‘Thank you for your letter of 18 May enclosing correspondence from your constituent, Mr Richard Stockley, about the MOD’s plans for surplus Nimrod MRA.4 aircraft.

I fully appreciate Mr Stockley’s concerns over the future of the two Nimrod MRA.4 trials aircraft that are currently in storage at BAE Systems’ Woodford plant, following the completion of their involvement in the MRA.4 flight trials programme. As Mr Stockley notes, the Nimrod MRA.4 is currently being introduced in to service to replace the Nimrod MR.2, which was retired from service on 31 March 2010.

The option to convert the two pre-production aircraft to production standard has been considered in detail on a number of occasions but the cost estimates are unaffordable within existing financial provisions. Furthermore, the essential operational tasks of the MRA.4 fleet can be met with a fleet of nine aircraft.

Mr Stockley’s helpful suggestions that the surplus aircraft be retained as an attrition reserve or retained as instructional airframes are, in fact, impracticable as the trials aircraft were not built to the same design standard as the production aircraft and are thus not representative of the in-service fleet. Either course of action would require a costly conversion of the aircraft to the production standard before the production line closes in 2012.

A number of options remain under consideration for the aircraft. However, on a personal note I can assure you that, should a decision be taken to dispose of the trials aircraft, they will be stripped of all items that could be used as spares for the production aircraft.

I hope this explains the position to Mr Stockley’s satisfaction.

You’ve got to accept that the man does have a point, as a nation we are skint and to bring them up to production standard will cost a packet. But as I mentioned in my previous post, there were three Nimrod MRA.4 development aircraft, ZJ517 (PA03), will be fed into the production line and become an operational aircraft. So the concept is feasible, unless PA01 and PA02’s design differs greatly from PA03. Also, the fleet of nine aircraft may not always be there, it only takes a ground handling mishap, a bird-strike or a hanger fire to seriously deplete their numbers, and if these two prototype aircraft were to be scrapped, where would the replacements come from? That to me is the most important issue regarding the prototypes.

Hopefully, with an eye on long term-ism, the airframes will be preserved and converted when the financial climate is somewhat sunnier – fingers crossed! On a positive note though, it is good to see that the MOD have at least given it some serious consideration.

The Lynx Mk.9A is an upgraded version of the Mk.9 and features LHTECH CTS800N engines which offer significantly more power over the original ‘wheezy’ Rolls Royce Gems. This will vastly improve the Lynx’s hot and high performance in Afghanistan. Prior to this operations were severely restricted especially during the summer months.

This additional engine power also allows the Mk.9A to carry heavier weapons as pictures have been released of the aircraft fitted with the 0.50 M3M HMG, which is a significant increase in fire power over the usual 7.62 L7 GPMG.

In addition to the new engines the Mk.9A is also fitted improved secure communications equipment. Given this quantum leap in capability over the previous Mk.7 and Mk.9 variants, it will be a welcome addition to the flight line.

Lynx 9a being loaded into an RAF C17

EDITOR: Let’s hope there are more than 2 being deployed.

‘Thank you for your letter of 4 March 2010 enclosing correspondence from your constituent, Mr Richard Stockley, in which he enquired about maritime reconnaissance and patrol capabilities around the Falkland Islands on the retirement of the Nimrod MR.2 fleet.

The introduction of the Nimrod MRA.4 will bring a substantially more capable aircraft than the MR.2 into the RAF’s fleet. In the period of transition until the MRA.4 enters service we intend to use other assets, as available, in the long range search and rescue and maritime reconnaissance roles. For obvious reasons, we do not comment on more sensitive operational matters, including capability levels. I would also note that while embarked on a ship, all Royal Navy rotary wing aircraft, such as Merlin, are Search and Rescue capable.

Her Majesty’s Government is responsible for maintaining the security and territorial integrity of the Falkland Islands, and the UK’s other dependent territories. You will understand that I cannot comment on the capabilities we retain for this purpose, but I can assure you and Mr Stockley that we take this responsibility very seriously.’

I was somewhat disappointed with the response, as it unsurprisingly maintained the line of ‘sensitive operational matters’ and ‘other assets’, with a passing reference to air sea rescue capabilities, rather than the, “Thank heavens you contacted us Richard, we never realised we’d made such an error of judgement, we shall postpone retirement of the MR.2 forthwith,” I would have preferred. It should be noted that the main crux of my letter was long-range, maritime strike capability.

Nimrod MRA4

With regard to other assets, the UK doesn’t have any other airborne, long-range maritime patrol/attack capability like the Nimrod, unless you count a C-130 Hercules and a pair of binoculars. Due to this and the amount of times I’ve been left shaking my head in disbelief at some of the decisions the Government has made in relation to defence, I will have a nagging doubt in the back of my mind until the MRA.4 becomes fully operational. When it eventually does, I believe it will be a case of, “We were lucky nothing serious happened in the mean time,” rather than, “We had that base well and truly covered.”

Being a mere mortal, I do not get to confer with the likes of Bill Rammell MP on a daily basis, but as we will still live in a democracy (despite the attempts of Tony Blair et al) I will continue to raise issues such as this at a higher level, as I believe anyone with a keen interest in defence should.

Which leads me onto my next point:

The UK is to purchase a total of Nine Nimrod MRA.4’s, what isn’t widely known is that a total of eleven MRA.4 airframes will have been manufactured. Prior to the manufacture of the production aircraft, three development aircraft were constructed, these being PA01, PA02 and PA03. PA03 will be fed into the production line and become an operational aircraft.

The remaining airframes PA01 and PA02 are currently in open storage at BAE Systems’ Woodford Aerodrome pending a decision on their fate. It should be noted that Woodford is due to close at the end of 2012, so a quick decision would be somewhat prudent.

Following completion of the test programme, PA01 (ZJ516), has 913 hours on the clock, and PA02 (ZJ518) has 753 hours. As fatigue lives go, these aircraft are still in their infancy. They may have a couple of bumps and scrapes received during their flight trials, but there is nothing to suggest they aren’t in sufficient condition to be fed into the production line like PA03 (ZJ517). As an aside, ZJ517 accumulated only 205 hours during the development phase.

A number of commentators on this blog have remarked that the UK isn’t buying enough Nimrod MRA.4’s or that the RAF should utilise them as an R.1 replacement instead of the Rivet Joint. So, what should be done with these two remaining aircraft?

• Strip for spares and then scrap
• Feed them into the production line and have two additional MRA4’s
• Utilise them for another role

Come the May 6th election, as soon as I find out who my new MP is I’ll be sending them a letter highlighting these two spare aircraft and suggesting what to do with them.

The question is, what will you do?

The contract, worth £41.8milllion, has been awarded to AgustaWestland and will see the final 10 airframes upgraded. These are in addition to the previous 12 which began conversion at the end of last year. The out of service date for the Mk 9A has also been extended to 2016. The Minister for Defence Equipment and support, Quentin Davies said:

“This improved version of the very successful Lynx helicopter will greatly benefit our troops in Afghanistan when it deploys there for the first time next month. The enhancements will allow it to perform in the extremes of climate and geography that characterise that theatre of operations.”

Quentin Davies was right when he said it will greatly benefit our troops as operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq were severely limited by Lynx’s inability to operate in hot and high conditions, especially during the summer months. At times the troop carrying capability has been reduced to one, which makes something of a lonely patrol.

Quentin Davies was not so correct however in calling the Lynx successful.

The naval version may have sold a respectable number, but the only service to actually use the ‘battlefield’ version is the British Army. All the other Lynx operators stick to using it where it belongs, in the naval role. One also wonders if Quentin Wilson is also aware that the Lynx was known to be underpowered when it took part in the first Gulf War back in 1991?

A point which has been raised many times on this blog.

It should be noted that the Mk 9 is not the only Lynx version operating in Afghanistan. The Mk 7 (skid version), also has a presence in theatre. The question that needs to be raised is will any of the Mk 7’s be re-engined to Mk 7A standard? Or will they be left to struggle in the heat of the Afghan summer?

Given that the fact that the Lynx’s replacement, the Wildcat, is not due to enter service until 2014, this means the AAC will have to soldier on with the underpowered Mk 7 for another four years, possibly longer. At around £4.2million conversion cost per aircraft would the modification of a small number be acceptable if it means such a quantum leap in capability?

The main rotor gearboxes and LHTEC CTS800 engines of any converted aircraft could be re-used on the Lynx Wildcat.

Readers may be aware that the Lynx Mk 7 has been in service for quite a while, since 1988 in fact, and many of these were upgraded from the original Mark 1’s which entered service in 1978.

The advantage offered by a re-engined Mark 7 is that they are lighter than the Mk 9’s due to their simple skids instead of a heavier set of wheels and associated oleos. This would give them an improved hot and high capability over the Mk 9.

Although the Lynx is not a true battlefield helicopter and has its limitations, this additional capability should be a welcome improvement in a very difficult environment.

The present rumblings in Buenos Aeries therefore, are more down economic desires rather than some grandiose nationalist intent. In essence, Argentina would like a seat at the table and a large slice of the pie. However, seeing as your average British senior civil servant would rather cut his own throat with a rusty carving knife before considering a mutually beneficial agreement to share oil wealth, albeit in the name of peace and international relations, then the potential exists for conflict. Unfortunately, oil is one of the greatest catalysts for conflict known to man.

To those concerned with defence the opportunity arises to evaluate the conventional forces we have to hand, given that much of our present armed services are deeply entrenched in a counter insurgency conflict.

Although we could not mount a task force to recapture the Falkland Island’s, we should not need to. But the question needs to be asked, are the forces and capabilities we have at present adequate to repel an invasion or at least handle a heavy duty stand-off?

Before we ask this, we should also ask, does Argentina have the political and military capacity for an invasion?

The answer to that is probably not, as they no longer have an aircraft carrier and their only dedicated landing ship has been scrapped. The only ships they have that could land troops and equipment are a small number of LSL types. However, they still maintain a credible submarine capability as well as four destroyers and around ten corvettes.

In addition to this, the Argentine Air Force still has around 50 A-4 Skyhawk and Mirage sub-types, as well as nine Exocet armed Super Etendard’s. These aircraft may be old in comparison the RAF Eurofighter Typhoon’s based on the Island’s, but they still pose a significant threat to shipping, as do the handful of P-3B Orion’s they operate.   So, although there equipment is far from being state of the art, it has the potential to a painful, if not deadly, thorn in the side.

The threat to the Falkland Island’s therefore does not come from invasion, but from Argentina attempting to implement an air and naval blockade. The oil rig currently being positioned could be taken out with a torpedo or an Exocet missile at any time, as could HMS York, the current Type 42 destroyer on patrol in the area. The other ships in the Royal Navy flotilla could do very little as they consist of an RFA tanker, a hydrographic survey ship and fisheries patrol boat armed with a 30 mm cannon. The Admiralty could have a nuclear submarine in the area, but if they have, they are keeping tight lipped about it. As the Argentine navy can muster three submarines, the RN would need to send more than one should things heat up.

The five Eurofighter Typhoon’s based at Mount Pleasant provide an adequate deterrent from an assault on the Island’s themselves, but cannot provide a watertight defence of the whole exclusion zone alone.

One significant deterrent the Typhoon could provide, if it was integrated, would be the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile. This, and a robust submarine force would seriously curtail any Argentine designs on the Malvinas and the surrounding ocean. Unfortunately, and herein lies the crux, the only aircraft in the RAF inventory able to carry the Harpoon is the Nimrod. The powers that be have announced that the MR.2 variant will be withdrawn this year as a cost saving measure, and its replacement, the MRA.4, will not be operational until around 2012.

It should be remembered that it was the proposed withdrawal of HMS Endurance that triggered the invasion in 1982, a decision which Argentina viewed as a sign of weakness. What we need to consider is this, if we withdrew the Nimrod and its long range, anti-ship/submarine capability without a credible alternative, would they view this in the same way?

As we begin to make stringent cuts and changes to our armed forces we should clearly understand that we could not fight another Falkland’s style conflict. What we should be doing therefore, is ensuring that the forces we have stationed there have a sufficient deterrent capability so we don’t have to.

Richard Stockley

However, now that the aircraft has actually been fielded in Iraq and Afghanistan, the question can now be asked, is it any good and was all the pain, suffering and cost worth it?

It is easy to understand the reasoning behind the United States Marine Corps requirement for a tilt rotor transport aircraft, given the benefits that it offered over the seemingly obsolete helicopter. Now, over twenty years and an eye watering $27 billion later, has that realisation come true?

Although the Osprey seemed to offer a quantum leap in capability, during its development phase it developed a nasty habit of falling out of the sky and killing its occupants. Despite fielding and thoroughly testing a tilt rotor X-Plane prototype, the XV-15, the manufacturers found out the hard way that they were entering relatively unchartered waters with regards to control, stability and aerodynamics. Even after its introduction into operational service, it has still had a number of mishaps and close calls, although on the whole these tend to be connected with the earlier Block A versions and luckily there have been no casualties.

The advantage that the Osprey offers is that it can fly faster and higher than a normal helicopter, by virtue of its tilt-rotor. It can therefore get into a landing zone, drop its troops, take off and get to a safe altitude significantly quicker than any known helicopter in current production. This sounds great on paper, but by the virtue of its incredulous $27 billion development budget, it beggars the question, would it not have been cheaper to utilise an existing helicopter and buy more AH-1Z Viper helicopter gunships or attack aircraft to escort them into the LZ and out again?

The argument that the Osprey is used for amphibious assault is appreciable, in that it allows the fleet to remain out of harms way many miles off shore, and well out of the range of enemy artillery. But when used in Iraq, or a possible deployment to Afghanistan, where’s the fleet? After the initial invasion and the beach has been secured, the ‘off shore’ requirement becomes somewhat nonsensical. This is also apparent with regards to the USMC requirement for large and armoured amphibious assault vehicles. Once these behemoths have crawled up the beach and conquered the beach head it becomes a very large target, especially when it begins to move further in land and into markedly different terrain; for this, smaller more practical vehicles are required. Therefore, although the USMC may demand something bespoke for their needs, what they really need is a vehicle with a better all round combat capability, as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated.

With the Osprey, what the USMC has effectively got is a very expensive STOL aircraft/helicopter hybrid, when either the STOL aircraft or the helicopter would be just as well suited and more economically priced. The tragic off-shot of the Osprey purchase isn’t just the deaths of those killed in its development, it’s the fact that the helicopter was destined to replace the CH-46 Sea Knight, which is still in service and will be for some time to come. Because the Osprey was the Sea Knight’s one and only proposed replacement, politics has dictated that it shouldn’t be replaced by anything else other than the Osprey. This situation has been exasperated by the over-runs of the development period and costs. Fortunately in some instances the Sea Knight has been replaced, but only in the U S Navy’s vertical replenishment role. The U S Navy has had the common sense and foresight to replace it with a version of the Sikorsky Blackhawk called the MH-60S Knighthawk.

This means that the CH-46 is still used for combat missions by the USMC, even when the U S Navy concluded it was well past its retirement age. Most helicopters are deemed at the end of their useful and economic lives when they are between twenty-five or thirty years of age, depending on the type. The last USMC CH-46’s left the production line as new builds in 1971, although many were subsequently upgraded to CH-46E standard after that date. This means the youngest airframes in the Sea Knight fleet are thirty eight years old. However these aircraft are mere whipper-snappers if you consider the fact that many CH-46A’s were upgraded to CH-46E’s, the ‘A’ version entering service in 1964. This equates to a staggering age of forty five years; a large proportion of which is spent in a highly corrosive, salt laden environment!

The age of the aircraft also means that severe limitations have been placed upon it with regards to manoeuvring and lift capability, restricting the capabilities of the CH-46 fleet even further. As an aside and with hindsight being a wonderful thing, these time spans mean that the USMC could’ve replaced the CH-46 in the 1980’s with a version of the Blackhawk or a new-build CH-46, and then replaced this with the Osprey after nearly two decades in service; definitely food for thought with regards to future projects.

With regards to a viable replacement, given the fact that the CH-46, or Frog as it is known in USMC parlance, is a highly regarded airframe despite its age and giving regard to the old adage ‘if it’s not broke, don’t fix it’, the best alternative would seem to be another version of the CH-46, albeit upgraded. This would be appear to be common sense alternative to the Osprey. As with most defence programmes, there always seems to be an alternative sat on the sidelines which seems to be as good, if not better, and the Osprey programme is no different. Boeing Vertol, who presently manufacture the Osprey in conjunction with their partners Bell, built the original CH-46. They also build its bigger cousin, the CH-47 Chinook, what Boeing Vertol did, and did with their own money, was to build a state-of-the-art CH-46 as a technology demonstrator. This demonstrator, called the Model 360, was in essence an all composite ‘Super’ Sea Knight. It was significantly lighter, had ‘Fly-By-Wire’ controls, a retractable undercarriage and looked very similar to the Frog. It also shared a substantial number of proven transmission components with the Chinook.

The only major disadvantage it had was that it was slightly taller and therefore couldn’t fit in the small hanger at the back of many U S Navy warships, a problem not beyond the capabilities of human ingenuity. To highlight this singular issue, the Eurocopter Super Puma has a modified undercarriage that allows it to ‘kneel’ to allow access to the lower hangers of smaller ships.

One of the big technology leaps for the Model 360 was the use of an all composite fuselage. At the time it was the largest, all composite aircraft ever constructed, the design of which was subsequently used to develop the Osprey, thus laying the foundations for future aircraft development. Had the Model 360 been produced instead of the MV-22 or at least along side it, given ten years for development it could have been in service around 2003. Allowing additional time to become operational, the Model 360 could’ve still have been actively participating in both Iraq and Afghanistan significantly earlier and in greater numbers compared to the Osprey.

Despite its detractors, the Osprey does have its uses, once all its irksome problems are fully ironed out that is.

It is an effective troop carrier and although in the deserts of Iraq it does have a tendency to eat up spare parts, especially engines, it is a stable platform. This would make an ideal carrier borne AEW aircraft, like the E-2 Hawkeye or a COD (Cargo On Deck) aircraft like the C-2 Greyhound, albeit an expensive alternative!

This would suit the carriers of the Royal Navy or the French navy, given the smaller stature of their ships compared to the United States. Fortunately for the manufacturers, Bell-Boeing, France and the UK are one of the few first world countries that can actually afford the basic airframe, not including the additional cost of the electronic systems. Given the high value of the Osprey in both financial terms and as a propaganda target for insurgents, the USMC cannot simply throw it thoughtlessly into harms way.

In a negative way, this reduces the Osprey’s role to that of a simple cargo shifter, similar to the C-27J Spartan, but in a positive way it forces the U S military to question their previous tactics of flying recklessly into an unsecured Landing Zone, commonly known as a ‘hot LZ’.

The basic price of a single airframe is in the region of $90 million, a lot of dollars for simply hauling cargo. It should be noted that the Osprey can carry 24 seated troops or 32 troops nonchalantly sat on the floor, this capability is something akin to that achieved by the Douglas C-47 Skytrain (aka DC-3 Dakota), an aircraft of 1930’s vintage or the more favourably priced and contemporary Agusta Westland Merlin.

These comparisons may be unfair with regards to the Osprey, but what it does highlight is the vast cost of producing systems that are technologically ground breaking. It is true that helicopter technology as we know it is beginning to stagnate as we reach the upper thresholds of its design capability, and we should explore alternatives that offer seemingly quantum leaps in performance, but the question we should bear in mind is ‘does the capital cost of the whole project justify the end product?’

Although the BV360 may not have offered the starship like performance of the Osprey, it still demonstrated a quantum leap in capability over the current CH-46E. The BV360 also used a combination of new and thoroughly tested existing technology, namely the engines and transmission. This alone gives a high degree of confidence in the system as a whole, and also reduces the need for exhaustive testing and development, something the Osprey could only dream of. For this reason alone the BV360 should’ve been given a greater priority. On reflection, perhaps what we should be doing is taking smaller, more tentative steps, as with the Boeing Vertol 360, as opposed to going for a completely new design like the Osprey.

So, with regards to the question ‘is the Osprey any good’, the answer is definitely yes, but as to whether it was worth all the pain, suffering and cost, I’m afraid the jury’s still out.

The same goes for the Major Projects Report 2009, issued by the MOD on 15th December, with special regard to the AW159 Lynx Wildcat. The Future Lynx Wildcat is one of our favourite subjects, in a large pool of MoD debacles the Wildcat is in the Premiere League vying for the top slot with Nimrod MRA4, Astute and a few others.

The Report states that:

‘a decision was taken to reduce the number of helicopters being procured to 34 from 45 for the land variant, and to 28 from 35 for the maritime variant, an overall decrease of 23 per cent. The Department expects the reduction in the number of helicopters to deliver an overall saving of £194 million (10 per cent) in equipment costs over the next ten years, plus an additional reduction in the cost of capital. Further savings are expected to accrue from the associated decrease in the number of crews required to 72 from 110 and in support costs over the life of the fleet.’

However, a little digging reveals things are not quite what they seem, so a look back is informative…

Future Lynx gets an official mention in March 2002, when Dr Lewis Moonie MP (Parliamentary Under Secretary, MoD) in a written answer stated that the Future Lynx  proposal was being considered for the Surface Combatant Maritime Rotorcraft project.

A few months later Adam Ingram MP (Minister of State (Armed Forces) replied to another written parliamentary question with a statement in which the Battlefield Light Utility Helicopter requirement might also be met with Future Lynx.

BLUH eventually became the Battlefield Reconnaissance requirement, cut forward to 2006 and the MoD decided not to issue a competitive tender but instead to form a strategic partnering arrangement with AgustaWestland and proceed with Future Lynx. The term ‘value for money’ started to appear in relation to this very cosy partnering arrangement and the benefits of reusing parts of the existing fleet would further enhance value for money (more on this later)

In 2006 the Lynx Wildcat, or Future Lynx as it was then known, was ordered by the MOD. This allowed for a firm order of 70 aircraft at an estimated cost of £1billion (there was an option for an additional 10 aircraft but this was never exercised).

This was re-confirmed by Bob Ainsworth to Parliament on 30 April 2008. This gave a unit cost, not including development, training, spares and the like of around £10 – 12million.

In a December 2007 article in Flight Global, David Hillcoat, AgustaWestland’s head of the Future Lynx programme stated, “Any savings that we make are shared between the MoD and AgustaWestland. But any overspend above the maximum is at the company’s liability.”

A target and maximum price having been agreed between the MoD and AgustaWestland

In response to a question posed by Douglas Carswell MP at the end of December 2007, Bob Ainsworth MP stated that Future Lynx was selected because it provided the best mix of capability, cost and risk.

On 11 December 2008, the Future Lynx numbers were reduced to 62 (34 Army, 28 Royal Navy) with no change to the budget.

In January 2009 Quentin Davies declined to provide a breakdown of savings due to the reduction in numbers because of commercial sensitivity.

In a written response to Liam Fox MP, Quentin Davies confirmed that the forecast cost of Future Lynx was £1.968billion, a staggering doubling in cost despite 8 less aircraft being obtained.

By 20 July 2009, Quentin Davies confirmed to Parliament, in what seems like a contradictory figure to the previous one, that the total cost of the 62 Future Lynx was £1.7billion.

The much vaunted strategy of reusing components from the existing fleet now seems in tatters, less than 5% of components will be reused.

The Major Projects Report 2009 now states that the expected cost to completion for the Lynx Wildcat is now £1.669 billion against an approved cost of £1.966 billion, a saving of £297 million. The £1.7 billion figure quoted by Quentin Davies seems to be the lowest forecast/approved figure.

Rejoice rejoice, the MoD has managed to come in under budget, Christmas must be here.

Hold on there, this is the MoD, surely this is some mistake.

About a third of this reduction has come from risk differentials, cost of capital and other accounting/project related costs. The cost savings accrued by reducing the airframe numbers t0 62 is £194 million, roughly a 10% cost savings

For both the Army and Naval version of Future Lynx it seems that some Key Performance Measures are at risk of not being met, despite the massive investment. The report does state that this reduction will only affect a small number of mission profiles and if money can be found at a later date then it could be reintroduced.

On the 16^th of December the Yeovil Express reports that the local MP (David Laws) and the Secretary of State for Defence (Bob Ainsworth) have exchanged letters (obviously the local MP isn’t too happy about the MoD buying 20 odd Chinooks from Boeing rather than more Merlins from Agusta Westland) and in these letters Bob Ainsworth wrote of “the possibility that we might increase our order for Wildcat Future Lynx”

Nearly double the cost of the original budget yet still a few things that don’t meet requirements that will require even more money in the future to fix. We have cut the order but are now considering increasing it.

62 is a ridiculously small number, especially as it is now obvious that the ratio of ‘available for service’ to ‘not available for service’ because of maintenance, training and other  issues is relatively high, meaning that the Army will likely be able to field around 10 on a continuous basis and the RN even less.

It might not be so bad if the aircraft was worth the £27 million each (total cost divided by total airframe numbers, yes, we know that is not the complete picture) but it is not.

When discussing unit costs one must always exercise caution because the total cost divided by the total numbers is not a unit cost because the total cost will include everything from manuals to simulators to spare parts to training.

The NH90, using a similar ‘extras included’ price seems to be on average approximately £22 million each.

So, did you hear the one about value for money?

It’s the way you tell em.

Richard Stockley (with additional text from ADMIN, can’t let Richard have all the credit!)

The AW109 was born out of a marketing analysis in Italy in 1965, and was the first helicopter designed by Agusta SpA to be built in significant numbers.  Prior to this, Agusta SpA had designed and built the A101G, A103, A104 and the A106.  These aircraft were constructed as prototypes, and although some did see military service, they were manufactured in very small quantities.

The original A109A featured a single Turbomeca Astazou XII rated at 690 shp, although for safety reasons this was subsequently altered to two Allison 250-C14’s.  Following a number of design changes the helicopter emerged as the A109C Hirundo (Swallow), making the first of its tentative flights on 4 October 1971.  Unfortunately, due to a number of design changes and a protracted flight programme, the pre-production models were not completed until 1975, with full production taking place the following year.  Since then the A109C has enjoyed a long and fruitful production run and has a wide and appreciative customer list, both military and civil.  Following the link-up with Westland, it is now designated the AW109.

With two pilots the AW109 can seat six passengers, compared with the seven on the Lynx Wildcat.  Fortunately the AW109 has been certificated for single pilot operation, which brings its troop carrying capabilities up to par with the Wildcat.  As an aside, the Wildcat cannot be flown with a single pilot.

One of the reasons the Wildcat was chosen for the Army Air Corps was that its ship-borne capability allowed amphibious operations; a capability which some commentators may suggest the AW109 does not have.  Fortunately it does or at least it did; the original A109 featured a maritime derivative.  It was structurally similar to the standard A109 but featured a number of role specific items such as anchorage points for deck mooring, fixed undercarriage, four-axis auto-stabilisation, radar altimeter and a rescue hoist.  In addition to this it had a radar and could carry flotation gear, Magnetic Anomaly Detection equipment (MAD), torpedoes or AS.12 missiles.  Although the AW109 is used by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the US Coastguard, it is not utilised as a dedicated ship-borne aircraft, although it was originally intended as such, and much of the above equipment is optional on the current aircraft.  A maritime capable AW109 is therefore still a viable and cost effective option.

In its battlefield role, the AW109 can carry a plethora of different weapon systems including HOT, TOW and Hellfire missiles, as well as 70 mm rockets and 7.62/12.7 mm machine guns.  The LUH also comes with a liquid crystal display, armoured seats, self sealing fuel tanks and a comprehensive self-defence suite.  It is accepted that all of this equipment does not make it a true battlefield helicopter, but the same can be said of both the Lynx and the Wildcat.

AW109-LUH

As a testament to the aircraft it should be noted that A109’s were used by 8 Flight AAC to support SAS operations.  Following the capture of two A109C’s from Argentine forces in the Falklands’, they were ‘adopted’ by 8 Flight to replace their Westland Scouts.  These were supplemented by a further two purchased directly and have only recently being replaced by Eurocopter Dauphins.  If the A109 is good enough for ‘them’, then its logical assume that it’s good enough to support the rest of the British army.  As further testament to the aircraft, the AW109 is also used by the Empire Test Pilots School (ETPS), so if it’s good enough for the world’s best test pilots……

'Them' A109sas 8 flt

In terms of cost, this can vary significantly depending on the type of equipment fitted, but will be in the region of €8million.  In addition to this a quick Google search will bring up a large number of second-hand A109’s, something that cannot be done for the Lynx.  This demonstrates the advantage of the A109, in that spare parts are widely available globally and attrition replacement aircraft can be purchased from the civilian market and then modified to a military standard by either the manufacturer or an authorised sub-contractor.

So, what has the AW109 got to offer in comparison to the Lynx Wildcat?  The AW109 is significantly cheaper and widely available in terms of spare parts and replacement airframes.  It is faster, it does not have high development costs as these were recouped by Agusta SpA years ago and has significantly lower operating costs.  In addition to this, AW109’s are used by a number of tropical and desert nations due to its hot and high capabilities; something the Gem powered Lynx is not renowned for.

A109 TOW

To any commentators that may suggest that the A109 is too small, AgustaWestland also produces a stretched variant called the AW109 Grand, which features 200 mm of extra cabin length.  In the circumstances, a militarised Grand does not appear to be an outlandish suggestion.

It would be ludicrous to suggest that the AW109 could replace the Lynx as a naval helicopter, but then it could be considered ludicrous to spend £1.7billion developing a helicopter that is almost identical to the one it replaces without a significant improvement in battlefield capability (the RN could have replaced their current Lynx Mk 8’s with the current Super Lynx 300, without the extortionate development costs and also maintained a high degree of commonality).  The AW109 in comparison to the Lynx offers a great deal in the LUH role and has the virtue of being manufactured by the same company; something that should appeal to politicians who may have a helicopter factory in their constituency.

In these economically difficult times it does make a degree of sense to adopt a cheaper alternative, and definitely one which has a large number of willing customers should the MOD decide to sell them off at a future date; unfortunately that is a feature the Lynx truly does not posses.

Richard Stockley

“Who put the French to rout;

But what they fought each other for

I could not well make out.”

‘The Battle of Blenheim’ – Robert Southey (1774 -1843)

A searching question was posted on this website 18^th July, asking what was the point of Afghanistan and what we are hoping to achieve.  Before attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to understand how our forces ended up there in the first place .

Following the attack on the World Trade Centre, 11^th September 2001, the U.S went on the offensive against Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda as a whole, and their terrorist training camps inside Afghanistan; this operation was known as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  The Taliban government which ruled Afghanistan in 2001 was complicit in the setting up of these training camps and in allowing Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden freedom of movement.  The U.S then requested that the Taliban surrender Osama Bin Laden and a number of other suspects; the U.S also threatened to topple the Taliban regime if it did not comply.  Unsurprisingly the Taliban failed to heed the threat by the United States and their regime was subsequently ousted, with U.S forces invading the country in support of the Northern Alliance and anti-Taliban elements.  This was followed up by the limited deployment of the Allied forces, including the UK to provide support for the new Afghan government and consolidate the victory.  So, the aim of the conflict in Afghanistan was to destroy the Al Qaeda terrorist training camps and capture Osama Bin Laden.  The training camps may have been destroyed but new ones have sprung up on the other side of the border in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Western Pakistan.

So, in essence one of the main aims, the closing the terrorist training camps has been achieved, although only temporarily and the main suspects are still at large.  The aims of the original mission, Operation Enduring Freedom, could therefore be deemed as a failure, or at least just a partial success.

As with any victorious outcome in battle, the victory needs to be consolidated.  Sufficient troops need to be put on the ground to deny the enemy from regaining a foothold.  With Afghanistan the existing government had been toppled, the ‘new’ government came from the opposition parties that were in exile.  The forces which swept aside the Taliban was the Northern Alliance, this was a hotch-potch of warlords and Mujahedeen commanders left over following the departure of the Soviets and the inevitable civil war, the civil war which saw the rise of the Taliban.  It should be noted at this point that it was the Northern Alliance, allegedly under the auspices of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, which invited Osama Bin Laden to Afghanistan in the first place, not the Taliban.

As the Northern Alliance gained power, they lacked sufficient physical and political strength to maintain immediate effective control over the whole country, hence the need for an external force to provide military support.  This needed to be done until the newly formed government forces were available in sufficient numbers and of sufficient quality to provide security with minimal assistance.

So, in 2001, following the Bonn conference, the United Nations Security Council authorised the formation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the new Afghan Government, “in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”

NATO officially took control of ISAF on 11^th August 2003, and in October of that year ISAF was given a mandate to extend its responsibility from Kabul and the immediate surrounding area, to encompass the whole of the country.

The physical extension of this authority was phased with Stage 1 covering the Northern regions, this being the transfer of control of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) under the control of OEF to ISAF, and the establishment of additional PRT’s.

Stage 2 was announced 10 February 2005 and covered the expansion into the west of Afghanistan; the operation was launched 31 May 2006.  Stage 3, covering the South, was launched 26 January 2006 and Stage 4, launched 5 October 2006, took control of the east, thus fulfilling ISAF’s UN mandate to cover the whole country.

In attempting to fill a potential power vacuum it is necessary to assemble a sufficient military force and move swiftly, so back in 2003 when NATO officially took control of ISAF, what the United States and the Allies did was to assemble an absolutely massive military force and………..invade Iraq.

Afghanistan at this point suddenly dropped down the list of the Allies priorities, the invasion of Iraq diverted huge amounts of military resources and re-focussed political agenda’s; this action fundamentally weakened the NATO mission.  As the leader of ISAF, NATO should have provided a large and well supplied fighting force; this would have sent a strong and confident signal to the other NATO countries supplying troops.  This sidelining of the Afghan mission fundamentally reduced the organisations’ powerbase and weakened it both militarily and politically, rendering it in many observers eyes as obsolete.  This lack of confidence in the mission explains the reluctance of many of the NATO member states to accept a positive role.  This meant that the U.S, as the major player in Afghanistan, failed to properly consolidate the victory and allowed the Taliban to maintain a foothold in the provinces to the south of the country, namely Helmand and Kandahar.  The southern provinces have always been somewhat rebellious and difficult to control from Kabul.  When the Taliban were in power they managed to achieve control of them because they, being Pashtu’s, were on home ground and severely punished anyone who defied them, unlike the Allies.  They also imposed Shariah Law, which was favoured by the conservative peoples of the South.  Previous governments which had tried to introduce liberal policies such as equal rights for women, had always met with stiff opposition from the outlying provinces far from Kabul.

So, the reason why British forces are in Afghanistan is because we were part of the coalition forces for Operation Enduring Freedom, hence our involvement in 2001, and we are there as part of the NATO force which took over control of ISAF in 2003.  Our OEF mission was amalgamated into the ISAF mission in January 2006.  Our ISAF missions are as follows:

1. Security – assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment by

• Conducting security and stability operations
• Supporting the Afghan National Army (ANA)
• Supporting the Afghan National Police (ANP)
• Disarming Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG)
• Facilitating ammunition depots management
• Providing post operation assistance

2. Reconstruction and development:

• Providing security to permit reconstruction
• Humanitarian assistance

3.  Governance – through the PRT’s, ISAF supports the Afghan government institutions

4.  Counter narcotics

The British mission to the south, Stage 3, was announced by the Secretary of State for Defence John Reid, 26 January 2006.  However, the decision to go into the southern provinces wasn’t made by him, the plan was endorsed by the NATO allied foreign ministers in Brussels, 8^th December 2005.

This operation was led by the Royal Engineers and Royal Marines who constructed Camp Bastion, and was followed by the deployment of 16 Air Assault Brigade, centred around 3 Para.  It was also announced at this point that the deployment to Helmand would last three years and cost £1billion over five years; both of these predetermined limits have now been exceeded.

Because UK forces were also committed to Iraq at the time, this ensured that any troops and resources they required were diluted; it therefore came as no surprise that the forces sent into Helmand were too few and over-stretched.  What also arose at this time was the realisation that UK forces were woefully equipped with the necessary equipment to fight a vicious and protracted counter insurgency campaign.

Given the toppling of the Taliban in 2001, there has been a significant delay in the establishment of sufficiently sized force to counter an insurgency campaign.  This has allowed the insurgent forces, which are a mixture of Taliban, Al Qaeda and any miscreant with a Kalashnikov, to achieve a significant revival.  In addition to this, opium production, which was almost eradicated under Taliban rule, has increased dramatically which undoubtedly helps fund the insurgency along with a number of highly effective extortion rackets.  The current conflict at the moment is in support of the U.S and the ISAF mission, and we are fighting a war of attrition with the Taliban to see which side breaks first; unfortunately no-one seems to be in the mood to back down.

Although we may now understand why UK forces are in Afghanistan, the above doesn’t actually fully explain the point of it all.  President Obama and Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s assurances that we’re there to prevent terrorist attacks at home, have little credibility as the terrorist training camps have merely moved, such is the nature of terrorism.  The terrorist attacks in the UK have been purported by those born here, albeit with some support and direction from Pakistan, and that is where are biggest threat lies, not from the Taliban; in this sense Afghanistan is not our war.  The point of our troops being there is merely to support the ISAF and the U.S mission as part of NATO, not to directly protect the UK.

The irony of the situation is that the U.S and the U.K supported the Mujahedeen when they were fighting the Soviets, support which was quickly withdrawn once Soviet forces left Afghanistan.  Having left the nation to its own devices, and letting it suffer greatly in the process, the situation we are now deeply involved in could have been avoided had we taken the time and given the funding to help rebuild the nation; the current conflict was therefore created indirectly by our own hand.  So, in fighting global terrorism, perhaps it is also time to take a long and sober look at our foreign policy and its global impact rather than just fighting terrorism per se.

As a country we have supported the U.S in both Iraq and Afghanistan, more than any other nation.  Whatever assurances the then Prime Minister Tony Blair gave the U.S following 9/11, after eight years of conflict we have more than fulfilled our obligation.  Because we are fighting in Afghanistan, not for ourselves, but as part of NATO, it is time to question the viability of having NATO in command of ISAF and whether Stage 3 of the UN mandate to control the south of the country is actually an achievable goal.  Unless there are significant signs that we can achieve a victory in southern Afghanistan in the short term, then it is time to seriously consider pulling out and focus our attention, our troops and our resources on fighting the real enemy, the global terrorist networks, not the Taliban.

Richard Stockley

The exception to this was evident during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan where the Stinger Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) were supplied to the insurgents by a sovereign state, the USA.  Due to the insurgents’ lack of sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons, the aircraft deployed against them can themselves be somewhat unsophisticated, and therefore significantly cheaper.  Given the recent deployment of RAF’s Tornado’s to Afghanistan, replacing the versatile Harrier, the question needs to be asked, ‘is the RAF using a sledgehammer to crack the erstwhile nut?’

Utilising such a sophisticated aircraft, especially when dropping a 500kg laser guided bomb on a relatively small target, seems to be all too reminiscent of the Vietnam Conflict, along with the associated risk of collateral damage.

To give the RAF their dues, they are somewhat limited in the type of aircraft they can actually deploy as they can only use what they have in their inventory.  Although the Tornado may be a versatile weapons platform, it is tied to a long runway and in-depth support facilities, in this sense it is not a true weapon for counter insurgency; Sniper Pod or no.

The successful COIN type aircraft evolved following the Second World War, these small, single-engined fighters had been relegated to ground attack due to the advent of the jet age.  These aircraft surpassed in this role due to their rugged construction, effective armament and grass field capability; aircraft such as the P-51 Mustang and the A-1 Skyraider.  The Skyraider, previously a carrier-borne aircraft, fulfilled a great deal of the criteria required of a COIN aircraft in that it could carry a large and varied weapons load, loiter on station for hours at a time, was highly manoeuvrable and could absorb significant levels of battle damage.  Unfortunately being large and slow, the Skyraider was unceremoniously kicked into obsolescence on the battlefields of Vietnam by the advent of the SA-7 Strela MANPAD.  In spite of this, the Skyraider was one of the key aircraft that defined the requirement of a COIN aircraft.

Skyraider A-1

Counter insurgency conflicts determine the type of aircraft that can be used due to their very nature, they, on the whole, tended to be located in countries with large rural areas.  If the insurgents followed Mao’s doctrine, the government forces had to spread their forces more thinly and over a larger area in comparison to a conventional conflict, hence the need for airpower to provide far-reaching fire support.  These countries also tended to be ex-colonial, less affluent and lacking a large scale industrial base, meaning they would have some difficulty in supporting highly expensive, state-of-the-art jet fighters from large, dedicated air-bases.

Therefore, like the Skyraider, a dedicated COIN aircraft needs to be robust and relatively unsophisticated so that it can operate from grass or dirt strips away from a dedicated support facility.  In reality, these aircraft would not be permanently deployed in the field, but operate on short term deployment, returning to their main base for interim servicing and repair.  They also need to have excellent range and endurance capabilities in addition to armour plating, self-sealing fuel tanks and a heavy and varied weapon load mounted on a large number of hard-points.  Cargo carrying capabilities would also be an additional bonus, allowing the aircraft to shift men equipment as well as drop ordnance on the enemy.

Before reaching for a fresh pen and a clean sheet of paper, the aircraft designer will accept that that a number of existing designs already exhibit many of these attributes.  However, due to the advent of the MANPAD, current designs will require a greater element of sophistication with regard to self-defence systems.  Fortunately, it is not too great an industrial task to graft these systems on to just about any existing aircraft of an appreciable size.

The first port of call for a COIN aircraft is the propeller driven trainer; the advantage here is that many of the types currently in production offer armed variants for weapons training.  The RAF’s current turboprop trainer, the Shorts Tucano, can be fitted with weapons hard-points, as a number of these were sold to Kenya, although this weapons capability is not utilised by the RAF.  This model has a more powerful engine than the standard EMB-312, but it is debateable whether this aircraft could cut the mustard in the harsh, hot and high environment of Afghanistan.  Also, its ability to carry a modest 1,000 lbs (455 kg) of ordnance on four under-wing hardpoints severely limits its attack capability, especially if carrying additional, necessary items such as drop tanks and armour plating.

This is in sharp comparison to the larger and more powerful Air Tractor AT-802U, a modified agricultural aircraft, which can carry an impressive 8,000 lbs (3,636 kg) of ordnance on eleven hardpoints; a modern example of Russian Sturmovik.  The AT-802U also has an in-built AAR-47/ALE-47 countermeasure system for use against MANPADS; although the addition of infra-red shielding around the jet-pipe would not go amiss despite the drag penalty.

Air_Tractor_AT-802U

Embraer, the parent manufacturer of the Tucano have recognised this lack of attack capability in the original model and have unveiled a larger, more powerful model, the EMB-314 Super Tucano.  This dedicated COIN variant can carry a variety of dumb and smart bombs, rockets and even sidewinder missiles in addition to its two inbuilt, wing mounted 12.7mm machine guns, which it has used on a number of occasions to shoot down drug smuggling light aircraft.  Embraer are not the only manufacturer to recognise the suitability of the armed trainer aircraft for combating insurgents.  Beechcraft are offering their Texan II trainer in combat guise as the AT-6, as are Pilatus and Korean Aerospace with the PC-9M and KO-1 Wong Bee respectively.

EMB-314 Super Tucano

Variations on the COIN theme can be seen with the Cessna 208 Caravan which, in addition to its cargo role can carry two Hellfire missiles.  This concept could be transferred to the RAF’s Beech King Air B200 aircraft, however, how successful this concept would be needs to be seen.  Hitting a target with a Hellfire at night from high altitude carries with it a certain element of safety as the enemy cannot see you.  Hitting one with rocket and cannon fire at low level during the day is different matter altogether, and inherently more dangerous.

Larger dedicated, twin-engined COIN aircraft are still available on the global market, aircraft like the FMA IA-58 Pucara.  Although still a viable airframe it demonstrates perfectly the limitations of deploying a COIN aircraft against large and well equipped conventional forces; the majority of the Pucara’s deployed by Argentina during the Falklands conflict were destroyed with the few remaining being captured.  Hence, one needs to remember why such aircraft became obsolete in the first place.

This situation also highlights why a dedicated COIN aircraft has yet to be adopted by the UK for use in Afghanistan, despite the obvious advantages of deploying such an aircraft; its role will be limited to the low intensity conflict.  The attitude of the MOD would seem to be that they prefer to have an aircraft that is flexible enough to operate within both a conventional and a COIN environment and unfortunately this means sticking with hi-tech, high cost jet fighters.  One of the most truly flexible aircraft currently in the UK inventory is the Harrier, although it is now in its final decade of operation.  Whether its replacement, the F-35B is up to the task and is capable of operating from a muddy field in Germany or a jungle clearing in Belize has yet to be seen.  But given the costs involved, it would appear to make better sense to operate a lighter and cheaper, dedicated COIN aircraft rather than a super-fighter.

Not for the first time has the MOD been accused of operating a Cold War mentality years after it ended, this is one of the areas where it appears to be guilty as charged.  In this sense whether it is just the MOD’s lack of vision and flexibility or the RAF senior commands’ reluctance to get away from their large concrete runways and air-conditioned facilities and actually get their knees dirty, is besides the point, the point is that there is an actual need for such an aircraft in our forces inventory.  COIN aircraft are not just a one trick pony, in addition to their primary role, such an aircraft can be utilised for weapons training, FAC, reconnaissance or just as a standard trainer, although in this role they wouldn’t be as cost effective as their lightweight cousins.

Given the diversity of aircraft currently on the market and their differing capabilities, it may be necessary to utilise two types of aircraft.  A single-engined Super Tucano type for daytime ground attack and a twin-engined, Hellfire armed, transport type for night attack/interdiction.

The RAF’s new Commander in Chief Air, Air Chief Marshall Sir Christopher Moran, may acknowledge that his service’s role has changed from that of fighting the Cold War to one of fighting a counter insurgency.  However, despite having fought a counter insurgency war in Iraq and now in Afghanistan, at this time the only dedicated COIN aircraft in the RAF’s inventory is a single captured Pucara sat in the RAF Museum at Cosford.

Until a squadron of COIN aircraft in RAF markings are sat on the dispersal at Kandahar combat ready, it will be difficult to believe that both the RAF and the MOD have truly stepped out of their Cold War mentality and accepted the realities and needs of fighting an unconventional war in the 21^st century.

Richard Stockley

.

Even if the UK decided to maintain such a lengthy commitment there is one singular reason why it would be unfeasible, and that reason is oil.  This is not due to the fact that Afghanistan has oil, it doesn’t, or whether the oil/gas companies want to drive a pipeline through it, that will make no difference whatsoever.  It is down to the simple fact that global oil production has peaked, as such the current supply will slowly deplete and with it the petroleum and lubricants that keeps our armed forces mobile.  It would be easy at this point to predict some kind of Malthusian catastrophe or apocalyptic outcome; however, I shall avoid that subject as there are plenty of sites on the web proposing those without this one joining the fray.

The ‘peak oil’ prediction that I am highlighting was first purported by Dr M King Hubbert, he predicted the year of peak U.S oil production and was about one year out, not bad seeing as his calculation was made around 1956; he then utilised his calculations to predict global peak oil production.  The product of his prediction was a bell-shaped graph and the year of the peak was on or around 2006, we have therefore passed the point of peak oil production and from hereon in the quantity of oil available as a global resource will diminish.  If the decline accurately follows the line of the graph, world oil production will be at 90% of present capacity by 2019.  That may not set many alarm bells ringing until you consider that the oil crisis of the early 1970’s was due to a drop in production of just 5%.  Although Dr Hubbert has passed away, the baton has been picked up and championed by Kenneth S. Deffeyes, Professor Emeritus at Princeton University, USA.  Professor Deffeyes is not an environmentalist he’s a geologist and has spent the greater part of his life searching for oil.

Peak Oil Graph

As with most predictions, there are no hard and fast rules as to when the oil will run out; in fact the oil doesn’t need to completely run out it just needs to fall below a level sufficient to maintain an acceptable level of economic output.  So, whether it is in thirty years or in fifty years time, that is dependent on the rate of consumption, what is certain is that at the present rate it definitely will, sooner or later.  Although thirty years may not seem like a long time, the effects of the restrictions in oil supply will start to be felt, even by the average consumer.  One should appreciate that the current low oil prices are driven by a drop in global demand due to the credit crunch rather than surplus supplies; Saudi Arabia announced in 2003 that their production has peaked and they cannot increase supply to control prices and there are no new Kuwaiti style oil fields waiting to be discovered.

So, how does this affect defence?  At this time the UK armed forces are highly dependent on petroleum and oil based lubricants; to counter the threat of a future restriction in oil supply, they must reduce this dependency in all aspects to remain as effective in the future as they are now.  In addition to this, maintaining access to a continuous oil supply over the forthcoming decades will be one of the primary driving forces behind UK foreign policy.

Unfortunately, one area where the Government is not reducing dependency is the proposed acquisition of the two new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.  For all of their advanced technology the propulsion systems on these vessels will still utilise a combination of gas turbines and diesel engines which are by their very nature, oil-dependent.  Their engines may be described as the most fuel efficient of their generation but they will still guzzle fuel at an alarming rate, as will the aircraft deployed upon them.  The only viable answer it would seem would be to go for a nuclear powered option; unfortunately this was discounted at an early stage on the grounds of cost.  To put this into perspective, the carriers themselves are estimated to enter service between 2016 and 2018 just in time for the first predicted major oil shock.  It will probably be around this time that the Government will realise that going for the non-nuclear, oil-dependent option was something of a bad idea.  We can expect the carriers to be in service for around 25 to 30 years, by which time the oil reserves will have been depleted even further and become an even greater cause for concern.  Meanwhile the UK’s nuclear submarine fleet would continue to deploy, being less dependent on oil they would not suffer from the same limitations.

The Government are well aware of problems of peak oil, although they tend not to use the same language as Professor Deffeyes.  If you substitute the term ‘Climate Change’ with ‘Peak Oil’ you will get as idea how seriously the Government is taking this issue.  Unfortunately the general public at large have yet to pick up on the idea; the only ones who seem to have a clear view of what is coming are the environmentalist groups and the general population still seems to regard them with some suspicion.  To give you an idea how much the general public regards the issue of peak oil, a friend of mine has just recently purchased a 2.8 litre BMW coupe; I feel he gives the subject very little thought.

Thankfully, a number of defence companies are proactively making the move to reducing oil dependence, QinetiQ have recently flown Zephyr, their solar powered, high altitude, long endurance UAV.  This will soon be available for deployment in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  In 2008, Boeing test flew a light aircraft that utilised hydrogen fuel cells, this could soon be the primary trainer configuration of the future whether we like it or not.

Boeing EC-003

QinetiQ Zephyr

To future proof our defence capability we must significantly reduce our dependence on oil and start looking for alternatives, this may simply mean more time in the aircraft simulator and less time in the jet-trainer.  Although not a perfect solution, it is something to seriously consider as in the forthcoming decade doing nothing will not be a viable option.

http://www.hubbertpeak.com/

Richard Stockley

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If the Lynx is the one and only answer to the needs of our armed forces, which it isn’t, this beggars the question why the MOD does not simply adopt the existing AgustaWestland Super Lynx 300 model that is already in service with a number of foreign forces, including Oman, South Africa and Malaysia; and has been for a number of years.  The development costs have already been paid for and although it will not have the systems proposed with the Lynx Wildcat, it will definitely come a very close second.  Given the costs involved this would appear to offer greater value for money, plus given its similarity to the current Lynx and it could be brought into service sooner.

South African Super Lynx

Long time supporter of Westlands is David Laws, MP for Yeovil, he gave the following comments to the Yeovil Express, dated 20^th July 2009:

“It would a disaster for both the armed forces and for South Somerset if there was any attempt to stop Future Lynx from proceeding.  It is essential that Future Lynx goes ahead, to replace the existing fleet of Army and Navy Lynx helicopters.  The Conservatives just do not appear to understand that we need both Future Lynx and a medium lift helicopter – and in my view this should be the British Merlin helicopter.  It would be madness for the Ministry of Defence to think again on Future Lynx, and it would cause yet more uncertainty and delay.  This project is already well advanced in Yeovil, and when Future Lynx/Wildcat is delivered it will lead to a big improvement in helicopter capability.  We have to find the money to meet all of our helicopter needs, and we should be focusing on reducing the number of helicopter types in service, instead of buying Blackhawk helicopters, as the Conservatives are suggesting.  We should in my view concentrate on four main helicopter types – Apache for ground attack; Future Lynx/Wildcat for naval operations, light transport and reconnaissance; Merlin for the Future Medium Helicopter; and Chinook for heavy lift.  We should be focusing now on securing extra money from the Defence Budget to buy more Merlins and Chinooks, rather than questioning the much needed Future Lynx/Wildcat.”

The above comments come as no surprise as the AgustaWestland factory is in Mr Laws constituency and he would gladly welcome any influx of investment into that locality, but his primary concern is for the manufacturer, not for the end user.  What isn’t mentioned above is that the Lynx helicopter has already demonstrated poor performance in Afghanistan and is unable to cope with the hot and high conditions.  Our forces therefore, seem to be operating quite well or at least coping without the need for a dedicated Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter (BRH), which was the whole point of introducing Lynx Wildcat in the first place; the role thus seems to be somewhat redundant before it actually gets into service.  Battlefield reconnaissance at the moment is carried out through a combination of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) and dedicated surveillance aircraft.  The Apache attack helicopters, which the Future Lynx was meant to compliment, seem to be coping quite well without it.

The Lynx Mk 9’s used by the Army Air Corps are currently going through an engine upgrade programme and will undoubtedly be deployed to Afghanistan once back in service.  This leaves a very large question mark over Future Lynx as it would be cheaper to simply manufacture additional Lynx Mk 9’s for a fraction of the cost which would still provide a significant proportion of the proposed capability.  So, contrary to Mr Laws’ comments, Future Lynx is not ‘much needed’ it is merely ‘much desired’, neither would it be ‘madness’ for the MOD to cancel Future Lynx, nor would it be a disaster for the armed forces if it did, if anything it would make financial sense as there are cheaper alternatives waiting in the wings; alternatives which are manufactured by the self-same company.

As with all defence projects there is a cut-off point where both the MOD and the Government need to accept that a project is no longer financially viable and a cheaper alternative needs to be sought.  As an example the United States Government cancelled the RAH-66 Comanche reconnaissance/attack helicopter even though an obscene amount of time and money had already been committed to the project.  This goes to prove that merely throwing money and effort at a project will not always guarantee success or result in an effective weapon system, as priorities can quickly change.  In addition to this, in these economically difficult times there is also a moral question regarding the expenditure of this nations tax revenue, is it right that we spend vast sums in developing a helicopter which demonstrates only marginal improvements in capability and performance as is the case with Future Lynx?

Despite what politicians may think, the Future Lynx/Lynx Wildcat is not the only game in town as AgustaWestland have a number of helicopters in their product line-up that could be adapted to suit the roles of both reconnaissance and light utility; namely the AW109 or the AW139.  Given the sums the MOD seems eager to spend on the development of Future Lynx alone, these alternatives could be modified and militarised for a fraction of the cost and would still help secure the long term viability of the company.  Unfortunately AgustaWestland, the MOD and David Laws appear to be somewhat blind to this.

AgustaWestland as a company produce a number of truly exceptional and highly regarded aircraft; however, the fact that no other service in the world has purchased the Lynx as a battlefield helicopter apart from the Army Air Corps must at least say something.  All other current Lynx users utilise the aircraft in a maritime role.

In sharp comparison to David Laws, Douglas Carswell MP, may think that the Sikorsky Blackhawk is the veritable panacea to all our support helicopter woes, which it isn’t and acquiring it could possibly make matters significantly worse.  However, whatever the outcome of the Future Lynx project, the solution will not be achieved by simply throwing additional money at it.  The solution should be achieved by diligent consideration of the viable alternatives and the selection of the most cost effective, this may even result in introducing more than one type.  Having commonality between a navy and an army aircraft may be desirable but one shouldn’t be selected to the detriment of the role of the other.  Unfortunately the procurement of Future Lynx seems to be more about politics than practicalities, with scant regard to cost or common sense.  So, whatever emerges from this morass, given the lives at stake and the costs involved, it had better be worth it.

Richard Stockley

The headlines recently announced that the RAF were operating a Chinook in Afghanistan that was rebuilt using two different airframes.  This was highlighted in ‘The Sun’, which reliably informed us that, ‘The two parts were fused together — a technique often used illegally by dodgy car dealers’ and contrary to the report in ‘The Daily Mail’, both engines were still attached to the airframe as the adjoining photographs clearly testify. On the face of it, the story itself is true, although missing a few vital facts.  One should take stock and note at this point that, dodgy car dealers aside, the processors used to manufacture a 1991 Vauxhall Cavalier and a Boeing Chinook are fundamentally different to say the least.

One, namely the Vauxhall, is made from pressed steel and welded, and was manufactured in a very short period of time.  The Chinook, in sharp contrast, is hand built in a jig using solid rivets and hand-formed sheet magnesium and aluminium; this as you can appreciate takes a significantly longer time compared with the Vauxhall.  Chinooks are also subject to a greater degree of quality control.

The aircraft in question is a Chinook HC.2, registration ZA704.  ZA704, Boeing build number B-834, was manufactured in the USA by Boeing at their Ridley Park Plant, Delaware County, Philadelphia and delivered to the RAF in 1981.  It was subsequently returned to the factory and converted into a HC.2 model, and then redelivered to the RAF around 1993.  On 23^rd November 1999 ZA704 had an accident whilst on exercise at Soz, Oman.  Unfortunately whilst carrying out a run-on landing, the rear rotors touched the ground and this consequently ripped off the aft transmission, together with the structural pylon.

Rather than send the aircraft back to the manufacturers in the USA, it was decided to repair the aircraft in the UK at Fleetlands, Gosport.  To those that don’t know Fleetlands it is, or at least was, a Royal Navy repair facility that carries out third and fourth line aircraft maintenance.  I understand it has now been privatised and sold to Vector Aerospace.  Fleetlands has a long association with the UK military and their engineers are highly competent at repairing aircraft.  I have no doubts that the repair would have matched any carried out by Boeing.

Having lost its rear pylon it was decided to cannibalise one from another Chinook, ZH257.  The donor Chinook ZH257 was originally a CH-47C, registration AE-520 (Boeing build number B-797) and was captured from the Argentine Army relatively intact following the Falkland’s Conflict in 1982.  It was then used as a ground instruction airframe and was subsequently given a UK military serial number.  As the RAF Chinook HC.2’s are equivalent to the CH-47D, it was necessary to make a number of modifications to the donor pylon prior to attaching it to the recipient aircraft.

Prior to re-assembly and flight testing the repair was signed off by one of Boeing’s own engineers as they were the Aircraft Design Authority, not something they would have done had there been any doubts about Fleetlands competence.  Following this, it would have been extensively air-tested and subject to alignment checks to ensure the structural integrity of the repair; if it wasn’t, the pilots assigned to fly it would be well within their rights to refuse.  The fact that they have flown it repeatedly since demonstrates their level of confidence in the airframe.  In addition to this the repair would be subject to routine inspection for the remainder of its in service life.  As a comparison, during the Falklands Conflict a Sea Harrier received damage from anti-aircraft fire.  This damage was repaired using a Battle Damage Repair (BDR) scheme as there was little time to develop a manufacturer based scheme.  This aircraft carried the BDR repair for many years until the aircraft was eventually modified to F/A 2 standard; proof that even ad hoc repairs can still have excellent structural integrity.

So to all those deeply concerned about the ’Cut and Shut Chinook’, be rest assured, the aircraft itself is structurally sound.

Another aspect of the story was that it was brought to the attention of the media by Ian Sadler, the father of Jack Sadler who tragically died in Afghanistan, 2007.  Mr Sadler has since campaigned to improve the equipment used by the UK armed forces.  The MOD can be accused of many things, financial incompetence and short-sightedness to name but two, but on this occasion the MOD probably did nothing more than sign the cheque.  Repairs of this magnitude are nothing new and comparable ‘Cut and Shuts’ have been carried out on other types of aircraft.  In conclusion, it was undoubtedly cheaper to repair the aircraft in the UK rather than ship it back to the factory, but this is more to do with standard industry practice as opposed to penny pinching by the MOD.  There are a great many things the MOD need to be taken to task on, especially regarding helicopters (watch this space!), but on this occasion the ‘Cut and Shut’ Chinook isn’t one of them.

Richard Stockley

The link below shows a picture of AE-520 prior to being ‘spliced’.

http://www.airliners.net/photo/Argentina—Army/Boeing-Vertol-CH-47C/0864107/

Helicopters, or at least the lack of them, have generated a number of headlines and a great deal of consternation in Westminster over the past few weeks.  David Cameron, the leader of the opposition, has made a great deal of political capital out of his comments that the UK armed forces have over 500 helicopters available, with only 30 of them currently deployed to Helmand Province.  This information is undeniably correct, however, it is important to take a look at the facts behind the statement rather than accept at face value what is merely a political sound-bite.  What the commanders on the ground are shouting for is more troop carrying helicopters, and of the 500+ aircraft supposedly available, it comes as no surprise that not all have a troop carrying capability.

Helicopters are not simple creatures, they are on the whole highly expensive and complex pieces of equipment; however, given their capability and flexibility, they are highly valuable and highly sought after battlefield assets.

With regards to their day to day management, for any number of aircraft deployed in theatre only a proportion of that number will be serviceable and available for operations at any one time.  This is due to the need for ‘down time’ for regular routine maintenance and the repair of any faults that materialise during use; the harsher the operational environment, the greater number that may be unavailable.  Looking at Afghanistan, although 30 helicopters may be based there, you can bet good money that the full complement will not always be available.

In addition to the aircraft, the services have a finite number of air, ground and maintenance crews to support them, all of whom cannot be deployed in theatre at the same instance.  Troops need to be rotated out of theatre on a regular basis; in addition to this a number may be sick or injured, undergoing training or promotion courses and will therefore be unavailable for operational deployment.  As these crews are highly trained specialists, it can take years and cost millions to create significant increases in numbers.

So, with regards to David Cameron’s magic 500 helicopters, the breakdown in numbers are as follows*:

Apache WAH-64D – total number 67: Nine of these attack helicopters are already deployed to Afghanistan, of the 58 remaining in the UK, one is awaiting repair following a crash landing and 15 are in storage.  Of all the aircraft, only 32 have the necessary equipment fitted for use in Afghanistan.

Chinook HC 2/2a – total number 40: Eight Chinook’s are currently deployed in theatre, although some sources site several additional aircraft.  On paper this leaves 29 to 32, depending on who you believe, available for use.  In addition to this a number of aircraft are utilised by the Operational Conversion Unit permanently for training.  However, recent reports suggest that there are insufficient numbers of trained aircrews to keep the remainder airborne.

Gazelle AH.1 – total number 42: The Gazelle is a light observation helicopter and is due to be retired around 2012.  Given the type’s limited remaining service life and the time/cost considerations to fit them out for Afghanistan, in addition to their limited hot and high capability, this aircraft should not be considered for deployment.

Lynx Mk 3/Mk 8 – total number 61: This aircraft is primarily a naval helicopter, its role being anti-ship and anti-submarine.  Given that Afghanistan is land-locked and the number of aircraft required for deployment at sea and for training, this aircraft should not be considered for deployment.

Lynx Mk 7/Mk 9 – total number 94: Of the 94 Lynx helicopters belonging to the Army Air Corps, 72 are Mk 7’s and 22 are the Mk 9 wheeled variant.  Four Mk 7’s are currently deployed to Afghanistan, although due to the limited power of their Gem engines they are severely restricted during the Summer months.  Of the 22 Mk 9’s on strength, 12 are currently undergoing a conversion programme to replace their Gem’s with more powerful CTS800’s; these aircraft will not be completed until November 2009.  Given the numbers of aircraft available, although this does not reflect the number of aircraft in squadron service, more Lynx aircraft could be deployed.  However, given their limited performance and troop carrying capability, it would appear pointless to deploy them in larger numbers unless they have been fitted with the new engines.

Merlin Mk 1 – total number 42: Again, this aircraft is primarily a naval helicopter, however, if necessary, they could be de-roled and converted into troop carriers.  These aircraft have also recently been fitted with a new defensive aids suite, making them suitable for deployment if required.

Merlin Mk 3/3a – total number 28: A number of these troop carrying helicopters have just returned from Iraq, however given the extreme environment they have been operating in, the aircraft may require prolonged maintenance before they are redeployed.  In addition to these, the RAF recently acquired six aircraft from the Danish armed forces to supplement their numbers.  As previously, following fitment of the necessary equipment these could be deployed in sufficient numbers.

Puma – total number 34: Having been in service since 1972, the Puma is one of the troop carrying mainstays of the UK services, with several still deployed in Baghdad.  Although in recent years the type has suffered a number of losses both in the UK and Iraq, the advantage of the Puma is that it is widely used throughout the world and as such, additional aircraft can be purchased and converted in a relatively short period of time if necessary.  It also ensures that spare parts are readily available from a number of different sources.

Sea King Mk 3/3a – total number 25: This aircraft is primarily a Search and Rescue helicopter and based in the UK.  Of the 25 available, 16 are allocated to SAR duties within the UK, and 2 are based in the Falkland Islands, with the remaining aircraft utilised for training and maintenance replacements.  When deployed abroad it is usually in very small numbers, therefore, this aircraft should not be considered for deployment to Afghanistan in the troop carrying role.

Sea King Mk 4/6CR – total number 42: Six aircraft are currently deployed in theatre with a further 23 aircraft currently available.  The remainder are currently being repaired, in deep maintenance or being modified.

Sea King Mk 5 – total number 15: As previously, this aircraft is primarily a naval helicopter which, like the Merlin Mk.1, can be de-roled and converted into a troop carrier.  A number of these aircraft are presently utilised for Search and Rescue duties, due to the limited numbers available, they should not be considered for deployment.

Sea King Mk 7 ASaC – total number 13: This aircraft’s primary role is that of Airborne Surveillance and Area Control, or what used to be termed Airborne Early Warning.  Given the permanent nature of its conversion and the limited number available, this aircraft should not be considered for deployment.

Conclusion

Although the UK armed forces do have over 500 helicopters available, over 360 of these are not dedicated troop carriers, although a number could be readily converted if necessary.  Of the remaining 140 plus aircraft which are, 30 are already in theatre and the remainder cannot be deployed immediately because:

• there are insufficient air crews available and of these, not all are currently trained for operating in hot and high conditions or type rated to those aircraft currently in theatre
• not all are fitted with the necessary long range communications equipment, armoured seats or defensive aid suites required in Afghanistan
• a number of these aircraft are in deep maintenance, being repaired or deployed elsewhere
• a number of these aircraft are dedicated to training and type conversion within the UK

Given the above restrictions, it would be difficult to ‘surge’ a large number of transport helicopters to Afghanistan, in the circumstances it would be more prudent to ‘trickle’ additional aircraft and personnel as and when they became available.  If the UK did decide to surge sufficient numbers, the existing stock of spare parts would quickly diminish, this would be due to the harsh conditions experienced in theatre and the need to ensure that those aircraft presently based in the UK, but grounded due to lack of spares, were made serviceable.

Taking the above into consideration, there is a strong demand for additional troop carrying helicopters in Afghanistan, however, what is also required is a long term, coherent strategy to ensure that there are sufficient numbers of trained personnel and serviceable aircraft to achieve this.  It is not a simple case of air freighting any spare aircraft to the requisite location, this would be a recipe for disaster, but a case of providing additional funding to purchase the necessary equipment, additional spare parts and expand the present training programme to ensure that such an increase is both achievable and sustainable for the remainder of the deployment.  Our forces have a sufficient number of troop carrying helicopters available to give our commanders the capability they need, unfortunately what is missing is the political and financial support required to achieve it.

Richard Stockley

*(Note: given the ‘fluid’ nature of aircraft serviceability, the numbers of aircraft denoted as available may fluctuate and should be regarded as approximate.  These numbers do not include those based at dedicated training establishments, civilian aircraft with military registrations, Chinook HC.3’s or dedicated special forces support aircraft)

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090617/text/90617w0013.htm

Bob Ainsworth, the recently appointed Secretary of State for Defence stated that it is in the best interests of the inquiry that it be held in private. This, he said, would allow those called to give testament the opportunity to speak frankly and openly without the pressure of public exposure. This sounds reasonable at face value, however, this is not a public accounts committee inquiry looking into why project x went x-million pounds over budget, this was a major combat operation that led to the deaths of 179 British servicemen and women and an untold number of Iraqi civilians, not to mention the wounded. What this inquiry is allowing those giving testament, if testament is the right word, is the opportunity to the right to silence, indeed any witness called can simply get up and walk out if they so desire; especially if the questioning gets ‘too hot’ and there’s nothing the inquiry team can do about it. The reason they can do this is down to the fact that this is not a judicial inquiry; because of this, any assurances the Prime Minister gives that, “No British documents and no British witness will be beyond the scope of the inquiry,” are somewhat hollow to say the least. Given the number of casualties there is a definite need to apportion both responsibility and accountability; with the chance of a politician being truly held to account, future Governments may think twice before committing our forces to questionable combat operations. Perhaps then they might look to the example of Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s refusal to deploy troops to Vietnam at President Lyndon Johnson’s behest rather than Tony Blair’s agreement with George W Bush.

The inquiry itself will be led by Sir John Chilcot, a man with an impressive resume, however, unless he and his team are given a truly sharp set of teeth there will be no guarantee that all of the testaments given will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Under a judicial inquiry those giving evidence will still have the opportunity to speak frankly and openly, albeit under oath, but at least they won’t be able to withhold evidence. This would give the public and the Government’s critics a greater degree of confidence in the proceedings and reduce the chances of the results being branded a whitewash.

Richard Stockley

The 24th of April laid witness to the official naming ceremony for Future Lynx (see Think Defence Archives March 2009 ‘The Advent of Future Lynx: Taking a Backward Step into the Future’), it has now been officially named as the AW159 Lynx Wildcat.

The Wildcat is due to have its first flight in November this year and is due to enter service in 2011, although it won’t see active service until around 2014.  Fortunately or unfortunately it won’t be ready for use in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.  It has a markedly improved performance over the Lynx it replaces by virtue of its LHTEC CTS800-4N engines, which have replaced the underpowered Rolls Royce Gem.  This lack of power in the Gems was widely recognised in 1991 following the first Gulf War; it comes as no surprise that it has taken an unacceptably long time for the MOD to actually do anything about it.

Amongst the many dignitaries attending was Quentin Davies, the Minister of Defence Equipment and Support, he was quoted as saying, “The name Wildcat evokes memories of past successes in previous campaigns, and I am confident that this aircraft will also prove its worth on operations.”  The ‘Wildcat’ he was referring to was the Grumman F-4 Wildcat, a single seat carrier-borne fighter of WWII vintage.

Wildcat

If Mr Davies had carried out a little historical research he would have discovered a number of interesting facts about the Grumman Wildcat; and having done so the powers that be may have decided to call it something else.

The Grumman Wildcat was purchased early on in the war by the Fleet Air Arm.  The original customer, France, couldn’t receive the order due to their unfortunate defeat at the hands of the Germans.  In Fleet Air Arm service it was initially named the Martlet, which can be described as a bird similar to the Swallow or Swift which is depicted on coats of arms and often devoid of legs; not a beast to conjure up visions of a voracious predator!  Subsequently it was renamed the Wildcat to bring it line with the United States.

Early versions of the Grumman Wildcat didn’t have folding wings which limited it to shore bases or severely restricted the number that could be carried aboard ship.  It was totally outclassed as a fighter in the Pacific Theatre by its arch-nemesis the Japanese Mitsubishi A6 ‘Zero’.  It was only because of the ‘criss-cross’ tactics devised by Lieutenant Commander John Thach, the ‘Thatch Weave’, at the time that prevented the aircraft getting totally decimated due to its vastly inferior manoeuvrability and rate of climb.  Wildcat pilots were advised and wisely so, never to take on a Zero one to one and to only attack when they were at a tactical advantage, otherwise Zero’s were to be avoided.  Admittedly this didn’t stop a number of U S Navy and Marine Corps pilots becoming aces early in the war flying the Wildcat, although these were the exception rather than the norm.

The Wildcat Pilots also described flying the Wildcat as an ‘experience’ and its stalky landing gear gave it some ‘exciting’ ground handling characteristics.  Also, the flight controls were mushy and if the canopy was opened in flight it produced a somewhat violent draught in the cockpit.  In the event of an emergency the canopy could not be jettisoned to aid an escape.  In addition to this the pilot’s seat was cramped and set too low which reduced visibility, something of a misnomer in an air superiority fighter.  In essence it was a tricky aircraft to fly and somewhat unforgiving.  The Wildcat was superseded by the larger and vastly superior Grumman F-6 Hellcat.

With regards to the newly named Agusta Westland Wildcat, although it’s new engines will give it greater performance it comes at a price, and I don’t mean just the £14 million per aircraft tag, it is significantly heavier than the Lynx it replaces.  The current Agusta Westland Lynx 300 weighs in at a published All Up Mass (AUM) of 5330 kg (11,726 lbs) the Wildcat in the meantime has a published AUM of 6,000 kg (13,000 lbs).  As both aircraft use a very similar flight control and rotor system this additional 670 kg (1474 lbs) is going to have a detrimental effect on its flight control envelope.  The Army Wildcat can only benefit therefore by removing the radar to save weight, although its lack of weapons other than a 7.62/12.7 mm machine gun is another matter.  This lack of radar also hampers its other role as a target designator for the WAH-64D Apache’s Hellfire missiles.  The Apache uses two types of Hellfire missiles, semi-active laser guided and millimetre radar guided; no radar, no radar designation.

Future Lynx Army Version

Although Wildcat was lauded over at the naming ceremony by the great and the good at the MOD, due to its restricted size it still lacks the ability to carry an infantry section of eight men and two door gunners, unlike its stable mates the Agusta Westland 412EP and AW139.  The MOD has got around this by changing its designation to a Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter rather than the Battlefield Light Utility Helicopter it was originally meant to be.  The utility role therefore, seems to have slipped down the MOD’s list of priorities which is somewhat at odds for the requirement of a battlefield helicopter.

At £14million per aircraft it is more than twice as expensive as the U S Army’s UH-72 Lakota, which is smaller, lighter and can carry more troops.  In this sense we can only hope that the newly named Wildcat doesn’t emulate its WWII namesake and really does live up to the fêted capabilities extolled by the MOD.  If it doesn’t it will be the servicemen and women of our armed forces who will undoubtedly pay the price.

Richard Stockley

EDITOR COMMENT

For the Royal Navy, the Lynx Wildcat makes a lot of sense. The sensor, engine, avionics and proposed weapons fit will create a significant capability uplift at a cost that whilst steep is not as much as if the RN changed to another type en masse. For the Army Air Corps though, this is an aircraft that offers marginal improvements at a high cost when it has more pressing priorities and better things to spend its budget on.

But if anything, what was wrong with the services being independent? Each had their own sphere of operations, air, sea, land, to each there own! It couldn’t be simpler, or at least that’s what was the general consensus of opinion. Unfortunately the organisation of the services isn’t as clear cut as one may think. Although they may have a simple, hierarchical command structure, i.e. privates at the bottom, generals at the top and so on, the actual lines between the services resembles something akin to the rules of Quidditch, in that it’s somewhat irregular and difficult to fathom.

As an example, although the RAF may command the air over the UK, they have to share the airspace with both the Army Air Corps and the Fleet Air Arm. This may produce an element of duplicity but it also introduces a ‘healthy’ sense of competition amongst the services, a la political struggles for control of air assets. In the days of the cold war, it also meant three different training schools for pilots (although the creation of Defence Helicopter Flying School at RAF Shawbury has diminished this problem somewhat) maintenance and ground crews, with different maintenance procedures and the utilisation of different types of aircraft. Within NATO has always been a drive to improve commonality of weapons and equipment between member nations. If the services of one member country cannot achieve standardisation, what hope is there for NATO? This can be highlighted thus, although the RAF and RN use the Sea King helicopter, they are of differing types due to their roles, and due to the differing training and maintenance regimes, an RAF Sea King cannot just land at a RN base and receive maintenance. So, although this highlights a rare example of commonality between the services, it also raises a serious issue of inter-operability.

The lack of demarcation was also evident in other parts of the services; back in the Twentieth Century shipping wasn’t the preserve of the Royal Navy. The question of who were the best sailors could be argued by all three services. Surely the defence of the seas was the mainstay of the Royal Navy, you might ask? That is their primary role, isn’t it? It was, but not strictly. The Royal Navy has lots of ships, no surprise there. But so too did the Army and the RAF! The RAF had a number of fast rescue launchers stationed around the coast to rescue downed pilots in times of war. This arm was disbanded in 1986, and the Army’s last two, freight hauling HMAV’s were decommissioned in 1998. Although these particular days have passed, the situation does highlight a number of serious problems and also raises a number of difficult questions. The first is why do the services feel the need to duplicate the same type of activity, helicopters being a prime example? It wouldn’t be thought amiss to expect the services to abide by a sense of demarcation and work together along those lines. However, with one eye on inter-service rivalry, that’s where the problem inherently lies. Whether it’s purely down to human nature, loyalty or otherwise, there is a sense that the services cannot be entirely trusted to support each other with the assets bequeathed to them. The example of mutual co-operation in the current conflict in Afghanistan may ridicule this notion, as the services seem to work together seamlessly, but it is in peace time away from the battlefield that the problems arise.

As an example, the British Army being the British Army has a tendency to believe that it knows best when it comes to the deployment of troops, few would argue with that statement, and why should they? The problems begin when large bodies of troops need to be deployed by helicopters, which belong to the RAF. If those helicopters are dedicated to carrying troops does it not make sense for them to be operated by the Army? This immediately breaks away from the supposed common sense concept of everything flying belonging to the RAF. It also raises the issue of command and control and who’s actually in charge. If the RAF needed to alter their priorities, do they have the right to re-allocate resources? Would the higher echelons of the RAF view the helicopters as theirs to use as they please? Who decides the priority and who gets the final say? The argument for each service to having their own aircraft is strong, or at least it is until fatalities occur. During the Falklands Conflict, an AAC Gazelle was shot down by the Royal Navy due to the incompatibility of their respective IFF systems. Also, in 1989 a Royal Lynx helicopter crashed in Kenya with the loss of nine passengers and crew. This was due to an oversight in the Royal Navy servicing procedures. This oversight had been noticed in the army procedures, but there was no mechanism to highlight this fact between the services. If all aircraft were operated by one service, these possible problems could’ve been flagged up and prevented, or so the theory goes.

One alternative to solving this particular problem would be to introduce a Military Aviation Authority. We have a civilian one which governs all aspects of civil aviation could this not be done for the military? The organisation could be made up of serving or retired military personnel, whose sole purpose would be to foresee possible areas of conflict and ensure compatibility and commonality. Plausible? Possibly, but then it could be just another layer of cost and bureaucracy in addition to three already very bureaucratic organisations.

In addition to this, you also have to look at the wider issues of duplication within all three services. To some the RAF Regiment is regarded as just another infantry unit, albeit under RAF control. If this unit was integrated into the Army would the actual RAF Regiment personnel accept this or would they leave en masse? Also, would ‘other’ troops be content permanently sat guarding airfields? This could raise a possible morale issue. Would field commanders be happy at a large body of men sat guarding an airfield and seemingly doing nothing when they could be out fighting the enemy? Despite promises to the contrary, these troops would soon become filched by local commanders and sent into the field, leaving the airfields to be guarded by the RAF Police (or whatever replaced it) and support personnel. In this sense it is easy to see why the RAF Regiment was created in the first place.

Other nations, such as Canada and Israel, have circumvented the problem by integrating their armed forces into one force and calling it a ‘Defence Force’. However, this is a simpler exercise for these relatively ‘young’ nations. They lack the deeply entrenched sense of tradition and politics ingrained in the British nation and the forces. Attempting to amalgamate and integrate the ‘Senior Service’ with ‘Horse Guards’ would be verging on a political impossibility. The fact that the services would wholeheartedly resist such a move itself beggars belief, can’t they just obey orders? The same applies to the three different service police forces, why do we need three separate police forces? You could say it was four if you included the MOD Police, all essentially doing the same job!

To reduce the level of infighting, some pundits have called for the disbandment of the RAF altogether, radical though it sounds. Some current aircraft magazines and undoubtedly many RAF personnel would regard this as the rantings of the lunatic fringe. But then, the Royal Navy probably thinks along a similar vein every time somebody mutes the idea of absorbing the Fleet Air Arm into the RAF. Fleet air defence would suddenly become a very low priority, tell me it wouldn’t?

The problem inherently lies in the equality of the services in relation to each other, all are treated equally and therefore each sees itself as a possible contender to be the lead service. Unfortunately for the services whether they like it or not, they are not equal and not by a long shot. All are vitally important, yes, but not equal, and this comes down to one simple, unavoidable fact: ships and aircraft cannot hold ground, only foot soldiers can.

To take the Falklands Conflict as an example, the army couldn’t have got further than Southampton en masse without the Royal Navy to take it there. Without the army the Royal Navy and RAF only could’ve mounted an air and sea blockade, but how effective would it have been? The Royal Navy and RAF are fantastic in support, but without a large body of men to actually go in, bayonets fixed, and physically take the ground from the enemy, then the chances of victory would be minimal.

The use of force is the last resort of foreign policy, without force the policy itself would be useless. Again during the Falklands Conflict, an Exclusion Zone was set up around the Islands and policed by aircraft and ships, yet Argentine Hercules transports were landing with supplies right up to the day of surrender. This demonstrates the difficulty of enforcing an exclusion zone. Although the Royal Navy and RAF may be given ‘stand alone’ operational roles to enforce such exclusion zones, such as the No Fly Zone over Southern Iraq or chasing drug smugglers in the Caribbean, that is not their primary role, whether they like it or not, their primary role is to support army operations.

You may ponder this idea for a moment, and suggest that the United States Air Force was formed at the end of the Second World War, purposely producing a separate force from the U S Army Air Corps, there must have been a good reason? You’d be right in thinking that, during that war all air operations were controlled by the U S Army. So why did they change? They changed because the USAAC had developed two distinct roles, one strategic and one tactical. The strategic role was essentially long range bombing, and the other was direct tactical support of the U S Army. Having a separate force also prevented army generals from mis-managing the air assets seconded to them, with the inevitable disastrous results. However, given these two distinct roles, rather than forming one composite force, the separation of the two does seem like an ideal solution. Why separate the two? Because it’s all about support and who controls it. General Erwin Rommel commented that before any battle it was necessary to win the war with the quartermasters, and in this sense nothing has changed.

In the UK, air support, rotary especially, appears to be a somewhat ad-hoc affair, given the political too-ing and fro-ing of the services. An ideal solution would be this: all aircraft designated as tactical support of the army, whether it’s RAF Harriers and Hercules or transport helicopters of all services, they should be organised into one force called the ‘Army Tactical Air Force’ (organised along the lines of the United States Marine Corps), whose primary role would be to support army operations. The RAF would be solely concerned with national air defence/air superiority, long range bombing and long range transport; they would become the ‘Strategic Air Force’. In fact, harking back to the Second World War the RAF specifically had formations designated as a ‘tactical air force’s’. This was for formations of more than one fighter group and dedicated to ground attack in support of the army! This organisation, e.g. the Second Tactical Air Force, was based in a particular theatre and purposely excluded a strategic capability. It was the Second Tactical Air Force which famously destroyed the German army in the Falaise Gap.

This ‘amalgamation’ of the services, however loose it may seem, is in fact already being achieved under such the guises as Joint Command Helicopter, in which the army have been given command and control of a number of RAF and Royal Navy Squadrons. This command is somewhat limited as it doesn’t control all of the transport helicopters available. This ‘centralisation’ has also been extended to the ‘Joint Harrier Force, which unites RAF and Royal Navy Harrier squadrons under one force. Whether this is just a prelude to the absorption of the Fleet Air Arms fighter squadrons into the RAF awaits to be seen.

With the creation of an ‘Army Tactical Air Force’ and the reorganisation of the armed forces, the Royal Navy would become divided into two almost distinctive services, Royal Navy Amphibious Support and the Royal Strategic Navy. The Royal Strategic Navy would be for those sailors who like sailing to far off exotic locations in frigates, destroyers and submarines and don’t like being near dirty soldiers. The Royal Navy Amphibious Support would be for those who truly understand the nature of modern warfare, and would absorb the Fleet Auxilliary landing ships, the aircraft carriers and the assault ships. These vessels would be given significantly improved weapons systems for air defence, fire support and the like. The Fleet Air Arm would still exist but its primary role would be fleet air defence for its jet fighters and anti-surface and ASW for its helicopters. The Fleet Air Arm would lose its transport helicopters to the Army Tactical Air Force and would gain a high flying Airborne Early Warning aircraft, something akin to the V-22 Osprey with a radome would suffice. The Royal Strategic Navy could also be given control of the Nimrod ASW aircraft, given their primary maritime role.

These forces would be supported by one centralised flying training school (again, nearly there with DHFS) and one aircraft engineering school etc, rather than duplicating the same thing over and over again. All aircraft maintenance procedures and manuals would provided by a Military Aviation Authority, an organisation that would issue regulations and ensure that all aircraft radios and IFF’s etc within the forces were compatible.

If we had an Army Tactical Air Force, why would we need a Strategic Air Force you may ask? We’d need one because of a lesson from history. Again during the Second World War, the primary role of the Luftwaffe was the tactical support of the Wermacht. Because of this it didn’t have a dedicated long range bomber force, like the RAF and the USAAC. Thus, when it came to bombing long range targets like arms factories and the like, it was hampered by a lack of large bombers and therefore couldn’t plan audacious, long range raids against key installations. A Strategic Air Force, independent of army control could achieve this. As for the Luftwaffe, one of the few large, long range bombers they had was the Heinkel He 177 Greif, which believe it or not was optimised for dive bombing to support the Wermacht! A strategic air force requirement could have prevented this unnecessary corruption of the aircraft’s specification, which significantly compromised its performance.

The upshot of these separate tactical and strategic forces would be that never again would the army sit waiting for RAF helicopters to turn up due to a political battle between the services about who actually had control. Never again would an RAF helicopter pilot declare that, “The RAF isn’t a taxi service for the army,” when it clearly is! Neither would the army have a helicopter forced upon it due to the need for commonality with another service (read Lynx/Future Lynx), it would get the aircraft it needed and they would be fit for purpose. They would also be at home, whether operating from ships or a muddy field, the force would also get the aircraft it truly needed, not just ‘de-roled’ ASW helicopters as has happened in some cases. It would also get all the tactical fighter support in needed. The Strategic Air Force could scream around the skies in air superiority fighters and long range bombers, content and relatively free from inter-service interference.

For the purists in the Royal Navy and RAF who see themselves as a ‘stand alone’, service, not beholden to the army in anyway, shape or form, they can join the strategic arms and patrol the air and seas to their hearts content, looking for non-existent enemy submarines and the like. This would leave the strategic elements to their own devices and allow the tactical elements to get on with what they’re good at, fighting and winning wars. Unfortunately, the biggest and hardest battle that will have to be fought is to get the services properly organised in the first place, and that is going to take some fighting!

Richard Stockley

With the recent invasion of Gaza by Israel, we have the latest phase in an ongoing conflict that appears to have no possible solution. Although a number of alternative ‘solutions’ are regularly muted by outside agencies and governments, the only plausible one would be for all parties involved to come to a settlement; the term settlement meaning the cessation of all hostilities between the two warring parties and a subsequent process of reconciliation. Peace would be fragile and at times tense, but it would be peace all the same. Unfortunately, trust between the Jewish and Arab states is seriously difficult to simply imagine, let alone search and hope for.

With regards to the invasion of Gaza, the Israeli forces have repeatedly stated that this was only plausible option they had. This is true to a certain extent, as it is nigh on impossible to prevent sporadic rocket attacks on towns like Sderot and the surrounding settlements. This is due to the long and winding border between Israel and Gaza, this unfortunately allows an infinite number of firing positions for the Kassam rockets. In this sense Hamas, whether the Israeli’s like it or not, have and will always have the tactical advantage. By the time Israeli forces can respond, the perpetrators will have simply melted away; it is guerrilla warfare in its purest form. So, is there an answer? When I mean an answer, I mean is there an alternative solution, and one that preferably doesn’t require the dropping of a thousand pound laser guided bomb into a populated area.

At this time, Sderot isn’t the only place in the world receiving daily rocket attacks. In Iraq, the Green Zone in Baghdad and Basra, to the South, receive their fair share of incoming ordnance. Fortunately for the coalition forces a solution has been deployed in the guise of C-RAM. C-what you may ask? C-RAM, it’s an acronym of Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar, and it’s one of the key components in the Allies defences.

C-RAM or Centurion, to give its official name (not to be confused with the British Centurion tank), is not a secret weapon and there is nothing remotely sinister about it. Centurion in its most basic form is a radar controlled, electrically driven Gatling gun and is mounted on the flat bed trailer of a lorry. It is fully traversable, has a fully integrated radar and generator, and is likened by American forces to R2-D2 with an erection. The British, having a somewhat more sensitive demeanour, call it the Dalek. When up and running, the system can detect rockets, mortars, artillery shells and the like and can blast them to pieces whilst they are still in flight, effectively destroying them before they hit their intended target. It is quick to react, accurate, and unlike its science fiction connotations, is fully operational, and yours for approximately $15 million a piece.

C-RAM

C-RAM

The actual science behind the system is nothing new, the large 20 mm M61 Vulcan cannon started life mounted on an aircraft, the F-104 Starfighter (yes, it is that old!). The M61 Vulcan cannon itself is also used on a whole host of current aircraft, including the F-15 and F-16; it can also be mounted on an M113 armoured personnel carrier for short range air defence. In that guise it is referred to as the M167. More recently, it has been mounted on the ships of the Royal Navy and U S Navy, amongst others; and is used for what is termed a Close In Weapon System (CIWS), to destroy Exocet style anti-ship missiles. In this role it goes by the name of Phalanx.

What the manufacturers, General Dynamics, have done is to take the Phalanx system and mount it on a flat bed truck, and that’s about it. It weighs approximately 5,500 kg, and is for all intents and purposes, fully independent. It can literally be driven to a location, unhitched, set up and is ready to go in a short period of time. The radar system is smart enough to only fire at incoming targets, so Centurion doesn’t destroy any ordnance fired by your own forces, and when it locks on to the target it hoses it with up to one thousand 20 mm cannon shells, fired at between 3,500 and 4000 rounds per minute from its 1500 round magazine. This gives the system a high probability of a hit, currently 70% to 80% if the data from Iraq is accepted as correct. The manufacturers also claim that the system can cover a four kilometre wide area of airspace; this means that the beleaguered town of Sderot could be defended by approximately five systems for the sum of $75 million. $75 million in defence terms is peanuts.

C-RAM Firing

This may sound too good to be true, and you may ask, “What becomes of the expended cannon shells that have missed the intended target, do they not rain down into the civilian populated areas causing untold damage and destruction?” The answer is that they don’t, the M246 high explosive cannon shells self destruct while still airborne. The manufacturers state that all that falls to earth are small, harmless pieces of shrapnel, although I would prefer to consult with the Iraqi inhabitants living near to the Green Zone before passing comment or judgement.

Unfortunately, things are never as simple as they first appear. The system has been thoroughly utilised and tested by the British and Americans in Iraq, and therefore proven in combat. The Israeli’s have looked at the system and ………subsequently rejected it.

Yes, it is true, the Israeli’s have rejected it on the grounds that it wasn’t suitable. Wasn’t suitable? This beggars the question, “In what way was it not suitable?” Did they borrow a battery of them and ring the town of Sderot and test them? No. Did they undertake exhaustive firing tests under simulated combat conditions in the United States? No.

Then what did they do? What the Israeli’s have done is to make the mistake of creating their own anti-missile project some years ago. This system, called Iron Dome, is still under development, and isn’t expected to be operational until at least 2011. When it is eventually ready, it will undoubtedly cost infinitely more that the Centurion system. The problem with Centurion is that it is manufactured by an American company rather than and Israeli one. To adopt a new, low cost system would possibly deny an Israeli company a sizeable chunk of the defence budget. It could also possibly lead to the cancellation of the Iron Dome programme altogether, which means egg on face for a lot of high powered Israeli politicians and military personnel, and is therefore unthinkable.

The reason stated for not purchasing Centurion given by Israel is that it only defends an area of a few hundred square metres. If this is the case, and the manufacturer’s data is incorrect, would it not be better to purchase a few units and defend a few hundred square metres of Sderot than do nothing at all? At least it might achieve something. Whilst Centurion is in service and whilst Iron Dome is being developed, operational experience could be built up and the system could be upgraded. Within a few years, technology will improve and therefore so will reaction time’s, range and kill probability. In addition to this Centurion systems could be updated and modified to inter-operate with each other as a fully integrated and co-ordinated battery.

Iron Dome has yet to get into service and has yet to get through its teething troubles. Many modern weapon systems are highly effective, but this effectiveness is dependent on the experience and efficiency of its crew, and that takes time. Israeli crews could be building up this experience now, as the British and Americans have done in Iraq. Once Iron Dome is in service, it could be integrated into the Centurion network, providing a multiple layered defence system. This would give it greater operational flexibility and range.

If a Centurion network was deployed, and deployed in sufficient numbers to cover some of the most vulnerable, populated areas in range of the Kassam missiles, what would be the consequences? Although the Kassam could keep on being fired, they could, in effect be rendered obsolete. Hamas could acquire rockets with greater range, but Centurion’s variants could also be produced to match them with larger calibre’s and greater range. It would become a localised arms race, albeit one with a finite limit, as Hamas can only smuggle, man-handle, deploy and launch rockets of a given size. Rockets would still get through now and again as no system is perfect, but in this sense Centurion could prove to be a defensive winner. If Hamas then realised that the only true form of attack they presently have is ineffective, what would be their next course of action, a change of tactics, a new strategy; peace?

Israeli politics at the moment loves a disproportionate response. This isn’t because the Israeli electorate is thirsty for Palestinian blood, it is because they have become desensitised and conditioned to the pain and suffering of what they perceive as their enemy; in effect, both sides have. This has allowed hard line politicians to come to the fore and become elected; conflict breeds tough leadership. In times of war an electorate will rarely tolerate liberal thinking and opinions, especially when they see their neighbours being killed and their homes destroyed on a regular basis. This appears to be an integral part of human nature. However, in the case of Centurion, where the risk of death and damage to property is drastically reduced, would this not allow breathing space for the civilian population? If Israel suffered no civilian casualties or very little property damage because of a Centurion network, how could they justify an assault on the scale recently seen?

Unfortunately, the history of Arab/Israeli conflicts is littered with mistrust and broken cease fires too numerous to mention. As soon as one side sees a significant tactical or strategic advantage in the offering, the first thing out of the proverbial window is the cease fire and the prospect of peace.

In Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War’, the scholar Wang Xi is reputed to have said, “In military operations, what is valued is foiling the enemies strategy, not pitched battle.”

In this sense Israel has missed a valuable strategic opportunity. Unfortunately, as is the way of things, if Israel did adopt the Centurion system it wouldn’t stop there. It would come fully integrated with Remote Piloted Vehicles, Artillery locating radar’s and supporting airpower. The aim of this network would be, defence aside, to locate and destroy the firing point and the operators. Given the current climate, the destruction of the firing point would invariably include anything else in close proximity, terrorists and innocent civilians alike. The message from the Israeli Government is clear, they see Hamas as the instigators and they would not sit and accept a rocket bombardment lightly; however ineffective it would be. A response would be inevitable, as would its lethality.

With this in mind perhaps its time to ask the question, “Is conflict purely about killing the enemy combatant?” Just because a nation has an offensive capability at its disposal, should it actually use it to its maximum effect?

If Israel could actively reduce the number of casualties it inflicts by utilising something like Centurion, then the perpetual cycle of violence that seems to dominate life in the Middle East could diminish.

Defensive weapons however, are not the only solution. Whether it’s in Gaza, Iraq or Afghanistan, the main causes of insurgency are a combination of factors including desperation and depravation. If the ill-educated, unemployed and disaffected youth of a nation are permanently impoverished, what have they got to lose? Breaking the cycle of violence is not merely down to the agreement of the opposing governments. Economic stability and standards of living must also improve; once at an acceptable level, insurgent activity will diminish.

With Israel’s rejection of the Centurion system, whatever the truth behind the reasons, they have failed to promote an alternative to the current, continuing conflict. In this sense they have left the citizens of Sderot open to bombardment and indirectly left the citizens of Gaza vulnerable, vulnerable to the fundamentalist ideals of Hamas and the determined response of the Israeli defence forces. Centurion as a defensive system isn’t perfect, but at least it offers a possible alternative to the laser guided bombs and white phosphorus shells that make up just a small part of Israel’s offensive armoury. With this in mind, we can only hope that ‘Iron Dome’ is as effective or better than the Centurion system, or at least accept that the violence perpetuated until its installation is a price worth paying.

Richard Stockley

The Sixty-Six is a recoilless, one-shot, shoulder launched, unguided anti-tank rocket and unlike its Russian counterpart, the RPG-7, it is disposable. That means that instead of carrying one weapon and a plethora of rockets to be fired by one member of the rifle section, everyone can carry one. It’s light, it’s cheap and portable, and it was so good it is rumoured that the Russians copied the warhead for use on the RPG-7. The Russians have also produced a very similar version in the form of the RPG-18. The early versions of the Sixty-Six were less than reliable, however thorough testing in the hellfire cauldron of Vietnam produced a number of improvements, hence the A1, A2 etc suffixes.

The warhead of the Sixty-Six is a shaped charge, primarily used for penetrating armour plating, which equated to approximately 300 mm of steel plate on a good day, depending on angle of penetration. It was used to great effect during the Falklands campaign as one of a selection of ‘Sanger Busters’, the others being the Carl Gustav 84 mm and the MILAN. After the Falkland’s it fell out of favour as the powers that be decided that it was too light to take out a Warsaw Pact T-72, so along with the old Charlie G, it was replaced by the 94 mm LAW 80 (Light Anti-armour Weapon 1980); which was essentially a super sized Sixty-Six. The LAW 80 has the advantage of an integral spotting rifle and can penetrate 700 mm of armour, again on a good day.

Fast forward to present day Afghanistan where a problem has arisen in the fact that using the LAW 80 or a Javelin ATGW to take out a Taleban gunman in a mud hut is something akin to over-kill, it also had a tendency to obliterate the mud hut which does little for endearing Allied forces to the local population. The MOD has therefore issued an UOR (Urgent Operational Requirement) for a LASM (Light Anti Structures Missile) and their call has been answered in the form of the M72A9. Although outwardly similar to the Sixty-Six the LASM uses a different warhead, which carries 1 kg of HE instead of a shaped charge, this makes for a more useful weapon as the Taleban have few armoured vehicles.

Light Anti Structure Munition

So there you have it, although the LASM differs in comparison to the Sixty-Six LAW they do still have a lot in common, and both can be used for busting Sanger’s. It could therefore be argued that had the MOD kept the original Sixty-Six in the inventory, there would’ve been no need to issue a UOR as the right kit would’ve been ready to hand in sufficient quantities. In addition to this, as the LASM was purchased using a UOR, because of this the unit cost is undoubtedly higher than if it was purchased during peace time, such is the nature of the beast. Like I said earlier, it’s just like the tin opener.

Richard Stockley

Added by Editor

The M72A9 LASM reportedly uses a slower burning insensitive explosive (PBX-6) encased in a heavy aluminium casing to ensure that structures are destroyed with minimal fragmentation. Supplied by Nammo Tally in the USA it is an interim weapon until the Anti Structure Munition comes into service. The ASM is a much larger weapon with a correspondingly greater effect although it may be used alongside the LASM.

Nammo Talley

This latest hot potato comes in the form of a row that appears to be smouldering in Westminster between David Law, Liberal Democrat MP for Yeovil and the Douglas Carswell, Conservative MP for Clacton and Harwich. Spats between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives are nothing new, if anything they should be actively encouraged. However, this one concerns the defence of the realm, or the lack of it depending on who you choose to believe.

Future Lynx Army Version

On or around 2014, development problems aside, the British Army will receive its latest combat helicopter, the ‘Future Lynx’. Unfortunately in the last few years the Lynx has had tendency to make the headlines for all the wrong reasons, these being a number of fatal crashes and the subsequent groundings of the fleet.

The Lynx as we know it entered service with the British armed forces in 1978, it saw action in the Falklands Conflict, the first Gulf War, Iraq and Afghanistan, to name but a few. The Royal Navy use it to hunt ships and submarines, which it does very well, and the army uses it as a battlefield taxi, which it does admirably, but not as well as it should.

The gestation of Future Lynx has been somewhat difficult, following its initial inception. Defence procurement in the UK can be a dicey affair at the best of times with cost over-runs and late deliveries appearing to be the norm. The ones who seem to repeatedly get the raw end of the deal are the servicemen and women who have to operate the equipment and the tax payers who have to foot the inevitable over-inflated bill. The original Lynx helicopter also had its fair share of problems, however with the advent of the £1billion Future Lynx project, all of these problems should be ironed out; or at least we can hope that they are.

For the Lynx to become a ‘Future Lynx’ a number of modifications and improvements have been made, namely:

• New engines. The old Rolls Royce Gem engines have been replaced by more powerful LHTEC CTS800-4N engines which will vastly improve performance.
• Navy style landing gear for both army and navy versions.
• Crashworthy seating for the crew and passengers. These are the same seats as used in the American Blackhawk and vastly improve survivability.
• An uprated transmission system.
• Structural strengthening. The Lynx airframe was known to be weak in several areas.
• Crashworthy fuel tanks to reduce the risk of a post crash fire.
• Addition of a large optical aid, and in the case of the navy version, a new radar.

In addition to these modifications the helicopter bristles with the latest communication, targeting, detection equipment and weaponry that the MOD can lay its wallet on, or at least the navy version does. The version destined for use by the British Army doesn’t quite bristle as much. Being predominately land based, it forgoes the Sea Skua anti-ship and Hellfire anti-armour missiles, its dipping sonar and the radar of its navy sibling and replaces them with…….a machine gun or at least a choice of machine guns; either a single 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm machine gun to be exact.

Being land based one would expect things to be somewhat more simplistic, naval warfare by its very nature is both highly specialised and highly sophisticated. Land warfare on the other hand tends to be more bayonet technology than stealth technology, or so you would think. This assertion is incorrect however, as a close up inspection of the latest Apache gunship will testify. After feasting your eyes on its 30 mm automatic cannon, its multitude of Hellfire missiles and high velocity rockets, you feel yourself empathising with the large swathes of the Iraqi army that surrendered when one of these gunships hoved into view. Apart from its menacing looks, the Apache has a number of features designed explicitly for the modern battlefield:

• Its powerful engines are widely spaced to prevent the other engine getting damaged if one is hit by anti-aircraft fire.
• Its airframe had ‘crashworthiness’ designed into it from inception.
• A robust undercarriage for landing on rough terrain.
• It carries the latest in anti-armour missiles, rockets and has an in built cannon slaved to the pilots helmet, so where he looks, the cannon points.
• It has a ‘Longbow’ radar mounted above the rotor blades, allowing it to peer over terrain to acquire targets for its missiles and remain largely hidden from view.
• Ballistically tolerant flight controls and multiple hydraulic systems to allow redundancy in case battle damage.

With the army version of Future Lynx, there is very little on which your eyes can actually feast, but then it has a distinctly different role. It is not by its nature a gunship, so, you may ask, what does it do?

Well that depends on the MOD, and whether it can make its mind up. When the powers at be at the MOD decided they needed a Lynx replacement, the best solution appeared to be somewhat elusive. So in 2002 they called on the then Westland Helicopters to help them, and gave them £10 million pounds of taxpayers money to carry out an in-depth study to find one.

The Westland Helicopters solution was……to buy more Westland Lynx helicopters, albeit improved ones. Surprising stuff you may think; the biggest surprise being the fact that it cost £10 million pounds to arrive at this conclusion. It should be noted at this point that the nominal sum of £10 million pounds could purchase two light reconnaissance helicopters.

What the army required was a Battlefield Light Utility Helicopter (BLUH). Unfortunately, Lynx is too small to be a true troop carrying utility helicopter. Having realised this, and to save the potential embarrassment of having a troop carrier that couldn’t carry enough troops, the MOD changed the role to that of Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter (BRH). This way it didn’t matter how many troops it could carry, any troops at all would be seen as a bonus. It was a case of massaging the role to fit the aircraft as opposed to buying an aircraft that actually suited the role.

Given this new role it could now peer from behind cover and observe the enemy at will, although it can’t because the observation aid is in the nose, requiring most of the aircraft to be exposed to view the enemy. This was to maintain commonality with the navy version.

In its new role it can now designate targets for the Army Air Corps Apache gunships, which unfortunately it can’t do all of the time because it doesn’t have a ‘Longbow’ radar. The Apache uses two types of Hellfire missiles, semi-active laser guided and millimetre radar guided.

Guess which one Future Lynx can’t designate for?

At least it can carry troops and deploy them at will around the battlefield. Well it can, but not as well as you’d expect. The original Lynx could carry nine troops, but not with all their equipment and certainly not with a door gunner. Movie buffs familiar with such films as ‘Apocalypse Now’ and ‘Blackhawk Down’ will remember scenes of the door gunners blazing away as the helicopter approached a hot landing zone. The Lynx can do this too, or at least half of it as it only carries one door gunner at a time. This creates a tactical problem for the Lynx crew; if the enemy fires at the aircraft from the other side, where there is no door gunner, what does one do? Answers on a post card to the MOD. If the Lynx does manage to land in one piece, it cannot deploy an infantry section of eight men as the cabin isn’t big enough, especially with a door gunner on board. Future Lynx cannot do this either as it carries less troops than the current Lynx courtesy of its crashworthy seating. As if to confound its problems, if the Lynx did have the space to carry the additional troops, it wouldn’t get off the ground anyway as its current Rolls Royce engines lack sufficient power.

The Lynx as we know it is the army’s ‘battlefield taxi’, or at least it should be if it could carry enough troops, and two door gunners to defend itself against hostile fire. The Lynx Mk 7 had the advantage of carrying eight TOW anti-tank missiles, or it did until the Apache gunship pulled the rug from under its skids to become the army’s number one tank killer. The Lynx Mk 9 cannot carry TOW missiles, but has a robust wheeled undercarriage for landing on rough terrain, something the Future Lynx does not. It has a navy style undercarriage, again to maintain parity with the navy version. The army version of Future Lynx isn’t destined to carry missiles of any sort either.

To compare Future Lynx against its contemporaries also raises a few disparities. It appears to be too large and expensive to be a light reconnaissance helicopter and it is too small to be a true troop carrying, utility helicopter. So what is it? As any aircraft designer will tell you, a helicopter is a compromise of function, performance and cost. If it cannot carry out the basic functions of its role, what is its purpose? If it cannot fly and operate within the expected parameters, how can it adequately perform? And if it is too expensive for the role expected of it, is it actually worth it? In this sense the army version of Future Lynx seems to be too much of a compromise.

The Lynx has been likened by those who fly it, to something akin to a flying supercar, in that it’s fast, it’s highly manoeuvrable and a pleasure to ‘drive’. But like the famed supercars it emulates, it is temperamental, prone to unreliability and expensive to maintain. With the Future Lynx price tag being muted at £14 million pounds per helicopter, it doesn’t come cheap either. A light reconnaissance helicopter, such as the Eurocopter EC145, a helicopter favoured by many UK police forces as their spy-in-the-sky, costs less than half of the Future Lynx. The Americans should know they’ve just bought several hundred as medevac helicopters for their army. The EC145 in the utility role can also carry nine troops compared to Future Lynx’s seven, even though it’s a lot smaller, lighter and has the same crashworthy seating. The Agusta 412EP Griffon, used by the RAF to train helicopter pilots, also costs significantly less, and can carry a full infantry section with the added bonus of two door gunners, something of a novelty in the circumstances!

In essence the army version of Future Lynx is simply a navy helicopter without the advantage of guided weapons or radar. It is under sized, under armed, overly expensive and seemingly ill-suited to its intended role. So why is the MOD buying it?

That, it seems is the £14 million question. Part of the MOD selection criteria looked at the ‘strategic’ view of Future Lynx. Westland Helicopters was and is the UK’s one and only helicopter manufacturer. To buy a foreign make would effectively consign Westland’s to oblivion. So, to maintain the UK’s helicopter manufacturing base, the British Army uses Lynx helicopters. The twist in the situation is that Westland’s has now become Agusta Westland, teaming up with the Italian helicopter manufacturer. This has led to the product range being expanded, so the Lynx helicopter is no longer the only possible choice from the Company brochure. However, the MOD being the MOD, is standing by its decision, thus giving the British Army no choice but to stick with the Lynx until 2039.

When it finally ends its days, the Lynx will have been in service for over sixty years. Sixty years of temperamental reliability, high maintenance costs and political interference. Why doesn’t the RAF use it? The RAF doesn’t use it because the RAF has enough political clout to say no. Why does the Royal Navy use it? The Royal Navy uses it because it is a navy helicopter and it suits its role to a tee. Those sophisticated systems that it carries also justify its purchase and operating costs. Why does the army use it? The army uses it because the Army Air Corps is not a service, it is a corps within a service and therefore lacks the political clout that the RAF and the Royal Navy seem to enjoy.

Future Lynx Naval Version

So what, if any, are the alternatives?

• Buy a foreign equivalent, such as the Blackhawk or the Eurocopter NH90. That could cost British jobs and is therefore politically sensitive unless licence production can be secured. In fact Westland’s previously had a licence production agreement with Sikorsky to build the Blackhawk, however the UK government refused to buy it.
• Purchase or lease Agusta 412EP Griffon’s. These are already used by the RAF as training and rescue helicopters. Although they have some of the drawbacks of their Vietnam era forebears, they are still an effective aircraft and are used by several other NATO countries. They are also inherently cheaper. These could be used in the short term until something better is developed.
• Develop and adapt the Agusta Westland AW139, which is a civilian helicopter, into a military transport. This would take time and money, but it is still cheaper than Future Lynx, it is also manufactured by the same company and it can carry more troops.
• Build a bigger Future Lynx, with a larger cabin to hold more troops. Now there’s a possibility! In fact Westland’s has a lot of experience in doing just that. The Westland WG30, although not a commercial success and did court some controversy, was derived from the Lynx Mk 1. In simplistic terms they took the engines, transmission and rotor head and stuck a larger fuselage underneath that carried nearly twice as many troops. Although not perfect, it proves the concept is feasible.

David Hillcoat, Agusta Westland’s Future Lynx Programme Head, stated in 2007 that, “The aircraft looks the same, but it’s completely new.” In essence the Future Lynx is 95% different to the current Lynx models, with very few interchangeable parts. If this is the case, why didn’t they have the foresight to make the cabin larger? The fact is they could have, but it’s the MOD that issues the specification and requirements. Agusta Westland just makes the product, and in this case the MOD merely changed the requirements to suit what Agusta Westland could produce. The MOD also tendered the BLUH, sorry I mean BRH, to Westland’s under a single tender, so Westland’s effectively got the contract without any competition whatsoever.

For our £1billion, UK forces will get sixty two helicopters; thirty four for the army and twenty eight for the navy. These numbers have been reduced however, from a total of seventy aircraft. Yet the overall project costs are still being cited at £1billion. Are development costs soaring? Are we, the tax payers missing something? Where are our eight missing helicopters?

It is only fair at this point to state that the Lynx is not a bad aircraft, it is not a widow maker by any stretch of the imagination and all aircraft have their own problems and idiosyncrasies. Future Lynx is a vast improvement over the current Lynx. Its engines are a lot more powerful, giving it greater performance. Its airframe is stronger and it has crashworthy seating, which will significantly enhance crew survivability. Its systems are a generation ahead in capability and when it is eventually unleashed on the high seas by the Royal Navy our enemies will no doubt have many sleepless nights. This version of Future Lynx definitely has a deserved future, and rightly so.

However, what is good on the high seas does not always translate to the battlefield. Navy helicopters have in the past served with distinction overland, the Sea King in the Falklands Conflict was a war winner, the Wessex started life as a navy helicopter and both were manufactured by Westland’s. But these aircraft, unlike the Lynx, are dedicated troop carriers and cargo shifters. Their primary task is to haul men and equipment, which they did, and some still do admirably. However with the Lynx, Westland’s and the MOD seem to have got lost along the way. The ‘Huey’ of Vietnam fame set the standard for troop carrying utility helicopters. It was cheap, simple to maintain, robust and could haul a section of men, including door gunners, across the battlefield. Unfortunately, the Huey is old, noisy and relatively slow. The battlefield has changed significantly since Vietnam and the modern helicopter needs to be somewhat more sophisticated, but unless a helicopter can meet the basic criteria of what is essentially a ‘battlefield taxi’, it is not truly fit for purpose.

Fortunately for Future Lynx, it has friends in the right places, friends such as General Sir Kevin O’Donoghue, Chief of Defence Material. He was quoted in the recent ‘Defence Equipment 2009’ report, when asked, “(If) an off-the-shelf solution would have provided the same capability at lower cost?” He replied, “I do not actually agree ….. that we could buy a helicopter which you could fly off the back of a ship and fly in the battlefield and have a common helicopter. I do not agree that we could buy that cheaper.” When pressed further, he went on to say that, “…(Future Lynx is) exactly what’s required.”

General Sir Kevin is obviously unaware of the ship borne versions of the ‘Huey’, such as the AB 212ASW which could carry torpedoes and Sea Skua missiles or the AB 412 Sentinel which featured an under nose radar, sound familiar? These aircraft also have a high degree of commonality with their land based counterparts and the AB 212 ASW is still operated by a number of NATO navies. Although these aircraft may no longer be regarded as state-of-the-art in naval circles, they are well proven airframes and their electronic systems can easily be upgraded. So contrary to what the General thinks alternatives are available, they are significantly cheaper and incredulously, they are manufactured by the same company! But then it’s not his money that’s being lavished on Agusta Westland, it’s ours.

Another keen supporter of Future Lynx is David Laws MP, he believes that it will be highly effective in meeting the Ministry of Defence’s needs. But then he would, the Agusta Westland factory is in his constituency, what else would we expect him to say? Fortunately for David Laws and the staff at the MOD, they won’t have to fly repeatedly over an increasing hostile battlefield in Future Lynx as our servicemen and women will.

One of the few opponents to Future Lynx is Douglas Carswell MP, he has attacked the project as a waste of money, and has stated that British servicemen and women will subsequently pay a blood price because of it. Whether you agree with this or not, serious questions do need to be raised about its introduction into army service. As a troop carrier or as a reconnaissance platform, Future Lynx certainly isn’t value for money, and not by a long shot. And although it’s a lot more powerful and crashworthy than its predecessor, its flight control systems still lacks the full redundancy and ballistic tolerance taken for granted in other contemporary helicopters. Its engines aren’t widely spaced apart either, unlike the Blackhawk or Apache. These things aren’t aesthetic design features they are the culmination of the hard won lessons of combat experience.

Future Lynx is due to have its maiden flight later this year and it won’t be introduced into service until 2014. It certainly won’t be ready for use in Afghanistan or anywhere else for the foreseeable future. In this sense, its name ‘Future Lynx’ seems somewhat apt. It is widely known that the helicopter lift capability of our armed forces is approaching that of scandalous, there are simply not enough to go around. What our forces need are cost effective, reliable helicopters that are fit for purpose, and they need them now, not in 2014.

One small ray of light to come out the Future Lynx debate is the fulfilment of an Urgent Operational Requirement for Afghanistan. Twelve existing Lynx Mk 9’s will be fitted with LHTEC CTS800-4N engines to vastly improve their hot and high performance. However, no-one has said whether this ‘generosity’ will be extended to include the crashworthy seating, crashworthy fuel tanks and cockpit airbags that the Americans seem to take for granted. It should also be noted that the lack of power in the Lynx’s engines was widely recognised during the first Gulf war in 1991. Unfortunately it has taken seventeen years and another conflict to finally spur the MOD into action.

With the proposed introduction of Future Lynx into the army our servicemen and women will once again have to gaze in awe and envy at the superior equipment used by their allies. They will have to fly into combat in a helicopter that is too small, carrying SA80 rifles that have a frighteningly chequered history and talk to each other on ‘Bowman’ radios that don’t work properly. The vital importance of just these key items cannot be emphasised enough, yet each costs millions of pounds more than it should, was late into service or both. They also failed to deliver what was simply expected of them.

This situation is clearly unacceptable, especially when cheaper, more effective and proven systems are readily available ‘off the shelf’. A country has a strategic interest to produce materials for its own armed forces, this is accepted. But the question needs to be asked, if we cannot produce the necessary equipment or even produce equipment that is simply fit for purpose, is it not right to look elsewhere? We ask a high price of our servicemen and women, and we owe them a duty when we send them into harms way to provide them with the best equipment that is available. In this sense we appear to have failed them, and failed them for the sake of national pride, strategic interests and political expediency.

Given the opportunity and sufficient funding, Agusta Westland could produce a truly exceptional battlefield helicopter that would be highly sought after, and guarantee the security of the company for a long time to come. With Future Lynx though, it really does seem that we are taking a step backwards in capability as we move forwards into the future.

Richard Stockley

Added by Editor

Another eminantly suitable alternative is the Bell UH-1Y Venom or Super Huey currently being delivered to the USMC. Like FLynx it is based on an old design but unlike FLynx is well suited to the Army requirements even having such refinements as folding rotors to make it suitable to be deployed from amphibious assault vessels like HMS Ocean. This would also make it a viable alternative to the Sea King Mk4 Commando currently in service with the Royal Marines / Fleet Air Arm that are also due for replacement.

Links to relevant sources

http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/aircraft/military/bellUH-1Y.cfm

http://www.nhindustries.com/

http://www.agustawestland.com/