Four of the 200m tankers will be obtained in the £452m deal

This is a quick post to which I will probably add to later.

Some older links on the subject

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/02/fdr-maritime-at-sea-replenishment/

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/12/the-future-of-the-royal-navy-11-logistics-and-support/

This photo was taken on January 21, 2012

Those ladders look like the plain old common or garden variety

British soldiers from the QRH (The Queen's Royal Hussars) Battle Group are pictured patrolling during Operation Zmaray Ibda (Lions' Discovery) in the district of Lashkar Gah, Helmand province. British soldiers from the QRH(The Queen's Royal Hussars) Battle Group, consisting of troops from Support Company(Coy) 1 Yorks alongside C Coy QRH took part in Operation Zmaray Ibda(Lions' discovery). Having deployed by Chinook helicopter into a rural outreach of Lashkar Gah, the mission was to apprehend an insurgent commander. The Operation was partnered with the ANP (Afghan National Police) throughout.

Back in February 2010 I bemoaned the lack of engineering technical expertise within DE&S, not that it isn’t there but what is there is obviously in short supply which results in the MoD having to buy in technical consultants or contract specific projects. In years gone by, when the MoD was technical skills rich the kinds of projects we are now outsourcing would have been handled in house.

With state sanctioned vandalism that saw the rundown of the government research establishments and the ultimate sale of DERA/QinetiQ the reduction in technical skills, in favour of management skills, resulted in the the MoD becoming a commissioning entity rather than a systems developer or integrator, the costs of this are only starting to become clear now.

There has been much in the papers over the last few days about how much the MoD spends on consultants, it is always an emotive subject.

The arguments for moving to technical consultants and contractors is based on the simple premise that a non MoD employee does not attract pension contributions and are therefore much cheaper, even accounting for the significantly greater day rate. A secondary argument, to the cynic, is that reducing the number of so called ‘fat arsed civil servants’ plays well with the House of Parliament and tabloids.

I hold no truck whatsoever with argument because we should be measuring value in other ways and it is pretty shameless for this government and others, the MoD and even the media to portray MoD civil servants in such a bad light. They should know better and stand on for their people.

Anyway, back to the ladder.

The example I used in the previous post was the humble ladder, much used in Afghanistan for small gap crossing and getting onto a compound roof.

Defense News ran with a story describing how when faced with a requirement from Afghanistan for a portable short gap crossing system (thats a ladder  to you and me) instead of calling on the resources of its 22,500 employees it outsourced the job to BMT.

Responding to an urgent operational request from the frontline to come up with a better method of crossing ditches and scaling walls than a conventional ladder the Ministry of Defence turned to BMT Defence Services to provide an answer.

In the space of five weeks this summer the Bath, England-based consultancy conducted a survey of possible solutions and completed a competition involving more than a dozen bidders from the U.K. and overseas.

Eugene Morgan, the director of systems at BMT Defence Services, says the consultancy team running the project spoke to designers ranging from a supplier of ship gangways to a Formula 1 racing team in order to find the best possible solutions.

Morgan said recommendations on the top three or four designs for the 3 metre bridge requirement was submitted to the MoD last month.

I suppose it’s a good thing that the requirement was met in double quick time.

Is this another indicator of something we covered earlier, it’s not the numbers of civil servants that count but the types.

If DE&S doesn’t have the bandwidth to run an acquisition exercise for what is more or less an upgraded ladder, then we need to be concerned.

A year after BMT submitted their recommendations the MoD has released details of the resulting product.

Sorry for the crap pictures…

Short Gap Crossing (Not a Ladder)

Short Gap Crossing (Not a Ladder)

Short Gap Crossing (Not a Ladder)

Roger Pidgeon, the DE&S team’s project manager for the short gap crossing, said:

“We received an urgent request for an ultra-lightweight and man-portable short gap crossing capability.

“In the first instance we looked to deliver a commercial off-the-shelf solution, but none was immediately available on the market.

“BMT’s engineering knowledge helped us to reach specialist suppliers in the motorsport and aerospace sectors who have extensive experience in lightweight aluminium, carbon fibre or composite structures.

“Our requirement was turned into a bespoke design solution by BMT in just four weeks.”

The bridges designed by Alpha Composites can be carried by each member of a patrol. Troops can also use the system as a lightweight assault ladder, replacing the bulkier, heavier in-service equipment. Alpha Composites are a market leading company in hi technology materials and I wonder if any of the trials team or IPT managed to blag themselves a gucci briefcase !!

What does this tell us?

First, there is valuable and cutting edge capabilities within the UK manufacturing sector that we absolutely need to exploit so the MoD/Automotive sector partnership that was started a few years ago has to be nurtured and expanded.

Second, whilst BMT are no doubt an excellent organisation, this kind of facilitated access to manufacturers and technical evaluation role should be a core MoD function. If the MoD and DE&S is going to improve its variable record on buying equipment for the armed forces it needs to bring back in house the expertise it hastily discarded and continues to discard.

Finally, here is an excellent example of not buying off the shelf, not going with the 80% or ‘good enough’ solution. However, given the quite staggering loads being carried by infantry soldiers in Afghanistan it is equally an example where insisting on something other than good enough and developing a bespoke solution was absolutely the right thing to do.

Those advocating more of the former might perhaps like to carry those extra kilograms in 40 degree heat.

Of course we don’t know if it is any good or substantially lighter than the traditional alternatives.

Maybe it really is a Short Gap Crossing and definitely not a ladder!

Which brings me back to the question posed in the title of this post.

If they are so fantastic why does the first image above, the one taken last month, not have the Short Gap Crossing system on view.

Is it because they are in short supply?

Is it because they are not needed?

Or

Is it something else?

Perhaps this comment from a TD contributor might have something to do with it.

Ah that ladder. Awesome for crossing ditches. But heavier than a normal ladder and extremely uncomfortable to carry. Know what the SF guys did? Wrapped some hesco frame around the old normal ladder! Voila! Works better too. Oh to answer your questions at the end. No it’s not lighter. And everyone hated it as with the old ladders you could carry them by putting your arm through the rungs. You can’t do that with these ladders which made them heavier and incredibly fatiguing to carry. Yeah it’s good for crossing ditches but as I said the SF just wrapped hesco framing and got the same result but lighter and more comfortable to carry. I emphasise this because it’s such a good example of over engineering and wasted money. Yes folks. They f*cked up a ladder. A ladder! Horrible bit of kit. I shudder.

I assume there is more to this than meets the eye (there usually is) but in our rush to strip the MoD of civil servants are we in danger of throwing the baby out with the bath water just to appease stupid politicians and journalists?

BAE have released a few images of their solution…

BAE Systems Ground Combat Vehicle

BAE Systems Ground Combat Vehicle

BAE Systems Ground Combat Vehicle

BAE Systems Ground Combat Vehicle

Click to enlarge

The honest answer is we don’t know. The Americans are not reducing the total numbers of JSF but changing the profile of those purchases. Other partner nations are indicating they are going to reduce their actual off take.  This is likely to have implications for JSF prices particularly in the early stages which is when this country intends to procure its (fighters).

Something else we don’t know is the cost and operational implications of the switch to CATOBAR beyond an estimate of just shy of a billion pounds.

Or

How we are going to turn a conventional carrier into the flexible Carrier Enabled Power Projection

Construction is going well and the training and cooperation agreements with the US and French navies seem to be equally on track but project CVF/JCA still has a great deal of risk and uncertainty that has still to be resolved.

Click here to read it.

This bit of news popped into the newsreader this afternoon

Click to visit

General Dynamics and BAE Systems have demonstrated a precision guided 81mm mortar round, or should that be bomb!

The question I think of when I see this (followed by the inevitable clamour to buy some) is this…

Does adding cost and complexity disrupt the fundamental characteristics of mortars,namely; simplicity, low cost, ease of use and immediacy?

Anyone care to answer?

As part of the Team Complex Weapons construct the LMM was ‘reversed’ into an existing production and long term support contract, thought to be for Starstreak. Because the threat that Starstreak is designed to counter is considered lower than when it was placed in production this seems like a sensible and flexible approach. Thales have a support contract with the MoD for Starstreak out to 2020 but it is not known if the commercial arrangements have also been modified to account for fewer of those missiles and the introduction of LMM, one would imagine its all in the small print.

Fulfilling the Future Air-to-Surface Guided Weapon (Light) requirement it will be one of the primary weapons of the maritime variant of the Wildcat helicopter.

AgustaWestland AW159 Lynx Wildcat

Aboard the Wildcat it has been shown in a couple of configurations, 5 and 7 round launchers.

Lightweight Multirole Missile - AW Wildcat

Thales Lightweight Multirole Missile - Wildcat

The initial production variant (that will be obtained in a quantity of 1,000) is the laser beam riding version.

The LMM is derived from the innovative Starstreak High Velocity Missile

Click here to view the embedded video.

Designed to attack small targets like inflatables, fast attack craft and surfaced submarines for example, what marks the LMM as something rather special is its relatively low cost, the motor for example was value engineered by Roxel to a specific cost and the guidance and much of the control system has been taken from the Starstreak.

The second distinguishing feature is its small warhead when compared to the larger Hellfire or Brimstone missile. This precise and low collateral damage warhead will allow it to be used against a much wider variety of targets. The warhead is a blast/fragmentation type weighing 3kg; compare this with 9kg on a Hellfire and 8.4kg on a Javelin.

The missile weighs 13kg and range is given as 8km with only a small minimal range, 400m, unlike the precision guided 70mm rockets that need a considerable distance. The fuse uses a laser proximity system and the missile itself is only 76mm in diameter with a length of 1.3m. The use of a laser proximity fuse is designed to allow the missile to be used against non-metallic targets, inflatable boats being the obvious example.

Thales Lightweight Multirole Missile

Thales have stated that a semi active laser seeker and anti-armour warhead would be relatively easy to integrate, the SAL seeker being recently test fired.

The laser beam riding guidance system means that the firer must remain focussed on the target and whilst this makes countering it difficult the firing platform has to remain exposed. Only one target at a time can be attacked with this guidance method which might limit its use against multiple swarms, however, this is a reasonable cost trade off and because it has a high speed, depending on range, this focus time may not be all that great.

The upgrade path, specifically a low cost semi active laser (SAL) seeker would allow the missile launch and target designation platforms to be different.

What intrigues me the most about LMM is its flexibility, being helicopter launched is just one of the means in which it can be used.

Air Launched

The LMM could also potentially arm the Watchkeeper unmanned system and is nominally slated to do so as part of the development path, although the extra weight might impact on performance in other areas it might be a reasonable trade off in some circumstances. Watchkeeper is already quite heavy compared to the design it is based on although engine improvements might also mitigate this extra weight.

For fleeting targets of opportunity it would offer something quite interesting and improve the flexibility of Watchkeeper, even if there would be an additional training burden.

LMM has been fired from a Scheibel Camcopter and shown on a BAE Systems Fury UAV

Fury UAV

If it can be used on Wildcat and Watchkeeper, why not Apache or the King Air 300 based Sentinels or even an A400, Harvest Hawk style?

One might even imagine a pair being used on the Base-ISTAR aerostats to provide a snap shot capability against fleeting targets, it has zero recoil when fired.

Maritime

The LMM has also been shown on a naval mount, Seahawk Sigma, as below, combined with a 30mm Bushmaster automatic cannon for naval applications. MSI are one of those low profile UK defence manufacturers that deserves to be heard about a lot more.

MSI 30mm mount with 7 LMM

MSI 30mm mount with 7 LMM

The Turkish company Aselsan has shown the LMM on a naval mount with 4 LMM’s

Aselsan Thales LMM

Aselsan teamed up with the patrol vessel maker, Yonca Onuk, to develop the two axis gyrostabilised mount and off mount electro optical director.

Land

Because the LMM has been designed to fit within the existing physical and electrical footprint of the Starstreak HVM missile it is not inconceivable that it could be used on the numerous launchers that have been developed or in use.

One such example is the Thor system, which could carry a mix of LMM and Hellfire as needed.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Aselsan have also shown a remotely operated weapon system (RWS) fitted with a 2 round LMM 12.7mm HMG combination.

Thales Lightweight Multirole Missile and 12.7mm HMG

In a land environment LMM could provide a lower yield alternative to Javelin in complex environments where precision and a reduced blast radius would be useful.

Perhaps even a new lease of life for the Stormer HVM vehicles.

Stormer High Velocity Missile

We can exploit the LMM across multiple domains, not just maritime.

I think the LMM has a great deal of export potential and of great utility across multiple platforms and environments, anyone else agree?

Threats

Threats to a vehicle, and by definition, its occupants come from many sources.

MINES and IED’s

The need to protect vehicles against mines is hardly new but in numerous conflicts the improvised mine, or IED, has been effective and deployed in increasing quantities. Sophisticated off route mines that employ explosively formed projectiles are a dangerous threat and difficult to defeat.

IED’s are complex because of the many variations, some may use commercial explosives or surplus munitions and others may use home-made explosives. They may be linked, have anti tamper devices, command or victim initiated with the trigger being some distance from the charge. The charge may even not be buried but in a vehicle on the side of the road.

This complexity makes them difficult to defeat.

DIRECT FIRE

Vehicles may need protection from small arms up to large calibre anti-tank rounds, RPG’s, anti tank missiles and air delivered weapons.

Although showing small arms ammunition only the 1 million frames per second video below is fascinating

Click here to view the embedded video.

The video below shows the effect of a typical man portable anti-tank guided weapon, the Javelin.

Click here to view the embedded video.

and, a 120mm tank round

Click here to view the embedded video.

Direct fire can produce significant spalling on the inside of the vehicle

The development of spalling

Spall Liners

INDIRECT FIRE

Typically blast and shell fragments from artillery

FIRE

Molotov cocktails are still surprisingly effective and with the increasing proliferation of knowledge about how to create high burn temperature mixtures coupled with a greater likelihood of operating in hybrid conflicts in urbanised areas fire should be seen as a key future threat.

NBC

Although seen as a lower likelihood it is still critical for armoured vehicles to be protected against the impacts of nuclear, chemical and biological weapon systems.

ELECTRONIC

Electronic attack may be increasingly important and future vehicles begin to rely more and more on electronic systems for sensors, weapons and even propulsion.

Mitigation

To mitigate the effects of the threats highlighted above is a complex business. Ignoring the active means of defence, shoot them before they shoot you, vehicle protection is essentially passive in nature and even if we take the so called active protection systems in account they are still passive in so much that they are initiated in response to an attack.

ARMOUR

Steel, aluminium and advanced ceramic composite armours continue to develop, greater protection and decreased weight being the goal. Fabric armours are also an interesting recent innovation and highly advanced materials like graphene show great potential.

For lightweight vehicles composite materials offer an excellent blend of protection and low weight. DSTL and NP Aerospace have developed CAMAC EFP system that instead of using conventional ceramic tiles, packages small hexagonal ceramic segments into a resin matrix that is said to offer much better performance.

CAMAC EFP

An earlier development that looked at composite armour was the DERA/QinetiQ and Vickers Defence Advanced Composite Armoured Vehicle Platform (ACAVP) that used a Fox turret and Warrior running gear mounted on a complete composite hull.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The so called plastic tank was the world’s first monocoque armoured vehicle chassis that used composites instead of metals for load bearing and protection. Advantages included a 15% reduction in weight, reduced thermal and radar signature, improved protection and resistance to corrosion (especially in salt water)

Advanced Composite Armoured Vehicle Platform (ACAVP)

At 24 tonnes it had frontal protection against 30mm AP and 14.5mm protection elsewhere. It is now in the Tank Museum which is somewhat ironic given that it was designed to meet a future 18-25 tonne reconnaissance vehicle, the £6 million ACAVP being a precursor to TRACER.

The demonstrator was designed around a central mission module with driver and commander sitting side by side.

More details here, here, here and here.

Developed by Corus, Bodycote, DSTL, QinetiQ and the University of Cambridge, perforated Super Bainite steel armour not only improves ballistic performance it reduces weight, comes in at a fraction of the price of conventional armour steel and provides a sovereign production capability.

Super Bainite

Flash Bainite makes some very bold claims, stating that it is cheaper, lighter, higher performing and easier to work with than conventional aluminium armour.

To disrupt the molten jet produces by shaped charge warheads DSTL has been investigating electric armour

Upon impact, an explosive warhead shoots a jet of hot copper into the target at several miles per second. Capable of penetrating over 1 foot of solid steel armour, this simple weapon can destroy a modern armoured infantry combat vehicle or tank. Few vehicles could practicably carry the weight of armour needed to resist such impacts, so the MOD’s scientific arm, the DSTL (Defence Science & Technology Laboratory) has been charged with developing a lighter solution.

The result is an Electric Armour system that DSTL claims will reduce the effect of impacts by such projectiles to almost zero.

Developed at DSTL’s R&D facility in Fort Halstead, Kent, the system consists of an outer skin – made from an unspecified high-strength alloy – that can be rapidly electrified to several thousand volts.

When hit by an RPG, the incoming copper jet has to pass through the electrified layers.

DSTL’s Professor John Brown explains how it works: ‘the high speed copper jet is virtually instantaneously dispersed by the powerful fields generated by the so-called ‘Pulsed Power’ System carried by the vehicle. Any residual debris is absorbed by the vehicle’s ordinary armoured hull.’

In a recent demonstration to high level British Army and MOD Customers, an armoured personnel carrier equipped with the system was subjected to repeated attacks, some from point blank range, and suffered only cosmetic damage.

Professor Brown says that the system, which weighs only a couple of tonnes, has a protective effect equal to carrying an extra 10 – 20 tonnes of steel armour

electric armour

There would seem to be a considerable number of obstacles to overcome to make this militarily practical and resistant to simple countermeasures.

The fundamental problem with exotic composite armour is that they become prohibitively expensive.

Applique armour is simply armour that is ‘added’, or up armouring.

If one looks at pictures of almost any modern military vehicle it will be obvious that up armouring is extremely common.

Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Naked)

Warrior with Increased Armour (WRAP2)

Warrior with bar armour

Modern developments in this area include not only the materials but also how they are applied, modular or tuneable protection kits can be used to tailor protection to suit the threat environment, assist with transport and allow easier replacement in the field.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Scimitar BAR armour

Used since the emergence of shaped charge warheads spaced armour is a typical add-on for vehicles. Available in rod or bar configurations the familiar cage armour seeks to place distance between the warhead and vehicle skin. In order to be effective, shaped charge warheads but be initiated at a specific distance from the target in order to allow space for the jet to form, by holding the warhead away from the vehicle, penetration is greatly reduced. The armour will also seek to physically disrupt the weapon.

The British company Amsafe Bridport produce a lightweight version of spaced or offset armour called Tarian. Amsafe are a traditional manufacturer of aircraft cargo nets, they make the largest cargo net in the world for the A400 for example and in conjunction with DSTL created Tarian.

Tarian on HET

Tarian with dazzle colour scheme

Tarian was developed as a UOR for the princely sum of £500k and is a blend of different materials encapsulated in a fabric skin. It is fire proof and offers some ballistic protection in addition to high levels of RPG protection. Tarian is currently used on the Oshkosh Heavy Equipment Transporters and has been tested on a number of other vehicles.

Tarian quickshield

Tarian QuickShield is a rapid replacement kit for damaged or missing bar armour, because it is so lightweight it can be carried as part of a vehicle’s standard equipment and is no in service with the MoD.

The latest version is called Tarian Extreme that has been extensively tested and is said to be 90% lighter than traditional steel bar armour, just as effective capable of being easily repaired in the field and much cheaper.

Tarian extreme on a Warthog/Bronco

Amsafe have an agreement with ST Kinetics to use Tarian on its vehicles, the Bronco or Warthog as shown below

Tarian has huge potential, not just for vehicles and forms part of the Textron TRAPSnet system.

With possibly the exception of fabric armour, applique armour adds weight, sometimes a lot of weight. If a vehicle is not designed to accommodate this weight mobility and reliability will adversely suffer.

FRES Scout, is designed to deal with this potential weight growth, a clever move.

SHAPING

Shaping or sloping can increase protection against direct fire and blast effects.

The familiar sloped front and sides of armoured fighting vehicle is designed to increase the effective thickness of armour and present a glancing surface to projectiles.

To protect against mines and buried IED’s V shaped hulls deflect the blast up and around the vehicle rather than providing a flat surface for the blast to act upon.

Deep V shaped hulls has many disadvantages and one technique that is being investigated is to use a chimney to channel the blast wave, no I have not been on the sherry.

blast chimney test

A recent Marine Corps Times article said the following;

While the tests’ results remain classified, DARPA officials say the blasts indicate a Humvee equipped with the structural blast chimney provides the mandatory survivability level required of an M-ATV, the lightest version of the military’s mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. And it does so at almost half the weight.

Not a universal panacea the Hardwire LLC blast chimney is at least a promising alternative.

SACRIFICIAL COMPONENTS and ABSORBTION

Designing components so that they come away in response to blast, for example, reduces resistance to blast and reduces the likelihood of a large under body explosion flipping the vehicle over. Although the vehicle may be rendered unusable its occupants survive.

Blast absorption matting is commonly used on the floors of armoured vehicles.

SPALL LININGS

Spall linings are designed to protect the vehicles occupants from high speed fragmentation caused by direct fire.

Because they are generally made from aramid, spun glass and other spun or woven fibre materials they provide a great deal of additional protection for only a modest increase in weight and cost. Spall linings are also mostly fire resistant.

DSTL are active in the field of armour research and last year, in conjunction with Ricardo, developed a new lining material;

Spall liners are an arrangement of molecularly manipulated polyethylene, the same material used to produce supermarket carrier bags. The polyethylene is spun into a fibre and compressed tightly; the units feel similar to dense wood, albeit lighter with far higher resilience to ballistic stress.

These were subsequently tested on the Foxhound light protected patrol vehicle.

The materials used in spall liners are also combined with other material to form integrated protection panels.

SEATING and INTERNAL FITTINGS

The careful arrangement of pedals, controls and various internal fittings does not have a great deal of bearing on vehicle survivability but has a significant impact on the survival of its occupants. Blast protected seating that insulates the seat from the vehicles floor, suspending the seat from the roof, has also seen a much greater use.

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Filtering chemical, biological and radioactive particles is a simple method of protecting a vehicles occupant’s. Operating inside an enclosed vehicle in high or low ambient temperatures can be debilitating and rapidly inhibit effectiveness so heating and air conditioning are essential.

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

Active electronic countermeasures are used to prematurely detonate or defeat the trigger mechanisms of mines and IED’s, it is an area that the UK is seen as a leader in although by going low-tech and employing simple pressure plate systems enemy forces can simply negate the many millions spent on these systems.

ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

Active systems have tried to create a step change in protection against direct attacks by reducing the need for heavy armour.

A number of systems exist or are in development

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT

Specifically for direct attack, if the vehicle cannot be seen it cannot be shot at, so visual, thermal, electronic and sound signature testing and reduction is an essential part of a vehicles protection matrix.

The BAE Systems Adaptiv IR Camouflage system has recently been demonstrated

Click here to view the embedded video.

Although less exotic the Saab Barracuda signature management system is relatively cheap and in widespread use.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Even RF signature reduction on electrical and electronic connectors and enclosures plays a part.

DEF STAN 59-411 covers electromagnetic compatibility.

FIRE SUPPRESSION

Moving to diesel and away from petrol was an obvious means of fire protection but active fire suppression systems are still widely used in engine compartments to protect against oil mist fires and explosions.

Click here to view the embedded video.

External fire suppression is likely to be seen as important when operating in urban areas.

Standards

Testing is a hideously complex subject to many international and national standards.

The most commonly known is STANAG 4569, this describes Protection Levels for Occupants of Logistics and Light Armoured Vehicles.

The version was released in 1999 and the second revision in 2004 which included fragmentation, grenade and mine blasts.

The levels are described as;

Level 1

Kinetic Energy

7.62 x 51 NATO Ball (Ball M80) at 30 meters with velocity 833 m/s

Grenade and Mine Blast

Hand grenades, unexploded artillery fragmenting sub munitions, and other small anti-personnel explosive devices detonated under the vehicle.

Level 2

Kinetic Energy

7.62 x 39 API BZ at 30 meters with 695 m/s

Grenade and Mine Blast Threat

6 kg (explosive mass) Blast AT Mine:

2a – Mine Explosion pressure activated under any wheel or track location

2b – Mine Explosion under centre

Level 3

Kinetic Energy

7.62 x 51 AP (WC core) at 30 meters with 930 m/s

Grenade and Mine Blast Threat

8 kg (explosive mass) Blast AT Mine:

3a – Mine Explosion pressure activated under any wheel or track location

3b – Mine Explosion under centre

Level 4

Kinetic Energy

14.5x114AP / B32 at 200 meters with 911 m/s

Artillery

155 mm High Explosive at 30 m

Grenade and Mine Blast Threat

10 kg (explosive mass) Blast AT Mine:

4a – Mine Explosion pressure activated under any wheel or track location

4b – Mine Explosion under centre

Level 5

Kinetic Energy

25 mm APDS-T (M791) or TLB 073 at 500 meters with 1258 m/s

Artillery

155m High Explosive at 25m

Other related standards include STANAG 2920, EN 1523 and EN 1063.

Complimenting STANAG 4569 is the NATO RTO-TR-HFM-090 test methodology for determining Protection of Vehicle Occupants against Anti-Vehicular Landmine Effects. This seeks to look at the occupants not the vehicle.

View the full (and very complex) document here

These should be seen as starting points, not the end of the conversation.

For example, the Foxhound is reported as only having Level 2 protection but given the complimentary design of all the features I think it would be arguably a better place to be than for example, an older design at a similar level.

It should also be noted that availability plays a key role in survivability, if a vehicle is not serviceable because it takes too long to repair or maintain then it doesn’t matter what its protection level is.

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory

The MoD’s DSTL has an active materials research programme run by the Materials and Structures Technology Science and technology Centre (MAST STC) whose objectives are to support in the long term;

• Collaboration
• Maximising impact
• Innovation
• Maintaining the UK Defence materials capability

It is an area in which the UK has a strong reputation; Chobham and Dorchester armour were of course developed in the UK.

Its current targets are as expressed as;

Critical materials capabilities: Maintain a UK defence materials capability, including the sovereign Low Observable materials capability, areas where UK industry is not committed to continue supporting but are required for sovereign reasons and ensuring UK sources of strategic materials for defence.

Value for money: with reduced funding, materials are needed which are cheaper, last longer, are more reliable whilst maintaining or improving performance.

Support to current platforms: Providing improved materials, knowledge and materials advice to help sustain current defence capability

Future threats and opportunities: Develop novel materials with performance beyond current requirements to meet future requirements. Reduce technical risk in current and future platforms

Work Package 3.1 is for metallic and ceramic structural and protection materials.

Work package 3.2 is for polymers and composites structural and protection materials.

Read more here and here

Trade Offs and Trends

It is obvious but worth saying anyway, in order to mitigate threats one has to implement a range of solutions. Those solutions invariably lead to the need to trade increased protection with other capability areas.

Implementing a V shaped hull to protect against mines and IED’s will generally increase the height and centre of gravity of a vehicle, thus making it less mobile and more likely to have to be driven through vulnerable areas, increasing the chance of it being attacked.

Increasing armour thickness to protect against direct fire will increase weight and thus require a more substantial engine with its increase in fuel consumption, this increase in fuel consumption means putting people who provide that extra fuel into harms way.

There are areas on the margin where improvements can be had for minimal cost but in general every action has a reaction.

A market survey carried out by Defence IQ last year showed that the vast majority (90%) of responders believe IED’s will be a significant future threat with Heavy Machine Guns and RPG’s following closely.

One day, vehicle designers may well have to deal with laser beams and plasma rifles but that will be no more complex than it is today!

It is generally accepted that for serious mobility, especially where low surface compaction or high tractive force is needed, tracks are superior to wheels. Another generally accepted fact is that tracks have higher running costs, create more vibration, are noisier and have higher fuel consumption.

Various FRES studies seemed to draw the same conclusions and there are some interesting (although quite old) research papers on the web;

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0744222

http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/eng8171

But, there are a number of technologies and designs that have and are chipping away at these assumptions, wheels and track technology does not stand still.

We all know about the Supacat ATMP and BAE BVs10 Viking but these are the more unusual and mostly civilian solutions.

If these don’t wet your appetite then head over to Unusual Locomotion

Articulation

Forestry Machines

http://www.epsilonkran.com/eng/produkte/off_road/aufbaubilder.php

http://www.hsm-forest.net/

http://www.ponsse.com/english/media/publications/videos.php

http://www.deere.co.uk/wps/dcom/en_GB/products/equipment/forwarders/forwarders.page

http://www.rottne.com/uk/

http://www.gremo.se/default.asp?id=SKOTARE1350VT_MEDIA&seek=&ref=&gid=&sidaNr=1

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

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Articulated Loaders and Derived Designs

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And to close this video mini series

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Yes, I have watched them all

It is generally accepted that for serious mobility, especially where low surface compaction or high tractive force is needed, tracks are superior to wheels. Another generally accepted fact is that tracks have higher running costs, create more vibration, are noisier and have higher fuel consumption.

Various FRES studies seemed to draw the same conclusions and there are some interesting (although quite old) research papers on the web;

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0744222

http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/eng8171

But, there are a number of technologies and designs that have and are chipping away at these assumptions, wheels and track technology does not stand still.

We all know about the Supacat ATMP and BAE BVs10 Viking but these are the more unusual and mostly civilian solutions.

If these don’t wet your appetite then head over to Unusual Locomotion

Hybrid Wheel Tracks

http://www.galileomobility.com/

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is generally accepted that for serious mobility, especially where low surface compaction or high tractive force is needed, tracks are superior to wheels. Another generally accepted fact is that tracks have higher running costs, create more vibration, are noisier and have higher fuel consumption.

Various FRES studies seemed to draw the same conclusions and there are some interesting (although quite old) research papers on the web;

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0744222

http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/eng8171

But, there are a number of technologies and designs that have and are chipping away at these assumptions, wheels and track technology does not stand still.

We all know about the Supacat ATMP and BAE BVs10 Viking but these are the more unusual and mostly civilian solutions.

If these don’t wet your appetite then head over to Unusual Locomotion

Hill Climbing and Ditches

Berky

http://www.berky.de/index.php?ID=1041

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Menzi Muck

http://www.menzimuck.com/index-en.html

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

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This is my favourite clip because the driver has a fag on, very cool

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is generally accepted that for serious mobility, especially where low surface compaction or high tractive force is needed, tracks are superior to wheels. Another generally accepted fact is that tracks have higher running costs, create more vibration, are noisier and have higher fuel consumption.

Various FRES studies seemed to draw the same conclusions and there are some interesting (although quite old) research papers on the web;

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0744222

http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/eng8171

But, there are a number of technologies and designs that have and are chipping away at these assumptions, wheels and track technology does not stand still.

We all know about the Supacat ATMP and BAE BVs10 Viking but these are the more unusual and mostly civilian solutions.

If these don’t wet your appetite then head over to Unusual Locomotion

Extra Wide Tracks

Pisten Bully

http://www.pistenbully.com/en/products/special-purposes.html

Click here to view the embedded video.

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Prinoth

http://en.prinoth.com/Utility-Vehicles/Go-Tract%C2%AE-4500

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is generally accepted that for serious mobility, especially where low surface compaction or high tractive force is needed, tracks are superior to wheels. Another generally accepted fact is that tracks have higher running costs, create more vibration, are noisier and have higher fuel consumption.

Various FRES studies seemed to draw the same conclusions and there are some interesting (although quite old) research papers on the web;

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0744222

http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/eng8171

But, there are a number of technologies and designs that have and are chipping away at these assumptions, wheels and track technology does not stand still.

We all know about the Supacat ATMP and BAE BVs10 Viking but these are the more unusual and mostly civilian solutions.

If these don’t wet your appetite then head over to Unusual Locomotion

Ice and Water

Arktos

http://www.arktoscraft.com/gallery.htm

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is generally accepted that for serious mobility, especially where low surface compaction or high tractive force is needed, tracks are superior to wheels. Another generally accepted fact is that tracks have higher running costs, create more vibration, are noisier and have higher fuel consumption.

Various FRES studies seemed to draw the same conclusions and there are some interesting (although quite old) research papers on the web;

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0744222

http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/eng8171

But, there are a number of technologies and designs that have and are chipping away at these assumptions, wheels and track technology does not stand still.

We all know about the Supacat ATMP and BAE BVs10 Viking but these are the more unusual and mostly civilian solutions.

If these don’t wet your appetite then head over to Unusual Locomotion

Legs

Plustech/Timberjack Walker

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Big Dog

http://www.bostondynamics.com/robot_bigdog.html

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is generally accepted that for serious mobility, especially where low surface compaction or high tractive force is needed, tracks are superior to wheels. Another generally accepted fact is that tracks have higher running costs, create more vibration, are noisier and have higher fuel consumption.

Various FRES studies seemed to draw the same conclusions and there are some interesting (although quite old) research papers on the web;

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0744222

http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/eng8171

But, there are a number of technologies and designs that have and are chipping away at these assumptions, wheels and track technology does not stand still.

We all know about the Supacat ATMP and BAE BVs10 Viking but these are the more unusual and mostly civilian solutions.

If these don’t wet your appetite then head over to Unusual Locomotion

Over Wheel Tracks

Ecotracks

http://www.eco-tracks.com/default.aspx?id=5228&ptid=4755

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

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Click here to view the embedded video.

Prowler Tracks

http://www.prowlertracks.com/

Click here to view the embedded video.

Solideal

http://www.solideal.ca/tracks.asp

Click here to view the embedded video.

Hovertrack

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is generally accepted that for serious mobility, especially where low surface compaction or high tractive force is needed, tracks are superior to wheels. Another generally accepted fact is that tracks have higher running costs, create more vibration, are noisier and have higher fuel consumption.

Various FRES studies seemed to draw the same conclusions and there are some interesting (although quite old) research papers on the web;

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0744222

http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/eng8171

But, there are a number of technologies and designs that have and are chipping away at these assumptions, wheels and track technology does not stand still.

We all know about the Supacat ATMP and BAE BVs10 Viking but these are the more unusual and mostly civilian solutions.

If these don’t wet your appetite then head over to Unusual Locomotion

Direct Wheel Replacement

4orce Mobility

http://www.4orcemobility.com/

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

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Click here to view the embedded video.

Mattracks

http://www.mattracks.com/

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Surtrac

http://www.ebertwelding.com/groomers/surtrac/

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Soucy Tracks

http://www.soucy-track.com/en-CA/home

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

J Wheels

http://www.j-wheelz.com/

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is generally accepted that for serious mobility, especially where low surface compaction or high tractive force is needed, tracks are superior to wheels. Another generally accepted fact is that tracks have higher running costs, create more vibration, are noisier and have higher fuel consumption.

Various FRES studies seemed to draw the same conclusions and there are some interesting (although quite old) research papers on the web;

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0744222

http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/eng8171

But, there are a number of technologies and designs that have and are chipping away at these assumptions, wheels and track technology does not stand still.

We all know about the Supacat ATMP and BAE BVs10 Viking but these are the more unusual and mostly civilian solutions.

If these don’t wet your appetite then head over to Unusual Locomotion

Amphibians

Fast Track Amphibian

http://www.fasttrackamphibian.com/

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Gibbs Technology

http://www.gibbstech.com/humdinga.php

Click here to view the embedded video.

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National Oil Well

http://www.nov.com/Well_Service_and_Completion/All_Terrain_Vehicles.aspx

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Remu

http://www.remu.fi/

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Lighter units whose ability to move rapidly may have different needs to others and secondary roles may take on a greater importance. A light armoured vehicle may be compromised when acting in support of a heavy armoured brigade but might be just the ticket for a light role rapid reaction force.

With FRES SV and Protected Patrol Vehicles like Mastiff we have become increasingly ‘weightier’ and this will inevitably have an impact on operational agility around the area of operations. With an increasing focus on protection from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan this weight and size increase has very real implications on mobility.

The ability to quickly move a light force, equipped with a modest degree of protection/firepower, is still a capability we should strive for and enhance. Whether this is air dropping or more likely by helicopter is to some extent, detail. In the teeth of increasingly competent air defence systems this might seem an anachronism but mobility and agility allow one to advance from unpredictable locations, cut forces off and apply decisive combat power to rear areas for example. This means that some equipment has to fit in the payload and space envelope of helicopters and aircraft.

Mobility in all its guises is still a critical design factor and in the general move to favour protection in the protection/mobility/firepower triad we should still give mobility some priority.

This is a fundamental problem that Western forces face, the desire to reduce casualties by increasing protection has an adverse effect on mobility that in turn, could increase casualties.

There are of course no easy answers, just a number of sometimes uneasy trade-offs and compromises.

Arriving in Theatre

We make the assumption that the theatre of operations for land forces is not going to be in the South East of England repelling the French. Modern operations are predicated on playing nothing but away matches and so the ability to transport the personnel, stores, equipment and vehicles to distant places is the first consideration.

RAIL

For most vehicles the limitations placed on rail travel are not considerable although the weight of main battle tanks usually requires heavy duty flatbed wagons. Unless operations are to be conducted in Europe rail transportation of vehicles is unlikely, even though the British Army operate rail transportation systems in Germany and Canada with specialists from The Royal Logistic Corps and the Royal Engineers.

Rail transportation to theatre is actually very efficient; it is fast at between 30 and 50 mph and very cheap.

As heavy equipment is withdrawn from Germany back to the UK, rail transportation either to the Marchwood Sea Mounting Centre, the Channel Tunnel and other ports may become more frequent.

Standard flat-bed wagons can accommodate loads up to 2.59m high and low loaders, 2.89m high.

CVR(T) Rail transport - Starstreak

Because rail freight business is concentrated on loose bulk materials, liquids and intermodal containers the standard rail flat is the width of an ISO container, 2.44m. Vehicles that are wider can of course overhang but this may be a limiting factor on some routes and Challenger 2 and its derivatives are too wide for use on the UK rail network but CVR(T), Warrior and other vehicles can be moved by rail. Challenger 2 can be moved on some European rail networks.

The Warflat wagon was developed in WWII (images from IWM here) and has seen extensive service since but many of these are now in the hands of collectors, with a maximum payload of between 40 and 50 tonnes, depending on weight distribution, they would not be able to carry the main battle tanks of today. The Warwell is a low loader style flat wagon often used to carry Warriors and because of their width, a special platform is also sometimes used to raise them above the height a platform to avoid fouling. The older FV432 can be carried on standard flats but anything with storage bins or other equipment fitted to the roof must be carried on the low loader style Warwell.

CVR(T) on a Warwell flat wagon (courtesy PG Models)

Warrior on a Warwell flat wagon (courtesy PG Models)

The Movement Control Association has an excellent article on the use of trains in 1942, click here to view.

Modern railway flat wagons can are often fitted with quick opening tarpaulins which obviously avoid prying eyes knowing what is being carried.

If we look at the constraining factors for vehicle design and railway mobility it is the width of a vehicle that is a key issue, to a lesser extent height and even less so, weight. If a vehicle can be designed to be less than 2.35m wide and 2.39m high, the internal dimensions of a standard ISO container then it will be able to use the civilian rail container transport infrastructure in many countries.

ROAD

As with rail, there may be limited circumstances where we can deploy directly to the point of entry via road, renewed conflict in the Balkans for example. Road transportability is also important for training and UK movements, abnormal load regulations are fiendishly complex, click here, but loads (including tractor and flatbed trailer) over 44 tonnes or 2.9m width require special permissions and notifications.

Oshkosh Heavy Equipment Transporter

Oshkosh Heavy Equipment Transporter

Driving to a European theatre is again possible but with obvious limitations. Outside the UK these restrictions might not apply but moving from the port or point of entry via road will be the norm so road and bridge classification and the availability of suitable transport is an issue concern.

SEA

The most common form of getting to theatre will be by sea, at least for any sustained or operation excluding the light role rapid reaction units. Whether by civilian ships, the Point class RORO PFI or amphibious shipping the main limitation is vehicle length and availability of ports and offload facilities

By using RORO ships heavy equipment can be driven straight off a boat and onto waiting road or rail transport for movement to the area of operation.

UK Forces in Bosnia

UK Forces in Bosnia

Point Class RORO

Using ISO container flatracks to move vehicles removes reliance on RORO vessels or RORO port handling facilities and allows a deployment to take advantage of the global ISO container logistics system, ISO flatracks can utilise widely used lighterage and barge systems to move inshore.

DROPS CVR(T)

The value of this should not be underestimated; a number of 105mm Light Guns were moved into the Balkans using ISO containers for example.

Domino Flatrack for CVR(T)

Standard intermodal flatrack usage would tend to restrain width to 2.3m. Length of a single TEU is about 6m and a weight limit of 30 odd tonnes. Height is also about 2.2m but this is less critical as they can be double stacked.

AIR

Usually a last resort, most air transportation to theatre by air is for highly sensitive vehicle traffic or those that are time critical.

Warrior being transported to Afghanistan in a C17

Warrior infantry fighting vehicle inside a C17

When discussing vehicles most people tend to dismiss air transportability as a secondary consideration, arguing that if a vehicle is going to be operating alongside heavy armoured forces there is very little point in moving them expensively by air where they will sit and wait until the big fellas arrive. There is much common sense in the position but there are certain limited circumstances where deploying by air a modest armoured force can be decisive. Rapid intervention with light forces, reinforced with light/medium armour, can be very effective. The original FRES concept was predicated on moving a medium weight intervention force by air direct to theatre by air. As we all know this was flawed in many aspects not least the amount of aircraft required but there is still some value in the concept and the weight limitations of available aircraft should be considered when designing equipment.

For the UK, those relevant future aircraft are the A400, C17 and occasionally chartered Antonov 124’s.

C17 Cargo Hold Dimensions

AN 124 Cargo Hold Dimensions

The C17 can lift about 70 tonnes and whilst the UK has never transported Challenger 2 by C17 other nations have done so with their main battle tanks, the capability is proven even if we don’t practice it. It’s not generally recommended though and certainly not a practical exercise for austere locations. Vehicles between 20 and 40 tonnes could be carried comfortably and the UK has transported Warrior vehicles to Afghanistan using C17’s as in the picture above.

In pitching a vehicle at the 20-30 tonne level, 2 are transportable per C17 or at a much lighter weight and depending on dimensions; up to 6 may be transported.

The A400 has yet to fully demonstrate a maximum load but the UK requirement is for 30 tonnes and the A400 website lists a maximum of 37 tonnes. Payload inevitably impacts on range and the same website lists a strategically significant range of 2,450nm at 30 tonnes and 3,450nm at 20 tonnes. The ability to move such payloads at range is one of the significant performance features of the A400, even if it will be concrete runway to concrete runway for most of the time.

A vehicle with a weight of 15 tonnes means 2 at a time or 30 tonnes means one in an A400 or 2 in a C17, there are a number of combinations that can be tried.

To fit into an A400 and C17, the width of a vehicle needs to be less than 4m wide and 3.85m high.

Weight will affect range, as the diagram below shows

Range and Payload, X axis in 1000 miles, Y axis in 1000kg

Air dropping direct to theatre might be seen as an anachronism and easily dismissed but it is a capability we should not lightly discard, even for vehicles.

When the C130K leaves service and the A400 enters the existing Medium Stressed Platform will no longer be able to be used so a new platform is hopefully going to be obtained, the obvious choice would be Type V platform from Airlift Technologies.

The Type V can accommodate vehicles up to 19 tonnes, 19.5m long and approximately 2.3m wide.

Getting to the Action

In some locations the point of entry might also be the area of operation, Sierra Leone being a good example, but in others the area of operation might be some distance to the point or port of entry and this leg if often called ‘intra theatre’

If a vehicle is flown direct to Bastion it does not have a long way to get to the area of operation but if the said vehicle goes by a Point class RORO ship that disembarks at Karachi it has a very long and hazardous road move ahead.

Generally speaking, the same options exist except perhaps for rail although it should never be completely discounted because local rail infrastructure might be used depending on location.

AIR

Because the intra theatre journeys are shorter and end locations not always endowed with 10,000 feet runways the type of aircraft used will change, tactical airlifters and helicopters. There are a number of grey areas because both the A400 and C17 can be used in a tactical context.

in a typical hub and spoke operation, strategic aircraft will bring in personnel and supplies (sometimes vehicles) to a strategically located main operating base location and tactical airlift aircraft will bring them forward to smaller airfields, Kandahar to Bastion being a good example, at least until the new runways at Bastion were built. There are a wide variety of scenarios here that might affect vehicle design but with the A400 and C17 being more or less capable of both strategic and tactical airlift operations this hub and spoke arrangement might not always be the best model.

The same cargo hold and weight limitations would therefore apply, and equally for air despatch.

ROAD

There are two options, self-deploy or catch a lift. Self-deploying significant a distance for tracked vehicles is fuel intensive, causes a great deal of expensive track wear and therefore they tend to be carried to the area of operation on a low loader.

Wheeled vehicles can self-deploy much greater distances although segmented band tracks on light and medium weight vehicles can reduce the impact somewhat. This is one of the great attractions of wheeled vehicles, like FRES UV for example.

The UK has a small fleet of 96 Oskosh Heavy Equipment Transporters operated under a 20 year, £290 million PFI with Fasttrax. The original trailer used for transporting heavy vehicles was from King Trailers but given the poor road infrastructure in Afghanistan a number of Broshuis rough terrain trailers have also been obtained to allow the HET fleet to operate.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Another video

Heavy Equipment Transporters in Afghanistan

A lighter vehicle, like CVR(T) or Viking can be easily transported on more or less any truck, civilian or army. A simple jib can lift it onto the truck bed and move it long distances, even though CVR(T) can move quite effectively on road. DROPS have also been used quite often for deploying small vehicles including CVR(T), the Balkans especially made use of this method

One of the implications of replacing CVR(T), which can move forward under its own steam or on the back of any truck, with the 30 tonne plus FRES SV is that road moves forward will not be possible with anything but one of the 96 Heavy Equipment Transporters and specialist trailers. If we are only buying a handful this might not be so bad but given the numbers envisaged, unless we significantly increase the HET and trailer numbers in the PFI then we might have difficulty assembling a sufficiently strong force in reasonable time, this could lead to vulnerabilities as speed of deployment to a forward area is reduced.

SEA

Although less likely than road or air, vehicles can of course be moved to the area of operations by a short sea journey and landed via Mexeflotes or landing craft for example.

Cutting about the Battlefield

Freedom of movement on the battlefield is critical to effectiveness and there are many factors that influence battlefield mobility.

AIR MOBILITY

We use air mobility to rapidly move light forces.

Internal carriage in a Chinook means that slinging can be dispensed with, drag massively reduced and range and handling increased.

Supacat Extenda Chinook

The Germans have developed the Mungo to be internally transportable in their CH53’s

Mungo

For vehicles that can at least stay within the sling load limitation of the Chinook this remains a useful option.

Chinook HC2 and underslung Land Rover

CVR(T) Sling Load Operation Agricola

Chinook and BV206

Chinook and Land Rover WMIK flying off HMS Ocean

WEIGHT and GROUND PRESSURE

Although absolute weight is often less important than ground pressure it is still important, especially for bridges and road surfaces.

The NATO standard means of defining the ability of a surface to bear particular weights is called the Military Load Classification (MLC) system and common break points are 30 and 70, we use Class 30 and Class 70 trackway for example.

In an area with poor road and particularly, bridge infrastructure, no matter what the ground pressure, the vehicle weight will dictate tactical mobility. Existing bridges can be supplemented with military bridges and here, the classification system is important.

Most close support , general support and logistic bridges are in excess of Class 70 but for lightweight forces the kind of military bridge usually available have a lower classification.

The Air Portable Ferry Bridge currently in service with the Royal Engineers has an MLC of 35 which is close to FRES SV and UV although one might reasonably assume that neither will be in service with such light or air mobile forces.

Whilst CVR(T) could easily cross even poor bridges its replacement, the ASCOD based FRES SV Scout at a weight in excess of 30 tonnes will need more robust road and bridge infrastructure.

German BVs10 in Afghanistan

Ground pressure is a critical factor where the underlying surface is soft, snow, marsh or loose sand for example. Soil mechanics and ground pressure is a fiendishly complex subject that simple generalisations defy but the seemingly constant battle of tracks versus wheels is often distilled into simple statements that tracks will always be better than wheels is the soft stuff.

The videos below shows that as 8×8 designs have evolved, or gained weight form turrets, additional armour and electronic systems the degradation in mobility even in what might be reasonably considered to be only mild off road conditions is obvious.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

As impressive as these splashy bouncy videos are they do seem to be suspiciously on dry and firm ground, not much marsh, deep mud or snow to be seen.

Tracks do not necessarily confer immunity from the effects of soft ground

CVR(T) Stuck

Promotional videos for tracked vehicles do tend to focus on soft ground performance though.

Click here to view the embedded video.

An example of extreme mobility over soft ground is the BVs10 Viking, its articulated design, very wide tracks and high power to weight ratio provides superb off road performance.

Click here to view the embedded video.

For many years the British Army has been conducting operations in dry places but operations in the Balkans should remind us of the need for mobility over soft ground, unless of course we only plan on operating in hot and dusty places!

SIZE

One of the original design constraints for CVR(T) was the distance between rubber trees in what is now Malaysia, vehicle width was a direct response to the terrain.

CVR(T) narrow tracks

The images below show a couple of instances where small vehicles can get to places that would be denied to larger vehicles.

Fennek in Afghanistan

This is not necessarily a bad thing in itself but if it has an impact on carrying out a given task then size becomes an issue!

ROAD DAMAGE

In a high intensity conflict this is not necessarily a concern but in counter insurgency or peace support operations heavy tracked vehicles churning up roads and counter-productive and so wheeled vehicles have a significant advantage.

Modern segmented band tracks from Diehl, Astrum and Soucy are addressing some of the traditional disadvantages of rubber pad metal tracks.

CV90 band tracks

The image above shows BAE CV90 with segmented band tracks, they are currently in Afghanistan.

ANGLES

Gradients determine if the vehicle can traverse steep inclines, head or side one.

Approach angles can be determined by overhang in front of the wheels or tracks.

Contrast this image of a Warrior

Warrior

With a Stryker

Stryker

This video from British Pathe shows vehicles being tested on gradient test tracks.

SPEED, ACCELERATION and DECELERATION

Top speed and high rates of acceleration and deceleration are always useful and an integral part of battlefield mobility. The general assumption is that wheeled vehicles have a higher speed and greater rates of acceleration but depending on the surface tracked vehicles can demonstrate impressive speeds and it is important to make the distinction between high speeds and useable high speeds over difficult terrain.

I seem to recall CVR(T) holds the track record at the Nurburgring for tracked vehicle and of course, any video of the Ripsaw will show that tracked vehicles are capable of extreme speed.

Click here to view the embedded video.

With wheeled vehicles the geometry of the drivetrain and payload tends to produce a vehicle with a higher centre of gravity that can be dangerous in high speed manoeuvring

PUSHING and PULLING

Although not necessarily a mobility issue per se it is still an important consideration for vehicle designers. You don’t see many wheeled bulldozers because the transferring the power of the engine to low speed pushing or pulling is greatly aided the increased ground contact area of tracks.

Pulling is usually used for recovering vehicle casualties in the absence of specialist equipment but pushing is used more often.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Pushing examples might include moving a road block or vehicle casualty out of the way or pushing over a tree.

Warrior demonstrating the tractive force of a tracked vehicle

An upgraded British Army Warrior vehicle tows a Mastiff out of a wadi

Artificial obstacles in urban areas such as barricades, walls and cars etc present challenges to wheeled vehicles, not always insurmountable challenges but tracked vehicles, with their greater surface area on the ground and traction can more easily overcome these obstacles. The infamous US operation in Mogadishu showed that even old fashioned tracked vehicles like the M113 (driven by the Pakistani Army) could deliver winning effects in an urban environment, pushing through rubble and other obstacles.

In the aftermath of the special-forces capture in Basra, Operation Thyme was mounted against the Serious Crimes Unit in Jamiat police station. The outer wall was breached by a Medium Wheeled Tractor of 38 Engineer Regiment and through/over the resultant rubble a number of Warriors from the Staffordshire Regiment entered the compound. The shock delivered by this breach might have been impossible to conduct with a wheeled vehicle, instead of going through a breach a wheeled vehicle might have had to go through the entrance. In the video below the Warriors can be seen entering the compound and pushing other vehicles out of the way.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Bulldozer or obstacle clearance blades can be fitted to wheeled vehicles, especially the larger 8×8 types but they are generally not as effective as those attached to tracked vehicles.

DAMAGE RESISTANCE

If part of the vehicle is damaged retaining some mobility to get out of danger is a very attractive feature. Once a track becomes damaged, as robust as they are, or thrown then the vehicle is effectively immobile.

Modern wheeled combat vehicles are designed to retain mobility even if one or more wheels are destroyed.

The video below shows an early model LAV without a couple of wheels still being able to move (although the running gear has been chained up to prevent it digging in to the ground)

Click here to view the embedded video.

This video from British Pathe (at about 3 minutes in) shows that even in the sixties mobility in multi wheeled vehicles with one of those wheels ‘missing’

WATER

Many water obstacles can be forded, the interesting video below shows fording in Afghanistan, at about 2 minutes 50 seconds.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Wading kits used to be relatively common on armoured fighting vehicles but have fallen out of favour and a small number of vehicles are fully amphibious.

Leopard tank

This reduces the dependence on combat engineering but adds penalties related to complexity and weight.

GAP CROSSING

Simple ditches can be surprisingly effective vehicle barriers so the ability to cross irrigation ditches or manmade ditches is essential.

This is a driver training video (so the ditch is being crossed in slow time)

Click here to view the embedded video.

Tracked vehicles can generally cross larger gaps than wheeled and at a greater speed.

This video at about 1 minute

Click here to view the embedded video.

TURNING CIRCLE

With an increasing likelihood of operations being conducted in urban areas the ability to turn around and extricate oneself from trouble or negotiate tight streets is important.

Turning circle was one of the more challenging requirements for the Light Protected Patrol Vehicle that is being fulfilled by the Ocelot/Foxhound.

Tracked vehicles have the advantage of being able to turn on their own axis but some of the newer 8×8 wheeled combat vehicles can also perform this very neat trick.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Articulated vehicles like the Viking and Warthog cannot perform these turns although their articulation does allow relatively tight turns to be made.

FUEL CONSUMPTION and MAINTENANCE

Fuel consumption is an increasing concern, with asymmetric conflicts the need for combat logistics as opposed to logistics becomes a greater demand, absorbing valuable combat power. Every litre of fuel or spare part places a considerable strain on logistics and support arrangements. The larger protected patrol vehicles have increased fuel consumption enormously over previous types. Tracks generally have poorer fuel economy than wheeled vehicles but as soon as difficult terrain is encountered or in stop start activity this is reversed. Run flat tyres are very expensive and the US experience in Iraq with Stryker’s demonstrated that running costs are more expensive for wheeled vehicles than tracks (fuel and tyres).

If operated on hard surfaces for extended periods metal tracks tend to heat up and expand, requiring constant maintenance or running the risk of throwing a track.

The inherent complication of an 8×8 like drive train might need more maintenance than the very simple arrangements of a tracked vehicle but vibration from tracks causes many problems so whilst the wheeled drivetrain might have more parts and be more complex it isn’t necessarily more maintenance heavy.

Future systems are likely to take advantage of automotive hybrid systems, regenerative braking, fuel cells, advanced batteries and the broad technology base that is evident in the civilian sector will eventually find their way into military vehicles.

Break Points

In any design discussion there will inevitably be a series of break points.

One of the burning issues with vehicle design is to what extent we let aircraft payload factors dictate design.

There are two competing thoughts, keep to aircraft weight limitations and take what protection fits within that envelope or design a vehicle with the desired protection levels and buy aircraft to suit.

As with road and bridge classification there are a number of break points and multiples. The table below shows weight as the deciding factor (volume, floor loading and sling point load considerations are ignored)

Other considerations are road transportation, landing craft and recovery capacity

Stacking ISO flatracks is constrained by weight, a typical flatrack such as those manufactured by Domino can stack 9 high but only with a maximum weight of 24 tonnes, a tare weight approx 4 tonnes. ISO flatrack carriage will constrain vehicle width to just over 2.4m. The A400 has a 4m width cargo hold, the C17, 5.5m, Chinook, 2.3m and CH53K, 2.7m.

Keeping a vehicle width less than 2.4m provides the best combination; it could be carried on an ISO flat rack, the A400, CH53K and 2 abreast in the C17 but how would this affect protection, space for equipment and systems and stability?

By keeping a vehicle within the constraints of a 20foot ISO container/flatrack we can not only utilise the huge civilian infrastructure used to move them on the ocean but critically, also the intermodal facilities of ports and trucks. The main reason the UK entered into the Points Class PFI was because the international shipping market was consolidating on larger and fewer vessels, particularly pure car pure truck carriers (PCPT), availability of RORO shipping for expeditionary operations was becoming tenuous. Whilst the agreement provides for 6 vessels the flexibility and additional capacity in the civilian container shipping market could be exploited.

The sub 5 tonne weight bracket is basically for quad bikes and vehicles like the Roush LAS100, Supacat ATMP and stripped down Land Rovers.

10 tonnes is the key point for Chinook lift and 3 in a single A400 or 6 in a C17, 2 abreast

If we were to step up from the Chinook to the CH53K or the Chinook sucessor proposals the 15 tonne point becomes more realistic, 2 in an A400 and 4 in a c17. Given length issues, 2 in an A400 might be more feasible than 3. There is a constant pressure to improve helicopter lift capacity and the US and others have several studies and exploratory programmes, an evolved Chinook may be the result but ultimately, 15-18 tonnes is the likely end point for heavy vertical lift helicopters after Chinook.

Keeping a vehicle below 20 tonnes allows it to be carried on a C130 or some of the newer C130J class aircraft under development, the Embraer C-390 for example.

Beyond 20 tonnes the A400 only carries in singles and beyond 30 tonnes we start seeing mobility issues; ISO flatrack, DROPS, special load, bridges and trackways for example.

With tunable protection these hard limits can be bent a little. The German Puma, for example, uses a modular armour concept, the base vehicle is designed to be transported in the A400 with additional armour carried in follow on aircraft. It is most unlikely that a vehicle will speed down the aircraft ramp and get stuck in straight away so allowing some time to assemble the armour add-ons is a sensible and pragmatic decision.

The US M8 AGS used a scalable armour system and some of the newer Warrior UOR’s have worked on this principle.

The categories below may seem heavily biased to air transportation and when this is compared to actual airlift it might seem ludicrous but if the UK is to maintain its expeditionary capabilities we must carefully tailor equipment to available lift capacity and factors such as bridge classification or surface transportation will also be significant. Modular protection allows air transportability weight limits to be maintained whilst providing for improvements in protection when rapid transportation is not such an issue.

I know I go on a bit about ISO container constraints but if we are at all serious about moving stuff from A to B, the civilian intermodal container ecosystem has much greater capacity than any military logistics system.

With this in mind I think the following is a reasonable weight distribution (assuming we start with weight and not other requirements such as survivability or payload)

Category A; sub 5 tonnes, 1 sling load for a Merlin or 2 by a Chinook and preferably, internal carriage in a Chinook.

Category B; 7.5 tonnes maximum weight, this allows 1 to be sling loaded by a Chinook, 2 from a CH53K and 4 in an A400 or 8 in a C17 (volume permitting). Air droppable, easily carried on civilian trucks or DROPS and able to traverse most if not all bridges and trackway. Going up to 10 tonnes still allows Chinook slinging but reduces the multiples in the A400 and C17, a trade off.

Category C; 15 tonnes maximum base weight with the capacity to handle an additional 5 to 7 tonnes, this allows a base configuration to be slung loaded from a CH53K or future heavy lift helicopter. 2 could be carried in an A400 or if 4 A400’s were used, the combined payload would be 6 vehicles and 6 additional 5 tonne protection kits. A C17 could carry 4 base configuration vehicles or 3 with the protection kits already fitted. Can be carried on standard ISO flatracks, utilise all RE trackway and vehicle bridges and be carried on the back of a standard truck or DROPS. Can also be lifted by the RE Terex AC35 crane and recovered using the FRES SV recovery variant.

Category D; ideally this would be around 30 tonnes base configuration with 5 to 10 tonne additional protection kit, 1 to be carried on A400 or 2 per C17. Additional protection kits would be available but this would reduce aerial transportation to C17 only. However, this might seem too close to Category A and not deliver enough protection whilst still being constrained by the same deployment issues as the heavy equipment it will be supporting. Weight therefore becomes less of an issue because at 30 tonnes plus it is still a special load, borderline for ISO carriage and bridges and at a maximum for A400 carriage. So for this category I would be inclined to worry less about weight and concentrate on protection and firepower, true to the concept of stand up knock down fighting for information in a high threat environment as per many of our recent discussions on fighting Recce rather than sneaky recce. If you need to get the odd one or two into theatre by air, for whatever reason and however rare, as long as it is below 50-60 tonnes it can be carried by C17.

Category E; the heavy 70 tonne plus vehicles that are rarely moved by air

I will expand on vehicles to fit these categories in a future post.

Summary

The old norm that only tracked vehicles are mobile over difficult terrain is no longer the case but at higher weights and for extreme off road mobility tracks would still seem to have the edge

With all the extra equipment such as ECM, communications, air conditioning and off board power generation volumes have inevitably increased and with an increase in volume comes an increase in weight. So although, for example, a 10 tonne CVR(T) might enjoy the benefits of this low weight in mobility terms it suffers in protection and equipment terms.

FRES SV Scout, at 30 tonnes plus and the same width as an MICV like Warrior, has clearly sacrificed some aspects of strategic and tactical mobility in order to get better protection and firepower, a conscious trade no doubt, but if we look at the numerous instances where the nimbleness of CVR(T) has been useful then we might wonder what we are going to fill the gap with, Jackal perhaps or Viking.

Before we even get into issues of firepower and protection the number of factors when considering mobility is extremely diverse and inevitably there will be trade-offs and compromises.

Who would be a vehicle designer?

Introduction

1.  At the outset of our Report, we wish to pay tribute to the UK Armed Forces and civilian personnel who contributed to operations in Libya. They continue to impress us with the courage, dedication and professionalism with which they undertook this operation which we are convinced saved thousands of civilian lives. We also wish to acknowledge the contribution of the families of Armed Forces personnel. (Paragraph 1)

2.  We support the principle that Parliament should whenever possible be consulted and authorise the use of military force prior to its deployment. However, given the Prime Minister’s statement on 18 March 2011 and the debate in the House of Commons on 21 March and that urgent action was required to safeguard civilians in Libya, we are content that Parliament was consulted as soon as practicable. (Paragraph 4)

United Nations

3.  Witnesses told us that there were unique circumstances in Libya and, given the gravity of the situation and the potential consequences of inaction, we agree that the international community was justified in its response. (Paragraph 16)

4.  We note the contrary opinions we have received regarding the legality of the operation in Libya. It is not for us to comment on the legality of the operation. We agree that the legality of the operation is a separate issue to the issue of the legality of how the operation was undertaken. In response to our Report, the Ministry of Defence should commit to review the conduct of the operation and its compliance with international law. We commend the Government for publishing a summary of the Attorney General’s legal advice and respect the decision not to publish the advice in full but are disappointed that the Prime Minister felt unable to share the advice with us on a private and confidential basis as this would have enabled us to scrutinise the operation in Libya more effectively. We recommend, however, that when a summary of legal advice has been published and developments occur that lead to updated legal advice being sought from the Attorney General, an updated summary of the advice should be published as soon as possible. (Paragraph 24)

5.  We welcome the Minister for the Armed Forces’ statement that the Government would expect National Transitional Council forces to be treated in exactly the same way as pro-Gaddafi forces with respect to potential war crimes, as it is essential that both sides in the conflict are treated the same not just in the interests of justice but also for the credibility and future of the International Criminal Court and support of the international community for future operations. (Paragraph 28)

6.  While we are aware that there are circumstances where no international authorisation is required for the deployment of UK Armed Forces, we expect the Government to ensure that UK military and civilian personnel comply with international law at all times. (Paragraph 29)

7.  We note the concerns expressed that, although not authorised under the UN Security Council Resolutions, regime change was a goal of the mission of Libya. Although it is difficult to see how the mission could have been successfully completed without Colonel Gaddafi losing power, we are concerned that this, rather than the protection of civilians as set out in the Resolution, came to be seen by some countries as an integral part of the mission. The apparent conflict between the military and political objectives meant that the Government failed to ensure that its communication strategy was effective in setting out the aims of the operation. In future, the Government’s communication strategy needs to be more effective so that the public are confident of the aims and goals of such operations. (Paragraph 34)

8.  We accept that the coalition forces did their best to prevent and minimise civilian casualties and we commend them for this approach. This lesson, taken from Iraq and Afghanistan, will, we hope make the building of the subsequent peace in Libya significantly easier. Nonetheless, it is at least possible that some civilian casualties were caused by coalition actions. In the absence of observers on the ground it is impossible to say whether, despite the best efforts of coalition forces, any civilian casualties were caused by coalition action and if so how many. (Paragraph 38)

9.  We note that under Resolution 1973, the coalition was obliged to protect civilians from casualties caused by National Transitional Council forces as well as pro-Gaddafi forces. In response to our Report the Government should set out how this obligation was carried out. Although we acknowledge that it is difficult to estimate numbers, this should include an assessment of the number of civilian casualties caused by coalition forces, pro-Gaddafi forces and NTC forces. (Paragraph 41)

10.  We are concerned by reports that large numbers of man-portable surface-to-air missiles, previously in the armament of pro-Gaddafi forces, are missing in Libya. We accept that the Government, the UN and NATO have acknowledged that this is a major concern for security in the region and the wider world. We expect the international community to support and maintain pressure on the new Libyan regime to ensure that these weapons are held securely and safely. We agree this should be part of a UN-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, as part of the broad post-conflict settlement. We expect an update on progress on this in the Government’s response to our Report. (Paragraph 45)

11.  We acknowledge that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons confirmed, following an on-site inspection, that the remains of the chemical weapons stocks declared by the Gaddafi regime were intact and secure, pending completion of destruction. We note with particular concern the discovery of a previously undeclared stock of chemical weapons. We also note that the Government stated that it would monitor the situation closely with international partners. In its response to our Report the Government should state what further measures it has taken to address this issue and the progress made in the destruction plan. (Paragraph 48)

12.  The international community must help and support Libyan women in the future to ensure that there are opportunities for them to have a wider role in the building of the new Libya. (Paragraph 50)

13.  We note that the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated that the UK would be more selective in its deployment of UK Armed Forces and would do so where there was a “clear strategic aim…and a viable exit strategy”. Whilst accepting that operations should have a clear strategic aim, we recommend that the Government should develop this concept by undertaking a more detailed, comprehensive and strategic assessment before deciding to intervene. We also note the Minister for the Armed Forces’ comments that the operation could have ended in a variety of ways and that there is a limit to the number of engagements that can be undertaken where the exit strategy is known with complete clarity at the outset. Whilst recognising that the changing circumstances of operations may require exit strategies to be reviewed and updated, we are concerned that the Minister’s comments invalidate the SDSR’s assertion that UK Armed Forces will be deployed only where “we have a viable exit strategy”. (Paragraph 55)

14.  While we do not regard a UN Security Council Resolution as a prerequisite for military action by UK Armed Forces in all cases, we commend the Government for obtaining UN Security Council approval for operations in Libya. However we are concerned that the abstentions of five Council members, particularly the veto-wielding countries of Russia and China, may make obtaining United Nations support more difficult for similar situations in the future. (Paragraph 60)

15.  We note that some commentators have suggested that the action in Libya may have made it impossible (as evidenced by the Russian and Chinese concerns over Syria) for the international community to take decisive action over other countries. The implication contained in that suggestion, that we should therefore not have supported the action in Libya, is one we reject. It is impossible for us to tell what the consequences would have been of allowing the killing of civilians in Benghazi, but we consider that the determination of the Arab League and of most countries of the United Nations that a massacre would be unacceptable was an example of the international community acting as it should. It was acting in a coordinated way to reflect the adoption by the United Nations in 2005 of the “Responsibility to Protect” enshrined in Resolution 1674. (Paragraph 61)

NATO

16.  We commend NATO and UK Forces for the speed of the operational deployment in Libya. We are however concerned about the tensions regarding command of the operation during its early stages. There was confusion over the command and control of the operation in the early stages of the operation until NATO took command. We are particularly concerned at the apparent decision of the French Government to commence air operations without consulting allies. We call upon NATO and the Government to look very carefully at how command and control decisions were made in the early stages of the operation and to identify the lessons for any future operations which necessarily begin in an ad hoc manner. (Paragraph 74)

17.  We welcome the significant involvement of non-NATO countries, particularly those from the Arab League and Sweden, to operations in Libya. However, we are concerned to establish how the contributions of non-NATO countries fitted into the NATO command and control structures and call on the Government to clarify the command and control structures that were implemented and how they were coordinated. We also call on the Government to clarify how it ensured that any bilateral alliances between non-NATO countries and the National Transitional Council were monitored to ensure that they did not impact unfavourably on the NATO mission or were contrary to the measures in the UN Resolutions. An assessment of the integration of non-NATO countries should be a key part of the lessons learned exercises undertaken by NATO and the UK. (Paragraph 81)

18.  For the time being, there will still be a heavy reliance on US command and control functions for future operations. It should be a priority for NATO to examine this. However, whilst accepting the current economic climate and its implications for defence capabilities, we are concerned that future operations will not be possible if the US is not willing or able to provide capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, intelligence and refuelling aircraft. It should be a priority for NATO to examine this over-reliance on US capabilities and assets. This challenge will be heightened by the US stated intention to shift its military, geographic and strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region. (Paragraph 90)

19.  We have no evidence of any shortfalls in military assets held by NATO nations needed for operations in Libya. Nonetheless we seek assurances that the UK is pressing NATO to consider the issue of over-reliance on any single nation, and is itself considering the balance of its future forces and how it can best add to the overall mix of NATO capabilities and command and control capacity. (Paragraph 91)

UK contribution to the operation

20.  The National Security Council appears to have worked well in respect of the situation in Libya, particularly in coordinating the response of Government Departments. This was important as the mission in Libya had many component parts, not just the military operation. (Paragraph 95)

21.  We commend all air units on their role in the operation, both in a combat role and in the Non-combatant Evacuation Operations for UK and other civilians by Hercules prior to the commencement of combat operations. We note the Chief of the Air Staff’s view that both Tornado and Typhoon had operated well. We particularly note that in its first operational role Typhoon performed very reliably. We also note that the Joint Helicopter Command was able to deploy successfully Apache helicopters to the Mediterranean Sea as well as maintain numbers in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 106)

22.  ISTAR capabilities are vital to the ability of UK Armed Forces to undertake operations such as those in Libya. We note that it was necessary as part of the mission to extend the service life of the Nimrod R1 signals intelligence aircraft. We expect the MoD to give a higher priority to the development of such capabilities in advance of the next SDSR. In response to this report we also expect the MoD to clarify the position on the future of Sentinel and whether consideration is being given to its retention and what impact retention would have on other budget areas. (Paragraph 110)

23.  We commend the actions of the Royal Navy in the operation particularly in respect of the evacuation of civilians from Benghazi, the enforcement of the arms embargo and the early deployment of the first Response Force Task Group. However we note that important tasks, such as the Fleet Ready Escort and counter drugs operations, were not able to be carried out due to meeting the Libya commitment. Given the continued high levels of standing maritime commitments it is likely that this type of risk taking will occur more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented. This will be a significant challenge for the Royal Navy and the MoD who should outline their plans to meet this challenge in response to our Report. (Paragraph 114)

24.  In our SDSR report we noted the decommissioning of the Harrier Force. Whilst none of our witnesses told us that the Libya operation could not have succeeded without a fixed wing aircraft carrier, we note that three ships capable of carrying aircraft were deployed in theatre as well as the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean. We also note that the First Sea Lord told us that if a carrier with Harrier Force capability had been available it would probably have been used. In response to our Report the Government should indicate if the operation could have been carried out more effectively and efficiently with an aircraft carrier. We repeat our support for proceeding with both Queen Elizabeth class carriers to ensure one is always available for operations. (Paragraph 116)

25.  We note the high reliability and accuracy of the principal air munitions employed, but we also note reports regarding shortages of munitions, such as the new variant Brimstone missile, during the operation. UK Armed Forces require large enough stocks of ‘Warlike Materiel’ which can be quickly replenished when used. This requires larger stocks of those items which are more difficult to procure or slower to produce. In response to this report the Government should outline the contingency measures that are in place and whether it has any plans to review them. We accept that that it was necessary for UK Armed Forces to use costly precision guided weapons on some missions in order to minimise or avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage. In response to our Report, we request a detailed explanation on how decisions on which munitions to deploy are made, and at what command level, and whether cost is one of the factors considered. (Paragraph 125)

26.  Although the UK was able to satisfy both operations in Libya and the Military Standing Tasks and other operational commitments, Operation ELLAMY was conducted prior to the implementation of many of the Strategic Defence and Security Review decisions on capability reductions. We believe the Government will face significantly greater challenges should an operation of similar size be necessary in the future and it will need to be prepared for some difficult decisions on prioritisation. We consider that Operation ELLAMY raises important questions as to the extent of the United Kingdom’s national contingent capability. We urge the Government to review the United Kingdom’s capacity to respond to concurrent threats. This work should be conducted as a matter of urgency before the next Strategic Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 127)

27.  We welcome the successful interoperability of Anglo-French Forces during the operation, particularly in respect of maritime-based attack helicopter operations. We note the Minister’s comments that there were some problems in the early stages of the operation and request an account of what these were and how resolved. We will continue our scrutiny of the Anglo-French Defence Treaties. (Paragraph 129)

28.  We note that in December 2011 the Government stated the estimate for the whole operation was £212 million, made up of £145 million of operating costs, plus a further £67 million on the cost of replenishing munitions used in Libya. We also note that the Secretary of State for Defence announced that fully audited figures would be produced as part of the annual accounts. We expect the details included in the accounts to be as complete as possible and should include a detailed explanation of the component parts of the additional costs, including those of replenishing munitions. In response to our Report the MoD should indicate the timetable for them being reimbursed the additional costs by HM Treasury. In light of the fact that other commentators have estimated the cost of operations to be much higher than the MoD estimate, we expect the MoD and HM Treasury to provide us with a detailed and transparent explanation of the methodology used when calculating its figures. We remain concerned that the MoD does not understand the full costs of operations in Libya. (Paragraph 135)

Implications for future operations

29.  Some aspects of NATO’s involvement in operations in Libya were particularly positive, especially the involvement at an early stage of non-NATO nations. However, we also note concerns expressed to us that the US “handed off” the operation to European allies and that NATO is a divided Alliance. We consider that the US decision not to lead the engagement in Libya was positively beneficial, in that it forced European members of NATO to face their own responsibilities, and shone a light on the gaps in European capabilities—gaps which we consider it essential to be plugged. Experiences from operations in Libya have revealed challenges for the political and military future of NATO, including the requirement to develop new ways of working especially if the US does not participate in operations and there is further involvement of non-NATO countries. These challenges must be considered as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 143)

30.  We commend the Government for commissioning a lessons learned exercise undertaken by the National Security Adviser. We request a list of all those consulted as part of this exercise. We note that the review stated that “overall the central co-ordination mechanisms worked well”. However we also note that the review highlighted a number of lessons for handling future conflicts. In response to our Report, the Government should set out the steps to be taken and timescales involved to resolve these concerns. We look forward to hearing how the Government proposes to “ensure that it obtains key command positions in those parts of a reformed NATO Command Structure that are most likely to be relevant to the conduct of future operations”, including clarification of which key command positions. (Paragraph 147)

31.  We note that the National Security Adviser’s review stated that individual departments would conduct their own lessons learned exercises. The MoD should clarify the remit, format and schedule of the reviews it has carried out or will be undertaking and we expect to see the reports. We request a briefing from the MoD’s Defence Operational Capability on the lessons learned from the Libya operation. (Paragraph 148)

32.  We commend the Minister for the Armed Forces’ commitment to include the costs of the operation in the lessons learned process. This should include an assessment of cost effectiveness and value for money of the assets deployed. We note his comment that cost comparisons with allies on different types of operations are only valid if comparing like with like (including the difficulty of the operation), but recommend that where possible these comparisons should be undertaken. (Paragraph 150)

33.  We note the concerns of witnesses regarding the operation, but believe that the mission in Libya should be regarded as a success. NATO and other nations acting under the authority of the United Nations have ensured the safety of Libyan civilians who would otherwise have been at risk of being killed by pro-Gaddafi forces. (Paragraph 155)

34.  UK Armed Forces have contributed significantly to the successful conclusion of the operation. UK Service personnel have yet again performed their duties in a professional and dedicated manner. The capabilities deployed by NATO and the UK performed well, minimising civilian deaths and collateral damage. However the mission has also highlighted challenges and issues that need to be addressed and taken forward by the United Nations, NATO and the UK Government. The mission in Libya was successful in discharging the UN mandate. The real test is whether the success of this mission was a one-off or whether the lessons it has highlighted mean that future such missions can be successfully undertaken, whilst maintaining the UK’s capability to protect its interests elsewhere. (Paragraph 156)

Down load the reports by clicking the links

Operations in Libya - Vol I

Operations in Libya - Vol II

The first is the laser guided bullet that Sandia Labs have been working on.The .50-caliber bullet, which behaves more like a miniature guided missile, doesn’t have a spiral rotation, but instead twists and turns to guide itself toward a laser-directed point and is capable of making up to 30 corrections in the air — it could be a perfect fit for military machine guns, scientists said.

From the Sandia press release;

Sandia researchers Red Jones and Brian Kast and their colleagues have invented a dart-like, self-guided bullet for small-caliber, smooth-bore firearms that could hit laser-designated targets at distances of more than a mile (about 2,000 meters).

“We have a very promising technology to guide small projectiles that could be fully developed inexpensively and rapidly,” Jones said.

Sandia is seeking a private company partner to complete testing of the prototype and bring a guided bullet to the marketplace.

Researchers have had initial success testing the design in computer simulations and in field tests of prototypes, built from commercially available parts, Jones said.

While engineering issues remain, “we’re confident in our science base and we’re confident the engineering-technology base is there to solve the problems,” he said.

Sandia’s design for the four-inch-long bullet includes an optical sensor in the nose to detect a laser beam on a target. The sensor sends information to guidance and control electronics that use an algorithm in an eight-bit central processing unit to command electromagnetic actuators. These actuators steer tiny fins that guide the bullet to the target.

Most bullets shot from rifles, which have grooves, or rifling, that cause them to spin so they fly straight, like a long football pass. To enable a bullet to turn in flight toward a target and to simplify the design, the spin had to go, Jones said.

The bullet flies straight due to its aerodynamically stable design, which consists of a center of gravity that sits forward in the projectile and tiny fins that enable it to fly without spin, just as a dart does, he said.

Sandia's self-guided bullet

Computer aerodynamic modeling shows the design would result in dramatic improvements in accuracy, Jones said. Computer simulations showed an unguided bullet under real-world conditions could miss a target more than a half mile away (1,000 meters away) by 9.8 yards (9 meters), but a guided bullet would get within 8 inches (0.2 meters), according to the patent.

Plastic sabots provide a gas seal in the cartridge and protect the delicate fins until they drop off after the bullet emerges from the firearm’s barrel.

The prototype does not require a device found in guided missiles called an inertial measuring unit, which would have added substantially to its cost. Instead, the researchers found that the bullet’s relatively small size when compared to guided missiles “is helping us all around. It’s kind of a fortuitous thing that none of us saw when we started,” Jones said.

As the bullet flies through the air, it pitches and yaws at a set rate based on its mass and size. In larger guided missiles, the rate of flight-path corrections is relatively slow, so each correction needs to be very precise because fewer corrections are possible during flight. But “the natural body frequency of this bullet is about 30 hertz, so we can make corrections 30 times per second. That means we can overcorrect, so we don’t have to be as precise each time,” Jones said.

Testing has shown the electromagnetic actuator performs well and the bullet can reach speeds of 2,400 feet per second, or Mach 2.1, using commercially available gunpowder. The researchers are confident it could reach standard military speeds using customized gunpowder.

And a nighttime field test, in which a tiny light-emitting diode, or LED, was attached to the bullet showed the battery and electronics can survive flight, Jones said.

Sandia's self-guided bullet path

Researchers also filmed high-speed video of the bullet radically pitching as it exited the barrel. The bullet pitches less as it flies down range, a phenomenon known to long-range firearms experts as “going to sleep.” Because the bullet’s motions settle the longer it is in flight, accuracy improves at longer ranges, Jones said.

“Nobody had ever seen that, but we’ve got high-speed video photography that shows that it’s true,” he said.

Potential customers for the bullet include the military, law enforcement and recreational shooters.

In addition to Jones and Kast, Sandia researchers who helped develop the technology are: engineer Brandon R. Rohrer, aerodynamics expert Marc W. Kniskern, mechanical designer Scott E. Rose, firearms expert James W. Woods and Ronald W. Greene, a guidance, control and simulation engineer.

Sandia's self-guided bullet (detail)

Seems like a niche capability and not something we would seem to be in desperate need of.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The second interesting development is not actually new but something that, rather sensibly, has been field tested in Afghanistan, the XM25, a collaboration between HK and ATK.

This is an evolution of older weapons but the US has stuck with the concept of a 25mm weapon used for attacking dismounted targets in a defilade position and other targets.

The XM25, Counter Defilade Target Engagement (CDTE) System will provide the infantry Soldier with leap-ahead overmatch capability and range with a family of 25mm programmable air burst munitions

It does look rather sci-fi but the feedback returning from Afghanistan has apparently been incredibly good.

XM25 Individual Semi-Automatic Airburst System (ISAAS) in Afghanistan. The XM25 Individual Semi-Automatic Airburst System (ISAAS) enables the small unit and individual Soldier to engage defilade targets by providing a 25mm air bursting capability that can be used in all operational environments.

The concept of precision fusing to detonate the warhead at a set distance from the firing point is not new, the 40mm CTA is supposedly having this as an optional extra but squeezing it down to 25mm is very impressive.

25mm High Explosive Air Bursting Round

A full range of ammunition natures is available and more being developed including air bursting, door breaching and less than lethal.

Because it is still a development weapon the ammunition is expensively hand made, at $700 per shot this is not something to be spraying but that is the point, one does not need more than one or two. From a recent economist article;

A handful of XM25s are now being tested in Afghanistan by the Americans. So far, they have been used on more than 200 occasions. Most of these fights ended quickly, and in America’s favour, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Shawn Lucas, who is in charge of the weapon’s field-testing programme.

If the trials are successful and the system goes into mass production the target price per round is $25. These trials have been so successful to date that an additional 36 weapons have been ordered.

Some videos;

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

This looks very interesting but does the loss of a standard infantry rifle in a section, for example, cause too much of a loss of flexibility?

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