The National Army Museum are running an online exhibition asking what are the greatest British battles;
Exploring 400 years of British Army history, from the English Civil War to the current conflict in Afghanistan, this exhibition gives you the key facts, describes the impact and looks at the legacy of 20 of Britain’s greatest battles. We are asking you to decide which of these was the greatest engagement ever fought.
Click the image to visit and take part
A collection of images from the exhibition are also on their Facebook page
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10151500435365844.553411.399166670843&type=1
“what are the greatest British battles;” – I think you’ll find that’s LAND battles. Otherwise, I vote for The Battle of the Atlantic
Agree with WiseApe – Trafalgar isn’t going to go down a storm with that lot either.
Not sure I’m totally comfortable with the tone of some of this coverage. Warfare is a tragic business whatever the scale of the historical impact or the heroism of the individuals involved.
“Next to a battle lost, the greatest misfortune is a battle gained” – said the Duke of Wellington. And he should know.
Playing fields of Eton, for those who think the orificers are important?
Or Brecon on a cold Wednesday February evening, where our best corporals learn their trade, before exporting it globally. Forestry block B, looking out over the valley and with that challenging line of sight range estimation problem.
Brecon of course first established as a Roman cavalry camp for taming the rebellious Welsh (after 2,000 years, we have to report failure). But there is a well-known Tom Jones song, to the tune of “Men of Harlech” which you can sing with your troop in the back of a Bedford going to the ranges:
Men of Harlech, stop complaining, Wales was built for troops to train in, and it’s always f**king raining, Welsh girls have big tits”
(etc, etc, for lots of verses, most unprintable and involving perversions I would not draw attention to, but enough to consume a journey from Tidworth up the 303 to Bisley)
Surely it was this;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Brightlingsea
P.S. Welcome back RT.
Granted it’s a bit more than 400 years ago, but I’d suggest Agincourt (1415).
And if we remove the ‘Land’ restriction the answer’s obvious – the Battle of Britain. (dives for the air raid shelter – incoming!)
@ Neil,
I think you are right. B of B was existential, to our country. If we had not won, goodness knows, but probably a German invasion, and Captain Mainwaring to the fore, which would not have been too hopeful for us. I’m not often generous to the Kevins, but they did a jolly good job of work there.
There’s also the much-less remarked Channel battle of MTBs and E-boats, from 40-44. Nightly derring-do by brave matelots on both sides, all while actually trying to avoid each other, and get up close and personal with submarines (our team) and RN Frigates (their team). You also have to acknowledge the bravery of the German E-Boat sailors, “Go and find an English frigate that out-guns you in every dimension, and attack it”. They did this nightly for 4 years.
@Neil
Just been reading about the Hundred Years War and their is also a documentary series about it on BBC4 at the moment.
Most people remember something about Agincourt (largely down to Shakespeare I guess) but everyone always forgets Crecy and Poitiers and that the three together represent a trilogy of decisive and rather bloody victories spread across the war.
“B of B was existential, to our country.”
Rubbish.
It was essentially a reconnaissance in force.
“Will the door fall in? No it hasn’t, will it fall in now? Still hasn’t? Well fuck it then let’s do Russia like we planned.”
Waterloo or Blenheim
As the outcome proved these battles were decisive and enduring. France has played an incredible bit part role since. That is not to knock France but much of it’s success since has been by being on the right side.
Phil
?
B of B was strategically a good idea by the German air force to force Britain to the negotiating table in a poor position, but then balls’ed up by the civvies Hitler and Goering changing the targeting plan at the wrong moment. Hardly a recce in force.
(There’s a visceral part of me that objects to the concept of a “recce in force”. That’s not a military success story. Either sneak in and sneak out and get your information without leaving handprints, without being noticed like proper recce soldiers can achieve, or charge in with lots of ammo, the artillery going balls out and, and so clout the fuckers fucking hard when they are not expecting it. Don’t ever dribble, in a Clausewitzian sense.)
Army: Waterloo and Naesby
Navy: Atlantic and Trafalgar
Air Force: BoB
Then again, the smaller engagements are often overlooked but have a vital significance, for example the defense of Malta in WW2, the blockade of the french navy in port during the Napoleonic wars…
Naturally, a subject to be debated; though many don’t often think of engagements of the past 50 years… nor that they seldom fit into such groups as I have used.
Home soil may not be threatened directly, but that doesn’t lessen the ‘greatness’ (silly word to apply to warfare) of the event. For example, the Army’s units in the Korean war and the SAS’s own war against the against the IRA
B of B was an exercise in exploitation. So far they had had fortune on their side and their first reverse was Britain not immediately throwing in the towel.
Now from my reading of the sources the Hun were schizophrenic about the whole Sea Lion thing but in fact Hitler, when it came down to it, decided it was worth a little punt at air superiority and nothing more.
If the Germans had been serious about the B of B they’d have built up their forces and continued the fight for a year or so. Instead it was a case of we’ll have a go and see what happens, if the door falls in then the green light is on, but if it doesn’t we’re not too fussed because we can screen them and crack on with the East and with any luck they’ll throw in the towel if we keep up the pressure.
It was nothing more than a probe writ large, an attempt at exploitation or to shoe horn in a phrase, a kind of reconnaissance in force. Partly it was to apply pressure and bring us up to the negotiating table but the sources seem to show that Hitler was game if the pre-conditions could be met within strict timelines that made it all, in reality, an exploitation event.
The trouble with the BoB is that it could be argued that the German’s lost it more than we won it. Beyond our planes shooting their planes down and their planes shooting down our planes there is a lot, perhaps too much, speculation on the why’s and wherefore’s of the campaign. Easy to contrive a myth for the populous (whose grasp on events was tenuous) eager for a victory after a year of defeat. Even easier when the enemy sits a cross 20 odd miles of sea, in Autumn, and you have sea control.
@Challenger
Thanks for that, I’ll check the BBC4 schedule. I’ve been interested in the battle of Agincourt ever since I saw a one man production of it at the Royal Exchange Manchester, as a kid in the 1970s.
Saw a re-enactment of Agincourt (amongst other things) at the Festival of History at Kelmarsh, 2009 I think, it was very impressive. Shame King Henry V messed up his speech when his horse decided to pirouette! And it was a pity the ‘French’ were so heavily outnumbered; still, who wants to be on the losing side?! Also the English archers advancing to collect their first volley of arrows so they could have another go was a bit suspect. The kids and myself loved the spectacle anyway and the effort put in by the re-enactors was very impressive.
Phil,
I think you are wrong, in that Hitler in 39/40 still thought he could take Britain out of the strategic game (by forcing surrender and a negotiated peace), and that Stalin was his biggest future problem. But, it’s a big subject, and I’m not the expert.
Still, throwing his entire air force at us is hardly a recce in force. It’s a full on assault.
From what I have read, I think the truth lies between @Phil and @RT’s opinion. Quite rightly, the former made the point that Hitler had no previous interest in invading the UK; he spent quite a lot of time trying to negotiate a grand bargain with us where we would stay out of Europe while he concentrated on his “lebensraum” in Eastern Europe and western Russia. Equally, I suspect the likes of Raeder, Goering and elements of OKH wanted to give it a try, but were defeated in effect by the lack of pre war preparation for amphibious landings. Once it became clear that the RAF was not defeated and the means of forcing a landing were lacking before 41, Hitler basically said “sod you, we’re off to Russia”.
If we had lost the BOB, I’m sure Hitler would have reconsidered. We didn’t thankfully, so he called it off.
RT
I’m not saying that was not one track of his strategy. To frighten us into suing for peace.
But, he was also serious enough about having a crack if his preconditions for the operation were met. Either way he expected either a quick plea for a negotiated settlement which he was more than willing to come to; or a rotten door to fall in and the Luftwaffe gain air supremacy and close the Channel to the RN. He was keeping his options open but what is obvious is that whilst we differentiate the B of B in German eyes it was the continued exploitation of the Battle for France.
When I say reconnaissance in force I mean Hitler gave the green light to hit us with the Luftwaffe partly to try and frighten us into suing for peace and partly (and this is where the recce in force or probe analogy comes in) to see what happened.
You can’t escape from the conclusion, looking at the primary sources, that Hitler kept an open mind whether or not Sea Lion was feasible and he issued directives to earnestly plan for it. That said he was not stupid enough to try it in anything other than completely favourable conditions and the B of B was set in motion partly to see if those conditions could be bought about. There was no intention to continue the Battle on the part of the Germans if there was no peace and the door was sturdier than thought.
Hitler told the armed services no war before 1943.
One of those “what if” history questions that I find fascinating.
What if Britain had agreed a peace with Hitler in early 40? Quite within the bounds of possibility.
Hitler, not having to watch his back on the channel coast or have most of his TA deployed to France on internal security duties, gets another half million men and lots more armour to the eastern front. Could have made things a bit different.
He should also have really twisted Franco’s arm to allow a couple of divisions free passage down to La Linea, in order to take out Gibraltar . Would have made a world of difference to British and American access to the Med throughout the war, closing off southern France and Italy, and probably changed the outcome of the whole desert campaign. Barking mad oversight by Hitler, I think.
@Phil
I know what you’re trying to say. Nowadays everybody is led to believe that victory for the Luftwaffe and the undertaking of Sea Lion weren’t just linked by cause and effect but were actually two vital milestones in some long thought out grand plan.
Whilst certain individuals such as Goering clearly saw victory in the air as a crucial turning point in the war (largely due to personnel pride over ‘his’ Luftwaffe) German strategy in the broad sense was actually far more responsive to events and caught off balance by a sudden victory over France.
Whilst clearly more than just recon the German aerial assault was probably driven by the hopes of a negotiated peace with the UK first, curiosity over the strength of our defences second and a vague hope of Sea Lion being feasible third.
Events/decisions regarding the Battle of Britain and Sea Lion indicate that Hitler hadn’t completely lost the plot in 1940. Flash-forward to 1944/45 and he would have probably ranted and raved non-stop until an invasion was undertaken, regardless of how suicidal it may have been.
@Red Trousers
‘Could have made things a bit different’
Considering how far the Whermacht had advanced and how desperate the situation was for the Red Army by the winter of 1941 I’m inclined to agree.
“Could have made things a bit different.”
Not if there was not the logistical capacity to utilise them. As far as I have read German logistical capacity was beyond maxed out for Barbarossa with the force structure they had.
Railways can’t be laid overnight and lorries can only shuttle so much.
@Neil
Sounds like a good show, even with the minor faults!
I remember seeing another programme about Agincourt years ago which said that archery pretty much became compulsory in England at around that time, with lots of other sports being banned to try and produce a large amount of high quality archers, seems to have worked!
Another thing I found fascinating was the shift in soldier and battlefield culture around this time. I’ve heard it argued that the centuries old chivalric traditions of the knights essentially died when archers and longbows became the modern core of English Army. These guys were skilled but with little or no aristocratic blood and heritage. Mercy and capturing for ransom were replaced by calculated slaughter at a distance. The shift from ‘decent’ and ‘honourable’ knights to this kind of cold brutality apparently horrified English and French society at the time.
It’s also been said that English Longbows in the Hundred Years War weren’t rivalled again until the invention of the Gatling gun for sheer efficiency of accurate and sustained fire!
Maybe you have heard all this already, just thought id share the stuff I find interesting but isn’t often talked about where the battles concerned.
If losing battles count as turning points, I got one.
Dunkirk.
Something I found interesting was that while the size of the German army continued to increase from 1941 to 1944, and the number of Axis troop on the Eastern front remained about the same, about 4 million, the number of German troops on the eastern front actually declined after the initial push. The difference was made up by allied troops.
@RT
I tend to agree with you on RiF. It’s a US concept, on the one hand it’s the interesting notion of recce by MBT, on the other, as praticised in the woods overlooking the South China Sea it was what I would call ‘aggressive patrolling’, US wasn’t much good at that either, but I guess you can blame flawed tactics in a conscript army.
They don’t use MBTs for recce in force, the wagons of choice then were the old M-113s and currently the M-3 cav vehicle. It makes a bit of sense if you think in terms of the composition of army defences, most defending units are infantry, whose ability to hurt armour is much less than that of an armour unit which are usually held in reserve, unless you’re unlucky enough to stumble onto a pure AT fireteam, and those support units are also as rare and held in reserve too against an armour push.
This means firepower-wise, they are only faced with section level AT weaponry, i.e LAW/Armbrust/MAW, and these are terrible weapons against targets moving laterally.
I’d even go as far as to rate the danger to these scout units as less than that of LSV equiped scout raiders, at least they are proof against small calibre rounds, a single SAW burst at a LSV and you’re in a lot of pain, and both are almost about as likely to stumble onto the enemy by accident.
Recce by MBT? Oh, good God.
Proper recce is done on your belly, not dressed in 70 tons of metal. But it is more of a way of thinking. Don’t try to bump into things to discover if they are there, rather have a think about the likelihood of them being there in advance, and invest your precious soldiers only in those few areas where they can gain most information, despite any danger. If you want merely surveillance and not intelligence, you can always task the Kevins and one of their planes, or these days, a UAV.
There’s also the US concept of “recce by fire”. Basically, shooting at bushes to see if they shoot back.
I am not 100% certain the Germans really thought Sea Lion was feasible. Their “assault craft” were unsuitable. They had limited anti shipping capability from the air. No anti shipping torpedo capability whatsoever and as the Norwegian campaign proved they had to drop hundreds of bombs to sink 1 Destroyer. People often look at what happened to force Z and then transport that capability to the Channel.
Repulse and POW were both hit by over 5 Torpedoes launched by veteran Japanese crews flying Torpedo Bombers, a capability that the Germans did not have.
Given the number of craft up to frigate size gathered to oppose the Invasion, the lack of anti shipping capability of the Luftwaffe and the unsuitability of the “barges” to be used I believe the invasion would have been a failure regardless of the air campaign and would have been a massacre given the excellent performance of the RAF.
The army were obviously not overly worried as they were sending tanks to North Africa at the time.
APATS Africa is a different story, if they lost Africa, there goes the fuel, which was why it was also another critical area for the British, not an “I’m not worried” indicator.
I do think he could have had the UK, if Hitler could actually focus on one thing instead of getting so distracted. My suspicions lie in that he thought oil was more important to future ops than securing his western flank, considering the “Atlantic Wall” that was built in place, so he redirected his attention to Africa and later the Caucus oilfields. Material minded warfare?
And of course there were all the low level resistance groups in the countries he conquered. Though for that I suspect he delegated so not sure how distracting it really was.
RT, I’m with you on the sneaky recce, just trying to see the other side’s POV too. Putting yourself in the other side’s shoes and seeing how he sees things is always a good skill in intel and planning. The better to predict his actions.
There’s a whole new debate: would Op Sea lion have worked (as we know of the capabilities of both sides)?
I’m doubtful.
To put a bit of context on. It took the Allies a couple of years to work up for D Day, 100s of thousand of men, all sorts of specialist beach landing gear developed especially. It seems a bit of a mental stretch to think that the Germans could have done the opposite at next to no notice and with no amphibious capability, with half of the forces and no prior training.
Assuming it would not have worked, would Hitler have taken it on the chin and still gone on to Barbarossa?
RT, it would really depend on the point I made above, “Was it material warfare?” If the German industry and war machine was fuel starved by the stalemate in N.Africa and the inability to control the oilfields, there are going to be very few sources to tap as a counterbalance, the most prominent one would be the Caucus oilfields. Which was one of the targets of Babarosa in the first place.
People tend to see the attack on Russia as insanity, backbiting or greed, but what if the reason was simpler? Desperation? If the oil needed for the heavily mechanised German army was running out, it might have been an attack of desperation to feed their war machine. The timing would be about right too, May 1941 was when the Afrikacorp got bogged down at Tobruk. June was when the USSR got attacked.
What would have happened if Hitler had offered the return of Gascony & Ponthieu to England in return for full peace in July 1940? He would have been free to attack Russia without fighting on 2 fronts.
Also Italy would have been better off staying neutral like Franco.
Perhaps we should go back to the future for the next battles, ie only fight for profit (what are the 21st C equivalent of Spanish treasure gallions?).
Observer,
An interesting point. I never realised that prior to 1939 Mexico supplied 50% of Germanies oil requirements. Good article at the link.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/becker.htm
JH, oil tankers.
I think its worth remembering the British army and the south coast defences of Britain in 1940 were hardly comparable to the Atlantic wall and the wehrmacht in 1944.
What would have happened if Hitler had offered the return of Gascony & Ponthieu to England in return for full peace in July 1940?
England had already given-up on European posessions, otherwise we would have kept Hanover and The Netherlands. Our goal was to keep Europe divided (hence our current machinations in Brussels).
Agincourt (incl. Crecy and Poitiers)
Those battles – as I posited at the DT web-site a few weeks ago – were not British fought. The English with – maybe reluctant support from – Wales and Ireland fought against France (which was allied to the Scots).
Historically England raised ‘regiments’ under lordship: Cromwell “created” the British Army via the “New Model Army”. His English Commenwealth – England, Ireland and Scotland – marks the creation of a British polity and a British Army.
On battles: They no longer exist in the historical sense. One-day conflicts turn into chess-like strategy challenges. Look at Mali and the inability for the French to project outwith support.
Obviously the web-site upthread is Army-centric; I’d place Monmouth’s glourious campaigns above anything achieved in the modern era. When considering the other services:
Royal Navy:
Let us down against the Dutch and the French during the Septics Revolutionary War. Finest victory – following the a defeat at Coronel – must be the Battle of the Falklands (1914).
Royal Air Force:
The BoB is huge, but what would have happened if we had lost Malta?
Finally
Sadly, following post-imperial guilt, many of the gallant efforts of the SE-Asia battlefront are forgotten. One wonders if Churchill had ignored Italy and had sent Alexander to India how the war would have turned out….
Fluffy, badly. The oilfields in Italian hands were needed badly, India, while economically valuable tradewise, does not drive the industrial machine as well as oil producers. Though there WERE actions in India against the Japanese.
Mark, exactly. I suspect they thought the UK could keep, being contained like that, for later.
1. I’m not saying the B of B conforms to some multi-bulleted point list definition of a “recce in force” that is sat in some Staff Officers handbook. I’m using it as an analogy for throwing most of the Luftwaffe at the RAF to essentially see what happens.
2. The Germans by and large did believe Sea Lion would succeed, IF, and massive IF, the preconditions of air and sea control were gained, and the tides and weather were right. Now it is those pre-conditions that the High Command was worried might not be achieved but I do think that they thought Sea Lion stood a good chance of success if they could achieve it.
Hindsight shows us that it was only going to happen if Germany had concentrated on us and we had been the focus of their strategic effort – which we were not. They not unreasonably assumed we could be screened and left for dead.
@ Mark
“I think it’s worth remembering the British army and the south coast defences of Britain in 1940 were hardly comparable to the Atlantic wall and the Wehrmacht in 1944″
That is true but in order for us to put 170k troops over the beaches in the first wave, support elements included.
3 Airborne Divisions deployed in over 800 transports and gilder towing aircraft.
1200 naval vessels in direct support including 2 15 inch gun Battleships and 15 Cruisers for NGS. The whole Operation being screened against Kriegsmarine involvement by the whole of Home Fleet.
Over 1000 bombers flew missions in support of the landings on d day and 5,000 fighters insured air supremacy.
In excess of 4,000 transports and landing craft were used. Specialist landing craft were available and training had been conducted.
We also had operational surprise.
Now the Germans were going to attempt a crossing without air supremacy, in the face of 800 MTB/MGB/armed launches and 100 launches without the ability to screen the landing or obtain sea control.
They had over 2,000 river barges but less than half of them were powered and they would struggle to achieve operational surprise.
@Phil
Containing the UK, essentially leaving us for dead wasn’t a terrible plan…The UK was of almost no threat and in a desperately weakened state in 1940, so it was reasonable for the Germans to think they could turn their attention away for a year and finish the job later on, if we hadn’t of already surrendered by then. It all depended on them keeping to a timetable and destroying the USSR as quickly as possible.
Of course in reality a year in the East became a struggle to the death and Italy proved to be about as useful as a chocolate teapot in dismantling our position in the Middle East.
Alexander was C in C when the Anglo-Indian army was driven out of Burma and back to India in 1942. Not his fault – the resources he inherited to defend Rangoon were grossly inadequate to the task. He was then withdrawn from there before taking over Middle East Command in Cairo. So he could in theory have stayed on in India.
But it is doubtful if he, or anyone else, would have done a better job than Slim. After Alexander went Slim was promoted first from divisional to corps and ultimately to army command, and he was largely responsible for the successful defence of India and ultimate British victory in Burma.
Now it is arguable that Slim could have taken the offensive earlier if he had been given more resources in 1943 – but it was always accepted that the Far East command was the lowest priority for the British, coming after Europe and Africa. 14th Army was explicitly told it had to draw most of its reosurces from British India. The fact that they wrere so successful in doing so was down to some brilliant improvisation.
They were short of just about everything but, for instance, compensated for a lack of parachute silk by creating “jute-chutes” (effectively out of sackcloth) which were ‘good enough’ for airdropping supplies. They had insufficent hardcore and asphelt for road building, so created monsoon resisitant supply roads out of jute and pitch. TD could do a whole article on the military engineering and logistics of the 14th Army. There’s some great stuff in there.
“One wonders if Churchill had ignored Italy and had sent Alexander to India how the war would have turned out….”
Maybe someone could further elaborate, but I’m pretty sure a large-scale and intricate war game was conducted in the 1970s to determine the outcome of Sea Lion if it had gone ahead. The game involved surviving military planners from both sides and used all of the information and resources available at the time, without any hindsight to make it as realistic as possible.
They concluded that the Germans could have probably made a lodgement on the south coast, albeit with large casualties, but that the British home fleet would have reached the channel after a few days and devastated the German supply lines. Even if the Luftwaffe had destroyed RAF fighter command their air superiority wouldn’t have swung the campaign in the Germans favour.
Of course it was only a simulation, but I think most analysts and commentators drew the conclusion that at most Sea Lion could have been an initially partial success but couldn’t have been exploited to defeat and occupy Britain in the long-run.
“Now the Germans were going to attempt a crossing without air supremacy,”
No they weren’t. Air supremacy was a clear and unequivocal precondition for the invasion. In hindsight we know they weren’t going to get it but at the time the door seemed wide open just like we thought the door was wide open in mid September 1944.
Apas
I’m not suggesting it was going to be easy it may have gone badly but we were in much disarray that summer of 1940.
I don’t think he would have needed to land as many troops as we did to gain a foot hold in Britain had he achieved air supremacy.
This maybe a myth but did hitler not say England is not our natural enemy. I think he was using the Luftwaffe to gain air supremacy in order to try for peace with Britain he hated the Russians this was his ultimate downfall. Had he maintained peace with Russia it may have been a much longer war for us.
“I don’t think he would have needed to land as many troops as we did to gain a foot hold in Britain had he achieved air supremacy.”
The British Army was not in that much of a state. It still existed and in many cases the kit it needed was sitting around waiting for the blokes to get re-organised to meet up with it.
We were certainly in no condition to mount anything other than local offensives but we were certainly capable of dying in place and conducting local actions to fight off any invaders. And every single days delay meant the Army was getting stronger and stronger.
Phil
My post was in response to Marks point about the Atlantic wall being more formidable than our defences. I was not suggesting they would actually try it. If you read Hitlers 4 pre requisites for the Invasion it becomes blatantly obvious that the German forces were never going to achieve all 4.
Mar,
Given the Luftwaffes inability to successfully engage RN shipping and the amount of vessels we had to fling at them then I do not think they would have gotten many troops ashore at all regardless of air supremacy.
Phil
In the world at war series it mentioned the only fully equipped division in England was Canadian. This gives a flavour http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_anti-invasion_preparations_of_World_War_II.
@All
Not fully convinced about the Luftwaffe’s anti-ship capabilities.
Look at how many ships we had sunk of damaged in the Med in 1941, particularly surrounding the defence and evacuation from Crete.
Although the RN was successful in preventing amphibious landings on Crete they could not hold station long enough to mount an effective blockade on the German forces that had first arrived by air.