The Army is generally moving towards a rational and coherent fleet of logistic vehicles. The Bedford MK’s and TM’s are slowly going out of service to be eventually replaced by the MAN Military Trucks Support Vehicle (SV) range and whilst the Foden DROPS are being hammered in Afghanistan they will eventually be replaced by the HLDC programme. The Oskosh Close Support Tanker is performing extremely well, one of the most mobile vehicles in theatre and although operating under a PFI, the Heavy Equipment Tractor (HET), also from Oskosh, has proven to be a great success. Future programmes include the Light Equipment Transporter, General Support Tanker and the Articulated/Non Articulated Vehicle Programme.

Trucks

The MAN Support Vehicles comprise a number of weights and types and will eventually replace the 4, 8 and 14 tonners in addition to a number of recovery variants, the total fleet should be about 6,600 vehicles for £1.3billion, the numbers having been continually revised down from about 7,200. The order attracted significant controversy because the competing offers seemed to offer better value for money and the European integration aspect of the decision trumped other considerations. Despite this, they are an excellent design, but if the Oshkosh offer was taken,  the commonality advantages between the Heavy Equipment Transporter, Close Support Tanker and whatever trucks were taken from the range, would have been very useful.

The SX has a stiffer chassis and coil springs so has much greater mobility, the HX is the lower specification variant, which of course we have ordered many more of.

There are 3 HX variants, the 2 axle SX60 which replaces the 4 tonner, the 3 axle HX58 which replaces the 8 tonners and finally, the HX77 which replaces the 14 tonner. The SX comes in two variants, the 4 axle SX45 Recovery Variant and 3 axle SX44 Unit Support Tanker and Cargo.

Man SV SX45 Recovery Variant

We don’t call them HX or SX though, instead preferring titles like Medium Mobility, Cargo Vehicle Heavy Medium Mobility and Improved Medium Mobility!

The theatre entry specification includes armoured cabs, weapon stations, run flat tyres and many other enhancements. The 288 recovery vehicles are partnered with 69 recovery trailers, each vehicle weighs 32 tonnes and can lift 15 tonnes, much more than the old Foden ‘wreckers’

Instead of the old bench seats or trying to find a comfortable place to sit between cam nets and stores the SV’s will have the option to use dedicated rollover protected seating from Roush, health and safety legislation means the sight of soldiers hanging out of the back of a 4 tonner will be a distant memory!

C Vehicles (Trucks)

The C Vehicle PFI incorporates engineering plant, cranes and other equipment. Awarded to the Amey Lex Consortium (ALC) in 2005 after a lengthy bidding process and is a 15 year deal, valued at approximately £600million. Equipment is centrally pooled in a number of locations and when units use the equipment they are in effect, hiring it. VT have subsequently acquired Lex Defence and are now part of the Babcock organisation. On contract commencement, ALC purchased the MoD’s equipment although it is rumoured that acceptance criteria was so stringent the MoD had to spend considerable sums getting equipment ready for the handover and for the same costs it could have bought new. This legacy equipment was to be phased out and replaced with new equipment as the agreement progresses, most of this has already happened.

Although the scheme includes operator training, surely it would have been logical to use the same equipment as the rest of the Army?

Not in crazy PFI land it isn’t, despite nearly 500 of the MAN Support Vehicles being fitted with jibs the C Vehicle PFI has provided similarly equipped Iveco Trakker units. There is nothing wrong with the Trakker but another vehicle type that overlaps completely with existing vehicles but provided as part of the PFI means yet another training requirement at a time when we should be consolidating equipment types, funnily enough, one of the core objectives of the C Vehicle PFI, the halving of equipment types.

The PFI has provided a number of 6×6 Trakker vehicles, total chassis order was 206, variants include Self Loading Dump Trucks (SLDT), Medium Dump Truck (MDT) tippers fitted with the Thompson Loadmaster tipping body, Nurock volumetric concrete mixing plant, Truck Mounted Loader with an Atlas Terex lifting arm and even well drilling rigs.

Iveco Tracker - Nurock Cement Mixer

Iveco Trakker - Medium Dump truck

Iveco Trakker - Self Loading Dump Truck

Iveco Trakker - Truck Mounted Loader

The MAN SV is a proper military truck with a long heritage and has been designed specifically with expansion in mind, it can be fitted with a protected cab for example, without modification. The Trakker vehicles in theatre appear not to be protected to the same degree and the quantities seem to be very low, the SLDT and MDT will be obtained in quantities of around 70 each for example.

It is not clear whether the recent UOR purchases of protected engineering plant has been obtained through the PFI.

I remain to be convinced about the operational usefulness and value for money of PFI schemes especially given the fact that those with the information to illustrate value for money have a vested interest in not releasing it. Ideally, all military trucks in UK service should be based on the MAN SV base designs.

DROPS

DROPS is a family of logistics vehicles that use a HIAB Multilift designed derivative of the Marel Corporation hooklift system, commonly used for waste containers.

There are two types of vehicle - the Leyland Medium Mobility Load Carrier (MMLC), and the Foden Improved Medium Mobility Load Carrier (IMMLC). IMMLC is used primarily as an ammunition carrier in support of AS90 155mm self-propelled guns. MMLC operates solo, or towing a skeleton trailer. DROPS revolutionised logistics transport when introduced and continues to be the backbone of the Army’s transportation capability. Coming into service in 1994 the IMMLC (Foden) contract was for £75million and 400 vehicles. The earlier Leyland MMLC contract delivered just over 1,400 vehicles.

Leyland DROPS

Foden DROPS

A research paper from the US in 1991 shows some of the thinking behind the DROPS and ISO Container system, click here to read.

The Enhanced Palletised Load System (EPLS) is designed to supplement the existing DROPS vehicles because there are of course not enough of them, by fitting a number of HX77 chassis, which were on the production line, with a HIAB Multilift hooklift system. EPLS is a UOR, the original SV programme did not feature a DROPS replacement and it has pulled vehicles from the existing pool, they are not extras. The main difference between EPLS and the DROPS system is that EPLS can lift standard ISO containers without putting them on a flatrack first, obviously providing much greater flexibility although flatracks are used quite frequently for non container loads like vehicles, trailers or other equipment.

EPLS

There is absolutely no doubt, EPLS is a success story, more flexible than DROPS and delivered in double quick time, but it is not necessarily the best system for the medium to long term. Once the load has been deposited on the ground it needs a crane or similar to reposition, the centre of gravity can be high which reduces mobility and the departure angle can be disadvantageous to certain loads. The original role of DROPS, delivering huge quantities of ammunition to Royal Artillery batteries, may have diminished somewhat, but simply looking at a typical Combat Logistics Patrol in Afghanistan it is clear that the ISO container has completely penetrated the logistics system.

The low cost option would simply bring EPLS into the main equipment programme, so this is what is likely to happen, but in the medium term we should be moving towards a more comprehensive and flexible solution.

A key question is, should the system be mounted on the chassis of a truck, on an articulated trailer or both. The second question is the design, a simple hooklift or more complex but more flexible sideloader.

A trailer mounted system would likely be towed by the Close Support Tractor unit and if chassis mounted, the MAN SV would be the obvious donor vehicle.

The sidelift or side loading arrangement provides maximum flexibility that loads, unloads and stacks ISO containers using two hydraulic arms at either end of the chassis or trailer. Sidelift was developed in the sixties by Klaus Transport-systems, who were ultimately purchased by Steelbro in New Zealand and the system developed further. Other manufacturers include Hammar and Swinglift. Advantages include reducing the need for container handling cranes or fork lifts, the flat load/unload profile is advantageous for some loads and the ability to stack containers can also be very useful. A single sidelift trailer could be used to offload an entire convoys worth of containers and can be telescoped to handle 10, 20 or 40 foot ISO containers or flatracks.

DROPS or EPLS would need 2 vehicles to transport 2 containers, those 2 vehicles would need 4 crew. The cost of 4 crew members must include training, wages, health cover, pension and a myriad of other ‘capitation’ costs. The 2 vehicles need maintaining, spares holding, training courses and of course all these need personnel, expensive personnel.

If we could replace 2 DROPS/EPLS with a single system that can handle 2 20ft containers then the personnel reduction alone would result in a significant cost saving.

See the video below for the operation of a 40 foot system

Click here to view the embedded video.

Sidelifters are in use with the Army but only a very limited basis.

Trailer mounted units may not have the mobility required and a chassis based design is relatively top heavy, which again limits mobility because of the tip over hazard.

In an earlier FDR post I proposed using an articulated loader as a base for a protected vehicle family. The front cab would be armoured and a variety of swappable modules forming the payload. Payload modules could include personnel carrier, command, mortar, ISR or other weapon systems. By making the payload separate from the transport vehicle we increase flexibility and reduce overall cost.

In a logistics role these articulated loaders could use a side lift system, the mobility advantages of an articulated loader are apparent in the video below.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Because of the relative advantages and disadvantages of articulated loaders, rigid chassis and trailer mounted units it would seem obvious to use all three options.

Others

The Oskosh Global Heavy Equipment Tractor (HET) is teamed up with a number of trailers from King Trailers and Broshuis, the King trailers being used mainly for very heavy equipment like Challenger and the Broshuis for Warrior sized and below loads (max 45 tonnes). The HET is a version of the US M1070 HET.

Heavy Equipment Transporter with King trailer

Earlier this year, 20 Improved Mobility Trailers were obtained under a UOR for the Heavy Equipment Transporter. At a cost of £150k each, the trailers from Broshuis have greater ability in rough terrain i.e. Afghanistan, than the existing trailers. Given the wholesale move from CVR(T) that can be carried on the back of a Foden DROPS or MAN EPLS, to an ASCOD SV which can’t, there is going to be a need a much greater number of HET’s and trailers. The HET’s are provided by Fastraxx, a PFI provider owned by Kellog Brown and Root. The PFI will run for 20 years and provides 92 HET’s, trailers and sponsored reserve drivers.

The implications of FRES Scout on this PFI are uncertain.

Broshuis IM Trailer

Providing fuel and water distribution, the Oshkosh Close Support Tanker, another Oshkosh success story, are amongst the most mobile vehicles we have, based on the well proven MTVR.

Close Support Tanker

Completing the stragglers is the Alvis Unipower 8×8 vehicle used for carrying the Royal Engineers General Support Bridge. In the interests of logistics commonality we should transfer the bridging and launch/recovery equipment to an SV chassis.

Alvis Unipower GSB

Containers and Modules

Combat Logistic Patrol - 19 Combat Service Support Battalion

As can be seen from the image above, the ISO container is here to stay.

Based on a standard 20ft ISO container the Deployable Machine Shop (DMS) from Marshall SV has recently been purchased and will equip the REME, RM and RAF. 44 have been purchased for £5.8million, hold on, that over £130k each. In 2008, the MoD purchased 25 fuel tank containers from WEW Westerwalder for £4million to provide static and mobile refuelling points. WEW have a long track record in defence and provide tank containers to numerous military forces. General Dynamics have provided the container based Bulk Medical Storage Facility (BMSF)  and the RAF have also joined the rush to containerise with the Tactical Reconnaissance Deployable Imagery System (will leave you to work out the acronym!) made from recycled hospital containers (which were pretty rubbish by all accounts)

Deployable Machine Shop

Bulk Medical Storage Facility

TARDIS

WEW Fuel Container

The march of containerisation should continue, their all round usefulness has been well proven in Afghanistan.

The Oshkosh PLS Engineering Mission Modules are a good illustration of what can be achieved and these would go some way to achieving commonality with the C Vehicle fleet.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Container handling equipment includes everything from simple dollys to complex rough terrain handlers. There have been a number of interesting studies on improving the C17′s ability to handle ISO containers and this work translates to other aircraft.

ISO reach stackers are available from a number of manufacturers such as Fantuzzi, ISO Loader and Atlas Terex but the most common type in military service is from Kalmar Rough Terrain Container Handler, often called the ‘wretch’

In April this year I published a post on lightweight vehicles in which I wondered if we could extend the concept of containerisation and DROPS to non logistics applications, more combat oriented but in a smaller package.

In what was probably a coincidence, great minds thinking alike, the Cameleon MMS concept was launched in May, featured in the July edition of G3 and at DVD10

The MMS uses an Iveco 4×4 Daily as the donor chassis and has a small capacity DROPS like system to load and unload various mission modules.

Cameleon MMS

It is clear that the Army has fully embraced the ISO container for logistics and combat service support but we should be thinking ahead and realising the advantages that containerisation, modularisation and quick handling provide into non logistics roles, as ably demonstrated by Oviks

Summary

Short Term

• Continue with SV

Medium Term

• Independent investigation into value for money and operational effectiveness of C Vehicle and HET PFI’s
• Coherence between SV and C Vehicles
• Sidelift DROPs replacement on range of trailers, SV and articulated loaders
• Move towards a modular demountable architecture

Click here to view the embedded video.

General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen

General Sir Peter Wall (Late Corps of Royal Engineers) is currently Commander-in-Chief Land Forces.

Peter Wall was commissioned into the Royal Engineers (RE) in 1974 then read Engineering at Cambridge. His early service was spent in Belize and Rhodesia, in ‘Cold War’ Germany, as a platoon instructor at Sandhurst, and in Hong Kong.

He has commanded 9 Parachute Squadron RE, 32 Engineer Regiment in Hohne – including time in Bosnia, 16 Air Assault Brigade in the UK, the Joint Force Headquarters, and 1st (UK) Armoured Division in Iraq and Germany.

Staff posts have included Chief of Staff of 5 Airborne Brigade, a Military Adviser post in MOD, Project Manager in Abbey Wood, Chief of Staff of the UK National Contingent HQ for Op TELIC 1, and Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Ops) in the Permanent Joint Headquarters.

In July 2009 he moved from Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) in MOD to become Commander-in-Chief Land Forces in Wilton.

He is Chief Royal Engineer and president of Army rugby, Association Football, modern pentathlon and sport parachuting. Married to Fiona, they have two teenage sons, Alexander and Archie. He follows most sports and plays occasional games of golf and village cricket.

Hurrah

No, didn’t think that was likely

Is a half rice/half chips moment looming where the MoD pay some and so does the Treasury?

In the war of words between now and the Comprehensive Spending Review, which, let’s face it, is what the SDSR actually is, the real position remains to be confirmed.

Anyway,  here is a nice picture for the Liberal Democrats who will no doubt be popping the champagne corks on hearing the news.

Hat Tip to our commenters C and Andy for the head ups by the way

In the paper, Professor Chalmers assesses four possible options for maintaining both an effective nuclear deterrent and also reducing costs in light of anticipated budget restrictions.

The options include:

1.       A ‘Normally-CASD’ Submarine Force – Extend the Vanguard-class submarines, delay the start of peak spending on the renewal programme until 2019/2020 and redefine what is meant by ‘CASD’ to cut the fleet of boats from four to three.

2.       A ‘CASD-Capable’ Submarine Force – Abandon CASD in normal circumstances, but maintain a credible capability to reconstitute it if required.  This option could cut the fleet of successor submarines from four to two and delay peak spending until 2023/2024.

3.       A ‘Dual-Capable’ Submarine Force – Rationalise the submarine fleet around a single model of boat, which could be used either for conventional or deterrent roles. This new model would eventually replace both Vanguard and Astute class submarines.

4.       A Non-Deployed Strategic Force – A more radical option, this would abandon the UK’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent, maintaining only a non-deployed arsenal. Offering the most substantial financial savings, this option would still aim to provide a guaranteed – but not prompt – ability to retaliate against future nuclear attacks.

To read the paper in full, please visit www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/CASD.pdf

Or, you could read our take on it, here , here and here

But what alternative?

There isn’t really an alternative to the STVOL F35B, unless one considers a redesign of the Harrier a worthwhile venture, it is the only game in town if one wants the flexibility of short take off and vertical landing.

F35B would also allow the RAF and FAA to share training and logistics, recognising that flying off the CVF will not always be the mode of operation and expeditionary planning generally calls for the initial flying to be done with CVF with follow on operations moving the aircraft to land bases that can support more sustained operations. Sortie generation rates also favour the F35B and a recent runway closure at Kandahar in Afghanistan meant that the only aircraft that was able to provide CAS were Joint Force Harrier aircraft.

Although the F35B was always going to cost more than the conventional carrier take off and landing version this was amply offset by the cost of installing catapults and traps, the cost of maintaining them and more significantly, the cost of maintaining carrier landing skills.

These are extremely perishable skills and need an enormous amount of training to maintain safety.

If we want to extract maximum benefit from the significant investment in the fast jet fleet, STVOL is the most sensible option.

The worst outcome in terms of cost would be a separate RN and RAF jet fleet using 2 variants of the F35, CTOL for the RN and STVOL for the RAF. Add on the aspirations of the RAF for a Tornado GR4 replacement that might be  fulfilled by another F35 variant and the capital and through life operating costs start spiralling upwards.

Rumours abut interest in F18′s, Sea Typhoon and Sea Grippen continue to float around and of course the other option of sharing a carrier force with the French and therefore Rafale is also regularly hinted at.

Lack of ratification of the ITAR treaty, with the US clearly reneging on an agreement on technology transfer to allow the UK full sovereignty over its F35′s, continues to cast a long shadow over the programme. The Defence Select Committee covered this in a 2005 report

We fully support MoD’s position that the ability to maintain and upgrade the JSF independently is vital. We would consider it unacceptable for the UK to get substantially into the JSF programme and then find out that it was not going to get all the technology and information transfer it required to ensure ‘sovereign capability’. This needs to be sorted out before further contracts are signed and we expect MoD to set a deadline by which the assurances need to be obtained. If the UK does not receive assurances that it will get all it requires to ensure sovereign capability, we would question whether the UK should continue to participate in the JSF programme

We all know the MoD is absolutely strapped for cash, every option to save money is being looked at so read into this announcement what you will.

Converteam have made excellent progress with the EMCAT system and although only scaled for small UAV’s the intention was clear, at the end of the programme, this month, a number of challenges had been solved.

The F35B’s continued problems and uncertainty over costs mean that a Plan B makes a lot of sense.

£650k might seem like something the MoD loses down the back of a sofa but this was a significant investment and talking of its success sends a message to all concerned with the F35 and those wanting us to share CVF with the French

The door is still open.

The NAO report stated

“Despite action by the Department to improve its asset management and accounting, the issues I have identified are systemic and deep-rooted.  The level of control exercised by the Department is not yet sufficient to enable me to provide an opinion on a significant proportion of assets reported in the financial statements.”

Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office, 26 July 2010

One is left wondering if some of the problems are a result of the fragmentation of responsibility for logistics and equipment accounting to various military, MoD agencies and civilian organisations.

The post of MoD Commercial Director was created as a result of the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy was to take the lead in shaping the departments relationship with industry and future strategic commercial arrangements.

The first post holder came from an accounting background and was a partner at PriceWaterhouseCoopers, upon joining he said

“I am very pleased to be joining a dedicated group of professionals in the Ministry of Defence. I will work hard to lead, support and develop the commercial team in MOD, to build strong relationships with industry, and, working with both, to help deliver good results for our armed forces, the taxpayer, and business.”

So who was the first post holder

Say hello to Mr Amyas Morse, forging relationships with industry, the people who bought us JPA, JAMES and numerous other IT systems that always seem to deliver less than they promise. For another view on the impact that Amyas had on the MoD, click here and our take on JPA, here

Perhaps Mr Morse knows too much!

This might seem like something that only concerns the bean counters, those paper clip empire building bureaucrats that the mainstream media like so much to vilify but it has very real operational impact. If you do not know where something actually is you will not be able to use it when you need it, on operations for example. Equipment is no longer disposable, the value of almost everything in the inventory has risen and as we look to upgrading rather than buying new we absolutely have to know where equipment is at any given point.

To further highlight the very real issues of supply chain management have a read of AVM Jock Stirrups evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, especially with regard to body armour.

The MoD claim that the BOWMAN equipment hasn’t been lost, its just can’t locate exactly where it is, anyone who has ever been charged for a diffy tent peg on their 1033 might find this defence rather amusing.

I will keep this one short, just a set of basic suggestion without much background because, to be perfectly honest, I don’t know that much about the subject, please ignore my ignorance

• Create a new joint service mega Corps to manage all Combat Service Support functions, merging the RLC, AGC and REME into a single integrated support group.
• Transfer the RLC Pioneers to the Royal Engineers
• Embed a CSS cadre with all combat and combat support units to ensure an effective end to end supply chain, as low as squadron or battalion level if needed to support sub unit QM’s. This would replicate and enhance the existing REME Light Aid Detachment function and extend into logistics issues.
• Transfer all RAF and RN logistics functions into the new group, including catering and engineering (maybe a bit too far but included as a talking point)
• Instead of the piecemeal and poorly integrated system we have now, invest in a proper end to end logistics management application with the appropriate tracking equipment and training. Above all though, despite the differences in between the services, it must be a single system.
• Reconsider the use of consultants; partner with worldwide logistics organisations for skills transfer or simply develop expertise in house
• Consider moving all transport and logistics equipment into the tri service CSS Corps, including the RFA and RAF transport. Support helicopters might even be included in this. This will create a truly seamless, joint logistics organisation that has control of all the means of delivery of fuel, ammunition and others stores (OK, even more wild than above!)
• A serious, independent review of DSDA and its integration with other MoD supply chain and accounting functions

One of the problems with the RLC is that it is too large, too diverse, too many roles and ultimately too diffuse. Transportation, logistics management (this is not transportation), ammunition storage, postal services, fuel operations, port operations, pioneers and field catering.

How can the delivering post, rustling up an egg banjo and disposing of IED’s sit within one organisation?

In some respects though, it makes sense for the Combat Service Support elements to be under one roof, it is a difficult issue to reconcile.

To make matters worse, or better depending on your viewpoint, we also have duplication of very similar functions across the three services

I am going to break this post up into a few parts for ease of reading

Counter IED

This is a difficult subject to write about whilst so much sterling and incredibly brave work is going on in Afghanistan, but it is still worth discussing.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal is a broad subject with a long history but in the modern context has evolved as much by a combination of historical accident as anything else, the need to excavate to deeply buried German bombs needing the obvious involvement of a field engineering force, the Royal Engineers, for example.

The Joint Force IED arrangement we are now seeing are a result of both the changing nature of the IED threat and the sheer volume of devices, but the underlying structures have remained. Evolving from the WWI Ordnance Examiners of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps the modern Explosive Ordnance Disposal capability traces much of its history back to the Blitz, having to deal with both unexploded ‘duds’ and devices that used time delay fuses. The ongoing ‘measure’ and ‘countermeasure’ struggle between the German designers and those tasked with clearing them continued throughout the war and this experience was disseminated widely to other nations like the USA.

Modern EOD arguably evolved from here.

The use of sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IED’s) in Northern Ireland lead to the creation of specialist units in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, now RLC. The Royal Navy Mine Warfare Diving Branch and Royal Air Force 5131 Bomb Disposal Squadron can also trace their histories back decades.

This has led to a situation where to counter conventional and improvised explosive devices we have 2 units from the Army and one each from the other services.

This may seem wasteful but to understand why, one simply has to look at their respective missions. The Royal Engineers (33 and 101(V) Regiment) are responsible for specialist search and conventional explosive ordnance clearance. 11 EOD Regiment RLC are responsible for counter terrorist bomb disposal, explosive ordnance disposal and the recovery and safe disposal of conventional munitions which can include anything from small arms ammunition to battlefield rockets. The RN clearance branch is attached to the mine countermeasures capability and is responsible for explosive ordnance disposal underwater (RE divers also have this role) and the RAF EOD Bomb Disposal Squadron is responsible for airfield clearance operations. There is sound logic for this distinction, the RLC C-IED operators are drawn from the technical ammunition trade and this specialist knowledge is an advantage when dealing with the wide variety of devices found both on and off a battlefield. Specialist expertise takes a long time to develop, career structures are very different from the RE EOD personnel.

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have focussed on the IED but the other skills and capabilities must not be neglected. However, whilst the UK armed forces were large it could support these specialism’s but there are obvious crossovers and duplications that might be unsupportable in a smaller force.

IED’s have gone from a specialist weapon used by terrorist organisations in Northern Ireland to a mainstream weapon that will feature in probably every future conflict and we have to ask if the existing arrangements are efficient or sustainable.

With the increasing use of direct to user delivery of ammunition from the manufacturer and more complex ammunition that needs REME support the demand for the traditional role of ammunition management might be less. It hasn’t and won’t go away though because the cost effective management of all types of ammunition is still a highly skilled and essential activity and to counter the manufacturer to user argument there is an increasingly onerous legislative environment and much more insecurity of supply. One could argue either way about the need for specialist ammunition/explosive specialists.

With a reduction of the trade from which High Threat C-IEDD operators are drawn this will inevitably reduce career opportunities and mean a greater demand on those actually able to carry out this extremely difficult task, a sustained demand for manual approaches will inevitably mean those individuals are going to suffer. The highly specialist and technical approach to IED disposal as perfected in Northern Ireland may not always be appropriate in an environment like Afghanistan, a range of response capabilities are therefore needed that operate at different levels of risk. One wonders if the current casualty rate is sustainable and if the high threat C-IED operators are both in short supply and high demand is freedom of manoeuvre being compromised?

Whatever we do, we must recognise that the often irrational animosity between the RE and RLC has to stop, the growing and evolving threat, likely greater use of technology and reducing resources demand that inter service and cap badge politics is stomped on from a great height. There are very real and practical barriers to creating a single tri service organisation beyond the current ‘joint’ but still separate arrangements but we must tackle them decisively.

A completely new EOD Corps may be the ideal end state and could amalgamate the 4 entities currently involved and be responsible for all clearance activities. A separate Corps would be large enough to sustain a variety of career paths across a number of related trades, sustainability is one of the key issues that would need to be resolved.

A much greater use of technology should also be part of the new unit, the UK has yet again, given up its clear technical lead in related technologies, especially in robotics. Talisman is a clear step in the right direction but me must continue with this and expand it.

Traditional assault minefield breaching would be retained with the Royal Engineers and the ammunition technical trades transferred to a new function within the RLC, merged with the REME (more on this later)

In addition to the non assault clearance activities the new EOD Corps would also be heavily involved with demining activities in post conflict zones as part of a comprehensive overseas aid/emergency response package (this is going to be detailed in a future post) that includes elements of military and civilian capabilities.

With the increasing use of modular mine warfare equipment, especially in our C3 proposal, it might even be possible to task this new corps with underwater mine clearance as well.

This is only a tentative suggestion, one possible way to create and perhaps more importantly, sustain, a range of capabilities in the face of likely increasing/changing demand both at home and abroad. By creating a dedicated corps that takes responsibility for all munitions disposal activities across the three services the overall workload creates the need for a larger unit, in a larger unit there will be greater career opportunities for those hard pressed operators to move within.

The challenge in such a unit would be to increase the capability whilst maintaining quality and safety, a thorny issue currently being wrestled with by the professionals in all three services.

UPDATE 1

One of the commenters took offence to me calling the Pioneers grave diggers. I thought I should apologise for any offence but simply say it was a bit light hearted, banter, no offence intended whatsoever.

UPDATE 2

Have sense of humours sharply declined?

Think Defence is not in the business of upsetting or insulting people so once again, if the grave digger comment was out of order I apologise.

It has been removed and by way of penance, if any serving or former Pioneer wishes to send me an article on your past, present or future then I will publish it

What next, revelations that bears do in fact shit in the woods, no doubt we will have an interactive map showing the frequency and location of poo that smells of salmon and call it a sensational expose of the failure of the bear coalition to provide adequate toilet facilities.

Let’s forget the fact that they reveal precisely nothing that isn’t already well known and enjoy the frothing from the left and right.

If things change then I will change my mind but for now it makes for a more interesting diversion than actually creating and executing a coherent strategy after nearly a decade in, billions of dollars/pounds/whatever and thousands of lives.

Anyone got a tin foil hat and a collection of conspiracy theories?

UPDATE:

Perhaps I was over egging it in saying ‘precisely nothing’, there may be some small value to the enemy in pouring over this data but it I still think it is minor in comparison to what they already know, observed by actually being there or obtained by talking to the civilians and ANA/ANP.

The latest revelations about HUMINT sources being in the leaked information self evidently changes everything. On a wider level about the conduct of the conflict, the information reveals nothing that wasn’t already well known but at a human level, this is outrageous and WikiLeaks should step back and question their motives and methods, hard
]]> http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/07/wiki-leaks/feed/ 0 http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/07/decision-on-cuts-already-made/ http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/07/decision-on-cuts-already-made/#comments Mon, 26 Jul 2010 13:22:30 +0000 Think Defence http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/?p=4550 Must have been a really thorough Strategic Defence Review then…

Click here to view the embedded video.

A quote from Dr Liam Fox

What do the Challenger tanks in Germany and the costs of maintaining them and the personnel required to to train for them, what does that contribute to what’s happening in Afghanistan

This statement makes me think that he is basically unfit to be the Defence Secretary of toytown let alone the United Kingdom

Just a few things to counter that

1. The only reason Challenger 2 is not in Afghanistan is because the MoD does not want to fund them

2. Canadian and other forces have had tremendous success with their tanks in Afghanistan

3. Armoured engineers in Challenger 2 derived vehicles have been doing a brisk trade in Afghanistan

4. Those people he assumes are sitting on their arses in Germany polishing their Challengers  are to be found driving Mastiff’s and other vehicles, guess where.

5.To see the latest casualty announcement click here and then see which regiment one of them comes from click here, does anything jump off the page? He might have chosen his words very carefully because strictly speaking they are a UK unit but 3 soldiers from 2 Royal Tank Regiment have also have died in Afghanistan  and many more from the Formation Recce units, also stationed in Germany.

We all know we are going to have to face a reduction but please, lets stop pretending it is anything other than an exercise in cutting dressed up with the new clothes of some superior strategic insight or knowledge, because you are convincing no one. Picking on those so called Cold War relics and using them as a fig leaf for the unpalatable truth just demonstrates a serious lack of wisdom and beyond the idiots of the most of the mainstream media, you are becoming a figure of ridicule.

Just come out with, we are going to have to drastically reduce the budget and some things are going to have to go.

PS, is anyone missing Geoff yet?

It is clear then that ground based air defence is a relatively neglected activity, yet more evidence that those Cold War relics have been in the process of being binned off for quite some time. One has to ask if there is still a need for ground based air defence when in every conflict since 1982 any airborne threat has been neutralised before ground operations have commenced. That said, 1982 is a salutary lesson in the consequences of operating in an environment where air attack is still possible and your defences are no more than average.

We must still be able to deal with every eventuality if we are to maintain a flexible force but the most likely threat in future conflicts is not Migs streaking in at low level but enemy UAVs.

The technology is maturing at a frightening rate and with this growth in production volume and capability will be proliferation in a wide range of state and non state actors. Hezbollah have already used rudimentary UAV’s and there are many models available now, commercially of the shelf, that can be deployed after only a few hours training.

When used in their traditional role of gathering intelligence they can negate many of the advantages that Western forces currently enjoy. Unconventional forces have shown an increasing capability in adapting commercial technologies for military use, triggering IED’s in Iraq with remote control garage door openers or mobile telephones is a good example. Taking one of these commercial UAV’s and loading it up with a couple of grenades or even a chemical agent is not beyond the realms of the possible. With assistance from rogue nations, even more sophisticated systems may be deployed against us.

The threat has clearly changed but there is still a need, albeit it at a reduced level, for ground based air defence against conventional aircraft and helicopter threats.

In the man portable or light vehicle role the HVM, either in MANPAD mode or with the triple clip on launcher is still relevant. It provides light forces with an effective short range anti aircraft capability. The heavier Stormer vehicle based system is being withdrawn anyway and this is the right decision.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Rapier FSC is still a very effective system and has the advantage of portability. Due to replace it is the Common Anti Air Modular Missile that is derived from the RAF’s ASRAAM, the basis of the Future Local Anti-air Defence (FLAADS) available in Land and Maritime flavours. This will replace Rapier and Sea Wolf; a fantastic idea that makes so much sense it is hard to believe we are still actively pursuing it and a good example of the benefits to be had from ‘ruthless commonality’

Instead of three missiles we have one, maybe with the odd minor change to suit the environment but still largely the same so we can benefit from a single logistics and maintenance stream. Current plans call for it to be truck mounted; another contender for my modular launch container concept that could be used by round and maritime forces. The system has a great deal of export potential as many nations start to replace legacy systems after squeezing every last drop of usefulness out of them and we should make sure that the funding stream remains in place.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Missile based systems are expensive and directed at high value targets like aircraft, helicopters and even cruise missiles but against small UAV’s they are overly expensive. It would be very easy in an asymmetric conflict to rapidly diminish missile ready stocks by swarming expendable UAV’s at a deployed force.

To counter the UAV threat we need a gun based system, ammunition is cheaper than missiles and the air bursting ammunition has a very high likelihood of hitting the target, the slightest of hits likely to render the UAV unusable.

The low rate of fire of the CTA 40mm canon might rule it out of an anti air mission but with the right ammunition, possibly based on the Rheinmetall AHEAD system it might still be effective. Combining this with an off the shelf fire control system would create a system that again, might be deployable on land or at sea. Alternatively, we could simply buy the Rheinmetall Skyranger 35mm system. In a previous post I discussed the possibility of buying into Rheinmetall base protection system (C-RAM), based on the 35mm revolver cannon and AHEAD ammunition and this would also be the same as that used for counter UAV. The current 20mm Centurion (click the link and turn the volume up) and Phalanx systems are facing issues of obsolescence and now might be a good time to upgrade both land and naval systems. The Rheinmetall system is available in a turreted or towed configuration so could be deployed in different types of brigades and with the Royal Marines as required.

Click here to view the embedded video.

If we could use the CTA 40mm for this role the advantages of commonality are obvious but in this case it might be a push too far, the Rheinmettal systems is available off the shelf and has excellent performance.

Organisationally, we should reconsider single system regiments and create composite units that would have elements of all systems, similar to the single TA air defence regiment, 106 Regiment. Two multi system air defence regiments would be equipped with the full range of systems and the third, the TA regiment would still be retained. These Regiments would find utility in all spectrums of conflict and not have to find alternative roles when we are engaged in one type of conflict or another. High intensity they would be using CAMM, counter insurgency they operate in C-RAM and counter Improvised UAV mode (IUAV, is that a new acronym?)

Summary

Air defence is still vital if we are retain any aspiration to being a serious military force but the threat, as ever, is changing and the Counter Rocket and Mortar and Counter AUV mission is now as important and more likely to be experienced. Our air defence capabilities must therefore change and creating a capability that has common elements with other services makes sense in many ways.

Short Term

• Continue with withdrawal of Stomer based HVM
• Continue funding CAMM
• Retain Rapier FSC

Medium Term

• Investigate air defence feasibility for CTA 40mm canon
• Introduce CAMM in common modular container based system for land and naval use
• Introduce C-RAM and C-UAV gun based system
• Form 2 Regular and 1 TA composite air defence regiments

Artillery has had a mini renaissance in Afghanistan with the continuing and increasing use of GMLRS, the 70km sniper, 105mm and even the humble mortar. With likely future conflicts taking place over a wider area there is a trend for greater range.

Man Portable Mortars

Although not artillery in the traditional sense, they are in the infantry not Royal Artillery, mortars remain a wickedly effective and versatile weapon. Whether being used to suppress, nuetralise or provide smoke and illumination their greatest attributes are simplicity, speed of reaction and portability.

The venerable 51mm mortar has now been replaced with a Hirtenberger 60mm obtained under UOR and is providing a valuable improvement over the 51mm, even if it is a little heavier. This should be bought into the main equipment programme and provides an invaluable compliment to the 40mm UGL.

The L16 81mm Mortar, in service with infantry battalions since 1956, has now upgraded to the A2 model that provides a number of improvements including a new Target Locating Equipment (TLE) package. The only other improvement I would like to see is the introduction of a multi fuse for 81mm bombs like the L3 M734 or Junghans PX581 which uses optical technology to reduce costs and eliminate the threat of fuse jammers. In most mortar missions its dispersion is a positive advantage and whilst a more accurate mortar round would be useful, I would doubt the value for money. Logistics are the real problem with mortars, they demand a great deal of support, a standard pallet for example would have over 120x 81mm bombs but only 60 odd for a 120mm so despite the many calls to upgrade infantry mortars to the 120mm their lower speed of deployment and significant logistics overhead quickly diminishes any advantage they might have.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Vehicle Mounted Mortars

In a modern conflict, where counter mortar radar will be in use, simply plugging away with mortars from a fixed location will be a very dangerous pastime, vehicle mounting a mortar is used to support rapid fire and move missions.

The UK also uses the 81mm L16 in this role, fitted to Bulldog armoured personnel carriers although they can also be used in a dismounted mode.

In the vehicle mounted role, the heavier weight of 120mm bombs are arguably less of an disadvantage, a vehicle can carry the extra weight and manage the increased recoil forces.  Being vehicular borne also lessens the logistics problems although of course, the underlying issues remain. Many argue that 120mm mortars are simply poor mans artillery but providing infantry or armoured infantry with a more lethal system, retained within its organic chain of command would be valuable.

If we accept the argument that 120mm in the vehicular role is worth pursuing then the choice of available weapons is the next argument.

There are a number of systems on the market, from the traditional towed systems to modern automatic loading devices and all points in between.

At the high end is the AMOS twin barreled and NEMO single barreled systems, but these are complex and expensive, although the direct fire capability might offset these.

To keep things simple, the two systems I think worth considering are the Soltam CARDOM and the STE SRAMS.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The CARDOM is battle proven and is in service with a number of nations but we would have to get over the objections of the yoghurt knitting class and buy from Israel. Although the SRAMS looks very interesting the CARDOM has a number of very useful innovations like the ability to quickly dismount, automated rapid fire control and can even use an interchangeable 81mm barrel. The interchangeable barrel improves versatility and eases logistics problems, which as we have said, will be greater than with an 81mm system. In the lighter brigades it could be mounted on 4×4 or 6×6 vehicles like the Ocelot or Jackal and in the medium weight brigades, a mix of FRES SV or whatever wheeled vehicle is chosen.

If we are to buy into this type of system, we should absolutely make sure they remain with the Infantry.

Guns

The 105mm L118 Light Gun has seen widespread service with the UK and many other armed forces. Its apparent simplicity belies its sophistication and superlative design, the 105mm Light Gun, like the 81mm mortar, derives its effectiveness from its rate of fire, portability and speed of operation, with the addition of accuracy. Weighing less than 2 tonnes, it can be lifted into position by many helicopters, towed by a range of light vehicles (including the new Wolfhound Tactical Support Vehicle) and in extremis, moved by hand. The famous Roshan Dragon story from the MoD shows just how versatile and portable the Light Gun can be and the effectiveness, even in rather old fashioned direct fire mode, is not in doubt.

Click here to view the embedded video.

With the relatively recent mid life upgrade the Light Gun has many effective years left in it, in service with three regiments.

The self propelled AS90 is another brilliant system, rumour has it the design spec was less than 2 sheets of paper and the contract awarded in double quick time. Despite being a bit long in the tooth it is still an effective weapon but the lack of precision/insensitive natures and shorter range than many comparable systems means it is ripe for investment. This is unlikely to happen though and it could be argued that other systems have eclipsed it.

Some of the AS90 regiments have re roled to Light Gun for Afghanistan but AS90 officially it equips 5 field regiments (1  RHA, 3 RHA, 4 RA, 19 RA, 26 RA) and in order to realise short term savings we should consider reducing this to 1 regular regiment and 1 TA, a significant reduction but these are tough times. With 1 regular and 1 TA regiment we still retain a core of this very useful system and the ability to regenerate should we need to.

In the medium term and with whats left, we might have another go at upgrading to a 52calibre barrel, introduce insensitive and guided rounds but this would not be a high priority and the cost would have to be spread across a small number of systems, making it not cost efficient. The US Excalibeer rounds have already been trialled on the AS90.

A more radical medium term solution might be to withdraw AS90 completely and replace it with one of the many 155mm wheeled or lightweight systems on the market. The cost of operating 155mm weapons on a tracked and armoured chassis is considerable, a wheeled system not only radically reduces cost but also results in greater strategic mobility by road and air (air transport by C130/A400 instead of C17 for example)

For years the Royal Artillery have been itching to get their hands on the BAe M777 155mm Ultra Lightweight Field Howitzer, as sold to the US  and created the Lightweight Mobile Artillery Weapon System (LIMAWS) programme to equip the proposed medium weight FRES brigades. LIMAWS consisted of a rocket and gun based system, the gun being the M777.

LIMAWS was cancelled in 2007 but it is worth having another look at as a medium term replacement for AS90, maybe taking elements of the long term programme to replace the AS90 and Light Gun post 2020 called FIFS.

In addition to the Supacat HMT Portee system the NEXTER truck based CAmion Equipé d’un Système d’ARtillerie (CAESAR) was also trialled for the requirement but since then other systems have come onto the market including the  BAe Archer, Soltam ATMOS and Denel T5. Using 52 cal barrels they all have significantly greater range than the in service AS90 (especially the Denel) and can use the various NATO standard extended range and guided munitions. Although the Archer is sophisticated it is expensive, a truck mounted systems might be more appropriate.

We might buy off the shelf or combine the M777 and a MAN SV medium mobility truck, this is should not be a complex engineering challenge

In the short term then, we should reduce our AS90 regiments significantly and in the medium term, replace them with a truck based 155mm system.

Rockets

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) was proven in the Gulf War but with the introduction of the cluster bomb treaty, its future was uncertain. The systems were subsequently upgraded to accept the guided rocket, GMLRS. These have gone on to perform sterling service in Afghanistan where they are nicknamed the 70km sniper because of their extreme range and hyper accuracy, they have even been used to drop into a large well that was being used by the enemy.

The armoured chassis weighs in at about 27 tonnes and is tracked which means strategic mobility is limited but the twin launcher means they can deliver a massive weight of very accurate fire, as the video below

Click here to view the embedded video.

The rocket version of LIMAWS was also designed to equip the medium weight brigades and was very similar in concept to the US HIMARS with a single launcher on a very lightweight Supacat HMT chassis that kept the whole system below 9 tonnes, to allow sling loading by a Chinook. Given the range of GMLRS it is difficult to see the value in making the system this lightweight, with the additions of the whole range of theatre entry specification it would be very difficult to achieve this in practice so in order to achieve some commonality with the future 155mm gun system it should be mounted on the same Support Vehicle truck chassis.

Rather than create a wheeled vehicle based system where the weapon and transport are one and the same we should create a common modular launch system, based of course on a 20ft ISO container, that can be carried on a variety of flat bed or DROPS vehicles and even naval vessels like the Think Defence C3 concept.

This container becomes hugely strategically mobile, extremely flexible and can be used for a variety of weapon systems by merely swapping the payload.

Payloads could be the existing 6 pack GMLRS, Fire Shadow, CAMM or other future systems.

Whilst I am on the subject of the Fire Shadow loitering munition, I am not convinced and would consider cancellation.

Apart from the air mobile and amphibious units, the Royal Artillery will then largely go to work in the same vehicle, regardless of system to provide obvious logistics, maintenance and training benefits.

To reduce reliance on Storm Shadow and Strike Fighters (F35 and Typhoon) for deep strike we might also consider the value of buying the Lockheed Martin ATACMS tactical rocket. This would of course stray into inter service politics but when compared to the alternatives is actually extremely cost effective. If we can break out of the inter service rivalry and stovepiped thinking that characterises much of our procurement decisions we could provide the Royal Artillery with a serious deep strike system and allow cost savings to be made elsewhere, elsewhere being the Typhoon and JCA fleets.

Click here to view the embedded video.

At just under 300km range the ATACMS missile compares favorably with the range of the Storm Shadow, can even be fitted with the same BROACH warhead as Storm Shadow and costs less than $0.75million each.

What’s not to like.

As a justification for CVF/JCA we keep hearing that the majority of the worlds population is within 100km of the shoreline. Putting an ATACMS module on a Royal Navy vessel sitting 100km offshore  puts them within easy reach, of course I am not suggesting ATACMS can replace CVF/JCA but it is food for thought and worth considering as part of the force mix.

GMLRS, Storm Shadow, ATACMS and submarine launched Tomahawk are overlapping and complimentary but taken together, would be a powerful capability and if we can achieve some commonality with naval mounting of the GMLRS and ATACMS then the overall costs can also be managed.

Other Systems

I will cover air defence in a future post and in a previous post UAV’s have been discussed

MSTAR, MAMBA and COBRA should be retained as is, counter artillery is a very complex task that is about much more than technology

Summary

This is not a particularly revolutionary proposal but takes existing systems and applies selected enhancements whilst reducing the number of heavily armoured systems to improve strategic mobility and reduce cost.

Organisationally, we also need to resolve ongoing cap badge and service rivalry in the delivery of indirect weapons and their supporting services, ISR and UAV’s being the primary source of these disagreements that make the argument over who controls mortars look tame in comparison.

As the cost of providing close air support and deep strike from aircraft rises the lower cost of artillery starts looks increasingly attractive. A series of overlapping layers provides a cost effective means of reducing the need for expensive air delivered strike/CAS.

Note I said reduce, not replace.

Short Term

• Obtain new proximity fuse for the 81mm mortar
• Bring the 60mm mortar into the main equipment programme
• Retain 81mm in man portable and vehicle mounted role
• Retain 105mm Light Gun at 3 regiments in the light role
• Disband 4 regular AS90 regiments and transfer 1 Regiments worth of systems to the TA
• Retain GMLRS at existing level
• Cancel Fire Shadow

Medium Term

• Introduce 120mm vehicle mounted mortar
• Withdraw AS90
• Introduce truck based 155mm system
• Consider guided 155mm ammunition
• Develop common weapon container and modules for land and naval use
• Transfer GMLRS systems to truck based carriage using common modular payload container
• Invest in ATACMS

We all know that the forthcoming review is going to be nothing more than an exercise in slashing costs with a thin veneer of strategic direction.

• Objective 1 – Short Term cost savings and Afghanistan
• Objective 2 – Long Term plans based on the idea of investing to save, coherence and a standardisation strategy that enforces the Think Defence mantra of ‘ruthless commonality’

We know that Objective 1 is the most pressing but in swinging the axe we also have to ensure that a range of capabilities can be regenerated or built up as the financial climate improves.

It’s a far cry from grand ambitions of defining our role in the world, punching above our weight and other equally redundant platitudes and rooted in reality.

I read this article in the Guardian that I thought actually quite brilliant in some regards, the comments are both interesting amusing but the fundamental point I take out of is this.

Stop messing about grandstanding about our role in the world and start thinking what is in the British interest?

Of course, I think it is in the British interest to maintain a strong military capability to be applied in support of our wider economic and political strategy, but on what basis?

All you need to do is simply access it from your device and it should automatically recognise you are browsing from a mobile device and format it appropriately.

I have tried it on an iPod and it seems to work fine so if anyone fancies testing it and let me know how it looks that would be rather excellent.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Oh, yes, of course there is

MoD Gifts £26million to the Northern Ireland Assembly (H/T UK Defence Forum)

And there’s more where that came from

“A crucial question for the Ministry of Defence is whether it can use strategic financial management to stop living beyond its means. The current Strategic Defence and Security Review will provide an opportunity for the MOD to balance its books in the short-term. The greater challenge will be to keep spending plans affordable in the longer term. The Department is not at present placing enough emphasis on financial management to be able to do this.”

Mr Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office, 21 July 2010

Perhaps we should ask the team to look into the footwear of MP’s and the cabinet.

Quite clearly they are not wearing the correct footwear, instead of the expected elegant brogues they seem to be wearing these.

Amid the continuing confusion over withdrawal dates and strategies in Afghanistan we have the Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Defence, Foreign Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister chipping in with contradictory comments.

Whilst they are sweating over the canapes in the White House or subsidised drinks in the House of Commons they should spare a thought for those doing the real sweating and try and get their act together.

Then we have the Prime Minister dropping his trousers and bending over for the US President

In the final act of buffonery, we have the Deputy Prime Minister, a Minister of the Crown, standing at the Despatch Box trying to score a cheap political point against Jack Straw by declaring the Iraq War illegal.

Come to think of it, am I being unfair to clowns?

• Added a section on the right hand column to show a table of most prolific commenters
• Added a new page to show all the Think Defence links on one page
• Added a status update and links of interest section on the right hand column to show links to news stories that are of relevance to UK defence. I will try and keep these limited to really interesting or topical issues. It also links into the Think Defence Twitter feed

If anyone has any suggestions just let me know

“The defence programme is entirely unaffordable – especially if we try to do what we need to do in the future while simultaneously doing everything that we’ve done in the past

Without cost containment in the current programmes, we have no option but to either cut the programmes currently under way or curtail investment in future programmes. We demand, and the nation expects, that our armed forces are provided with the equipment and support they require to do the jobs that we ask them to do. But in addition, we demand, and the nation expects, that we can demonstrate value for money on defence expenditure”

Serious stuff indeed.

So with that as a backdrop, very limited money and a real pressure for defence suppliers to contribute to cost savings, a stated desire for greater collaboration/resource sharing with the French and Saint Vince of the Cable said to be looking seriously at the FSTA PFI, we have a number of strands that could combine to create a more efficient package.

We have discussed the FSTA PFI a number of times, it seems a PFI too far and on face value, extremely poor value for money for a very ordinary capability. The aircraft that form the service will not be able to refuel a number of RAF types, it will not be able to take on fuel whilst airborne itself and a number of other design deficiencies that are deliberately accepted to ensure the aircraft can be used in the civilian market when not required by the RAF.

We need a mature and very carefully considered approach that provides a realistic and effective capability whilst maintaining the profit of the various companies involved. Profit is not a dirty word because it sustains these manufacturers and that is of course, good for the country.

When we look at the organisations that form part of the Airtanker PFI consortium and the manufacturer of the A400 we see a range of organisations that have the potential for business with the MoD and DGA beyond the A400 and tankers.

Cobham, VT, Rolls Royce, Thales and of course, EADS (parent of Airbus)

Everyone knows the FSTA is a bad deal so if the consortium members decide to lawyer up and enforce their penalty clauses then maybe we might reconsider the A400 and other deals the consortium members are involved in. After all, we can simply walk away from the A400 with no penalties whatsoever and in any arrangement, if both parties agree to walk away, there is no need for expensive contract lawyers.

Its time we stopped being a frightened lamb and got everyone around the table and discuss a long term future that would both deliver capability and sustain industrial capacity to the benefit of all.

Both the UK and France have substantial requirements for the A400

Both the UK and France have substantial requirements for an airborne refuelling and strategic transport aircraft

Training, maintenance and other facilities could be pooled and whilst there are significant issues about the sharing mechanisms there are options worth considering. We don’t have to share the aircraft in their entirety, a national buy plus a shared pool might provide a baseline capability for both the UK and France whilst providing surge capacity for UK/French use or even to other nations.

If we pooled our resources, contracted with OCCAR and created a single ‘mega deal’ we could realise cost savings for the UK and French armed forces whilst providing the industrial partners with a stable long term deal, both are desirable in the kind of financial environment of the day.

Cool heads, maturity, pragmatism and a long term view need to prevail, not contract lawyers.

Click here to view the embedded video.

As we know, it is due to replace the RAF C130K models, is over budget and will be in service later than expected.

Business as usual then.

Negotiations are still ongoing for the final share of the overspend, various partner nations are talking about order reductions and nothing concrete seems to have come out into the public yet.

Prediction time, the MoD will eventually settle on 22 A400′s and retire the C130J’s early as part of the future SDR moving at an accelerated pace to its ‘two type strategy’

The A400 will also be included in a ‘deal’ with EADS that includes the A330 and the cancellation of the FSTA PFI, this will also be integrated into a joint programme with the French combining strategic transport, air refuelling and tactical transport.

That’s my contribution to the rumour mill for today.