Defence reviews have a habit of only coming round every change of government. This simple piece of information should be taken as an immediate pointer to the nature of defence reviews: they are a statement of political intent. A review of both the likely threats and the current and future capacities to deal with those threats are a necessary add-on, but clearly of secondary importance.

Nevertheless, on first reading, the Strategic Defence Review published in July 1998 appeared to be a very solid document that had made a genuine and honest assessment of the political, security and defence situation. Moreover, it also appeared to have been produced by a genuine collaboration between the civilian politicians and the uniformed staff to arrive at a coherent and workable strategy to deal with future military challenges. It certainly had its flaws, but it was a very welcome document that seemed to tick all the right boxes.

Less than 12 months had passed before it became abundantly clear that the document was nothing but hot air. If not an outright attempt to deceive, it was certainly a clever piece of political spin. Events quickly proved that the document was more a conflation of two statements – one by New Labour and one by Chiefs of Staff – than collaboration to effect common strategy. And it wasn’t just the politics that was spun, the military element also proved to be little more than a coat of gloss to hide the rot beneath.

Bold statements I know, so I’d better put some meat on those bones. Why? Because the SDR 1998 (and subsequent add-ons) provide a perfect picture of what’s wrong at the heart of defence policy, strategy and planning. We could learn a great deal from it.

Back to the Good Points

With the decline of the Empire, British military might had been concentrated in Northern Europe and the North Atlantic. Step by step, the UK armed forces were subsumed into a multi-national attempt to prevent the Soviet Red Army marching eastwards. Even by the early-70s, what little out of area capabilities that remained were legacies from an earlier period – allowed to wither away completely as platform life expired or burned out (literally as in the case of HMS Eagle!). British defence was predisposed to achieving two simple goals: delay the Red Army on the North German Plain; and, keep the North Atlantic sea-lanes open for US reinforcement. Unfortunately, the US had other ideas and developed tactical nuclear strike capabilities and doctrine that would allow an end to hostilities without having to expend too great an effort in resources and manpower – at the expense of a few European cities!!!

Once the Soviet Union collapsed, the UK armed forces were left in a bit of a quandary: all tooled up to fight an enemy that no longer existed. What to do? The entire 90s were a period of complete stagnation and drift. Iraq and Yugoslavia kept them occupied, but at the same time also exposed and highlighted their internal weaknesses. Virtually the entire Army was robbed to place two ‘triangular’ (and bandaged) brigades into the Gulf with modern equipment. Had they needed to be replaced in the front-line, scratch formations of tired Chieftains and FV430 APCs were next up. Thankfully, they were not required. The RAF’s main strike aircraft had to be quickly re-roled from the very mission it was doctrinally built around. And the RN, the alleged prime mover in power projection beyond UK shores, was hardly the key asset in securing an Iraqi climb-down.

In Yugoslavia, the Army had major problems supporting just two small battle groups, whilst maintaining ‘deployment harmony guidelines’, on an enduring, open-ended, peace support mission. The RAF and RN were found wanting in their ability provide credible support to those meagre ground forces.

Both examples show major structural weakness in the Armed Forces regardless of political restrictions that may have hampered their performance. The Conservative government singularly failed to provide political direction and the military chiefs were more interested in their own internal turf wars. It was left to the opposition, New Labour, to pick up the baton and to provide both the political direction and the imperative/urgency to the military to get their house in order.

Coming to power in 1997, the new government did not divulge its political intent with undue haste. It appeared to consult widely and sensibly and thus published its Strategic Defence Review sensibly in July 1998. It publically – and honestly – stated that there was no longer any practical (military) threat to UK territory or sovereign independence This gave them a blank page on which to craft a defence (and security) policy around all UK interests – there was no longer any need to put all their eggs into the anti-Soviet basket.

New Labour grasped this opportunity with open arms and, rather than simply cutting the military to the bone as some anticipated, developed their ideology of foreign intervention and being a “force for good”. The military had a new purpose for which it needed new doctrine, strategy and – to the obvious delight of the military staff – new equipment.

The SDR document laid it all out in a simple and understandable manner – albeit padded by plenty of fluff. Politically, the UK was to remain firmly aligned with the US, NATO and the EU and was to encourage even greater military cooperation with these partners. At the same time, it was going to form expeditionary forces that could perform a multitude of tasks ranging from disaster relief, through peace support to putting the stick about occasionally to bring undesirables into line. Of course, this was all to be done from a firm position on the moral high-ground.

For their part, the military staff put together a coherent plan to restructure the forces then available to best tackle those political demands, and to lay out what equipment and strategy would be required in the future to even better perform the given tasks. Relatively minor alterations were made to core structures with the emphasis being placed on acquiring the logistical capacity to support these potential far off and enduring missions. But on the whole, it was hardly a bold reorganisation or reform and very little was surrendered by the services in the way of numbers, equipment or control – especially for the Army and the RAF. The RN, however, were a little more forward looking and were prepared to make immediate sacrifices in existing platform numbers with the promise of the future arrival of two new, huge ‘fleet’ carriers.

But, what was perhaps the most gratifying from the document was the apparent cooperation between the uniformed and the non-uniformed in laying out publically the manner and extent to which UK forces would be deployed and engaged. It truly looked like there had been an attempt to match what the politicians wanted to do with what the military could do – and agreement found in the middle.

Oh how we were all mistaken and the doubters and critics proven right

Where it All went Wrong

SDR 1998 clearly laid out the scale of operations that the military would be able to contemplate based upon its size and resources: namely, a “large scale” (ie division sized force) high intensity operation OR two concurrent “medium scale” (ie brigade sized force) operations with only one being, temporarily, of high intensity. Please note the capitalised ‘OR’. A “very large scale” or “full scale” effort would only be made where the UK itself, or a NATO ally, was under direct attack and the forces would be deployed in the tradition hunting grounds of the North German Plain.

Neither the Kosovo Albanian people, nor the insurgent cum terrorist organisation Kosovo Liberation Army, were NATO members or allies of the UK. Their plight may well have caused sympathy in the UK, but it was hardly crucial to UK interests let alone defence. Nevertheless, the UK government was prepared to make available virtually the entire British Army as a battering ram up the Kacanik Pass to ‘liberate’ Kosovo. At the political level, both 1st and 3rd Divisions were offered for the assault, as well as 5 Airborne and 3 Commando brigades. Fortunately, this force was not required.

Less than 12 months after SDR 1998 was published, the fundamental planning assumptions were ignored and effectively cast aside. New Labour were willing to rubber stamp a deployment at almost “full scale” – not to secure UK sovereignty or even crucial interests – but for the personal gratification of Tony Blair’s sofa committee. SDR 1998, as a guiding document was dead in the water. Just about every policy document related to military affairs subsequently produced – of which there were many – barely considered military effect; there were nothing more than political fluff.

It’s difficult to find a period since 1999 that the military has ever been within those planning assumptions!

Kosovo 1999 also showed the vast weaknesses in the military structure and capabilities extant. The relatively minor structural changes to a “balanced force structure” and the creation of an “operational cycle” across 6 similar brigades were stillborn. Various cap badges were more interested in preserving their own territory and tradition that creating an army fit for purpose. Still, the very concepts of ‘pairing’ brigades in a “balanced force structure” and the “operational cycle” were the main flaws of the military element of SDR 1998 as Op Telic 1 was to demonstrate. Almost 5 years after SDR 1998 appeared, it still required the stripping bare of almost the entire 1st Armoured Division to deploy a single ‘square’ brigade.

In 2010, the Army is barely any closer to resolving this particular conundrum despite the best efforts – much hated – by General Jackson.

Moreover, the efforts of neither the RN nor the RAF were able to provide the knock-out blow to a poor 2nd rate enemy after almost 10 years of sanctions. During Allied Force, more civilians were killed by NATO bombing that YU security forces. Democracy in Serbia brought victory in June 1999, not strategic bombing, naval power projection or even the threat of land invasion.

To knock over even a small, significantly inferior opponent requires MASSIVE forces if the blunt cudgel made of jelly is applied. The UK doesn’t have the financial resources for a small little cudgel let alone a MASSIVE one. Think Serbia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

New Labour’s ideological wet dream of deterring assorted bad guys by talking tough, deploying forces to borders in a show of strength and, if necessary, using them, had collapsed at the first point of contact.

Since 1999, the government continued to compound the problem as it disregarded all reference to their own policy documents. SDR 1998 was a valid document until, perhaps, 1 April 1999 and no longer. From then on, New Labour made up defence policy and strategy on the hoof. Or maybe, on the sofa. The military simply played catch-up, with both eyes firmly fixed on selfish cap-badge interests.

The military is inherently conservative when it comes to change. But their conservatism and aversion to change is not based upon wanting to prevent the breaking of something that is not broken, it’s about preservation of selfish cap-badge interest – keeping what’s broken rather than replacing it with new.

SDR 1998 depicted a relatively minor restructuring. The Army was incapable of even managing this due to the structural weaknesses of the regimental system and intransigence of any cap-badge to sacrifice or downsize – irrespective of merit and value to the whole. Collectively, the Army remains wedded to fighting an armoured conflict against the Red Army. If it were to drop this notion it would mean the donkey wallopers and the (big) gunners having to give up their prized possessions and competing for pre-eminence in a ‘recce’ corps – primarily with air assets that would probably better fit in the AAC!

The Navy decided, boldly, to forsake some ageing surface ships on the future promise of a pair of fleet carriers. CVF has become the Navy’s Holy Grail for which they now seem to be prepared to sacrifice anything to obtain. The Navy has done far greater damage to its own capabilities, current and future, by pursuing this dogma than the Treasury has inflicted. Its plan for the CVFs is to tramp steam around the oceans with an all FAA (ie weak) air wing. To do any meaningful intervention operations, it will require major investment from its arch enemy the RAF.

The RAF too sacrificed some older aircraft to keep its Typhoon pet project on the table. Intervention forces desperately need strategic and tactical airlift. Other than 6 C-17s, what has the RAF done to increase either its fixed wing or its rotary airlift since SDR 1998?

The RAF doesn’t want to be a taxi driver to the army.

In effect, none of the services, corps or even regiments were willing to see any significant change to what they already had/did even though they claimed to be willingly signing up to the new doctrine of intervention and expeditionary warfare. You see, a change of tasks meant lots of new equipment, which means an inter-service bun fight for the cash. Unsurprisingly, the government managed to find away to slice the cake evenly.

And even more unsurprisingly, none of these key equipment purchases has yet to appear. Where are the CVFs? It took over 10 years of New Labour government before they even signed the contracts to order the steel! Where is the strategic airlift? And where are all the lovely FRES vehicles that are going to be whisked around the world as a “force for good”?

As it now stands, the UK military will begin to receive over the next decade the hardware that had relevance for about 9 months from July 1998 to March 1999.

But it will arrive, in credible numbers, about 2020 and then handicap the military for the next 30 years.

Well done New Labour! Well done the Chiefs of Staff.

What’s happened since Kosovo 1999?

More of the same. Iraq and Helmand are nothing more than political wet dreams gone wrong. The initial air assault on Afghanistan in 2001-2 was conducted with relatively small numbers and proved essentially successful. It’s the sort of thing Britain should be aiming to be able to do, as a final resort, alone. It’s what happened since that went wrong.

Sierra Leone also stands out as an example of how it should be done: both politically and militarily. Strangely it took a 1-star military commander to actually get the policy right before setting the military element on the way to success. Again, a lot was done with a relative small and technologically outdated force.

The trick is picking the right places to intervene and applying rapier like precision to ones efforts – pretty much as SDR 1998 anticipated.

It’s when the politicians think wielding blunt cudgels made of purple jelly will reshape the world that things go wrong. This strategy seems to have made the UK less, not more, secure.

And therein lies the lesson(s) which I consider most important. The future lies in the military capacity to provide prudent rapier like incursions. Prudent being the key word in that sentence. And those incursions are not necessarily of a war fighting nature. A prompt casualty evacuation or disaster response in a hostile area is more likely to win friends than create enemies – thus enhancing (indirectly) UK security.

This is the complete opposite (cause AND effect) of New Labour efforts in the ‘Moslem’ world.

The future does not lie in a new set of politicians trying to dream up new political tasks for the military to bark at. Nor does it lie in continued intransigence of military personnel to change and reform and their dogmatic determination to fight amongst themselves to preserve their own fiefdoms.

If the UK gets the diplomacy, the intelligence and the prudence in intervention right, there is no need for massive air, land and sea forces to man siege fortifications around the British Isles.

SDR 1998 was a cleverly constructed document that came in two parts: a political statement explaining how the British Armed Forces were going to be used to satisfy Tony Blair’s sofa committee morals irrespective of capacity and capability; and, how the services were going to do their absolute utmost to prevent change and fight their way internally for a bigger slice of a diminishing defence budget.

I hope the soon to be published ConLibdem defence and security review is not another helping of the same. The omens are not good.

In Part 3, I will look at each of the services in turn as to what and where, perhaps, they should be looking to accomplish and implement as a benefit to UK national interests rather than their own self cap-badge interests.

It is of course, just my own opinion that I have hastily tapped into my laptop.

ED: Mark, great post, there is nothing wrong with hastily typed opinions, it our stock in trade here!

As sure as night follows day, the arrival of a new government leads to cuts in defence spending.

Maybe, just maybe, on this occasion we should understand that when they say the cupboard is bare, they genuinely mean that it is packed full of IOUs left behind by the last tenant at The Treasury. The lack of public debate surrounding the necessity for the cuts themselves suggests the inevitable is accepted by all. Moreover, now seems open season for leaks to national dailies from serving officers trying to influence public support for their pet project, service, arm or regiment.

Maybe now is the time to act as grown-ups and think what’s best for the country rather than childishly make selfish demands for what’s best for oneself.

Most of these newspaper reports are based around squabbles and scares over which equipment purchase should be maintained/dropped, which unit (battalion/squadron/ship) disbanded, how many personnel are to be ‘retired’ and how the share of the inevitable cuts should be parcelled out. The comments lie around selfish determination to protect one’s own pet project or organisation.

Very little encourages debate around what is best for the country.

Any major reform, restructuring or downsizing should quite rightly be preceded by a credible review of the state’s security imperatives and likely future threats. Indeed, it would make sense for such a review(s) to be fixed at regular intervals – say every five years – rather than appear ad hoc on arrival of a new government. It would also be helpful, in my opinion, for this to be lead – if not completely written – by an independent body rather than simply being a statement of what the government has decided is best for us.

Will the soon to be presented Con-Libdem defence review be a statement of how brilliantly they have managed to meet all of the security demands within their budgetary means, or will it be a statement of how they are going to best allocate scare resources against the backdrop of a genuine and realistic assessment?

I suspect the former – lavishly ensuring equality of pain to each service irrespective of defence need.

Nevertheless, we cannot ignore a number of painful realities have to be addressed.

In addition to the cupboard being stuffed full of IOUs, the UK is no longer an imperial power and, frankly, has no obligation to act as the world’s policeman or benevolent rebuilder of broken states and societies. This may grate upon liberal interventionists who confuse/conflate choice with pseudo-moral obligation. I remain quite unconvinced that the ‘moral obligation’ argument has any substance let alone primacy in influencing international relations policy.

Yes, the UK should play its part rightful part in international bodies and actions – being a ‘force for good’.

But let’s stop peddling the delusion that just because ‘we’ claim it is good it must be good.

The third major, and perhaps most painful for uniformed personnel, reality is that the UK can no longer sustain the status quo regarding tri-service equivalence.

In some ways, this is the biggest elephant in the room. It has to be culled. No, I’m not going to argue for the three services to be amalgamated into purple jelly, but I will advocate that defence spending is now allocated according to defence need not inter-service politics. In effect, precious resources are distributed according to the best interests of national defence not the best interests of inter-service rivalry and petty jealousies.

Any credible security/defence review has to start with an examination of the threat(s). Resources are then allocated and forces generated to meet these threats through, preferably, deterrence in the first instance and when deterrence fails, the ‘defeat’ of the threat if necessary by military means. Looking at the credible threats to UK national security and wider interests over the next decade or so, perhaps diplomacy and intelligence deserve a greater share of security spend than the military.

But that’s another (bigger) argument for another forum.

So what are the credible threats to the UK over the next 20-30 years?

Of course this is impossible to answer definitively. Nevertheless, some basic assumptions can be ascertained around which to build a response.

It is unlikely that there will be another major conflagration on European soil that involves the UK at the upper end of military intervention. I add this latter proviso since I consider it quite foolish for the UK to involve itself in a Russia-Ukraine spat or similar. At the same time, I do not believe the Russian Army is going to attempt to roll into NATO territory unless NATO was to be the wrongful instigator/provocateur. In effect, anything to the east of NATO’s current boundary should remain out of bounds – not because we grant Moscow a ‘sphere of influence’ but because the UK has even less right or interest in trying to leverage it as part of their ‘sphere of influence’. Russia wants and needs to trade with Europe. It is not going to conquer it and colonise it as the Soviet Union 2.0. I thus suggest there is no sense in specifically equipping the military to combat Russia as was the case for several decades and from which the current equipment legacy remains.

I also do not see the sense in looking for ‘enemies’ in the rapidly advancing states such as China, India or Brazil. Their growing presence and influence on the world stage may present diplomatic concerns to the UK’s national interest, but if the UK resorts to using military means to ‘get its way’ then, not only has it not progressed on from an imperialistic bully mindset but would put is clearly in the wrong. Not the policy direction I’d wish for old Blighty. Are there any other states that have, or likely to have, credible grievances AND the means to pose a threat to the UK itself or its sovereign territories and dependences? Spain may have the means to retake Gibraltar, but does it have the grievance? Argentina may have a grievance regarding the Falklands, but does it have the means? The current garrisons and support are already more than adequate for purpose. Neither – in particular the Falklands – should be used as an argument for strengthening the Royal Navy.

I would suggest that there is little for the UK to fear from regarding a direct (and by implication conventional military) threat to UK territory. Moreover, I would consider it rather unwise for the UK (or others) to be attempting offensive operations against those very same players. The world is being built around mutual inter-dependence and it will not be in the interest of any state wishing to do ‘well’ to resort to military aggression against another major player. I predict, during the foreseeable future, the UK’s future conflicts are going to be against non-state actors or recalcitrant less-developed states with leaders suffering from delusions of grandeur – as well as a lot of gendarme work. The first task is problematic; the second deserves perhaps a quick and well-defined slapping and little else. The last task requires a radical rethink as to whether the military is really the right tool for the job. This leads me to the conclusion that a large standing (high-end) military is, perhaps, not necessarily what is in the UK’s best interests looking 20-30 years hence.

Nice to have, but perhaps not the best tax-spend during this era of fiscal austerity.

Of course, the counter-argument will be that we can never be sure of what threat will suddenly appear tomorrow.

Very true!

I will counter by saying that if that argument is to be followed to the letter then we have to train and arm the entire population with the most sophisticated weaponry to sustain combat with a surprise invasion by aliens.

Sensible compromises have to be made.

I suggest the compromises are based around sound and credible analysis not a superficial siege mentality.

With all of the above thoughts in mind, I’m left with the conclusion that each of the services have run out of truly independent, non-purple, tasks.

The Royal Navy is faced with a multitude of littoral tasks in support of land and/or air operations. Threats to sea navigation requiring (independent) ‘blue water’ capabilities are coming from low tech piracy not state backed interdiction. That is unlikely to change. To pre-empt those wishing to suggest that an Iranian threat to Gulf shipping challenges my argument, I would argue that force protection of merchant shipping in the Gulf is a littoral task for which we elect not to use air and land forces. The only real stretch of water that is critical to the UK is the English Channel/North Sea. Nevertheless, are ‘blue water’ escort ships such as frigates and destroyers the best line of defence in any of the likely scenarios?

And few can argue that they are ‘made-to-measure’ anti-piracy assets.

Of the current inventory, a Bay Class would offer far greater counter-piracy effect than an escort.

Of the three services, it is the RN that is most vulnerable is sustaining its ‘independent’ character according to the status quo extant – and the admirals have recognised this already.

Like the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force has major worries about the ‘independent’ tasks it is left with. Strategic bombing is looking strikingly passé. There is a residual need to provide an air defence capability to UK territory, but beyond that, the RAF is little more than a support arm to land forces: khaki green or navy blue. Nevertheless, air support is of a far ‘pointier’ nature than sea support. In future littoral conflict, it is the FAA and RM component of the RN that will offer the greatest pointy effects, whilst the ‘navy’ provides logistic support and force protection such as ASW and mine clearance.

Maybe even the ASW component should be considered as part of the ‘air’ element.

On first appearance, it is the Army which looks the most secure. And so it is. But as an independent force, it can do little without tactical air support and air/sealift to get it to (and around) the operational zone. The days of naval gun support are limited. Alone, it can slap a few natives and play gendarme. But even those require significant air assets in the intelligence gathering role to provide the edge. Just because those assets may be operated by khaki clad individuals doesn’t detract from the reality that they are air assets.

If the CURRENT reality of ‘jointery’ is not clear enough to the reader, then ask yourself why is it that the RN has both air (FAA) and land (RM) arms included; the Army has air (AAC and RA) assets and sea (OK, it’s only bit of log spt); and the RAF has land (RAF Regiment) and has (or had) a major maritime-strike role. The plain fact is that any enemy lives on land, not in the air or at sea, and thus the Army will always remain the key player.

But, coupled with that, is the undeniable fact that modern warfare requires air and sea assets to complement the land effort.

The case for ‘independent’ services remains; the UK will always need air, land and sea assets.

The case for inter-service rivalry to maintain and enhance independent operational tasks is yesteryear. This fundamental difference needs both to be understood and accepted by the defence chiefs if the UK is to continue with a military that is both affordable and effective.

The current squabbles suggest that the defence establishment has settled for one not both.

The politicians will gleefully play on this military selfishness and superimpose (as they always have done) their own blueprint for political reasons which will be neither affordable nor effective.

This is a riposte to my post about Afghanistan from Mark Nixon

I will drop my response (along with the dummy) in comments.

On December 9th, ADMIN posted Afghanistan, Who is Pulling Their Weight and concluded his piece with: “It is simply too easy a cop out, either NATO is a collective where all nations pull their weight in both blood and treasure or not.” Worryingly, the thrust of the argument is remarkably similar to the official UK approach to encouraging greater participation by European NATO allies.

As ADMIN points out, it is indeed “a widely help opinion that some NATO nations are not pulling their weight in Afghanistan”. But is there any solid basis for this opinion or is merely a UK-centric delusion that has only gained credibility through frequency of repetition. If you repeat a lie enough, it will become a truth, allegedly!

With this post, I hope to demonstrate that the (statistical) evidence produced to support this conclusion is beyond flimsy; and little more than UK-centric self-delusion of self-importance and self-righteousness. It’s an argument and approach that has proven to be more likely to dissuade than persuade our allies from greater participation. It is thus, counter-productive. Putting it bluntly, ‘we’ are simply demanding that more body bags leave Afghanistan with German, French, Greek etc bodies inside. Hardly the best way to encourage greater support, is it?

Firstly, I’ll look at the argument presented by ADMIN – which, as I’ve already mentioned is very similar to HMG’s line behind closed doors – and then I’ll present an insight into the non-UK-centric understanding of the issue and why there is reluctance on their behalf to become more involved.

As gown-ups, I’m sure we all accept the truism that one can ‘prove’ almost any argument with clever use (manipulation) of statistics. ADMIN has been rigorous in analysing the statistics ONLY pertaining to Afghanistan. The UK only has 9,500 troops committed to Afghanistan because it has walked away from its commitments elsewhere: Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq for example, and opted out of other international missions in Chad and Lebanon to name just two. Is it fair to expect other countries to back-fill our premature departure from other missions AND match our commitment in Afghanistan? More on this later.

Then, considering the content of the statistics, all that is presented is a comparative analysis of current effort. There is no analysis of what outcomes that effort has achieved, or is likely to achieve. Moreover, there is no analysis of what constitutes the benchmark of pulling one’s weight.

I would argue that the resources and effort required to achieve the stated and desired results require a MASSIVE uplift and that the UK is no less guilty in this respect than any other. In fact, probably more guilty, given that the UK’s effort to desired outcome ratio has far greater divergence than the effort to desired outcome ratio of other NATO members. Is it an honest argument to measure others against ‘ourselves’ when ‘we ourselves’ have failed to produce? 10,000 troops may sound alot, but the weight of evidence suggests it is far from adequate to achieve the stated political and military goals.

Now consider this. Greece is presented as the prime slacker within NATO. Imagine that the Greek government decided to uplift their 145-strong contingent to a 1,000-strong BG in Kandahar. Instantly, they move from almost bottom position to 7th in the table of deployed to population ratio (1:11,260) – above Canada. They would still be near the bottom of the deployed to armed forces (0.6%), but given that the Greek military is artificially large due to conscription, this is hardly a surprise. Now, further assume that shortly after arrival a disaster struck the contingent and they lost 50 personnel in a Chinook accident. Suddenly, they leap into 1st place in the casualties to deployed (5%), 3rd place on the casualties per head of population (225,200) and 4th place in total casualties incurred. Almost overnight, the go from ‘worst performer’ to one of the ‘best’.

But ask yourself what have they achieved other than filling body bags? In what way has ‘success’ in Afghanistan been advanced? The statistics presented are not a guide to who is pulling one’s weight, they are a guide to who is suffering on the butcher’s bill.

Moreover, I would argue, that given the incoherence of policy aims, the collective inability to define and achieve mission success, those making the greatest effort are the greatest losers and the greatest fools. Those lurking in the bottom 10 are thus the wisest of the fools. Perhaps the only truly wise are those not represented in Afghanistan at all.

ADMIN premises his argument and conclusion that others are not pulling their weight on the basis that other NATO members are obliged to be involved in Afghanistan. This is a falsehood. Let’s look again at Article 5 of the NATO Charter, in particular the parts I have underlined:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

In other words, each members state is only obliged to assist with whatever action it sees necessary to restore and maintain security in Europe and the North Atlantic. If Greece decides security has already been restored and only 145 troops are required in Afghanistan to assist in maintaining that security, then that is their decision. There is NO obligation to do any more. No member state is obliged to meet the level of effort that another provides. Every member determines its own level of effort and has no obligation to meet the demands of others.

Moving on to the second element of this post: the perceptions of the non-UK/US centric minded.

The UK/US accusation is that other NATO members are now unreliable and untrustworthy allies. This accusation is based upon their ‘failure’ to support UK/US intervention efforts more robustly. What the UK/US fail to grasp is that those very same NATO members will not increase their assistance because they see the UK/US as unreliable and untrustworthy allies and have no desire to be dragged into their ill-conceived foreign policy adventures. Who is right and who is wrong?

I consider that the rebuilding of Germany post-1945 should be the model for nation building. The economy and society were rebuilt in a manner that ensured the German people didn’t resort to further military means to ‘right’ self-perceived injustices as they did in the late 1930’s. The model provides benchmarks in respect of level of resources (financial and other), political capital, military effort and duration required of the international community.

In Bosnia in 1995, then Kosovo in 1999 and later Iraq, the UK proclaimed it was in for the long haul in nation building. None of the issues is anywhere near resolution. Nevertheless, the UK is already effectively out of the Balkans and Iraq and leaving it to others to worry about the long term. On each occasion, it left on the basis of others back-filling. It has also decided not to be part of UN/EU missions in Chad and Lebanon. The UK has gained a reputation for being very keen to trash places and then make a hurried exit to avoid the long term consequences of their actions. Many NATO members are fed-up being duped into these quagmires.

The UK/US has a problem of credibility. There is a significant credibility gap between their intervention theory, policy and intervention practice; a huge gap between the rhetoric and the results; and a MASSIVE credibility gap in their sincerity. Today, Tony Blair was on the BBC World Service opining over the Iraq invasion. He clearly stated that he would have taken the UK to war even in the knowledge that Iraq had no WMD – all he would have done is change his arguments as to why it was necessary. He opined on his (continued) belief that Saddam was a threat to regional security – bar Kuwait perhaps, none of Iraq’s neighbours believed that. He opined on how removing the ‘threat’ in Iraq would remove threats elsewhere, and so it went on. Many NATO members see UK foreign intervention policy as self-serving self-delusion and wish to take no part in it. Today, we heard more evidence to suggest they may well be right.

The current ‘strategy’ for Afghanistan seems to be to build Afghan security forces as quickly as possible and then exit. If I’m not mistaken, that was the Soviet Union’s exit strategy too. Look how that fared. Most analysts suggest the number of forces required to bring about a genuinely favourable environment for pull-out requires a massive uplift in forces. The UK could, if it chose to, do FAR more in Afghanistan than it already does – military, politically and financially. But it chooses not to. The UK is perceived as going round with the begging bowl to save it having to dig into its own pockets. The 10,000 UK troop level is an artificial ceiling based upon lack of political will to succeed. The UK is perceived as requiring help to reinforce failure not to bring about success.

And finally, even though there is no stated Alliance obligation for NATO members to up their footprint in Afghanistan, the argument has been made that they have a security imperative and a moral obligation to do so.

But have they?

It may well be the UK’s considered (no laughing in the stalls please!!!) opinion that international terrorism can be eradicated in Afghanistan, that the world’s drug problem can be resolved in Helmand and Europe’s immigration worries reduced, but is this ‘fact’ or ‘self-delusion’?

The evidence and arguments are at best incoherent, at worst a deliberate falsehood. Most NATO members simply do not accept the arguments that receive a good hearing in the Red Lion.

To sum up, it may well be the case that many, if not all (the UK & US included), are not pulling their weight in Afghanistan. But that can only be determined when a credible and universally recognised benchmark is presented as to what pulling one’s weight actually entails.

Mudslinging – that others are not doing as much as oneself – is neither helpful nor particularly honest given the issue and the historical background.