Following on from the previous post about the Nimrod MRA.4 and the two prototypes sat idle at Woodford Aerodrome, I contacted my MP and received the following reply from Peter Luff, the Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology:
The MOD has announced that the upgraded Lynx Mk.9A has arrived and started operational service in Afghanistan. The first aircraft arrived in theatre courtesy of an RAF C-17 Globemaster III earlier this month. Although no specific date was given for their arrival at Camp Bastion, two aircraft, ZG888 and ZG915, were noted at Brize Norton on April 12 awaiting shipment following their return from flight trials in Kenya earlier this year.
The Lynx Mk.9A is an upgraded version of the Mk.9 and features LHTECH CTS800N engines which offer significantly more power over the original ‘wheezy’ Rolls Royce Gems. This will vastly improve the Lynx’s hot and high performance in Afghanistan. Prior to this operations were severely restricted especially during the summer months.
This additional engine power also allows the Mk.9A to carry heavier weapons as pictures have been released of the aircraft fitted with the 0.50 M3M HMG, which is a significant increase in fire power over the usual 7.62 L7 GPMG.
In addition to the new engines the Mk.9A is also fitted improved secure communications equipment. Given this quantum leap in capability over the previous Mk.7 and Mk.9 variants, it will be a welcome addition to the flight line.
Lynx 9a being loaded into an RAF C17
EDITOR: Let’s hope there are more than 2 being deployed.
In a previous post, ‘Looking South: an Alternative Slant’, the subject of the retirement of the Nimrod MR.2 and the delay of the MRA.4 into service attracted some discussion and debate. Having concerns about this lack of airborne maritime cover I contacted my MP to raise the issue at a higher level, and received the following response from Bill Rammell, Minister of State for the Armed Forces.
THE MOD has announced the contract to re-engine the remainder of the Army Air Corps (AAC) Lynx Mk 9 helicopters, to bring them up to Mk 9A standard.
The contract, worth £41.8milllion, has been awarded to AgustaWestland and will see the final 10 airframes upgraded. These are in addition to the previous 12 which began conversion at the end of last year. The out of service date for the Mk 9A has also been extended to 2016. The Minister for Defence Equipment and support, Quentin Davies said:
“This improved version of the very successful Lynx helicopter will greatly benefit our troops in Afghanistan when it deploys there for the first time next month. The enhancements will allow it to perform in the extremes of climate and geography that characterise that theatre of operations.”
Quentin Davies was right when he said it will greatly benefit our troops as operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq were severely limited by Lynx’s inability to operate in hot and high conditions, especially during the summer months. At times the troop carrying capability has been reduced to one, which makes something of a lonely patrol.
THE SEARCH for oil in the South Atlantic has briefly caused the eyes of the nation to divert its gaze from Afghanistan to the Falkland Islands. The Government of Argentina has seen fit to voice its concerns over the potential untapped mineral wealth under the ocean, and is clearly unhappy about the UK getting all the benefits it would bring.
The present rumblings in Buenos Aeries therefore, are more down economic desires rather than some grandiose nationalist intent. In essence, Argentina would like a seat at the table and a large slice of the pie. However, seeing as your average British senior civil servant would rather cut his own throat with a rusty carving knife before considering a mutually beneficial agreement to share oil wealth, albeit in the name of peace and international relations, then the potential exists for conflict. Unfortunately, oil is one of the greatest catalysts for conflict known to man.
To those concerned with defence the opportunity arises to evaluate the conventional forces we have to hand, given that much of our present armed services are deeply entrenched in a counter insurgency conflict.
Although we could not mount a task force to recapture the Falkland Island’s, we should not need to. But the question needs to be asked, are the forces and capabilities we have at present adequate to repel an invasion or at least handle a heavy duty stand-off?
Before we ask this, we should also ask, does Argentina have the political and military capacity for an invasion?
Since its inception the MV-22 Osprey has generated a significant amount of controversy, especially during its protracted development. This development phase was significantly long, at times tragic, and the costs were somewhat insurmountable, even by UK MOD procurement standards.
However, now that the aircraft has actually been fielded in Iraq and Afghanistan, the question can now be asked, is it any good and was all the pain, suffering and cost worth it?
Like any joke, it’s the way you tell it that makes a good one great.
The same goes for the Major Projects Report 2009, issued by the MOD on 15th December, with special regard to the AW159 Lynx Wildcat. The Future Lynx Wildcat is one of our favourite subjects, in a large pool of MoD debacles the Wildcat is in the Premiere League vying for the top slot with Nimrod MRA4, Astute and a few others.
The Lynx Wildcat, whether you love it or loath it, will undoubtedly be the Army Air Corps main mode of battlefield transportation for the next three decades, despite its stratospheric development and procurement costs. As a previous post highlighted the AW139/149 as a low-cost Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) alternative to the Wildcat, this post highlights its lightweight cousin, the AW109.
The AW109 was born out of a marketing analysis in Italy in 1965, and was the first helicopter designed by Agusta SpA to be built in significant numbers. Prior to this, Agusta SpA had designed and built the A101G, A103, A104 and the A106. These aircraft were constructed as prototypes, and although some did see military service, they were manufactured in very small quantities.
“It was the English,” Kaspar cried,
“Who put the French to rout;
But what they fought each other for
I could not well make out.”
‘The Battle of Blenheim’ – Robert Southey (1774 -1843)
A searching question was posted on this website 18th July, asking what was the point of Afghanistan and what we are hoping to achieve. Before attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to understand how our forces ended up there in the first place .
With any conflict, whether it is conventional or counter insurgency (COIN), airpower will play an important, if not pivotal role. When fighting a large, sophisticated army the air assets need to be equally sophisticated to counter the vast array of weapons that will be deployed against them. In a counter insurgency war, the anti-aircraft weapons deployed by the enemy tend to be somewhat less sophisticated, and of the sophisticated weapons deployed, these will tend to be few in number.
The exception to this was evident during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan where the Stinger Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) were supplied to the insurgents by a sovereign state, the USA. Due to the insurgents’ lack of sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons, the aircraft deployed against them can themselves be somewhat unsophisticated, and therefore significantly cheaper. Given the recent deployment of RAF’s Tornado’s to Afghanistan, replacing the versatile Harrier, the question needs to be asked, ‘is the RAF using a sledgehammer to crack the erstwhile nut?’
Utilising such a sophisticated aircraft, especially when dropping a 500kg laser guided bomb on a relatively small target, seems to be all too reminiscent of the Vietnam Conflict, along with the associated risk of collateral damage.
A recent article in The Independent on Sunday, 2nd August, highlighted the current problems with UK’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan. With regard to this deployment, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, commented that UK forces could be there for ‘decades’. By decades it is reasonable to assume that Sir Nigel means timescale of twenty to thirty years as British troops were on the streets of Ulster for a similar timescale. So, with regards to Sir Nigel’s suggestion, is it plausible to expect UK troops to be patrolling Helmand Province for the next twenty to thirty years? The answer is resolutely no; public opinion, rising casualties and the cost of such an operation to support what is undeniably a failed nation, will put paid to the Afghanistan conflict long before that, whatever the political or moral desires may be.
Even if the UK decided to maintain such a lengthy commitment there is one singular reason why it would be unfeasible, and that reason is oil. This is not due to the fact that Afghanistan has oil, it doesn’t, or whether the oil/gas companies want to drive a pipeline through it, that will make no difference whatsoever. It is down to the simple fact that global oil production has peaked, as such the current supply will slowly deplete and with it the petroleum and lubricants that keeps our armed forces mobile. It would be easy at this point to predict some kind of Malthusian catastrophe or apocalyptic outcome; however, I shall avoid that subject as there are plenty of sites on the web proposing those without this one joining the fray.
Not for the first time in its history has the AgustaWestland Lynx Wildcat been the focus of this website or the media in general, and not for all the right reasons. Lynx Wildcat’s latest foray back into the headlines has been due to vast increase in its development costs. The actual cost of the Lynx Wildcat project has been open question since it the initial budget for the aircraft was announced as £1billion for 70 aircraft; with a mix of both navy and battlefield reconnaissance helicopters. This was then adjusted to 62 aircraft, although the price tag remained the same; with the approximate cost for each aircraft being muted at £14million. Following recent questions asked in the House of Commons by Conservative MP, Douglas Carswell, regarding the costs of Future Lynx, Quentin Davies stated that the total cost is now forecast at a staggering £1.7billion for the same 62 aircraft. Allowing a sundry cost to each unit for spare parts, training and infrastructure etc, this demonstrates a unit cost, including development, in the region of £20-25million. Although the aircraft offers a greater capability over the existing Lynx models, this additional capability does not equate to £1.7billion, and not by a long shot. This also pushes it into the cost realm of the Chinook and Merlin, for a fraction of the lift capability. In this sense Lynx Wildcat is a prime example of the ‘Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns’; but you don’t need a degree in economics to work that one out.
Whether the Government likes it or not, helicopters are on the agenda and regularly on the front page. In this instance we take a delve into the recent story of the ‘Cut and Shut Chinook Scandal’, which actually isn’t a scandal. It isn’t actually much of a story, but at the moment it is being used as a stick to beat both the Government and the MOD.
The headlines recently announced that the RAF were operating a Chinook in Afghanistan that was rebuilt using two different airframes. This was highlighted in ‘The Sun’, which reliably informed us that, ‘The two parts were fused together — a technique often used illegally by dodgy car dealers’ and contrary to the report in ‘The Daily Mail’, both engines were still attached to the airframe as the adjoining photographs clearly testify. On the face of it, the story itself is true, although missing a few vital facts. One should take stock and note at this point that, dodgy car dealers aside, the processors used to manufacture a 1991 Vauxhall Cavalier and a Boeing Chinook are fundamentally different to say the least.
Another excellent post from one of our regular contributors;
Helicopters, or at least the lack of them, have generated a number of headlines and a great deal of consternation in Westminster over the past few weeks. David Cameron, the leader of the opposition, has made a great deal of political capital out of his comments that the UK armed forces have over 500 helicopters available, with only 30 of them currently deployed to Helmand Province. This information is undeniably correct, however, it is important to take a look at the facts behind the statement rather than accept at face value what is merely a political sound-bite. What the commanders on the ground are shouting for is more troop carrying helicopters, and of the 500+ aircraft supposedly available, it comes as no surprise that not all have a troop carrying capability.
Helicopters are not simple creatures, they are on the whole highly expensive and complex pieces of equipment; however, given their capability and flexibility, they are highly valuable and highly sought after battlefield assets.
The Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, announced today that an independent inquiry into the invasion of Iraq will be held in behind closed doors. Following the draw down of combat operations and the withdrawal of British troops from Iraq, it has now been deemed acceptable for the inquiry to go ahead. Although many opposition MP’s and commentators had demanded that the inquiry be held sooner, it appears prudent that the inquiry be held following cessation of combat operations as any findings or outcomes will no longer have an effect on troop moral or their legal standing whilst in the field. This does make sense, however, what doesn’t make sense is the Prime Ministers insistence that the inquiry should not apportion blame. Why shouldn’t it apportion blame? The point of an inquiry is to determine the root cause, if it is not how can ‘lessons be learned’, to coin a cliché which appears to be over-used by this Government of late. The lesson in this sense was learned at Suez, some fifty years previously, this being that the justification for ordering large scale combat operations needs an equally justifiable legal and moral aim, not what is perceived as an alternative agenda. It was and still is a widely held public belief that the supposed threat of WMD was merely a cover to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, faulty dossiers aside.
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