What next, revelations that bears do in fact shit in the woods, no doubt we will have an interactive map showing the frequency and location of poo that smells of salmon and call it a sensational expose of the failure of the bear coalition to provide adequate toilet facilities.

Let’s forget the fact that they reveal precisely nothing that isn’t already well known and enjoy the frothing from the left and right.

If things change then I will change my mind but for now it makes for a more interesting diversion than actually creating and executing a coherent strategy after nearly a decade in, billions of dollars/pounds/whatever and thousands of lives.

Anyone got a tin foil hat and a collection of conspiracy theories?

UPDATE:

Perhaps I was over egging it in saying ‘precisely nothing’, there may be some small value to the enemy in pouring over this data but it I still think it is minor in comparison to what they already know, observed by actually being there or obtained by talking to the civilians and ANA/ANP.

The latest revelations about HUMINT sources being in the leaked information self evidently changes everything. On a wider level about the conduct of the conflict, the information reveals nothing that wasn’t already well known but at a human level, this is outrageous and WikiLeaks should step back and question their motives and methods, hard
]]> http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/07/wiki-leaks/feed/ 0 http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/07/talisman-on-operations/ http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/07/talisman-on-operations/#comments Sat, 10 Jul 2010 14:28:02 +0000 Think Defence http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=4331 In our earlier posts on the subject we have lamented the timeliness of the Counter IED programme called Talisman and and asked if it is too little too late.

The MoD has now released some more information on the work it is supporting in Afghanistan.

Scattered throughout Helmand province, these indiscriminate weapons kill and maim both ISAF and Afghan forces as well as innocent Afghan civilians.

However, the British Armed Forces now have a revolutionary new capability called Talisman which is being used to counter the threat.

I don’t mind the occasional bit of bully but come on MoD, revolutionary, you have to be joking.

This life-saving equipment is being used to support combat logistic patrols which can be up to several hundred vehicles in total and trek through the country delivering vital supplies to bases for the troops on the front line. Talisman is also starting to be used in combat infantry roles, such as for deliberate route clearances.

Major Thomas Donohoe, Officer Commanding 15 Field Support Squadron, explained:

“What Talisman brings is a remote capability. It keeps soldiers out of the contact zone of the IED, massively reducing the danger.

“The optics and the unmanned aerial vehicle lower the threat to the team on the ground. It will save lives.”

The vehicles and equipment used by the Talisman Troop include a specially equipped Mastiff vehicle, known as ‘Protected Eyes’, and a Buffalo – the most highly protected vehicle on operations. There is also a small robot on caterpillar tracks known as a Talon. It is armed with high tech optical equipment which can be operated from the safety of the armoured vehicles. Talon is used to detect and defeat the IED on the ground. Once the IED threat has been dealt with, the high mobility engineer excavator (HMEE) is brought into play.

High Mobility Engineer Excavator

One of the key differences between the HMEE and the other armoured plant in theatre, the armoured Light and Medium Wheeled Tractors, is that it can move at the same speed as the convoy without additional low loaders being needed to carry it.

It really is great news that we finally have some decent equipment out in Afghanistan but please MoD, lets stop saying it is revolutionary and lets not be slapping ourselves on the back for the time it has taken. Other forces have had this for years.

With a keen eye, the author had spotted a couple of images from the USMC media operation in Helmand.

Because there seemed to be no coverage in any UK media outlets I was a little reticent about covering it, fearing that it was combat damage and there might have been a news embargo for obvious reasons.

With news starting to filter out in the UK I have assumed its safe to cover it.

Rotorhub.com has been told the incident occured on 23 June after the Merlin assigned to 1419 Flight made a heavy landing at an assault base in the Lashkar Gar area of Helmand province.

No-one was seriously injured and the incident is now being investigated while the aircraft is being assessed to see if it can be returned to service.

A heavy Lift CH53E Super Stallion helicopter has recovered a damaged Merlin, the pictures show the impressive lifting power of the helicopter but no doubt a lot of skill and expertise from all concerned also went into the whole operations.

More details from the Marine Times here

Merlin - Prior to Recovery

Merlin - Recovered USMC CH53E

So, a gracious tip of the hat to Solomon

UPDATE

Wing Cmdr. "Spats" Paterson, the commanding officer of the Joint Helicopter Force (Afghanistan) here, peers inside the 'lifeless' body of Mk3 Merlin which Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 recovered from a forward operating base. The helo went down in a nonhostile event recently and had to be toted back here - a mission HMH-466 was able to plan and execute in about 16 hours.

The 'lifeless' body of an Mk3 Merlin with Joint Helicopter Force (Afghanistan) here sits just off the air field where a CH-53E Super Stallion with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 put it down moments earlier.

Members of the United Kingdom's Joint Helicopter Force (Afghanistan) here remove the rigging from a Mk3 Merlin after an early-morning operation to recover the aircraft from a forward operating base. The helo suffered a hard landing recently, and JHF(A) turned to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 and its CH-53E Super Stallions for the lift because the Marines were the only squadron capable of reconfiguring its aircraft for a lift of this magnitude on extremely short notice.

Click here to view the embedded video.

There are any number of theories floating around as to why he did this; vanity, a push for political power with an eye on the Presidency, a sneaky means of disentangling himself from the wreckage of his own/President Obama’s failed strategy or simply a good old fashioned cock up.

So depending on your point of view, the General is either relaxing today with a mission accomplished grin or packing up the wreckage of his career after the official ‘interview without coffee’

Of course he had to go but was he any more successful than his also sacked predecessor, General McKiernan, and will he be missed?

Apart from asking serious questions why a General in charge of something as serious as operations in Afghanistan has time for left leaning magazine interviews or why the cult of personality around an operational commander was allowed to grow, the real question is not why it happened but what happens now.

To some extent, we know what happens now, Lt Gen Nick Parker takes over interim command until General Petraeus is formally appointed by NATO/ISAF (there are niceties to observe you know)

The whole point of a military command structure is that it is resilient and can absorb losses. Elevating the commander to rock star status means commentators often lose sight of this point.

In one way, there should be absolutely no change, the strategy that has been decided by the military and civilian leadership team should simply be executed. Self evidently, the existing team was dysfunctional and its deliberately created ‘creative tension’ did not work as planned so the management of an already decided strategy is the issue at hand.

President Obama has said that despite the personnel change, the strategy remains the same. Whilst demoting/re assigning General Petraeus may be a sign of political strength and savvy in reasserting the primacy of the civilian in the civilian-military relationship, there are problems ahead. The ball may be firmly back in the military’s court but they will still have to deal with a corrupt Afghanistan government, diminishing support within the ranks for the softer COIN strategy and a lack of focus from the State Department. There may be some short term gain for the President but long term, he is still going to have to account for the success or failure of the mission in Afghanistan and he is running out of fall guys.

Is the strategy right then?

To steal a quote from Sir Winston, however beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.

After 18 months of the new McChrystal approach there are some isolated signs of progress but the Taleban still hold the momentum and numerous other issues continue to erode our capability to defeat the Taleban. The restrictive rules of engagement and legal briefings before every operation do not seem to have had much impact except make a difficult job even harder. The new regime may actually be more like the old one, a loosening of the ROE and greater use of indirect fires. Despite the PR and high hopes of the COIN theorists, Marja was an all too predictable disaster and one wonders if the upcoming and oft delayed operation in Kandahar is going to be equally ineffective?

Much like the UK forces tried to apply the lessons of Northern Ireland in Basra, ISAF is applying the lessons of Iraq in Afghanistan. With our Westernised way of doing things and concern for the population we simply create opportunities for others to exploit. The ANSF are being trained in a Western style and not for their own environment and culture, ultimately dooming them to failure. We certainly have not won of the majority of Afghan population and when we are sacking our own political envoys because they don’t agree with the current US strategy then there is cause for concern about our strategy.

As I mentioned in a previous post, the Afghans seem to enjoy the status quo and milking the Western tit for as long as possible. We are being played and need to recognise that our security interests lie elsewhere. The reason the Taleban seem to enjoy so much influence is partly because we attribute it to them, when in fact they are irrelevant in the wider scheme.

There is nothing quite like being told you are irrelevant to knock the wind out of ones sails.

Most of the ‘Afghanistan is the  graveyard of empires’ talk is ridiculous hyperbole and the comparisons with the Russian occupation show very little association with fact, the Russians lost 26,000 personnel and had less in theatre than do ISAF and the Afghans had an estimated one million casualties. If there are any lessons to learn, perhaps we should look up the tactically flawless withdrawal of Soviet forces.

I have no doubt we could eventually prevail with the right strategy, sufficient resources and unity of purpose but the key question is, why do we need to prevail.

This is an opportunity missed, to have a serious rethink about Afghanistan, what are our objectives, is there unity of purpose/effort, are resources appropriate, is the strategy the right one and finally, is it worth the cost in blood and treasure?

Much of the talk is about the military desire to ‘crack on’ or wanting to win at all costs, without recognising that strategic withdrawal to go and fight somewhere more important is a valid military option.

I used to think that a precipitous withdrawal would be a big mistake, nature abhors a vacuum and the resultant inrush would pull in all manner of malignant factions, the final outcome being difficult to predict, but maybe we just have to recognise that Afghanistan needs an Afghanistan solution. We might worry endlessly about the results of such as withdrawal; an emboldened Iran, the break up Pakistan or Pakistani nuclear warheads falling into the hands of Al Qaida but if we try and hedge against every eventuality then we will be led by the nose from one engagement to the other and get suckered more and more until we have no blood or treasure left to give. Those with an interest in the outcome; India, China, Russia and Iran are all conspicuous in their absence, being forced to address the prospect of radical islamist terrorism being exported from Afghanistan to Chinese Sianking, the southern former Soviet ‘stans’ and the central Indian states might focus minds somewhat. Instead, they are happy to play games whilst the West walks all the hard yards.

The prospect of all that potential mineral wealth might also galvanise regional diplomacy.

Rather than grandiose ambitions building a nation in the mould of the West; a focussed provincial approach, supported by aggressive special operations and lots of hard nosed political deal making may be a more suitable way to find the exit door.

As we debate the finer points, yet more ISAF/Afghan soldiers and civilians are being killed and wounded, cash we don’t have is being poured into the desert and the real threats to our collective security go underfunded because of the cash hoover that is Afghanistan.

There are any number of threats that are being ignored or underfunded; the Falkland Islands, home grown Islamic terrorism, energy/water/food security, piracy on the high seas, drug smuggling, cyber attack and that is before we even look at the economic situation.

Take your pick, but they are all more important than creating a stable Afghanistan with clean water and education for girls, however laudable that goal is.

So whilst we all concern ourselves with the man, shouldn’t we actually be looking at the strategy, or more fundamentally, what are we trying to achieve with that strategy?

That strategy comprises of two broad elements

1. Get the fuck out of dodge

2. Pretend it was a victory

After years of failure in Afghanistan the new strategy will be to come up with a sensible disengagement. Lets face facts, we have failed.

The government has failed, the MoD has failed and the senior military leadership has failed.

It might be fashionable to blame crusty old Cold War Generals or penny pinching Treasury officials but the truth is, they are all equally responsible. Trying to undertake a complex operation with the absolute minimum of everything was never going to work and that is making the assumption that it was worth making work in the first place.

That should be Labour’s epitaph, ‘what’s the minimum we can get away with’

With confused strategic objectives that ranged from cutting opium production one day to sending Afghan girls to school the next the real strategic objective has been to coat tail the USA. There is nothing wrong in standing by the USA if we are honest about it but the dishonesty that the current argument of ‘reducing terror on the streets of the UK’ is patently ridiculous. How many British Citizens have been killed in the UK by Islamic fundamentalists and how many have been killed in Afghanistan?

The Afghan population is unwilling to actually do anything other than sit on the fence and wait and see, whilst squeezing every last drop of money out of pockets of Western nations tax payers back pockets.

The execution of the operation has been and continues to be deeply flawed, under resources and plagued by delusional optimism. It has taken the academic and free thinking US forces to come and show the supposed master of COIN how to do it. The student has become the master. Apart from the usual suspects, our NATO partners have been dragged kicking and screaming into a conflict that they perhaps quite rightly judged to foolhardy.

We have lost nearly 300 killed and countless wounded, the cost to the public finances are simply huge and on the ground, despite good news stories from the MoD, there is very little progress.

A cynic might suggest that the current government, having spent many years in opposition complaining about underfunding will have an entirely different perspective now they are in government and might have to stump up the money to do the job properly.

Better to blame those Cold War Generals.

Facing a very real defeat in Iraq we chose to use the line of ‘supporting the Afghanistan mission’ as an excuse, providing a fig leaf for the failures in Basra.

We always seem to fall back on our our successes in Malaya, Oman and particularly Northern Island as the model for this type of operation, without recognising that each is different. Look at the force levels in Northern Ireland or the tactics in Malaya, there are no parallel with Afghanistan. We have failed to apply even our own experiences.

Out of the wreckage of Afghanistan and Iraq the British Armed Forces and Great Britain itself has to recover some of it’s reputation.

I don’t buy into the ‘no one has ever won in Afghanistan’ arguments but it is really difficult to see how we can make any real difference now.

Do we double up and put enough resources in to actually make a real difference or cut and run?

Whatever the strategy…

However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results

Winston Churchill

PS, sorry for the sweary bits!

The significant increase in the number of international troops in southern Afghanistan is enabling commanders to make improvements in the laydown and command arrangements of coalition forces in the region. The first of these was the handover of security responsibility for Musa Qaleh district in Helmand province from UK to US troops on 27 March. This transfer allowed UK troops in Musa Qaleh to be redeployed to the population centres of central Helmand where they have increased ISAF’s capacity to protect the Afghan civilian population from the threat posed by the insurgency, and to train and partner with the Afghan National Security Forces.

On 21 May, ISAF announced that Regional Command (South), the ISAF command responsible for overseeing the operational activity of international forces in southern Afghanistan, will be divided into two separate commands: Regional Command (South West), headquartered in Helmand and consisting of Helmand and Nimruz provinces; and, Regional Command (South), headquartered in Kandahar and consisting of Kandahar, Dai Kundi, Uruzgan and Zabol provinces. The division of responsibility for ISAF troops in southern Afghanistan into two regional commands will ensure that ISAF can continue to provide the optimal level of command and control over its forces as they increase in size from around 35,000 in October last year to over 50,000 troops this summer. Furthermore, the separation of the commands along regional boundaries will align the ISAF military structure in the south with the structure of the Afghan National Army, enabling a greater partnering capacity between ISAF and Afghan forces.

ISAF intends for Regional Command (South West) to become fully operational over the course of the summer. The first commander will be Major General Richard Mills of the US Marine Corps, and the US 1 Marine Expeditionary Force, (Forward) which is already based in Helmand, will provide the framework for Regional Command (South West)’s headquarters component. The UK-led Task Force Helmand will come under Major General Mills’ command from 1 June. Subject to final confirmation in due course, the UK and US have agreed in principle that command of Regional Command (South West) will be shared on a rotational basis.

As a further element of ISAF reorganisation in Helmand, and as announced by ISAF last week, the British battlegroup based in Sangin and Kajaki, which comprises in the order of 1,100 troops, will transfer from the UK-led Task Force Helmand to the US-led Regimental Combat Team that is taking on responsibility for the north of the province. Under this arrangement, the battlegroup will not be relocated but for operational purposes it will come under the command of the US. In common with the other changes to ISAF’s command structures, the transfer of command in Sangin is intended to optimise the command support available to the troops on the ground in the light of the increase in the number of ISAF troops and other operational assets. The transfer will occur on 1 June.

The UK has been consulted throughout ISAF’s decision making process and we welcome the changes to the command arrangements that will enable ISAF to make optimal use of the increased forces now deploying in southern Afghanistan.

H/T UK Defence Forum

In addition to the numerous good works they have been carrying out, including mentoring the ANA/ANP,  food and seed distribution, water and sanitation projects , limb fitting and physical rehabilitation they have also reported on efforts to improve the care for the sick and wounded.

Nothing wrong with that you might say.

However, what about these

The ICRC also provided basic first-aid training and first-aid kits to arms carriers

That’s the people carrying weapons to kill ISAF personnel, Afghan Security Forces and civilians.

And,

In April, it reached over 100 Afghan security forces personnel, over 70 members of the armed opposition, taxi drivers involved in the transport of wounded people, first-aiders and its own staff.

Is there a precedent for this?

So we are training the Taleban and their weapons carriers to be more effective combatants.

It doesn’t sound like a very good idea to me, especially given that the UK taxpayer and public contribute a great deal to the ICRC. Their 2009 financial report lists the UK government contribution at over £50million and the ‘public’ via the national society, at over £5million.

Of course ISAF and the government are deafening in their silence, best stay neutral in case we upset anyone.

Placing the paper in context he makes the observation that whilst there is some political consensus amongst the new government, principally on the need for a strategic review, there are enough differences to make for an interesting debate. At a higher level and in the context of foreign relations there is a decision to be made on emphasis, do we lean more to Europe or the US and do we retain a nuclear deterrent?

Of a more pressing need is the choice on the structure and capabilities of the armed forces that might support these higher level strategic positions. Whilst he has laid out a number of choices in his previous paper it is probably safe to say that ‘we are not Belgium’ so this leaves a choice between two positions, strategic raiding or global guardian, or maritime or continental in the vernacular of the paper.

I fundamentally disagree with this position because it assumes that a compromise is neither likely or indeed possible, I do not think these options are as stark a choice as described. The fundamental basis for the paper is that the UK has to make a choice, that a fudge is not possible, the UK is in decline against the backdrop of India, China, Brazil etc so we must make this decision because we cannot afford ‘great power status’

This management of decline is something that we need to address, the UK is a great nation, whilst our economy is in the doldrums this is a cyclical thing, it will recover. We need to regain a degree of self confidence and the political will to assert our influence on the world. The UK has massive reserves of hard and soft power, we need above all else, to learn how to harness these different strands for the national interest, not some amorphous ‘force for good,’ a phrase that seems to have seeped even into the US forces.

To summarise my basic position, we need to absolutely avoid making a solid edged decision, because there is a danger we take the wrong one. Better to try and maintain as much as a balanced force as possible, perhaps emphasising one over the other. The problem with harsh choices, even those forced upon us by financial circumstances, is that they tend to produce results that lead to capability, equipment and skills loss that just when you need them, have gone. There are of course practical limits to this and we have to recognise that whilst trying to balance capabilities some will perhaps have to go.

The issue of defence inflation is mentioned, even an increase will only allow us to stand still, yet this is also the same for other public services, especially health. Mr Codner argues that the UK is the ninth largest economy in the world but is the fourth largest military spender and makes the conclusion that we pay more for defence than our economic status justifies. But this makes the relationship between influence and the size of our economy an absolute and neglects the differences in measuring spending (pensions, gendarmeries etc,) comparative purchasing power or even that spending does not actually always equal effectiveness.

The IMF and World Bank both rate the UK as the sixth largest economy in the world, not ninth. So if we are fourth in terms of spending on defence then the difference between fourth and sixth isn’t that great. Delving into the figures even deeper, the difference in size of economy between the UK and France, currently ranked at fifth, is small. Yet, French spending on defence is third. Percentage of GDP introduces even greater contradictions, Saudi Arabia spends the greatest percentage of GDP at over 9% but what does this actually include, if we take this as a measure we are ranked 43rd, yes 43rd.

None of this of course proves anything, defence spending statistics are as confusing, complex and arcane as tractor production statistics, one could prove anything.

Referring to the recent defence green paper, the report highlights the 9 strategic premises upon which the paper seeks to define our place;

• We are more secure today than at most times in our history
• The UK has a stake in the success of the international rules-based system and should maintain an active global military role which complements our diplomatic efforts and enhances our influence on wider international developments
• Our Armed Forces protect our interests. We also use our Armed Forces as a Force for Good
• We must preserve the reputation of our Armed Forces
• No relationship is more important than that with the United States and our relationship also increases our impact
• We must be able to undertake evacuation operations
• NATO is essential to conventional deterrence, reassurance, and collective defence and a robust EU role in crisis management will strengthen NATO
• Our economy is exceptionally open to trade with many parts of the world and relies on the free passage of goods, services and information
• We have to begin the process of renewal of a minimum strategic nuclear deterrent because not to do so would effectively commit us now to unilateral disarmament

The green paper also concludes that the strategy of ‘go first, go fast and go home’ as proposed in the much vaunted SDR98 has not been borne out by the real world of the last decade or so. Yet another nail in the coffin of the PowerPoint fuelled fantasy that was RMA/EBO etc etc. The paper extends this by asking what can be learned from history. What the last decade does tell us is that the world is an unpredictable place and a balanced force is our best insurance against this uncertainty.

Casting an eye over the recent election, the paper describes four false dichotomies and three clear choices.

• US or Europe, is a hard choice between the two or would greater cooperation with Europe actually result in a stronger relationship with the US. The role of NATO is crucial here and the recent NATO strategic concept poses some interesting options for how this might be achieved. Some excellent analysis of the paper can be found here
• Security of Defence, will the review extend to wider domestic security concerns
• Home or Away, the paper argues that home defence might need an away capability
• Afghanistan or the Future, ‘the war or a war’, if the answer is Afghanistan as per Op Entirety then this will limit our strategic ability as capabilities are denuded to concentrate on one area

Three clears choices are then described;

• Trident or something cheaper. This is obviously a clear choice but given it is not likely to be included in any review makes it somewhat of a moot point. Every study and my opinion (for what it is worth) is that Trident is the only credible option
• Efficiency Savings or Risk Free Budget. Efficiency based cost savings might be possible but this might not necessarily support an expeditionary capability. This is a fair enough statement, whilst there are efficiency savings to be had they are likely to be difficult to achieve, after all governments since time began have been trying to be efficient. The only way significant savings can be achieved is if political and industrial concerns are removed from the acquisition process i.e. very unlikely
• People or Kit, both parties have committed to supporting ‘our brave boys’ but any welfare improvements will come at a cost to wider capabilities and not just equipment.

Moving on to a defence review it describes a logical sequence;

• Protect against direct threats (autonomous obligations)
• Meet government obligations (contributory obligations)
• Permit expeditionary operations (autonomous operations of choice)
• Extend status and influence (contributory operations of choice)

Types of Operation

Autonomous Obligations

These are the non negotiable elements, must haves. They are comprised of four tasks, defence of the UK mainland, domestic security within the UK, security & defence of overseas territories and evacuation of non combatants, the paper describes the types of capabilities that underpin these tasks.

1) Defence of the UK mainland – Although as the paper states we have collective defence via NATO we must also provide for our own defence and lists intelligence & surveillance, air defence and sea denial as basic capability areas. The question to really ask here is defence from what/who. Realistically there is very little direct threat that needs the application of military force.

2) Domestic security within the UK – In this the paper seems to be somewhat out of touch with reality, stating that the armed forces will typically support the civilian power. No they won’t. The latest doctrine on the defence contribution to resilience (JDP02) quite clearly states that the military contribution to UK security and resilience will be as an absolute last resort. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 has seen local authorities, police, fore and other responders improve their capabilities to such an extent that in general, they don’t actually need the armed forces. There are a number of niche capabilities that are still essential for the armed forces to maintain in support of domestic security and resilience but these are niche and relatively low cost. I would prefer to see the armed forces transfer even some of these capabilities, like EEZ protection, to civilian agencies.

3) Security & defence of overseas territories – An obvious need but it is probably better to invest in defensive capabilities and political agreement rather than expecting our armed forces to go an retake those territories after we have allowed our defences to lapse in those areas. These overseas territories are in reality, quite few in number.

4) Evacuation of non combatants – Maritime and airlift capabilities are are the principal enabler, yes, this is an important and likely to be used often capability. UK citizens conduct business, go on holiday and travel all over the world. It is a reasonable expectation to be rescued by the armed forces should things go bad.

Contributory Obligations

5) Defence of the NATO Article V Area – NATO is arguably the most successful security alliance in recent times, our commitments are clear but as NATO reforms and recognises changing realities the nature of those commitments may change.

6) Maritime Security – The paper makes the point that as a ‘maritime nation’ we are economically dependant sea routes and along with other geo strategic reasons means that we are obliged to provide a significant contribution and level of leadership alongside other maritime nations to maritime security. Perhaps reflecting his past career, the author I think, overplays this. Are we really any more or less dependant on the seas than say Germany or Australia, the global trading economy means that in reality all nations are equally dependant on the sea so why should the UK be a major contributor, Recent experience has also shown that the reality of our capability in this area is relatively limited, global trade has not ground to a halt as our collective failure to combat Indian Ocean piracy becomes ever more obvious.

7) Proactive Counter-terrorism – It is argued that terrorism threats are best tackled at source, the paper is at pains not to mention what type of terrorism but we are of course talking about fundamental Islamic terrorism. Mr Codner argues that principal instruments are special forces, specialist infantry (not sure what this is) and air power, supported by maritime basing in some cases. Is this a little too simplistic, proactive counter terrorism may use the full spectrum of capabilities including ISR or submarine launched cruise missiles for example, terrorism may take many forms.

Autonomous Operations of Choice

8) The classic example of this would be Sierra Leone, a single operation carried out without substantive support from other nations. The paper states that this operation started out as a non combatant evacuation and this is correct but part of that operation was to secure entry facilities for a larger UN force and one of those non combatants was actually a British officer attached to that UN force. That said, it supports the need to maintain this capability, no matter the armed forces are doing elsewhere.

Contributory Operations of Choice

9) Perhaps the largest and most important aspect of this section is contributory operations of choice, Iraq being a good example although operations in the Balkans might also be another good example. These are characterised by the UK providing elements of a larger force multi national force That force might be under the auspices of the UN, NATO or even the EU. The paper makes the very good point that the dividing lines between this and others may be blurred and ultimately interlocking. One might argue that Afghanistan sits in this category or number 7, proactive counter terrorism. The paper highlights the argument that once forces have been committed the difference between choice and obligation becomes academic.

It is in the nature of this contribution that the paper sees as the fundamental issue and links back to the previous paper, a Force for Honour. The choices presented are between maritime (Strategic Raiding) or continental (Global Guardian) and he makes the case that a more tentative maritime approach is more likely to have political and public support.

Is this actually the case though, de we have to chose between one or the other and is a maritime approach more likely to gain public support?

On the latter issue I am not sure, we have been fighting in Afghanistan for nearly a decade and in that time seen a number of national, European and local elections. In none of this time has there been any significant public or political calls for withdrawal. All major political parties support the need for operations in Afghanistan and once operations in Iraq commenced, opposition tended to shift to supporting our personnel with the correct equipment and focussing on the legality of the operation.

There was no major debate between a maritime of continental approach, the public and politicians simply do not see the world with the same eyes as defence analysts.

I would not suggest that Michael Codner is simply taking this view because he is an ex Royal Navy Officer but one can see that ones past will always colour, however slightly, ones perceptions.

Force Structures

Getting down to the nitty gritty , Michael Codner states that it would be easy to define a core force structure for roles 1 to 4 and 6 but is it, there are still many questions to be answered here?

Do we need Typhoons for example to fulfill the QRA North and South roles, could a chepaer aircraft work just as well?

How can we best meet the demand of securing the maritime domain, Type 26 frigates or maybe something less capable, is maritime security best obtained by mentoring local forces?

What are these overseas territories and would their security best be obtained by cooperation or forward defence?

For the other obligatory categories (5 and 7) the question is, to what scale to do contribute. This is true but the questions must be asked what as well as how much. The appropriate contribution is described as whatever we are willing to and these would likely come out of the 1 to 4 categories.

It is at this point that Michael Codner shows a maritime preference in describing Typhoon and heavy armour as legacy capabilities, making the case that heavy armour could have some role in expeditionary operations but not to operations of obligation, whilst there is some truth in this it is not entirely accurate. Heavy armour (if we include Warriors, Challenger, AS90 and tank based combat engineering) could well be used in a number of obligatory categories.

The final stage in this process is defining and scaling the force strucures for expeditionary operations of choice, categories 8 and 9.

After autonomous operations and maritime security what is left is a fundamental question of do we concentrate on the Strategic Raiding or Global Guardian route as defined in his earlier works, and to what scale.

Continental prevalence he argues, provides for a continuation of of capabilities post Afghanistan. Maritime prevelance, allows for a rational expansion of categories 1 to 4, 6 and 7 and a greater ability to influence through inducement operations.

These are pretty big assumptions and need challenging.

How does a maritime strategy (which includes the crown jewels of CVF and JCA) follow on from a rational expansion of categories 1 to 4, 6 and 7?

Not sure an expeditionary carrier strike group has any relevance to the defence of the UK mainland or internal security, defence of overseas territories might be better served by actually defending them rather than planning to gloriously retake them and whilst evacuation of non combatants should be a core capability the types of equipment used do not necessarily mean the same or a logical extension for a maritime expeditionary choice.

The same with 6 and 7, a maritime expeditionary capability is not ideal for maritime security, far from it. It concentrates resources in a small number of very high end platforms at the expense of lower cost and lower capability systems that arguably make a greater contribution.

As for the ability to induce through persuasion because of a maritime focussed expeditionary capability, this is another one of those statements that is accepted as the norm but in reality is a little more difficult to actually prove. Did the fact that their were aircraft carriers practically bumping into each other in the Adriatic and Mediterranean stop the Bosnia Serbs, were Somali warlords deterred by the US carrier and amphibious strike groups off Mogadishu, what about the Taleban or Saddam Hussein.

He also states that a smaller Army would reduce the risk of embroilment, even if that might be in the national interest but costs would need careful consideration because specialist, agile, infantry would higher salary levels to attract and retain suitable individuals.

Eh…

This one had me scratching my head, reducing bog standard infantry and making a smaller Army that comprises wholly of underwater knife fighting specialists would cost more because they would need to be paid better? No soldier enters the armed forces because of the great rates of pay on offer and increments and allowances for SF or jump pay might increase the cost slightly but in the wider context are simply a drop in the ocean. Come to think of it, I am not sure what the term ‘specialist infantry’ actually means.

Capabilities

He then goes on to discuss implications for specific capabilities.

Command, Control and Communication: High end C3 is an obvious core need but might change in nature depending on which strategy option is taken. I would argue that this would not be a significant change as open standards based systems become more prevalent.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition: Again, these might be similar but change slightly in nature depending on the option taken. We need to spend less on the means of collection and more on creating usable and actionable knowledge in the hands of the consumer.

Helicopters: The report makes the point that the need for rationalisation and improving availability are the key, definitely.

Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships: In combining these the report describes them vital for operation types 3 and 4, evacuation and security of overseas territories but states that the case for carriers is stronger if the maritime option is taken. This of course assumes that all carriers are created equal. Italy and Spain have a modest carrier capability for the same type of operation but don’t see the need for 2 65k tonne expeditionary strike carriers.

Fixed-Wing Attack Aircraft: Have a core justification in categories 1 to 3, again I would argue that it is not as simple as this, they also have a core contribution to make to other categories.

Infantry: The size of the Infantry is constrained by Afghanistan but after that will depend on the scale and nature of expeditionary operations. The point about specialist infantry comes into play again here but fails to see the whole cost of the infantry. Specialist infantry, by that I assume he means special forces types might cost more in allowances and increments but do they actually cost more in the round, this seems one of the weakest areas of the report.

Combat Support: Will be constrained by the size of the infantry.

Strategic and Operational Airlift: Common to either choice and dependant on the scale

Armoured Vehicles: The issue of adaptability to the prevailing environment is highlighted, citing the UOR process and suggesting that institutionalised off the shelf purchasing may be the way to go. Not sure how this would fit in with the short operational time scale of maritime focussed operation though, whilst UOR has been a success it is a fundamental admission of failure and not something to be aspired to. It creates many problems and as we have said many times, what happens if that shelf belongs to someone else? He also mentions the modularity options of air and maritime platforms, not sure what he means on this one either.

Surface Combatants: The issue of cost, number and capability are highlighted.

Heavy Armour: Displaying a worrying lack of awareness of what and where heavy armour has been deployed in operations in the last few years he makes the statement that the only strong argument for the retention of heavy armour, and one would assume its attendant armoured infantry, artillery and combat engineering, is for category 5 i.e. NATO Article V operations. He then goes on to state that this is a capability that is offered in abundance by our European neighbours. Quite frankly, this is a ridiculous statement and destroys much of the credibility of the paper. Heavy armour (including matching capabilities) has been deployed and successfully used in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. It has relevance and utility in many categories and although there is a strong argument for a reduction in numbers to simply relegate heavy armour to the dustbin is dangerously naive and uninformed.

Others: Other capability areas include precision engagement and network enabled capabilities remain strong capability drivers. Cyber attack is an interesting subject (although I am not a fan of the term), the paper argues that a strong military capability to defend against cyber attack  will provide capabilities useful in domestic security. This seems like a very dangerous confusion of military and civilian capabilities with many constitutional issues to resolve. I think the whole issue of defence against electronic attack, in all their variety, is best handled by civilian agencies that are not hidebound by rank, career based pay scales and other restrictions. The military would be better places to fill in the physical aspects of the electronic defence picture and certain specialist areas. i will cover this in greater detail in a future post.

Report Conclusions

The report makes the conclusion that there is a logical sequence for defining the future force structure and that beyond obligatory operations the scale should be defined by what the nation can afford and willing to pay for.

The question being, what financial premium, above the 1.6% of GDP of a normal European nation, are we prepared to pay for to achieve/maintain world power status. We are not a normal European nation though, no other except France has a seat on the Security Council or aspires to great nation status. Whilst Germany might have a larger economy her influence on the world stage s much less than the UK or France.

An alternative is also described, become like Canada or the Scandinavians.

Read the rest of this excellent article from lee Bruce, here

Speaking about the role of UK troops in Helmand, Dr Fox said:

“I think that we should be having our forces deployed where they are going to have the greatest effect in terms of the overall strategy of the coalition and I don’t think we should be precious about that.

“Our troops have done a wonderful job in Helmand, talking to American commanders there. They are extremely impressed now that they’re on the ground in Helmand and seeing the difficulty of the conditions. They’re very impressed about how bravely and professionally the British forces have operated.”

Reading between the lines (and possibly getting it hopelessly wrong!) that means UK forces are off to Kandahar Province to replace the Canadians who will be leaving in 2011 and the Dutch who will be leaving neighbouring Urōzgān this year.

]]> http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/05/off-to-kandahar-then/feed/ 5 http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/05/nato-2020-assured-security-dynamic-engagement/ http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/05/nato-2020-assured-security-dynamic-engagement/#comments Mon, 17 May 2010 13:37:25 +0000 Think Defence http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=3770 NATO have just published a new Strategic Concept, the first for a over decade.

With a commitment to the same core values of collective defence but a recommendation to improve missile defence and cyber capabilities it makes an interesting read.

Where do they get the names of these reports though?

Download from here

Click here to view the embedded video.

The UK has deployed the Trojan combat engineering heavy armoured vehicle but not Challenger 2 citing terrain restrictions in the Green Zone as the main reason for not deploying them There was some talk of a request being turned down on cost grounds a few months ago.

If the UK area of operations does shift to replace the departing Canadians one wonders if the UK might emulate the success of he Canadians and others with the deployment of small numbers of main battle tanks.

They certainly have an intimidatory effect but perhaps our new ‘courageous restraint’ approach might not be compatible with 70 tonnes of mobile firepower.

Excellent reporting, however, does anyone else here wonder about a few issues thrown up in the article; lack of Javelins, no close air support and no heliborne counter attack to block and encircle the Taleban.

Nevertheless, an inspiring story and yet another affirmation that the much maligned youth of today are still taking it to the Queen’s enemies, much like their forefathers.

Makes one very proud.

The transcripts are available at the links.

Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope

Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton

General Sir David Richards

Clearing mines and IED’s in front of vehicle or foot patrols, called ‘Op Barma’, is usually a painstaking, dangerous and incredibly difficult task, using Vallon hand held detectors. The people who make up Op Barma teams are generally unsung but some of the bravest individual’s one could ever meet. Occasionally an opportunity exists to use more automated methods.

The Python is the replacement for the Giant Viper, in fact a mid life upgrade called Giant Viper Mid Life Upgrade (GVMLI) that replaced the motor unit and other components. Instead of the parachute system in the Giant Viper the Python uses a long strip of Velcro (honestly) to retard and straighten the hose as it deploys.

Although seemingly unsophisticated it is very effective. It is nothing more sophisticated than a 228m length of rubber hose, except the hose is filled with high explosive!

Launched using a rocket motor it deploys across the ground to be breached and when it lands the explosive filled hose detonates, initiating and destroying any mines or IED’s in its path, clearing a safe line approximately 7m wide and 180m long.

The Trojan and Titan (the world’s fastest armoured bridge layer) have been in service with the Royal Engineers for three years and are soon to be joined by the Terrier, a lighter armoured combat engineering vehicle that will replace the Combat Engineer Tractor.

Trojan Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers

The operation allowed a significant section of wadi north of Patrol Base Wahid to be cleared of IED’s, although the Python provides a breaching not clearance capability meaning that clearance teams will have to make sure the area is 100% clear. Breaching versus clearance is about the management of risk, breaching means operational tempo can be maintained at an acceptable risk.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Trojan and Python have been in theatre for a while but this is the first public airing of its undoubtedly excellent capabilities and marks an interesting change in approach, in the right location it enables rapid breaching of suspected IED/mine areas with all the operational benefits that this brings.

The present rumblings in Buenos Aeries therefore, are more down economic desires rather than some grandiose nationalist intent. In essence, Argentina would like a seat at the table and a large slice of the pie. However, seeing as your average British senior civil servant would rather cut his own throat with a rusty carving knife before considering a mutually beneficial agreement to share oil wealth, albeit in the name of peace and international relations, then the potential exists for conflict. Unfortunately, oil is one of the greatest catalysts for conflict known to man.

To those concerned with defence the opportunity arises to evaluate the conventional forces we have to hand, given that much of our present armed services are deeply entrenched in a counter insurgency conflict.

Although we could not mount a task force to recapture the Falkland Island’s, we should not need to. But the question needs to be asked, are the forces and capabilities we have at present adequate to repel an invasion or at least handle a heavy duty stand-off?

Before we ask this, we should also ask, does Argentina have the political and military capacity for an invasion?

The answer to that is probably not, as they no longer have an aircraft carrier and their only dedicated landing ship has been scrapped. The only ships they have that could land troops and equipment are a small number of LSL types. However, they still maintain a credible submarine capability as well as four destroyers and around ten corvettes.

In addition to this, the Argentine Air Force still has around 50 A-4 Skyhawk and Mirage sub-types, as well as nine Exocet armed Super Etendard’s. These aircraft may be old in comparison the RAF Eurofighter Typhoon’s based on the Island’s, but they still pose a significant threat to shipping, as do the handful of P-3B Orion’s they operate.   So, although there equipment is far from being state of the art, it has the potential to a painful, if not deadly, thorn in the side.

The threat to the Falkland Island’s therefore does not come from invasion, but from Argentina attempting to implement an air and naval blockade. The oil rig currently being positioned could be taken out with a torpedo or an Exocet missile at any time, as could HMS York, the current Type 42 destroyer on patrol in the area. The other ships in the Royal Navy flotilla could do very little as they consist of an RFA tanker, a hydrographic survey ship and fisheries patrol boat armed with a 30 mm cannon. The Admiralty could have a nuclear submarine in the area, but if they have, they are keeping tight lipped about it. As the Argentine navy can muster three submarines, the RN would need to send more than one should things heat up.

The five Eurofighter Typhoon’s based at Mount Pleasant provide an adequate deterrent from an assault on the Island’s themselves, but cannot provide a watertight defence of the whole exclusion zone alone.

One significant deterrent the Typhoon could provide, if it was integrated, would be the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile. This, and a robust submarine force would seriously curtail any Argentine designs on the Malvinas and the surrounding ocean. Unfortunately, and herein lies the crux, the only aircraft in the RAF inventory able to carry the Harpoon is the Nimrod. The powers that be have announced that the MR.2 variant will be withdrawn this year as a cost saving measure, and its replacement, the MRA.4, will not be operational until around 2012.

It should be remembered that it was the proposed withdrawal of HMS Endurance that triggered the invasion in 1982, a decision which Argentina viewed as a sign of weakness. What we need to consider is this, if we withdrew the Nimrod and its long range, anti-ship/submarine capability without a credible alternative, would they view this in the same way?

As we begin to make stringent cuts and changes to our armed forces we should clearly understand that we could not fight another Falkland’s style conflict. What we should be doing therefore, is ensuring that the forces we have stationed there have a sufficient deterrent capability so we don’t have to.

Richard Stockley

So in the rush to avoid buying those much maligned exquisite systems are we losing sight of a few painful lessons earned by the blood of service personnel.

In a shooting war with a serious military nation like Iran, would you rather have a top of the range piece of equipment that can over match your opponent or something that is 80%

Just a question for those advocating (us included) accepting ‘good enough’

Things aren’t always simple, are they?

Combining innovative doctrine, technology like wireless telegraphy and air delivered weapons what has jumped off the page is the response times.

In a RUSI Journal published in 1937 Air Commodore Portal noted

The use of the air bomb and machine gun in close support of troops on the ground has proved of utmost value in police operations on the Indian frontier. It was bought to a very high state of perfection in the recent operations in Palestine where small bodies of troops were often held up by fire of armed bands occupying strong positions. When this occurred, a W/T message was sent by the troops and so good was the organisation that at almost any point in Palestine a formation of bombers would arrive within 15 minutes of the origination of the message

15 minutes from call to release using aircraft like the Hawker Audax, Hart and Hardy, hired trucks carrying a wireless set called a Rodex, various machine guns and freefall bombs, combined HQ’s and a system of codes for terrain features. They even had to use different coloured umbrellas for combat identification!

In an interesting parallel, the RAF also had to deal with restrictive and politically motivated rules of engagement.

RAF Hawker Hardy

In Afghanistan today we have supersonic jet aircraft, precision guided munitions, live video targeting pods, GPS, ROVER terminals and reliable air to ground communications.

Undoubtedly, chalk and cheese in terms of versatility, precision and effect but also radically different in cost, training and maintenance overhead.

Today, we are technologically so advanced that pilots takes years to train, aircraft take decades to deliver into service and costs are spiraling out of control.

Ask yourself how long is it between a call for close air support and an aircraft turning up.

How many minutes…