Watch it here, in full gory detail

http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=13160

Jon Thompson, who I think is very very under rated and a breath of fresh compared to what went before, made a fairly significant statement on the information on which the decision to switch to the F35C was made;

Deeply Flawed and Immature

Exactly, my point all along was the speed of the decision making, a decision that went against years of established staff work, was far too fast.

It seems now, the MoD have come to an agreement on this point, the decision was made far too quickly based on shoddy process.

Air Chief Marshall Hillier also confirmed something else that we discussed, the secrecy involved with the decision making process, bypassing the normal team involved and made by a little clique.

It is well worth watching in full, loads of interesting snippets that add to the debate

This is significant stuff, significant for the relationship between politicians, civil servants and the military

A sad tale indeed but with the reforms from Bernard Grey and Jon Thompson around project governance and decision making one can be forgiven a glimmer of optimism.

The post Carrier Strike 2010 – Deeply Flawed and Immature appeared first on Think Defence.

Now, how many T26s are we going to swap for these?

The post Italy, a possible MHPC partner? appeared first on Think Defence.

The final voyage of HMS Ark Royal

The post Farewell HMS Ark Royal appeared first on Think Defence.

Euro Hawk would have represented a fantastic capability in the hands of a European ally and possibly could have  helped to contribute to European coalitions without having to involve the USA. Its a key capability that both Britain and France lack.  It’s sad to see the Germans cutting such a capability. Lets just hope the NATO program remains on course

The post Germans Cancel Euro Hawk appeared first on Think Defence.

I will be adopting a phased approach to the refresh

Phase 1

The annotated image below shows the major design blocks;

ONE – Top Menu

This might change as we progress through the open testing but the current version is

• Home: pretty self explanatory!

• last 50 Comments; shows the last 50 comments across all posts. Although the formating does get collapsed and any embeded images/video surpressed the link will take you direct to the post AND comment

• Bookstore: Its an Amazon thing, if you are buying a book from Amazon ordering through here will take you to Amazon, be no different from normal but I will get a few percent. Every little helps

• Wall of Fame: The top 12 commenters, not attached to this to be honest so it might go

• Authors: This is evolving, as the contributing authors list grows a single menu will be a little unwieldy so in Phase 2 of the redesign I will look at something a little more sophisticated

TWO – Search

Erm, use this for searching for stuff

THREE – Latest Posts

A ticker showing the most recent posts on Think Defence

FOUR – Main Menu

The main menu shows the post categories and the obligatory ‘about’

• News and Information: Short news items, interesting images, videos and links. These should form the main post rhythm of Think Defence and will replace the open threads, which were getting unwieldy and difficult to follow to be honest.

• Analysis and Proposals: Longer posts with more research and analysis.

• Culture and Community: Films, charity, welfare and even the odd funny

• History: I am hoping to do more in this section but the category is self explanatory

• Parliament: Written answers, select committee and national audit office reports

• Administration: Anything to do with site updates and administration

• About: contains the small print, information on sources, how to become a contributing author and a contact form should anyone want to get in touch

FIVE – Connect with Think Defence

There is more to Think Defence than just the main web site, twitter, facebook, tumblr, flickr, pinterest and of course the RSS feed. You can also enter your email address to receive notification of new posts

SIX – Latest Tweets

If you like that sort of thing

SEVEN – What’s New

Similar to the ticker at the top but static

EIGHT – Last Ten Comments

Think this one is self explanatory as well

NINE – Authors

Select the author from the drop down list and you will be able to see all they have written. Think I have everyone on now but if anyone has written a guest post and they aren’t on the list, please accept my apologies and get in touch.

TEN – Favourite Subjects

One of the recurring problems I have is how to provide easy access to the nearly 1,600 posts and 80,000 comments. By using the tagging system I am going to build this list to include subjects that everyone is interested in. This area will evolve over the next few weeks.

A couple of people have suggested a ‘new to Think Defence’ and I will put it here when complete, it’s a great idea.

I would like to request your help here, what are the best posts in Think Defence?

Phase 2

Once all the reader feedback is in I will use this period to do the big fixes and changes.

Phase 3

The next phase will see further developments with the contributing authors as we are only just getting started with this. Phase 3 will also see a few ideas floated for funding support, digital downloads, donations etc.

I am not going to be making Think Defence a pay to access site

Summary

The migration process might take a few days and is not likely to be 100% error free so please bear with me and I know I keep saying this but let me know anything that doesn’t work or you would like to see changed.

Thanks for your patience

TD

The post Think Defence – Site Refresh May 2013 appeared first on Think Defence.

ONE

Think Defence is still only a blog, it is not a campaign for change with lofty objectives.

We don’t have to be too serious or take ourselves too seriously, the whole thing has to be enjoyable and interesting or it is not worth doing.

There is more than enough room for differences of opinion, errors and and ignorance but none for arrogance, closed minds or righteous aggressiveness.

The objective of Think Defence will remain the same as it always was, simply an effort to get people talking in a sensible and informed manner about UK defence issues, no more, no less.

A place to listen, talk and learn.

TWO

I am going to slow down my own posting so I can both sustain the type of post I really enjoy researching and writing and experiment with a couple of commenters suggestions about sharing the workload.

THREE

One and two will not produce any real change, the same stuff, just less of it, I might even migrate it over to WordPress or Blogger to drop the cost down.

The following ideas will mean much bigger change.

In parallel with the longer and more considered articles from me and other guest posters I would like a kind of side blog format that sees a team of contributors logging in to Think Defence as contributors as bashing out Quick Posts on a regular basis.

What is a Quick Post.

If you go back to the contents of ‘this weeks links’, the Facebook image slideshow or a single YouTube video with a couple of sentences this is what I am talking about.

A single link or a collection of interesting images or media that are topical.

The open threads would close, these are usually pushed along by something in the news or something one of the commenters finds interesting.

If it is newsworthy or interesting, a new Quick Post would be the start point.

If I can get a group put together it means publishing these short posts wouldn’t become a chore for any single person, exactly what I am trying to avoid.

What would you get out of being a contributing author?

All the container images you could realistically consume in one lifetime!

OK, not just that but a chance to contribute to Think Defence content and of course my undying gratitude.

The absolute VERY LAST thing I want this to turn into is a chore for you, come and go as you please, take as much or little part as you want but basically, play some part.

The only condition would be that you maintain the sites security by not sharing login credentials etc. because in effect, I am handing over the keys to the castle.

Just as a quick aside, being a contributing author does not mean you would be limited to Quick Posts, you can post what you want within sensible limits but I would imagine the majority would be short, time sensitive posts in reaction to news and events.

FOUR

To support you in this, a login to the TD admin system and access to the about to be published Think Defence UK Defence Newsfeed to end All Newsfeeds to provide inspiration, up to date news and media.

The TD News Pipe will funnel hundreds of defence and related subject newsfeeds, facebook pages and media queries into a single sorted and de-duplicated feed that you can read in any newsreader, offline or online.

In addition to the News Pipe I will make available online my PDF and media library, it being fairly mahoosive.

As this grows I hope to make this ‘back room’ much more collaborative, much more than me just showing you mine!

You can always send in a guest post as well without being part of the team. Guest posts are great, I want more but don’t want barriers in the way either.

FIVE

To build this additional capability I am going to have to spend a bit of cash, more than I do at the moment.

Hosting, security, additional software and perhaps outsourced design work all add up and if we are going to build Think Defence then it has to be secure, well designed, unbuggy, fast, reliable and visually appealing.

I know many people like the current ‘agricultural’ layout but it is only sparse because it keeps server load to a minimum, its hardly a looker is it?

Also, being part of the TD team will not be linked to donations, time, money, both or none are all equal in my eyes.

Reluctantly, I might therefore as the TD readers to throw a few quid into a pot to help me along.

SIX

I don’t know whether these plans will work, whether people will put their hands up and pony up a few quid.

If not, it will be normal jogging, just slower.

If so, and I am actually pretty enthusiastic about building the TD Massiv, then I hope together we can push Think Defence out from its one man band (ably supported by guest writers and commenters) approach into something much better and collaborative.

This is an experiment, if it works great, if not, OK, I will just carry on but less frequently and accept a reduction in traffic.

SEVEN

I am going to ask for some very specific feedback to gauge interest before jumping

1. Would you be interesting in joining Think Defence as a contributing author?
2. Would you throw a few quid into the pot?

In addition, do you have any specific comments on this proposed direction, even if the answer is no to questions 1 and 2

The post Think Defence is Changing appeared first on Think Defence.

The Ministry of Defence acted quickly once it realized, in early 2012, the extent to which its 2010 decision to procure the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had been based on immature data and flawed assumptions. In May 2012, the Department announced that it was reverting to procuring the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the fighter. In a report published today examining that 2012 decision, the National Audit Office has called for the Department to introduce a degree of consistency in decision-making not previously apparent in the Carrier Strike programme and to work within the financial and capability assumptions underpinning the decision, if it is to deliver value for money.

By February 2012, the estimated cost of converting the aircraft carrier for the carrier variant of the JSF, requiring the ship to be fitted with catapults and arrestor gear (‘cats and traps’), had increased by 150 per cent: from £800 million to about £2 billion.  As a result, the Department estimated that, over the next ten years, the STOVL option would be £1.2 billion cheaper than the carrier variant. This difference halves to £600 million over 30 years.

Another key factor was that the carrier variant option of the JSF could also not be delivered until 2023, three years later than the planned date of 2020. The Chief of Defence Staff judged that, in the emerging security environment, such a gap in capability would be undesirable. When the Department reverted to the STOVL option, it announced that it would deliver the Carrier Strike by 2020. However, a week later, it delayed investment in Crowsnest, the helicopter based radar system making up the third element of Carrier Strike, meaning that the system is not now scheduled to be fully operational until 2022, two years later than the carriers and aircraft.

Resolving the future of the Carrier Strike programme (comprising the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft operating from them and Crowsnest) was central to the Department’s efforts to balance its ten-year equipment budget. When the implications of the 2010 decision became clear, the Department acted quickly to put in place a unique, streamlined approvals structure, with focused attention from senior officials. This was crucial to the pace of decision-making.

The Department expects to write off £74 million as a result of the reversion decision; but this cost could have been ten times higher if the decision had been made after May 2012.

Successful delivery will require the Department to manage significant affordability and technical risks. There are cost, schedule and technical risks across the JSF programme over which the Department has limited control. The highest risk phases of carrier construction and integration are yet to come and the Department must successfully conclude complicated negotiations with commercial partners.

Today’s report notes that the carrier variant of the JSF has a greater range and payload than the STOVL variant and would have provided a more effective strike capability. However, STOVL creates the option to operate Carrier Strike from two carriers, providing continuous capability. By contrast, the carrier variant could operate from only the one carrier installed with cats and traps and therefore could provide capability for only 70 per cent of the time.

Pick the bones out of that one but in the meantime, some selected reading from Think Defence towers on the issue;

This one being the most up to date, so if you only read one, read this

• Looking Forward to an F35 Future – Part 2 (Dredging Up the Past)

Others

• Looking Forward to an F35 Future – Part 3 (The Promise)
• CVF Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment FOI
• Making Sense of the F35 Decision
• Reasons to be Cheerful – Part B
• Why I Joined the Dark Side
• Forward to Plan B
• F35 – Back to Plan B
• Arse, Meet Elbow
• That NAO Report
• How Do You Solve a Problem Like Maria and/or CVF?
• SDSR – Analysis #05a (Carrier Strike)
• A French Affair
• Too Expensive to Cancel
• CVF Rumour and Sigh*
• Thoughts on CVF
• I Am Puzzled
• B or C

And my all time favourite post on the subject

• The F35 and MoD Credibility

mmm, we do seem to have spent rather a lot of time discussing this one:)

A Summary of the Decision Making Process

On the decision itself, summarising from the first linked post;

• For some reason, the NSC’s Option 1, by far the most pragmatic option was rejected
• Liam Fox and the Service Chiefs were dazzled by the Strategic Raiding fad and prestige of operating a mini me USN style ‘proper carrier’
• Liam Fox allowed the switch decision to proceed based on estimated costs because he could not resist scoring a political point over the previous government
• Liam Fox did not have the balls to defer any decision until after the SDSR deadline and so went forward with cost estimated prepared in weeks
• The Civil Service failed in its duty to provide some measure of decision making governance
• The Service Chiefs had the same cavalier attitude to information assurance and ignored all the previous work that consistently pointed to STOVL as being the most sensible option
• The Service Chiefs were tempted by the delights on offer from the F35C
• The RAF, specifically, saw an opportunity to simultaneously protect Typhoon and get a Tornado replacement at the expense of operational flexibility
• Everyone was prepared to ignore the realities of the F35B development issues because it fitted their agenda
• Phil Hammond, to his great credit, stood up to the Service Chiefs and demanded a rigourous analysis, the same rigourous analysis that should have happened, and in fact, did happen many times before
• Phil Hammond made a brave decision to revert
• There are still a whole gaggle of bitter and twisted people who just don’t get it and are prepared to put in jeopardy the programme(s) to further their agendas

The only one who comes out of this debacle well is Phil Hammond

The Guardian

You may have seen the article this morning from Nick Hopkins of the Guardian

This is exactly the reason I started Think Defence, to counter complete and utter nonsense like that headline.

The post Carrier Strike: The 2012 reversion decision appeared first on Think Defence.

Think Defence was started by me as an antidote to some of the drivel in the mainstream media on defence issues, hoping to provide an environment to sound off, rant and generally provide an outlet for a subject that I care about.

Think Defence does not make me any money, far from it actually and it takes a huge chunk of my time but it is fortunate enough to occupy a rather interesting place in the defence debate and gets what is frankly, a huge amount of traffic.

I have no desire to step out of the limelight and am very wary of taking myself too seriously or assigning some importance to what is just a bloody blog after all but visit statistics and especially where those visits come from (you would be surprised) place a bit of a, self-imposed arguably, obligation to always be accurate, always be relevant, always be writing and be very wary of making a joke or offhand comment because of who it might upset.

There are no delusions of grandeur or over inflated opinion of worth, don’t think that for one minute, but when over a thousand a visitors a day arrive from Google having searched not for F35 or CVF, but the term ‘Think Defence’ I do start to wonder.

It would be remiss of me at this point not to mention those who contribute comments and guest posts, I made the point before and will keep on doing so, it is readers, commenters and guests writers (you know who you are) who actually make this place far far more than the sum of its parts and I owe a huge debt and indeed, an obligation to them to also.

It gives me a rather warm feeling seeing others taking a small crumb of inspiration from here and finding their own voice, expanding the debate into other areas, either here or in their own sites (Sir H and Chris B for example)

It enriches our discussions enormously to have people from the USA, Germany, Holland, France, Singapore, Australia and others offer their perspectives on UK defence issues, no man being an island and all that, regardless of the fact we are, in fact, an island.

Get to the point you waffling old fart!

What I am trying to say first is thanks to everyone but am at a bit of a crossroads because Think Defence is turning into a full time part time hobby that is weighing a heavy at the moment.

I need to get my mojo back so will be having a bit of a serious think over the next few weeks about what do.

What are the objectives of Think Defence, has it made any meaningful contribution, can it be any more than just another place for people who are interested in this stuff anyway, does it need to change format, frequency or approach and more importantly, have I converted anyone to the joys of containers, military bridging and Mexeflotes?

The outcome of my blue sky naval gazing thought showering may well be to just carry on normal jogging, but as ever your opinions are most welcome.

The post Thinking some more about Think Defence appeared first on Think Defence.

Inspirational stuff

Good luck all

The post Four guys, six legs and the roof of the World appeared first on Think Defence.

If you are so inclined, can I ask that you let me know;

1. What are the best bits of Think Defence, I will try and build on them?
2. What are the worst bits of Think Defence, I will have a sulk and then see if I can correct them?

Can be anything from site design, subjects covered, frequency of posts, multimedia content, guests and commenters, moderation or anything else for that matter.

Thanks in advance

The post A Think Defence Request – Your Blog Needs You appeared first on Think Defence.

Do the words snivelling lickspittle apply?

The post Just Wait till UKIP Find Out appeared first on Think Defence.

The Best Use of a Drone

I must admit to having rather a dislike of the word ‘drone’ as I think it plays into the ‘unthinking killer’ meme that so characterises much of the hysteria around unmanned systems and it’s use should be opposed as much of the term ‘warfighter’.

Still, this seems like the best of of an unmanned system yet

Reflections on The French and Australian Defence Reviews

A good read from Sir H on the recent defence white papers/reviews from the French and Australian governments

Brimstone on UK Reapers

Hot on the heals of the announcement that the USAF is looking integrating Brimstone missiles onto a US platform (which turned out to be their MQ-9 Reapers) is news that the MoD may look at using them on the RAF Reapers.

I like to think I was on the ball with this one, picking up the news on the 29th

Revolving Doors

Not saying a word

A Breakthrough in Small Infra Red Cameras

Things just keep getting smaller

One Careful Owner

Sale of one ramped landing craft RLCV Audemer, Pennant # L111. Located at Gunwharf jetty, Sea Mounting Centre, Marchwood, Southampton

More UK Unmanned Engineering

In these cash strapped times it is always good to see investment in research and development

Armoured Trains

Bit of a blast from the past but this is a cracking post from Dark Roasted Blend on armoured trains of old, and not so old

The Whole Army Data Concept

I have written about the Joint Personnel Administration system a few times but it has been some time since any news on this much criticised system.

With the increasing reliance on reserve forces the previous focus on regular forces personnel administration is being changed to meet the demands of the ‘whole army’ concept

The Insider Cyber Threat

It is not all besandled geeks with bad breath or Chinese hackers and this article from Continuity Central looks at a report from the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure on the threat posed from insider attacks

The post This weeks links appeared first on Think Defence.

In addition to oral questions, MPs and Peers can ask government ministers questions for written answer.

These are often used to obtain detailed information about policies and statistics on the activities of government departments.

In the House of Commons ‘ordinary’ questions do not have to be answered on a specific date. An MP will date a written question for two days after they have tabled it (ie, submitted it for answer via the Table Office). The convention is that the MP can expect it to be answered within seven days of the question being tabled.

Also included are written ministerial statement

16 Air Assault Brigade

Dan Jarvis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what proportion of those trained parachutists currently serving within 16 Air Assault Brigade are classified as in-date. [151920]

18 Apr 2013 : Column 525W

Mr Robathan: The most recent figures show that 88% of trained parachutists currently serving within 16 Air Assault Brigade are classified as in-date.

Armed Forces: Recruitment

Cathy Jamieson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many visits the armed forces made to (a) state secondary schools, (b) independent schools and (c) colleges in (i) Scotland, (ii) Wales, (iii) England and (iv) Northern Ireland in 2011-12. [145626]

Mr Francois: This information is not held in the format requested. A breakdown of visits by geographical area is being compiled, but will take some time. I will write to the hon. Member once the information has been collated.

Substantive answer from Mark Francois to Cathy Jamieson:

Further to my response to your Parliamentary Question of 7 March (Official Report, column 1127W) I promised to write to you with further details to your question about the breakdown, by UK Country, of the number of Armed Forces visits to schools and colleges in 2011-12. It is not possible to break this down by type of teaching establishment, but the number of visits have been broken down by Service and UK Country is detailed in the following table:

These visits can comprise presentations, citizenship talks, meetings with staff, participation in career events, practice interviews and activities with the students. Activities with students can comprise science and maths challenges, and other indoor or outdoor exercises.

The Armed Forces do not visit schools for recruitment purposes and would only ever visit a school after being invited by a teacher to support school activities. Similar contributions to schools are made by the Police, Fire, Ambulance and other emergency Services. The Armed Forces get numerous requests from schools each year and the three Services take these opportunities to explain to children their role to protect the nation and pass on valuable skills such as leadership, teamwork and citizenship.

Armed Forces: Sexual Harassment

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he has taken to address the findings of assessments of experiences of equality and diversity conducted in 3 Division in 2012 with respect to sexual harassment; and if he will make a statement. [151474]

Mr Francois: The British Army is committed to being fair and free from harassment, with a culture that supports diversity, where commanders at every level lead by example, and where all personnel feel valued and able to realise their full potential.

The Army are making tangible progress in delivering a more inclusive environment through a programme of initiatives that reflect best practice gleaned from the public and private sector. These include:

18 Apr 2013 : Column 526W

Improved interactive, scenario-based training, delivered by professional experts from outside the Army who are prepared to challenge their attitudes and perception. The training was doubled in 2012, and the Army are doubling this training again this year.

The introduction of a confidential Bullying, Harassment and Discrimination helpline in 2011, which enables our people to raise any concerns about their treatment directly with a dedicated team outside the chain of command.

Increased use of mediation to tackle and resolve concerns as early as possible.

The expansion of employee support networks.

Improved leadership and engagement from commanding officers based on greater understanding and awareness of their soldiers’ perceptions.

This approach is kept under constant review and is informed by feedback from a wide range of sources, both internal and external, including representations from the chain of command.

All commanding officers are also made fully aware of their responsibility to protect others from the differing forms of harassment, physical and mental intimidation and discrimination.

All those who are found to fall short of the Army’s high standards or who are found to have committed an offence under the armed forces Act are dealt with administratively (up to and including dismissal) or through the disciplinary process, as applicable.

Armed Forces

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many personnel under the age of 18 formed part of the trained strength of each service in each year since 2010-11. [152055]

Mr Francois: The number of personnel under the age of 18 who formed part of the trained strength of each service in each year since 2010-11 up to 1 March 2013 is detailed in the following table.

Armed Forces Day: Belfast

Mr Donaldson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what arrangements he is making with Belfast

22 Apr 2013 : Column 612W

City Council for the flying of the Armed Forces Flag on Armed Forces Day at Belfast City Hall. [152034]

Mr Francois [holding answer 18 April 2013]: Armed Forces Day is a day when we invite the whole nation to show support for our military community both serving and retired, at home and abroad. Each year the Chief of Defence Staff writes to each city and town council across the country requesting that they show their support to Armed Forces Day by flying the Armed Forces Day flag from the Monday preceding Armed Forces Day. This year the ‘Fly the Flag’ date will be Monday 24 June 2013. It is left to the discretion of each city or town council to decide if they wish to participate.

Armed Forces: Apprentices

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many people in the (a) Army, (b) Royal Navy and (c) Royal Air Force have completed apprenticeships while serving in the last three years. [152218]

Mr Francois: The number of armed forces personnel who have completed apprenticeships while serving, in the last three academic years (AY)—1 August to 31 July is shown in the following table:

There are two levels of apprenticeship—intermediate, which is level 2 and equivalent to GCSEs at grades A to C, or advanced, which is level 3 and equivalent to A level.

The breakdown by service for completed apprenticeships is only readily available for AY 2011-12 which is shown in the following table:

Armed Forces: Basic Skills

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many members of the (a) Army, (b) Royal Navy and (c) Royal Air Force do not currently have (i) Level 1, (ii) Level 2 and (iii) Level 3 qualifications in (A) numeracy and (B) literacy. [151963]

Mr Francois [holding answer 18 April 2013]: Data are not available on the total numbers of personnel in each service holding literacy and numeracy qualifications at Levels 1, 2 and 3. However, all personnel are expected to be qualified to at least Level 1 within three years of joining and at Level 2 within eight years.

All candidates undertake Basic Skills Initial Assessments to establish their level of literacy and numeracy. These results are shown in the following tables and the three services seek to improve the English and Maths Functional Skills abilities of all their recruits by at least one national level, and to a minimum of Entry Level 3, prior to the start of Phase 2 training.

22 Apr 2013 : Column 613W

Armed Forces: Disciplinary Proceedings

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will give consideration to replacing the summary hearing system with an alternative system. [151718]

Mr Francois: I have no plans to do so. The service justice system, of which the summary hearing system is one component part, is subject to regular review, and I am satisfied that it appropriately reflects the unique role and operating environments of the armed forces. The summary hearing system provides a mechanism for dealing both with minor criminal offences and minor examples of the disciplinary offences which are specific to the armed forces and calls to account those who are found, after a proper investigation, to have fallen short of the high standards of behaviour we expect from service personnel.

Personnel who are charged with an offence which is to be dealt with by a commanding officer in a summary hearing have the right to choose trial by court martial instead, with the court applying the same limited powers as a commanding officer. Furthermore, those who are found guilty of an offence in a summary hearing can appeal to the summary appeal court against both the conviction and punishment, with the appeal taking the form of a rehearing.

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many appeals against the (a) sentence and (b) punishment awarded by summary hearings have been recorded in each year since 2005; how many such appeals have resulted in a change to (i) the sentence and (ii) the punishment awarded; and if he will make a statement. [151719]

Mr Francois: The information requested is provided in the following table:

Armed Forces: Firearms

Dr Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what steps he has taken to introduce firearms amnesties for service personnel since the case of Sergeant Nightingale; what assessment he has made

22 Apr 2013 : Column 614W

of the effectiveness of such amnesties; whether Sergeant Nightingale will be permitted to benefit from such amnesties; and if he will make a statement; [149887]

(2) whether he has made an assessment of the effectiveness of the firearms amnesties introduced for serving members of the armed forces since the Sergeant Nightingale case; whether it will be open to Sergeant Nightingale to make use of such amnesties; and whether the existence of such amnesties will be a factor in the assessment of the public interest of re-trying Sergeant Nightingale. [149886]

Mr Francois [holding answer 25 March 2013]: The Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Mr Hammond), has made it clear he thought an amnesty should be looked at. The Department is currently looking into it.

Armed Forces: Housing

Mr Ainsworth: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether spending on (a) single living accommodation and (b)service family accommodation (i) new build and (ii) improvements are classified as (A) current and (B) capital expenditure. [152420]

Mr Francois: Spending on new build single living and service family accommodation is classified as capital expenditure.

Improvements, refurbishment and upgrading of properties constitute both current and capital expenditure.

Mr Ainsworth: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) single living accommodation units and (b) service family accommodation units were found to be affected by damp in each of the last five years. [152421]

Mr Francois: The Ministry of Defence has some 65,000 service family accommodation (SFA) properties and 130,000 single living accommodation (SLA) bed-spaces worldwide. Instances of damp in service accommodation are not centrally recorded and therefore an answer could be provided only at disproportionate cost. While damp is not a specific factor within the measurement of the standard for condition for SFA and the grade for condition and scale for SLA, we recognise that it can be an issue for occupants. The treatment of deep-rooted damp problems is included within the accommodation upgrade programmes, and, where necessary, during the preparation of SFA for the move in of a new family. In addition, advice is available to service families on practical steps that can be taken to reduce any condensation within their accommodation.

Mr Ainsworth: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the proceeds from the sale of Chelsea Barracks were spent on upgrading armed forces accommodation. [152422]

Mr Francois: There is no specific link between disposal receipts and individual elements of Defence expenditure. Exceptionally, however, the disposal of Chelsea barracks, by the previous Government which was sold for £959

22 Apr 2013 : Column 615W

million, was included in the plans of the Department and underpinned investment in-service accommodation of £250 million in 2007-08.

The disposal of Chelsea barracks has, therefore, helped to secure the major investment in-service accommodation through Project SLAM (Single Living Accommodation Modernisation), the service housing upgrade programme and other significant accommodation projects in the UK and overseas to improve the living conditions for our service personnel.

Armed Forces: Officers

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he is taking to promote (a) University Officer Training Corps, (b) University Air Squadrons and (c) University Royal Naval Units as a means of recruiting officers into the armed forces. [1512003]

Mr Francois: The armed forces promote University Royal Navy Unit, University Officer Training Corps and University Air Squadron opportunities and associated sponsorship schemes through their recruiting websites.

In addition, young people are offered information on the university service units during career fairs/talks or at an armed forces careers office, as required. The three services visit universities to participate in careers events and to promote closer liaison with the wider student population, and the university units are encouraged to be highly visible on campuses to support the visit programmes. The university service units also engage at a more local level with their affiliated universities through local meetings and outreach events. The university service units also have an internet presence through websites and social media.

Armed Forces: Pay

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many members of the armed forces were paid on average at below the hourly rate of national minimum wage in (a) 2011-12 and (b) 2012-13. [151942]

Mr Francois: In order to safeguard operational effectiveness, the armed forces are exempt from the provisions of the 1998 National Minimum Wage (NMW) Act. Nevertheless, we aim to ensure that the armed forces are in line with NMW provisions. As part of their work, the independent Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB) makes a broad assessment each year of whether there may be personnel earning below NMW rates. In their most recent report, a copy of which is in the Library of the House, the AFPRB noted that service personnel on average worked 44.5 hours per week which, when applied to the basic pay of junior ranks on the lowest level of pay, equated to an hourly rate of £7.55, higher than the then NMW hourly rate of £6.08.

Given the hours that personnel have to work on operations, a similar calculation could produce an hourly rate which is below the NMW for some deployed junior personnel. However, additional allowances, including operational allowance, are payable during these periods and additional paid post-tour leave is also granted on return.

22 Apr 2013 : Column 616W

Armed Forces: Qualifications

Nic Dakin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) pursuant to the answer to the right hon. Member for Birkenhead of 12 March 2013, Official Report, column 159W, on armed forces: recruitment, if he will publish the data collected by his Department over the last 10 years on educational qualifications of recruits joining the armed forces; [151849]

(2) what proportion of new recruits to the (a) Army, (b) Royal Navy, excluding Royal Marines, (c) Royal Marines and (d) Royal Air Force had gained GCSE grades A* to C or Scottish Standard grades 1 to 3 in (i) English or English language and (ii) mathematics in the last 12 months for which figures are available. [151850]

Mr Francois [holding answer 18 April 2013]: The information is not held in the format requested and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Nic Dakin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the minimum educational qualifications are for joining each (a)branch and (b) trade of the armed forces. [151857]

Mr Francois [holding answer 18 April 2013]: The following information shows the minimum educational qualifications for joining each branch and trade of the armed forces. Where reference to GCSEs is stated, equivalent qualifications are acceptable.

Generally, Royal Navy officers require five GCSEs and 180 UCAS points; additionally engineer officers require appropriate BEng, MEng, IET, CEng or IENG qualifications. Additional qualifications are required for the officers detailed in the following table.

Generally, for Royal Navy Ratings there is no minimum educational qualifications requirement but they require a pass at the Recruiting Test to the required level for their branch of choice. Exceptions are detailed in the following table.

22 Apr 2013 : Column 617W

Generally, Army officers must achieve GCSE/SCE in English Language, Maths, a science or foreign language. They must achieve at least 35 ALIS points at GCSE from their best seven subjects, and have scored a minimum of 240 UCAS points at A level or equivalent from at least two passes.

Additional qualifications are required for the officers detailed in the following table.

Generally, Army other ranks require no educational qualification but recruits must pass the Recruiting Test (BARB) to a level commensurate with their branch of choice. Exceptions are as follows:

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All RAF officers require five GCSEs and two A levels. Additional qualifications are required for the officers as follows:

All airmen/airwomen require a suitable pass in the Recruit Test applicable to their

choice of trade. Additionally, the following apply:

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many individuals gained GCSEs during their phase 1 initial training in each year since 2005. [151965]

Mr Francois [holding answer 18 April 2013]:Phase 1 training is the broad militarisation training completed by all recruits on joining the armed forces. Training is generally short (10 weeks for the RN, 14 weeks for Army Standard Entry and nine weeks for the RAF) and the focus is on inculcating the essential military skills, so there is no time to complete a GCSE course.

The Army Foundation College (Harrogate) offers longer Phase 1 training courses of 23 and 49 weeks and the infantry and RAF regiment each undertake a combined Phase 1/2 training course (26 weeks and 24 weeks respectively). These courses include Intermediate level apprenticeships but not GCSEs, although individuals may elect to study for GCSEs and other academic qualifications in their own time.

Armed Forces: Recruitment

Mr Frank Field: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 12 March 2013, Official Report, columns 159-60W, on armed forces: recruitment, if he will place in the Library the data on fitness levels. [151418]

22 Apr 2013 : Column 619W

Mr Francois: The following table reflects the number of fitness tests undertaken by potential candidates over the past seven financial years (FY). The number of

22 Apr 2013 : Column 620W

fitness tests conducted does not correlate to the number of candidates recruited into the armed forces and includes all tests regardless of whether the result was pass or fail.

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what proportion of infantry recruits in each year since 2011 were aged (a) 21 or below and (b) under 18. [152053]

Mr Francois: The information is shown in the following table as percentages of total infantry recruits and relates to training years, which run from April to March.

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what proportion of recruits enlisting in the (a) armed forces and (b)Army under 18 years old attended the (i) Army Foundation College, Harrogate and (ii) Army Technical Foundation College, Winchester in each year since 2011. [152068]

Mr Francois: Only Army personnel attended the colleges. The Army Technical Foundation College, Winchester closed for Junior Entry intakes in June 2012, when all Junior Entry Phase One training transferred to the Army Foundation College, Harrogate. The table shows the percentages of the total Army inflow for each period, and relates to training years which run from April to March.

Armed Forces: Rented Housing

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what information his Department holds on the proportion of members of the armed forces who rent domestic properties. [151943]

Mr Francois: The Ministry of Defence does not hold information on the proportion of service personnel who privately rent their accommodation. However, the most recent Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey (2012) indicated that some 4% of respondents occupied privately rented accommodation during the working week. The full survey is available at the following link:

http://www.dasa.mod.uk/index.php?pub=AFCAS-MAIN

Armed Forces: Training

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how long phase 1 initial training is for those who join the (a)Army, (b) Royal Navy and (c) Royal Air Force at 16 years old. [152219]

Mr Francois: Phase 1 training is the broad militarisation training completed by all recruits on joining the armed forces. This training focuses on inculcating the essential military skills. For young people joining the Army, including those aged 16 years old, Phase 1 training is completed at the Army Foundation College, where courses last either 23 or 49 weeks.

Phase 1 training for entrants to the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force is not dependent on age and lasts 10 weeks for the Royal Navy and nine weeks for the Royal Air Force, although the RAF Regiment undertakes a longer combined Phase 1/2 training course.

Army: Discharges

Tom Greatrex: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how many army personnel were given a temporary discharge in(a) 2010-11 and (b) 2011-12; [152302]

(2) how many army personnel given a temporary discharge subsequently had their discharge changed to permanent discharge as a result of ill health. [152305]

Mr Francois: There is no such term as a temporary discharge and therefore no information is held to answer these questions.

Tom Greatrex: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many army personnel were discharged for medical reasons in(a) 2010-11 and (b) 2011-12. [152303]

Mr Francois: There were a total of 834 UK Regular Army personnel medically discharged from the service during the financial year 2010-11 and a total of 963 UK Regular Army personnel medically discharged from the service during the financial year 2011-12.

Tom Greatrex: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many army personnel discharged from the army have claimed their preserved pension under AFPS 75 early in each of the last 10 years due to being permanently incapacitated. [152304]

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Mr Francois: The numbers of Army personnel who have been awarded their preserved pension under AFPS 75 early due to being assessed as permanently unable to undertake any form of full-time employment are as follows:

Army: Qualifications

Nic Dakin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many and what proportion of infantry soldiers gained GCSE grades A*-C or Scottish Standard grades 1-3 in (a) English and English Language and (b) mathematics in the last 12 months for which figures are available. [151848]

Mr Francois [holding answer 18 April 2013]: The Ministry of Defence does not routinely collect nor centrally record the information requested.

Nic Dakin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what apprenticeship qualifications are available to those enlisting in the Army as minors. [151956]

Mr Francois: The following is a list of qualifications for all those enlisting in the Army including minors:

ICT Users (Levels 2 and 3)

Driving Goods Vehicles (Levels 2 and 3)

Logistics Operations (Levels 2 and 3)

Warehousing and Storage

Mail Operations

Aviation Operations on the Ground (Levels 2 and 3)

IT and Telecoms Professional (Levels 2 and 3)

Policing (Level 3)

Animal Care (Levels 2 and 3)

Horse Care (Levels 2 and 3)

Customer Service (Level 3)

Engineering Maintenance (Levels 2 and 3)

Engineering Maintenance and Installation (Level 2)

Performing Engineering Operations (Levels 2 and 3)

Plant Operations (Construction) (Level 2)

Professional Cookery (Levels 2 and 3)

Communications Technologies Practitioners (Levels 2 and 3)

Fabrication and Welding (Level 2)

Public Services (Level 2)

Providing a Security Service (Level 2).

Army: Recruitment

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the average expenditure per Army recruit was of recruiting and training to identical roles recruits who were aged (a) under 18 years and (b) 18 years or above in each year since 2010-11. [152244]

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Mr Francois: Recruits under the age of 18 undertake either the Junior Entry or Senior Entry training route. Although the majority of recruits over 17 will enter the Senior Entry route, some recruits between 17 and 17.5 undertake the longer Junior Entry course as, during selection, it was assessed that the Junior Entry route would be more appropriate for the needs of the individual.

For those on Senior Entry, the cost of recruiting and training those under 18 is the same as for those over 18.

In recruiting year 2010-11, the average cost of Phase 1 training for each of those under 18 (including both Junior and Senior Entry) was £52,267 and the average cost for those over 18 (Senior Entry route only) was £19,916. Recruitment costs are the same across the board and an additional £10,823 should be added to each.

In recruiting year 2011-12, the average cost of Phase 1 training for each of those under 18 (including both Junior and Senior Entry) was £44,526 and the average cost for those over 18 (Senior Entry route only) was £18,178. An additional £11,094 should be added to each for recruitment costs.

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he is taking to encourage enlistment into the Army’s technical corps. [1512002]

Mr Francois: The Army’s technical corps include The Royal Engineers, The Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, The Royal Corps of Signals and the Royal Logistic Corps. While we are actively recruiting soldiers across the Regular Army and the Reserve, the technical corps remain well subscribed. Further education bursaries continue to offer financial incentives for potential technical corps soldiers to stay on at school or college before joining their chosen trade.

For officers, A-level courses are offered at the Defence Sixth Form College at Welbeck, and the Defence Technical Undergraduate Scheme offers degrees to students in predominantly science and engineering-based areas. Bursaries and mentorships are available for those studying under the scheme. More information is available at the Army website:

http://www.army.mod.uk

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he is taking to encourage people leaving school or university to choose a career as an Army officer as their first choice. [1512005]

Mr Francois: A review of officer recruiting is currently under way, which is likely to lead to a marketing and recruiting campaign later in the year. The forthcoming ‘Boots’ Army recruiting campaign will also have an officer element. University Officer Training Corps units offer undergraduate members valuable insights into life with the armed forces. The Defence Sixth Form College at Welbeck offers places for applicants who wish to join the Army as officers, predominantly within the technical corps, and who progress to the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst via the Defence Technical Undergraduate Scheme.

For others, a limited number of scholarships are available to Sixth Form students, and bursaries are available to undergraduates. More information on Army Officer careers is available at the Army website:

http://www.army.mod.uk

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Army: Scholarships

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many individuals awarded Army scholarships have failed to progress to the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst upon completion of their degree in each of the last five years. [1512004]

Mr Francois: This information is no longer held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. Data were collated until 2007, and the information for the most recent full three years held is shown in the following table. The proportion of those in receipt of Army scholarships failing to progress to the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst since 2007 is believed to remain at similar levels. The target figure for the awarding of Army scholarships is 100 per year.

Army: Training

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the average age is of an Officer Cadet at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. [1512006]

Mr Francois: The average age of an Officer Cadet on entry to the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst is 23.

Assets

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the value was of (a) thefts, (b) items lost and (c) items lost in transit from his Department’s establishments in (i) October 2012, (ii) November 2012, (iii) December 2012, (iv) January 2013, (v) February 2013 and (vi) March 2013; and if he will make a statement. [151681]

Mr Francois: The information on thefts is shown in the following table:

The reason for the high figure in January 2013 was as follows:

Theft of a Tornado Jig Assembly—£193,243

Theft of NVG—£11,573

Theft of Military equipment—£36,310

Further information on losses is not available at this stage because accounts information for financial year 2012-13 has not been finalised and is still subject to audit. Losses information recorded in the accounts only distinguishes between culpable losses and other losses

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of accountable stores. Figures across the Ministry of Defence for losses in transit could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Losses of any type are not necessarily recorded in the same month that they occurred. However, it is important that losses are recorded in the correct financial year for accounting purposes.

Defence: Procurement

Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which projects being delivered for his Department by (a)Babcock, (b) Boeing, (c) Cobham, (d) the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, (e) Finmeccanica, (f) General Dynamics, (g) Kelloggs-Brown-Root, (h) Lockheed Martin (i) Marshall Aerospace, (j) Northrup Grumman, (k) Rolls-Royce, (l)Thales and (m) Ultra Electronics are running over budget; and by how much in each case. [128063]

Mr Dunne [holding answer 13 November 2012]: The information will take time to collate and the commercial sensitivity of the data could prevent full disclosure. I will write to the hon. Member as soon as I am in a position to provide further information.

Substantive answer from Mr Dunne to Angus Robertson:

I am writing in full response to the answer I gave on 26 November 2012, Official Report, column 22W, regarding the question you asked about Ministry of Defence (MOD) projects being delivered by a list of named companies that are running over budget.

The following table details the three projects being delivered by those named contractors that are currently assessed as running over budget.

For the purpose of answering this question, my officials have examined all Category A-D equipment acquisition projects, but limited to those showing a variance of more than £1 million against their approval costs, 50% confidence figure. It is also limited to those projects where the named company is listed as the prime contractor or where projects are being delivered by subsidiaries of the named companies. It does not include support projects. This was necessary to avoid significantly exceeding the disproportionate cost threshold limit for answering parliamentary questions.

This approach means that there are some differences between the above table and the list provided to you in my answer of 6 November 2012, Official Report, column 519W, for example the inclusion of the A400M supplied by Airbus Ltd. as a subsidiary of EADS. The differences are due to the filters placed upon the data as explained above, as well as the passage of time.

It should be noted that the cost variation quoted is assessed against MOD project approval figures, which represent the total MOD costs for any particular project. They therefore do not necessarily reflect contractual obligations. Project performance can be affected by a number of reasons, not all of which are in the contractor’s control.

I apologise for the time it has taken to get this information to you but its compilation has involved a significant amount of work and there was also a need to consult the companies concerned.

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Dementia

Oliver Colvile: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his Department has a dementia strategy. [151822]

Mr Francois: The Ministry of Defence (MOD) does not have a dementia strategy. Our population, in the main, is not likely to suffer dementia while of working age. In the unlikely event of any incidence of dementia, it would be covered by the MOD’s employee health and well-being policies.

HMS Victory

Mr Andrew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) further to his Answer of 13 March 2013, Official Report,column 644W, on HMS Victory, whether he has taken expert advice in order to ascertain whether the skull from HMS Victory 1744 recently shown on television was exposed by human excavation of the seabed; [151549]

(2) whether his Department gave permission for excavation of HMS Victory 1744; and what assessment he has made of whether there has been any breach of the Deed of Gift of the wreck. [151550]

Mr Francois: The Deed of Gift signed on 12 January 2012 forms the current agreement between the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Maritime Heritage Foundation (MHF) for management of the site of the wreck of HMS Victory 1744.

Odyssey Marine Exploration (OME) has conducted regular site surveys since it discovered the wreck in 2008. No specific permission was sought from the MOD before OME revisited the site in summer 2012.

On 13 March 2013 the expert panel discussed the television images of the skull in advance of OME’s report of last summer’s activity, which the Government expects to receive shortly as part of MHFs revised management plan and response to the key management principles.

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No determination has been made on whether there has been any breach of the Deed of Gift. The expert panel will review the MHF submission and provide its advice to the Government through the advisory group.

Military Alliances

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence with which non-EU nations other than the US the UK has undertaken collaborative defence projects in each of the last five years; and which such projects have been undertaken. [152022]

Mr Dunne: Over the last five years, the UK has undertaken collaborative defence equipment and support projects with Brazil and Australia.

For Brazil, the collaboration has been on maritime systems, which commenced in 2012.

For Australia, the collaboration has been on the advanced short range air to air missile (ASRAAM) which commenced in 2012. The other collaboration involves submarines, which also commenced in 2012.

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what the cost to his Department was of military aviation collaboration projects with the US in each of the five years prior to 2011; [152023]

(2) what the cost to his Department was of military aviation collaboration projects with non-EU countries other than the US in each of the five years prior to 2011; [152024]

(3) what the cost to his Department was of military aviation collaboration projects in the EU in each of the five years prior to 2011. [152025]

Mr Dunne: Ministry of Defence expenditure on military aviation collaboration projects for each of the five years prior to 2011 is shown in the following table, rounded to the nearest million pounds. The expenditure includes airframes, engines and other systems intrinsic to the aircraft. It does not include airborne weapons fitted to aircraft.

The information for financial years 2005-06 and 2006-07 is incomplete owing to the impracticality of retrieving and disaggregating financial data from legacy systems which could be completed only at disproportionate cost.

The information provided for financial year 2011-12 has changed compared to that previously provided, owing to accounting treatment decisions and variations in exchange rates.

The UK is not engaged in any military aviation collaborative projects with only non-EU countries and excluding the USA. One project includes a collaboration of EU, non-EU countries and the US. This explains the cost in the ‘non-EU’ category above.

RAF Fylingdales

Miss McIntosh: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when RAF Fylingdales was last refurbished. [152190]

Mr Francois: Work to refurbish or replace the infrastructure at all RAF bases is assessed and programmed on a regular and continuous basis and carried out as required.

The recent programme of work at RAF Fylingdales has included the provision of a new combined mess facility and demolition of a number of redundant buildings.

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RAF Staxton

Miss McIntosh: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the refurbishment of the radar at RAF Staxton will be complete; and if he will make a statement. [152191]

Mr Dunne: The delivery of the TPS-77 radar at Remote Radar Head (RRH) Staxton Wold is scheduled for August 2013, with Full Operating Capability planned for September 2013.

Royal Military Academy

Bob Stewart: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent assessment he has made of the necessity for the Royal Military Academy to charge the Sandhurst Foundation, which hosts events to bring former officer cadets and instructors back to the academy, for room hire. [152433]

Mr Francois: The Sandhurst Foundation is a non-publicly funded, registered charity, located at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. When departmental assets such as rooms and facilities are hired out to third parties, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is obliged under Treasury repayment rules to recover an appropriate and consistent level of cost, so that the taxpayer is not left out of pocket. This will include insurance cover. Where services such as catering are provided by a single contractor, they might also charge for service provision that is over and above that provided under contract to the MOD. Any further charging that the Sandhurst Foundation might wish to apply is a matter for the foundation.

Staff

Priti Patel: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many days of work were carried out by officials in (a) his Department and (b) each of its agencies and non-departmental public bodies on average in each of the last five years; and what the total salary cost was of officials in each year. [151103]

Mr Francois: A broad estimate of the number of days work carried out in the last five years by civilian defence officials is set out in the following table. Each full-time member of staff is expected to work 214 days per year after the deduction of weekends, public and privilege holidays and annual leave. From this must be deducted the average level of sick leave taken.

Territorial Army: Dudley

Ian Austin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what plans he has for the military facilities at Vicar Street in Dudley; [151619]

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(2) what his policy is on the future of the Territorial Army’s base at Vicar Street in Dudley. [151620]

Mr Francois: The Reserves White Paper and associated basing announcements are expected later this year. Until it is announced it is too early to make a decision on the future of the Territorial Army Centre in Vicar Street Dudley.

Ian Austin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many residents of Dudley currently serve in the Territorial Army. [152059]

Mr Francois: This information is not held in the format requested.

Afghanistan

Mr Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the total cost to his Department was of improving infrastructure in Helmand Province, Afghanistan in 2012; and how much such spending was claimed against the UK’s overseas development assistance target. [151388]

Mr Robathan: In 2012 the Ministry of Defence spent £23.3 million on infrastructure in Afghanistan. This figure incorporates all building works carried out on the UK military bases in Helmand Province. As net additional costs of UK military operations in Afghanistan, these costs were resourced by the Treasury reserve.

In addition £203,000 was spent from the Commander’s Stabilisation Fund on improving the infrastructure in local communities in Helmand Province. The Commander’s Stabilisation Fund is funded by the Conflict Pool. We will consider whether these costs could be counted as overseas development assistance (ODA) as part of the Conflict Pool and departmental ODA return for 2012.

Mr Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the cost was of Operation Oqab Tsuka; and how much such spending was claimable against the UK’s overseas development assistance commitment. [151389]

Mr Robathan: Operation Oqab Tsuka was conducted under the previous administration using armed forces personnel and resources already in Afghanistan. As such the additional costs incurred in undertaking this specific operation as part of the wider Operation HERRICK are not held in the format requested. The costs of this operation were not counted as official development assistance activities.

Mr Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the total cost was of training the Afghan police forces in 2012. [151391]

Mr Robathan: The total cost of training the Afghan National Police in 2012, is a matter for the Government of Afghanistan. The NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A), supports the Government of Afghanistan in generating and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces, including the Afghan National

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Police. It had a total budget of $11.2 billion last year. In 2012, the Law and Order Trust Fund, which supports the payment of Afghan National Police salaries, had a total commitment of around £600 million with the UK contributing £10.5 million.

The UK channels its direct support for the Afghan National Police through a number of different avenues, predominately multilateral missions. In 2012, the provision of senior and specialist advisors to the EU Police Training Mission to Afghanistan totalled 16 police officers in key positions. We also provided three senior civilian police advisors and 11 military personnel to the NTM-A’s policing arm, alongside numerous police advisory teams whose numbers fluctuated throughout the year.

Today there are 64 military personnel working in Lashkar Gah Training Centre, formerly known as the Helmand Police Training Centre, and 105 UK personnel working in a police advisory function at ANP district/provincial command centres.

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the suitability of the Glock 17 Gen 4 pistol for prevailing conditions in Helmand province. [151999]

Mr Robathan: The Glock 17 Gen 4 pistol has been selected as the new standard issue sidearm for the armed forces. During the procurement process the pistol was rigorously trialled in a range of extreme climates and environmental conditions to ensure its suitability for service anywhere in the world. Deliveries to Afghanistan will commence this summer.

Armed Forces: Absent Voting

Jim Shannon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he is taking to review the arrangements for allowing serving personnel stationed away from home to vote in elections. [152197]

Mr Francois: The Government are committed to members of the armed forces being able to take their full part in the democratic process, in accordance with the armed forces covenant.

The Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013 has provisions that will better support military personnel overseas to have their postal ballots included in the count. However we still encourage service personnel overseas to vote by proxy as a preference.

Armed Forces: Housing

Mr Ainsworth: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what proportion of the occupied UK service family accommodation estate was below Standard 2 for condition in March 2013. [152423]

Mr Francois [holding answer 22 April 2013]: Of those Service Family Accommodation (SFA) properties assessed for their Standard for Condition (SfC), the following were at each SfC in March of this and previous three years:

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SFA properties at S3fC and S4fC are no longer allocated to service families and all remaining SFA at S3fC and S4fC are either in the process of being upgraded to S2fC as a minimum, or are awaiting disposal.

Mr Ainsworth: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what proportion of single living accommodation bed-spaces for trained personnel was Grade 1 standard in March 2013. [152424]

Mr Francois [holding answer 22 April 2013]: With the exception of 2011, a worldwide audit of the Grade for Condition and Scale (GfC&S) of Single Living Accommodation (SLA) has been undertaken in each of the last four years, the last being in March 2012. These showed that the following numbers of SLA bed-spaces were at each GfC&S:

Armed Forces: Postal Services

Katy Clark: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much his Department has paid to Royal Mail for managing postal services for the armed forces in each of the last five years. [152251]

Mr Dunne: The British Forces Post Office (BFPO) provides a mail service to serving armed forces personnel and their families worldwide, including on exercises and operations. It operates as an extension of the UK’s domestic mail system.

Payments made by BFPO to the Royal Mail Group for official mail services in support of the Ministry of Defence over the last five financial years are shown in the following table:

23 Apr 2013 : Column 808W

Armed Forces: Recruitment

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many recruits to the (a) Army, (b) infantry, (c) Royal Navy and(d) Royal Air Force were aged 16 at enlistment in each year since 2010-11. [152050]

Mr Francois: The number of recruits to the Naval Service, Army, Infantry and Royal Air Force who were aged 16 at enlistment in each year financial year (FY) from 2010-11 to 28 February 2013 are shown in the following table:

Armed Forces: Sexual Offences

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 14 January 2013, Official Report, column 596W, on armed forces: sexual offences, if he will consider amending sections 156 and 157 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 and the Armed Forces (Court Martial) Rules 2009 to include provision in relation to the gender composition of court martial juries in cases of (a) rape, (b) sexual assault and (c) sexual assault by penetration; and if he will make a statement. [152582]

Mr Francois: The Armed Forces Act 2006 permits women officers and warrant officers to sit as lay members of the court martial on the same basis as men. For a particular court martial, the individual members are chosen on an essentially random basis by the court administration officer for the court martial. Under rule 35 of the Armed Forces, Court Martial Rules, 2009, either party to proceedings, the defence or the prosecution, may object to any lay member of the court on any reasonable ground. These provisions broadly reflect those which apply to juries in the civilian Crown court and Ministry of Defence policy is to maintain that consistency. Accordingly, I do not currently propose to reconsider our provisions.

Armed Forces: Training

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he is taking to increase the provision of training for assisting officers; and if he will make a statement. [152391]

Mr Francois: There is no specific training for assisting officers. The duties and responsibilities of assisting officers are set out in detail at annexes F and G of

23 Apr 2013 : Column 809W

volume 1 of chapter 9 of the Manual of Service Law (JSP 830). A copy of this document is available at the following link:

www.gov.uk/government/publications

Armoured Fighting Vehicles

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessement he has made of the effectiveness of the Foxhound vehicle (a) in each climate and (b) on each terrain. [1512000]

Mr Robathan: The Foxhound vehicle has been subject to a number of tests and assessments using simulated environments, such as climatic chambers and test tracks in the UK, comparable with the climate and terrain in the UK, Europe and Afghanistan. Trials were also conducted on test tracks in Afghanistan. The Foxhound vehicle has since successfully deployed to Afghanistan and continues to be a reliable and effective platform in this theatre of operations.

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Foxhound vehicles are in service in the Army. [1512001]

Mr Robathan: As at April 2013 196 Foxhound vehicles are in service in the Army.

Army: Qualifications

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what qualifications are available within two years to those who join the (a) Army, (b) Royal Navy and (c) Royal Air Force at 16; [151961]

(2) what (a) literacy and (b) numeracy training is required for those who join the (i) Army, (ii) Royal Navy and (iii) Royal Air Force aged 16 years within two years of joining; [151962]

(3) how many individuals serving in the (a) Army, (b) Royal Navy and (c) Royal Air Force who joined at 16 years do not currently have (i) Level 1 or (ii) Level 2 qualifications in numeracy and literacy; [151964]

(4) what proportion of those who joined the (a) Army, (b) Royal Navy and (c) Royal Air Force at 16 years old in the last three years did not have literacy and numeracy training to (i) Level 1, (ii) Level 2 and (iii) Level 3; [152220]

(5) what literacy and numeracy training is mandated in the first two years of service of those who join the (a) Army, (b) Navy and (c) RAF at 16 years old; [152221]

(6) how many 17 year-olds in the Armed Forces do not have any formal qualifications. [152222]

Mr Francois [holding answer 18 April 2013]: Within their first two years of service, personnel enlisted in the armed forces aged 16 will usually have completed phase 1 and phase 2 training and joined the trained strength. All recruits enlisted under 18 who do not hold full level 3 qualifications are enrolled on an apprenticeship scheme unless their trade training attracts higher level qualifications. The qualifications available range from intermediate-level apprenticeships to degrees, depending on the trade specialisation of the individual. In addition, serving members of the armed forces can complete elective learning that results in nationally recognised qualifications.

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The services aim to improve the English and Maths functional skills abilities of all their recruits by at least one national level, and to a minimum of entry level 3 prior to the start of phase 2 training. There are no mandated requirements for the first two years of service. However, all personnel (including those enlisted aged 16) are expected to be qualified to at least level 1 in literacy and numeracy within three years of joining and at level 2 within eight years.

Data is not available on the total numbers of personnel in each service holding literacy and numeracy qualifications at levels 1 and 2, and those who enlist at age 16 are not tracked as a separate group.

The Ministry of Defence does not track 17 year olds as a separate group and therefore information is not available on those who do not hold formal qualifications.

Army: Redundancy

Mr Buckland: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 26 March 2013, Official Report, column 1010W, on Army: redundancy, whether figures given in that answer are in real terms. [152819]

Mr Francois: The Government Actuary’s estimates are in real terms.

British Overseas Territories

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many civilian and military personnel from his Department are based in (a) Anguilla, (b) Bermuda, (c) British Antarctic Territory, (d) British Indian Ocean Territory, (e) British Virgin Islands,(f) Cayman Islands, (g) Falkland Islands, (h) Gibraltar, (i) Montserrat, (j) Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, (k) St Helena and St Helena Dependencies (Ascension and Tristan da Cunha), (l) South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, (m)Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia and (n) the Turks and Caicos Islands. [149250]

Mr Robathan: The military and civilian personnel based in the Overseas Territories in March 2013 are shown in the following table:

The civilian personnel figure includes locally employed civilian personnel.

The military figures may vary from published statistics as personnel change location or are deployed on operations. Figures above 100 have been rounded down to the nearest 10.

There are no military and or Ministry of Defence civilian personnel serving in the following regions Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Antarctic Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,

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Montserrat, Pitcairn; Henderson; Ducie and Oeno Islands, St Helena, Tristan da Cunha, South Georgia South Sandwich Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands.

Defence: Procurement

Alison Seabeck: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 19 March 2013, Official Report, column 644W, on defence: procurement, if he will list those projects which are funded on an entirely (a) committed and (b)uncommitted basis. [150623]

Mr Robathan: I refer the hon. Member to the answer given by the Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), on 19 March 2013, Official Report, column 644W.

The £159 billion, 10 year Equipment Plan published in January this year, contains funding for specific risks to project delivery totalling £8.4 billion over the decade. For the first time, it also contains £4.8 billion of contingency funding.

In addition, there is around £8 billion of headroom in the Equipment Plan which is not currently allocated to projects within the core programme.

Electronic Warfare

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the cost to his Department was of measures to protect military assets from cyber attacks in each of the last five years. [152015]

Mr Robathan: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 13 March 2013, Official Report, column 223W, to the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth).

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the UK’s ability to defend against cyber attacks on military assets. [152016]

Mr Robathan: The Ministry of Defence reviews regularly the cyber threats to military assets drawing on a wide range of intelligence. We ensure that such threats are considered fully in the design and use of information systems and in contingency planning for operations. Information on these assessments, and the steps we take to secure our systems, is being withheld for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

France

Mr Ainsworth: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions (a) he and (b) Ministers in his Department have had with their French counterparts on the effect of reductions in defence budgets on the UK-French bilateral relationship. [152384]

Mr Robathan: Defence Ministers regularly discuss Franco-British cooperation with our French counterparts and we have been kept in close touch with the development of the French strategic defence review, the Livre Blanc,

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and its potential implications. In addition, our ambassador in France has been a member of the Livre Blanc Commission and has been able to contribute to the development of the review.

Haiti

Mr Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the cost of Operation PANLAKE was; and how much of this cost was claimable against the UK’s overseas development assistance commitment. [151386]

Mr Robathan: The marginal cost recorded for the Defence disaster relief response to Haiti in 2010 under Operation PANLAKE was £620,000. These costs were subsequently recovered from the Department for International Development (DFID). As the lead Government Department for humanitarian operations, DFID reports Overseas Development Assistance-eligible activity rather than the Ministry of Defence.

Mali

Andrew Stephenson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the cost to the public purse has been of UK support for military intervention in Mali to date. [152145]

Mr Robathan: We are refining our estimate of the cost of this continuing operation. The costs for the financial year 2012-13 will be set out in the MOD’s Annual Report and Accounts for that year, which we will publish in the summer.

Military Bases: Scotland

Sir Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 25 March 2013, Official Reportcolumn 937W, on RAF Leuchars, if he will place in the Library (a) the sustainability appraisal for the development of the estate at RAF Lossiemouth, (b) the sustainability appraisal for the delivery of an Adaptable Force Brigade Scotland, (c) the updated sustainability appraisal for the Base Optimisation Programme in Scotland and (d) the updated sustainable development action plan for the overarching Base Optimisation Programme. [152163]

Mr Robathan: I refer the right hon. Member to the answer I gave on 17 April 2013, Official Report, column 413W.

RAF Fylingdales

Miss McIntosh: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the effect on RAF Fylingdale’s work of (a) onshore and (b) offshore wind turbines. [152231]

Mr Francois: No formal assessments on the effects of wind turbines, onshore and offshore, on RAF Fylingdales’ radar have yet been carried out.

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RAF Lossiemouth

Sir Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what recent estimate he has made of the cost of capital works to relocate RAF Leuchars’ current parented units to RAF Lossiemouth; [152187]

(2) what recent estimate he has made of the total cost of Typhoon-related capital works at RAF Lossiemouth. [152189]

Mr Robathan: The estimated total cost of all Typhoon-related capital works at RAF Lossiemouth is some £85 million. This figure includes the work required to enable the move of two Typhoon squadrons from RAF Leuchars.

Sir Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what current estimate has been made of the cost of the move of (a) personnel, (b) stores and equipment and (c) communications and information systems from RAF Leuchars to RAF Lossiemouth in relation to the transfer of the Typhoon Force. [152188]

Mr Robathan: The current estimate of the move of personnel, stores and equipment and communications and information systems from RAF Leuchars to RAF Lossiemouth in relation to the transfer of the Typhoon Force is £13 million.

As we prepare for the implementation phase of the Army Basing plan, further detailed work will be carried out to refine the infrastructure requirement.

USA

Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the recent statement by Rear Admiral Barry Bruner, Director of the Undersea Warfare Division of the US Navy, that that navy needs 12 operational ballistic missile submarines to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. [152720]

Mr Robathan: This is a matter for the US Government.

Written Questions: Government Responses

Dr Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what he plans to provide a substantive answer to Questions 149886 and 149887 tabled on 22 March 2013 for named day answer on 25 March 2013; and what the reason is for the time taken to answer those questions. [152485]

Mr Francois: I answered my hon. Friend today.

Armed Forces: Vehicles

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the maximum capacity is of each of the current sites available to his Department for the receipt, inspection, repair and storage of military vehicles; what the current capacity is of each such site; and if he will make a statement. [152697]

Mr Robathan: This information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Cyprus

Mr Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much of the cost of Operation Tosca is being claimed against the UK’s Official Development Assistance Target. [152743]

Mr Robathan: The Ministry of Defence did not claim any costs for Operation Tosca against Official Development Assistance (ODA). Under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee ODA guidelines, this activity is not ODA eligible.

Costs for Operation Tosca, which in financial year 2012-13 amounted to £17.706 million, are met from the Conflict Pool.

Defence Support Group

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the Defence Support Group has been given the opportunity to submit an in-house bid for the purchase of the business it currently carries out for his Department; and if he will make a statement. [152607]

Mr Robathan: The purpose of the sale of Defence Support Group (DSG) is to raise a capital receipt through a privatisation enabling the business to diversify, grow and get access to investment.

A privatised DSG will remove its dependence on the Ministry of Defence as its sole major customer, and at the same time give the front line the best opportunity to retain access to a DSG with the capacity and transformed capability needed to support the Armed Forces of the future. The opportunity is there for anyone to make a bid for DSG if they can satisfy the requirements for sale.

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence to which Defence Support Group sites the military equipment project teams have been advised to cease sending equipment; and if he will make a statement. [152695]

Mr Robathan: No project teams have been advised to cease sending equipment to Defence Support Group sites.

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when any formal decision to close any Defence Support Group site was made; and if he will make a statement. [152696]

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Mr Robathan: I refer the hon. Member to the written ministerial statement made by the then Secretary of State for Defence the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), on 29 March 2010, Official Report, column 79WS.

This followed the conclusion of a formal consultation exercise with the trade unions on the proposal which began on 30 November 2009. No other DSG business transformation activity has resulted in site closures.

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what dividend has been paid by the Defence Support Group to his Department in each year since 2008; what savings have accrued in reduced costs and efficiencies in each such year; and if he will make a statement. [152698]

Mr Robathan: The dividends returned from Defence Support Group (DSG) from an almost entirely Ministry of Defence (MOD) revenue stream have been:

It should be noted that, while a good indication of the DSG Trading Fund managing its business well, it is only at the moment MOD money circulating through one of its own business divisions.

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library the business case developed by the Defence Infrastructure Organisation for the redevelopment of each of the Defence Support Group sites; and if he will make a statement. [152701]

Mr Robathan: No business cases for the redevelopment of the Defence Support Group (DSG) sites have been produced. All of the sites are considered to be suitable for their current and future use. DSG disposal is part of asset receipts required of the Department.

Defence: Procurement

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what account his Department has taken of international traffic and arms regulations in reaching any decision to place contracts for the receipt, inspection, repair and storage of military vehicles and equipment within the private sector; and if he will make a statement. [152606]

Mr Robathan: The Ministry of Defence (MOD) invites all bidders to specify in their bid responses any non-UK export licence, authorisation or exemption that may be required in order to perform any resultant contract, or any other related transfer control.

The MOD then considers what risks such controls, including the US International Traffic in arms regulations, may place upon the performance of the particular contract and what actions the bidder intends to take to mitigate such risks, before awarding any contract.

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HMS Ambush

Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what defect caused HMS Ambush to be towed back to HMNB Clyde during its recent sea trial; [153041]

(2) what maintenance occurred on HMS Ambush prior to its being towed back to HMNB Clyde during its recent sea trial. [153042]

Mr Robathan: HMS Ambush recently completed a planned maintenance period at Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde. This was the submarine’s first maintenance period since leaving Barrow, and provided the first opportunity to address various issues raised during the initial set of Platform Sea Trials.

On sailing from HMNB Clyde on 10 April 2013, a problem with the lubricating oil system was identified. HMS Ambush returned alongside under her own power and remedial action was taken; she was not towed but accompanied by tugs, which is standard operating practice for any submarine entering or exiting HMNB Clyde.

RAF Cranwell

Mr Kevan Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of trends in the average running cost of RAF Cranwell since 2000; and whether any savings have been made over that period. [152969]

Mr Robathan: Trends in the average running cost of RAF Cranwell are assessed annually as part of the Ministry of Defence budget setting process and in managing expenditure in year. These costs are influenced by a number of factors such as changes to the Royal Air Force recruiting and training requirement, inflation, equipment support costs and the renewal of multi activity contracts.

Savings are made wherever possible, such as when contracts for the provision of services are renewed but these may be offset to some extent by the effects of inflation.

Royal Naval College

Mr Kevan Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how many members of the (a) Royal Navy and (b) Royal Air Force currently undergo training at Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth; [152792]

(2) what assessment he has made of trends in the average running costs of Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth since 2000; and whether any savings have been made over that period. [152968]

Mr Robathan: There are currently 280 Royal Navy personnel undergoing training at Britannia Royal Naval College. There are no Royal Air Force personnel.

The running costs and efficiencies associated with Britannia Royal Naval College are reviewed annually as part of the financial planning and approvals process.

Storage

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which sites are currently available to his Department for the receipt, inspection, repair and storage of military vehicles; what the maintenance and improvement spend on each such site was in each year

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since 2003; whether a controlled humidity environment is available at each such site; whether there is access to a railway line at each such site; how many staff are employed at each such site; and if he will make a statement. [152699]

Mr Robathan: This information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Submarines

Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what modifications will be needed at HMNB Clyde and RNAD Coulport to accept the successor submarine programme; [152716]

(2) what estimate he has made of the cost to the public purse of adapting the ship lift facility at HMNB Clyde to accommodate the successor to the Vanguard class submarines. [152721]

Mr Robathan: The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is currently conducting a series of studies examining the infrastructure that will be required to support the successor submarines.

Only when the studies have been completed, and the results analysed, will the MOD be in a position to determine what changes will be necessary to the infrastructure at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, including the Royal Naval Armament Depot, Coulport and to estimate the cost of any such changes.

Trident Submarines

Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the first Vanguard class submarine will come out of service; and when the first successor submarine will come into service. [152717]

Mr Robathan: As outlined in the Strategic Defence and Security Review, the first successor submarine is planned to enter service in 2028. Current Vanguard class submarines will undergo comprehensive life extension activities to ensure they are able to hand over with the successor class as they enter service.

Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many ballistic missile submarines will need to be fully operational during the transition from Vanguard class to its successor during the transition period between classes. [152718]

Mr Robathan: The Ministry of Defence will ensure that there will be sufficient numbers of submarines during transition to maintain our current posture of continuous at sea deterrence.

Unmanned Air Vehicles

Rehman Chishti: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many times (a) British forces have flown US unmanned aerial vehicles and (b) US forces have flown British unmanned aerial vehicles in the latest period for which figures are available. [128974]

Mr Robathan: The information will take time to collate. I will write to the hon. Member as soon as it is available. UK Forces have only ever flown US unmanned aerial vehicles outside Afghanistan, during Operation Ellamy in Libya.

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Substantive answer from Andrew Robathan to Rehman Chishti:

I undertook to write to you in answer to your Parliamentary Question on 29 November 2012 (Official Report, column 461W) about Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). I apologise that it has taken so long to reply.

I should point out that my answer contained an error in the final sentence that I would like to take this opportunity to correct. My answer stated that UK Forces had only ever flown US unmanned aerial vehicles outside Afghanistan during Operation Ellamy in Libya.

The answer should have said that UK personnel embedded with the US Air Force have only flown US RPAS in support of operations in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq.

I have asked for the Official Record to be corrected.

Between October 2006 and 31 December 2012, UK aircrew had flown approximately 2,150 operational missions using US REAPER and PREDATOR RPAS in support of operations in Afghanistan and Libya.

UK and US personnel also operate both nation’s RPAS as part of the launch and recovery phase in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, information on the number of occasions they have done so is not held centrally and could only be provided at disproportionate cost. Information about operations in Iraq is also not held centrally.

Rehman Chishti: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 29 November 2012, Official Report,column 461W, on unmanned air vehicles, when he expects to write to the hon. Member for Gillingham and Rainham. [138546]

Mr Robathan: I answered my hon. Friend today.

USA

Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what (a) representations and (b) communications he and his Department have made to the US Navy on delays in the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine replacement programme and its effect on the successor programme. [152719]

Mr Robathan: We have regular discussions with the US on a range of issues, including on the successor programme. The planned in-service date for the successor submarine programme has not been affected.

Defence Materiel Strategy

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond): For decades, there has been an acknowledgement that defence acquisition in this country can, and should, be done better. Despite almost countless reviews and reorganisations, successive Governments have failed to embed the radical changes necessary to provide our armed forces with the equipment they need in the most effective and efficient way possible.

In 2011, my predecessor established the materiel strategy programme to consider what changes would be required to the defence equipment and support organisation (DE&S) to resolve this problem.

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In July last year, I announced to the House that, after a rigorous examination of all the possible options open to us, our preferred model for the future operation of DE&S was a Government-owned, contractor-operated entity, a “GOCO”. Since then, we have conducted more analysis that has confirmed our thinking in this regard, and today I am pleased to be able to announce the next steps in taking this work forward.

This final assessment phase, which we expect to last approximately 12 months, will allow us to make a true comparison between two options. These are a public sector comparator which is known as “DE&S +”; and a GOCO, implemented in two stages.

I would like to put on record my appreciation of the excellent staff at DE&S and the work they do. This programme is about giving them access to the necessary skills, processes and resources to enable them to do their job better, ensuring that the armed forces are provided with battle-winning equipment on time and to budget.

During this assessment phase, we will work with HMT and the Cabinet Office on the “DE&S+” option to explore the extent of change that could be delivered while keeping the organisation fully within the boundaries of the public sector.

In parallel, a commercial competition will be launched that will enable us to determine with potential private partners how a GOCO would work in practice, and what the costs and benefits would be. By the end of the assessment phase, we would expect to have proposals in a form capable of being contracted, if we decide to proceed with the GOCO model.

We have made no secret of our expectation that the GOCO option is likely to prove better value for money, but we need to test this assumption with the market, to see what can be delivered and at what cost. No decisions have yet been made. At the end of this 12 month assessment phase we will have a comprehensive set of qualitative and quantitative data for both possible operating models which will enable us critically to evaluate the two options and make a final decision about the future of DE&S.

I expect to publish a White Paper later in the spring setting out further details of our analysis of the problems in defence acquisition, of the options for potential solutions and the reasoning behind our focus on the GOCO as the preferred solution.

Afghanistan

Mr Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence by what process his Department claims (a) its mine clearing and (b)its police training activities in Afghanistan against the UK’s official development assistance target. [152878]

Mr Robathan: The Official Development Assistance (ODA) criteria are set by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Expenditure on police training in routine policing functions, and the removal of landmines where it is for civilian purposes, are reportable as ODA. The Ministry of Defence reports to the OECD, through the Department for International Development, on activity that is eligible to be counted towards Her Majesty Government’s ODA target.

Afghanistan and Iraq

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many minors have been deployed to (a) Afghanistan and (b) Iraq since the start of British military operations in those countries. [152056]

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Air Travel

Priti Patel: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many officials in his (a) Department and (b) its non-departmental public bodies travelled on (i) domestic and (ii) international flights in each of the last five years; in which class categories; at what total cost; and what the monetary value was of the 20 highest airfare charges in each such year. [152527]

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Ammunition: Scotland

Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many munitions of each type have been placed on the seabed in Scottish waters since the signing of the OSPAR Convention; and where each group of munitions has been placed. [148572]

Mr Robathan: This information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Armed Forces

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many and what proportion of armed forces personnel including those in training in each (a) corps and (b) regiment in each year since 2010-11 were aged under 18 years old. [152054]

Mr Francois: The number of armed forces personnel, including those in training, in each service by corps and regiment each year since 2010-11 to 1 March 2013 are shown in the following tables:

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Armed Forces: Absence Without Leave

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) trained strength and (b) in training armed forces personnel went absent without leave in each year since 2011; and how many such people were under the age of 18. [152052]

Mr Francois: The information readily available on armed forces personnel who have been absent without leave (AWOL) in the last three years, broken down by service is shown in the following table:

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The number of incidences of reported AWOL may include the same individual more than once.

Armed Forces: Complaints

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the number of service complaints being completed by internal systems within 24 weeks; and if he will make a statement. [152392]

Mr Francois: From January 2013, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) brought in new bi-monthly reporting arrangements for updating the Service Complaints Commissioner on progress against the new timeline of 24 weeks.

From the end of June onwards, these reports will enable the MOD to build up a full picture of our performance against the 24 week timeline for those complaints submitted since January.

Armed Forces: Convictions

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many notifications of convictions of armed forces personnel have been received by the Central Criminal Records and Intelligence Officer and the Naval Provost Marshall in each year since 2005; if he will publish the number of convictions by offence; and if he will make a statement. [153280]

Mr Robathan: The ‘Central Criminal Records and Intelligence Officer’ has been interpreted as he Criminal Justice Office Manager within the Service Police Crime Bureau (SPCB) who acts as the point of contact for notification by Home Office police forces.

The following table shows the number of notifications made to the SPCB since 2005:

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Figures represent notifications of all kinds, regardless of the outcome: i.e. they include arrests where no further action was taken and outcomes including informal and community resolutions, fixed penalty notices, warnings, reprimands, cautions. A breakdown to identify the number of convictions and the classification of each could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

For the naval service, notifications between 2005 and 2010 were made to individual units. No central record is held and information could be provided only at disproportionate cost. Since 2010, notifications have been handled by the SPCB and are included in the table above.

Armed Forces: Crime

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 26 October 2012, Official Report, column 1074W, on armed forces: sexual offences, if he will place copies of the annual analyses of crime and incidents produced by each service police force in each year since 2005 in the Library; and if he will make a statement. [136188]

Mr Robathan: I will not be placing in the Library copies of the annual analyses of crime and incidents produced by each Service police force. These analyses enable the Service police to make assessments and develop strategies and contain sensitive information. Much of the content of the analyses could be based upon intelligence gathered by police and other policing agencies. The disclosure of the analyses could therefore prejudice crime prevention, detection or reduction, the arrest or prosecution of offenders, and the effective and efficient conduct of the Service police.

Armed Forces: Death

Andrea Leadsom: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence who has the responsibility of determining whether to carry out an internal review or a service inquiry in the case of service personnel killed in action. [152131]

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Andrea Leadsom: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the criteria are for determining whether to carry out an internal review rather than a service inquiry recommended by a coroner in the case of service personnel killed in action. [152132]

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to my hon. Friend in the time available before Prorogation.

Armed Forces: Discharges

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will provide service personnel who make complaints relating to unfair discharge with access to independent scrutiny of their complaints; and if he will make a statement. [152393]

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Mr Francois: The provision of an independent scrutineer for service personnel who make complaints relating to unfair discharge was the subject of a recommendation in the Service Complaints Commissioner’s Annual Report 2012. The Ministry of Defence is considering the report carefully and will be responding shortly.

Armed Forces: Disciplinary Proceedings

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many armed forces personnel under the age of 18 at the time of an alleged offence have been court-martialled in each year since 2011; and (a) what charges were brought and (b) what action was taken in each such case. [152051]

Mr Francois: Over the period requested, the Ministry of Defence holds the following information on a total of 10 individuals in the Army who were under the age of 18 at the time of an alleged offence, these are shown in the following table:

25 Apr 2013 : Column 1245W

No data is available yet for the Army in 2013. There are no records of courts martial of Naval or RAF personnel who were under the age of 18 at the time of an offence in the period requested.

The data provided within this answer has been derived from records in the Joint Personnel Administration system and cannot be considered as exhaustive.

Armed Forces: Domestic Violence

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many allegations of domestic violence have been reported to (a)service police and (b) other police forces since 2005; how many such claims were made by (i) family members of serving personnel and (ii) serving personnel; how many such claimants were based (A) in the UK and (B) overseas; and if he will make a statement. [151680]

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for Luton North of 12 June 2012, Official Report, column 446W, on Armed Forces: domestic violence, if the domestic abuse protocol has been rolled out to all garrison areas; and if he will make a statement. [151684]

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the effectiveness of the JSP 913 Tri-Service policy on domestic abuse and sexual violence; and if he will make a statement. [152390]

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Armed Forces: Drugs

Jim Shannon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many armed forces personnel were found to have illegal drugs in their system in each of the last five years; and how many of those personnel were (a) charged and (b) discharged. [128433]

Mr Robathan: The Ministry of Defence has a policy of compulsory drug testing (CDT) which seeks to reinforce the message that drug use is unacceptable for service personnel. Providing a positive result, indicating the presence of illegal drugs, will almost certainly result in an administrative discharge⁽¹⁾. Positive rates in the armed forces over the last few years average around 0.42%,

25 Apr 2013 : Column 1246W

compared with 7% in civilian workplace drug testing programmes in the UK. These statistics demonstrate that drug misuse is significantly less prevalent among service personnel than in corresponding civilian demographic groups.

⁽¹⁾ Service personnel are not ‘charged’ in a disciplinary sense. Rather, they are administratively discharged under the terms of their employment. Therefore, the data presented here relates to the numbers of compulsory drugs tests conducted and positive results, rather than ‘charges’.

The following tables provide information on the numbers of compulsory drug tests, positive results and consequent administrative discharges in each of the last five years.

25 Apr 2013 : Column 1247W

Armed Forces: Hearing Impairment

Ms Gisela Stuart: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects the Independent Medical Examination Group to produce the findings of its examination of provision for hearing loss within the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme. [152740]

Mr Francois: It is expected that the Independent Medical Expert Group Report for 2012-13 will be released in May 2013.

Ms Gisela Stuart: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate his Department has made of the cost in terms of manpower and financial compensation as a result of noise-induced hearing loss in the next 10 years. [152741]

Mr Francois: None.

Ms Gisela Stuart: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many members of the (a) Army, (b) Royal Navy, (c) Royal Air Force and (d) Royal Marines were medically downgraded as a result of noise-induced hearing loss in each of the last five years. [152742]

Mr Francois: Defence Statistics cannot provide the numbers of service personnel who have been downgraded as a direct result of Noise Induced Hearing Loss (NIHL).

The following numbers of downgraded service personnel have a Read Code of NIHL entered into their medical records, however, this may not be the reason for their downgraded status.

A snapshot in January 2013, the latest date for which data is available, shows:

550 Army personnel were medically downgraded and also had a code for NIHL.

10 Royal Navy personnel were medically downgraded and also had a code for NIHL.

10 Royal Air Force personnel were medically downgraded and also had a code for NIHL.

30 Royal Marines personnel were medically downgraded and also had a code for NIHL.

Armed Forces: Offences Against Children

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many allegations of child abuse were made (a) by and (b) against (i) service personnel and (ii) civilian staff based in the UK in each year since 2005 by

25 Apr 2013 : Column 1248W

service; how many of these (A) were referred for prosecution and (B) resulted in a conviction; and if he will make a statement. [152501]

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Mrs Moon: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many allegations of child abuse were made (a) by and (b) against (i) service personnel and (ii) civilian staff based in Germany in each year since 2005 by service; how many of these (A) were referred for prosecution and (B) resulted in a conviction; and if he will make a statement. [152502]

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Armed Forces: Recruitment

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the average cost of recruitment was per armed forces recruit; and what the total cost to the public purse was of recruitment for all new personnel into the (a) Royal Air Force, (b) Royal Navy and (c) Army in each year since 2010-11. [152069]

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Dr Huppert: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what proportion of recruits who enlisted (a) below the age of 18 and (b) aged 18 and over extended their service contract beyond the minimum service period in the latest period for which figures are available; [152245]

(2) what proportion of recruits who enlisted (a) below the age of 18 and (b) aged 18 and over had been in service for 10 years or more in the latest period for which figures are available; [152246]

(3) what proportion of recruits who enlisted (a) below the age of 18 and (b) aged 18 and over left the armed forces before completing (i) phase two training and (ii) their minimum initial service period in the latest period for which figures are available. [152247]

Mr Robathan: The information available on extensions of service contract, on those personnel who serve 10 years or more, and on those who leave the armed forces before completion of Phase 2 training and their minimum initial service period, is not held in the format requested, nor can it be matched against age or date of birth data without incurring disproportionate cost.

However, the Army have identified that in financial year 2012-13 some 12% of under 18s left before completion of their Phase 2 training against the total number who enlist under the age of 18. In comparison some 14% of those who enlisted over the age of 18 left before completing their training.

Dr Offord: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment his Department has made of the cost to the public purse of teenage recruits to the armed forces prematurely ending their services contracts. [153422]

25 Apr 2013 : Column 1249W

Mr Francois: It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

The post Parliamentary Answers – to the 25th April 2013 appeared first on Think Defence.

The post The French Defence White Paper appeared first on Think Defence.

A speech by Phillip Dunne MP,  Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology at McKenna, Long and Aldridge, Washington DC describes how the USAF ‘Big Safari Group’ will be ‘rapid prototyping’ the Brimstone missile onto a ‘US platform’ to, one would assume, demonstrate its capabilities.

Click the image to read the speech in full but the relevant passage is below;

On weapons, we are currently working together through the Big Safari Group in rapid prototyping a UK weapon, Brimstone, on a US platform.

Brimstone was used incredibly successfully during the Libya campaign, no one else has managed to develop a fast jet precision weapon system that can be effectively used in such a complex environment as was present in Libya, and deploying it from a US asset will further demonstrate its US-UK utility.

Read more about Brimstone here and Big Safari, here

It is not certain to what extent any trials will be, or what platform is in question or if it will ultimately end up in a production order but it is certainly intriguing.

When was the last time the UK sold a missile to the USA, am struggling to think of any?

The post Brimstone missile to be trialled by the USA? appeared first on Think Defence.

Watch the video

And download the paper, click here

Is this how we announce policy now then?

A good blog post on the subject

The post East of Suez appeared first on Think Defence.

In this article I aim to put across some of my ideas for how a new model TA might manage to bridge the risks inherent in its new role of providing even more of an even smaller regular army. It is an article to stimulate debate and I do not pretend that it is the whole answer or even if the model is a good one but  I think it provides opportunities to tackle the two main problems with the current TA: lack of confidence in it by regulars and relatively poor senior leadership.

In a nutshell what I propose is a multi-tiered Army Reserve with an emphasis on good Officer and Senior NCO leadership with resources focused not only in those two areas but in technical training also. How might it work? Well the model is one based on the Danish recruitment system which I wrote about some time ago now here on TD. What happens in the Danish model is that a large number of conscripts receive a basic training period of 4 months but at the end of these 4 months they can opt to sign onto a reserve contract which will see them undergo 8-9 months more training in their role and then be eligible for deployment. The advantage of this model is that it exposes a large number of people to the military who may not have realised they like it – in other words it broadens the recruitment base and attracts more souls.

Now I do not propose conscription into the Army Reserve but what I do propose is a tiered model whereby there are two levels of commitment – the bottom tier is essentially normal jogging and represents almost exactly what is done now with the exception that there would be a legal minimum training period of a 2 weeks a year in camp event and 4 weekends a year. Training could continue as now in 2 week modular courses and the commitment would be entirely open ended with no minimum terms. What I would envisage is that these flexible and open commitments would attract people of all ages (especially mature personnel) and ensure a wide recruitment pool for a higher commitment tier of the Army Reserve. It would essentially act as a hook but also provide soldiers that, as now, could be brought up to operational standards for an enduring operation – units need critical mass and warm bodies are very useful in themselves as they enhance retention and provide for better training events.

Now this basic recruitment and training model would be supplement by a higher commitment Army Reserve and act as one gateway to it. What I would envisage is a tier with higher level of compulsory training periods like the US National Guard and with a firm commitment in the same vein as a company might require a certain number of years of service after putting you through an MBA for example. This tier would be on an individual basis so a unit might have both lower and higher tier soldiers in it.

So in this higher tier soldiers would be eligible to do regular courses in exchange for a certain number of years’ service afterwards at the higher commitment level. The number of years’ service would depend on the type of course – I propose there could be 4 levels of courses: basic military courses (phase one and two training); advanced military courses (phase three training courses, promotional courses); long military courses (your long phase three military courses like Ammo Technician and so forth) and finally long trade courses (courses that have a direct civilian equivalent or use, such as artificer, environmental health etc). Now recruits might decide to join direct to the higher tier and do the basic military courses and thus give 3 years commitment; or after 18 months’ probation and training in the lower tier they might choose to do an advanced military course for 3-4 years commitment, or at some point in their career a long trade course for 7 years commitment (the longer time reflecting the more useful nature of the course and the extra expense involved in putting a reserve soldier through it).

What we would then have is a reserve with a large pool of flexible, casual soldiers able to be brought up to speed for an enduring operation buttressed by numbers of higher commitment soldiers who have stepped up or entered directly, requiring little more training than their regular counterparts for operations, having done exactly the same courses.

To accomplish this would require a change of primary legislation and the terms and conditions of the higher tier reservists. It would become necessary to offer them better pay (higher bounty, the full X-Factor, their trade pay etc), enhanced pension rights and also open up almost the full range of military benefits like access to med centres, dentists, rail cards, even married quarters perhaps but at a less subsidised rent – proper AT courses for example could also be offered. However it is done, there needs to be a real and palpable enhanced set of terms and conditions for the higher tier – there needs to be differentiation.

Stiffening this would be a better reserve Officer and Senior leadership cadre. For Officer entry I would propose removing the Reserve entry option as it stands and making either the 12 months RMAS commissioning course a requirement and / or a new OTC model based loosely on the US ROTC model where a good chunk of the RMAS syllabus is delivered part time over the 3 years of University followed by the final term of RMAS full time: thereafter all Officers must do the regular Army courses and give several years commitment. For Senior NCOs I would propose that they have to conduct the regular Army promotional course for their Corps (an advanced military course) and thereafter give a minimum 3-4 year commitment at the higher level of commitment. This would mean that all Officers and Senior NCOs conduct identical training and are selected in an identical manner – the leadership core would thus become more professional. JNCOs in the lower tier could do a TA 2 week course as now, or they could opt to do the Regular course and move onto the higher tier.

Enhancing this further would be a far more permeable barrier between Reserve and Regular forces. Officers and ORs at the higher or lower commitments would be allowed to sign onto FTRS type contracts to serve with the Regular Army subject, at more Senior levels, to having completed the appropriate courses. Furthermore, Regular Senior NCOs and Officers, and certain Corporals would be allowed to take “sabbaticals” in the Reserves thus spreading Regular experience throughout the reserves by a mechanism other than the Permanent Staff. These things happen now but the objective would be to institutionalise this and promote it and normalise it so an Officer who takes three years out in the Reserves for example, to study, isn’t penalised. The objective is to have a very fluid movement between Regular and Reserve forces to spread experience, to spread leadership, to give reservist SNCOs and Officers command opportunities in the Regulars and to try and raise familiarity and trust.

Underpinning all this would be a selection process completely identical to the Regular forces with potential recruits held to the same mental and physical standards as regular recruits and undergoing the same selection process at Litchfield. Furthermore, all personnel will have the same scale of clothing and equipment and will (with few exceptions) be required to maintain the same levels of basic soldiering proficiency as regulars including basic fitness levels and marksmanship. In addition, partnering Reserve units with their Regular counterparts and encouraging cross posting using the new permeable boundaries will help operational effectiveness by allowing units to get to know one another better and to know strengths and weaknesses – the mere attendance of Squadron or Company personalities and OCs at a Regular Battalions CO Prayers cannot be underestimated, nor can running simple weekend joint MCCP type affairs where regular and reservist soldiers have their deployment documentation and vaccinations done together.

The main challenge to this would be creating an environment where regular counterparts trusted their reservist comrades to do their job at short notice to the same level as regulars are perceived to be able to do it. The system of higher commitment and doing regular courses and being able and encouraged to partake in FTRS contracts is designed to mitigate this risk and breed confidence. The other barrier is of course the money to pay for these extra courses and the higher number of MTDs needed at the higher commitment level and the enhanced conditions packages. And finally there would need to be legislative changes to give the higher commitment legal status and put the requisite reservists and Officers under military law 24/7 unlike their lower tier brethren. However, none of these are insurmountable obstacles. By embracing reserve units into their day to day lives regular units will become more familiar and if the senior leadership is better their impressions are more likely to tend toward ‘decent blokes’ rather than ‘cretins’.

The post A new model TA appeared first on Think Defence.

It is intended to maximise commonality across all three services in order to minimise logistic and support costs. FLAADS(M) for Maritime, FLAADS(L) for Land and FLAADS(A) for Air were all intended to be delivered with the Common Anti-Air Modular Missile. The modular design is also intended to facilitate lower the cost of through life incremental upgrades.

This type of commonality across all three services was previously somewhat hard to find but it makes so much sense as to be obvious.

Background

The CAMM concept came from MBDA studies into a replacement for Rapier and Startstreak.

In 2004, the MoD awarded a £10m technology demonstration programme contract to MBDA through the Joint Sensor and Engagement Networks Integrated Project Team. Another £15m was committed to a second stage TDP and in January 2012 the MoD announced a development contract with MBDA for the ‘Sea Ceptor’ system that would use the Common Anti Air Modular Missile at its core, this final contract was valued at £483m

Don’t forget, the £483 is for a ‘demonstration contract’ and does not include any production systems.

From MBDA, the 2010 description of each system was;

Maritime

FLAADS(M) provides a true 360° air defence capability for naval forces out to ranges greater than 25km against the future air threat. Requiring no dedicated tracker/illuminator radars, CAMM can be cued by ship target indication data to provide high levels of protection in open ocean and littoral environments. It can also be used against surface targets. The weapon system, which incorporates a 2-way data-link capability to CAMM missiles in flight, is intended for vessels of corvette size or larger, for either new ships or as a retrofit. It will provide self and consort defence whilst operating with 2-D and 3-D radars and has an architectural design to allow integration within a variety of combat systems. CAMM can operate from SYLVER and Mk41 family launchers utilising features such as folding missile fins to maximise packing density. For smaller ships, a simple bespoke quad-pack launcher (occupying the same space as a Seawolf canister) will be available. The introduction of “soft launch” techniques reduces system mass and eases installation. MBDA has taken a Through Life approach in developing the CAMM solution. New weapon system architectures that reduce customer costs by removing expensive components are now possible. MBDA’s PAAMS (Principal Anti-Air Missile System) naval self, local and fleet area defence weapon system has now established a preferred architectural approach to air defence. FLAADS(M) follows this approach by re-using software and substituting new low cost components.

Land

For ground based air defence (fulfilling the need to replace the UK’s currently in-service Rapier system), FLAADS(L) is expected to form part of the air defence equipment being procured within the UK’s NEADS (Network Enabled Air Defence and Surveillance) programme. FLAADS(L) will provide future land forces with a highly effective and deployable local area air defence system capable of operating as a stand alone unit or of being integrated within a future battlespace network.

Air

The CAMM missile uses the same airframe and has technology pull through from MBDA’s proven ASRAAM design (Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile in service with the UK RAF and the Australian RAAF) with a range of performance enhancing modifications. CAMM technology can now be used to re-life ASRAAM for its Mid-Life Re-life. FLAADS(A) provides an opportunity to generate a new short range anti-air capability for the RAF in the future.

All good stuff, a modern missile family designed to offer all the usual commonality benefits whilst still being effective against a range of targets.

FLAADS(M) was always intended to enter service first as Sea Wolf was due out of service in 2016, well before Rapier and ASRAAM.

Apart from the crap name, Sea Ceptor will be quite an advance of Sea Wolf that will first be fitted to the Type 23 frigates and transferred to the Type 26 as they enter service.

Sea Ceptor is all system go but no production contracts have been announced for FLAADS(L) or FLAADS(A) although work is reported to be on-going with both, with the work CAMM being used to inform decisions on how best to enhance of life extent ASRAAM.

Design

The missile itself takes a great deal from ASRAAM but it is not a surface launched ASRAAM with a new name. Common components include the very low signature rocket motor from Roxel, the warhead and proximity fuse from Thales.

The seeker and open architecture electronics backbone are new, the latter is called Programmable Open Technology for Upgradable Systems or PrOTeUS and uses an IEEE 1394 Firewire bus technology as a starting point.

Sea Ceptor differs from Sea Wolf in a number of respects but the most significant is the elimination of a requirement for dedicated fire control radar. By removing this reliance on fire control radars the data link and two-way active radar homing seeker is designed to overcome saturation attacks and has the additional benefit of removing a piece of equipment from the support chain.

Although range will of course be classified MBDA declare it as ‘in excess of 25km’, which in any case is better than Sea Wolf and Rapier but then it should be, at 99kg it is nearly 20kg heavier than Sea Wolf and over 50Kg heavier than Rapier.

The ability of Sea Ceptor to use many different radars for initial target information should provide an advantage on the export market, as will its flexible siting and quad packing, if customers need it.

An update from MBDA in September 2011 described progress on the Command and Control system, noting that 75% of the Sea Viper’s software had been re-used and the common data link had been developed.

The Common Data Link (CDL) is the small ‘black box’ that sits on top of the mast, especially clear in pictures of FLAADS(L) although it doesn’t necessarily have to use the two way data link to the launch vehicle, so, it could take mid-course corrections from any number of suitably equipped land or air platforms and then switch to active homing when it gets close enough. The original launch platform could have even moved by the time the missile hits.

It is reported that each missile in its sealed canister will have a shelf life of ten years and although MBDA claim it can be quad packed in either a SYLVER or Mk 41 launcher current images suggest they will be installed on the Type 26 in a bespoke low cost launcher, which does make a lot of sense. The Type 45, that is another matter though.

On the Type 23, images such as this one show a 2×6 arrangement offset to one side and if the silos shown in that are similar to the design below (one cover equals 4 missiles)

That makes a potential of 48 missiles total load, an increase on Sea Wolf’s 32 by some way.

(How many will actually be carried is of course, another matter)

The soft vertical launch system that ejects the missile to a height of about 30m before a small a thruster fires to orientate the missile with the target location. This method is safer, removes the need to manage hot gas efflux in the launch silo and ensure all of the main rocket motor fuel is used for arriving at the target.

The vide below shows a number of test firings that demonstrate very well the vertical launch and tip over sequence

Read the Sea Ceptor brochure here for some technical details, weight, size etc

The first land based version was shown in mid-2009 and has continued to be developed in parallel. Adapting Sea Ceptor for land use should be relatively straightforward, the images and video below show it mounted on a MAN HX Support Vehicle

An interesting feature of the CAMM system in a land environment is that it does not require the radar system to be co-located, opening possibilities for concealing the launch point and attacking non line of sight targets.

Linking the missile system into the Royal Artillery’s evolving Land Environment Air Picture (LEAAP) system which uses the Falcon trunk network, Saab Giraffe radars and Link 11/16. This might also evolve is the Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance (NEADS) project ever gets off the ground and will provide a series if incremental improvements over LEAAP.

One problem does present itself though, tactical mobility.

Rapier Field Standard C is a pretty mobile system, it is towed and can be air lifted by in three parts (launcher and surveillance radar and electro optical tracking system) easily by Chinook and Merlin.

The current development shows the FLAADS(L) system mounted on a demountable pallet on a MAN HX truck. Decisions on a lighter transport platform or perhaps a smaller missile load (currently 12) remain to be made.

Not everything in 3CDO or 16AAB needs to be air droppable or able to be lifted by Chinook/Merlin, but it would be sensible to maximise tactical transportability for such an important capability of light role spearhead type forces. One might argue it is these type of forces that need air defence more that the heavier units as they would tend to operate under a much more controlled airspace.

Futures

After spending over half a billion of the Queens Pounds I can’t see Sea Ceptor not entering service as planned and it would be foolish not to integrate it with LEAPP/NEADS as a replacement for Rapier FSC but one can imagine the investment case for the land version would be more difficult given the low perceived likelihood of the Army or Royal Marines operating in a non-permissive air environment.

That is of course complete nonsense but it will still be a difficult argument to counter and evidence of such is amply demonstrated by the low level of investment in ground based air defence for the Army recently.

For the RAF, CAMM would seem to offer opportunities to extend the service life of ASRAAM rather than be a complete replacement, at least in the medium term.

There are more costs ahead for CAMM, Sea Ceptor and FLAADS but it does have a high degree of export potential in Rapier customers and improves over Mica VL and ESSM in a number of important areas in the maritime domain.

CAMM has a number of innovations and the commonality aspect across all three services should deliver significant through life cost savings in comparison with maintaining three distinctly different missile systems as of today.

It will be interesting to see if the UK can sustain the investment and export this very interesting and exciting development in surface launched anti air.

The post UK Complex Weapons – Part 5 (Common Anti-Air Modular Missile) appeared first on Think Defence.

Some great contributions and debates have been had this last few weeks, Chris and Sir H are blasting out some superb articles and I especially like the interaction we have with overseas sites like those run by Chuck, Sven and Sol, three excellent examples.

Traffic is rising, there are plenty of people linking to Think Defence from an assortment of defence forums and Twitter followers generate plenty of debate and interesting comment as well.

Great stuff, really, thanks.

It is the commenters and guest authors wither their differing but knowledgeable opinions that make Think Defence such an interesting place.

On the horizon at Think Defence towers is a thought provoking guest post on the TA, a conclusion to the UK Complex Weapons series (CAMM  and Fireshadow) and then I think it is on to SDSR 2015, SIMSS Part II and a look at ship to shore logistic, the complexities of the urban environment and expeditionary airfields.

It has actually been a while since I did anything container, pallet or bridge related so expect a handful of posts on those as well.

I might even take the baton from Monty and write something on airborne operations and then finally get round to my hair brain scheme thoughts on the future of armour.

If anyone has any specific requests, don’t be shy and remember, the guest door is always open.

The post Quick Thanks appeared first on Think Defence.

The tired old saying about the enemy getting a vote is fair enough, but what about the author of Murphy’s Law

Shit really does happen

When slimming equipment numbers right down to the bone those in the driving seats should consider that fate has a vote as well.

The post Shit Happens appeared first on Think Defence.

The system is called KERS or Kinetic Energy Recovery System

Although flywheel technology has been in development for several years this is interesting because it chooses to store the energy close to where it is needed in kinetic form, it does not convert it into electricity for use by motors.

When the vehicle brakes the flywheel spins up and releases that stored energy when it accelerates. The energy stored is said to be enough for about 80 horsepower which is not in itself a great deal, especially for a large military vehicle, but every little helps.

The 25% was for a specific configuration and a specific set of driving conditions which simulate stop start city driving but the military applications are obvious.

Military vehicles consume vast quantities of fuel and that fuel has to be transported into theatre, stored, guarded and transported forward. Any improvement in fuel consumption is self-evidently a ‘good thing’, especially if the technology can be easily integrated and does not come with a hefty maintenance price attached.

No doubt this kind of technology will find its way into military vehicles soon.

EDIT: I saw on another forum me being accused of being outside of my comfort zone, guilty as charged

Have corrected the errors

The post Volvo KERS appeared first on Think Defence.

The Marshall Containerised Deployable CT Scanner is one of the reasons why.

Read more at Marshall’s

And read the brochure, click here

Another great UK defence company we don’t hear enough about

The post Marshall Containerised Deployable CT Scanner appeared first on Think Defence.

I know we are skint but it would be interesting comparing the running costs of one of these with something that can lift a comparable amount in the rotary world and then look at the instances where helicopters are used where a short runway would be available.

Not for one minute am I advocating the replacement of a helicopter with a STOL aircraft but there is still a gap at the smaller than an A400 end of the market in the K armed forces

Want that one!

Some of those landings look more like controlled crashing to me but bloody impressive.

Defender and Shadow replacement perhaps, short range MPA, a common medium twin for a host of multi role missions?

You would be surprised at just how cheap the Viking new builds are.

Put in a wing fold and are you thinking what I’m thinking

The post Twin Otter Short Take Off appeared first on Think Defence.

Parts of military vehicles. The Authority has under consideration a 7 year Enabling Contract for the supply of spares in support of light, medium and heavy armoured vehicles and Pinzgauer. The scope of the Contract shall be strictly limited to those parts that, for reasons of exclusive rights, can only be purchased from BAE Systems Global Combat Systems Ltd.

Lowest offer 4 500 000 and highest offer 10 000 000 GBP

So whilst it might mean keeping the lightweight and specialist kit which rides on the back of a Pinzgauer like CBRN, communications, ASTOR or medical it might equally mean Vector staying in service!

Great bit of kit

The post Pinzgauer 2020 appeared first on Think Defence.

Every now and then, some bright spark comes along and says that some established military paradigm has become redundant. We’ve heard it all before. Nuclear weapons are irrelevant. The tank is dead. Large calibre small arms are pointless. And conventional warfare is a thing of the past. Then, when you start to look at these things in more detail, you begin to realise that they’re not necessarily obsolete, merely that they need to evolve.

A look at the future of airborne forces

When it comes to airborne operations, quite a few strategic analysts have suggested that assault helicopters (think Chinook and Blackhawk) have become a superior delivery mechanism to the traditional airborne drop from a C-130 or C-17.

I don’t agree with this, although I do think that helicopters have become a very important tactical and strategic asset.

While the mission to take out OBL shows how effective heliborne ops can be, it also shows their vulnerabilities.

It doesn’t help that when you think something like a battalion-level jump, we still operate in terms of the old round canopies used since Normandy and Arnhem, where you jump blindly hoping that the wind will blow you more or less to where you need to be

There’s also a practical consideration. As much as we might like to consider executing brigade-size drops (let’s not forget we have three parachute infantry battalions), we simply don’t have the airlift capability to perform such an operation.

So, there are three questions I’d like to pose and then try and answer (with your help):

1. Is the capability to deliver an airborne forces by parachute still relevant?
2. If airborne forces remain important, what size / level of capability should we have?
3. Could an improved capability be achieved more cheaply than it is with existing forces and equipment by embracing new technology?

History

It is perhaps worthwhile to start this discussion by looking at the origins of airborne forces.

When it comes to UK airborne forces, as an ex-Guards officer, I like to remind Parachute Regiment types that the first battalions were populated with volunteers from Household Division battalions.

Actually, we need to go further back. In addition to inventing the tank, Leonardo Da Vinci is also credited with inventing the parachute although Sebastien Lenormand, Faust Vrancic and Jean Pierre Blanchard bought the idea to fruition.

Winston Churchill also gets a credit, having advocated the use of a parachute forces to attack Germany towards the end of World War 1. Despite US experiments in the 1920s, which included soldiers clinging on to the wings of aircraft and opening their chutes to be pulled away from it, the first proper military parachute capability emerged in 1927 when the Italian Army developed the static line concept. This opened a soldier’s parachute automatically upon exiting an aircraft. In parallel, the Russians also did much to develop the concept.

The head of Luftwaffe, Herman Goring, and Luftwaffe General Kurt Student, had been impressed by early Italian and Soviet efforts, and so commissioned Nazi Germany’s Fallschirmjäger divisions.

The first major airborne assault was against Aalburg airport in Denmark in 1940. This was followed by a succession of increasingly more ambitious operations including the attack against Fort Eben-Emael in Belgium, which accelerated the eventual fall of that country.

Then there was the invasion of Crete in 1941, where an entire division was parachuted into battle.

The surprise achieved in Crete was total. German parachute forces created confusion and panic. Many historians who have analysed the campaign have concluded that the attacking airborne force could and should have been repulsed. The fact that it wasn’t speaks as much to the quality of parachute infantry employed as the effectiveness of the tactics used.

In these early days, parachute reliability was not anything like as consistent as it is today. Paratroopers didn’t wear reserve chutes and their main canopies often didn’t open. Even in training, injuries or deaths were frequent.  In combat, airborne troops usually jumped without heavy weapons and landed in direct contact with the enemy. Their aircraft were large easy targets and many were shot out of the sky before depositing their troops on the ground.

In short, the casualty rates of airborne troops were shocking and completely unacceptable by today’s standards. Indeed, after Crete, Hitler forbade any further large-scale airborne operations.

Conversely, the shock of Crete forced Britain to finally get its airborne act together with the US following soon after.

Volunteer allied troops became airborne pioneers and the tactics they developed evolved with every mission.

The Bruneval Raid in 1942 showed that we soon caught-up with Nazi Germany and by the invasion of Sicily in 1943 airborne units had become a permanent addition to the overall Allied force structure.

By D-Day, airborne units were highly skilled and drilled elite forces. The jumps made by the US 101st Airborne Division, US 82nd Airborne Division and British 6th Airborne Division were a vital part of securing the Normandy beachheads.

Operation Market Garden, to seize the bridges at Nijmegen and Arnhem in Holland, was the most ambitious airborne mission attempted. Had it succeeded, it might well have shortened the war. As it was, it ended in massive losses for the British 1st Airborne Division. Cornelius Ryan’s seminal book about Arnhem, A Bridge Too Far, is perhaps the best description of airborne warfare written so far. (One interesting theory to emerge was that UK Airborne Forces had been trained to such a fever pitch, that they were sent into battle even though intelligence reports indicated that the 9th SS Panzer Division was resting there – because there was a fear they might mutiny if they weren’t used.)

The airborne operation to secure crossings over the Rhine in 1945, Operation Varsity, was less ambitious, but proved much more successful. The audacity of World war 2 Allied airborne operations elevated the standing of airborne soldiers.

Today, they are the elite units of all regular armies and provide a steady stream of recruits for special forces.

After the war, airborne deployments tended to be restricted to Battalion-size  jumps rather than Brigade- or Divisional-size operations. During the Suez crisis in 1956, 3 Para successfully jumped into Egypt securing their objectives with very few casualties despite heavy resistance. The slickness of this operation represented a zenith in airborne forces capabilities.

Thereafter, combat jumps became a rarity.

The US 82nd Airborne Division made its first operational jump since 1944, when it deployed to Panama in 1989.

The US 75th Ranger Regiment jumped into Kandahar in 2001 to secure the airfield. Most recently, 250 paratroops  from the 11th French Parachute Brigade jumped into Mali in January 2013 to support the operation to capture Timbuktu from rebel insurgents.

The most recent British airborne assault was in Sierra Leone in 2000, but this used helicopters not parachutes.

The post war model for airborne operations has essentially followed lessons learned from previous WW2 operations, although modern equipment such as the Lockheed C-130 Hercules and C-17 transport aircraft have proved to be more efficient delivery tools than the ancient but robust Douglas DC-3 Dakota.

Advantages and Disadvantages

While modern tactical helicopters offer many benefits, mass airborne assaults using paratroops still offer a range of attractive advantages over heliborne assaults:

1. Strategic reach.  Aircraft like the A400 and C17 are strategic assets that enable paratroops to reach objectives well beyond the reach of heliborne forces. Parachute forces can attack virtually any location on the planet within 18 hours of wheels-up.
2. Speed. There is still no faster way to put 1,000 or more troops on the ground more less simultaneously in a forced entry operation. Parachute operations are still the preferred technique for airfield seizure during a forced entry.
3. Load-carrying ability of strategic aircraft. Modern transport aircraft such as the C17 can drop much heavier equipment and armour than any modern helicopter can.
4. Vulnerability of helicopters. Helicopters which have to land, take-off, or hover are much more vulnerable targets for enemy small arms and RPGs than fixed wing aircraft flying at 500-1000ft and 125 knots over the drop zone.

Despite recent developments and refinements in military jump techniques, a number of disadvantages still remain:

1. LZ dispersion. Parachute delivery can deposit forces over a large area requiring them to regroup which can take time. Unexpected winds can blow units way off target, causing disorientation and increasing the distance between the landing zone and final objective and thus the time taken to secure it. This can void any element of surprise and may result in mission failure should a determined enemy be able to quickly mount a counter-attack.
2. The amount of weapons, equipment and ammunition that airborne soldiers can carry is limited. The practical load limit that can be carried by dismounted troops is around 70 kg. Battle order reduces this to around 35 kg. The more kit you pile on a soldier, the more you reduce his combat effectiveness. The very real limits of equipment that a paratroopers can carry, means they can only hold positions for a few days before ground forces will need to link-up with them. This makes airborne operations short-term, limited initiatives even with air resupply.
3. Limited number of strategic transport aircraft reduces level of immediate armoured support that can be delivered. While it is now possible to air-drop a variety of light tanks, heavy weapons and support vehicles, such as jeeps and CVR(T)s, the availability of sufficient aircraft is a practical limitation. While hand-held ATGWs will provide a reasonable defensive capability, scope for offensive actions by parachute troops will be limited.

Essentially, the ideal use of contemporary airborne forces is to deploy them behind enemy lines to seize strategic targets such as airfields, bridges, supply dumps, or areas inaccessible to vehicles. Operations may also include outflanking manoeuvres that deny the enemy access to key routes or strategic resources. Once an objective is captured, the airborne unit holds it until relieved. In some situations, airborne units may be dropped merely to delay an advancing enemy. This tactic can be used to cover a withdrawal or act as a diversion.

Perhaps most relevant to today, parachute delivery is ideal for the covert insertion of special forces. HALO (high-altitude, low-opening) or HAHO (high-altitude, high-opening) parachuting both require a higher degree of training, but this is consistent with the specialisation of such troops anyway. HAHO is more dependent on wind and weather conditions than HALO, but allows units to track large distances across country before landing near their objectives.

Gliders

Gliders were used successfully during World War 2. On occasions, they proved to be a highly effective means of delivering larger concentrations of airborne troops into battle as well as inserting heavier support assets such as weapons and vehicles.

The British landings the night before D-Day to seize crossing points across the River Orne and Caen Canal were textbook examples of glider operations. Analogous to modern day helicopter assault operations, they enabled larger forces of better equipped airborne troops to land much close to their objectives. With soldiers ready to fight as soon as they disembarked, gliders reduced the amount of time required to regroup and thus maximised the element of surprise.

Gliders were, of course, slow, fragile and vulnerable, especially when being towed en route to an objective. Successful operations required large, flat landing areas. When glider operations went wrong, the consequences were often disastrous. During the invasion of Sicily, poor planning and bad weather led to a large number of gliders landing in the sea with the loss of everyone on-board. Sometimes glider infantry units could be scattered even more widely than parachute infantry. Glider operations also took a heavy toll on glider pilots, who were expensive to train and difficult to replace. After the war, glider operations fell out of favour, especially as techniques for air dropping large vehicles by parachute were perfected.

21st Century Military Parachuting

While there is a clear strategic and tactical justification of the requirement to retain parachute-capable troops, the cost of maintaining such assets is frequently debated. It is argued that only special forces are required to land by parachute in order to secure landing zones for main heliborne assault forces. While there may still be a strategic requirement to rapidly deploy large-scale parachute forces, analysis of the potential circumstances where this might be necessary are increasingly considered to be exceptional rather than routine. Notwithstanding such concerns, the USA remains committed to the retention of two parachute-trained divisions. The UK is less certain and only one battalion of our three regular Parachute Regiment battalions serves in a dedicated parachute-ready role at a time. If there are further defence cutbacks, the number of parachute battalions could even be reduced. Given the elite status enjoyed by Parachute Regiment soldiers, there is considerable resistance to reducing their numbers. That being the case, the UK continues to spend a lot of money on a military parachute jumping capability that is seldom used.

In defence of our highly valued Parachute Regiment soldiers, while they may never deploy by parachute, they are frequently deployed by helicopter and will continue to be so. The UK maintains 16 Air Assault brigade as a rapid reaction force that can be quickly sent to trouble sports. Despite a reduced parachute-jumping requirement, it is probably not expedient to rename the Parachute Regiment as the ‘Helicopter Regiment’.

What modern military parachute operations do not take account of is recent developments, not only in civilian sports parachuting, but also in extreme parachute base jumping. There is evidence to suggest that these might be extremely relevant to an improved capability.

Parachute design has undergone a continual metamorphosis over the last 20 to 30 years.

Parachuting started with round canopies. The first major evolution was rear vents, which were added to make them steerable.

New round parachute types have gradually become more sophisticated to achieve a limited degree of control. A major change in canopy design came with the cruciform (square) parachute design, which has a larger surface area and a reduced oscillation effect (the tendency of a parachute to swing from side to side to release trapped air).

The US Army is currently evaluating the T-11 Cruciform design to replace its T-10 parachute, which has been in service since 1955.

The quantum leap in parachute design came with the invention of the ram-air parachute in the 1970s. This is essentially a parachute with two layers instead of one. The two layers are divided into cells, with a typical ram-air parachute having between 7 and 9 cells.

As a parachutist deploys the canopy, air floods into the cells automatically filling providing lift as the parachute moves forward. Some designs have plastic rib inserts to help the canopy maintain its shape. Once inflated ram-air parachutes function like wings creating lift to slow the descent. They can be steered much more precisely. They can also be flared (stalled) immediately prior to landing to reduce speed and the force of the landing. The lift effect of ram-air parachutes means that they can be reduced in size yet still achieve the same controlled descent effect.

With the aid of computer-aided design systems and advanced high-strength nylon fabrics, the latest ram-air parachutes have steadily become smaller, lighter, and safer. At the same time, they are more manoeuvrable and controllable. The parallel development of parachute harness-containers means that these too have become smaller, lighter and more compact. They now hold both main and reserve chutes. Above all, they have been designed to facilitate the reliable deployment of the canopy.

Today, the fatality level for sports parachuting is approximately 1 in 100,000 jumps. According to published statistics in the USA, around 20 people a year die during parachute jumps, which is the same number of people killed on US golf courses and much less than the annual number of SCUBA diving or motorcycle accident deaths.

If the latest civilian 9-cell ram-air canopy types for sports parachuting were to be used for military parachute operations, they would allow paratroopers to steer, brake and land with much greater precision than any existing standard round parachute. Ram-air canopies would also substantially reduce the total weight of the jump load carried. While these advances are relevant for both HALO and HAHO jumps made by special forces soldiers, they could also provide a step-change in the tactical military capabilities of ordinary airborne troops.

Wingsuits

The most significant development in sports parachuting over the last 50 years is the Wingsuit. This is a one-piece garment worn as an outer layer over other clothing like coveralls. With extra fabric that joins the arms of the suit to the body they create what is best described as a set of wings. with an additional flap positioned between the legs, a wingsuit adds significant amount of air resistance to a free-falling human body. When you wear one, you look like a flying squirrel. By allowing forward movement as the parachutist descends, impressive horizontal distances can be covered from a jump point to the landing area. Typically, the horizontal ratio of modern wingsuit designs is 1 to 4, that is 4 metres of forward flight for every metre descended.

Wingsuit design is still in its infancy. Every year new designs push the boundaries of what was previously possible. When we achieve a horizontal ratio of 1 to 10 or higher, the ability for individual parachutists to literally glide from an aircraft to the ground and to land in a specific place will be as easy as jumping of a fence. At some point, a parachute may no longer be necessary.

A parachutist wearing a wingsuit can reach speeds of over 100 mph, even terminal velocity. What makes wingsuit flying compelling for those who use them is that they enable a skydiver to turn with a high degree of control. Wingsuit aficionados describe the sensation as being about as close to flying as is humanly possible.

Wingsuits have given birth to a new sport called proximity wingsuit flying. This is a variation of base jumping, where an individual wearing a wingsuit jumps from a solid object, usually a mountain, and follows its contours down before opening his or her parachute at a low, but safe height above the ground. The thrill of flying unassisted at high speed close to the ground is addictive. Base jumping with wingsuits is popular, but dangerous. With approximately one fatality every 100 jumps, wingsuit base jumping is undisputedly the world’s most dangerous sport.

However, wingsuit flying has also percolated across to the safer and more conventional sport of regular sports parachuting. Many ordinary parachutists now use wingsuits without taking unnecessary risks. Jumping from much higher altitudes, 10,000 feet or more, a wingsuit can still provide an incredible sensation of flying. You can track across country to cover distances of several kilometres, depending on the height from which you jump.

When you combine the precision effect of wingsuit flying and the control imparted by modern parachutes, you have the potential for a large group of individuals to exit an aircraft some distance from a target – even across a border and then descend en masse to reach a very small landing area, something the size of a football field. Forget old style PLFs, you just flare your parachute around 10 feet above the ground and you coast to a halt.

The following films, provide an excellent visual description of the above.

This first video shows a modern parachute being packed in several deliberately incorrect ways. Note that the ‘chutes still opens and function correctly:

This video shows how easy modern canopies are to fly:

This video shows a speed flying canopy and the level of control it provides. (Yes. The guy really does execute a 360-degree turn!):

This video shows a wingsuit being used for base jumping. Note level of control, horizontal velocity versus speed of descent:

This video shows wingsuit precision flying from a helicopter. Really crazy, but it shows what’s possible:

This video goes one step further. Exit from a powered hang-glider passing in between buildings in Rio Da Janeiro Ultimate wingsuit flying

Potential Future Airborne Operations

Now, let’s consider a military application for the same technology. Put an airborne company of 100 men equipped with wingsuits in a single C-17. They fly under the radar, i.e. at very low level, to within 10 kilometres of a target. Then the aircraft climbs to 10,000 feet and they all jump out en masse and track towards the target. The team leader would follow a pre-agreed glide path to the LZ and everyone would track down behind him in formation. At 600 feet, each parachutist would open their chute (automatic opening at this height could make the process safer). This would enable the company to all land more or less in unison in a staggered formation. Using this technique, it should be possible for all 100 soldiers to land in an area not much bigger than a football field. Assuming they could all exit the aircraft within 60-120 seconds, then they should all land within about the same amount of time. That’s 100 men landing in almost complete silence, together and very close to an objective. Now multiply a single C-17 by 10 and you’ve landed an entire parachute battalion discretely and with precision.

Before they deployed their canopies, any airborne troops using wingsuits would be difficult to spot, even if you knew they were coming. Thereafter, once their canopies were deployed, they would be moving forward fast enough to present quite a difficult target to shoot.

What I am proposing is a very different from the type of military parachuting executed in recent years. What’s changed is the ability to control freefall descent. With relatively little practice inexperienced parachutists would be able to use a wingsuit to fly in formation – airborne drill if you will. Never before has it been easier to track horizontally across the sky from an aircraft exit point and then, with the benefit of highly steerable canopies, to achieve a precision landing at a specific drop zone. The ease with which a novice skydiver can now control a parachute is a world a way from what it was only 10 years ago. Although BASE jumping is dangerous because many participants take unbelievable risks, regular airborne troops would jump from an aircraft as before, not from mountains. Wingsuits obviously require more experience, training and practice, but new developments continue to reduce the learning curve.

In essence, parachuting as we know it is unrecognisable. It is no longer a matter of blindly jumping out of an aircraft via a static line and being carried by the wind to an area more or less in the proximity of your objective and hoping you land near your mates.

A military application of recent developments would require high standards of training and equipment, but would it be beyond the ability of our existing airborne troops to master the techniques required to execute a precision jump onto an enemy objective and then secure it? I don’t think so. As usual, it would involve planning, discipline and practice. I am sure that the UK Parachute Regiment, the US 82nd Airborne Division and French 2ième REP would all relish the task of mastering these arts.

In the final, analysis, I believe that an evolved jump technique would allow a large group of soldiers to be positioned where you want them much more quickly and quietly than landing by helicopter or driving in a vehicle. Once airborne troops get reasonably proficient with their wingsuits, you could give them night vision goggles and then jump at night. Covert infiltration on an industrial scale.

One of the problems of both helicopters and armoured vehicles is that they can easily be seen and heard from quite a distance. When the US conducted operations in Grenada, it lost a number of Blackhawks to a single enemy machine gunner IIRC. Opposed helicopter landings remain a risky proposition. In Afghanistan, vehicle tracks kicked enormous plumes of dust making them ideal IED or ambush locations. With 100 parachutists landing anywhere you want them to and almost simultaneously, one or two might get shot by an enemy that was quick to react, but the rest of the attacking force would soon be down and upon them. More often than not, they’d land and no one would know they were there. The element of surprise and psychological effect would be that much greater.

Airborne Unit Vehicles

The final piece of the future airborne jigsaw is delivering vehicles with the same level of precision.

World War 2 gliders were flimsy wooden machines with limited structural integrity. However, aircraft design has moved on even more than parachute design. So let’s imagine a glider constructed from carbon fibre and aluminium. It would be very light and very strong. Instead of towing it behind a C-17, we could design one that fits inside. Equipped with pop-out wings, it would fly close to the landing zone, and be released along the same lines as a battle box container. The glider would then release its ‘chute and manoeuvre towards the target. It would land quickly near the objective. Now pre-pack a 40-tonne vehicle into the glider and make it autonomous like a drone. It should be possible to air drop large armoured vehicles with relative ease.

There is no reason why other older ideas considered during World War 2 could not be resurrected and tried again. One particularly interesting concept was attaching aircraft to the gliders to deliver them.

These would then detach and return to base. As drone technology proves, modern aircraft don’t need pilots. So heavy lift gliders could be piloted by remote control. Gliders could be used to land much heavier vehicles than it is presently possible to land by parachute.

Summary

In summary, by failing to embrace new parachuting technologies, we have reduced the relevance and effectiveness of our airborne forces. Recent advances have changed the paradigm: they allow large groups of soldiers to land with increased control and precision much closer to an objective. Mastering new techniques would require investment in new equipment and additional training. Naturally, there are risks, but in pioneering something like military wingsuits, the benefits outweigh the dangers, which are considerably less than they were in 1941.

There is no need to limit new parachute equipment to special forces. They offer more general strategic and tactical benefits which are hard to ignore. Landing a battalion-size force covertly wherever we wanted to would be a worthwhile advantage. Instead of being scattered over a wide area, we would achieve a greater concentration of force closer to an objective. This is the same benefit conferred by tactical helicopters, but there is much less risk of ground fire bringing down a transport aircraft. Ideally suited to COIN operations as well as general war scenarios, wingsuits combined with lightweight steerable parachutes would deliver combat soldiers exactly where they were needed. In the final analysis, you could say: The paratrooper is dead! Long live the paratrooper!

TD:

Sir H did a nice post on a similar subject a few weeks ago

http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/to-infinity-or-beyond-future-of.html

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