Have heard a Twitter rumour the affordable ten year equipment plan is all getting published tomorrow.
Tmr Defence Sec will set out a £160BN plan to equip #armedforces over the next decade.The affordability of plan has been endorsed by the NAO
— Sophie Bolsover (@SophieBolsover) January 30, 2013
A result of the SDSR, subsequent budget reductions, budget claw back, surplus raiding, Planning Rounds, Decision Points 1 through 4, the whiteboard exercise, the Land Capability List, the 3 month exercise, the Single Integrated Capability Planing List, Equipping for Contingency (bringing UOR into Core) and finally the Annual Budget Cycle (replacing the Planning Round) everything is rosy.
Except of course the thing with a ten year equipment plan is that it will be subject to at least one change of government and probably one SDSR, as we know, no matter what the MoD or anyone else thinks, the basic and unmovable principle of ‘a government cannot bind its successor’ applies.
Will update as things unfold but am out all day, talk amongst yourselves for a bit 
Contents
UPDATES
DefSec will publish on Thurs 31 Jan a multi-billion pound plan to equip Armed Forces – the first of its kind #Equipment
— Ministry of Defence (@DefenceHQ) January 30, 2013
MOD 10 year Equipment Plan includes £35.8Bn on submarines and the deterrent, £18.5Bn on combat air, £17.4Bn on ships and £13.9Bn on aircraft
— Ministry of Defence (@DefenceHQ) January 31, 2013
MOD 10 yr Equip Plan includes £12.3Bn on armoured fighting vehicles, £12.1Bn on helicopters and £11.4Bn on weapons eg, missiles & torpedoes.
— Ministry of Defence (@DefenceHQ) January 31, 2013
Drop your linen and stop your grinnin’ (or is it the other way around)
There are two bits to this, a National Audit Office report and the Equipment Plan itself
The Equipment Plan forward from Philip Hammond, Sectary of State for Defence…
When I first took on this job, I recognised that establishing a sustainable equipment programme was absolutely key to delivering the vision set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review—a vision of formidable, adaptable and well-equipped armed forces built on a foundation of balanced budgets, disciplined processes and an efficient and effective Department.
The previous Government left us a legacy of poor project management, weak decision making and financial indiscipline which added up to an unaffordable defence programme. To bring the equipment programme back into balance has required tough and difficult decisions. But those decisions were right and necessary. The best way I can support our Armed Forces, as they restructure and refocus themselves for the future, is to give them the assurance of stable and well-managed budgets and the confidence that the equipment programme is affordable and deliverable.
This report provides a summary of our future Equipment Plan, covering around £159 billion for new equipment, data systems and equipment support over a ten year period. The plan includes £8.4 billion of risk provision within individual project budgets as well as centrally-held contingency provision of £4.8 billion, and unallocated headroom totalling around £8 billion. This puts the Department in a strong position, with an affordable core Equipment Plan and the flexibility we need to be able to deliver our Future Force 2020 headmark.
The publication of this summary of the Equipment Plan is part of an ongoing commitment across Government to transparency. It provides more information on the Equipment Plan than has ever previously been published. I believe this report will help deliver greater efficiency within the Department and enable the Defence Industry to plan future investment with greater confidence.
Today, the National Audit Office are publishing their first independent assessment of the affordability of our Equipment Plan. I’m delighted the NAO have also recognised the significant progress we have made with the Equipment Plan and the positive steps we have taken to deal with the accumulated affordability gap. I also welcome the NAO’s guidance as to how we can further improve our processes in future years. I look forward to the NAO’s continued engagement in this process which, coupled with the transparency around publication of the Equipment Plan summary, will give Parliament and taxpayers a growing confidence in the robustness of the Defence Budget.
The second part is a National Audit Office report on the same subject
The report summary
The MOD’s ten-year Equipment Plan sets out its forecast expenditure plans to deliver and support the equipment the Armed Forces require to meet the objectives set out in the National Security Strategy over the ten years from 1 April 2012 to 31 March 2022. The Plan covers a budget of £159 billion. The Department has committed to publishing a Statement to Parliament each year on the cost and affordability of the Equipment Plan. The first Statement was published in January 2013. At the Department’s invitation, the NAO has reviewed the assumptions which the Department has used to compile the Equipment Plan. The NAO performed this work to assist Parliament in evaluating the confidence it can take from the Statement of affordability of the Equipment Plan as presented by the Department. Full details of the audit procedures undertaken by the NAO are given in Appendix One of the report.
Since the beginning of 2011 the Department has substantially revised the way it compiles and manages the Equipment Plan, and is now approaching the task on a more prudent basis. It has taken difficult decisions to address what was estimated to be a £74 billion gap between the Department’s forecast funding and cost of the defence programme as a whole and to try to bring the Equipment Plan itself into balance. These include cutting unaffordable expenditure and revising the way it compiles and manages the Equipment Plan to include greater contingency and provide greater protection to a core of prioritised projects, which will allow it to better manage cost variability.
The Equipment Plan is based on forecasts of costs and funding, representing the position at the end of the Department’s year-long planning process known as Planning Round 12. The Plan will inevitably change over time as economic and operational priorities evolve and as short-term affordability or urgent requirements cause the Department to flex its plans. For this reason, this report does not, and future reports will not, offer a definitive view on the affordability of the Equipment Plan. Rather, the NAO has constructed an affordability assessment model that breaks the Department’s assertions down into assumptions covering costs and funding against which the spending watchdog can test the realism of the Department’s approach. Of necessity, some time must elapse before performance against these matrices can be properly assessed. To increase confidence in the realism of its assumptions and the consistency with which its forecasts are calculated, the Department will need to demonstrate their reasonableness over a period of years. The Department does not yet have in place all of the necessary measures to do this. The NAO has set out in more detail the type of measures it would expect to see, in Appendix Two of the report.
This is the first year the NAO has undertaken this engagement and it was aware from the beginning of issues, detailed in the findings of this report, which would limit the confidence that could be taken from the Department’s Statement. In future years, as the Department’s approach to producing the Equipment Plan matures, the NAO intends to extend the scope of our work to cover progressively more elements of and assumptions included within the Equipment Plan. Notably, in agreement with the Department, this year the NAO has not performed any review of the Equipment Support costs, which make up just over half the Equipment Plan cost by value: £86 billion (54 per cent) of the total ten-year cost. This is because in preparing the Equipment Plan 2012-2022 the Department focused on increasing the robustness of its procurement costings, and has yet to apply the same level of challenge and review to the support costs element, although it plans to do so for the Equipment Plan 2013.
HIGHLIGHTS – THE EQUIPMENT PLAN
The report details equipment plans for each sector;
Combat Air
This sector covers fast jets, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and military flying training, including procurement of training aircraft. This investment includes:
- continuing investment in Typhoon to bring Tranche 2 & 3 aircraft fully into service.
- Further investment to develop and enhance the aircraft’s multi-role and ISTAR capabilities are priorities for use of unallocated headroom in the plan budget;
- increasing investment in the Lightening II (Joint Strike Fighter) – a state-of-the-art fifth generation carrier capable aircraft, incorporating cutting edge stealth technology which, together with the Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers, will deliver a high-end power
- projection capability for decades to come
- a growing investment in unmanned aerial vehicles, including through co-operation with France.
A priority for future investment when funds allow will be to expand our investment in simulated
pilot training.
Air Support
This sector covers all large aircraft, including transport, air-to-air refuelling and large ISTAR platforms. This investment includes:
- The A400M future generation of strategic/tactical air transport aircraft;
- Bolstering our strategic airlift capability with the purchase in 2012-13 of an additional C17 to bring the fleet up to 8 aircraft
- The brand new Voyager transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, which will replace the VC10 and TriStar fleets;
- New Airseeker Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance aircraft to replace the Nimrod R1 and provide us with a state of the art airborne SIGINT collection capability;
In the later years of the programme we expect to make further investment in the latest technology to enhance and protect our Air Support fleet.
Helicopters
Our plans in this area include:
- The purchase of an additional 14 Chinook helicopters as confirmed by the Secretary of State in July 2011;
- Completion of the Life Extension Programme for Puma;
- A capability sustainment programme for our attack helicopters, to maintain the capability until 2040;
- The completion of the Wildcat programme, which will replace our existing Lynx helicopters, with separate variants for the Navy and Army;
- Continuing the Julius programme to upgrade the Chinook Fleet;
- Taking forward the Assessment Phase for work to address obsolescence and ship optimisation for the Merlin Mk3 helicopters. Continuing that programme into demonstration and manufacture is a high priority for future investment later in the decade.
ISTAR and Information Systems
We plan to spend some £15.7bn on ISS over the next ten years. This includes significant investment in Defence Information Infrastructure support costs and support costs for BOWMAN Tactical Communications and Information Systems.
ISTAR
We will be spending around £4.4bn on ISTAR programmes over the next decade. This excludes some significant platform spend, for example the new Airseeker aircraft which will replace the Nimrod R1 Intelligence platform, which is included within the Air Support area.
The main areas of spend cover deployable and fixed communications networks and services. This area also includes our CBRN detection and countermeasures programmes and a range of Special Forces Equipment. This is in addition to the considerable sums invested in this priority area through the UOR process, including the procurement of REAPER Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Land Equipment
Our planned investment includes: An upgrade to our fleet of Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles, to maintain that capability with enhanced lethality out to 2040 and beyond;
- Continued development of the family of Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) vehicles, including Scout and Utility variants, which will replace a wide range of legacy armoured and protected vehicles;
Further funding will be allocated in due course to cover the cost of bringing appropriate equipment procured for the Army in Afghanistan under UOR processes permanently into our core inventory, based on their future utility, current condition and the cost to recover and reconstitute them for further service.
Ships
Our plans in this area include:
- Completion of the two Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers which, together with the Lightning II aircraft, will deliver a high-end power projection capability for decades to come;
- Delivery of the remainder of the 6 state-of-the-art Type 45 Destroyers with Samson RADAR and Aster missiles combining to offer an unparalleled air defence capability;
- Design and development of the Type 26 Frigate, which will replace the Type 23;
- Development of the Maritime Afloat Reach and Sustainability programme, which will provide a fleet of new, modern vessels for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Submarines and Deterrent
This covers all costs relating to the submarines themselves, nuclear propulsion costs and the costs of the strategic weapon system. This includes:
- The completion of the remainder of the class of 7 Astute attack submarines;
- Design, development and production of the replacement for the Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines, assuming that Main Gate approval is obtained in 2016;
- The ongoing costs of managing and maintaining the strategic weapon system, both missiles and warheads
Weapons
The programme includes investment of around £7bn in the complex weapons sector which will deliver a wide range of weapons, in the short term including the Future Local Area Air Defence System, which will be based on the Sea Ceptor missile, and the Future Air-to-Surface Guided Weapon (heavy) which will equip the Royal Navy’s new Wildcat Helicopters.
Other elements of the Equipment Plan not individually broken down in this analysis total around £5.6bn including Naval Bases, Joint Supply Chain and Logistics & Commodities.
HIGHLIGHTS – NAO REPORT
- The plan covers the ten years from 1 April 2012 to 31 March 2022.
- The Plan covers a budget of £159 billion
- It has taken difficult decisions to address what was estimated to be a £74 billion gap between the Department’s forecast funding and cost of the defence programme as a whole and to try to bring the Equipment Plan itself into balance.
- The plan will inevitably change over time as economic and operational priorities evolve and as short-term affordability or urgent requirements cause the Department to flex its plans.
- For this reason, this report does not, and future reports will not, offer a definitive view on the affordability of the Equipment Plan
- To increase confidence in the realism of its assumptions and the consistency with which its forecasts are calculated, the Department will need to demonstrate their reasonableness over a period of years
- The Equipment Procurement Plan is composed of more than 400 individual cost lines relating to specific projects, most of which comprise thousands of assumptions based on technical and specialist knowledge.
- On an annual basis the project teams update the ten-year project costs using the cost forecast at the 50th percentile
- The Department has quantified the provision it has made for risk within projects for the whole Equipment Plan as £8.4 billion
- The inclusion of the contingency provision is a positive step that demonstrates the Department’s recognition of potential cost growth and the need to make greater provision for the materialisation of risk. The establishment of the contingency provision will increase the Department’s ability to manage cost growth in the programme without delaying projects
- However, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 20 to 30, we are concerned the amount may not be sufficient. If this proves to be the case then the Department would be able to use the £8 billion unallocated budget to protect the core programme, but this would have capability implications
- The overall affordability of the Equipment Plan is highly sensitive to changes in the assumptions about funding, which could be affected by changes to economic or political priorities. The unallocated £8 billion from the budget insulates the core programme from some of this sensitivity. However, any element of this expended on protecting the core would reduce the available funding for non-core projects, meaning the Department would have to find other ways of delivering capability or adjust its strategic objectivesthe Equipment Plan as presented does not include funding or costs for the return and ongoing support of equipment purchased under Urgent Operational Requirements from Afghanistan
Contingency Funding
Both reports make it clear there are three levels of contingency funding, all are over TEN YEARS
ONE
In the equipment programme there is £8.4 billion of risk funding, this is nothing new and even a casual glance at any NAO Major Projects Report will see risk funding coming and going as applied to individual projects
TWO
A new centrally held contingency fund of £4.8 billion which will be used to cover overspends beyond that covered by the individual project lines, the theory being that the previous practice of covering individual project overspends by grabbing money from others should stop
THREE
Finally, there is a sum of money, £8.4 billion, available towards the end of the decade that is for projects that are not in the core programme. This slush fund doesn’t start building until after 2016/17. The forces have their ‘wanted list’ called the Single Integrated Capability List which will change over time. I wonder if this will be used in place of UOR’s
The NAO clearly shows that even with these provisions, there is still, based on sound empirical analysis of past and current in flight projects, a high degree of optimism built into the assumptions.
In short, expect pain.
A FEW THOUGHTS
Expect the usual hubris from the Government and bitching from the opposition but the opposition make a very good point about the breakdown of the £38 billion black hole never having been released. I can’t see any national security interest in withholding the information and for the NAO to say ‘trust us’ is not good enough because the NAO only report on what the MoD tells them.
£38 billion you say, hang on a minute, we are up to £74 billion in this report.
Is this ‘pick a number’ hour, for this to have any credibility whatsoever it needs detailing or it simply becomes subject to a slanging match between the children in our lower house.
Defence becomes politics and politics becomes defence
The armed forces of this country deserve better, frankly.
Has the 1% increase in equipment funding come at the expense of the support and non equipment budgets?
One part of the report that I think will get drowned out in the shouting is that UOR equipment obtained for use in Afghanistan is not accounted for in this equipment plan.
EH
Had to read it again, but it clearly states this to be the case.
It also makes clear that the £8 billion in unallocated budget will be needed to deliver Future Force 2020, which if it is used for going beyond what the NAO thinks is an unrealistic contingency provision due to the sensitivity and dependence on cost savings elsewhere, FF2020 will be under threat.
Great.
As for the actual equipment plan, doesn’t really contain any surprises and I am struggling to see anything on there that wasn’t on the table from the last Government.
So, its all good stuff and that, very interesting to see the MoD moving in the right direction but the proof of the pudding will be in the eating, just as those doing all the shouting today on both sides of the House will be doing different jobs.
If you look at the funding graph it has a whiff of jam tomorrow about it, the funding increase rises steadily post the 2015 general election and 2015 SDSR.
What was that about a conspiracy of optimism again?
In so far as it goes, this is a good piece of transformational transparent management (do I get ten points for that one) but the 1% increase in defence equipment spending is just a big fat con because;
- The Equipment Plan now has to support Successor, which as you should see from the numbers is much larger than any 1%, so in reality, it is a big reduction
- Non equipment and support costs are either declining or static, robbing Peter to pay Paul
- Fewer soldiers, sailors and airman means reductions in headcount which pays for the 1% increase
- It assumes that the next government will honour the commitment, good luck with that
All this wouldn’t be so bad if the Government stopped telling the fundamental SDSR lie about no strategic shrinkage and just fessed up to having to do less with less, a bit of honesty would go a long way to making it all more palatable.
In short, Dave, match your taste for intervention with the money to do so.
LINKS
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/31/trident-uk-military-shopping-list
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/mod-reveals-160-billion-plan-to-equip-armed-forces
TD,
How reliable is your source on this?
I shudder to think what is going to happen. Given the mission creep that has so quickly occurred in Mali, this could be a spectacular own goal if the cuts – there’s no other way to describe the plan – seriously impede future capability.
Quite apart from Type 26 Frigates / GCVs and aircraft carriers for the Navy, and F-35s for the Navy and RAF, the Army desperately needs new vehicles – the FRES UV – in addition to Foxhound and new small arms.
Monty, updated the post with the source
tory graph:
“The Prime Minister has moved to reassure Armed Forces chiefs by pledging that the Treasury will increase defence spending above inflation from 2015, even as it cuts other Whitehall departments’ budgets.”
fingers crossed.
From 2015…..and the odds of Cameron still being PM from 2015?
“Though the MoD suggests that the independent National Audit Office has given its blessing to the huge 10-year weapons procurement programme, it has has emerged that this is far from the case.”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/31/trident-uk-military-shopping-list
Labour is even better at spending… problem is when the money runs out.
I think everyone here would like more money to go to defence, and it’s probably too good to be true. One thing though, it’s crucial that the MOD keep to it’s new found fiscal discipline. I would like to see any above inflation increases linked to certain capability enhancements or items such as forces housing improvements.
The Telegraph story does not make sense: Consider:
“The programme includes £35.8 billion for submarines, including a replacement for the Trident nuclear system; £18.5 billion on warplanes and drones; and £17.4 billion for surface ships, including new aircraft carriers.”
So almost four-billion Sterling per-annum to build five more Astutes and maintain the rest of the boats? And the “Successor” programme is unlikely to come-on-stream by 2023 surely.
Seventeen-and-a-half billion to build the remainder of the Carriers and to update the thirteen frigates and six-destroyers? The MARS tankers only account for the odd £400 million….
[ The light-blue expenditure does make sense: Twenty-one A400M Euro-Turkeys and the Tiffies'. ]
So unless HMS Ajax is announced (along with 9 & 10) or we increase Type 26 numbers to 21 (so we can sell-on the early girls to Chile and Romania) I don’t see the procurement maths.
Maybe I am drunk…?
All i ask is that breaking the NATO commitment to 2.0% of GDP is too politically embarrassing to contemplate.
With the US getting jittery over anti EU noises coming from the UK, perhaps a little more money on defence would remind them that we are more than just the inside EU man. Just a thought…
Update:
http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2013/01/cameron-defence-spending-is-protected-hammond-no-it-isnt/
Finally Cameron gets it. So Hammond had better fall into line and quickly.
@Fluffy thoughts
My understanding is that the costs for the Trident replacement don’t come out of the Defence Budget, but a central pot, unless this this changed?
I still don’t understand all this sucking-up to the French. I thought we had learned that when you interfere abroad you merely create terrorism at home.
Monty, yes, the Trident/Successor bills now come out of the MoD’s pocket
@Fluffy thoughts
My understanding is that the costs for the Trident replacement don’t come out of the Defence Budget, but a central pot, unless this this changed?
Where have you been since SDSR 2010? You should spend the next twenty-four hours at militaryphotos.net (subject to OGH’s approval)!
On a serious point: Almost £38 billion on submarines? I am seriously struggling….
From Al-Beeb:
Defence Secretary Philip Hammond said that he believed the commitment applied to spending on defence “equipment”.
Mr Hammond indicated that the rest of the budget – about half – would be up for discussion in the forthcoming government spending review, in which many departments will be facing further cuts.
[Src.: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21271670 [
So no confirmation about procurment, but an understanding about non-personnel expenditure. Froth and no more....
[Edited to Add]
Equipment list
The list includes nearly £36bn for a new generation of nuclear-powered submarines, almost £19bn for combat aircraft, and around £17bn for Royal Navy warships.
And “Toenails” puts his bye-line to this…?
[Edited to Add (Duex)]
“£19 billion on combat aircraft”. Journalists, pfft!
@Fluffy
If its 10 years from 2013 to 2023 there’s a hell of a lot planned:
On Submarines we’ve got to finish the Astute build AND make a start on designing and building Successor.
On Ships ther’s finishing Carriers plus the first few T26 Frigates, the MARS Tankers and any MARS SSS that get ordered.
On Aircraft as well as Atlas and Tiffy there will be a lump for the planned 48 F35B that we don’t know how much they will cost yet.
The armour – presumably the FRES recce wagons.
Plus lots of things that go whizz and bang.
@TD
I loved the comment from NAO that basically says “We won’t believe its true until a couple of years have gone by without a major fuck-up”
Kind of what we’re all thinking. Anyone can fiddle the figures for a short period of time – but things come out int he wash eventually.
Overall pretty encouraging though.
I’m still waiting for an excuse for £36 – 38 billion on subs. I don’t hear one.
If we are arguing preloaded expenditure then riddle-me-this: The QE-class are – according to MSM – being funded out of current-expenditure. The idea that 2013 – 2023 funding of “Successor” will be accomodated implies it is being allocated out of capital-expenditure (or Fixed-fee Contracts).
So we have a £160 billion pot to pay for yesterday’s decisions, those of today and – maybe – our ambitions of tomorrow? Well, enough frustration: Let the man speak….
Nice plan. Now if only you can predict equipment losses during operations and budget for that too. Predictive planning can work, provided you do not keep shoving your forces into unpredictable situations. If they want this to work, strongly suggest to pull in their horns for the next 10 years until the reorganization is complete.
@ Observer – Sorry you are forgetting the key theme of SDSR 2010. “We wont be having another war until after 2015″, he says as he committs us to the second conflict in less than 2 year’s
I wonder what we could have bought with the £600 million that is being used to bypass HS2 around Mr Austerity’s constituancy. Could have probably got MPA back for that or Crowsnest funded (by that way where is Crowsnenst of the list)
All in all this seems like a load of s**t mouthed of by Hammond. “The plans fully funded but we don’t have any money for the Army’s Vehicles, MPA and Fleet AEW so as long as we don’t need those things we are awesome”. I wonder if we are now going to start hearing about the £78 billion black hole that he fixed now.
“Gordon Browns plans for a Death Star bult at Rosyth were completley unworkable in the equiptment budget”
“Senior British officials said no fresh defence cuts would be accepted by the Conservatives in a new post-election spending review covering the years 2015 and 2016.”
Thats likely because the will be in opposition and its easy for them to pretend they are big on defence when they don’t have to put their money where their mouth is.
Never trust the outgoing government
Hopefully the contingency allowing allocation of in year cost rises to stop the delaying of program’s that tend to lead to the big cost increases later on.
As an aside hope this ends the navy supporters nonsense of how there starved of funds because of the nasty raf and army. I make that 50 odd billion on ships and subs not to mention navy helicopters and missiles.
Marks says “As an aside hope this ends the navy supporters nonsense of how there starved of funds because of the nasty raf and army. I make that 50 odd billion on ships and subs not to mention navy helicopters and missiles.”
Um. No. More ships! MORE SHIPS!
Lets try reading the thing shall we?
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70112/20130130-Defence_Equipment_Plan_2012_-_20130130.pdf
For those who have tried to add up procurement costs and not understood the numbers, you will see that they include in-service support for current and future kit. Support is not cheap (particularly for nuclear reactors and their submarines) and I’m a little suspicious that the FSTA PFI may not actually be in the equipment budget here. Looks a bit light for £13Bn over 25 years.
For those who think the Navy are hoovering up all the funds, note that this does not include the (well over) £10Bn (well) spent on Typhoon so far and that ISTAR and ISS budgets are predominantly (DII excepted) for the RAF and Army – as is the majority of the committed helicopter budget. It’s also worth reflecting that the Army equips the man rather than manning the equipment – this budget does not include paying people, or maintaining the defence estate that they live on.
Interesting numbers that are going to require a bit of thought and reflection.
@Fluffy
So almost four-billion Sterling per-annum to build five more Astutes and maintain the rest of the boats? And the “Successor” programme is unlikely to come-on-stream by 2023 surely
Look at p16 – it shows the split in the submarine budget, currently about £2.7bn/year. That’s about £1.2bn on capital spending – which doesn’t just include building the Astutes but design work on Successor, designing the CMC, the £500m upgrades to Raynesway and the £600m for PWR3. The £1.5bn/year on support covers the Trafalgars, Vanguards, Astute, the Trident missiles, Faslane, Coulport, Burghfield, Aldermaston and so on.
Not a boffin
Read it twice now thanks still see 50 plus billion being spent on subs and surface ships more than any other area. Page 10 certainly seems to include voyager to me.
NaB
A typical public sector document that tells you a lot & nothing at the same time + plenty of migraine inducing charts.
A couple of things worry me. All that money for ships includes the design and planning for T26, but not actually building any.
And I don’t see Sentinel anywhere either. Not that its new, but it really should be mentioned under ongoing investment in ISTAR. Presumably we will have to wait until SDSR 2015 for that.
And I for one would like to see the unfunded wish list – becuase it would make it much more transparent what isn’t in the funded bit.
I begin to understand why NAO want to wait a couple of years before giving it the blessing.
Page ten has the word Voyager there, true. However, if the PFI is £13Bn pa for 25 years, then you’d expect about half a bill pa in either in-service support or committed core procurement. If you take half a bill out of either of those annual lines, there’s not a lot left for A400M, E3, C17, C130 support….As I say, needs some thought, this one.
Some of us appear to be missing the point about which part (equipment)of the budget this is as opposed to people and estate.
By the way does anyone know if the FASGW (which is funded) is intended to be integrated on F35 as well as Wildcat?
That would give our new carrier the ability to sink enemy ships at range – which is kind of an obvious thing for our flagship to be able to do.
Thanks for the link NaB.
@Mark – Well, somebody’s got to make the world safe for jets to pootle about in
Well if the end sum is actually 13b I’ve heard various of which that figure is the highest why would you be spending half over 10 years when the contracts for 25 years?
Quite true wiseape.
@Peter Elliott
FASGW(H) is a relatively short range missile compared to something like Harpoon. I haven’t seen it linked with F-35 at all. A missile for dropping from a helicopter is going to be designed rather different than for a fast jet.
Brimstone and SPEAR Cap 3 aren’t too bad for plinking FAC from high altitude (or you could use a Paveway II like the RAF did in Libya)
@Hannay
Thanks. Thought is was too good to be true.
Back to waiting for Perseus with an oustside bet on NSM I suppose.
@Peter Elliott
There’s something to be said for the idea of firing a number of SPEAR Cap 3 at long range and targeting individual parts of ships. Resolution of onboard sensors and guidance has improved quite remarkably so you could fairly confidently make some nice big holes in the VLS silos.
@Hannay
Mission kill is all very well and good.
But there’s just something emotionally satifying about putting a ship on the bottom of the sea. I realise the best weapon for that is a torpedo, but the word Exocet has now entered the language for a reason.
Would the ARA Veinticinco de Mayo have turned for home if the Belgrano had just had a few holes knocked in her? And would it have raised British Morale so mcuh if we hadn’t “gotcha”?
I suppose a warship is a symbol of national pride. The sinking of PoW at Singapore (by air launched torpedo) still hurts now.
Given the people we might end up fighting are often dictatorial regimes to whom pride and prestige are critical the ability to put ships on the bottom has a moral effect beyond strategy, tactics or logisitc.
Maybe we need to integrate Spearfish on F35? Is that as crazy as it sounds?
No one air drops torps in anything but an anti-submarine role anymore. It is just not realistic. And certainly you are not going to be using a 4,000 pound plus heavyweight torpedo in that role.
There is no need to reinvent the wheel here. If the RN wants a heavier anti-ship weapon for aircraft either buy the NSM for smallish targets or sign onto some other program (LRASM-A, SLAM-ER) if you want something more heavyweight that goes further. SLAM-ER can be had now for a pretty reasonable sum. LRASM-A is a bit up in the air but my bet is that it gets built because JASSM-ER is being built in large numbers and it will vastly extend the standoff range against ships at sea and will basically be a dual use missile right out of the box.
Perseus is just a fantasy on a drawing board right now. It is a very long way away in my view, assuming it every happens. It reminds me very much of LRASM-B.
“Maybe we need to integrate Spearfish on F35? Is that as crazy as it sounds?”
Yes. Yes it is.
2 x 21″ Torpedo tubes on T26?
How about a proper spar torpedo or a ram?
What’s a proper naval battle without Greek Fire?
For those in the know: Could you help me?
Why are infrastructure, support and facilities included in procurement and not support and every-day expenditure? I had assumed – based on the Boss’ post from a few months ago – that MoD expenditure was 1/3 incomes and pensions, one-third new kit and 1/3 support and everyday expenditure.
I understand that, in a modern IT-centric world, kit needs to be regulary updated. This obviously effects SLEP-cycles and refits. My question is why do bases appear and weapon-systems (the latter should be a consumable, no) within the procurement budget?
After looking at the MoD PDF, my question about subs is still vexing. All of that money assigned to new kit (and we know the cost of PWR Core-III) and yet we are only anticipating five more Astutes…?
A final note: Let’s accept it and put-to-bed. Hammond* has basically outlined:
+ No extra Globemaster-IIIs,
+ No possible MPA,
+ Seven Astutes,
+ Very little hope of a Portsmouth C3-contract, and
+ Thirteen Type 26s and no more.
A sad return for £159 billion. Anyone know if Geoff Hoon is looking for an assistant…?
* And he is appears to be one of the more comepetent MPs…!
@ Fluffy – Bases are usually included in defence estates however additional facilities for example to handle Trident etc may well be in the procurement budget. It’s all very murky and to be honest I don’t think the MOD even truly understands how it breaks down.
Another possibility as to why it some facilities may occur under “procurement” might also have to do with the department occupying the building. It might be that it is an armed forces building that is occupied by a unit that deals in procurement and specifically paid out of that individual unit’s budget.
Ok the positives – there is a long term plan and there is a budget. There is some attempt at transparency but I’ve read enough reports in my time to know that its the ‘unsaid’ that is key.
On the immediate negatives, whilst appreciating it is high level there is no addressing of known capability gaps, so I assume those will continue (see below). Further as TD says, it does not address the increasing mismatch between what the government wants our armed forces to do and how it equips them. This equipment plan may be absolutely fine for a certain level of commitment etc but if this is the plan then SDR 2015 needs reigning in on ambition. We could still commit a large force to a major campaign (eg as 1991 say) but its the increasing number of smaller and possibly enduring commitments that cause the strain. Further I remain concerned with the home defence piece. Not in the context of hordes of Russian amphibs and bombers assaulting our shores but the asymmetric / nuisance stuff possibly as a consequence of our involvement elsewhere that I see as being an emerging threat. Those sorts of things could easily result in at worst substantial loss of UK life or at best substantial dents in our world standing and in the credibility of the government. I think we are sleepwalking in that area.
So assuming that the governments willingness to commit our forces remains unabated, where are the capability gaps (not apparently addressed in the MOD plan_ in the next 10 years? In the spirit of the MOD report, I’ll do it high level and let others with more knowledge fill in the details:
– I’m all for paras and RM remaining fully ‘light’ but I feel there is an AFV gap at the light end if not for RM / Paras, then for attached battalions, eg 1 Rifles. Wheeled AFV, Stryker / LAV / similar (I’m thinking more future deployments to Africa like the French)
- More helos in general. Why upgrade puma, why not more Merlins? Don’t like the idea of trying to marinise anything not designed for it. We should explore off the shelf new purchases. I’ve always wondered why we don’t have a small buy of AH1Zs for permanent CVF embarkation (annd on future amphibs
– 10-12 C17s in total and larger buy of A400M. Enough (ie possibly more) Voyagers to support our airlift needs
– Keep sentinel – our ISTAR capability can become one of our key cards to play
– Crowsnest
– MPA – small fleet of P8s and a fleet of less fighty MPAs (Sea Herc?) for ‘coastguard’ type patrol over UK and FI. AShM for P8s
– Harpoon for all T45s
– A buy of 4-6 Clyde II OPVs with hanger and very modest up gunning to allow 2 for permanent station in FI and 2 in UK waters (existing Clyde relocates to Gib).
– Have a rolling battalion deployment in FI for training etc with a degree of prepositioned kit
– ensure there are ‘ready companies’ on the ramp on a regional UK basis to deploy within hours to deal with national threats (may be that already exist??)
– enhanced key port security squadrons, with e.g.CB90s
– Plan to replace Argus and Ocean with 2 Karel Doorman type multi role vessels- part funded by DfiD possibly
I’ll stop before I drift into fantasy territory but I think that overlaid with the existing equipment plan fits more squarely with SDR written and unwritten objectives.
Smoke and mirrors, there is nothing new in this announcement, just a confitmation that the armed forces mean little to our politicians. They are peripheral to their thinking, except when they want to show themselves to be ‘big boys’ on the global stage.
To add to my last post
I’ve probably over-egged the Clyde IIs – 4 would do it in the interim. Seems like it will be up to 10 years at least before we see a T26 in the water. So need to keep T23s up to date and a modest trickle of modest Clyde II OPVs will help keep some sort of skill base.
To the future? Speculative I know but here goes
– more F35Bs for expeditionary (land and CVF) and ultimately one type of F35 possibly to partially replace Typhoon in anything other that UK / FI QRA role
– Taranis / strike length silos on T26 for longer range strike options
– Possibly SSGN variant of successor
– LPHs / LPDS- 2 Juan Carlos possibly although I am increasingly attracted by the logic of a third CVF (could even put cats and traps in from the start?!) I think CVF will prove one of the better value for money buys from recent times
– Albion / Bays – common class replacement with hangers (4 decent size and ‘flexible’ replace 5 possibly with the 2 Karel Doorman’s adding to that)
– MHPC – focus on getting a vessel that can do Mine and Hydro right, patrol secondary
– T26 – 13 will do, but no less – possibly extend class to supplant T45 in future
– some sort of ABM defence for the UK
– a proper long term planning cycle for replacement of all our core kit and capabilities – not this ‘oh crikey the T42s are getting old, what do we do now’ type of thing
– increase shift to special forces / para / RM enhancement and related kit
@MickP – on the question of home defence, I have wondered for some time if all our Armed Police Units (MoD, “Nuclear”, SO19, Airports, regular Police Force Firearm Squads, possibly even RAF and so on) ought to be consolidated into something akin to the Gendarmes (with or without CRS); allowing traditional Police Officers to work without firearms (which most I know would prefer) – but creating a single unified structure for that sort of work – providing a potential reserve of last resort – and sharing cost with the Home Office and other departments.
A bit like the Atlantic Ridge Coastguard Idea.
Any thoughts out there?
@GNB
I’m not averse to considering that idea. The fewer agencies the better I feel. I might draw a line at regular police firearm squads / SO19, but for state security issues at installations, eg MOD / nuclear / airports / harbours, that could be a combined unit
@Mickp
Broadly agree with you’re equipment plan, most of them are no brainers! Just a couple of points…
Rumour has it that Boeing have reserved slots for possible RAF orders of C17 9 and 10, so that would obviously be fantastic if it was taken up. With the rest of the transport force, I reckon an eventual 30 A400m plus some C130 retained for SF would do us nicely, though it would probably be better to wait on the additional A400m until the costs are secure and Airbus are keen for extra orders!
A battalion on the Falklands is something I have long craved! combining the roles of garrison and training kills two birds with one stone, lovely!
Agree that MHPC should focus on mine-hunting and survey stuff first and foremost. If the basic hulls turn out to be half decent patrol ships then great, but shoving too many roles in one programme could be risky.
Id personally seek to replace Argus and Diligence with essentially the same stores ships that are going to eventually replace the Forts. Current designs show it having a largish hangar and flight-deck for 2-3 Merlin’s, I think that’s good enough.
Ocean will have to wait a while for a direct replacement, but with CVF being so huge I don’t think it will be a major issue. Id try and replace Ocean, Albion and Bulwark with two Juan Carlos type ships around 2030, and also look at something with a hangar and the ability to take on a mother-ship role to replace the Bays in the far future, maybe Karel Doorman’s, maybe not. Right now I think their are more pressing priorities.
Oh and CB90′s for ports would be nice, but Crowsnest, Sentinel and MPA should be absolutely crucial core capabilities.
In general, “bases” are kept out of the equipment programme and in the estates budget, unless it is specific facilities being procured for a new equipment project. Examples might be things like the new Astute jetty at Faslane, dredging the new entry channel at Portsmouth for QEC or the new hangar and facilities at Brize for Voyager.
Whether they are in or out depends on the terms of the contract and to some degree to the whim of the finance type for each budgetholder.
There will be no Clyde 2. There is no requirement for it and definitely no identified budget. The C3 referred to above died some years ago to be replaced by MHPC, which will not arrive before teh mid 20s at teh earliest.
Some still seem to think this is £159Bn to buy new kit. It isn’t. It is £159Bn to buy some new kit and also to support (and modify) lots of existing kit. It includes Chally2, Warrior, AS90, every Type A and Type B vehicle in the MoD inventory (Landy’s, WMIKs, Pinzgauers, 4 tonne trucks, Foden recovery trucks, DROPS trucks), C130, Hawks, E3D, Chinook, Sea King, Chinooks (all marks), Lynx, Watchkeeper, Tristar, T23, Hunt, Sandown, LPD, T-class, V-class, the list is huge.
Of that £159Bn, only about £60Bn is for new kit and some of that £60Bn will actually be spent on upgrades (as opposed to normal support) for in-service kit. As an example, the Warrior and CR2 upgrade programmes will come out of that, as will the significant amount of work required to extend the T23. To give an example of that, buying and fitting SeaCeptor, Artisan etc to T23 comes out of the “new kit” budget, whereas the “normal” upkeep work comes out of equipment support. That will not include any hull modifications to get the ship out to 36 years against a design life of 18 years…..
What it does demonstrate is just how expensive it is to own and operate military equipment.