The term ‘stealth’ has been applied to everything from ships to towed generators but the most widespread understanding of term is as applied to combat aircraft, the F117, F22 and of course, the F35. Low observability has a cost penalty but in the face of emerging air defence technologies such as multistatic radar it really isn’t an optional extra.
Electronic countermeasures also contribute to the aircraft survivability mix, arguably under reported in the sexy stealth world.
One of the newest technologies on the attacking side is intercept-resend, it is far more sophisticated than what we might understand as jamming.
Put simply, Intercept-Resend, absorbs the sending radars signal, manipulates it and resends it back to the receiver. The resent signal can give a false impression of location, speed and shape, or, it can even be manipulated in such a way that completely false targets are fed back.
These false signals are extremely difficult to counter.
Step forward Mehul Malik, Omar S. Magana-Loaiza, and Robert W. Boyd from the University of Rochester, New York.
We have built an imaging system that uses a photon’s position or time-of-flight information to image an object, while using the photon’s polarization for security. This ability allows us to obtain an image which is secure against an attack in which the object being imaged intercepts and resends the imaging photons with modified information. Popularly known as “jamming,” this type of attack is commonly directed at active imaging systems such as radar. In order to jam our imaging system, the object must disturb the delicate quantum state of the imaging photons, thus introducing statistical errors that reveal its activity.
This exploits the simple fact that in order to measure a photon changes its quantum properties and it is these changes that can be detected, using quantum mechanics to provide what would appear to be a detection system that is immune to counter.
Their initial tests have been reported to be successful but no doubt there are a whole host of people lining up to devise a counter counter counter measure!
No, I don’t understand it either but it is interesting to see the source of primary science research and how it might evolve.
Read the paper here;
As far as I know this is a widely known thing in quantum encryption; basically an optical (landline) connection which is not only encrypted, but both legitimate participants also notice if someone is listening or even trying a man-in-the-middle stunt.
I doubt it’s relevant in regard to sensors.
It’s actually very simple to use polarization for ECCM; all you need is an antenna which you can rotate. It’s really only a volume and weight problem.
I don’t know if it works with phased arrays; I’m not sure how they polarize or if at all. Passive phased arrays should be able to do so as easily as classic antennas.
Isn’t this just “range gate pulloff”?
And read carefully, they did not say it is “unjammable” they said, “disturb the delicate quantum state of the imaging photons, thus introducing statistical errors that reveal its activity.” which means that it can detect jamming easier, not that it can bypass the jamming.
AESA frequency hopping can bypass this already by moving to a different frequency before the jammer can react, AND by using multiple frequencies to develop a “composite picture” so that single frequency jamming won’t work. To counter, you either need to know the radar’s frequency hop patterns or use a broad spectrum jammer and a hell lot of power.
No idea what this research could possibly bring to the table.
Seriously; AESA is first and foremost a non-mechanical technique for steering the peak of the emitted radio energy into different directions.
Whatever frequency hopping you can do with AESA, you can most likely do with a parabolic or cassegrain or synthetic aperture antenna as well.
By the way, the “hell lot of power” is not really true as long as the search radar is in LPI (low probability of intercept) mode, which by its principle doesn’t allow much emission of energy.
“Seriously; AESA is first and foremost a non-mechanical technique for steering the peak of the emitted radio energy into different directions.”
That is true, it is just that the multi-diode structure of an AESA gives a lot more flexibility to play games with directional radiation, like multiple peak frequencies from the same emitter. Frequency hopping yes, all radars can do that, but the old ones are limited to single peak frequencies due to their construction.
Regarding power, broad spectrum jammers unfortuantely work by blanketing almost everything, which takes power. Jamming a single frequency may not take much, but if you add everything up, it can come up to a fair bit of transmission power to cover all the possible multi-frequency bands AESA can use. It’s a brute force technique, but if it works, not going to complain. Might be a good counter to stealth. Blind both sides.
Either way, think we finally agree on something. This “new” development isn’t much.