Thought I would bounce this one out with a provocative title
Does this mean all talk of a maritime decade and the end of protracted land wars is somewhat premature?
Does anyone else think those in green will be seeing a opportunity?
Does anyone else think those in blue are having a depressing week?
They are questions by the way…
Depends on whether a war which will last decades requires more than small training teams or SF support? Hard to see a requirement for sustained UK commitment to the region beyond this, and hard to spot the desire for it either.
or those drones/airships are gonna get some more funding, eyes in the skies don’t tend to come home in a box. Sounds harsh i know, and i’ve seen it first hand, sadly in the politicans eyes it’s not a soul lost it’s a vote. That’s why i can see a bit of SF and mainly the above
Drones can be launched from ships too.
We will surely not make the same mistakes again, it will not be thousands of ground troops – SF, with larger contingents only in raiding and assault type roles, drones, missile / air strikes and some degree of training and support for appropriate regimes (with no scope creep), if we can find any.
So, on the contrary I would say, expeditionary maritime capability should be at the core of that sort of operation
Rhetorical question ? Are we supposed to have a maritime strategy then ?
Haven’t the French been engaged in brush wars in Africa for over 50 years, without anything like the cost in blood and treasure we have incurred in the last 10 ?
Have to agree with Jed 19 surface combatants and 7 SSN’s hardly sounds like a maritime strategy.
That being said I think rapid intervention forces on short term deployment handing over to African Union peace keepers is the only way to go. I am not sure what this says about the bulk of the Intervention Force 2020 plan being based around 3 armoured brigades. I think we are only likely to enter a ground conflict with support of the local government as with Mali and Sierra Leone. If we do have to take out a dictator it will only be in an air campaign as with Libya. I am sure that for the forseeable future 2003 style nation building will not be attempted again and certainly not in Iran under any circumstance. I think we are more likely to glass the place than go back through a decade of protracted nation building.
I was wondering the same thing myself TD. As a leading European nation – and one of the few with the means and interest to – will containing unrest and tackling terrorists near Europe’s borders in North (and North East) Africa become the new primary mission/focus? If so how does that affect the plans for Army 2020? Will the tactics and equipment from Afghanistan suffice? What about those for the “Peer” competitor?
RE: Maritime Strategy. Still need one (We are an island you know!) and (North) Africa does have lots of useful coastline… A forward presence squadron(s) might be useful for engagement, intelligence and MSO while delivering troops by sea is easier than air if slower.
TD
Yep But I can’t see another Afghan or Iraq being particulary Afghan as there are no semistate approved safe havens for proper substantial bases supplies etc.
I suspect this time the concentrated attention of the west will be rather more effective.
A lot of these rebels do not have local support, are not as routed in the local populations, Nor indeed are there in north africa that many people. They posses huge areas of territory: – With the population of swindon.
@ Jed
“Haven’t the French been engaged in brush wars in Africa for over 50 years, without anything like the cost in blood and treasure we have incurred in the last 10 ?”
Foreign Legion blood doesn’t count, they don’t have a Joanna Lumley.
The CGS’ interview comment about normal troops increasingly doing what SF used to do, and related policies, then I’d say a training mission will be normal units.
Am I the only one amused by naive folk who think SF are the solution to anything somebody cares to dream up? What insurgency has ever been defeated by SF – answer zilch. Storming Jebel Akbar did not defeat an insurgency, although it may have recovered a stuff-up. Recce and raiding, that’s what SF do. Leave the grind to proper soldiers.
The units earmarked to be regional specialist in N Africa look like getting a workout over the next couple of decades. Of course the biggy is N. Nigeria, but they probably won’t ask for help.
I read somewhere that the UK and France decided a couple of years ago to split the anti terrorist fight in North Africa with France focusing on the West and UK the East. Anyone know if it’s true?
We should be training and equipping the African Union to hold and police the ground supporting them with high end capabilities (Logistics, intel, sf etc). Why on earth would we or Africa want UK boots on the ground beyond limited strategic raiding if needed.
Mali is, if anything, Oman, not Afghanistan.
I think there are 500 Frogs in the area?
Most of whom were either already there, or have been diverted from other African bases.
Its not the death of maritime focus, but a return to it.
We arm, we train, we lead, but locals make up the vast majority of the ground troops.
I’m sure someone once posted an ill thought out road map, using British Officers and NCOs with local privates….
@ Trt, I would not mind seeing us raise and African force of 3-5 light brigades with British officers and NCO’s and African privates. Essentially an African Gurkhas with out the need to be paid the same as British squaddies. The force could then form the core of African Union and UN intervention missions. Would be even better if we could get DFID to pay for it. This way our forces could focus on what they do best which is k*cking the s**t out of other Armies and providing rapid reaction and SF rather than low grade peace keeping.
I know we already support AU missions financially and to some extent this model works well in many places but I am not sure if the same guys are going to be able to stand up to hardcore islamic fundamentalists with out more direct support from us and the last thing we need is a large British presence in theatre to attract even more fundamentalists from across the world.
A couple of points.
1. We will attempt to contain the situation in N Africa and the easiest way to do that is to keep it South of the natural fire break provided by the Med. Militarily I would expect ISTAR/Advisors/Air Strikes/SF and Maritime surveilance to be important.
2. We have been engaging and helping countries in the region for years, be it Uk through MONOGRAM tasking or the NATO advisory team to the AU.
Surely – considering the ‘prowess’ of the opponent in the Sahel – it is the green that need to worry, no? Why invest in a 34-45 tonne Austro-Spanish FRES system when you lack the logistics – mainly port facilities – to deploy them where they are needed?
Light-blue are probably scratching their scalps too: What use is the A400M Euro-Turkey if it will take you whole fleet to deliver an unneeded armoured-infantry unit to fight Hilux-mounted ‘martyrs’…?
Historically the UK has never contested the centre-West of Africa (or the vast regions of Asia and Latin-America), but has stuck to littoral areas. [Ok, Rhodes did chew-up a large chunk of the centre-south, but he was a bit wierd (by all accounts).] By focusing on maritime the UK will be able to spoil Jihadist attempts to reach choke-points and challenge global-trade vital to our open-economy.
The real problem is – once again – placed in the Light-blue inbox. Considering the might of AQIM-AF they are probably focusing on Tranche-3B and less on extending the service-life of Sentinel. A rebalance in the RAF might be useful militarily but awkward politically.
On the political-front the question is how this effects medium- to long-term geo-politics. The resources of the Sahel could be protected by the West only to see China take the spoils. Should the West spill blood for Eastern gain? It is interesting to see that China is giving vocal [UN Security-Council] support to the French (whilst elsewhere it appears many African locals are turning anti-Chinese). Could be be throwing more fuel on the fire by intervening…?
Which returns us to ‘Ole Blighty’: How should we focus our nation’s defence? The best solution would be a bit of military Anglo-sphere isolationalism; at least within the Atlantic waters. We have no local enemies (nation-wise) in the vacinity atm. Focus on the Old Commonwealth as a defence alliance. On reflection the world is currently looking very Orwellian: Who are we at war with today…?
@ Fluffy,
One problem with focusing on the old commonwealth is that most commonwealth countries can find better partners elsewhere. India and the UK are not even close in terms of major strategic priorities. Australia is better off aligning themselves closely with the United States and other near neighbours.
The only thing we have in common with a lot of commonwealth countries is a shared history of sorts. We need to let go of the commonwealth paradigm and shift to something new.
Look at how much support we’ve gotten from somewhere like Denmark, both in regards to Afghanistan and Libya, who also happen to be a quick trip over the North Sea from us. The Canadians are still good allies, as obviously is the United States.
But we need to start thinking less about the colonies and more about who are our most beneficial allies. The middle eastern countries buy a lot of our equipment for example, so keeping them sweet is always useful.
And if we really want to go down a certain road and look at the EU and the eurozone as working against us with their rules etc, depending on how you view Europe, then the traditional strategy has always been to cultivate as many continental allies as possible to work against them (though I think Russia might be off the cards this time around).
It depends on where you want to go, who you see as valuable, what threats you consider the highest priority, or indeed what you classify as a threat. The reality is we have very differing priorities to most of our Commonwealth “partners”. We should be looking at the stark reality of the world today for allies and trade deals, not calling on people just because we have historical ties to them.
I think we should play the age-old game of arming and equipping the side that best suits us. A few live weapon system demonstrations and a few peace-keepers. Other than that, let them go through the teething that all countries seem to need to go through. Hopefully they can then emerge at the other end as a stable democracy with all physical fighting replaced with financial competition… like the real war that we’re currently in against all up-and-coming financial powers.
An interesting parallel
TrT says:
January 21, 2013 at 08:15
Mali is, if anything, Oman, not Afghanistan.
- in Oman, too, the opposing group(s) were ethnically separate from the bulk of the population (when not down-right foreign)
“Does anyone else think those in blue are having a depressing week?”
It is a good question ask, but the answer is “no”.
The choice has already been made, and this will not change that.
The big-army crew led by Max Hasting as PR-in-chief were calling for:
“My own strongly held view, shared by some much cleverer people on both sides of the Atlantic, is that the only credible way forward is to undertake a drastic restructuring, which explicitly prioritises ground forces. We should plump for a properly funded fighting army with appropriate support, including helicopters and transport aircraft, and a big commitment to unmanned drones. In a rational world the RAF, already smaller than the US Marine Corps’s organic air wing, would be integrated with the army.”
This would have seen the army remain at 105k, and possibly even grow to 110k, with the brief to provide long-term persistence in theatre-wide low-intensity deployments. The navy would have dropped much further to ~25k and the airforce to ~30k.
Given the pressure on the procurement budget, and the reduced role for the other two services the following would have been cut:
Carriers (both of them – now we get two)
MARS (at least two of the four we will now get)
JSS(would never have seen the light of day)
LPD (one scrapped, instead of putting it in ER)
LSD (two sold instead of one)
T26 (at most eight, instead of the thirteen we hope to get)
As things turned out, it is the army that will drop to 82k, with the RN and RAF staying around 30k.
Now, rather than an army designed for persistence, we have a structure that is designed for two things:
a) a rolling surge with a heavy core in the middle
b) intervention forces (16AAB and 3Cdo) that are back to providing rapid-reaction.
A permanent ability to intervene, rather than a persistent ability to sustain large scale ground operations.
Actually I would like to echo much of the above.
The region is vast. And mostly Arid and very sparsely populated by a mixture of Arab, Bedouin, and Tuareg. Large parts of it have buggerall population and less roads.
IT has a govt of sorts in situ, In Mali Chad Tunisia, and Algeria
If we are going to play then we play, the arming and supporting Local govts, playing the locals off against the Jihadis, (the Tuareg are already pissed of with the erstwhile allies apparently over their enforcement of Sharia law.
The one exception is Libya where the govt is very weak everywhere and sharia types are running around, that is a bit more like Iraq.
If I was the army I would be worried.
Need for tanks Nope
35 ton MICV and recon vehicle nope.
Need for motorsied light infantry – yep
If I was In the light blue, i would be worried.
How are Typhoon and f35 going to handle the heat and dust?
I am sure that there are many on this site who are more familiar with the area and the problems of desert war, than me. i have been in the Eastern Sahara. It is so hot in summer even the locals pack up all work by about 11.30 a.m.
More how are the super jets going to used?
Overall that are the problems of logisitcs getting into Northern Mali, Chad etc will make getting stuff into afghan look like a short trip up the A1. we will send logistaclly light vehicles and troops – we are going to have to. We are not going to be able to fly in aupport for anything else.
So you can tear up the last ‘defence review’ break ou the khaki shorts and the longrange desert group shorts.
So Will the navy get in on the action- probablky in support of the national gov in the north. Will the army and airforce get involved yes.
However we have had 10 years of “Afghan/ Iraq are one offs we need to retain/ return to broad spectrum force”.
Another 10 or more years of ‘North africa is a one off we need to retain a broad spectrum force’ Is not going to be sustainable. If I was in the armoured infantry or tanks I would be worried, was going to be thrown a pair of boots and being told to get use to the back of a truck. Now where did we put those Jackals???
If I was in the RAF someone somwhere is going to be looking for Coin aircraft and more transports.
The Mediterranean rim (ie Europe’s southern borders) includes the following armies :
Spain – 61000
France – 122000
Italy – 108000
Greece – 86000
By my count that’s north of 350000 troops between the “problem” and the UK. Of those four, two maintain either sovereign territory or significant bases in the North and West of Africa. To quote the great Homer Simpson – “why can’t someone else do it?”
Now obviously, it doesn’t quite work like that, but you get the idea. Keeping two Bde groups and a couple of dozen aircraft operational on Herrick is costing a marginal cost (ie on top of pay and usual costs) of over £3bn pa.
If it is to be suggested that the UK gets involved in an area where we have no historical interest and where logistic costs will again be quite significant (if not on the scale of Herrick), there had better be a more compelling reason than “the army needs to do something to reverse Future Army 2020″, don’t you think?
NAB
Good point about the ‘Armies in the way’.
My post above was predicated on the fact that we seem constitutionaly unable to keep our beaks out.
@NaB
You make a very good point that this region of Africa is one in which the UK has very few historical ties, it’s mostly French with a smattering of Spanish.
However, UK support doesn’t have to mean a large scale and sustained ground intervention, as I’m sure many people have already pointed out the combination of other European and adjacent African contributors means that the most sought after commitment from the UK could be further heavy lift, surveillance aircraft and maybe drones.
At most perhaps some eventual fighter-jets to relieve the pressure on the French and one off deployments by special forces.
We should be bringing stuff that either no one else can provide or would struggle to sustain to the party, not the same old generic components that anyone with a military can throw in.
IXION
Our posts crossed – absolutely agree that someone needs to make a cast-iron case for sticking our c0cks in the custard with ground forces on this one.
Chally – again, agree entirely, merely countering the original question of the thread, which was is this an “opportunity” for Perce at the expense of dark blue….
“why can’t someone else do it?”
That only works here if it is a naval capability.
You forget 430,000 odd Turks too.
X why the naval capabillity? Mali and Northern chad are about as far away from the sea that you can get – unless the mongolians or Kazaks kick off.
Like it!
I had assumed that the Turks might have one or two problems closer to home…..
Arm the Africans and support them. I agree. But then we have the daily rant against the DfID budget…
@ IXION
“why can’t someone else do it?”
That only works here (at Think Defence) if it is a naval capability because the navy here (at Think Defence) is expendable but the Army must have its tanks and bands and the RAF its £35bn air superiority fighter, drill teams, air display, infantry force, etc.
Do the over egged bits in italics help?
@ NaB
The Turks, our NATO allies (though they are nowhere near the North Atlantic), still sit between us and crap holes like Syria and Iran.
Isn’t the scale of the French intervention (looking to deploy up to 2,500 men to the region for a relatively short period of time) totally within the ability of Army 2020 to as currently planned?!?
It would have thought regional instability in Northern Africa, and the Middle East would have been the corner stone of any scenario’s that the MoD gamed out in order to inform the decisions of the last SDSR – and while most of the last SDSR is cuts lead, at it’s core there does seem a good amount of good ideas – so logically speaking there should be no need for major changes to the strategies already agreed in the last SDSR.
Still I think IXION is right, in the future we are going to find our low numbers of high end kit, which need large amounts of support infrastructure to function well being a burden rather than a benefit – still I cannot see the RAF buying COIN aircraft or a cheap mud mover (not that anyone but the Chinese are making them nowadays) any more than I can see the Army deciding to not go ahead with FRES Scout and buy something smaller, lighter, more air mobile and cheaper off the shelf.
@ TRT – Just been reading about Wingate and the WW2 campaigns in North East Africa. Was a strong supporter of British leadership of local forces. Need to sign up to read but it is free:
https://www.tjomo.com/article/2/Orde_Wingate_And_Paramilitary_Support_Operations_Messages_For_The_21St_Century/
X – Yep. Those are two of the problems closer to home I was referring to, “Kurdistan” being one of the others.
Tubby – “It would have thought regional instability in Northern Africa, and the Middle East would have been the corner stone of any scenario’s that the MoD gamed out in order to inform the decisions of the last SDSR – and while most of the last SDSR is cuts lead, at it’s core there does seem a good amount of good ideas – so logically speaking there should be no need for major changes to the strategies already agreed in the last SDSR.”
Hmmm. You might think those sorts of scenarios were also “gamed” as you put it, during SDR and indeed SDR New Chapter. The strategies have not changed for nigh-on fifteen years, only the force structure available to deal with them has. One might credibly argue that ideas on force composition and strategies can be traced back to Options for Change, it’s just that the force structure for each has shrunk.
I suspect many on here will remember “Golf bags” back in OfC/FLF days, which is actually very little different from what SDSR2010 produced. The navy is making a big thing about Response Force Task Groups (RFTG), which is in fcat just a new name dreamed up for a naval task force, only slightly rebadged to reflect thte fact we don’t have a carrier at the minute, so can no longer differentiate between carrier and amphibious task forces.
Same things to do, less things and people to do them with……
Comes down to what our armed forces are for…what do we a) want them to do, and b) what can they do? The answer to a) is of course ‘everything’ and b) not that much…or, to be fair, quite a few things but not to a great extent: we don’t have a large MBT force; we don’t have many surface combatants; ditto carriers and no planes to put thereon anyway; hardly any air force and what there is optimised for air-to-air combat.
What we do have though is swarming masses of senior ranks and MoD officials and civilian ‘back-up’ organisations who have succeeded in leading us to defeat in Iraq and failure in Afghanistan.
UK defence should be firmly prioritised towards the Navy and the Army with the latter using its reserves much more intelligently.
@ Jedi and Ixion – “b) intervention forces (16AAB and 3Cdo) that are back to providing rapid-reaction.” and ” Need for tanks Nope
35 ton MICV and recon vehicle nope.
Need for motorsied light infantry – yep”
Could the circle be squared by giving more tactical/operational mobility to the Paras and Marines (without unduely affecting their strategic mobility)?
Are we backing the right side?
The Tauregs, after all, are demanding a national homeland first and foremost.
They are quite likely to win it.
Should we be trying to prop up a Malian Occupation?
Or guiding Tauregia into a civillised direction?
We know they arent overly keen on AQ-IMs version of sharia, what if we offered a better alternative?
We can bully the various coastal nations into giving up their claims on the desert, in return, the Tauregs annihilate AQIM…
@ Jedi and Ixion – “b) intervention forces (16AAB and 3Cdo) that are back to providing rapid-reaction.” and ” Need for tanks Nope
35 ton MICV and recon vehicle nope.
Need for motorsied light infantry – yep”
Insn’t that the role of the lightweight protected mobility infantry units in the 2020 force structure?
Foxhound does seem to be a much better bet than a stripped down landrover in the protection stakes. Along with Jackal mounted “light cav” it should provide a decent but fairly transportable capability.
Although a lightweight armoured car like AMX10 RC (like the old Saladin in role) does seem like an idea as well if we intend to get involved in Brushfire wars all over again.
Bob said “Although a lightweight armoured car like AMX10 RC (like the old Saladin in role) does seem like an idea as well if we intend to get involved in Brushfire wars all over again.
Just like South Africa do. Wheels all the way.
@ Bob – “Insn’t that the role of the lightweight protected mobility infantry units in the 2020 force structure?
Foxhound does seem to be a much better bet than a stripped down landrover in the protection stakes. Along with Jackal mounted “light cav” it should provide a decent but fairly transportable capability.”
Quite so. I was getting too focused on aircraft/helicopter deployability (been reading about rapid deployment forces). How many Foxhounds and Jackals can the A400m and C-17 carry by the way?
“Although a lightweight armoured car like AMX10 RC (like the old Saladin in role) does seem like an idea as well if we intend to get involved in Brushfire wars all over again.”
Something based on the AHED testbed? I think a 105mm gun would be overkill; perhaps armed with something like the 75mm ARES automatic cannon?
Future recce/Cavalry vehicle?
This: http://defense-update.com/products/a/AHED.htm
Armed with this gun: http://m.flickr.com/#/photos/us_army_rolling_along/3566120143/
To make a modern version of this: http://www.warwheels.net/images/panhardebrfl11DUJARDIN2.jpg
Military capability aside, and looking at religion for a moment; for me the elephant in the room is written in the first couple of lines of the ‘The Telegraph’ article at the top: Islamic extremism.
I don’t believe Islamic extremism appears spontaneously all over the Islamic world, it’s nurtured and sustained. And the place its nurtured and cared for the most is Saudi Arabia. The form of Islam in the Kingdom of Saud is Wahhabism, an extremly conservative form of islam, which tends to upset a great many muslims. Unfortunately politicians in the West fail to see or accept the paradox of supplying advanced weapons to the Saudi’s in return for their oil, the money from which is then used to uphold and sustain Wahhabist values and teaching, which creates the extremists that we end up fighting. Talk about the proverbial vicious circle….
Rather than fighting in North Africa for decades as David Cameron suggests, maybe we should provide logistical support to a combined Islamic force instead and help them invade Saudi Arabia.
Or seriously try to invest in energy beyond oil (no me neither) so that those that wish to live in the Middle ages can be given a stiff ignoring by the rest of us and allowed to do so in splendid isolation…..
Shale gas may be part of the temporary bridging solution, but f8ck knows what the long-term answer is.
NaB, ok, I’ll put off my invasion of the Arabian Peninsular for now…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qqRp3XsZeFg
I know it was made for a ‘teen’ programme but its still worth watching all the way through. The fundamental concept is is inspiring, or is it just me….
End of a maritime strategy?
So why are the French sending the Mistral class LHD FS Dixumde to West Africa? Loaded with IFV’s and two companies worth of Infantry!
http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=847
Hmmm… You could do the same with a Endurance class LST/LPD… Just saying…
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8857071/Marines-in-daring-amphibious-raid-in-Somalia.html
Now that’s a maritime strategy…
Ace
Well, for one, we dont give the Saudis Cash.
Typhoons and Tornados arent great for supporting terrorists, and thats mostly what they get off us.
I cant imagine Iran would use Saudi wealth any better (for us). Although of course they would quickly collapse production.
And of course, Wahabi’s greatest triumph was in the Balkans, when we bombed their enemies…..
@ Swimming Trunks – “Could the circle be squared by giving more tactical/operational mobility to the Paras and Marines (without unduely affecting their strategic mobility)?”
I rather think that will be the job of the foreign force partnered adaptable brigades, possibly with one of the unattributed light cavalry regiments if a little mobile muscle is needed.
I still like the new BAE CVR(t) 21 for this role, the simpler the better.
After all, the adaptable brigades are designed for the build up and wind down of a conflict, with the reaction forces doing the door kicking (remember that phrase?
)
Unfortunately the “oil” problem doesn’t just stop at energy… there are plastics and chemicals aplenty. Not sure what the split is but I remember reading that only 2/3 of oil is used for fuel/energy.
Perhaps we should build a stealth sailing ship with solar and thermocouple supplemented electric drives.
Who better than the former sea lord to answer the question
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdRH5wzCQQw
Sounds much like the sdsr strategy fwd engagement
Nurse, is it time for my daily rant on the DfID budget?
We give the Saudis money for their oil.
ICI just before it was trashed (would the French or Yanks allowed the dismembering of one of their world class companies?)developed a process for making perspex with CO2 rather than oil.
If Al-qaeda take over Saudi Arabia we will be fighting jihadists armed with F-15E, Typhoon, etc.
Not keen on Cameron, but lending C-17s for “Operation land Hollande in it” was a stroke of genius. Let the French do the fighting for once. Or as the American sign said “French rifle for sale, never fired, only dropped once”.
Hi Simon, I used to think like that, too
Take UK in 2011, in mln tonnes of oil eqvlnts:
Oil/ petroleum inputs 145
Total final consumption of energy 147!
- that includes gas, coal, bio and other electricity!!
Conversion losses between energy sources before distribution or any other uses 48
- once converted, further losses in distribution 17
Non-energy use (DIVERTED) of oil 8.7 (call it 9)
- 6 % of input of oil/ petroleum (within the UK that is, not accounting for the content in imported goods)
- 18 % of what is lost just because the inputs (of all energy sources) are not optimal relative to the capacity using them
- 50 % of what is lost by the energy industry in use, including transmission
So the laws of physics might be hard on trying to change the last mentioned proportion, but you can still see that the 2/3′s is the old fish wives talking?