Introduction
Thank you Lord Hutton for your kind introduction. It is good to see so many friends and colleagues here and may I take the opportunity to thank you all for your strong support to the Armed Forces. It is hugely appreciated.
I am feeling slightly cautious this evening. Our senior Defence Attaché in the Americas tells me that in the Aztec calendar today is the Day of the Lizard. They say:
‘The warrior must be like the lizard, who is not hurt by a high fall but, instead, immediately climbs back to its perch. These are good days to keep out of sight; bad days to attract attention.’
So perhaps today isn’t the best time to be standing before you!
In honouring my commitment to this august organisation that plays such an important role in the life of UK Defence, I want to take the opportunity to examine where we are today, what deductions we should draw, and what we are doing to ensure we are prepared for tomorrow.
You are all aware of how much change there has been over the past two years. We have begun to introduce the SDSR, balanced the books and turned a corner in Afghanistan. Yet much of the world seems less stable and more dangerous than was the case even two years ago; a harsh world in which intra-state conflict can be confused by and for new forms of inter-state conflict. A world in which governance vacuums present opportunities for extremist groups to perpetrate large-scale violence and disruption, especially as precision-strike capabilities, cyber instruments and bio terror weaponry become inevitably more accessible. And this in a period when economic fragility makes us both more vulnerable and less able to respond in a confident and timely manner, a reality aggravated by the huge cost differentials between western forces and non-state opponents.
All this is demanding much from all of us and is changing the shape and capabilities of the Armed Forces.
Together with my fellow Chiefs I have been examining, as you would expect, how we should best use what we have and what we need for the future. We have to be hard-nosed realists; accepting we have less than we would wish but that we are still required to protect this nation’s interests through the projection of military force. We cannot shrug our shoulders and hope the problem will go away. We have to be ready to fight and fight effectively, often not on our own terms and accepting the constraints we are under. I have brought this together in a piece of work I will be sharing in the future called How We Will Fight. And I will look at some of its key deductions in a moment.
We should be under no illusions; the Armed Forces of tomorrow, like those of today, will be engaged in operations around the world. They will require the best of their generation as they always have. People who can think flexibly and with imagination. As Einstein said, “imagination is more important than knowledge”.
These operations will not be carbon copies of Afghanistan or Libya. But they will require the same skill and dedication that these operations, and all the others we have engaged in since the Cold War, have demanded. They will require the strength and indeed guile that our Army, Navy and Air Force are famous for.
Building on the battle-winning reputation, proven resilience and technological edge of the past decade, I hope you won’t notice some of the tasks the Armed Forces will be doing. They will be performing a key part of our developing military strategy – deterrence. Preventing conflict, you may recall, is rightly a principal task of Defence.
I will come back to this theme later but it is worth remembering that your Armed Forces are often most effective when they are not in the headlines. Few operations, exercises or training missions are widely reported but each one communicates that we are strong, credible and reliable. This deters our enemies and reassures our friends.
And we should be proud of our nation’s record in this respect. The relative peace we have enjoyed here in the UK for the past 70 years is not an accident. It is in large part the result of the quiet work of diplomats building friendships, the skill of our financiers and businessmen in making our economy strong, and the courage of our Armed Forces in deterring and when necessary overcoming threats.
Afghanistan is an example of this lesson. With our partners in NATO/ISAF and the ANSF we have been more successful than many, regrettably, recognise.
I have recently returned from a visit there and, I can tell you, we are meeting the tasks laid on us. Over the past decade we have:
a. closed Al Qaeda’s bolthole ;
b. helped underpin a more stable government;
c. overseen elections;
d. trained an Army and police force;
e. and put a country that suffered 30-years of war into a position where industry, education and the rule of law are beginning to grow.
True, there is a long way to go. The presidential elections in 2014 will be hugely important. But we are heading in the right direction and we have proved what can be done with the right resources and with the right support.
I look forward to 2013 seeing us increasingly transition to an Afghan lead as we move from mentoring battalions to supporting brigades.
The Afghan Army now enjoys the support and trust of 84 percent of the country, only 3 percent less than the British Army in this country. That is a fantastic achievement, by them and ISAF. It recognises the integral part they are playing in turning the destiny of a country away from violence and onto a path of peace.
I am proud of what our Service men and women have achieved in Afghanistan. Alongside partners in DFID and the Foreign Office we have given Afghans a chance they couldn’t have dreamt of only a few years ago.
Our operation in Afghanistan does not stand alone. It is linked to Pakistan and India and the wider region. In my recent trip to Islamabad, a city I have got to know well, I was very encouraged by the helpful attitude of civilian and military leaders to reconciling the Taliban. The Taliban, like us, are focussed on Afghanistan’s presidential poll and the end of our combat operations in 2014. They know that the window of opportunity to play a role in their country’s future is closing.
Every day the Afghan Army and Police grow in capability and legitimacy. Every day the government is better able to serve its people and thus better able to marginalise the Taliban. Now, surely, the time is ripe to take risk in order to find that elusive political solution 10 years of military effort and sacrifice has sought to create the conditions for? But in order to pull this off, it is vital that Afghan confidence in the West’s long-term commitment to their country is retained. Why, should this be lost, would they stay the course themselves let alone fight to protect us in 2014 when, absent successful reconciliation, we will be at our most vulnerable? And why should the Taliban reconcile, if they thought we were ‘cutting and running’? Retaining Afghan confidence is the campaign’s centre of gravity. And for the UK, retaining our influence and status within NATO and amongst key allies, is another reason for getting this right.
While achieving our goals in Afghanistan, British Armed Forces have been active elsewhere around the world. For example:
In Libya we fought in support of a people who wanted to be free from tyranny. We joined allies from around the world built around a NATO core. Together, we supplied the air force and the navy. The people themselves were the army. They made the change happen.
In the seas off Somalia we are playing our part in an operation that is controlling the spread of piracy. Alongside navies from around the world, including Pakistan, India and China, reinforcing the benefit of cooperation.
Closer to home we have also been proud to play our part in HM the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations. And my fellow Chiefs and I were delighted to receive so many letters of support for the actions of our Regular and
Reserve Service men and women during the Olympics.
It reminded all of us in uniform of the level of support that we enjoy amongst the people of this country. We are very grateful.
All this has happened as we have been going through reforms.
Over the past two years we have implemented some of the most radical changes to the Ministry of Defence and to the Armed Forces in decades.
The SDSR shrank the size of the Armed Forces and changed the governance of the department. And whilst we are aware that the Autumn Statement has further implications, a balanced budget means we can start from a firm base and better demonstrate what is at stake.
The new Armed Forces Committee mandates the Chiefs to resolve problems in the interests of Defence as a whole. It exploits collective military judgment and balances single service requirements in private allowing the CDS to go to the Defence Board with the underpinning authority of a combined Joint service view.
The AFC, the Defence Strategy Group chaired jointly by John Thomson the PUS and me, and the new style Defence Board chaired by Philip Hammond enable the MOD to be more agile and decisive in responding at the strategic level to developing threats and trends. The world is not a safe place. Some threats to our interests and allies are long term but some are very present.
The immediate danger of the collapse of the Syrian regime is one. We will support our allies in the region and would all like to see a diplomatic solution but cannot afford to remove options from the table at this stage. Should chemical weapons be used or proliferate, both President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron have made it clear that a line would have been crossed.
And Syria is linked to Iran. The regime is backed by Tehran so the fall of Assad’s dictatorship will impact the Iranian government. What that means for the stability of the region is as yet unclear.
In my recent trip to the Manama Dialogue I was struck by the issues that came up. Our host, Crown Prince Salman of Bahrain, emphasised the threat of nuclear proliferation. North Korea’s missile test last week aggravates this risk.
The Kenyan and Ugandan armed forces have been exemplary in bringing order to Somalia but this has not been without cost. Both have sustained losses, and the retaliation of terrorist groups has endangered Kampala, Nairobi and the Kenyan coast. We must continue to support both countries, as well as the fledgling Somali government.
To the west, Mali is a major cause for concern. As still is Yemen, despite President Hadi’s laudable efforts. So What?
Now reducing these short and long term threats, our task is to evolve a force capable of meeting, with allies, various complex tasks. By the early 2020s, these plans result in a powerful Joint force that, on the basis of a balanced budget from Planning Round 12, should be able to meet the requirements laid on it.
It has not been easy.
But the Secretary of State, building on the work of the SDSR, has ensured that the department is able to squeeze the most from the resources available.
By 2020 we will have kit that many of my fellow NATO Chiefs of Defence, saddled with much more sclerotic budgets than we, are envious of:
a. A World Class Carrier Capability with the JSF – Lightning II – on board;
b. Type 45 destroyers on patrol;
c. Type 26 frigates in production;
d. Astute class submarines;
e. Chinook Mk 6 bringing the total Chinook fleet to 60;
f. Typhoon Tranche 3, as well as the Lightning II;
g. Atlas and Voyager air transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, underpinned by our now larger C17 fleet;
h. Scout vehicles, upgraded Warrior, Challenger, and Apache to give the Army better reconnaissance, mobility and firepower;
i. Rivet Joint and other critical ISTAR platforms that will ensure we have better situational awareness than ever.
j. And much more emphasis on Cyber, to which I will return shortly.
But our most decisive asset will remain our Service men and women.
As the private sector puts it, we must look after the ‘talent’. As I see equipment around the world parked with no-one to operate it. Great equipment without talented people counts for little.
We must ensure our people have the intelligence and confidence to treat the unexpected as an opportunity to exploit. They must be capable of informed, independent action; of what has been described as a ‘brains-based approach’ to operations.
You have all heard the common refrain that we must do more with less. Well, to be frank, that is what we are doing. At the strategic level, a brains-based approach means deciding to act only when we must and then doing it well, not always kinetically.
This type of thinking has shaped the work I have started on ‘How We Will Fight’. Assuming the approach I have just outlined, I and my fellow Chiefs have designed our forces to:
a. act jointly and with allies, but able to act alone.
b. be well equipped, but not tied to platforms.
c. adapt as the environment changes.
But we must prioritise. And as spending has tightened, we must be ruthless in our requirements and getting the most from them. Effectively targeting limited resources is, in large part, the art of military command in war and in peace through force design.
The new UK Joint Expeditionary Force is an expression of this. The JEF promises much greater levels of integration than previously achieved especially when combined with others, as is already happening with our French allies in the Anglo/French Combined JEF. The JEF must be genuinely synergistic. It is the building block to future alliances and independent action. And we would hope that allies such as Denmark and Estonia, who have fought with distinction in a British formation in Afghanistan, will want to play key roles within the British element of the CJEF.
What it offers is clear: an integrated joint force with capabilities across the spectrum at sea, on land and in the air. A force that can confidently be allocated a specific slice of the battle space in an allied operation or act alone.
It will be the basis of all our combined joint training.
With the capability to ‘punch’ hard and not be a logistical or tactical drag on a coalition, we will be especially welcomed by our friends and feared by our enemies.
The JEF will be of variable size; a framework into which others fit. It will be the core of the UK’s contribution to any military action, whether NATO, coalition or independent.
Together with critical C2 elements such as HQ ARRC and the emphasis placed on the maritime component HQ at Northwood, the JEF is designed to meet our NATO obligations.
In the Libyan campaign, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were able to play a vital role by bringing their regional expertise into the command structure of a NATO operation. This provided greater military and political reach. I look forward to the alliance, perhaps in part through the vehicle of the JEF, working more with non-member states.
Britain’s JEF will be capable of projecting power with global effect and influence. Nowhere is more important to us than our friends in the Middle East and Gulf and in line with clear political intent we would expect, with other initiatives, for JEF elements to spend more time reassuring and deterring in that region. The Royal Navy
Let me briefly examine how the How We Fight work affects the single services, starting with the Royal Navy. As the Prime Minister has put it, the Navy “keeps the arteries of trade of the global economy from hardening.”
The Royal Navy will continue to grow in importance. As our carrier capability comes into service it will be a key part of our diplomatic, humanitarian and military strategy. Prepared to overcome the toughest military challenges. This is its raison d’être. But I know it will be used for much more.
The Americans demonstrated through their deployment to Aceh and Haiti that aircraft carriers have huge strategic impact supporting people around the world. Seeing US military personnel, ships and helicopters playing such a critical role boosted the standing of the US in the world’s most populous Islamic country and undermined extremist rhetoric.
Hard power is an essential element of soft power. In this respect especially, numbers, or mass, still matter. We must resolve the conundrum at the heart of Bob Gates quip about ‘exquisite technology’.
In the future, the Chief of the Naval Staff and I have a vision for a Navy which procures ships differently allowing us to have more, not fewer platforms.
We must resist the pressure that has shrunk the number of platforms. Clearly that will mean rethinking the Navy, including examining the case for ships that may have a limited role in general war. But this is not new ¬¬¬– remember the corvette over the ages – and is similar to the utility of light and heavy land forces, tailored to task. And in so doing we will ensure seamanship skills and leadership qualities, so much in demand by our friends and allies, flourish into the long term.
The Royal Navy’s maritime and amphibious components, with 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines at the core of the latter, will be at the heart of Britain’s JEF. As the concept develops we will look to acquire ships that range from top-end war fighting elements through potentially to more vessels tailored to discrete but important tasks, to be deployed on a range of routine non-warfighting duties.
The British Army
The Army too is changing. Once we come out of the combat role in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, it will cease to be on permanent rotation with the burdens that imposes.
The Army will maintain a hard power war-fighting capability while creating the strategic influence, support and engagement ability essential to modern operations.
Like the Navy, these land forces must be equipped to pack a punch but war fighting is not all they’re for.
Conflict prevention, to which I will return in a moment, is not just sensible strategy; it is a military operation requiring appropriately configured and equipped forces.
The Army 2020 reforms are a fundamental re-set for the Army, making the best of a regular force a fifth smaller than when I commanded it only three years ago.
While we will retain three high-readiness manoeuvre brigades, we will also have ‘adaptable brigades’ to sustain enduring operations and routinely develop partnerships and knowledge around the world.
Though more conceptual work is needed, given the importance of the region and clear Prime Ministerial intent, I envisage two or more adaptable brigades forming close tactical level relationships with particular countries in the Gulf and Jordan, for example, allowing for better cooperation with their forces. Should the need arise for another Libya-style operation, we will be prepared. This would greatly enhance our ability to support allies as they contain and deter threats and, with our naval presence in Bahrain, air elements in the UAE and Qatar, and traditional but potentially enhanced roles in Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, would make us a regional ally across the spectrum.
In Africa, brigades would be tasked to support key allies in the east, west and south whilst another might be given an Indian Ocean and SE Asian focus, allowing for much greater involvement in the FPDA, for example.
If we are to influence, we must know what drives our friends and how to motivate them. This is not something that can be done on the eve of an operation. As these adaptable brigades develop links with countries around their region, this will create opportunities for soldiers and officers to progress their careers through linguistic and cultural specialism.
The Defence Engagement Strategy, prepared with the Foreign Office, will provide what I have often referred to as a ‘strategic handrail’ for engagement.
This will require tough decisions. If we are to invest properly in some relationships, others will naturally get less attention.
But if we get this right ¬– and we will – we will have deeper links to specific regional partners giving them the confidence to deal with their own problems and, when appropriate, to act in partnership with us.
What I have described puts military flesh on the bones of welcome, NSC endorsed, national strategy.
This all comes as we are increasing the Reserves and integrating them closer with the Regular forces. This will do more to increase our own capacity and ability to help friends and allies. The Royal Air Force
Turning now to the Royal Air Force. The rate of technological advance is most keenly felt on air platforms. This is understandable. These are complex fully networked combat and ISTAR platforms. This intelligence cuts the time between understanding and reacting. It allows us better to out-think and out-act our opponents.
At the same time, lift, both tactical and global, reduces the number of reserves we need to keep, giving the Armed Forces a flexibility that was unimaginable just a few decades ago.
Understanding and exploiting the opportunities technology presents will be decisive in maintaining our advantage – in sufficient numbers – into the future.
Remotely piloted air systems and novel anti-air defences have changed our understanding of both what it means to fight and defend. We must not allow sacred cows – such as the indispensability of on-board pilots – to rule the day. The Chief of the Air Staff is leading the change. By giving ‘wings’ to UAV pilots the Royal Air Force is recognising the capability of the platform and skill of the pilot.
Indeed, it is a reflection of how early we are in this process of transition that we still refer to remotely-piloted air systems or unmanned aerial vehicles. How long was it before we stopped referring to the horseless carriage?
For all three Services, their role within an integrated CJEF will be the driving force in their force development and training. Whoever the enemy, wherever the threat, we will need partners. Building them now is an investment in our own future and our capacity to succeed quickly should war break out. Cyber
But there is a new environment within which we must learn to manoeuvre with confidence.
Today Facebook, with around a billion users, is the third most populous country in the world. It exemplifies one of the most extreme changes we have seen in the past decades.
Cyberspace is the nervous system of our global economy. We are reliant on the internet and other networked systems for every aspect of our lives. It allows bewildering speed of action and global reach.
Unsurprisingly, just as crime has become e-crime, spying has increasingly become cyber espionage. We have seen nations, their proxies and non-state actors use this new space for terrorism and conflict.
Though not conventional assaults, the hostile cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008 and Burma in 2010 were damaging.
In the Middle East, there have been unprecedented levels of cyber attack over the past 24 months. Israel has reported over 44 million attempts to disrupt its government websites during recent tension around the Gaza strip. STUXNET demonstrated a new class of threat aimed at process control systems at the heart of modern infrastructure.
Without doubt, actions in cyberspace will form part of any future conflict. Communication and the control of infrastructure and systems has become a new environment through which combatants will further their objectives.
Our immediate priority must be to ensure our networks are secure and defensible, working with partners in industry and around the country to drive up standards and ensure we have robust protocols in place. This builds on the excellent work done under the National Cyber Security Strategy but Defence has particular challenges as a department, as Armed Forces and through the contractors and partners with whom we work.
I am determined that the Armed Forces should understand cyberspace, and how it will shape future conflict, as instinctively as we understand maritime, land and air operations.
This will mean changes in the way we operate: new doctrine; new capabilities; new structures, with Joint Forces Command at their heart. It will mean a new approach to growing and developing the talent we need to operate in this new, electronic, environment. Like our Secretary of State, I see an important role for reserves in this domain.
Winding Up
In examining each environment separately I hope I have highlighted some of the key issues on the Chiefs’ plate and how we must respond to them. But the most important is developing an integrated Joint model.
The JEF is neither the 1980s Canadian model nor, whilst there are some apparent similarities, is it a British version of the US Marine Corps.
The effectiveness of the UK armed forces relies heavily on the different skill-sets and ethos of each single Service. Each adapted for its environment, and evolving as times and technology change.
But a joint conceptual approach, based on lessons from the real world, embedded through force development, in training, on operations and though the cohering glue of modern C3I and cyber is vital to delivering the military capability the nation requires.
This is about ensuring single Service skills meld into joint action so that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
The JEF won’t mean we can do more with less; it will mean, through the synergy it provides, that we get the most from what we have. And doubtless there will be some roles that we continue to leave to others, notably the USA.
As I close let me draw some lessons from my 41 years in uniform.
Some constants which may seem obvious in this room but are often over looked:
a. The need for military force to influence, secure and protect is as great as ever.
b. I joined an Army that was geared to defend Britain by fighting in Germany.
c. Today life is more complex but the principle is the same.
d. 9/11, and the 7/7 bombings in London show that we cannot choose our battlefields as we once did.
e. The world is not a safer place and the distinction between home and abroad is strategically obsolete. Today it is part of a continuum.
We cannot just stand by and hope we are ignored and danger passes us by.
As the Foreign Secretary said in September last year: “the country that is purely reactive in foreign affairs is in decline”.
Responses may be based on either soft or hard power, but to divorce the two is strategic blindness. Soft power is not a substitute for strength. On the contrary, it is often based on the credible threat of force, either to support a friend or deter an enemy.
Hard power and soft power are intertwined.
It is not enough to provide aid or speak kindly. Our friends want to know we are there when it counts, not just fair-weather friends. This is the confidence hard power brings. It drives equipment sales and thus industrial growth, as well as diplomatic treaties, just as it has for centuries. But hard power also does more than this: it dissuades.
Deterrence doctrine has fallen out of fashion so perhaps you will allow me to recall some of the elements. Sun Tzu’s famous maxim is: “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”.
Too often this is seen as clever posturing on the eve of battle. It is not. Training, equipping and partnering with allies enhance the aura of British power. They give us presence on the world stage and ensure that we are not tested.
It is worth being clear: when the Armed Forces train we do not just do it to be ready, we do it to be seen to be ready. When we succeed on operations, we do not just win a battle. We prove that we can win a war.
In a very real sense, everything the Armed Forces do deters and reassures. With enough numbers, enough equipment and with good leaders at every level, Britain is a credible threat to our enemies and a reassuring friend to our allies.
This is cheaper than fighting and more credible than talk.
Reading the record of how the Soviets saw the Falklands War demonstrates this admirably. What many saw as post-colonial folie de grandeur, the Soviet leadership, rightly, saw as proof that the British Armed Forces were united with their government and people – Clausewitz’s famous trilogy – and more than a match for them.
It was far from the only factor, but the increase in Soviet defence spending in the 1980s which ended up contributing to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was partly due to clarity of their failure to impose their will in neighbouring, occupied countries while Britain could liberate territory some 8,000 miles away.
As Chief of the Defence Staff I do not wear the burdens of office any more lightly than my predecessors. I have set out some of my concerns for the coming years and some of the ways we will think and act to meet them.
Under the Prime Minister’s chairmanship, The National Security Council, on which I am privileged to sit, considers all the big strategic issues that I have listed and more. It is a hugely welcome addition to Whitehall, directing and bringing clarity to national strategy and coordinating cross-government action.
But the nature of the world is such that what will later seem obvious, today is opaque and unpredictable. How will Europe emerge from the Euro crisis? How will the Arab Spring conclude? How will global warming affect water supplies?
And what of cyber?
After all, grand strategy, while providing a guide to action in peacetime, is also about being prepared and balanced for what we can never know.
Ensuring we have enough left in the bag while actively deterring, and when required defeating, aggression against us and our friends, enough left to succeed against those ‘unknown unknowns’, is ultimately what I and my fellow Chiefs are paid for.
END
H/T Mark
I agree with Chris B that the Holland class offers most of what we should be looking for in a cheap OPV. If not that then a River mk2 is fine with me as long as it doesn’t end up as a project that spends a lot of money for very little difference to the original design.
As I said earlier I think it’s best to keep a very clear high/low distinction. I really don’t want to see some mid sized, reasonably armed light frigate of corvette because it wouldn’t fill either high intensity task group or constabulary roles particularly effectively for the money invested.
Either sacrifice 1 or 2 T26 on the clear understanding that it brings about either a Holland or stretched River with something like APATS suggested weapons fit or simply build more T26 hulls without all the expensive stuff installed.
APATS said “only 1 stern block is designed that can all take a TAS if required.”
You don’t think they would do it differently do you? Say it ain’t so! Oh gosh. I hope not. Then again this the MoD we are talking about.
I know this comes up a lot but wouldn’t something like Singapore’s RSS Endurance for the MHPC role?
With the recent cost for Thailand being 200 million SGD with associated landing craft.
With the loss of RFA Largs Bay a few of these vessels could provide 80% of that capability, provide the patrolling task with its hanger and well dock for small craft and mothership usage. And with the amount of space and the utility of the well deck could provide some of the other missions?
Pre SDSR 2010, the RN had 47 significant surface vessels outside of the carriers / amphibs – 1 T45, 5 T42s, 4 T22s, 13 T23s, 8 Hunts, 8 Sandowns, 4 Rivers, 2 Echos, HMS Scott and HMS Endurance (albeit with a hole in).
Current plans would give 33 – 6 T45s, 13 T26s, 8 MHPCs, 4 Rivers (?), HMS Scott and an ice breaker.
I would be interested if anyone thought 33 was enough hulls based on the current commitments. In my view ww either need to cut commitments or come up with a way to get back to pre 2010 levels (atleast).
Whilst I agree we should wait to see how things progress before throwing away our MCMs the MHPC concept is probably a good place to start with an early patrol focused batch.
I’ve been over fed and over drunk over the christmas period. I have caught up on my recorded TV (coz so much on telly was crap). I am now an instant expert on the subject of several navel matters having watched about 8 hours of relevant telly and caught up on few internet bloggs an sites.
(Those of you who have ‘flogged the hoggin’ whatever a hoggin is and why it needed floggin elludes me but there we go, please feel free to role your eyes at armchair experts.)
Traditional MCMs have been built to the absolute rule of reducing magnetic and accoustic signitures. Whatever else that does, it has resulted in some vessels which are less that robust either mechanicaly or in terms of ‘knocks and bumps’ nor neceseceraly that good at sea keeping. They really are ‘one trick ponies’. Now that does not mean you cannot use them as for example OPV’s (The old Ton class were much used in this role, but their wooden hulls were tougher than modern GRP ones); its just that (to suposidly paraphrase the Emperor Claudius) ‘You can kill a cat with horn porridge spoon but you often break the spoon in the process’, in other words they were used because they were there not coz they were any good. They were also often the exception to modern ships, in that the hull and machinery costs are fully the equal of the special kit fitted to them.
Phil& others (I think) and I are suggesting that perhaps a steel hulled holland style GP vessels can be used for several roles IF a proper MCM kit can be fitted to it that actually works, and makes up for noisy standard diesel, and all that inconveniently magnetic steel. Now it seems that the US in particular is getting that part of the Kit wrapped round its neck.
For the life of me I cannot see why?
Lets face it we are talking about ROPV Sonars scaners and imaging systems, and Manipulating arm ROPV’s of exactly the type that are being used in the offshore Oil, survey and salavage industries. They are already not bothered with trying to get ships into tricky situations, but sending them in instead. Ok we may need the red hot millitary spec best there is, but in principle it simple.
I am not particulary wedded to the container with a view that such ships can swap roles the history of that kind of thing (and the pest if smaller example was the flex 300), is that such ships would rarely swapp assingned roles, but it would be cost effective if when we do need to start ordering them by 2020 or so we could order a batch of both. BTW could we get an anti sub kit worth having on a Holland class type hull? Could someone in the know say yea, nay or poss
This is rusi’s take on the year ahead has some interesting observations for this discussion I think
http://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=videos&ref=V50D2EC8D2A03F#.UOCYApEgGK0
Janes had an article in their 79 (I think), review of the year, about how F*ckin wonderful offshore support vessels would be as OPV’s MCM’s and towed array vessels, Sorry TD you are a rampant plagiarist:)
X said: “MCMV are constructed the way they are for a purpose. Same with hydrographic vessels. Same with OPV.”
I am afraid your just showing your age matey
Technology moves on, you dont need to build the worlds most expensive plastic, non-magnetic ship in order to do first rate MCM anymore; new sensors, new techniques, USV’s, UUV’s etc.
Regarding RAM, Raytheon won a contract worth $45.2 million for 70 Launching Canisters, 65 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 1/Mod 3, 25 RAM Block 1/Mod 7, and replenishment spares in support of the RAM Program for the United States Government. That gives a basic idea of the cost. There doesn’t seem to be a firm cost anywhere for the main unit, or how much it costs to integrate it.
My worry is that once you set about building a British version of the Holland class, with some kind of air defence measure, then you’re quickly creeping towards a threshold of spending more than 50% of the cost of a Type 26, which means you’re not going to get a 2:1 ratio of OPV versus T26.
That means to get 4 OPV, which is basically the minimum we would need to cover one task like the APT(N) is going to cost us two Type 26 and leave us just 11 frigates. I’m not sure that’s a worthwhile trade off?
@ Jed
I am not really sea keeping is still sea keeping. Sidescan sonars are still dependent on size for a given resolution and need a given amount of power still requires a given size of generator. A given hull shape will still push water that produces a given signature. Water is still water. Steel still has the same properties. Sound moves the through water in the same way. The sea bottom is still millions of square miles in its coverage. I know in your day valves (both for steam and electric) were very exciting and new technology and so modern advances probably seem like magic. But please don’t get carried away with the technology too much eh?
If you think this,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Echo_class_survey_ship_(2002)
can be replaced with a container’s worth of equipment without need for a platform with azimuth thrusters for precise positioning then you have probably drunk to much modular container kool aid.
Thanks Mark, for the great RUSI link (had passed me unnoticed that Prof. Clark also is the Director General of RUSI)
- the last two minutes of the less than five pretty much outlined all the themes and conclusions I have been banging on here for the last two years (how do you do the smug smile with those moodies?)
None of this works without some more money and an acceleration of shipbuilding otherwise we still have around about 19 escorts until the mid 2020s.
We can’t have anymore warship programs like T45 that stop at 6 and hardly gain any benefits of scale
It seems to me there should be two programs starting soon and running through the 2020s
T26 – at least 8 fully equipped as per the brochures; at least 13 hulls in total but recognising the other 5 may be more GP versions but still with upgrade potential
‘OPV’ – 90-110m boats – Holland type but potential for greater flexibility for some degree of modular add ons in mission deck or top side for self defence, UVs, TAS (and even MCM!) etc. Sensible self defence and flying the flag weapons fit (see APATs post)- 76mm main gun. This is not as radical as the Black Swan concept. These are more patrol oriented with less modularity but a greater basic weapons fit. Start out building 8 – asap to get fleet numbers up. This is where an initial increased budget is needed
I would hope that then with two mature platform designs, we can avoid starting from scratch again and instead develop incremental develop ‘flight 2′ versions of both to see us to the right mix of types for the future. Ultimately an AAW version of the T26 to supplant / replace T45. This then allows greater future focus on payload rather than platform
Hi APATS and Chris B, to me
“$45.2 million for 70 Launching Canisters, 65 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 1/Mod 3, 25 RAM Block 1/Mod 7, and replenishment spares in support of the RAM Program for the United States Government. That gives a basic idea of the cost. There doesn’t seem to be a firm cost anywhere for the main unit, or how much it costs to integrate it” sounds like 6 systems operational and about $ 7.5 mln each, exactly the same as the base system (with the throw-away gun) … well, not exactly, but integration is out of factory, so costed into the profit margin
- so basically the new system costs twice as much, but reaches out 6 times (and should have a more assured kill ratio)
- not a bad deal, and the 50% re-use should be considered a discount from the buyer’s perspective?
Flogging Ullstein X-bow ships to the Coasties.
An interesting French concept, at the other end of the scale.
@Chris B
‘My worry is that once you set about building a British version of the Holland class, with some kind of air defence measure, then you’re quickly creeping towards a threshold of spending more than 50% of the cost of a Type 26, which means you’re not going to get a 2:1 ratio of OPV versus T26′
Exactly! If you’re going to go down this road then keep it cheap and cheerful, otherwise why bother!
X
Surely the point is that ‘traditional’ MCMV opperated by ‘dragging’ there sensors into an area behind them or fitted to their hull, so the hull had to be as amagnetic and quiet as poss.
Newer technology would seem to offer the possibility of ‘pushing’ the sensors in first, avoiding the need for super delicate expensive unobtainum hulls and engines. Like I said much of the necessary kit seems to be of a type readily available.
The interesting bit of all this ‘how many Hollands in a trade off for one Txy’ is that the Dutch navy got rid of their corvettes,in order to get these ocean-going vessels with legs
- not all of the corvettes, because the Belgians had got some of them, and one could not pull the rug from under the whole fighting end of the Belgian navy, by terminating their long-term support arrangements
The Spain ship would be about as close as we get to ideal hard to see a uk design doing much better maybe a couple of different systems. The adaptable fwd engagement force of the rn
http://www.navantia.es/files/Avante%203000%20%2030092011.pdf
Hi Mark, I have always thought that BAM is v good VFM
Length overall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93.90 m
Full load displacement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,840 t
Full load draught. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.50 m
Total accommodation capacity. . . . . . . . . . 35 + 35 p
But, at 108m the Hollands will also have 60% more range, 50 crew, 40 other operatives, 100 evacuees, and thinking of going into e.g. Syria, to fetch them, a citadel against CBRN
- so almost double of everything, despite only 20% more in length and cost (almost double in displacement, as one would guess)
Thanks Mark and ACC
I think the sweet spot is somewhere in the BAM to Holland range of capabilities.
Anybody know how much does the strales 76 mm costs v a normal 76mm? The former at least gives some degree of missile defence without needing to consider adding searam / ram / seaceptor / phalanx at the outset. Although deck fittings for one of those would allow retrofitting in times of need.
ACC
The BAM actually has longer legs than the Holland by a decent margin. It specifies a Citadel but has no info on sub citadels, it also makes no mention of what “facilities” actually are for 100 evacuees. Not sure if a BAM has a citadel or not. It can however carry 3 containers
I think mark is correct in that if and I say if it was decided that we could use and should build such a vessel that we should look at what we want it to do. Although that should not rule out a foreign design as the basis.
I have already laid out what i would be looking for and I calculate the Ships company would require to be somewhere in the region of 50-60 including a Ships flight.
Did we lose a load of comments at some point?
Admin linked three of the naval-future articles back on page two of the comments for this RUSI post:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/11/the-future-of-the-royal-navy-04-forward-presence-squadrons/
Bizarrely there is a big reply from admin directed at half a dozen people, including me, but there is no sign of the post from me that he might be responding to……..
I seem to recall there were a few glitches some months back, maybe this is one of them.
Jedi’ had a quick look there. The comment count of 22 seems a bit low on that thread doesn’t it. Will do a spot of digging. At the end of then post are links to the other posts in the series’ for some reason they are broken because they have an extra couple of hyphens, the posts are there but just delete a couple of hyphens until I can change
Hi APATS, agree on your thinking, but I get the ranges as 3000nm vs 5000 (the latter at 15 knots). This article that has been made available in scanned form is quite thorough http://www.dutchembassyuk.org/images/document/354.pdf
Yes, the citadel is for crew only, so you can sail through or into a *potentially* contaminated area
What I dont get is that when you look at the Hollands, which are nothing more than a decent design for relativly big OPV of a type (See BAM) that other nations have looked at and decided to adopt; what in the name of Noel Edmunds, made the spams pay what they did for their big national defence cutters?!
I like the Hollands for all sorts of reasons and agree with other posters that the upgraded 76 mm gun at the front, and at least a phalanx at the back would be a better armamemnt. Than the 2 hi tech 50 cal mounts. However those are details.
The question is more can we see these in the RN replacing Mine Sweepers, Rivers, Survey vessels,etc? and a couple of t26?
If they did replace t26 could they be made with the option of a workable anti sub fit (towed array, targeting sonar, and helicopter) suitable for say working the coastally in uk water under land aircover and aew, releasing t26 for elephant herding duties?
BTW I do say the option of so if we need to we could rather that reinventing the t26, the old ‘fitted for not with’.
@IXION – I agree. In a wartime environment, they have to have a use, even if its just escort of RFAs to theatre or standing in for UK FRE and TAS for SSBNs. They therefore need a limited degree of adaptability (but perhaps greater than the Holland design) to bolt on a TAS module say at the rear, or maybe a Seaceptor / harpoon / ram module topside. Its not Black swan levels of modularity but just a sensible degree of forethought into whatever design we go for
ACC
The Navantia link at Marks post has the BAM range as in excess of 8,00NM at 15kts.
Ixion,
They NSC is 127M long. it has a GT for 30kts plus yet a range of 12000NM at 12kts. They have a 3D air and surface search radar as well as the EW suite from an Arleigh Burke. They also have a hangar for 2 MH60.
Despite this it still has only the 110 57MM gun and no missile system so I am not sure why they have ended up costing £400 million a pop either. More expensive I can see but that expensive i cannot.
@mickup
Just to clarify, are you fine with having a Holland sized and capable ship as long as it has the room for adaptability in a crises?
I agree that no matter how cheap and cheerful a class is it makes good sense to have some ‘fitted for not with’ margins included. My only fear is that we could take a very simple and cost effective design and start adding all sorts of modification and expensive bits of kit from the off, thus sky-rocketing the price and bringing the whole point of the project into question.
Yes Challanger
Very important to keep costs down otherwise no point.
I just wondered if there was any intrinsic problem with giving a Holland style ship room for a proper anti sub fit in a wholey beningn invironemt Ie UK home waters or even the mid atlantic where there is no real air threat other than bears whisch must be the easiest millitary aircraft target in the world.
APATS
I am familier with NSC spec. I have a very good, large, detailed, book on the history of the USCG.
In the 1970′s, BEFORE they gave up their axuillery Anti Sub role in the 90′s; the commanders were screaming can we PLEASE have no more super complicated specmachinery ships! KISS was the principle they wanted for all the machinery fit. God knows what happened between then and now, but not I suspect unconnected with the NSC builders now touting the platform as a replacement for the Perrys and LSC.
Hollands sensor fit is far from shabby, indeed they have been criticised in that element for being way over spec. I still think someone saw them comming when you consider we are supposed to be getting t 26 for about that price!
From what I can gather the proposed idea was these sort of vessels would be for standing patrols or for regional engagement. I guess there role in a more major conflict would be similar to the mcm and hydro fleet at present and possibly escorting STUFT to an area were I can’t see the threat being really high. This then frees up the proper ff/dd ships to do the major war/high end bit. We did gap or even sent and rfa to the Falklands for that very purpose in the last few years likewise Caribbean and I guess even pirate chasing with fort Victoria.
I mean if you look at recent conflicts going by wiki then we sent 9 proper ff/dd to the gulf in 91, 6 in 2003 and 5 to Libya (though not all at the same time and with less than there full weapons fit as the press kindly highlighted) the RN currently says it needs 8 with trailing sonar to meet its requirements there and way back in the 60s when cv01 was on the go did it not have a requirement for 4 type 82s to be built to protect the carriers we have 6 daring for that purpose today. And from reading a number of naval piece here and else where it’s not really the war fighting bit that’s driving numbers but those standing task requirement.
The fitted for not with requirement I think drives costs to high by all means ensure we know what can and can’t be done with these vessels but adding a citadel and link 16/22 to a bam type vessel would be about as far as I’d go. Ensuring a merlin can at least land on the ship would enusre at least some form of extra capability.
As in all walks of life money or the lack there off changes attitudes there is no extra coming and commitments ain’t gonna reduce so something is gonna have to change.
@ challenger – yes. Holland is an example, but the venator design, an expanded Clyde, BAM type could all be in the mix. I agree that the challenge is about getting the spec right at the outset. Basic sensor fit, commensurate with weapons fit, helo deck and hanger, 76mm main gun, 2-30mm guns and mini guns / GPMGs. The only ‘gold plating’ I’d look to extend to would be the strales version of the 76mm and the only other debate would be whether to fit a Phalanx (gun) at the outset or leave it fitted for but not with. These days, think having a CIWS is probably a price we need to pay to give a base level of self protection. Missile options such as CAMM / RAM / Searam and TAS option would be fitted for but not with
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khareef_class_corvette
To me these things kill several birds with one stone, they are more capable and rangy than a River class, have some decent weapons Exocet/Mica. They are cheap, £130m each, have RN compatible systems and British built.
A flotilla equipped with Lynx/Wildcat could cover all the various standing patrols e.g. APTS, plus anti-piracy leaving the DD/FFs to do the heavy duty escort stuff. This is the approach the French have with their small patrol frigates. They are also very close in size and spec to the dear old Leander class. Small but still fighty, more so than a BAM.
Added bonus is that they would keep BAE Portsmouth going as well. My vote would be a reduction in projected T26 fleet and enough of these to cover say 3 standing patrols 8 and 9?
@mickup
Yeah that’s all along the same general lines as what I was thinking, the most expensive items being the 76mm and a CIWS, the most important element being a flight deck and hangar, with some extra space being the only concession to missiles.
@waddi
Khareef is also a possibility, not sure why it needs 100 men though, nor if it has decent long legs or any capability to throw a TAS off the stern from an ISO container
On the plus side as you say, its a design we have to hand, sort of like an evolved Clyde. I’d drop any pretence of missiles for an original fit, and just put a phalanx on
Personally I am not sold on the requirement for a CIWS for these vessels beyond the capability offered by something like a Seahawk Sigma mount. Even with the older French Mistral missile in the cansiter that gives you an engagement range of 2.5NM. 2 or 3 of these combined with the integrated 30MM mount gives 360 degree coverage and good self defence capability against air and surface targets.
Waddi
I believe that the Khareef class have suffered several problems, not the least of which being a large cost overrun which is going to see BAE taking a big financial hit on the class. If we asked for the same vessel today the quote would certainly be around £200 million each.
@APATs
I suppose Phalanx has commonality in its favour but I’d probably accept a couple of seahawk sigmas instead; especially if it already has strales 76MM. Seems to me its a versatile system that could retrofit Rivers / Clyde, guns on Amphibs / RFAs
The Seahawk Sigma looks cool, id happily have that in place of a Phalanx.
Ok – Phalanx hi end, Sea Hawk sigma low end. Still can have phalanx / searam as a bolt on option if things get hotter
Of course, knowing the RN / Government, if we ever get a ship out of this, it will just come with one 30mm…
Info on the SIGMA here
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/08/the-type-26-global-combat-ship-2/
http://www.msi-dsl.com/our_products/weapons/sigma.php
http://home.janes.com/events/exhibitions/dsei2009/sections/daily/day3/latest-sigma-gunmissile-c.shtml
http://www.bdec-online.com/bd-cat37/c370092.pdf
A patrolling RN ship has the very important role of waving the national “willy” and as it is New Year’s eve I might just get away with saying that in this role size does matter.
Replacing a Type 23 with an “upgunned” River in my view is not right. A modern Leander, say 2500t with a gun, AA missiles and ASH missiles is the minimum if the flag waving role is not to be diminished. With imagination should be able to be done at reasonable cost. As per most T23s currently on patrol the launch tubes can be empty but having them fitted “with” rather than “for” is important especially if whomever we wish to be courting is not be left feeling underwhelmed!
A Leander was the T23 of its day; a first rate ASW/GP frigate. You mean a 2500t OPV which is BAM which has been mentioned above. Personally I would go 1000t bigger for the ice strengthened hull and go for a Thetis.
Waddi,
A modern Leander, say 2500t with a gun, AA missiles and ASH missiles is the minimum if the flag waving role is not to be diminished”
So what you want is a GP T26 compressed into a smaller hull form, given that steel and air are the cheapest components that we use in ships how many do you think we could get for each T26 we cancelled. The OPV concept being discussed here is really dependent upon what we may be able to use them for but the additional costs involved in adding a built in SAM system and AsHM will push the price up into frigate territory and simply mean we would be better of sticking with hard worked but full fat FFs instead of gaining an every few extra hulls.
As per most T23s currently on patrol the launch tubes can be empty but having them fitted “with” rather than “for” is important .
I can only assume that you are talking about VL Sea wolf. Harpoon tubes when fitted are armed.
You can tell if a VLS sea Wolf tube is full or not by the type of Cap on top of the tube so spoofing someone with any intelligence is not as easy as we make out.
I have been convinced by various arguments previously against pimped corvettes vs the need to maximise the number of real warfighers. As such I see these vessels supplementing rather than replacing a significant number of dd/ffs. Therefore, costs should be kept to the absolute minimum – the idea is that these are simple presence platforms where the capability is in what they carry rather than what they have built in. That is why tge Black Swan concept is so interesting.
@ APATS
I refer back to Khareef, accepting that the cost may now be more than £400m the Omanis are paying for three they are still very much cheaper than a T23/T26. I quote a Leander as a reference point to size and tonnage not of capability. A T23 is significantly larger, 5000t, than a Leander 2750t.
There are a wide range of 2500t, diesel powered Patrol Frigates/Corvettes/Avisos in service around the world all with Exocet/Mica/Otomat/Harpoon etc. etc. The point I am making is that it has been done for many navies especially the French/Italian/Danish and to simply have a 2500t Patrol vessel with a 30mm replacing a T23 is not right. Replacing a T23 with a similarly armed vessel but smaller one is, especially if it is not needed for escort duties.
I don’t accept that would come at the same cost as a T23 as all the navies that currently operate these Corvettes/OPVs would have come running the BAE’s door to buy T23′s, they didn’t. They took the lower purchase price and operating cost option.
Don’t get me wrong, I like the look of those Holland/Venator/Khareef “mini-frigates” as much as the next man, but I agree with those who say we either need more Rivers or more Type 26s; we don’t really have a role (or a budget) for anything in between.
Also, what’s the rush with MHCP? We have about a dozen perfectly good mine-hunters in no immediate need of replacement. I say let’s wait and see if the US (or anyone else) can develop a worthwhile remote MCM capability, in the meantime crack on with Type 26, then look to put remote MCM on a new ship class or even an extended run of Type 26s, use the hulls without all the expensive whoosh/bang bits, diesels only.
, some excellent ideas here…
I’ll go back to where I think the strategic analysis is taking us..
Firstly the good news.. Its a bigger role for RN..
Then the difficult to digest news, its not the one we are are used to.
And a teaser – when folks say in “wartime” – what do you really mean? Conventional WW2 all over again? Not going to happen. Van Creveld’s seminal book “the transformation of war” suggests (and has largely been proven out), that the days of Clausewitz – of war as inter-state politics by other means – are over. All of the biggest states and economic blocs need each other too much for old fashioned inter-state conflict to be a means to an end – yet their are many other ways they can gain economic advantage by *%&ing each other through asymmetric or cyber threats. Much more worrying are peripheral powers and transnational organizations… So we need to be ready for Argentina (although I doubt they would really be so silly again so long as we are resolute – much more likely to use these new methods of making war).
Lastly… precision already has (and remote technologies are) changed the way we fight. Fire Shadow (if it works?) will much much more useful than a big gun, shipboard UAVs will be much more effective than Wildcat.
So I’ll imagine my fleet.
A hard core for supporting expeditionary operations, either alone or with our allies, focused on a Carrier Task Group (one CV to two in a major crisis) and an amphibious landing group. This will have 8 dedicated escorts assigned (T45, T23/26) from a pool of 12 (4 in refit). All will have full weapons fit. I would go for Sylver for all ships to allow an joint Anglo-French carrier TF to cross deck, and get the new supersonic cruise missile/anti-ship missile.. laser CIWS.. ok I know Sylver is not as good a T41, but lets not have too much wastage on either the perfect solution (but only one ship
) or logistically and maintainance complicated multiple systems..
This battle fleet will exercise regulatory in the main high risk regions – eastern Med and Gulf-Indian ocean with French, US and also Aus, Kiwi, Singapore and Malaysian forces.
Then 16 “Black Swans”…
A six ship Gulf Flotilla – based in Bahrain – covering high threat areas the gulf and Indian ocean – these would be high spec (I accept Phil’s point on modular being hard to achieve – so maybe in between refits)… with MCM remote, UAV, some good ISTAR and maybe some kind of Fire Shadow arrangement, + some remote system for close in defence against surface and air threats.. They should probably have the capability to operate fast attack craft too. I’d rotate one of the Bays with this flotilla, plus a MARS tanker and an ASaC Sea King or Merlin…
A second South Atlantic/Mediterranean flotilla would have 6 Ships with a lower level outfit – good ISTAR is essential in this world (first line of defence, and a force multiplier par excellence – you know where the other guy is and what he’s gonna do next), so I would not cut back there, but no need for the MCM, UAV or Fire Shadow suites, and more limited self-defence kit can be fitted. They could also have a survey suite to carry out droggie missions. For me these ships would be fitted for Wildcat, and be able to provide Falklands, and Gulf of Guinea waters patrol – perhaps with 2 forward based from Gibraltar and 2 on Falklands duties on rotation, any Caribbean deployments can come from this flotilla.
The last 6 vessels would be UK-based with a joint ‘homeland security’ CT/OP/MCM mission, and be fitted out accordingly, with HELO facilities to support longer range SAR or even ASW operations. Some of this group would be in refit at any one time, to keep the two ‘front-line’ overseas flotillas up to strength.
I think some sort of deployable land-based MR will be required in time, but not at the expense of ships. Maybe 6 P8s and 8 MALE UAVs.
Waddi,
I have not suggested replacing a T23 with a 2500t patrol vessel, I was suggesting what would be required if and I say if general Richards speech was talking about introducing such a class.
I am talking about 90-100M 20-25 kts 6000NM at 15kts. 76MM Strales, 2 or 3 Seahawk Sigma mounts giving 360 degree missile CIWS out to 2-3Nm with a couple of 50 cals and a hangar capable of hosting a Wild Cat with FASGW/L, hardly a “River Class”.
Neither the Italians or the danes operate modern 2,500 tonne SAM and AShm classes. The Italian Minerva class Corvettes are ASW specialist units built last century and are only 1200t . the Sirio class do not carry as urface to surface missile. The Thetis is purely gun armed.
The French have the La Fayette but they are not cheap. Most other nations that deploy such vessels do so as they have no need capability or requirement to have a full sized frigate.
Wise ape,
I can see a role for the type of ~Ship i have outlined, i cannot envisage a role for more Rivers?
concur on MHPC.
@px
Not far from my thinking
Would like to keep high end escorts closer to 16 or 18 in total. Are you saying t26 fleet would be just 6?
Lets say 18 and then 18 ‘corvettes/black swans/whatever’
APATs
re Khareef:-
100m
25kts
4500nm (bigger tank needed)
1 x 76mm Oto Melara Cannon
2 x 30mm MSI DS30M 30mm cannon (replace with Seahawk Sigma)
8 x MM-40 Block III Exocet SSM (?)
12 x MBDA VL Mica SAM (replaced by Seahawk Sigma with LMM)
1 x medium helicopter
So by taking off the Exocet and adding a bigger fuel tank we can agree.
Happy New Year!
Reading the sloop of war concept, its clear that they see these ships as able to work together in groups, rather as escorts did in WW2. They also see them as able to operate systems between the group (i.e. each ship is not system specific), they are also mother ships to the emerging technology, unmanned systems. So UAVs, USVs and UUVs. These ships could also operate Wildcat or Merlin, and manned fast attack craft. This is very different type of ship from a patrol frigate or corvette, indeed it is a new type of ship altogether adapted to making the best of emerging technology, to future war. We definitely don’t want a ship that cannot operate these systems, or only in a limited way’
We need flotillas of ships, which are adaptable and less easy to kill – which is what the concept is about.
For me , no-one is suggesting that)this is what we need. How is a Lafayette, (lets forget about a River, no-one is suggesting that solution) going to operate the greater numbers of these unmanned systems as they become mature, more effective and cheaper to build? Its not. And will not such vessels soon be of minimal use and obsolete as a result? Also what happens if you loose two or three of these quite expensive nearly T26s? Give up and go home? 18-20 Blacks Swans please.