibious ready group now weve scraped the carrier group.
I see the US are moving the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Regan to northern japan to help in the rescue there according to the BBC. There Utility shown again.
mARK
I am sure the RR will be a great help genuinly so, but it is hardly the vessel you would pick for the Job One of the LHA s would give more utility.
@ Mark and IXION – The US are increasingly using their carriers in a more flexible way;
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/story.html?id=2442881
“In October 2001, Kitty Hawk deployed to the North Arabian Sea in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The ship served as an afloat forward staging base for U.S. special forces.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Kitty_Hawk_%28CV-63%29#1998_to_2008_.28Homeport:_Yokosuka.29
and I believe the 101st Airborne division used USS Enterprise(?) as an afloat forward stagging base some years back of Haiti…
Hi GJ, RE
“if successful do you think it would compliment the proposed CAMM’s system”
- it does not need, as such, any other system
- bearing in mind that it is by its nature a “terminal approach” system
- the principle is that you are more effective if you can intercept the launch platform (in time) rather than the already launched munitions
- in A-stan that does not apply as it is those sneaky guys getting close enough to launch their mortar rounds (rocket launchers are too heavy to be “sneaky” with)
@ ACC – So like the US C-RAM system?
Hi Gareth,
Skyshield, as it was 6 years ago, was part of the C-RAM evaluation.
Not sure if the latter ended up with Phalanx, or what… Don’t we have some Navy Phalanx kit out there for the same purpose?
Skyshield is now a fully-fledged land system (AHEAD ammo and all that), and have not seen any test results, but would guess the intercept ratio is better than the 50-60% when C-RAM was being trialled.
I pre-ordered my copy of Sailor from Al Beeb as soon as I knew it was going to be re-released for the princely some of £19.99.
When it first came out I kept putting off buying it. And then watched the prices steadily rise.
As for Phalanx I thought the US had been using tungsten rounds for quite a while because of cancer fears with DU.
@ ACC – don’t know much I’m afraid except the US deployed modified Phalanx to Iraq (got the nickname R2-D2, for obvious reasons); they might have it in A-Stan… Last I heard it wasn’t doing as well as hoped.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter_Rocket,_Artillery,_and_Mortar
Hi Gareth,
I would not like to count on 50-60% protection! So no wonder “it wasn’t doing as well as hoped”
Out of the following(from Wiki)
MANTIS: 35mm fully automated C-RAM system, produced by Rheinmetall based on Oerlikon’s Skyshield and ordered by the German Army for use from 2011 – NOW DEPLOYED
Iron Dome: an Israeli missile system featuring multiple target tracking and self-guided missile interceptors – DELAYED INTO SERVICE
… so which one, out of the 3 would I have; let me think about that one
Wow completely forgot all about this part of the site!
I noticed there was some Typhoon talk and F35 talk. Which brings me to a recent article on Flight Global, Canada Parliamentary Budget Office is saying 66 F35s will cost “US$29.3 billion over 30 years, compared to the $17.3 billion estimate”
Does anyone have any overall costs of Typhoon to compare with (Yes the aircraft aren’t the same but when you’re counting beans it doesn’t matter!) Such as inital investment cost of the program, cost of airframe and overall operating cost.
It would be interesting to compare the finances of the projects since they are both joint projects. On another note it’s disappointing to hear the second F35 engine is going to get cut, one of the wikileaks cable said the dutch wanted the second engine.
I also noticed some people have talked about BAe, mainly how stupid it is they are pretty much the main defence contractor and how we’ve let them get so big. I pretty much agree, with them we’ve got no home grown competition that can compete, which really does my protectionism little head in. Shame I feel the government aren’t bothered about this, they seem to like big corps *cough rupert murdoch cough*, love privatisation but does sod all about the regulation afterwards and love putting the boot in to the public sector (by government I mean all parties :P)
Hmmmm – Shibby’s post has got me thinking about an old idea I had; a list of British Defence projects/equipment cancelled by moronic politicians and tight-fisted bean counters which, with the benefit of hindsight (or just common sense!), Would have been Fan-F@*cking-tastic.
Personally I’m going for EM2/Tarden w/7mm ammo;
Rotodyne;
CV01;
Supersonic Buccaneer;
Hybrid rocket/jet interceptor (forget it’s name..:();
TRS2 must get a mention but too be honest I don’t know enough to list it personally.
What are everyone else’s?
@ Gareth Jones
You mean the Saunders Roe rocket-planes. But the bean counters and politicians with blood hands with that one were American.
Our rocket programme too. But the French seem to be doing well with it.
(And I suppose at a stretch we could include our Canadian cousins’ Avro Arrow. A victim of the same purp’s…….)
You can add to your list “What projects were cancelled during a defence review and what was created” That would be mighty interesting as well!
@ X – How could I forget the Black Arrow/Black Knight programme! Cheap as chips (relatively speaking), able to put small satellites in orbit. Cancelled just as the commercial satellites market took off…
Interesting projects cancelled/ignored
BSA belt fed 7.62 Bren gun.
.357 Sterling police revolver
A Russian agent gave us the plans for how the Russians put 4 rocket engines on one turbo pump. We could have enlarged Blue Streak to a 4 engined “Big Streak” powerful enough to launch a Gemini capsule.
Westland WG30 with powerful engines.
AV-16 supersonic Harrier
The T45 as first proposed before it was stripped into a merchant ship in drag.
Warrior 2000
Challenger 3
Just a start, more will come to me.
@x: “As for Phalanx I thought the US had been using tungsten rounds for quite a while because of cancer fears with DU.”
I don’t know that cancer was the concern, it may have been to do with pumping lots of DU into the maritime evironment, but it’s true that naval Phalanx has been using tungsten alloy penetrators since the 1980s.
The land-based Phalanx C-RAM (yclept Centurion) doesn’t use APDS at all because the penetrators can carry for miles and do all sorts of damage when they come down. So they use HEI shells with a self-destruct feature which means that if they miss the target, they blow up in mid-air before reaching the ground.
The most impressive C-RAM proposal I heard of was a German one for time-fuzed airburst 155mm artillery shells….
Re: projects cancelled/ignored:
I agree with 7mm EM-2 and TADEN (belt-fed Bren) combo in infantry small-arms. We’d still probably be using updated versions of these now if they’d been adopted in the early 1950s – and been much better equipped as a result.
Also agree (tentatively) over something like TSR-2, although the cost and timescale of that soared as a result of constant upgrading of the performance requirements. I would have accepted a more modest requirement to get it into service earlier, and also developed a bomber-swatter version carrying AAMs and a big radar. So it would have been a bigger, longer-ranged Tornado in effect.
Definitely agree over Fairey Rotodyne, vastly more capable than contemporary helos, something else we would probably still have in service today (in concept, that is).
I wouldn’t have bothered with CVA-01 or any CATOBAR ships or planes. Instead, I would have focused on Harrier STOVL developments, possibly the original P.1154 (with the single Bristol engine, not the twin RR) and told the RAF and RN to shut up and accept it. If we’d maintained this, we could still be the world leaders in STOVL today.
I don’t have much comment on AFVs. Until recently, we seemed to be doing fairly well with these.
As far as warships and their armament are concerned, I will depart from the text somewhat to focus on what I would have done in the 1970s – it’s on my website here: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/Alternative%20RN.htm
This piece was under-reported but happened in parallel to the US (and Germany) putting the brakes on no-fly zone(s):
“In a deliberately undiplomatic speech to NATO defense ministers, Mr. Gates called on European allies to put aside their domestic politics and work with the United States to secure the “semblance of normalcy” that he said was emerging in some parts of Afghanistan.
“Frankly, there is too much talk about leaving and not enough talk about getting the job done right,” he said. “Too much discussion of exit and not enough discussion about continuing the fight. Too much concern about when and how many troops might redeploy and not enough about what needs to be done before they leave.”
Mr. Gates made clear that the initial American troop withdrawals ordered for July by President Obama would be limited, perhaps to no more than several thousand troops. ”
New York Times has used the NATO-provided transcript from a closed meeting of Defence Ministers from those 48 countries that provide troops to Afghanistan.
- Libya is not mentioned, but clearly the tone is “you don’t scratch my back; hence I won’t scratch yours”
Hi TW,
RE “Also agree (tentatively) over something like TSR-2, although the cost and timescale of that soared as a result of constant upgrading of the performance requirements” I would be more definitive, and not put it onto the list.
- performance could not be improved enough relative to the improving defences
Over Christmas I read a book that dealt with that period and the British projects, incl. TSR-2 extensively. Instead of the propagandistic official statements of the time, the sources were rich in first-hand interviews of the test pilots. End verdict: good plane, but not capable of fulfilling its mission and therefore obsolete by the time it got to the test flight.
Hi TW,
Nice read, your RN what-if piece.
VLS in focus; quite rightly for a more all-round capability. It is interesting that the opposing navy adopted it early on, exactly for that reason (and also emphasised missiles over guns much more, perhaps too much).
Your gun alternatives did not bring in the 155mm? In the much later discussions the need to strengthen the turret rings has been brought up (expensive/ difficult modification when not designed in from the start). I just wonder how the Swedish 120mm (that you do mention)could be put on hulls well under a thousand t without a problem?
Hi ACC,
With the TSR-2, I wasn’t thinking so much of its strategic nuclear strike role but rather that we needed a big twin-engined, two-seat long-range plane for various purposes: tactical nuclear or conventional strike, anti-shipping strike, long-range recce and (in a different version, with a big radar) anti-bomber patrols over the North Sea. As it was, we ended up with Buccaneer and Phantom until (much later) getting Tornado, which was close to what was required but arguably too small.
On the naval gun side, if the UK was to develop domestic guns I would have taken the Tiger class designs of 3 inch and 6 inch guns and produced single barrel lightweight mountings for them. The 152mm 6 inch design could easily have been modified to 155mm later.
Hi TW,
For such roles Australia followed through with the F-111, and only retired the last one a couple of months ago (Voices heard stating that Super Hornets are a less (!) capable replacement.)
RE ” 6 inch guns and produced single barrel lightweight mountings for them”
- weren’t they a break-through in the sense of being fully automated? As you say, there should be no structural strength issues if you then go over from 152 to 155mm
@ ACC – “you don’t scratch my back; hence I won’t scratch yours”
it the US was prone to schadenfreude then I imagine they would be grinning wildly right about now, I certainly would in their position.
Indeed this is in europes back yard. The lessons of bosnia and kosovo over a decade ago has not been learnt. Its like the US waiting for Europe to conduct an operation in South America or Caribbean. Europe is a wealthy continent and must be able to look after its own security. We also have to learn we cant make people like caddife stop doing things we dont like by simply expelling hot air and jumping up and down without the hardware to back it up.
ACC, of course the F-111 was ordered for the RAF to replace the cancelled TSR-2, but IIRC the plane experienced a lot of development and teething problems and the order was cancelled, in favour of the versatile but very different Phantom II (which probably doubled in price as a result of redesigning it for Spey engines). What a mess!
Yes, the F-111 would have been a good bomber alternative for the RAF, and they did design a (naval) fighter version which was not proceeded with. If that could have been adopted alongside the bomber, the rest of the RAF/RN’s fast jet needs could have been met with developed versions of the Harrier IMO.
The US Navy almost had a modern 8 inch single barrel semi auto turret in the mid 1970s. What happened to it?
Is there not a Swiss upgrade for Phallanx that swaps the canon for 25mm?
The 8 inch seemed to work OK but IIRC was difficult to fit into smaller ships, so it was decided to standardise on 5 inch. The only people who really wanted the 8 inch were the Marines, who have always put a high priority on NGS. They got their wish in a more spectacular way with the reactivation of the Iowa class battleships, complete with 16 inch guns.
Yes, Oerlikon proposed refitting the Phalanx with a 7-barrel KBD rotary cannon in 25×184 calibre (more powerful than the standard NATO 25×137). No-one bought it, though.
The Arab League has just (according to BBC) come out in favour of no-fly zone.
- next question: How are you going to participate?
- East and South can easily be reached from land bases; despite the bases being ideally in Egypt, there are others with plenty of long-ranged jets
- Gaddafi does not reach any friends by flying West
- leaves just the over-the-water part for NATO
The recent advances by Gaddafites have made a “no-drive” zone imposed between the two parts impractical (that would cement Gaddafi, anyway)
… his side is going “all out” for the oil terminals, because without those his part of Libya (in a lasting stalemate) would have to fall back on tending goats and growing dates
Tony, from what I’ve read the UK Phantom was four times more expensive than the US version, with a drop in just about all performance parameters. Although the increased thrust to weight ration was appreciated by the pilot’s, it doesn’t justify the extra cost and the cancellation of the P.1154. Definately a mess. They should’ve learned from the Australian attempt to change the engine on the F-86.
Hi Richard,
I thought they “RE:learned from the Australian attempt to change the engine on the F-86″ were the best Sabre versions
- I could be wrong
About the Phantom: Israel and Turkey (at least) use the E version as a missileer for longer ranged, hardened target AGMs (which by their very nature are heavier)
- poor guys, USAF use their B-52H’s (no problems with lifting the weight)for same weapons
Can anyone tell me if the BAE Land Systems South Africa’s RG41 8-wheel armoured fighting vehicle is good cheap candidate for FRES UV?
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8381:bae-systems-announces-8×8-rg41&catid=50:Land&Itemid=105
@ John – article from G2mil about the 8″ trials;
http://www.g2mil.com/8inchguns.htm
I would go back to the end of the war and the cancelling of the supersonic test aircraft and the fairey delta designs and the failure to select a single v bomber design. Also the failure to stream line the a/c industry after the war.
I suppose the biggest problem for UK in all 3 services is the failure to develop multirole equipment that can be procured in significant numbers to preform multiple roles early enough (hopefully corrected by Oscelot, Type 26 and Typhoon).
Hi Tubby, ref your question
- it looks very much like this one “In May 2007, the South African Denel Land Systems was awarded a contract to build an improved version of the [Patria] AMV, with a high level of ballistic and mine protection for the South African National Defence Force. The AMV will replace South-African Ratels as part of the “Program Hoefyster” (Horseshoe). Five different versions are included: Command, Mortar, Missile, Section and Fire Support vehicles.[Source: Wiki]
- I don’t know how BAE and Denel sit together – if at all – but the AMV contract 2007 and BAE project start 2008 are also very close
- the SA version is different from others being improved for mine resistance (lots of different turret options, including Nemo and Amos for the base version, too, used among others by the Dutch Marines)
For the FRES use, pls google also SEP (that is a BAE project based out of Sweden)
- v good in my opinion
- lost out to AMV in Sweden (technical maturity was sited); also got eliminated in the FRES contest (probably for the same reason?)
Hi Mark,
I am definitely with you on the first two, in “I would go back to the end of the war and the cancelling of the supersonic test aircraft and the fairey delta designs and the failure to select a single v bomber design.”
But with the V-bombers I must disagree. There were three designs, instead of three competing prototypes, because there was such a rush to get a meaningful number of airframes into service
- had we got the Valiant (only) it would have been obsolete within a couple of years as the improved missile defences forced a change from high to low-level approach
- Valiants had to be scrapped as they were unsuitable, but Vulcan gave excellent service (even penetrated the DEW line on exercises) for a very long time – Victor carrying a bigger load came in handy in other ways, as we know
Gareth Jones
Thanks for the link to the Mk71.
I have printed it & will put it in my copy of Rapid Fire by Anthony Williams.
Just thought of another ignored project.
The Sea Eagle missile fitted with the Maverick nose. Would have been a great land attack missile. They shared the same diameter body.
I’m glad I started this discussion – Have to confess I hadn’t heard of the WG 30 – “Super Lynx”? Hell yeah! And Maverick nose on Sea-Eagle? Interesting! But Challenger 3? I’ve seen discussions about improving 2 but was there a actual design for 3rd version?
Hi ArmChairCivvy,
I found the RG41 by accident while looking for more on the AMV so you likely correct that the RG41 was a failed candidate for the South African programme. However it looks like the have developed further as they unveiled at EuroStatory 2010 and there are videos of it on You Tube. Being mine protected is no bad thing, and given that Africa and the Middle East are the most likely future conflict zones it seems to me that we should be looking for kit optimised for Africa and the Middle East and not for the plains of Europe, plus if we placed an order in South Africa we likely get more bang for our buck than if we buy some Piranha V’s.
In case anyone is interested here is the video of the RG41
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AmxhfiTMYeY
For anyone interested, there is a PDF version of the 1953 report on troop trials of the EM-2 in Malaya.
Download it here; http://www.mediafire.com/?bb6wlvrhux5f13r
Not sure Challenger 3 was ever formal, but the plan was to give it the longer gun & more powerful engine of the Latest Leopard 2.
Maverick/Sea Eagle was a proposed competitor to SLAM.
Various,
RG41 looks like a solid project. Make ‘em buy COTS for the FRES requirement, RG41 and Stormer 30 for the cav role in a mixed “armoured cav” cavalry regiment with the Challys and support vehicles.
TW,
Lovely article at your place. Failure to pursue VLS was roughly as large a blow to the RN as loss of CVA-01 (which I’d rate a bit more highly than you do solely because of the range of aircraft off it, even when one accounts for the sortie rate on V/STOL.) We can talk about about the Seventies as a “devil’s decade” that saw collapse in British industry, but at that point the UK still produced a fairly full range of world-grade naval missiles, following on a tradition of technical innovation in naval weaponry. I’d really rather they had done an ESSM with Sea Dart (keep the booster and its larger-than-Aster warhead, build something sleeker and more dynamic as a missile body) than go in on Aster, and perhaps pick up the newest iterations of Crotale (like the Mk 3) rather than pour money into CAMM. And frankly, a next-gen Sea Wolf would have made an excellent competitor to the RAM/Barak end of the market.
Hi jackstaff,
Like your “RG41 and Stormer 30 for the cav role in a mixed “armoured cav” cavalry regiment with the Challys and support vehicles”
- when going somewhere further, in a hurry, leaving the Challys behind and loading up, instead, a few “flying tanks” from 16 AAB
Reminds me, who will actually get the Army Wildcats, to operate (for recce and targeting help for the Apaches)?
On another note, Aster really gets a good hiding on this site; what’s wrong with it? Our development partners have a land version for theater AD; we may have to ask to borrow those one day.
I always wondered why Seastreak wasn’t picked up by the RN.
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=178.0%3Bprev_next=next
The mount requires no deck penetration, the missile would be common with the army and it would have a secondary role against speed boats.
@ Jackstaff,
Got to agree with you a mix of RG41 and Stormer would more than do the job, RG41 is COTS so would be relatively cheap (important as I guess we are looking at an order of several thousand) and we likely own enough Stormer’s to refit as Stormer 30′s. However looking at the video of the RG41 I think in its default design it carries less armour than it’s contemporaries, it is only weighs 20t before adding a turret or optional additional armour, while the often derided Piranha V is 28t.
Hi Tubby,
If it ever competed in the Ratels replacement programme, the design would have emphasised belly armour as opposed to the rest (bush wars emphasis, where heavy MGs are what the OpFor would have).
RPGs are everywhere, though. BAE’s improved-SEP that was on show in Paris was proudly showing off the “war wounds” from two successful RPG tests. The vehicles are in the same weight class.
- it wasn’t stated, however, with which version of RPG as they have been vastly improved for penetration, too
Having been watching the utter destruction in Japan particularly the infrastructure I was wondering if we should change the way we offer help. I know we have deployed a search and rescue team but they are reliant on local transport means. Should we perhaps also think about sending 2 or 4 of our SAR seakings or pumas in a couple of c17s to give the UK search teams the ability to move around without further burden on the local infrastructure and indeed help winch people out of danger.
Mark
Sounds like a good idea
Helos on a carrier might be even more useful….
Tony
I think thats why there putting the US aircraft carriers into the region to help refuel the rescue helicopters but that is not practical for the UK here. May have helped in somewhere like Haiti which had no infrastructure left but we can use US base here.
These events are a regular accordance and indeed usually involves the UK deploying a Search team. I just think that in the future we should also deploy a couple of sar helis too after all uk citizen are almost always caught up in these things.
I just thought I would share my thoughts on the last few comments I actually take a different view about sending helicopters to help out. I don’t think they are really needed especially given the effort that would be needed to get them there and what else could be sent along instead. What is really needed is the well trained professional rescuers with all their equipment including dogs etc that are already there or on their way. In situations like this airlift gets prioritised to whoever needs it or can make best use of it so I imagine that a highly trained professional rescue crew would get priority over some marines. Japan is not a third world country so they don’t really need the equipment we normally have to take such as excavators and bulldozers etc or even choppers what they need is people.
Euan
I was rather hoping that along witht the choppers would go trained searcha n rescue crews.
It take the point (and indeed have made it in several conversations) that japan is the firstest of first world nations; particularly in crisis rescue, we should givee them not only our best wishes, but any help they ask for we can give.
Hi Euan
I was thinking of something along the lines of what TD was suggesting for the one of the Bay class vessels in the naval section. If we had DFID partly fund 2 C17s (like Qatar is doing) and 2 Seaking SAR helicopters (or/and 4×4 land rovers) then these could deploy with the civil international rescue team as a single unit to were ever needed. The navy ones have the blade folding which mean they could be put in a c17 with minimal dis assembly. And while Japan is extremely well equipped I think the infrastructural problems always exists even there.
The Idea as I understand it is for these teams to be entirely self sufficient and this would all that when deployed so wither its Japan or any future event it maybe be a way to show a positive effect of international development spending.
@ IXION – I’ve been thinking along the same lines – as well as RFA vessels under DfID control (and funded) we could have a small fleet of transport aircraft for rapid emergency response; they carry the search parties etc, the vessels carry stores, engineering vehicles and modular field hospitals? International Rescue with out the strings and cool designs…
Picked up this quote in the explanation of SDSR given by General Houghton in its immediate aftermath (in Washington):
“Strategy is about sustaining the coherence of policy ambition, resources and capabilities. And we will not have got the 2020 force structure absolutely right. By 2015 the world will look different”
- against the premise given (which can’t be argued: resources are limited, but can be changed within some tolerance bounds; it takes time to turn them into capabilities; and while this is happening, also the policy ambition has to be a parameter that is adjusted – otherwise no coherence), the “translation work” so far has been quite incoherent
Can I start another thread?
Lets play list the weapons systems we would like to see propperly, (With all its firecontrol bells and whistles if poss) containerised within a TEU? be thay Maritime, land or air?
Euan
Ref Japan, I disagree. I have to admit I have just been close to tears watching some of the personal stories on BBC World News – but in the worst effected areas of north easter Japan the road and rail networks are completely trashed. The air port runways in many cases too, in fact one report says JSDF are using Chinooks to distribute food because of the issues with roads etc.
I know UK to Japan is a long steam, but LPH and Helo’s plus Albion or Bay with a well deck would probably be of far more use, even in a weeks time.
Interestingly enough, and I know UK does not exist on a massive fault line, or have regular village devouring twisters, but JSDF have sent 100,000 personnel to the effected areas, plus around 250,000 police and rescue personnel – with the draw down in the UK’s armed forces, how would we stand on the “military aid to the civilian power” scenarios of a MAJOR disaster in the UK ? (Nuke meltdown for instance) ???
Mark, Yes I agree with TD’s and others previous suggestion that DFID should contribute toward the cost of assets that can and do play a large role in humanitarian aid and disaster relief efforts.
Jed what I’m getting at is yes you can never have too much vertical lift but I don’t think going to the effort of getting 2 ancient RAF SAR birds to Japan is the best use of resources. I hope you know I’m in no way suggesting we should not render all possible assistance to the Japanese people and other foreign nationals in Japan. HMS Ocean or another amphib would be ideal as it can act as a self sustaining unit dropping of rescue teams and supplies where directed by the Japanese emergency management agency.
Hi Euan/Jed
The RAF sar helicopters arent actually all that old some were only order in the early 90s. I dont think it would require a huge amount of resources weve never really had the strategic transports to consider this before. Why I suggest the sar force is that it looks like winch skills are required now.
Indeed i think loading a bay class full of humanitarian aid and deploying post hast japan is a good idea but if it sails from blighty it may need 10-14 days (is sailing atlantic panama canal japan the quickest way?) to get there great for the clean-up, shelters ect ( I hear there expecting snow in the area like they havent had enough). I think airlifting a few helos could be up and running in 72hrs from departing UK.
I do remember hearing that uk forces are now so committed overseas that if we had a major disaster in 2 cities in the UK at the same time we would not have the helicopter lift to deal with both incidents effectively. So muddle through i guess
Mark to get to Japan it’s about the same distance either way and would probably take a minimum of 3 weeks at 18knots to get there that’s if HMS Ocean or other vessels could sustain that speed for that length of time. If something big happened in the UK worse than the flooding in Cumbria we would be up shit creek well and truly without a paddle but thankfully we have reasonably good geography. As for manmade disasters such as nuclear plants etc with the level of health and safety and regulation the risk is low and most plants are away from the biggest population centres.
Probably the best link I’ve seen yet to illustrate the devastation.
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/03/13/world/asia/satellite-photos-japan-before-and-after-tsunami.html
A overly ambitious (for them)concept from a bunch of liberal do-gooders to have disaster relief squadrons around the world; I doubt they could fund it but what about the UN?
http://www.twlg.org/mobile.html
Hi Gareth
The ship looks very like a JHSV the american are getting. Maybe they could form part of TD fwd presence ships as part of the c3 requirement for the UK. While im not suggesting we do it all our selves maybe a couple in the Caribbean and the indian ocean could be the UK contribution.
@ Mark – What about one “Humanitarian Task Force” per UNSC member? We could base ours in the Caribbean…
Gareth
Not a bad Idea. I think the force they outline in the piece is excessive to have entirely fwd deployed but currently if based on a JHSV vessel it could rapid deploy from UK. I think with the the likes of natural disasters and evacuation of civilians becoming what appears to be a more regular thing then more focus may need to be on this area. I know SDSR made great play of the joint up thinking between DFID FCO and MOD. This type of capability would benefit all three to great effect. 6-8 JHSV and 2 c17 represents a great capability that could be meet jointly from the three departments budgets but operated by MOD and used across a great many scenarios.
Hi Gareth,
I would go for one deployable air assault battalion and one sef-contained marines battalion each, to fulfill “collective, timely and decisive” in their own resolution “the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”
That would be “dues” of being a permanent member. For the rest of G20 what you propose, the size proportionate to GNP…
Typhoon
I am (sad git that I am) watching the select committee on the typhoon.
The MOD and RAF are getting monstered by the committee members.
And I am sorry to say the MOD and RAF answers are Bulls*it, when you have sat in the number of business meetings I have you know it when you hear it and I am hearing it right now.
e.g
Tr 1 is being scrapped because the IT hardware is going obsolete. That is the RAF’s official answer, I don’t know what they have said before, their answer to the committee is the electronics in the plane are rapidly becoming obsolete. Cannabilising Tr1 airframes to keep others flying is standard procedure and will continue. On that basis given the speed at which IT hardware is evolving, that means that Tr2 and Tr3 will get perhaps 10 to 15 years out of each tranche. (not expressly said as such, but intrinsic in the nature of their answers).
As one of the committee members has pointed out – were getting 30 years out of Tornado. If its 15 years for Tr 1 and 2 and 3. The the cost of the aircraft over it’s lifespan is therefore 100% higher if it’s lasting half as long.
Glourious example of double think by MOD.
We are withdrawing tranche 1 in line with proposed F35 capability.
Q How many F35 are we buying
A don’t know
Q How can you make that assumption if you do not know how many we are buying?
A Waffle
(I paraphrase)
LOts of hard q about spares etc, which get repetative, answers along the whoops we did not see these problems comming/ we’ve always done it that way.
Honestly I know I am a sarki git at times but this broadcast is really depressing. You cannot listen to this and believe there is anything other than drippingly condescending arrogance from MOD RAF every answer start with ‘It’s complicated’.
Ursula Brennan (perm under sec) is third rate Sir Humphrey
IXION, I’m afraid to say you’re not alone!
Tranche 1, 53 aircraft out by 2018 – did I hear that right?
RE “Ursula Brennan (perm under sec) is third rate Sir Humphrey”
- she has only been in the job a couple of months
- if she was an internal nomination, then that is no excuse
RS
Yep you heard right.
Yes 2019 part of this problem with typhoon has come about by the stop in typhoon ramp up enforced on the air force. Dont forget the Tranche 1 aircraft were built late 90′s early 2000 so they will be 20 year old buy then and most are 2 seat trainers. The RAF have been doing about 10000hrs a year from a fleet of say 50 a/c max at anyone time
So the while computer obsolescence is an issue that can be solved by replacing the computer is it worth the expense on an a/c that will have used over 2/3rd of it service life already. Also there is I believe a wish to move most of the Fast Jet training away from the OCUs to the new hawk to reduce costs. So the option are do we sell off the Tranche 1 and buy either the new Tranche 3 a/c or F35 or nothing (not an option) or go for the upgrade.
Just the tip of the Iceberg and it’s a fookin huge iceberg.
Ixion, I agree, the RAF need a proper shoeing over Typhoon and I have mentioned the arrogance of the MoD CS and Military personnel towards select committee members. They need to understand that however they might not be experts, they are the peoples representatives
Typhoon is without a doubt a very good aircraft but at what cost
Mark, a quick internet search says that the RAF took delivery of the first aircraft in 2003. Fifteen years of service life for a 4.5 generation fighter that cost so much, definitely triggers a sharp intake of breath!
TD
The same arguments about IT Obsolence will/ must clearly apply to Tr 3.
I detect (as did members of the committee i think), a ‘cunning plan’
That is to announce about 2020-2025 that T3 is all well and good for UK Air def/ falkland island etc. But the future is the F35 and we must buy lots to keep up with Joneses, and then get typhhon out of service ASAP.
I have an idea, from the sliperyness of their answers and downright refusal to answere some q; that Typhoon is already yesterdays news with the upper reaches of the RAF/MOD.
One blue uniform stated (in terms) Typhoon is a 1980′s 4th gen aircraft F35 is 21st century 5th.
Looks like RAf are playing look at the shiney new fighter again.
IXION I got that impression as well, next fast pointy thing please. One thing I hate is referring to the F-35 as a 5th generation aircraft to me it’s a half way house between the 4.5 generation fighters such as Eurofighter, Rafale and F-22, PAK-FA T-50.
Another thing that is puzzling me is the support costs are projected to stay reasonably static despite the smaller fleet the reason given was better avionics and capabilities etc. I might be wrong here but what I know suggests it should be almost the inverse for long term support costs. Modern avionics composed of LRU’s with open systems architectures and other systems with graceful degradation and higher mean time between failure should cost less to maintain.
Richard
It’s nothing new what were talking about is that it needs a mid life update
Just as tornado did after the same period but the airframe has used more than half it’s life do we get a return on investment if we spend the money on them. Also it’s significantly more difficult to extend the life of a composite a/c. I personally would spend the money and keep them till they use there airframe life up.
I was told the F-35B could have its lift fan removed and replaced with a extra fuel tank with little (relativly) ease, the RAF wanting a CTOL aircraft but playing the STOVL/Jointness game to get it. Now we’ve decided to buy F-35C for the FAA, what type of Aircraft do you think the RAF will be after?
@ Mark at March 13,9:59 pm – Sorry, late at night and I was getting confused as I was also commenting on the Forward Presence Squadron thread as well! You are right, home based Humanitarian Task force/Humanitarian support group (TD) plus 1-2 C-17′s (and prehaps some 146′s?) the way to go. However, prehaps having a JHSV per Forward Presence Squadron purely for Humanitarian Assistance Clinics etc would also be a good idea, if funding were available?
GJ @1.22
Big shiney woosh bang ones with lots of exciting technology that go sooo fast and look sooo sexy parked on the runway, and are fit for our square jawed techno knights of the air to swoop heroically down on the countries enemies…..
Say the 2 (count em 2) Air vice marshall’s in charge of bits of the RAF, who appeared last night in all their glorious gold braded finery. Like so many light blue clad Mr Toads, the F35 ‘Is the Only thing’. (If their weasel words to the comittee on typhoon where are anything to go by). Don’t know if it’s on Iplayer but if it is you should watch it, it is a real eye opener, and seriously depressing.
Some of the businessmen /women MP’s clearly knew they were having their leg lifted. When the chair intervened at one point to point out to a comittee member (asking about numbers of F35 buy the RAF wanted have), to the effect witnesses had made it clear they weren’t going to answer that question.
ON a more sensible note,(given we have to have the thing); the RAF clearly would want the A version.
They should get the C for RN commonality, but that would be silly….
@ IXION – What? Operate RAF jets from Navy Carriers in support of Joint Expeditionary operations? The mere thought of it…
RE: Containerised Weapons; a few suggestions but certainary not a complete list.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StanFlex
http://en.rian.ru/video/20100526/159164595.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Anti-Air_Modular_Missile
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM501_Non-Line-of-Sight_Launch_System
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Mobility_Artillery_Rocket_System
http://defense-update.com/wp/20101126_samp_t.html
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Germany-Orders-Skyshield-C-RAM-Base-Defense-Systems-05418/
http://www.hydroidinc.com/pdfs/REMUS_100_Transportable_Mine.pdf
Sorry for the multiple posts – spam flitter
Hi Gareth,
Under a different heading, you captured both the highs and the lows for LCS:
- REMUS (the last link( for both shallow and very shallow water; just what our OPVs will need (I have highlighted similar, ready to go solutions in that thread)
- about NLOS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM501_Non-Line-of-Sight_Launch_System) and JUST out of memory; this one was cancelled and now the land-attack capability of a LITTORAL combat ship is either a peashooter or ATGWs with a very limited range (they could always go and get some Spike-ERs with an 8 km range, but I don’t think so…)
Does anyone know what the MoD’s budget request for 2010/2011 is, split between DE&S, pensions, Land Forces etc
I hope this “http://hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/junebudget_complete.pdf” is what it says on the tin?
GJ
It was the club K system that got me thinking.
@ IXION – it strikes me (and of course I might be very wrong!) that shipping containers could house VLS for a number small/short missiles, TEL’s for taller/bigger missiles, and the mechanics/ammo for gun systems; the stanflex system includes 76mm guns but there appears no reason why larger guns couldn’t be similarly mounted. Of course the containerisation of command, control, Intel, elint, etc is well advanced.
@ All – Whilst looking for containerised weapons for IXION, I came across this concept for a “Utility Minehunter (UMH)” on a naval what if…? thread.
http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=124063&page=217
the notes for the design say: “So-called ‘Utility Minehunter (UMH)’ design. Bare GRP hulls built in yacht yards; diesel generators, Operations Room and annex built in standard ISO containers in a factory, sonar also in container (non-standard). Equipped with same Type 193M sonar and PAP submersible as Hunt Class.”
A drawing and diagram follow; I think its an actual concept but I can’t find more info. Does anybody know any more?
if we’re gonna have to move a shed load of emercancy equipment/food/trained people. Then why bother getting more c-17′s, go the whole hog and get a couple of An 124′s don’t have to join a queue have western avionics and they can be fitted with the same GE engines as the C-5M. put a caveat in that it does certain amount of hours for aid agencies (ie stuff for africa etc) and get DfID to stump up some of the cost, more tonnage per buck (150 tonnes vs 76)
@ Gareth re good aircraft done for by politicians.
Short Belfast. Thanks to the Stirling crisis we had to buy some C130 which help to put the boot into our own tank transporting super transporter. Only 10 out of 30 were purchased.
@ All re T45 sonar
I have done an a good bit of digging and T45 is much, much quieter than T42 and T22. So there is no reason why it can’t act as a good second rate ASW screening asset if the Thales UMS 4110 CL was fitted. I felt a bit happier for a while then I started to think we should have just stuck Sea Viper into CVF, built a third CVF, and then bought lots of cheap ASW hulls. I think we should buy FREMM and scrap T26 before BAE f*ck us over again.
Interesting idea Paul, in this scenario we don’t particularly need the austere capabilities of the C17 so an AN-124 might be just the ticket. Did you know Air Foyle proposed an AN-124 with Rolls Royce RB211 engines and Honeywell avionics for the interim programme that ultimately became the C17 in RAF service. The 211 is also more or less the same internals as the WR21 on Type 45 or we could always use a Trent
@ X – I was just comparing the Short Belfast with the A400m; similar max cargo load, A400m got the advantage in speed/range but I’m putting that down to the age of the Belfast engines. I wonder if the design could have been staedily improved like the C-130?
Are the AN-124 still in production? Fiddling with off the shelf aircraft can be costly. So its either An-124 as is or a couple of C17 which we already have in inventory so simple logistics.
X
Interesting on the type 45. As for FREMM I believe the French ones cost 750euro and Type 26 is supposed to have a price around 300m pounds.
Also the US marines will now also be buying 80 F35C as well as 340 F35Bs. So the overall navy buy will be 340 of each variant. Could be the start of a gradual termination of the B variant if it doesnt get off probation.
The Belfast is some aircraft; still looks quite modern. I think you will find it can carry more than a400m. And yes I agree with you about the engines, development potential.
It was another asset the forces got rid off before the Falklands. But unlike the conventional carriers and Tiger class carriers HMG could lease them back.
@ Mark
Is that pounds Stirling or pounds BAE?
I know FREMM is expensive. But the UK needs a first class ASW asset. The more that are built the cheaper they will be. T26 if it gets built we be another under armed, under sensored, thin grey ship that looks like a frigate. On another day you will find me just pushing for Darings plus sonar plus STWS plus Merlin (which as I have said is the best frigate we have.)
X
“Is that pounds Stirling or pounds BAE?” Probably the first stab in the dark but Type 23 was cheap so we can but hope.
With the Type 26 being offered in ASW GP and AAW we could eventually end up with a single class way in the future so IF type 26 starts life with a light weapons fit and has an incremental upgrade path (growth potential built in) to control cost I wouldn’t mind.
Hmmm – AAW Type 26? How would that work?
@ Gareth Jones re AAW T26
A bit like a story I read about a USN commander’s visit to a T42. He noted that the destroyer had every possible gizmo to detect all manner of stuff but little hard kill capability. He summed it up by saying “Gee you guys no exactly when you are going to die.” Well T26 AAW will be like that, but the crew won’t even know when they are going to get hit as well as not being able to kill much. (Only jokin’ before somebody replies…..)
We should cut our losses with T26 and just order more Darings with sonar etc.
ref the engines and production, it was stopped for a while during break up of the soviet union (it was built at 2 plants, one in ukraine and one in russia) but money talks and it’s all ticketity boo now I believe russia has ordered 20 due to high demand of the existing aircraft, work to start in 2012. I was in the falklands when it delivered 2 tornados when there were 2 bird strikes in one week. The engine scenario isn’t that much of a drama as they did all the R&D in an effort to get western sales, hence they did all the avionics mods which reduced the crew and also got the service life extended. wikki has costings of 70-100million US,C-17 quoted as 191million, hmmmmmmmmmm!
@ Paulg – Hmmmm indeed. I can’t see it replacing the C-17 in normal RAF service, but a couple for the DfID? And as been suggested, the odd job for the UN – moving peace-keeping equipment, civil reconstruction , etc?
Hi,
Why would we bother with exotic types within the fleet when “we” already have use of them, in a mix warranted by going circumstances? Wiki tells us “Under NATO SALIS programme NAMSA is chartering six An-124-100 transport aircraft. According to the contract An-124-100s of Antonov Airlines and Volga-Dnepr are used within the limits of NATO SALIS programme to transport cargo by requests of 18 countries: Belgium, Hungary, Greece, Denmark, Canada, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Finland, France, Germany, Czech Republic and Sweden. ”
- not sure if the contract was renewed from 2020 onwards
- there are two pools like this (heavily used). Both close to each other (in Belgium) but the lifting assets based as far a field as Hungary
- rather, push up the pool numbers, as it can let some of the assets go when circumstances change
sorry, typing on my lap,: from 2010 onwards was meant
@GJ – for AAW T26, the mental model would be something like the FREDA variant of the FREMM that the Frogs are talking about since they cancelled most of their proper AAW destroyers. FREMM hull with 32x Sylver A50 and a more powerful version of Herakles. Will probably end up costing just as much as buying more Horizons, but will come out of a different budget year.
I suspect that we probably can’t do a similar thing, as I suspect that the high cost of Sylver has led to its deletion in the new cheaper T26, which I suspect is being built round FLAADS rather than Sylver.
I would also note that there are similarities between the Burke as a cut-down Tico, except that the Burke has many more VLS tubes and has now grown to be almost as big as a Tico. It seems that it’s pretty hard to really make the most of the flexibility of VLS tubes in a hull of much less than 8000 tonnes, certainly if you want half-decent helicopter facilities.
Is the cost of the Sylver system due to the missile/launchers or the radar? If its the radar I come back to the idea of having a “mini-Arsenal ship” (based upon a Type 45 hull?) with CEC, one twinned to each Darling Class. Not as useful as having 12 separate AAW Destroyers but better than a kick in the Netherlands?
Analysis of the Russian Defence Spending Plans – they’re worse off than we are!
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8190/global-insights-hard-realities-for-russian-rearmament
@GJ – not sure, I suspect they shift the costs around to suit! Relatively high cost seems to be common to all Sylver platforms regardless of the radar system or number of tubes, there’s talk of Sea Viper being £250-300m per T45 so I suspect that your choice would be between 11xT45 or 12x(T45 without Sampson but with eg Artisan). And I think I’d rather have the 11 full T45′s….
@GJ i wouldn’t replace C-17′s but instead of relying on the salis pool I would have 2 to do all the nicey nicey stuff handing out sweets to kids etc etc but have a proviso that it can be used by HMF. I would even suggest crewed by RAF, we do a hell of a lot of chartering and private costs, something to do with profit!! If you read the wikki page it says that airbus and rolls royce are contacted customers, so offer them a deal, cheaper than private sector and then it can return funds used to purchase, so it can earn, deliver sweets, malaria nets and do the odd outsize job for us, I didn’t picture it landing in the desert to offload a regiment of underwater knife fighters!!! (although that would be awesome)!!
@ Jrd – one for you…
http://newwars.blogspot.com/2007/11/from-minor-power-to-major-leagues.html
For Jed, not Jrd… nice bloke tho :)
@ Gareth
Well you will know from your IR studies that rising powers will often ape established powers without reason much beyond they establishment represent a working model of success. Hence all the discussion in some quarters about why China with its ship killing ballistic missiles still wants a carrier. Of course the flaw is if the established model is successful why is it failing.
In a tangential way this leads to GB’s building Dreadnought. Thanks to the rise of the US and Germany during the 2nd industrial revolution (and even regional powers like Japan) Britain needed to push the naval envelope hoping to steal a lead on the rising powers. It was a gamble that only partially paid off. Compare Dreadnought to Warrior. In a position of technical and industrial supremacy GB could let other lesser powers (and innovators such as the CSA) experiment with naval ideas, before just copying them, improving on them, and regaining the naval lead.
Re the Belfast.
I was told that Lockheed was interested in fitting the engines & wings of the Starlifter onto the Belfast fuselage to create an outsize transporter. Sadly someone leaked the story to the papers & Lockheed went off in a huff.
The USAF ended up with the larger Galaxy.
A Conway powered jet Belfast would have been a C-17 (near enough) 25 years ahead of its time.
Has anyone read this book ? “Dead men risen: the snipers story” about two snipers from the Green Jackets / Rifles in the stan, 75 kills in 40 days !
Telegraph review: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/8376808/Dead-Men-Risen-The-snipers-story.html
Hi all
Read this over at another forum:
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/15858/Largs-Bay-possibly-to-be-leased-to-Australia
I dont have access to janes so i was wondering if somebody can comfirm this? If its true it would be good if it is on a lease basis (that way theres a chance we can get her back) however I feel that she will probably be sold.
Jed, just above,
Very interesting. Nice to see “the rifles” going back to their job, and since in the 21st century everything new is old again, maybe a model for what to do with that particular cap badge.
x, a little while back,
I’ll stick with my story that the real goal should be 3-4 more Darings, as things get scary in various littorals over the next couple of years (“why don’t we get ourselves prepared for Libya/Somalia/Bahrain/Straits of Hormuz/Suez Canal/maybe Nigeria/etc./etc. and kick-start some Saving British Jobs ™” will be the politicians’ cry) and get them armed up proper (restart 155mm program before it goes completely to the dogs, plug in SeaRAM to the Phalanx slots instead of CAMM/Aster 15, get Harpoon on, add some more VLS so you’re carrying a mother lode of Aster 30 and maybe some kind of “bastard nephew of ASROC/Ikara” ginned up by Kongsberg who would have some motivation with Norway’s own Fritjof Nansen frigates.) Then move on to T26 when and only when BAe (or some other organisation, a properly “trust-busted” offspring devoted to shipbuilding or some kind of Royal Dockyards) have developed her as a C2 with an ASW-optimised hull — yes that may cost money but the 23s turned out on the cheap with a long run and GP requirements above the waterline — and sold a bunch with cheaper kit to Oz, Brazil, Chile, etc. The MoD have to learn how to play the game or end up with the shaft, unfortunately not the empty mining one either.
Various,
I could cry in my beer regularly about the Short Belfast. God what beautiful beasts. Good range for their day, plenty of big and wierdly-shaped cargo (there’s a wonderful site out there about their use as long-haulers in Australia, have to get the hyperlink), capacity for two hundred paras each, solid birds. Absolutely you could have upgraded them slowly over time, and saved a cargo air industry in the UK. Much as TD would say, with some justice, that I’m on the deep blue team, as someone who used to live in Bristol the slow death of British aerospace (often at the hands of British Aerospace) burns. But then, thinking of the Belfast but also various other projects (the rockets, the Commonwealth space program, TSR2, etc.) this was an era when US industry was coming out of the model where General Motors actually hired thugs to tear up the streetcar lines in various cities (Philadelphia, I think, was the most famous, but I could be wrong on that) to force them into buying GM buses. Sounds a bit like TSR. “The Sterling crisis” — which one? There have been so many ….
The thing about Dreadnought was that at least it was tied to a (partially-formed, but genuine) revolution in strategic and operational concepts for the RN. And the bloke at its administrative centre, Jacky Fisher, was smart enough to realise that the real revolution he needed for all the bright ideas and shiny toys to work was in the management and cultivation of personnel. That’s really where nearly all Britain’s defence institutions have ossified, piss-poor management of talent, potential, and the avoidance of burn-out. And as we’d probably agree, at least roughly, carriers aren’t played out yet even as the field (wave?) is changing. If you want capital ships to nobble someone else’s navy, though, go with SSGNs….
John Hartley,
God I’d have loved to see that Conway-powered jet Belfast. It’s not simply that “oh, British industry collapsed under its own inefficiencies,” unless one includes the powerful variable that lots of good ideas that could have been made into production lines went to the knacker’s instead.
Of course, Fisher had congress with the pooch when it came to the “battlecruiser” concept, rather than realising (though he fully acknowledged subs’ power very early) that was a role better played by long-haul submarines. I love the smell of self-inflicted pedantry in the evening ….
Yeap, came and went quickly, just reading a book about it
“Fisher had congress with the pooch when it came to the “battlecruiser” concept”
@ Jackstaff and ACC – RE: Battlecruisers. The problem with the Battlecruiser wasn’t so much design as use. In its designed role as a fast response Cruiser-Killer it excelled – see Battle of Falklands – but using it in the Line of Battle was doomed to failure. It could also be argued that the technology for a fast, lightly armoured battleship that used range as a defence wasn’t there until the aircraft came of age; it has been claimed the (strike) carrier is the modern battlecruiser…
Hi Gareth,
Jellicoe did the “proper” RN training and routine on “proper” battleships; Beatty did not (on his excellent battle cruisers).
They fought “to death” about it (mainly Beatty did; and to make amends he was a pall-bearer for Jellicoe. They died 4 days apart).
But: HMS Hood, the nearest to a battle cruiser…later on
Completely different topic. Did anyone else see heston blumenthals mission impossible on ch4 last night which was on board HMS Turbulent. We know that a sub is limited on patrol only by what food it carries well he has come up with a new cooking and storage method which has it would appear significantly reduce the amount of space required to store fresh food and according to the captain of turbulent it is now going to be rolled out across the fleet and possibly the army too. Logistics wins wars after all.
Mark,
Very nice catch. Thanks for telling the rest of us.
ACC & Gareth,
Beatty’s signal failure — beyond the fact he was a reckless cavalryman on the waves, I actually have a good deal of sympathy for the crosses he had to bear in his personal life — was not implementing and practicing proper firefighting management in his command, the battlecruiser squadron. After they were beaten up in the Heligoland Bight, the Germans recognised how terribly prone the type was to magazine explosions due to fast-spreading fires and vulnerable armour arrangements. The RN was aware of the same issues but Beatty didn’t follow through, and quite a lot of the British casualties that soured public perception on Jutland were a direct result. Jellicoe had his faults too, mostly hat he was a good Home Counties fatalist, a quality his mentor Fisher ignored because of Jellicoe’s virtues: his encyclopedic mind, gifted seamanship, and the fact he was an outstanding boss. But Jellicoe presumed the worst where Beatty tended — often too rashly — to be up-and-at-’em. ACC you’re quite right, it was a classic dislike nursed over years and by their deputies as well (who went on to be the admirals of interwar and WWII), and Beatty showed good grace in the end.
Somewhere TD’s getting a skin condition from all that navalism so I’ll lay off now :)
@ Jackstaff re navalism and TD
He is getting his own back lumping all the helicopters under the RAF banner. Even though as we all know the light blue don’t really care about whirlybirds…………
“Our brave boys”, a MoD based Radio 4 satire is being repeated on Radio 7 at the moment. Trust me, it’s well worth a listen and far better researched than any newspaer journalism I’ve ever encountered.
Episode 1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007s74k
Episode 2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007t2v5
Listen out for the very good “national game” joke in episode 1 – xenophobic but funny!
TD made a comment on another thread about a containerised StormShadow; how many can fit in to a standard ISO container?
None – at least not a 20′ container, given that the launchers are 7.0m. So you go to 40′ container, and still have to tip it up on its side for launch.
Can’t remember the dimensions of the launcher, but I’d guess 4 in one container? You need space for gas efflux, plus C2 stuff etc.
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14252:somali-pirates-cut-ransoms-to-clear-hijacked-ships&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106
I hadn’t realised it was a done deal :(
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/17/australia-defence-idUSL3E7EH06L20110317
@ X – So the Pirate business is too good; perhaps they should have a clearance sale…
I have been thinking again (sorry!). After watching many images of 4×4 and pick-up trucks being used in Libya, I vaguely remembered this article by Carlton Meyer about SUV’s;
http://www.g2mil.com/toyota.htm
Which led to the discovery of this battle, ironically involving Libya;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fada
and the wide spread use of “Technical’s”;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technical_%28fighting_vehicle%29
and I recently read this article from WPR;
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8277/over-the-horizon-libya-and-the-afghan-model
So what about some Special Forces in Toyota’s with Javelins, 50 cal’s, mortars, and laser-designators giving a hand in Libya? Sorry, did I say Special Forces? I meant “Security Contractors”…
Gareth,
Actually, and I’m not kidding at all here, what needs to happen is the French need to takl Chad into intervening on the rebels’ behalf. So far the “Shabaab” (the ad-hoc rebel bands) have been stonkingly incompetent at that style of war. But let the Chadians, who are first-class at the opart of Technicals, get into the mix and we could see some progress. Cheers for all the linky goodness as usual. And sorry about the loss to the fecking French (the rugby one.) Bugged me too.
hey gareth and jack(s)taff (see what i did there) did you know the new anti armour shield used in afghanistan has got a welsh name? It’s called tarian which is welsh for shield!!
paul g,
I see what you did there :) (Although I’m much more Geordie and Scots, even though I was raised in neither place. But there’s some Welsh in there when you look and I always support the home countries against Les Froggies.) Didn’t know that; nice one. And I stand by last night’s comment — hire Chad for the job and the felcher of donkeys will be gone in a week.
Apropos of nothing except that it might be of interest to fans of VSTOL and what might have been, have a look at this link!
http://www.airlinebuzz.com/forums/showthread.php?t=51444&page=5
Um. Didn’t the army of an island somewhere of the north west coast of Europe get into bother sending soldiers to war in a what was basically a civilian 4×4……
x,
Well, yes, but that was using owner’s manuals straight out of the Colonel Blimp Memorial Library. LRDG and Popski’s Private Army had the right playbook (in Libya once upon a time, no less …) and the Chadians, via their French advisors, just followed it.
@ Jackstaff
I was alluding to Snatch. :-)
@ All
It appears the Chinese anti-carrier ballistic missile is dead in the air. If it actually worked in the first place.
http://www.space.com/11206-missile-defense-satellites-successful-test.html
I see Canada government has been toppled by a vote of no confidence. One of the issues is the cost of the F35 program…
I wonder when the UK government is going to take the decision on this :D
x,
Well, Snatch was largely what I meant: the current brigade-staff and battalion-level officers in the army of Parliament don’t fill me with confidence. And the way they’ve carried on vehicle and convoy tactics for, oh, the first four-fifths or so of Op Herrick seems to justify that lack.
Very interesting link.
Sad………..
http://www.irishseashipping.com/photofeatures/services/rfa/fortgeorge120311/fortgeorge120311.htm
Wonderful, useful, asset gone for no good reason.
@ X – Thanks for the link. It strikes me she would make a great HA/DR vessel; clear way with lifts for stores/patients, large hangar/flight deck, and I believe she already has good medical facilities (or she did).
x and Gareth both,
Yes. Of course I have an odd little love affair with the Forts, but RFA Fort George would be brilliant in the role. Get it into that notional (but probably easily achieved!) civilian HA/DR outfit within HMG that we’ve now started to piece together: Fort George as a conversion for the hospital/DR role, a few BAe 146s, and a couple of An-124s. Bloody useful combination of kit and much of it British-made, to do things that really do matter and raise a positive profile for the country and HMG both. All reasons why it wouldn’t happen …
x,
I shall have an extra glass for the old girl this evening. She deserved better.
RE “RFA Fort George would be brilliant in the role. Get it into that notional (but probably easily achieved!) civilian HA/DR outfit within HMG that we’ve now started to piece together”
- Paddy Ashdown is due to report on such an outfit within a week
- a quick e-mail to him might still slip the idea into the report
Do we know if it’s a done deal with the Aussies for Largs? She’d be very useful in such a group.
Energy has been mentioned in a number of other posts; supplying FOB’s, national deficit etc. But it is also of immense importance in DR operations; however, do you think the yogurt-knitters would like a floating nuclear reactor?
http://www.sendtheenterprise.org/
ACC two comments above,
Good to know. Just might have to do that.
Also, was just catching up on the transatlantic periodicals and ran across this and had to share with the crowd. Jacky Fisher was truly a man ahead of his time:
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/03/winston-churchill-was-the-recipient-of-the-first-omg/73054/
Interesting article from Information Dissemination – 16 CB-90′s in one LSD well dock?
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/03/option-for-short-range-accurate-naval.html
Hi GJ,
The UAE has some of those, as an anti-invasion force. An AMOS barrage from afloat and plenty more from wheeled armour.
- of course they can’t lend any to Libya as they worry about an invasion
You know that vague, zen like trance you fall into when you’re driving a couple of hundred miles on the motorway and the only thing on Radio 4 is bloody Womans Hour? Well during this morning’s trance I began to wonder what stopped you firing HARM/ALARM at an E3. Or even if it would be worthwhile putting a passive seeker head on a METEOR for doing just such a job. From there, my mind wandered into wondering if you could make a really big, airborne version of the tracked SAtarstreak system’s ADAD in order to stop someone firing their recently developed Anti-AWACS missile at you. Finally, just before I plugged my MP3 player in and retreated into the first five series of Old Harry’s Game, I wondered if such an ADAD could be streamed on a tethered balloon or kite behind a frigate.
on libya HMS Liverpool has sailed to relieve the cumberland so see can return to decommission.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498497&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
(for those who don’t do bare URLs, @GJ’s link was to a paper about using oil industry-style spar structures for offshore bases for eg helicopters and small boats, but they didn’t seem to work as remote SAM stations)
@Peter Arundel – that’s kinda the origin of some possible AWACS missiles. In particular the Kh-31 which started out as a baby Moskit (ie “Sunburn”) for air-launched antishipping use, became an ARM (Kh-31P), got transferred to China as the YJ-91/YJ-93 and then allegedly is being turned into a long-range anti-AWACS missile.
ALARM doesn’t really work as your average BVR AAM has a longer range, but AMRAAM is going to be replaced by a so-called Triple Target Terminator missile, under the JDRADM programme, in effect think of an AMRAAM with ramjet and a multi-purpose seeker head. Meteor will probably end up getting a similar seeker, it’s very much inline with RAF doctrine on SEAD.
Good link Gareth, very interesting
You know I keep thinking about using a platform supply vessel as a low end C3 style vessel
have a look at this for a mere £34m each
http://www.motorship.com/news101/sartor-offshore-orders-havyard-psv
Hi TD,
Very much for it, the more capable Iceland CG (designed in Norway, built in Chile)vessel was the same figure, but in USD.
This one http://www.motorship.com/news101/havyard-delivers-global-offshore-psv is the bigger brother of your specimen – takes twice the number of people, accommodates ROV & moon pool (just in case your chosen MCM system is not launched over the ramp as that might have other uses… like a heavy crane for 2-4 CB90′s?)
@ El Sid – Thanks for posting info for my link; was in a rush!
@ TD and ACC – Would it cost a prohibative amount to incorporate the stanflex system into a PSV? Might not be required for MSO duties but might be useful if the ballon goes up – convey escort, etc?
El Sid
I thought it was the future capabilities of the AESA radar that was going to be used by the RAF as it SEAD capability once the Alarm missile was removed from service as there was no requirement (money) for a new missile.
I wish to run a idea past people concerning my disaster response proposal – would it be a good idea to have a dedicated SAR dog training centre? The use of SAR dogs appears to be a great benefit in the field but would it be financially wise to set up a dedicated SAR HMG training/breeding centre, or an extension of existing facilities?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_and_rescue_dog
Don’t usually cross politics with this site but thought people might find this interesting:
http://www.libdemvoice.org/nick-harvey-talks-up-closer-nuclear-cooperation-with-the-french-23630.html
As this is the Open Thread then I thought I would come on here for a wee look and a grumble.
Gareth about Nuclear Cooperation with the French we either need to go all the way or not bother as it’ll only worry the US and that will have a knock on effect since we are more or less reliant upon their support for nukes. Also again in regards to nuclear cooperation there has been mutterings last month about a possible PWR3 reactor for the future SSBN based upon American technology as there are mutterings about the PWR2 safety. Although on balance I would imagine the frogs nuclear tech is pretty safe and reliable as they and us alongside the rest of Europe would have a rather big problem if it wasn’t.
Also again to do with the frogs I found this on my usual ramble around the web (see link below) although this may not be news to those who actually bother to keep a regular eye on naval developments. Anyhow it annoys me as the French have yet again got on and done something about an idea they have had and I would imagine might be successful in marketing and selling it abroad if Sarkozy can avoid trying to sell them a package deal. As folk say we hate the French as they annoy us by getting of their backsides and doing stuff we should have done and we secretly admire and respect them.
Anyhow grumble over with carry on…
Doh!
http://en.dcnsgroup.com/presse/patrouilleur-hauturier-gowind/
A good one “who is who” on the rebels side:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/only-a-few-of-libya-oppositions-military-leaders-have-been-identified-publicly/2011/04/01/AFH
- from CIA stooges to Bagram detainees, quite a collection!
I note Dave Cameon has been to visit the RAF to congratulate them on our behalf for launching some stand off weapons against a Third World country to allow £70million pound air superiority fighters to patrol empty skies.
I wonder if Dave will be popping down to Guzz to visit HMS Triumph? Or will he visit the crews of York and Cumberland? No I don’t think so either. Or the crew
Nobel Prize winning economist slags of “austerity budgets” in the NYT:
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980CE3DE1131F936A15750C0A9679D8B63&smid=tw-NytimesKrugman&seid=auto
Yay – increase defence spending ! Well, he is a Keynsian, which usually warns me off, but hey we all like a nice “spend your way out of recession” type story – let the defence spending bonanza begin…..
I will put in my bid now for a third QE class, and 100 F/A18E/F/G please….
Hi has anyone else seen this?
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12988025
Now if i remember correctly, Ark Royal was in the Indian Ocean a little while back (i think it was 2008/2009 but i’m not totally sure when), with a squadron of Harrier II’s aboard.
So how come they (politicians), are allowed to get away with so spouting so much rubbish, why wasn’t he called on an obvious lie?
Dutch armed forces to be gutted too !
Read the comments on this posting:
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/04/dutch-defence-cuts.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+InformationDissemination+%28Information+Dissemination%29&utm_content=Google+Reader
Hi Jed,
Thanks for the link. I read the earlier (not for this round) Defence White Paper, and what was started then, is now brought to the conclusion:
- no MBTs, just “flying tanks”
- IFVs have enough fire power against non-peer OpFor’s
- greater integration of “special” or light forces, between the Navy Marines and Army commando bn’s (earlier the integration emphasis was on formations from other NATO countries)
The much touted JSS (I’m sure it is a very good design)was actually the justification for cutting the Marines bn that was earlier permanently on the other side of the Atlantic.
If those are the bad news, what often is disregarded is getting into readiness to deploy with other (standardised?) EU formations. That is on the same lines as e.g. Sweden, Denmark and Finland.Both NL and Sweden have acted as lead nations for standing EU BG’s in readiness. Actually, Denmark’s deployable strength is very close to UK’s intervention force (however, with very little factored into “home” defence).
@Jed
You know, for some reason i’m not suprised by this at all. It’s like one of those April Fool’s stories, the ones that were so insane you thought they were actually true.
:(
Interesting article… http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/8445/libyan-intervention-as-a-global-security-wake-up-call
@ Gareth J
Wow this is a sentence,
“but also in the more problematic ones that help reinforce the global rule set, especially in cases where sovereignty-sensitive local stakeholders call for international intervention”
If I only I could have written my IR essays like that I would have got better marks than high 2.1s.
@ X – Its not what you know, its how many buzz words can you fit in a sentence – just look at the MOD and the Pentagon.
Crazy idea time again: Just seen a promo pic of the new “International Road map” Super Hornet with its stealth pod. Its essentially a pod that acts like a weapons bay. Couldn’t this concept be used by other aircraft?
I did hear the BAE Hawk trainer was supposed to be an “elusive target” during training exercises, with it carrying a special pod not only to better impersonate enemy aircraft but also make it easier to find! Could we reduce the RCS of the Hawk (100? 200?) even further by some tinkering AND put weapons in “Stealth Pods”? Budget stealth fighter?
@ Gareth J
:) I couldn’t be bothered with all the rhubarb. But I think it did cost me those few percentage points in to the academic premier league. In history, apart from historiography and other “meta” stuff, you are relatively buzz word free. Though a command of Latin does find favour with the Medievalists…… :-)
@ Jed – That’s got to hurt….Some of the left wing comments are ridiculous (and I’m left wing! Ssshhh… Don’t tell anybody!) However, I couldn’t help noticing they are chucking 17 Cougars – isn’t that a Puma by another name? Couldn’t we do what Tubby suggested with the French?
@ Gareth Jones re Hawk
Take the pilot out too. And don’t forget that some customers use Hawk fitted with RADAR. And don’t forget Goshawk T45. Perhaps BAE could just build the airframe out of composites?
X
Just if your interested in the joys of composite you can take a look this piece which gives a pretty good overview.
http://www.lonelyscientist.com/?page_id=18
Also I have just read that the Typhoon has now been cleared for Paveway IV and is increasing the pilot output from OCU due to current operations.
Micheal (Civ.) Thanks for the link, in my opinion that’s lies just pure and simple lies it’s not even just a little dishonest just straight up lying to the BBC and the public. If he had said harriers have not been flown operationally from a carrier since 2003 then as far as I know that might have been correct. However to say what he said is just lying there was AURIGA 2010 just last year that involved harriers flying from carriers which was an exercise but still should count for harrier being in use.
@ Mark
Thank you for the link. Just replacing metal for composite to rebuild “past” designs is something I occasionally think about; not seriously just idle speculation.
J