When decisions are informed by industrial expediency, short term budgetary pressure, knee jerk reactions forced by existing inadequacies and a complete lack of inter service coordination the result is precisely what we have now and to add insult to injury, acquisition incompetence on a biblical scale completes the sorry picture of too many types, with too few capabilities that cost way too much money.

Chinook, a number of variants are in service  that will still be sufficiently different, despite the hundreds of millions spent on engine and avionics harmonisation, to result in a fleet within a fleet. The headline grabbing order for an additional 22 seems to be on the back burner and in the amphibious role, have to be operated completely from an open deck because we don’t have folding rotors. Neither does any other operator for that matter but the point remains.

Merlin, again a number of variants, even within the utility role and the HM2 upgrade is not covering the entire fleet. None of the utility variants, which might be a replacement for the RM Sea King Commando, have folding rotors, folding tails or other equipment to make them suitable for maritime operation. In the frigate role, primarily anti submarine, it could be argued they are too big, resulting is extremely costly modifications to the frigate fleet in order that they can be operated.

Future Lynx, perhaps too small for the anti submarine role and for the Army, a retrograde step. Less than optimal sensor arrangements, a lack of door gun positions and no weapons planned mean that they will be a step back in many regards, despite costing three arms and seven legs. They will be obtained in such small numbers that there remains uncertainty whether they will completely replace the AAC’s Mk9a’s

Puma, a very expensive upgrade process will deliver improvements but these will be marginal and not value for money. Another aircraft that cannot be operated from ships in an enduring manner.

Sea King, still plugging away in the SAR, Airborne Early Warning and Commando role. One of the unsung success stories of the rotary fleet but despite a recent cost effective upgrade are in dire need of replacement.

Gazelle, just seems to be languishing in the doldrums, counting down the days to being pushed quietly out of service.

Apache, the AH1 Attack Helicopter is undoubtedly the jewel in the crown of the rotary fleet but despite a troubled introduction is providing invaluable service

Others, bringing up the rear are a number of other types, the Squirrel and Griffin in the training and SAR role, Dauphin for FOST transport, A109E on VIP duties and some SF types perhaps not even discussed!

We stand slack jawed in wonderment why we only have a handful of militarily useful and deployable types despite all three service operating a helicopter fleet numbering several hundred. Those that are able to deploy are being run ragged and have cost an even bigger fortune to get ready for deployment which raises an interesting point about the definition of ‘in service’

There are plans afoot to consolidate the types and engines but they do not go far enough. Quite frankly, it is a load of dog toffee, totally devoid of any strategic thought.

If we accept that helicopters form a central part of any future force composition then helicopters must be viewed as a strategic capability, too important to be left to the vagaries of inter service politics and held hostage by political/industrial concerns.

In order to achieve any sort of economy the number of airframe types, avionics systems, sensors, DAS and engines needs to be significantly reduced. It really isn’t rocket science and is well known by everyone but the less diverse systems one has the cheaper the through life costs are. Fewer types and components have implications all through the support chain, less training courses, tools, test equipment, people who train the trainers, pensions, wages, accommodation and well, you get the picture. You might be well and truly fed up with me banging on my ruthless commonality drum but if we are to achieve maximum effect from our dwindling budgets we cannot afford anything else. As a guiding principle therefore, the strategy should be underlined by a reduction in the diversity of equipment, operators, support and logistics infrastructure.

Industrial issues are valid concerns but the need to sustain Westland’s has resulted in Future Lynx and Merlin, arguably part of the problem. We should always consider the sustainment of sovereign engineering capabilities but these must be secondary concerns.

We must take a holistic view, across the whole of the public sector, not just defence. It is quite scandalous that most air ambulance services (Scottish ones are funded by NHS Scotland) are sustained by charitable donations, for a supposedly 21st century nation this is simply not acceptable. Airborne rescue, whether that is at sea, on a mountainside or motorway is the role of the state, not a private sector organisation.

When one looks at these civilian government or semi government operators the diversity situation is not any better. The Air Ambulance Association lists 30 helicopters, plus 2 for Scotland. In a total fleet of 32 aircraft there are 6 types (MD902, A109, Dauphin, B105, EC135 and BK117) with 5 engines. Police Service Air Support Units, of which there are about 30, operate 6 types (MD902, EC135, AS355, EC145, Bk117 and A109) and 5 engines. The coastguard (HMRC) operate 10 helicopters with 2 types (S61 and AW139) and 2 engines although some of these are actually owned and operated by private organisations on behalf of HMRC.

Across the non military public sector, the public purse s operating on one form or another, 9 types of helicopter and almost as many engine types in a total fleet of less tan 75.

We need to get a bloody grip.

So here is the Think Defence medicine…

Organisation, the worlds of military and civilian helicopter operations are of course different, but there are common areas and any organisation should seek out this common ground in order to maximise economies of scale. Maintenance, safety, training, certification and other ‘management’ activities should at least be investigated to see where there are synergies that can be exploited. Air ambulance, police, coastguard and rescue services should be combined into a national helicopter service. The military organisation should be the Army Air Corps and Fleet Air Arm with no RAF ownership of any rotary assets, including VIP or training.

Depth Maintenance, create two locations for depth maintenance of airframes, engines and avionics that will serve all government owned helicopters. Economies of scale would suggest a single large location but resilience needs would dictate location diversity, one North and one South.

Training Organisation, create a single training organisation for both basic civilian and military flying, again, this is a core government function and should not be outsourced to a PFI, as current plans.

Research, establish a common research programme across a limited number of subject areas[ automated landing, hazard avoidance, blade aerodynamics and materials for example. Instead of stretching our resources thinly, specialising in a focussed range of research topics will provide greater benefit.

Equipment, wherever possible select and standardise on common system building blocks like sensors, DAS, engines and even minor components like seats.

Types, select a light, intermediate, medium and heavy airframe and deploy across the military and civilian services, with appropriate modifications. Ensure all four types can operate equally from land or ships, this is crucial. The Attack Helicopter should remain as is, not sure I would like to see the Met flying Apaches!

By combining all publically owned helicopters into a single purchasing agreement we can achieve economies of scale and relentlessly drive down operating costs.

The question naturally leads on to what types, what equipment.

A bold strategy is one that ignores our legacy equipment and sets out a framework that will achieve maximum efficiency over the long term, planning ahead instead of lurching from one crisis led decision to another.

Light

For basic training and light utility roles, the Eurocopter Squirrel. It is already in service with the Defence Helicopter Flying School and uses a single Ariel 1D1 engine.

Intermediate

Replacing the RAF’s A109E’s and Griffons, the Royal Navy’s Dauphins, AAC FLynx/Gazelle and forming the backbone of the police/rescue/air ambulance fleet will be the new Augusta Westland A169. The AW 169 is a new design but based on the very successful AW139, although slightly smaller. Designed for robustness, safety, operations in hot/high conditions and with the latest avionics the 169 is designed to host weather radar, FLIR, rescue hoist, cargo hook, searchlight and a medical interior. It will also have a digital, night vision goggle compatible cockpit and be powered by two FADEC-controlled Pratt & Whitney Canada PW210 engines.

In addition to the police/SAR/air ambulance role it would be used for military twin engine, slinging, tactical and low flying training. A range of military but non combat roles such as VIP transport would also be fulfilled by this type. In modest numbers and equipped with suitable DAS and other systems it would fulfil roles such as section/team transport, light cargo, liaison, escort and other varied utility roles, operated by the Army Air Corps and Royal Marines. With a light weapon fit such as machine guns, rockets and the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) from Thales it could make a natural partner for the Apache Attack Helicopter. It is imperative that all AW169's in military service are equipped with folding rotors to allow them to be operated from ships, no exceptions i.e. a single design.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The shrouded tail rotor or MD NOTAR designs provide enhanced safety in the civilian role and these technologies should be investigated for possible inclusion on the AW169.

Medium

Replacing the Future Lynx, Puma, Sea King Commando and Merlin would be the NHI NH90, also available from Agusta Westland.

Given recent events in Australia and Germany this is perhaps a controversial proposal but I think the problems are those that are to be found with any new system and will in due course be resolved, the Finns seem to be quietly getting on with introducing theirs.

The logic behind the design of the NH90 is solid, a single helicopter that can provide land based medium lift and ‘frigate services’ has obvious advantages. The RN operates FLynx that is on the small side for Anti Submarine duties and the Merlin, which is too large. The NH90 NFH is optimised for anti submarine, surface attack and many other naval secondary roles.

The simpler TTH provides tactical transport for up to 20 personnel and would replace the Puma and Sea King Commandos. There seems to be a move towards larger helicopters with Merlin and Chinook but whilst this has obvious advantages of reducing the airframe and pilot count I am concerned about concentration of risk, operating helicopters is a dangerous business and by expanding the medium weight force we can provide greater resilience against loss. One of the key benefits of the NH90 is (like the Merlin) that it uses the RTM322 engine.

Unlike the FLynx, the NH90 will be able to carry a fully tooled up infantry section whilst armed with self defence door guns, both doors that is. The rear ramp allows them to enter or leave quickly and also allows very light vehicles like quad bikes to be carried internally.

The vast majority of civilian SAR is inshore or near shore, operations at extreme range are quite rare. The UK, however, has a very large area of responsibility for search and rescue and a small number of NH90′s might be used for the long range SAR mission. The Combat SAR and medical evacuation is one that has been neglected, in Afghanistan we rely on Chinooks and US ‘Pedro’ Blackhawks. Chinooks in the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) role are actually very well suited, fast and with enough space for a medical team with all their equipment and a small force protection team. With this role being less and less about pure evacuation and more about pushing treatment as far forward as possible but the NH90 a roomy cabin and only marginally slower than the Chinook.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Attack

Not much to say here, retain the AH1 Apache Attack Helicopter and upgrade uniformly across the fleet as required. We might purchase more and back them up with a more robust support infrastructure as well.

Heavy

This is where it gets even more interesting because the conventional wisdom is that the Chinook is the default choice but because there are no rotor fold options available it remains a ‘fish out of water’ when operating in the amphibious assault role. This has led the UK down the Merlin path but the Chinook and Merlin are too close in terms of capacities to make much sense. We cannot afford two types of aircraft that carry out very similar roles but the Chinook is a tough act to follow, fast, robust and with excellent lift performance, even in hot and high conditions.

There is a European Heavy Lift programme that is in the ‘talking about’ stage, an in service date of 2020 is suggested and they will sit above the NH90 in French and German service, replacing the German CH53G’s as well.  The design requirements have yet to be finalised but a payload of 13-15 tonnes seems to be the current thinking. Commonality with as much of the NH90 as possible will deliver cost savings. In these financially constrained times there seems little appetite for a brand new development and indications point to a joint effort with a US company, Sikorsky or Boeing. Whether the design choice is a conventional or tandem configuration is yet to be seen, the European Defence Agency will report on the way forward in 2011.

Whilst the US has been cycling through an alphabet of heavy lift programmes that have variously included quad tilt rotors and other unconventional designs the USMC and Sikorsky have been quietly advancing the CH53K. Designed to replace the existing CH53′s it will feature a cabin 9.1m long, 2.7m wide, 2m high and able to lift  a maximum payload of nearly 15 tonnes. It’s large cabin allows many vehicles to be carried internally and will have a drastically reduced maintenance overhead (the old CH53′s are very maintenance intensive)

A special forces optimised version might also be considered.

So, lets get on the CH53K bandwagon, either as a direct purchase or via the European programme and obtain between 40 and 50 for combined land and amphibious operations.

Summary

A clean piece of paper is never easy or likely to happen but sometimes, for equipment that is so strategically important, this kind of approach is worth considering. It is a bold strategy that would of course be very expensive in the short term but over the lifetime of the equipment we might accrue significant savings to the public purse, not just the defence budget.

By pursuing a 5 type 4 engine strategy we both increase capabilities and reduce operating costs.

IED’s in Afghanistan from the WikiLeaks data

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World Fact Book Dashboard

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Wall Street Journal Afghanistan Visualisation

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Royal Navy Global Deployments

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H/T Lifehacker

I hate inter service rivalry with a passion, it is responsible for many of the problems we face today.

Make no mistake, it is the grown ups in all three services who must shoulder equal amounts of blame with those devious ministers and unfeeling civil servants the mainstream media like to vilify. It seems to be an unwritten rule in defence reporting that civil servant/minister = BAD and anyone in uniform = GOOD.

Quite ridiculous of course but back on topic.

One can almost guarantee in any justification of spending on CVF or any other naval system the immortal words ‘we are an island you know’ will not be far behind.

In a neat one two, the island argument is  swiftly followed up with a light dusting of statistics, 95% of our visible trade is reliant on shipping or the majority of our food arrives by sea etc.

The Royal Navy provide some excellent background reading here

Behind the headlines though, is an interesting picture of spin, de-emphasis and obfuscation.

Visible Trade, yes, but what about invisible trade, for example financial services or tourism. The service sector is about 75% of UK GDP, financial services is 32%.

Traffic, the overwhelming vast majority of maritime trade is between European ports, not far off places. 70% of export tonnage and 66% of import tonnage is with Europe. When North America, Africa and South America are included the figures rise even higher.

Value, values are roughly in line with volumes, the majority is with Europe.

Shipping Industry, the industry is often touted as the third largest sector in the export economy but how much of this is shipping insurance and chartering?

Food, most of our food arrives by sea, so certain quarters would have you believe, raising the spectre of starvation without a strong Royal Navy, but this ignores our food exports, a growing proportion of air transport and the originator of these imports, Europe again. Out of the top 20 export countries, 15 are European. Imports from Europe account for roughly 70% of inward food trade. We are 60% self sufficient in all foods and 74% self sufficient in foods that can be grown here. It is estimated that we could become self sufficient if exports were stopped and certain foods not consumed.

Fuel, Food production is highly reliant of energy, as is the vast majority UK economic activity. We are oil and petrochemical products net importers and increasingly are importing large quantities of gas from Qatar.

Goods, trade with the Far East is primarily for manufactured goods but as China evolves it may well move away from being the low wage economy that has driven its growth, manufacturing output may well move to Africa and other low wage countries.

It is obvious that maritime security is important for the UK, but, and it is a BIG but, does it justify an expeditionary Royal Navy, centred on CVF and the amphibs?

What is the best way to provide security for a maritime dependant UK?

I am all for a strong Royal Navy, but please, let’s base it on sensible arguments instead of scaremongering.

In many ways, we are as dependant on the sea as France or Germany, Samsung plasma TV’s sold in Berlin still arrive via sea.

Looking at the above and other possible strategic futures one could argue that there are other, non defence, things to spend a finite budget on to secure food, energy and economic security. Increasing gas storage, new nuclear power stations, research in nuclear technology, agriculture, improving the resilience of gas pipelines, deep sea oil exploration and many other non defence areas might contribute to actual security more than an expeditionary naval capability.

This may seem strange coming from a defence blog but defence should always be seen in the wider context of security.

Our overseas territories should also be considered, Cyprus SBA, Gibraltar, the Pitcairn’s, various Caribbean islands and central and the south Atlantic but of these the only ones requiring a strong naval element is the South and Mid Atlantic, which would also include Africa, especially Nigeria for oil products and others for food. The Falklands and Antarctic may be important sources of food and energy.

Given the actual nature of sea trade and its importance to the UK an argument for stronger defences against asymmetric threats to European ports, pipelines and offshore energy installations could be made. Mines or suicide attacks against these could have a serious effect on UK and European short sea trade and energy distribution.

In the future, oil products may increasingly be obtained from deep sea and non Middle East sources, should infrastructure protection be taking a larger slice of the defence pie.

In an increasingly telecommunications and IT system dependant world, cyber defences will make increasing demands on the security budget, where is the money for this coming from?

Drugs interdiction, fisheries protection and anti piracy/seaborne terrorism are likely to be enduring requirements, some might argue for a stronger coast guard and there would be some merit in the argument but a Royal Navy better equipped for these challenges would be equally valid.

The Royal Navy is the training partner of choice for many nations, should we be expanding this and the broader defence diplomacy role.

This leads me to question the capability that the RN is mortgaging it’s other capabilities against, CVF and the air wing.

As the Royal Navy contracts to what is by default a surge expeditionary capability, rather than one based on forward presence, maybe it is time to address our real maritime security needs.

Click here to view the embedded video.

CVR(T) Scimitar in Afghanistan with the Household Cavalry

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Want that one!

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It seems to be a particular US trait that they intrinsically understand the value of standardisation in tackling large projects or tasks.

One only has to look at US buildings to see this, every aspect of design and construction is defined, in unambiguous detail, in various building codes. The result may be buildings that seem the same and lacking in design flair compared to those in the UK that are lovingly created bespoke designs, but they take less time to build and are less expensive.  This is a massive oversimplification and I hope there are no architects reading this who will shoot me down in flames, but that is the perception!

The concept of intermodal transport is deceptively simple but without it, the global supply chain would be very different.

Goods leave the production line, loaded onto pallets, which are loaded into containers. The container is closed and transferred by road to a port, where it is stored with other containers until the ship is ready. The container joins the thousands of others and is loaded into the hold of a waiting container ship. To make things even quicker still, modern container ships don’t have hatch covers, just efficient bilge pump.

At the end of the sea journey the reverse happens.

It is an intricate and finely choreographed routine but underpinning it’s success is the concept of intermodalism; using several modes of transport to move a single load, without excessive handling. The container remains sealed and handled as one, whether it is being transported by road, rail or ship. The goods themselves are handled a minimum of times, more handling equals higher cost and lower speed.

The desire to minimise handling has resulted in ISO containers, pallets, shrink wrapping and palletised roll cages for example; modern logistics.

In the previous post on containers and pallets I looked at the larger sizes and in the post on logistics software and systems, asset tracking was the main subject.

In this post I am going to look at efforts to make use of smaller containers, sub division and maximising volume.

Back to the Americans…

Bicons, Tricons and Quadcons

This sounds like something from the latest Transformers movie but it is a deceptively simple concept, subdividing the standard 20ft ISO into smaller containers that are more convenient to handle in theatre and more appropriately sized for many loads but can be ‘clipped’ together to form a standard 20ft container, the ubiquitous Twenty Foot Equivalent (TEU)

A Bicon is half a TEU, Tricon, a third and Quadcon a quarter.

BICON

TRICON

QUADCON

They are consolidated for road, sea and rail moves by simply locking them together, Lego style. When clipped together in a 1 TEU sized package they can instantly snap in to the global civilian and military logistics system that is dominated by ISO containers.

When unclipped, they can be handled by small forklift trucks and loaders, the kind of which are often held by forward units. Full size container reach stackers are large machines and rarely forward deployed. Because of this, 20ft ISO containers are usually offloaded using DROPS style vehicles and left in place.

Quadcon on a PLS (no flatrack needed|)

Instead of breaking down large containers for their contents, unit sized loads can be kept together in the supply chain as far forward as possible, reducing manpower, minimising double handling and reducing costs. Receiving units get the benefits of containerisation without the problems associated with handling large 20ft containers. The double door versions also mean that everything is easily accessible, avoiding the need to unload everything just to get that one item that will inevitably be at the back. There are many variations available on the basic theme, single doors, double doors, doors both ends, roller shutter doors and refrigerated to name but a few.

It’s a beautifully neat solution.

Storage Frames, Modules and Other Uses

As the Quadcon, Tricon and Bicon started to see  more widespread service, personnel in the field and a number of manufacturers started to realise they could be used for purposes other than simple storage, manufacturers responded with a range of ingenious solutions and adoption rates are increasing dramatically.

Manufacturers of the ‘con’ based solutions include Seabox, AAR, BOH Environmental, CMCI and Mobile Shelter Systems.

As an example, the US Army Force Provider Expeditionary (FPE) system uses a series of Tricons. Each FPE module comprises eight shower units, eight toilet units, four laundry units, and four kitchen systems. The equivalent of 8 20ft ISO containers supports 600 personnel and because of their modular nature, can be folded out and set up in minutes, comparing well with tentage.

Expeditionary TRICON Kitchen

Recent enhancements have included water capture and recycling technology, laundry and office units.

A number of dedicated storage inserts for Tricons and Quadcons have been introduced using sliding trays, drawers and racks.

The weapons storage module features racks for rifles, draws for pistols and sliding trays for sights, consumables and armourers tools It is very Hollywood but the weapons store prevents spare equipment from being stored incorrectly, improves availability availability and is an organised solution for weapon storage and field maintenance.

BOH Field Pack Up

Field maintenance modules are available for helicopters and vehicles with differing tools, test and inspection equipment. Instead of having tool boxes that get loaded into containers and unloaded in theatre, the container is the tool box. Inserts are not a random set of trays, shelves and draws, the complete system is configured using the exact equipment establishment of its recipient users, a place for everything and everything in its place, very organised.

The Field Pack Up from BOH Environmental is an excellent example of such well thought through integration.

BOH Field Pack Up Unit

BOH FPU being inserted into a container frame

Modular warehouse units are available that fit inside Bicons or Tricons and in a fiendishly cunning design change, can also be mounted on a 463L pallet for time critical air transportation. There are many empty ISO containers in theatre but getting new ones out there means slow sea and road transportation. Time critical supplies are sent by air but as we noted in our previous post, ISO containers are anathema to air transportation because of their high tare weight. Using the modular warehouse inserts, the 463L is used for the air transport leg and then the carrier insert is neatly fitted into an ISO container or series of Tricons/Bicons for onward shipping in theatre.

All the benefits of containerisation without the weight penalty for the air leg; labour intensive packing and unpacking is radically reduced. Instead of breaking then traditional 20ft ISO container into smaller pallets or boxes at intermediate locations, this system allows smaller loads for forward units to be retained in a single contiguous package.

Unit stores, tools and test equipment can be easily held in these warehouse units in home locations so when the need to deploy arises, they simply packed up and deployed in one. No need to load from one stores to another, this is like going on holidays and not packing a case, simply take your wardrobe with you. Units become dramatically more deployable, a UK example might be a units G10 stores.

The MSS  Storage and Transport Frame is a stackable, collapsible, wire mesh container for the transport of medium and small items, has integral forklift sleeves and can be carried on a 463L pallet or optimised for Tricons. The Intermodal Storage and Transportation Frame is a also designed for maximum flexibility with various stacking and space optimisation options, it is relatively cheap as well.

MSS Rack Storage and Transport Frame

A system that combines modified 20ft ISO containers and storage and transport frames is called the Expeditionary Warehouse System (EWS) that enables the near instantaneous establishment of a field stores warehouse. Individual compartments in the frames can be locked to deter pilfering or secure high value stores.

Expeditionary Warehouse System

Armouring of containers is a new trend and RFID tagging allows individual containers to be tracked and they progress through the supply chain (we are not alone in having tracking problems, a year ago, US forces could not account for some 25,000 containers in Iraq!)

In the maritime domain, the 20ft ISO container is too large for the smaller vessels but Tricons and Quadcons provide the benefits of mission modules in an easier to handle package, perhaps there is a use for these in the C3 or C2.

More complex designs are also starting to emerge including UAV control, image analysis, data centres and communications equipment stores. With the increasing proliferation of ISR collectors like R-PAS, targeting pods, biometrics and surveillance systems there is a danger of data overload. Analysing this data and turning into into timely and actionable information is going to be an increasing problem, automated software to assist with this process is storage and processor hungry. Containerised data centre’s from Sun, IBM and HP are likely to be seen as an essential part of a deployed force’s establishment.

Flat Racks

When I looked at pallets and containerisation I neglected the humble flatrack. They are of course used a great deal, carrying everything from vehicles to generators but their main use was for delivering ammunition to artillery guns. A battery of AS90′s can chew through vast quantities of ammunition and the DROPS fleet was configured to feed this beast, heavy artillery barrages are less likely to be employed in future conflicts so the flatrack has found its main role of delivering ammunition relegated somewhat.

There is still innovation to be head though.

The US Container Roll Out Platform (CROP) system uses a modified ISO standard flatrack whose unique feature is that it can be slid into a 20ft ISO container directly off the back of their DROPS equivalent vehicle. At the port of departure, the CROP is simply hooked onto the back of the vehicle and driven to its destination with absolutely minimal intermediate handling.

Container Roll Out Platform (CROP)

Container Roll Out Platform (CROP)

Using a 20ft ISO container allows the pre packed load to be transported using ubiquitous container handling systems and it also provides security and environmental protection.

An enhanced CROP is available from Seabox that provides a facility to collapse the A frame hook for easy stacking, 8 can be carried per 20ft container, for a reverse journey.

Air Portable Containers and Handling

Standard ISO containers have to be robust, this usually means steel construction and results in a heavy tare weight. When travelling by sea, road or rail this tare weight, whilst important, is not critical. Air transport, on the other hand, is very sensitive to weight so carrying ISO containers by air is the exception rather than rule.

The smaller Quadcon can be easily carried on a 463L, as below, despite the weight disadvantage this may sometimes be offset for other reasons.

Quadcon on a 463L

However, the benefits of containerisation apply equally to air transport as they do other means so there are containers in use, just not made of heavy steel. In the previous post on pallets I described the 463L and LD3 Unit Load Device but for forward field use the 463L is generally too large and certainly too expensive. The ULD is also awkwardly shaped as it has to fit into a cylindrical aircraft fuselage. The 463L generally does not have forklift slots so needs roller handling equipment, these are commonly found in aircraft floors and airbases but certainly not in forward locations although adapters can be fitted and some variations of the 463L do have fork lift slots.

The Dutch company VRR has been producing customised aircraft containers for many years, having a range of very interesting designs for applications that require rapid movement of equipment using civilian design derived aircraft, the example below is for spare parts carriage for NATO AWACS aircraft.

VRR Air Mobility Container

VRR also make a Merlin compatible pallet

The Chinook helicopter can be fitted with the Helicopter Internal Cargo Handling System (HICHS) that uses a series of rollers similar to those found in tactical air lifters and allows the rapid offloading of various pallet types.

Helicopter Internal Cargo Handling System

The Chinook HICHS can accommodate both 463L and NATO standard pallets.

Helicopter Internal Cargo Handling System

HICHS has reportedly had some availability problems with US forces in Afghanistan and the 463L pallet leaves no room for passenger carriage so alternatives have been rapidly introduced. Slinging loads increases drag and therefore reduces speed and range so wherever possible, internal carriage is preferred. Using this type of system pallets can be quickly unloaded using a roll forward maneuver, therefore avoiding time consuming handling. At a forward location it is obviously preferable to spend as little time on the ground as possible to reduce the time for an enemy to plan an attack against the aircraft when it departs the HLS.

UK Forces Unloading a Chinook

If the Helicopter Landing Site has a forklift or other type of rough terrain reach stacker the pallets could simply be transferred from the Chinook directly to a vehicle for onward transport, minimal personnel involvement and minimal time on the ground.

AAR Corporation manufacturer a wide range of containers designed specifically for internal carriage in tactical aircraft and external slinging from helicopters including designs as diverse as kennels, refrigerated storage and weapon containers.

Many of these designs can also be carried internally in a Chinook.

Personnel numbers are at a premium in Afghanistan, every person really does count.

There are of course, no magic bullets and everything has to be paid for in one currency or another but looking at recent stories one wonders if with some small scale investments we could be maximising efficiency by the application of ‘off the shelf’ logistics systems that have been highlighted in this and previous posts.

In the past year the rising tide of violence in Northern Ireland has lead commentators to suggest that the peace process is in terminal danger. Defence analysts question how an entrenched and complicated political puzzle like Northern Ireland can be ‘solved’ – as if to assume that all conflicts can be ended provided that sage politicians are prepared to engage in rational and constructive debate. Both of these interpretations should be questioned. Firstly, an increase in sporadic acts of sabotage and assassination from dissidents who are marginalised from power (political conflict bloodless or otherwise is all about getting your hands on the levers of power) does not mean that there will be a return to the ferocious insurgency of the 1970s and 1980s. And secondly, there needs to be a clear definition of how victory is to be understood. Resolution in Northern Ireland (or any other counter-insurgency for that matter) is not an end to all violence of any kind as this is impossible in the Hobbesian world – sink estates in England, Wales and Scotland attest to the type of racketeering, drug running and gangsterism that afflicts Belfast, South Armagh and Londonderry. Success should instead be defined as finding ‘an acceptable level of violence’. And this has been achieved by British intervention in Ulster.

When the administration of Edward Heath suspended devolved government in Northern Ireland three strategic decisions were taken. Any devolved government at Stormont should include representatives from both the Unionist and Republican communities, Northern Ireland was to remain within the United Kingdom providing a majority of its citizens wanted this to be the case and the Republic of Ireland was to be induced into dropping her territorial claim to the North. Two of these criteria were met in an agreement signed at Sunningdale in 1973 (the Republic did not drop the territorial claim but recognised the Unionist right to veto reunification)[i]. Sadly, the first multi-party Executive folded in a tide of Unionist hostility manifesting itself in industrial action. Despite this setback the formula developed in the dark days of 1972 remained and became the basis of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.[ii] Britain was nothing if not remarkably consistent throughout the ‘Troubles’.

Today the political framework conceived in the 1970s is more resistant and enduring than is commonly appreciated. An Executive filled with many of the protagonists from the ‘Troubles’ has governed Northern Ireland without collapsing in ignominy. Whilst there have been periods of disagreement, most infamously with the transfer of policing and justice,[iii] none of the political parties are advocating ending the Stormont regime. With nearly all the political parties holding at least one ministerial portfolio there is a vested self interest in prolonging the Executive in order that the trappings of power – a good case of Bushmills whiskey at Hillsborough Castle and a ministerial limousine– are enjoyed by the locals and denied to outsiders from London.

This analysis of political stability in the province might be accused of optimism. But if so, the alarmist needs to find a coherent group of activists who are prepared to collapse Stormont. They may look to the Republicans, the Unionist or the Republic of Ireland to manufacture instability. The Republican Sinn Fein, a party previously devoted to the destruction of the British state in Ireland, are perhaps the obvious candidates. It is also within the Republican community that overt hostility to the peace process – often in the form of a defiant Tricolour or Real IRA graffiti – can be found. Doctrinally pure Republicans consider it treasonous for their leadership to be serving in an Executive that passes laws carrying the stamp of the British monarchy and question what the British have surrendered now that wasn’t on the table in 1973.

However, even though there is residual hostility to Stormont and the sporadic flexing of the muscles by dissident paramilitaries, there is as yet little evidence that opponents of the peace process have substantive support or benefactors to bankroll a full-scale insurgency. The most talented Republican politicians are supportive of the Executive and need to sustain its existence if they are to continue to ascend the ‘greasy pole’. Moreover, should Stormont fold, Martin McGuiness and Gerry Adams would endure an uncomfortable bout of questioning about what precisely their political strategy has achieved. As this would be a less than desirable state of affairs it is safe to assume – and past experience as detailed by Ed Maloney[iv] bears out the cunning of McGuiness and Adams – that both men are able and prepared to deal in the black arts to shore up the Executive and protect their privileges. Supporters of the peace process will note with relief that there is no young Turk ready to usurp the Republican crown and in so doing bring down Stormont.

Is it possible that the Unionists could collapse power-sharing? In an article in the Belfast Telegraph[v] the former DUP leader Lord Bannside (Rev Ian Paisley) suggested that he would ‘accept’ a Sinn Fein First minister if the Republicans became the largest majority party. Both the DUP and UUP are supportive of power-sharing. But these concessions mask an unease at the direction of travel. In the same article Lord Bannside pointed out that Sinn Fein did not become the largest party ‘on my watch’ – a clear warning to the current DUP leader and First minister Peter Robinson that letting Sinn Fein in would end his career. Moreover, a Unionist splinter group that rejects power-sharing, the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV), are gaining some traction amongst the grass roots and a cursory reading of the battle between the DUP and the UUP for Unionist supremacy warns those in power to guard against complacency. Any significant gains by the TUV at the forthcoming Assembly elections in 2011 could force the DUP and UUP into demonstrating their Unionist credentials – something that may sit uneasily with Sinn Fein and the SDLP.

There are big political battles to be fought for the right to govern Ulster and a splintering of the Unionist vote could have serious ramifications for the future political composition of the province. But the leading Unionists have too much political capital invested in Stormont to let the institution die or to hand Sinn Fein the office of First minister. They hold the most seats in the Assembly, control the plum ministerial portfolios and are able to reflect on a political settlement that kicks the reunification of the island of Ireland into the long grass. Given these notable victories, the prospect of Unionists collapsing what is a favourable political structure remains negligible. The future is bright if you are of an orange persuasion.

The final point of the triangle is the Republic. Throughout the ‘Troubles’ the actions and territorial claims of the government in Dublin inflamed Unionist opinion and encouraged Republicans to believe that they would be supported in their quest to end British rule. In the end the Republic was rendered impotent: politicians in the Dail may have wished to govern the North but the Irish army was so bad they had no means of asserting their claim. Unionist intransigence and the brutal reality of the Provisional IRA insurrection finally convinced Dublin that it was best to give up the claim to the North of Ireland.

So the question needs to be asked: is the Republic likely to perform a dramatic shift in policy and reassert her claim to the North? The obvious answer is no. In the 2007 elections to the Dail, Sinn Fein polled abysmally proving that they are still distrusted, not perceived as credible and unable to manufacture significant support for their vision of a re-unified socialist Ireland.[vi] Moreover, there is little evidence that the Irish army would be any more capable of holding areas in the North than they were during the ‘Troubles’ and the dramatic downturn in the Irish economy means this is an unprofitable moment to be indulging in Republican gestures. The Republic remains impotent on the question of Northern Ireland and behind closed doors all the other political operators recognise this.

The upsurge in violence and intractable nature of the Irish question does raise concerns that the political settlement in Northern Ireland may collapse. But before descending into alarmism two key points should be borne in mind: counter-insurgencies rarely ends in the total abandonment of violence by all sides; instead an acceptable level of violence is achieved. And alarmism risks underplaying the interest all of the politicians have in tending to, and strengthening, the political institutions of Northern Ireland. Each participant needs Stormont to succeed because without it their careers as politicians who matter are at an end. Of course the Republicans, Unionists and security chieftains will all use the rhetoric of ‘crisis’. The threat of political violence is indeed a useful tool both in pushing for political concessions and as a means of funnelling money from the Exchequer – with Northern Ireland so dependent on the public sector and the bounty of EU peace funding running dry the temptation to demand special dispensation must be enormous. But the sober analyst must not be seduced into believing this fiction; for the time being the strategic decisions taken in 1972 by the Heath government continue to tie all the factions in Northern Ireland to the peace process.

Lee Bruce studied at the University of Leeds and has published a book on Northern Ireland politics: Perfidious Albion: The Application of British Policy and Strategy in Northern Ireland, 1970-74[vii]

[i] For a copy of the Sunningdale agreement see the CAIN website at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm

[ii] For a copy of the Good Friday agreement see the CAIN website at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm

[iii] Belfast Telegraph, 14 December 2009 at: http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/politics/northern-ireland-leaders-peter-robinson-and-martin-mcguinness-in-public-clash-14597456.html

[iv] Ed Maloney, A secret history of the IRA (2003) http://www.amazon.co.uk/Secret-History-IRA-Ed-Moloney/dp/014101041X

[v] Belfast Telegraph, 27 July 2010, at: http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/ian-paisley-irsquod-accept-sinn-fein–in-top-stormont-job-14890246.html

[vi] See the Dail election results here: http://electionsireland.org/results/general/30thdail/resultssummary.cfm

[vii] Lee Bruce, Perfidious Albion: The Application of British Policy and Strategy in Northern Ireland, 1970-74 (2009) at: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Perfidious-Albion-Application-Strategy-Northern/dp/3639109902/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1282511362&sr=1-1

I try and read these every day.

In no particular order

Daly History Blog Where the past meets the present (sorry to nick you tagline James) is a diverse series of superbly researched articles on various historic and contemporary military related subjects

Defence and Freedom Sven blogs on various military issues, a European slant on issues with a strong bias towards strategy, threats and doctrine

Thinking Strategically Found his one today, explores foreign policy in the wider strategic context

Danger Room US focussed but good for technology related stories, amongst others

Bruxelles2 Can’t tell a word they are saying without translation but they have nice pictures!

Defence Viewpoints The blog for the UK Defence Forum

Rogue Gunner Thoughts of a Falklands Veteran with a focus on welfare issues

Jedibeeftrix Not sure about the name but some of the sharpest strategy analysis around

Aquila Victrix UK military news and views blog

Mental Crumble Random thoughts from Middle England

Kings of War From the faculty and research students at the Department of War Studies, Kings College London

EU Referendum An often controversial political blog with a wide subject coverage including various military issues

The Camo Side of Dominic Hyde All you can ever possibly want to know about camouflage

Information Dissemination The Intersection of Maritime Strategy and Strategic Communications, not sure what that means but essential, thought provoking, reading

ELP Defence Blog Interesting and challenging thoughts on US and Australian defence issues

New Wars Mike is a tireless and unabashed reformer, go and buy his book

SNAFU Sweary, forthright and belligerent but very very good

Helmand Blog The official MoD blog from the Joint Media Operations Centre in Camp Bastion  accompanied by the various Flickr, Twitter and other resources from the Online Engagement Team, good stuff

And some other non blog sites I would like to highlight

Holidays4Heroes A non mainstream service community group that does incredibly good work, drop a few quid in the tin

Sgt Slingsby A fundraising initiative for Holidays4Heroes

Tony Williams Quite outrageously detailed and comprehensive site on guns and ammunition

The Sapper Shop With the rank and pay of a sapper

In 1991, the armed forces truly were in Cold War mode so the achievement of mounting an out of area operation of this size should not be underestimated. However, significant shortfalls were exposed, especially in logistics support.

One of the numerous issues identified was the rate of consumable use for the Nerve Agent Immobilised enzyme Alarm and Detector (NAIAD) in high temperatures which led to shortages. [if you want to see what a NAIAD looks like click here]

To quote the MoD

There were also problems caused by poor stock-keeping: many of the chemical reagents and enzyme pads that were provided were out of date. The fact that the enzyme pads needed to be replaced more often than normal, and that the high temperatures of the Gulf region were thought to reduce the lifetime of these pads, meant that this shortage of NAIAD consumables became a real problem. As a result, 1 (UK) Armd Div ordered that Army units were not to activate NAIAD below the Threat State NBC MEDIUM

In 1994 we had Front Line First that sought to reduce reduce the cost of defence, cuts that is.

In 1998 the Strategic Defence Review stated

If we ask our forces to fight, we must be sure they will win. That means we must correct the deep-seated problems we inherited from the previous government, most obviously in the medical and logistics areas, to ensure that our forces are properly supported. Past cuts in support have been presented as “trimming the tail without blunting the teeth”. The reality is that logistic support is the life-blood of the forces, and we must ensure that our forces get the back up they need

and

We will also radically reorganise our procurement and logistics organisations to spur efficiency and drive through best business practice

and

To assist the process we will establish a tri-Service Chief of Defence Logistics, who will be responsible for delivering best business practice throughout our support services. This is another huge change for the Ministry, which will allow us to coordinate and standardise our support services properly for the first time.

The 1998 SDR put the armed forces on an expeditionary footing and created the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) and with a swish of the pen, solved the problems of logistics.

The newly formed Defence Logistics Organisation has a key objective of reducing the cost of its outputs by 20% over its first five years. As part of this fresh thinking a whole raft of initiatives are put forward and of course, those management consultants have a field day.

Projects included a single system to replace the existing Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and Army supply systems, the Defence Stores Management Solution (DSMS), consignment tracking In Transit Visibility (ITV) and an asset and configuration management tool called Project DRUMM . DSMS was designed around a commercial off-the-shelf solution that would provide an optimised suite of IT packages with simple interchange of data between the separate specialised elements.

After the usual short term budget problems, resultant descoping and extensions to the project lifecycle, it was dumped in 2002.

How much, a snip at £118.3 million write off.

It was a depressingly familiar tale of over ambition backed up with cold feet when the real issues are revealed.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) then procured two tracking systems – Visibility in Transit Asset Logging (VITAL) for the Army and Air Force, and the Royal Navy Invoicing and Delivery System (RIDELS). Both are MoD-developed systems tailored for each Service.

After a McKinsey study in 2002 a revised DLO Change Programme with a “de-scoped” asset tracking requirement was recommended.  Given the suspension of DSMS, a new project, now known as Management of Materiel in Transit (MMiT), was initiated specifically to build upon the then current tracking systems. Full replacement of existing systems was considered but, on grounds of affordability and the DLO’s experience with DSMS, this was rejected as being unrealistic.

Also in 2002 the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) initiated the Future Defence Supply Chain initiative (FDSCi)

The initiative was set up to deliver a private sector outsourced solution but after intense pressure from the trade unions two in-house teams were allowed to bid against the two private sector consortia. Defence Supply Chain Solutions comprised Exel and Devonport Management and the Defence Logistic Solutions, consisting of TNT Logistics, BAE and Westland Helicopters.

In 2003 UK forces are again in the Middle East, on Operation Telic. The NBC threat was even higher but we had been practicing expeditionary warfare for several years and had also recently conducted a series of exercises in the area (Saif Sarea) to prove and improve.

Interestingly, NAIAD is still in service and a pretty vital piece of equipment given the whole reason we went to war was because one Saddam Hussein Esquire had an NBC arsenal and wasn’t afraid to use it.

After operations had concluded the Parliamentary Defence Select Committee and National Audit Office both conducted investigations. The NAO report was particularly scathing and had this to say about NAIAD;

vital cassettes for the NAIAD detectors were unavailable

So, in 1991 in Iraq we had a problem with the availability of NAIAD consumables and exactly the same problem, in the same place, in 2003, 12 years later.

This was just one example of logistics failures including a complete lack of NBC filters for armoured vehicles, not a shortage, a complete lack of them. Others included a shortage of desert combats and boots, NBC suits, morphine, small arms ammunition and body armour. Body armour was particularly contentious given its implications in the first UK casualty of the campaign. Geoff Hoon rightly copped for a lot of the blame for this but much of it must also be shouldered by the MoD, uniformed and civilian, if various lessons about logistics were heeded and incompetence in programme execution was not in evidence then perhaps the outcome might have been different.

The NAO reported also stated;

• The means of tracking supplies in-theatre was largely ineffective, manpower-intensive and swamped by the sheer volume of supplies. The whereabouts of some key equipment and supplies was unknown and therefore arrangements could not be made to get it to the people who needed it. This led to shortages, loss of confidence in the supply chain and inefficiency as personnel searched for items they had ordered or ordered duplicates urgently
• Lack of consignment tracking led to inefficiencies. For example…the absence of an accurate consignment tracking system meant that commanders could not verify precisely where the equipment was…a duplicate consignment was therefore cannibalised from equipment in Germany and the United Kingdom (in addition to equipment cannibalised earlier) and flown out to theatre as a contingency measure
• The lack of confidence in the ability of the logistics system to meet units’ needs in-theatre led to a considerable degree of misappropriation of equipment and stores moving through the supply chain…the unauthorised removal of items as they moved through the chain towards the front line served to further complicate the logistics process.

This is sterile and measured wording but translate that to the environment it is talking about and it is clear that yet again, we had to rely on individuals, military and civilian, to make up for a woeful system, lacking in almost every respect.

In 2004 the Defence Logistics Transformation Programme (DLTP) was launched with the aim (yet again) of increasing efficiency and responsiveness of the logistics organisation.

In 2005 the MoD announced that an in-house option for the Future Defence Supply Chain initiative (FDSCi) had won, promising cutting edge technology like roll cages and live shelving!

In 2006 another programme is launched, the Defence Logistics Programme is built around a number of themes; Comprehensive Capability Planning, Flexible Command and Control (C2), Minimised Demand on Logistics, Optimised Support Network and Unifying Logistics Ethos. Here is an update

In 2007 in a written statement to the House of Parliament, Lord Drayson stated

Significant improvements have been made since 2003 to the joint supply chain. The core tracking system, VITAL (visibility in transit asset logging), has been integrated with deployed inventory systems, and VITAL terminals have been located alongside the unit quartermasters in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Improvements to training, policy and process have made it easier for troops to operate the system. Further improvements to VITAL are planned to enable a simpler, more streamlined method of tracking consignments. These changes will also improve the quality and coverage of the data held by VITAL.

At this point it is worth noting the nickname US forces give to UK forces

The Borrowers

It is also worth noting that after every major operation there will always be write offs of equipment, military operations are complex and sometimes understandably chaotic affairs, whilst the individual may be asked to sign and indicate LAST ITEM on his 1157 or 1033, accountability higher up the chain has often eluded the MoD. There is a tale that when the items that were claimed as being lost on the Atlantic Conveyor in 1982 were added up, they would have filled the ship many many times over!

The same with the ‘Great Fire of Donnington’

There is also the tendency of soldiers, airman and sailors to hoard equipment against some future contingency that never seems to arrive and to coin a well worn phrase, if equipment were meant to be given out it would not be held in stores, the clue is in the name.

It is vitally important therefore, to know where your stuff is.

But, the diversity of requirements is mind boggling, a Challenger 2 tank to an indicator bulb, some items perishable, some not, some time critical, some not and perhaps in what is a unique challenge, a changing delivery address, akin to threading a needle whilst riding a horse.

And this is just for the forward delivery, logistics is of course much much more than that.

As we move ever closer to full scale jointery and centrally managed logistics we must also ensure that the different approaches of the services to logistics are maintained because supplying a ship with fuel or a Tornado with Paveway IV’s is very different to supplying a forward deployed infantry battalion. The QM’s in Army units are usually LE officers with a wealth of operationally useful knowledge that cannot be replaced with a web based application.

Stung by bad press, critical reports from the NAO and Defence Select Committee and a genuine recognition of the need for improvement (remember, service personnel will be all too aware of the implications) there has been a concerted effort to improve matters with a number of projects including;

• Future Logistics Information System Delivery Project (FLIS DP)
• JAMES 2 – Joint Asset Management Engineering Solutions
• JAMES(LAND) – Joint Asset Management Engineering Solutions for complex equipment
• Consignment Visibility (CONVIS)
• Management of the Joint Deployed Inventory (MJDI)
• Total Asset Visibility (TAV)
• Management of Materiel in Transit (MMiT)

In 2002, the MMiT programme was initiated, in 2008 the contract was awarded to EDS (of JPA infamy), came into service in 2009 and is now reportedly delivering real benefit.

Perhaps there is light at the end of the tunnel after several hundreds of millions have been wasted.

To give credit where it is due, the MoD has made great strides since the NAO report but we have had agile supply chains, supply chain integration, joint supply chain, converged logistics, end to end logistics, contractor logistics support, just in time logistics, mergers of different logistics organisations, outsourcing, contracts awarded, a whole alphabet of initiatives, consultants paid, bonuses all round, KPI’s fulfilled and boxes well and truly ticked yet here we are in 2010 and forward units still have to manually unload and break down pallets of stores, aircraft and vehicles going unserviceable for lack of spare parts and yet again the MoD’s accounts are qualified by the NAO because of issues around tracking of assets, particularly BOWMAN.

We must not in any way underestimate the huge and diverse challenges and it is truly credit to those involved that the joint supply functions as well as it does.

More is needed though.

One can only hope that the SDSR pays as much attention to getting rid of legacy logistics systems and continuing the funding stream for new ones as it does major equipment programmes.

As the service three services and Civil Service PR machines spin up expect more news about disbanding the Red Arrows, cancelling the carriers, merging historic regiments and others. Funnily enough, I have not seen a great amount of joined up strategic thinking, apart of course, from bloggers like JBT. Most of the stories crawling out of the woodwork have an individual service slant, which is a shame because the last thing all three services need right now is dissent in the ranks, you would think that the divide and conquer rule would be well understood by now but it seems yet again, the Treasury will find it easy to exploit service tribalism and threaten sacred cow projects to elicit a response.

What is also notably absent is innovative thinking or originality.

Where is Percy Hobart when you need him!

Instead, all the bluff and bluster is platform centric; carriers, aircraft or armoured vehicles.

I think we all have low hopes for the SDSR, not because it is overdue or has potential to deliver but because it is about saving money, first and last. No doubt there will be lots of things that we can agree with but these will be sweeteners to make the medicine easier to swallow.

Let’s hope it surprises us all.

In the time between now and when it is published in October I have a list of subjects I am hoping to cover;

• Airborne delivery
• Some more thoughts on containerisation (sorry about my obsession with this)
• Matting and trackway
• Fuel
• Military communications
• Small UAV’s (or RPAS in the latest vernacular)
• Dismounted close combat and small arms calibres
• Helicopter heavy lift including a good piece by Richard Stockley
• Disaster response and stabilisation forces
• Army structures
• Online engagement and the MoD

I am also trying to figure out how to put the solid mass of FDR comments and posts into a coherent structure

If anyone has any suggestions for subject areas we should be covering, that’s what the comment system is for!

Plus of course, as ever, the door is always open so if anyone fancies a stab at writing for Think Defence just shout up.

Instead of the old box body ‘masshy wagon’ Royal Engineers, Royal Electrical & Mechanical Engineers, Royal Air Force and Royal Marines engineers can now make use of the containerised ‘Deployable Machine Shop’

Marshals Land Systems completed delivery of the new shelters in April this year and they have been a great success.

Using a 20ft ISO DROPS compatible container the new units can be transported by C130J, C130K, C17, A400, Chinook, road and rail. Each is equipped with a number of field testers and tools as well as larger machine tools such as a lathe, milling machine or pillar drill depending on variant, chop saw, buffer/grinder, plus tool draws, vices, work benches and a degreaser. Once positioned it can be operational in 30 minutes with power provided by the Field Equipment Power Supply (FEPS) unit, a diesel-powered three-phase generator, that is trailed off the tail bar at the back of the DROPS vehicle. When working in the vicinity of sensitive electronics and things that go bang it is vital that EMC shielding and compliance is built in, not an afterthought, the system is fully compliant with relevant defence standards for EMC

Deployable Machine Shop

The DMS allows more equipment to be inspected, maintained and repaired in forward locations, this prevents costly and time consuming backloading to facilities further back up the chain.

The Deployable Machine Shop (DMS) compliments the larger and more complex Deployable Equipment Workshop (DEW) that comprises 12 containers and interconnecting tents with the trades either allocated as single use or shared access as follows;

• ME Fabricator and Blacksmith – two containers
• ME Carpenter and Joiner – two containers
• ME Fitter Equipment and Welder – one shared container
• ME Fitter Utility and & Petroleum Fitter ACR (Air Conditioning & Refrigeration) – one shared container
• ME Electrician and ME Fitter H&P (Heating & Plumbing) – one shared container
• Planning Staff & Draughtsman – one shared container
• ME Building and Structural Draughtsman – one shared container
• Main Work Area Storage Container – doubles as a Stores Container when Main Work Area Shelter is deployed
• Forward Deployment and Utility Container (FDUC) – provides a forward deployable capability independent of the main hybrid. System acts as a general Utility Container when not on deployment
• RACU Container – housing the environmental conditioning equipment for the Main Work Area shelter

The self-build Main Work Area (MWA) provides a large work area (242 square metres W 11.5m x L 21m) allowing full vehicular access and handling of large work pieces. The shelter provides an effective entry way at the centre to ensure that a variety of work pieces, machinery and vehicles can not only gain entry from either end of the structure, but that unnecessary movement of other maintenance tasks to allow entry / egress is eliminated. The system can be integrated with up to four 20 ft containers (2 on each side) using breezeway attachments which provide weatherproof connections between the trade containers.

Deployable Engineering Workshop (DEW)

In future, other trades and services could easily be integrated into this system. DEW is a truly versatile system providing the UK MoD with the agility to deploy tradesmen quickly to the most inhospitable places, at the same time allowing them to perform their tasks to a high standard.

With a suitable area to site the various containers, paired containers and tents, the DEW can be operational within 12hours, although planning assumptions are longer to allow site preparation.

Deployable Engineering Workshop

As good as they are we only have 4

Not often reported, especially on blogs, but both the DEW and DMS are a great capability that provide invaluable support to operations.

The defence review is occurring at a time of extreme financial pressure at home and considerable military risk in Afghanistan. Yet it would be a grave failure if it attended principally – or worse, exclusively – to the clamour of those issues. The deepest principles of national security are silent. They explain why bad things don’t happen and they must be given voice. This article also argues that geopolitics prescribe a primarily maritime framework for any British SDSR, and that the core strategic challenges are naval. The Royal Navy, however, has become dangerously weak. Urgent steps must be taken to reverse this trend before it is too late

Its timing is of course related to the pre SDSR buzz but I hope it doesn’t get get labelled as Senior Service Special Pleading because its is very interesting and relevant.

Acknowledging the dire state of the public finances, but arguing national security is not a discretionary expenditure, the paper suggests the strategic need for more surface combatants must be met through reassessing the choice of ‘seriously cost constrained’ new ships, looking closely at examples from Denmark and the Netherlands that offer a modular, adaptable design at a quarter of the price of currently planned purchases.

The paper argues for a cost constrained general purpose class of ships that make extensive use of modularity. It argues for 12-15 of these to compliment a force of 12 to 14 Type 45 and Type 26 (that’s in total, not 12-14 each)

This is a strong argument, a return to the two tier constabulary nature of forward defence with the ability to surge highly capable ships into an area should it be needed. Although the numbers and capabilities might be different it is fundamentally in line with the Think Defence position, that of  a high capability core surrounded by lower capability but more numerous types.

Jed wrote a couple of great posts on this, here and here

I also looked at it from another angle with the C3 modular concept and other posts here and here.

The authors also published a similar paper in 2007 called ‘The Royal Navy at the Brink’, arguing for a 30 ship Future Surface Combatant (FSC) comprising a 10 C1, 20 C2 ratio but the new paper recognises the financial constraints we are in.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Before anyone chimes up and says FRES Scout and Jackal, I have decided to not follow the conventional wisdom and plough on regardless, this would not be a proper military themed blog if it agreed with the sensible all the time!

What role would this replacement fulfil?

Pretty much the same as the existing version, a versatile light armoured vehicle that can fulfil a variety of recce and fire support tasks (for light forces) in a deployable and strategically mobile package.

One of the first issues that came up in our previous discussions was whether it should be Scimitar replacement or CVR(T) family replacement. In addition to Scimitar, CVR(T) variants include Samaritan (Ambulance), Sultan (Command), Sampson (Recovery) and Spartan (Protected Mobility)

Apart from Scimitar, Warthog and Viking are available in all the CVR(T) variants so if we are freed from the need for a common chassis for all roles then some interesting design options are revealed, we can, for example, put the engine and transmission to the rear. Taking this option means that we still retain a compact and high mobility vehicle that is able to be split and carried by Chinook or even Merlin in the case of the Viking (if we accept the inconvenience of splitting them)

No commonality I hear you say, OK OK, but in this instance I think the TD rule can be broken.

Thinking out aloud then…

Weights and Measures

In its basic form, 10 tonnes but with transmission and engine scaled for 15tonnes. 10 tonnes means it can be carried by Chinook, 2 in a Hercules, 3 in an A400 and 6 in a C17. It also means that poor bridges can be used and also, the air portable ferry bridge.

Extreme low ground pressure, achieved by low basic weight and wide tracks

Width, the original was sized to fit between rubber trees on plantation in Malaysia but I am not sure this is still relevant today, so taking into account a 463L pallet (2.235m wide), Type V airdrop platform, the internal dimensions of an ISO container (2.44m) and flatrack pallet the width should be in the order of 2.2m. A 463L cannot take the weight of this but other things are dimentioned off it. This also means it could be carried by an A400, C27 should we ever obtain them, Hercules and importantly, side by side in a C17. This narrow width gives it mobility in built up areas as well.

Scimitar is about 2.1m wide

Height, again lets take into account aircraft and container sizes, so about 2.2m, Scimitar is 2.1m

Length, not as critical but to fit three into an A400 it would need to be less than 5.5m. A 20ft ISO container or flatrack is 6m and the existing Scimitar is just under 5m so something around the 5m mark would be ideal. However, if 3 in an A400 is not critical then this length may be extended.

Mechanicals and Layout

The state of the art in transmission, engines, track and suspension has moved on considerably since the 1960’s when CVR(T) was designed although in its day the transmission system that used continuously variable track speed to steer was at the absolute cutting edge, there was a rumour that the designer of the transmission went insane trying to work out how he came up with the idea!

The UK is endowed with a gluttony of riches in automotive design that has been delivering great benefits of late into the defence sphere and there is also the work on TRACER and SEP to dip into. Whether we use band tracks, hydragas suspension, hybrid drive, in hub motors or regenerative breaking would be down to weight and complexity. We should remember that ease of maintenance must be a key design driver, the vehicle must be able to operate independently of external support as much as possible. There are many advantages of using these latest technologies but there are other important factors to consider.

A small auxiliary powerpack can be effectively silenced and provide power to electronic devices when not mobile.

Because I have taken the decision not to use the platform as a base for protected mobility, command, ambulance etc it would allow the engine and transmission to be located towards the rear, traditional tank style. There are two benefits, simplified maintenance as the engine can be slid out on runners and the drivers position can sit centrally. The layout where the engine is at the front means the driver position must be to the side, near the tracks and of course near a possible point of mine detonation. Not all mines or IED’s explode at the point of initiation of course so this is not a panacea but a protected cell, sitting centrally, would offer some degree of improved protection.

Another aspect worthy of serious consideration is range, FRES Scout has shorter range for a much greater fuel load. Again, logistics are impacted as the need for greater fuel transportation to support operations becomes evident.

Protection

Again, armour and protection technologies have moved on considerably and a combination of techniques could be used to provide small arms and splinter protection, we should aim for protection against heavy machine gun rounds as a base level. There are some very promising composite materials and new materials like Tarian and Super Bainite that might provide protection at reduced weights.

In the opening paragraph I mentioned 2 weight levels. The German Puma armoured vehicle takes this approach with multiple levels of armour being fitted as required or carried separately. This means the base vehicle retains its air portability but if this is not required, likely for the majority of circumstances, then protection can be increased.

If we can accept a weight limit that means only one can be carried by A400 or two by C17 then weight can creep up, and with it protection. If we could produce a basic design whose protection can be dialled up or down as the competing needs of protection and mobility are considered, the flexibility inherent in this approach would be invaluable.

Full NBC protection and air conditioning of course.

Electronics

One of the least talked about but most innovative aspects of the FRES Scout is the Core Infrastructure  and Distribution System, an electronic ring main that sensors, monitoring equipment, displays, controls, power connectors and other systems can plug into. Surrounding CIDS is an open source electronic architecture and both these should be directly ported into this vehicle.

All the usual comms, detectors, ECM and vetronics.

Optics and fire control, again, likely lifted directly from FRES Scout and if the weight allows a mast mounted setup then this would make obvious sense, allowing it to be used from behind cover.

Weapons

In the light fire support role the Army is currently relying on Javelin, indirect fire and CAS, with the CT40 not likely to be mounted on anything lighter than Warrior or FRES Scout. As effective as Javelin is, it is hugely expensive and the HMG, GPMG and GMG mounted on platforms like WMIK and Jackal lack serious hitting power. This is not to say they are not effective because that is far from the truth but we do lack an organic, high velocity direct fire weapon. We cannot always rely on indirect fire and again, Afghanistan, with its permissive air environment, might not be repeated in the next operation. Western forces have grown used to massive indirect fire and airborne close air support and this has created, I think, a small gap.

Cannister, HESH and other natures from the old 76mm Scorpion are still missed, as is the blank/boiled sweet combo!

CVR(T) was fitted with a Cockerill (now CMI) 90mm main gun and saw service with export customers. CMI still make a couple of 90mm weapons and the French Panhard ERC 90 F4 uses a long barrel 90mm weapon that can defeat some main battle tanks.

It would be ideal if we could have both a 40mm CTA version and one fitted with a CMI 90mm

the 40mm CTA is an obvious choice and certainly light and compact enough, Panhard have recently introduced the Sphinx vehicle as a proposed replacement for the ERC90, equipped with a 2 man turret mounting the 40mm CTA, CMI doing the turret integration work, incidentally.

Back to the future then, 40mm auto cannon and a 90mm main gun variants.

Summary

The replacement CVR(T), if we are going to investigate one, should be the bastard offspring of an Alvis Saladin, Panhard ERC90, Sphinx, Puma, BAe Sep and a Scimitar!

No, I haven’t been drinking, not much anyway.

It is significantly heavier and larger.

This means we can only deploy it by sea or C17, it cannot be lifted by Chinook or A400, will be restricted by bridge class, cannot use the Air Portable Ferry Bridge or Class 30 trackway, will not be as capable of traversing soft ground, it’s width will restrict movement and to move it into position, it will require the services a heavy equipment transporter, one of the 79 currently in service.

Hardly Rapid

Jackal, Coyote and WMIK have also been pressed into service in the recce roles. Viking and Warthog have also been used in the high mobility manoeuvre support roles.

If we are thinking about a CVR(T) replacement, Jackal, Coyote, Viking and Warthog have to be considered

The. Jackal family of vehicles are very well regarded by their users and voicing any criticism is tantamount to heresy!

They have very good mobility, long range, high speed and are a stable platform for the HMG, GPMG and GMG but as you can see in this video are vulnerable to direct and indirect fire and are a little top heavy.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Supacat Extenda, in use with special forces, can also be carried internally by Chinook, extending the range of the Chinook considerably.

Viking is a protected mobility vehicle but because was it vulnerable to IED’s is now being replaced in Afghanistan by the 19 tonne ST Kinetics Bronco, or Warthog in UK service.

Click here to view the embedded video.

So before we get into weights and measures, weapons and sensors, tracks and engines, we must first consider if, in the light of the Jackal and Warthog, we actually need a replacement.

CVR(T) and the Jackal or Warthog are apples and oranges and we should be cautious about using Afghanistan as a template for the future.

In making the case for a CVR(T) replacement that is broadly similar I thought a few quotes from others better qualified than I might do the job…

Moreover, there are some pieces of equipment that provide you with that flexibility, such as a medium mortar of the 81mm size, light artillery of good range and mobility, and light armour. It is significant I think that seventy-three of the seventy-four deployments have involved light armour at some stage in the campaign. Initially, light armor is used in the reconnaissance role for the protection and development of the lodgement area, beach head or air head, and also in subsequent operations, of course, not forgetting the pacification phase of an operation or stabilization or whatever you like to call it, when, again, (particularly) wheeled or light tracked armoured vehicles have been extremely useful. So there’s flexibility derived from both these characteristics of light forces, without which you know one could be really pushed about.

Colonel Neville Pughe, Parachute Regiment

I quite agree, and it is significant that the two most important areas of concern of the several areas that have been singled out for more work in terms of the characteristics of 3 Commando Brigade, as a result of our experiences in the Falklands (and we had the whole brigade down there) were the absence of any light armour in the 3 Commando Brigade and also the absence of air defence. There was light armour down there as you know, but it didn’t belong to us. We are now looking for both of those things to enhance the capabilities of 3 Commando Brigade, without making us into a heavy brigade which loses all of its light infantry advantages.

Colonel Andrew Whitehead of 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines

I am now retired from the Army and embarking on my second career, but I spent most of my 22 years serving in CVR(T) and most of what has been written here has been discussed by the men that did crew them and still do!

It is a fantastic piece of equipment, years ahead of its time when designed and that very fact that there is literally nothing that can do what it does, on the market today, marks it as still being a unique and valued capability, that as was written in the article, we loose at our peril.

In the Falklands, it was 10 years old, relegated to secondary roles for fear it would not be able to traverse the terrain, well it did and in the post op reports, they wanted a Sqn, if not a Regt down there.

In Granby it was written off again because “it wouldn’t keep up” with Challenger/Warrior. Well not only did it, but it was proved that both in the Close and Formation Recce role, the need for the manned platform to FIND the enemy, FIX him and if it went pear shaped could stand up for itself till the big boys arrived, was as valuable as ever and the platform of choice?

CVR(T)

In the Balkans, during the winter of ’93-’94, the only vehicle that could move over roads with inches of black ice, offer protection against IDF and traverse the steep, snowy terrain to get the job done was CVR(T).

During Telic 1 it was engaging and holding its own in fights with T55 while it’s human crew made the decisions to use Arty, Air or other ground units to out manoeuvre the enemy.

On Herrick with Mine blast Protection, ballistic protection and bar armour, not only does it mean the crew walk away from mine strikes and RPG strikes, I’ve seen it first hand, but in some cases the vehicle not only survives, but continues to fight! (But the extra protection does push it to 11 tonnes!)

Why is CVR(T) so good at what it does?

It has the perfect balance of Armour/Protection/Firepower but it is its size and weight that means it can go anywhere and do anything.

I for one, along with many other will shed a tear when it finally backs into the hanger for the last time.

Dean, a Think Defence commenter

Some more background on CVR(T) in the Falklands can be read here including…

The Blues and Royals went ashore at San Carlos without incident and were quickly incorporated into the defence, protecting the build up phase of the operation. During this phase, the CVRs were used for hauling supplies and for air defence using their coaxially mounted 7.62-mm machine guns. One Scimitar claimed credit for downing an A4 Skyhawk at a 1,000m with its 30-mm gun. After the build up phase, the CVRs moved south to assist with the landings at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. The CVRs accompanied 3 Para and 45 Commando (both are light infantry regiments) on their 50 mile march, ending up the only vehicles capable of making the cross country journey.

The sensation of driving across the water logged surface was described as similar to driving on a water bed. At Bluff Cove the CVRs were again pressed into air defence service. Civilians observing the air attacks on the Sir Galahad and Sir Tristan at Bluffs Cove claim to have seen one of the CVRs hit its target. In spite of losses, the British forces continued their move toward Port Stanley.

Battles fought across the high ground above Port Stanley were planned to take place at night and involved close direct and indirect fire support. The first phase-attack was opened by 3 Para with their assault on Mount Longdon. Initial  surprise was achieved in the darkness, but the enemy were soon alert and resisted fiercely with heavy accurate fire. 4 Troop provided valuable direct fire support with their 76mm, firing HESH. The battle for the eastern sector of Mount Longdon was to last 6 hours and, for the western half, 4 hours. The enemy positions were captured by a process of calling for very close fire support, at times within 50 meters of the leading British troops.

Two techniques used by the British employing the CVRs proved very successful. The first involved a diversionary attack on the night of 12 June. In the attack, the Scots Guards employed 4 Troop in a reconnaissance role and then a direct fire role insupport of the diversionary assault. The impact of the use of the CVRs was instrumental deceiving the enemy.

The Argentine commander later admitted that “…he had been entirely deceived by the diversionary attack into thinking it was the main attack on his position”

The other technique employed by the CVRs is known as “zapping”: …the CVR crew would engage the Argentine position with a brief burst of machine gun fire provoking a response, which was promptly silenced by the main gun. The 30mm RARDEN cannon, with its high velocity and great accuracy, was much favoured for this technique.

Few Argentines felt able to reply after being zapped.

Armour, played key roles during the Falklands War performing reconnaissance, security, and support of dismounted manoeuvre missions. The presence of the CVRs during the initial build up phase provided a degree of security otherwise not available had an attack been launched by the Argentineans, particularly if they had used their 90-mm gun equipped Panhards (wheeled armoured vehicles). Once again, armoured vehicles surprised their supporters and silenced the critics with their great mobility in terrain considered unacceptable. When employed in support of infantry, the CVRs provided critical direct fire, especially with their passive sights during the hours of darkness. Additional roles of air defence and aiding the logistics only enhanced the primary fire support role provided by the CVRs.

And if that isn’t enough, listen to Arnold Judas Rimmer

Click here to view the embedded video.

Before I move on to discussing the characteristics of a replacement, here are a few videos of CVR(T) in action

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is an old design, no longer made and possibly has an expensive logistic/spares package and we should be looking at transferring the bridging element to the MAN Support Vehicles as soon as possible.

All the design work has already been done, the Malaysian Army has the BR90 modular bridging system on their MAN SX vehicles.

Come on MoD, lets get them transferred and start realising the benefits of one less vehicle system to support.

Reviving a lightweight carrier for a smaller number of GMLRS rounds is still an option and the ability to carry these as a module on various vehicle platforms would provide a combination of capability and flexibility.

As we are on air mobile and raiding topics at the moment I thought another option might be worth investigating, a Think Defence less than serious fancy!

How about using the 70mm CRV-7 rockets we currently fire off the Apache Attack Helicopter?

The CRV-7 is cheap, effective and can be fitted with a Kongsberg precision seeker, either GPS or Semi Active Laser.

Mad I hear you say!

Or is it?

Both the Turkish RA-7040 and Indonesian NDL-40 system use 70mm free flight rockets, the same type as CRV-7

They are light, easily deployed and cheap. Both can also be used in the direct fire role, a volley of which I am sure would be a rather effective against certain target types and would bring much needed firepower into the air mobile firepower mix. The Nusantara Dual Function Launcher has 20 launch tubes and a maximum range of between 6 and 8km, depending on what type of rocket motor is used. It is not a precision weapons and its dispersion means that a full volley covers an area of 200x300m. At less than 750Kg it can be mounted on almost any light vehicle, small boats, hovercraft or towed as a trailer.

The Turkish MKEK RA-7040 is a comparable system, as is the LAU97 and Brazilian Avibras SBAT, which has a similar weight of 700kg. Avibras also make a newer system than the SBAT with a longer range of 12km. These can also be used as sub calibre training rounds on the larger ASTROS rockets.

Roketsan of Turkey also make a larger 107/122mm rocket system but this is much larger than the 70mm based systems.

Do these have any advantages over 81mm mortars or 105mm light guns on the light role?

So I will sign off on this one with a few pictures…

RA7040 - 01

RA7040 - 02

NDL40 - 02

LAU97

SBAT - 01

SBAT - 02

The fact that the Parachute Regiment hasn’t made an operational jump for decades is always trotted out when the rivals of the Regiment return to their annual pastime of trying to get it disbanded. We never seem to say the same thing about torpedoes or anti aircraft missiles but the Parachute Regiment remains under threat.

As for some hybrid or merged force with the RM, we have to realise that the diversity in training and approach of the two delivers a range of benefits to the UK that is priceless, providing a world beating edge. The cost benefits would amount to a few headquarters staff and maybe some training posts, not worth destroying the two units for.

So lets not have any more talk of merging or disbanding.

It is a reasonable question to ask, is 16AAB anything more than an extremely effective light infantry unit and what is the future of its airborne aspect?

Although I am not convinced of the utility of the strategic raiding concept for a number of reasons, there is some logic behind it, would it make sense therefore to reinforce capability.

Proliferating and increasingly capable surface to air missiles mean that airdropping will remain a niche capability, only viable in a limited set of circumstances but it is an important niche and when it’s gone, the capability is gone.

This reality informed the establishment of 16 Air Assault Brigade, at 8,000 personnel it is the largest brigade force in the army and uniquely flexible. A number of non parachute trained units are in 16AAB, helicopter assault is much more likely and being transported intra theatre by helicopter does not require anywhere near the level of initial and continual training as parachute operations.

Despite the label on the tin, 16AAB aren’t very mobile at all and when they do rapidly deploy they are extremely lightweight, lacking any serious firepower, organic lift capacity or means of sustainment. It might be argued that this is exactly what you need, light forces equal rapidly deployable forces but in the context of this conversation, should we be improving firepower, sustainability and of course the means to get there.

Wherever there is…

Things brings us neatly back to helicopters, the Scimitars of D Squadron Household Cavalry, FRES, light vehicles, airdrop logistics, a replacement for the geriatric Medium Stressed Platform and other subjects we have been discussing

ERE Logistics is a Canadian company based in Calgary, Alberta and we build bridges, fast!

Which is how we ended up on here.

Think Defence had created a quite thorough post on the variety of bridges that have been available for military and civilian use throughout the years and in their follow up article our company ERE Logistics and our ERE S80T portable bridge system were mentioned. After a few comments back and forth and some emails we were asked to guest post and here we are!

We are delighted to have the opportunity to explain a bit more about our portable scissor bridge system the ERE S80T and from an obviously biased standpoint, why we think this is the best bridge around.

So, let’s start with some brief history. The president of ERE Logistics, Richard Richter has been a long time army buff with an extensive history of tinkering with all sorts of mechanical items, military related predominately. Not only has he worked on vehicles such as army hummers, 8×8 and 10×10 military vehicles, he has also owned a decommissioned Chieftain tank and a decommissioned M113 Armored Personnel Carrier which both required continual maintenance!

It was during 2006 that ERE’s sister company ERE Firesupport (a builder of extreme off-road wildland firefighting vehicles), ran into situations where life simply would be easier if they had some form of portable bridge system. Much of ERE Firesupport’s work is around the foothills of Canada’s Rocky Mountains, where often times impassable areas require hours of detours to only travel a few miles as the crow flies.

Richard thought if only there was some type of bridging that would allow them to cross a mountain stream, or uneven terrain then they could save hours of time and allow equipment to get where it needed to be and to get there quickly. From here Richard’s brain went into overdrive. We had the perfect environment for this type of product, he had the technological know how and determination to follow it through and with the assistance of his father Erich Richter the ERE S80T bridge started to come to life.

Richard’s military knowledge and his experience with military vehicles also made him realize this would be a perfect fit for many military applications. So the key factor they immediately came up with was the use of the flatrack system for versatility, cost savings, and storage capabilities.

They also required the product to be fast and expandable. Looking at some of the options out there, several unique possibilities were available, but the scissor bridge technology seemed to be the best fit. It worked quickly, section after section could be added on indefinitely in theory and it was perfect for flatracking.

After months of design and redesign the first test model was finally ready to be built and the initial ERE S80T 60 ton prototype model was put into production. When the product was finally delivered and it ran through it’s initial paces, the entire crew were ecstatic. As always, with any new product there were still some tweaks to be completed, but the initial tests went incredibly well.

A 12 metre long bridge which was 4.3 metres wide, complete with handrails for foot traffic,can be set up and be operational in approximately 30 minutes, which isn’t exceptional compared to some of the armored vehicle launchers available today, but where it stands out is the expansion. The armored launcher vehicles have one section that is installed in two to five minutes and then they are done.

The ERE S80T can add additional sections one after the other and can create a 120 metre long bridge in around five hours leaving the armored launchers far behind. The additional improvements that have also come along make the bridge even better. Load capacity has been improved to up to 90 tonnes and the original 3.5 metre legs have been replaced with 10 metre legs making larger river crossings or deeper gully/trenched areas passable.

The actual bridge system consists of three components, the bridge itself, the launcher and the legs. Being a flatrack system it is designed to work with a multitude of military and heavy equipment vehicles. It’s this flatrack design that also makes it so appealing. Now you no longer need a single purpose vehicle to launch the bridge, instead you simply grab an appropriate vehicle from the motor pool, load the system up, and go install a bridge before lunch. Or if it needs to get shipped out from the warehouse to the field, it can be transported by truck or even by air transport in emergencies.

Since the heavy lifting is all done with hydraulics it only requires a small crew of four to unload, install and lock everything into place. During an emergency situations, this will allow extra personal to concentrate on their duties while the bridge builders get building.

ERE Logistics Bridge

ERE Logistics Bridge

ERE Logistics Bridge

Overall we are ecstatic with the product and we have been receiving inquiries from around the world about our portable bridge system. Both governments and logistics companies have been looking for solutions like this for emergency road replacement situations, military use and potentially dozens of other applications we never even dreamed of.

The world is out there and now you can get to it with the help of the ERE S80T portable bridge system!

Whatever the underlying doctrine, CVR(T) has performed a wide range of roles in its long career but as it is replaced by FRES SV it might be worth asking what we are going to lose by replacing an 8-11 tonne vehicle with one weighing in at 40 odd tonnes. Most of the discussion on FRES has revolved on what we will be getting rather than what we will be leaving behind.

FRES Scout

In 1982 Scimitar and Scorpion played a decisive role in the Falklands Conflict, especially the Battle for Wireless Ridge and they have been successfully used in almost every conflict the British Army has been involved in since it was introduced in the early 70′s. In this operation they were not specifically used as armoured reconnaissance but as mobile fire support for very light forces.

Having a vehicle that is below the magic 10 tonne mark allows that vehicle to be underslung by a Chinook, carried on a DROPS flatrack, air dropped and carried in multiples by tactical airlift aircraft. It is likely that the C130 will be leaving RAF service in the medium term so looking at the A400, it would be able to carry three such vehicles or a pair of them for long range flights. Scimitar could also be carried on an ISO flatrack container and its exceptionally low round pressure and narrow width means that it can go places simply denied to other vehicles. Scimitar could also move at serious speed on road surfaces and self deploy without the use of a flatbed truck.

Looking at FRES SV and comparing;

Chinook, NO

DROPS/Standard Truck, NO

C130, NO

A400, NO

Deploying even short distances will require a Heavy Equipment Transporter, which we have a mere 79 of and they are operated as a PFI.

What about gap crossing?

At 8-11 tonnes CVR(T) can use a wide variety of existing bridges, FRES Scout will be limited in the bridges it can use. The Air Portable Ferry Bridge, at Class 35, will be out of bounds, as will Class 30 Trackway.

One has to ask if the decision to go from 10 to 40 tonnes has really been thought out in the context of strategic mobility.

To see how much this degrades usability simply look at a couple of scenarios and calculate how many CVR(T) versus FRES Scout can be delivered to an airhead in a given period of time.

Using an A400, zero for FRES and 3 CVR(T) on a single flight

Using a C17, 1 for FRES and 10 for CVR(T) on a single flight

One might argue that we do not intend on deploying armoured vehicles by air, that a large vehicle is needed for survivability or that 1 FRES is worth many CVR(T) and these are all valid points, but the difference is stark.

It gets even worse when deploying from a port to area of operations, at a push CVR(T) could self deploy i.e. drive there itself or failing that be transported on the back of almost any military or civilian truck. With FRES we either have to wait for one of the very small number of HET’s we/KBR have or try and find civilian low loaders that can handle 40 tonne plus loads without special dispensation or ‘heavy load’ restrictions. It is probably fair to say that low loaders like HET’s operate at crawling speed in comparison with standard trucks.

Whilst in the area of operations we could in some circumstances, air lift CVR(T) as an underslung load by Chinook or even air drop them to support light forces and carry out flanking, envelopment, interdiction or deep strike operations. When engaged in amphibious operations a Chinook operating from HMS Ocean would be able to move CVR(T) inland instead of having to rely on our limited number of LCU’s.

None of these will be possible with FRES SV and in a strategic deployment context, I am struggling with the Rapid part of Rapid Effects.

The ‘answer’ to these mobility challenges seems to be defaulting towards Jackal because that is what we have been using in Afghanistan. Jackal is no doubt an excellent vehicle but is open topped, vulnerable to small arms fire and shell fragments, has no NBC protection, has limited firepower, limited sensors (even the gucci ones with mast mounted surveillance systems) and in soft terrain like mud or snow also has limited mobility when compared with the 40 year old CVR(T)

Going back to the first question, do we really need such a lightweight and multi role vehicle, what is the underlying doctrine and mission requirements?

If the answer to these questions is yes and we need a vehicle that is sub 10 tonne, has a reasonable level of protection, firepower and mobility then what can meet those requirements.

The elephant in the room is IED protection, CVR(T) is very vulnerable and this is a large part of the decision to ‘go heavy’

I suppose the most obvious answer is CVR(T), perhaps a development rather than a few re-manufactured hulls using the latest in lightweight armour and propulsion systems. This doesn’t address the IED issue though.

If not that then, how about a Think Defence hair brain scheme?

Take the front hull of a Viking and replace the body with a V shaped 2 seat crew pod, arranged in tandem like Apache. Fit a remote weapon station and mast mounted sensor pod. The weapon station could use anything from a HMG to 30mm ATK 30mm cannon or the Lightweight Modular Missile. This would still come in at sub ten tonnes, be amphibious and highly mobile in both a tactical and strategic context. I have conveniently forgot the transmission tunnel but come on, these are just ‘details’

If not that, are there any designs available off the shelf that can match the sublime blend of mobility, protection and firepower that is CVR(T)

The German Wiesel is an interesting class of vehicles, Sven might be able to shed some light on their deployment to Afghanistan whilst they are incredibly mobile, perhaps too small to be survivable in the age of the IED.

I still think there is a need for small and highly mobile vehicles that can support a wide range of missions and provide something better than wheeled vehicles but as I said, the elephant in the room is the IED, maybe its just not feasible.

To improve the current deployed operating base protection capability, new systems have been provided in Iraq and Afghanistan using mast and aerostat-mounted visual and electronic sensors.

In all the media coverage of Afghanistan not once since then has any mention of UK aerostats being made public but that doesnt’t mean they weren’t there.

The Cortez project implementing various systems for surveillance at base locations.

News out today at Aviation Week seems to confirm that a team is now en route to Afghanistan to

establish the U.K.’s first forward operating base equipped with a fully-integrated aerostat

Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) is a US system and the latest in a long line of elevated surveillance systems usinga  combination of advanced sensors, distribution networks, aerostats, masts and analysis software. The US have several in Afghanistan.

Defence Systems Journal reported in May

PGSS – really a smaller, cheaper, more deployable version of the Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) — increases intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and provides a more complete surveillance picture through inclusion of information from new sensor systems including EO/IR, full-motion video, and various acoustic payloads.  Dr. Carter argued that the system provides better persistent (24/7) surveillance and associated situational awareness than can be provided by fixed wing aircraft at considerably less cost.

The PGSS aerostat is a small (25,000 ft3) helium-filled tethered blimp that can raise a payload of up to 150 pounds to 1,200-2,000 feet and remain aloft for up to two weeks.  The mainstay PGSS payload is a (98 pound) L-3 Wescam MX-15 EO/IR sensor, but the turret can accommodate most any payload or payload combination of up to 150 pounds.  PGSS has carried various acoustic (shot/mortar identication) sensors and a SIGINT payload deployment appears to be also in the offing.

Program officials noted that the coverage areas of the PGSS with the MX-15 EO/IR payload are as follows: detect a vehicle at 18km; identify a vehicle at 12km; detect a man at 12km; identify a man at 4km.

As for operations, PGSS is operated in theater by contractor personnel, with plans to eventually train uniformed personnel.  The aerostat can be filled with helium in an hour and has a requirement to remain aloft for up to two weeks.  The aerostat can be deployed/launched in sustained winds of up to 20 kts. and operated in sustained winds of up to 60 kts.

To make PGSS more tactically deployable, DoD (with NAVAIR in the lead) is pursuing a spiral development to make the 16K lb. mooring station light enough to allow helicopter sling transport.

PGSS even has its own Flickr page and the Empire Challenge 10 event at which PGSS was demonstrated has a wide range of images here

There is a great story on their deployment in Afghanistan with US forces here

It is real cost effective stuff and reportedly, UK forces will be receiving 5 such systems.

There is no doubt that this is fantastic news but is it, once again, a case of waiting for the perfect when the good enough would do?

US and Canadian forces have been using aerostats and tower based surveillance systems for several years, the first one in Iraq in 2004. Since these initial deployments the various systems have improved in many areas but the UK has been searching for the last degree of capability before deploying, wanting to integrate the PGSS feed into a Cortez display rather than a stand alone display and other enhancements that will no doubt make the UK variant superior.

We are really not in a position to second guess or criticise decisions made by personnel at the MoD whose responsibility this is but the question has to be asked, is this and Talisman symptomatic of our larger acquisition problems. The US and Canada seem to get equipment into theatre and improve it in the background, we wait until everything is 100% ready and then deploy.

Which is the right approach, not sure?