General Sir David Richards speech to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

Introduction

Thank you Lord Hutton for your kind introduction. It is good to see so many friends and colleagues here and may I take the opportunity to thank you all for your strong support to the Armed Forces. It is hugely appreciated.

I am feeling slightly cautious this evening. Our senior Defence Attaché in the Americas tells me that in the Aztec calendar today is the Day of the Lizard. They say:

‘The warrior must be like the lizard, who is not hurt by a high fall but, instead, immediately climbs back to its perch. These are good days to keep out of sight; bad days to attract attention.’

So perhaps today isn’t the best time to be standing before you!

In honouring my commitment to this august organisation that plays such an important role in the life of UK Defence, I want to take the opportunity to examine where we are today, what deductions we should draw, and what we are doing to ensure we are prepared for tomorrow.

You are all aware of how much change there has been over the past two years. We have begun to introduce the SDSR, balanced the books and turned a corner in Afghanistan. Yet much of the world seems less stable and more dangerous than was the case even two years ago; a harsh world in which intra-state conflict can be confused by and for new forms of inter-state conflict. A world in which governance vacuums present opportunities for extremist groups to perpetrate large-scale violence and disruption, especially as precision-strike capabilities, cyber instruments and bio terror weaponry become inevitably more accessible. And this in a period when economic fragility makes us both more vulnerable and less able to respond in a confident and timely manner, a reality aggravated by the huge cost differentials between western forces and non-state opponents.

All this is demanding much from all of us and is changing the shape and capabilities of the Armed Forces.

Together with my fellow Chiefs I have been examining, as you would expect, how we should best use what we have and what we need for the future. We have to be hard-nosed realists; accepting we have less than we would wish but that we are still required to protect this nation’s interests through the projection of military force. We cannot shrug our shoulders and hope the problem will go away. We have to be ready to fight and fight effectively, often not on our own terms and accepting the constraints we are under. I have brought this together in a piece of work I will be sharing in the future called How We Will Fight. And I will look at some of its key deductions in a moment.

We should be under no illusions; the Armed Forces of tomorrow, like those of today, will be engaged in operations around the world. They will require the best of their generation as they always have. People who can think flexibly and with imagination. As Einstein said, “imagination is more important than knowledge”.

These operations will not be carbon copies of Afghanistan or Libya. But they will require the same skill and dedication that these operations, and all the others we have engaged in since the Cold War, have demanded. They will require the strength and indeed guile that our Army, Navy and Air Force are famous for.

Building on the battle-winning reputation, proven resilience and technological edge of the past decade, I hope you won’t notice some of the tasks the Armed Forces will be doing. They will be performing a key part of our developing military strategy – deterrence. Preventing conflict, you may recall, is rightly a principal task of Defence.

I will come back to this theme later but it is worth remembering that your Armed Forces are often most effective when they are not in the headlines. Few operations, exercises or training missions are widely reported but each one communicates that we are strong, credible and reliable. This deters our enemies and reassures our friends.

And we should be proud of our nation’s record in this respect. The relative peace we have enjoyed here in the UK for the past 70 years is not an accident. It is in large part the result of the quiet work of diplomats building friendships, the skill of our financiers and businessmen in making our economy strong, and the courage of our Armed Forces in deterring and when necessary overcoming threats.

Afghanistan is an example of this lesson. With our partners in NATO/ISAF and the ANSF we have been more successful than many, regrettably, recognise.

I have recently returned from a visit there and, I can tell you, we are meeting the tasks laid on us. Over the past decade we have:

a. closed Al Qaeda’s bolthole ;
b. helped underpin a more stable government;
c. overseen elections;
d. trained an Army and police force;
e. and put a country that suffered 30-years of war into a position where industry, education and the rule of law are beginning to grow.

True, there is a long way to go. The presidential elections in 2014 will be hugely important. But we are heading in the right direction and we have proved what can be done with the right resources and with the right support.

I look forward to 2013 seeing us increasingly transition to an Afghan lead as we move from mentoring battalions to supporting brigades.

The Afghan Army now enjoys the support and trust of 84 percent of the country, only 3 percent less than the British Army in this country. That is a fantastic achievement, by them and ISAF. It recognises the integral part they are playing in turning the destiny of a country away from violence and onto a path of peace.

I am proud of what our Service men and women have achieved in Afghanistan. Alongside partners in DFID and the Foreign Office we have given Afghans a chance they couldn’t have dreamt of only a few years ago.

Our operation in Afghanistan does not stand alone. It is linked to Pakistan and India and the wider region. In my recent trip to Islamabad, a city I have got to know well, I was very encouraged by the helpful attitude of civilian and military leaders to reconciling the Taliban. The Taliban, like us, are focussed on Afghanistan’s presidential poll and the end of our combat operations in 2014. They know that the window of opportunity to play a role in their country’s future is closing.

Every day the Afghan Army and Police grow in capability and legitimacy. Every day the government is better able to serve its people and thus better able to marginalise the Taliban. Now, surely, the time is ripe to take risk in order to find that elusive political solution 10 years of military effort and sacrifice has sought to create the conditions for? But in order to pull this off, it is vital that Afghan confidence in the West’s long-term commitment to their country is retained. Why, should this be lost, would they stay the course themselves let alone fight to protect us in 2014 when, absent successful reconciliation, we will be at our most vulnerable? And why should the Taliban reconcile, if they thought we were ‘cutting and running’? Retaining Afghan confidence is the campaign’s centre of gravity. And for the UK, retaining our influence and status within NATO and amongst key allies, is another reason for getting this right.

While achieving our goals in Afghanistan, British Armed Forces have been active elsewhere around the world. For example:

In Libya we fought in support of a people who wanted to be free from tyranny. We joined allies from around the world built around a NATO core. Together, we supplied the air force and the navy. The people themselves were the army. They made the change happen.

In the seas off Somalia we are playing our part in an operation that is controlling the spread of piracy. Alongside navies from around the world, including Pakistan, India and China, reinforcing the benefit of cooperation.

Closer to home we have also been proud to play our part in HM the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations. And my fellow Chiefs and I were delighted to receive so many letters of support for the actions of our Regular and

Reserve Service men and women during the Olympics.

It reminded all of us in uniform of the level of support that we enjoy amongst the people of this country. We are very grateful.

All this has happened as we have been going through reforms.

Over the past two years we have implemented some of the most radical changes to the Ministry of Defence and to the Armed Forces in decades.

The SDSR shrank the size of the Armed Forces and changed the governance of the department. And whilst we are aware that the Autumn Statement has further implications, a balanced budget means we can start from a firm base and better demonstrate what is at stake.

The new Armed Forces Committee mandates the Chiefs to resolve problems in the interests of Defence as a whole. It exploits collective military judgment and balances single service requirements in private allowing the CDS to go to the Defence Board with the underpinning authority of a combined Joint service view.

The AFC, the Defence Strategy Group chaired jointly by John Thomson the PUS and me, and the new style Defence Board chaired by Philip Hammond enable the MOD to be more agile and decisive in responding at the strategic level to developing threats and trends. The world is not a safe place. Some threats to our interests and allies are long term but some are very present.

The immediate danger of the collapse of the Syrian regime is one. We will support our allies in the region and would all like to see a diplomatic solution but cannot afford to remove options from the table at this stage. Should chemical weapons be used or proliferate, both President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron have made it clear that a line would have been crossed.

And Syria is linked to Iran. The regime is backed by Tehran so the fall of Assad’s dictatorship will impact the Iranian government. What that means for the stability of the region is as yet unclear.

In my recent trip to the Manama Dialogue I was struck by the issues that came up. Our host, Crown Prince Salman of Bahrain, emphasised the threat of nuclear proliferation. North Korea’s missile test last week aggravates this risk.

The Kenyan and Ugandan armed forces have been exemplary in bringing order to Somalia but this has not been without cost. Both have sustained losses, and the retaliation of terrorist groups has endangered Kampala, Nairobi and the Kenyan coast. We must continue to support both countries, as well as the fledgling Somali government.

To the west, Mali is a major cause for concern. As still is Yemen, despite President Hadi’s laudable efforts. So What?

Now reducing these short and long term threats, our task is to evolve a force capable of meeting, with allies, various complex tasks. By the early 2020s, these plans result in a powerful Joint force that, on the basis of a balanced budget from Planning Round 12, should be able to meet the requirements laid on it.

It has not been easy.

But the Secretary of State, building on the work of the SDSR, has ensured that the department is able to squeeze the most from the resources available.

By 2020 we will have kit that many of my fellow NATO Chiefs of Defence, saddled with much more sclerotic budgets than we, are envious of:

a. A World Class Carrier Capability with the JSF – Lightning II – on board;
b. Type 45 destroyers on patrol;
c. Type 26 frigates in production;
d. Astute class submarines;
e. Chinook Mk 6 bringing the total Chinook fleet to 60;
f. Typhoon Tranche 3, as well as the Lightning II;
g. Atlas and Voyager air transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, underpinned by our now larger C17 fleet;
h. Scout vehicles, upgraded Warrior, Challenger, and Apache to give the Army better reconnaissance, mobility and firepower;
i. Rivet Joint and other critical ISTAR platforms that will ensure we have better situational awareness than ever.
j. And much more emphasis on Cyber, to which I will return shortly.

But our most decisive asset will remain our Service men and women.

As the private sector puts it, we must look after the ‘talent’. As I see equipment around the world parked with no-one to operate it. Great equipment without talented people counts for little.

We must ensure our people have the intelligence and confidence to treat the unexpected as an opportunity to exploit. They must be capable of informed, independent action; of what has been described as a ‘brains-based approach’ to operations.

You have all heard the common refrain that we must do more with less. Well, to be frank, that is what we are doing. At the strategic level, a brains-based approach means deciding to act only when we must and then doing it well, not always kinetically.

This type of thinking has shaped the work I have started on ‘How We Will Fight’. Assuming the approach I have just outlined, I and my fellow Chiefs have designed our forces to:
a. act jointly and with allies, but able to act alone.
b. be well equipped, but not tied to platforms.
c. adapt as the environment changes.

But we must prioritise. And as spending has tightened, we must be ruthless in our requirements and getting the most from them. Effectively targeting limited resources is, in large part, the art of military command in war and in peace through force design.

The new UK Joint Expeditionary Force is an expression of this. The JEF promises much greater levels of integration than previously achieved especially when combined with others, as is already happening with our French allies in the Anglo/French Combined JEF. The JEF must be genuinely synergistic. It is the building block to future alliances and independent action. And we would hope that allies such as Denmark and Estonia, who have fought with distinction in a British formation in Afghanistan, will want to play key roles within the British element of the CJEF.

What it offers is clear: an integrated joint force with capabilities across the spectrum at sea, on land and in the air. A force that can confidently be allocated a specific slice of the battle space in an allied operation or act alone.

It will be the basis of all our combined joint training.

With the capability to ‘punch’ hard and not be a logistical or tactical drag on a coalition, we will be especially welcomed by our friends and feared by our enemies.

The JEF will be of variable size; a framework into which others fit. It will be the core of the UK’s contribution to any military action, whether NATO, coalition or independent.

Together with critical C2 elements such as HQ ARRC and the emphasis placed on the maritime component HQ at Northwood, the JEF is designed to meet our NATO obligations.

In the Libyan campaign, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were able to play a vital role by bringing their regional expertise into the command structure of a NATO operation. This provided greater military and political reach. I look forward to the alliance, perhaps in part through the vehicle of the JEF, working more with non-member states.

Britain’s JEF will be capable of projecting power with global effect and influence. Nowhere is more important to us than our friends in the Middle East and Gulf and in line with clear political intent we would expect, with other initiatives, for JEF elements to spend more time reassuring and deterring in that region. The Royal Navy

Let me briefly examine how the How We Fight work affects the single services, starting with the Royal Navy. As the Prime Minister has put it, the Navy “keeps the arteries of trade of the global economy from hardening.”

The Royal Navy will continue to grow in importance. As our carrier capability comes into service it will be a key part of our diplomatic, humanitarian and military strategy. Prepared to overcome the toughest military challenges. This is its raison d’être. But I know it will be used for much more.

The Americans demonstrated through their deployment to Aceh and Haiti that aircraft carriers have huge strategic impact supporting people around the world. Seeing US military personnel, ships and helicopters playing such a critical role boosted the standing of the US in the world’s most populous Islamic country and undermined extremist rhetoric.

Hard power is an essential element of soft power. In this respect especially, numbers, or mass, still matter. We must resolve the conundrum at the heart of Bob Gates quip about ‘exquisite technology’.

In the future, the Chief of the Naval Staff and I have a vision for a Navy which procures ships differently allowing us to have more, not fewer platforms.

We must resist the pressure that has shrunk the number of platforms. Clearly that will mean rethinking the Navy, including examining the case for ships that may have a limited role in general war. But this is not new ¬¬¬– remember the corvette over the ages – and is similar to the utility of light and heavy land forces, tailored to task. And in so doing we will ensure seamanship skills and leadership qualities, so much in demand by our friends and allies, flourish into the long term.

The Royal Navy’s maritime and amphibious components, with 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines at the core of the latter, will be at the heart of Britain’s JEF. As the concept develops we will look to acquire ships that range from top-end war fighting elements through potentially to more vessels tailored to discrete but important tasks, to be deployed on a range of routine non-warfighting duties.

The British Army

The Army too is changing. Once we come out of the combat role in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, it will cease to be on permanent rotation with the burdens that imposes.

The Army will maintain a hard power war-fighting capability while creating the strategic influence, support and engagement ability essential to modern operations.

Like the Navy, these land forces must be equipped to pack a punch but war fighting is not all they’re for.

Conflict prevention, to which I will return in a moment, is not just sensible strategy; it is a military operation requiring appropriately configured and equipped forces.

The Army 2020 reforms are a fundamental re-set for the Army, making the best of a regular force a fifth smaller than when I commanded it only three years ago.

While we will retain three high-readiness manoeuvre brigades, we will also have ‘adaptable brigades’ to sustain enduring operations and routinely develop partnerships and knowledge around the world.

Though more conceptual work is needed, given the importance of the region and clear Prime Ministerial intent, I envisage two or more adaptable brigades forming close tactical level relationships with particular countries in the Gulf and Jordan, for example, allowing for better cooperation with their forces. Should the need arise for another Libya-style operation, we will be prepared. This would greatly enhance our ability to support allies as they contain and deter threats and, with our naval presence in Bahrain, air elements in the UAE and Qatar, and traditional but potentially enhanced roles in Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, would make us a regional ally across the spectrum.

In Africa, brigades would be tasked to support key allies in the east, west and south whilst another might be given an Indian Ocean and SE Asian focus, allowing for much greater involvement in the FPDA, for example.

If we are to influence, we must know what drives our friends and how to motivate them. This is not something that can be done on the eve of an operation. As these adaptable brigades develop links with countries around their region, this will create opportunities for soldiers and officers to progress their careers through linguistic and cultural specialism.

The Defence Engagement Strategy, prepared with the Foreign Office, will provide what I have often referred to as a ‘strategic handrail’ for engagement.

This will require tough decisions. If we are to invest properly in some relationships, others will naturally get less attention.

But if we get this right ¬– and we will – we will have deeper links to specific regional partners giving them the confidence to deal with their own problems and, when appropriate, to act in partnership with us.

What I have described puts military flesh on the bones of welcome, NSC endorsed, national strategy.

This all comes as we are increasing the Reserves and integrating them closer with the Regular forces. This will do more to increase our own capacity and ability to help friends and allies. The Royal Air Force

Turning now to the Royal Air Force. The rate of technological advance is most keenly felt on air platforms. This is understandable. These are complex fully networked combat and ISTAR platforms. This intelligence cuts the time between understanding and reacting. It allows us better to out-think and out-act our opponents.

At the same time, lift, both tactical and global, reduces the number of reserves we need to keep, giving the Armed Forces a flexibility that was unimaginable just a few decades ago.

Understanding and exploiting the opportunities technology presents will be decisive in maintaining our advantage – in sufficient numbers – into the future.

Remotely piloted air systems and novel anti-air defences have changed our understanding of both what it means to fight and defend. We must not allow sacred cows – such as the indispensability of on-board pilots – to rule the day. The Chief of the Air Staff is leading the change. By giving ‘wings’ to UAV pilots the Royal Air Force is recognising the capability of the platform and skill of the pilot.

Indeed, it is a reflection of how early we are in this process of transition that we still refer to remotely-piloted air systems or unmanned aerial vehicles. How long was it before we stopped referring to the horseless carriage?

For all three Services, their role within an integrated CJEF will be the driving force in their force development and training. Whoever the enemy, wherever the threat, we will need partners. Building them now is an investment in our own future and our capacity to succeed quickly should war break out. Cyber

But there is a new environment within which we must learn to manoeuvre with confidence.

Today Facebook, with around a billion users, is the third most populous country in the world. It exemplifies one of the most extreme changes we have seen in the past decades.

Cyberspace is the nervous system of our global economy. We are reliant on the internet and other networked systems for every aspect of our lives. It allows bewildering speed of action and global reach.

Unsurprisingly, just as crime has become e-crime, spying has increasingly become cyber espionage. We have seen nations, their proxies and non-state actors use this new space for terrorism and conflict.

Though not conventional assaults, the hostile cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008 and Burma in 2010 were damaging.

In the Middle East, there have been unprecedented levels of cyber attack over the past 24 months. Israel has reported over 44 million attempts to disrupt its government websites during recent tension around the Gaza strip. STUXNET demonstrated a new class of threat aimed at process control systems at the heart of modern infrastructure.

Without doubt, actions in cyberspace will form part of any future conflict. Communication and the control of infrastructure and systems has become a new environment through which combatants will further their objectives.

Our immediate priority must be to ensure our networks are secure and defensible, working with partners in industry and around the country to drive up standards and ensure we have robust protocols in place. This builds on the excellent work done under the National Cyber Security Strategy but Defence has particular challenges as a department, as Armed Forces and through the contractors and partners with whom we work.

I am determined that the Armed Forces should understand cyberspace, and how it will shape future conflict, as instinctively as we understand maritime, land and air operations.

This will mean changes in the way we operate: new doctrine; new capabilities; new structures, with Joint Forces Command at their heart. It will mean a new approach to growing and developing the talent we need to operate in this new, electronic, environment. Like our Secretary of State, I see an important role for reserves in this domain.

Winding Up

In examining each environment separately I hope I have highlighted some of the key issues on the Chiefs’ plate and how we must respond to them. But the most important is developing an integrated Joint model.

The JEF is neither the 1980s Canadian model nor, whilst there are some apparent similarities, is it a British version of the US Marine Corps.

The effectiveness of the UK armed forces relies heavily on the different skill-sets and ethos of each single Service. Each adapted for its environment, and evolving as times and technology change.

But a joint conceptual approach, based on lessons from the real world, embedded through force development, in training, on operations and though the cohering glue of modern C3I and cyber is vital to delivering the military capability the nation requires.

This is about ensuring single Service skills meld into joint action so that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

The JEF won’t mean we can do more with less; it will mean, through the synergy it provides, that we get the most from what we have. And doubtless there will be some roles that we continue to leave to others, notably the USA.

As I close let me draw some lessons from my 41 years in uniform.

Some constants which may seem obvious in this room but are often over looked:

a. The need for military force to influence, secure and protect is as great as ever.
b. I joined an Army that was geared to defend Britain by fighting in Germany.
c. Today life is more complex but the principle is the same.
d. 9/11, and the 7/7 bombings in London show that we cannot choose our battlefields as we once did.
e. The world is not a safer place and the distinction between home and abroad is strategically obsolete. Today it is part of a continuum.

We cannot just stand by and hope we are ignored and danger passes us by.

As the Foreign Secretary said in September last year: “the country that is purely reactive in foreign affairs is in decline”.

Responses may be based on either soft or hard power, but to divorce the two is strategic blindness. Soft power is not a substitute for strength. On the contrary, it is often based on the credible threat of force, either to support a friend or deter an enemy.

Hard power and soft power are intertwined.

It is not enough to provide aid or speak kindly. Our friends want to know we are there when it counts, not just fair-weather friends. This is the confidence hard power brings. It drives equipment sales and thus industrial growth, as well as diplomatic treaties, just as it has for centuries. But hard power also does more than this: it dissuades.

Deterrence doctrine has fallen out of fashion so perhaps you will allow me to recall some of the elements. Sun Tzu’s famous maxim is: “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”.
Too often this is seen as clever posturing on the eve of battle. It is not. Training, equipping and partnering with allies enhance the aura of British power. They give us presence on the world stage and ensure that we are not tested.

It is worth being clear: when the Armed Forces train we do not just do it to be ready, we do it to be seen to be ready. When we succeed on operations, we do not just win a battle. We prove that we can win a war.

In a very real sense, everything the Armed Forces do deters and reassures. With enough numbers, enough equipment and with good leaders at every level, Britain is a credible threat to our enemies and a reassuring friend to our allies.

This is cheaper than fighting and more credible than talk.

Reading the record of how the Soviets saw the Falklands War demonstrates this admirably. What many saw as post-colonial folie de grandeur, the Soviet leadership, rightly, saw as proof that the British Armed Forces were united with their government and people – Clausewitz’s famous trilogy – and more than a match for them.

It was far from the only factor, but the increase in Soviet defence spending in the 1980s which ended up contributing to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was partly due to clarity of their failure to impose their will in neighbouring, occupied countries while Britain could liberate territory some 8,000 miles away.

As Chief of the Defence Staff I do not wear the burdens of office any more lightly than my predecessors. I have set out some of my concerns for the coming years and some of the ways we will think and act to meet them.

Under the Prime Minister’s chairmanship, The National Security Council, on which I am privileged to sit, considers all the big strategic issues that I have listed and more. It is a hugely welcome addition to Whitehall, directing and bringing clarity to national strategy and coordinating cross-government action.

But the nature of the world is such that what will later seem obvious, today is opaque and unpredictable. How will Europe emerge from the Euro crisis? How will the Arab Spring conclude? How will global warming affect water supplies?

And what of cyber?

After all, grand strategy, while providing a guide to action in peacetime, is also about being prepared and balanced for what we can never know.

Ensuring we have enough left in the bag while actively deterring, and when required defeating, aggression against us and our friends, enough left to succeed against those ‘unknown unknowns’, is ultimately what I and my fellow Chiefs are paid for.

END

 

RUSI Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture 2012

 

 

 

H/T Mark

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462 thoughts on “General Sir David Richards speech to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

  1. martin

    “In the future, the Chief of the Naval Staff and I have a vision for a Navy which procures ships differently allowing us to have more, not fewer platforms.”

    Interesting I wonder what he means.

    “We must resist the pressure that has shrunk the number of platforms. Clearly that will mean rethinking the Navy, including examining the case for ships that may have a limited role in general war. But this is not new ¬¬¬– remember the corvette over the ages – and is similar to the utility of light and heavy land forces, tailored to task. And in so doing we will ensure seamanship skills and leadership qualities, so much in demand by our friends and allies, flourish into the long term.
    15. The Royal Navy’s maritime and amphibious components, with 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines at the core of the latter, will be at the heart of Britain’s JEF. As the concept develops we will look to acquire ships that range from top-end war fighting elements through potentially to more vessels tailored to discrete but important tasks, to be deployed on a range of routine non-warfighting duties’

    Black Swan Class anyone?

    “In Africa, brigades would be tasked to support key allies in the east, west and south whilst another might be given an Indian Ocean and SE Asian focus, allowing for much greater involvement in the FPDA, for example.”

    Not sure if he will have enough brigades but makes for very interesting idea. Nice to see a greater focus on FPDA.

    Winding up

    “The JEF is neither the 1980s Canadian model nor, whilst there are some apparent similarities, is it a British version of the US Marine Corps.”

    Just goes to show that the Chief of the Defence staff defiantly reads think defence. :-)

  2. martin

    One thing confuses me is the Joint expeditionary force he refer’s to the combined joint expeditionary force we share with the French or something else.

  3. x

    I wonder if CDS ran any of his cyber cabbage past GCHQ?

    And he mentions the US Marines. As somebody here recently said that is a novel view point. ;)

  4. Mark

    This is I think a very interesting speech which will be interesting to watch be implemented particularly the part about twining adaptable brigades with Africa the Mid East and FPDA (which has been ignored for too long IMO).

    It will also be interesting to see how the ships part plays out is it corvettes like opvs or type 26 with fewer weapons installed I suspect the first which suggests the later might be reduced the mod pus was particularly evasive when discussing type 26 numbers with the defence committee recently.

  5. ArmChairCivvy

    V good speech. And the twinning idea gives some content to the “forward deployment” soft component
    - even if the folks out there are military, they are not sent to fight (initially) but to create the essentials for joint ops in the future
    - the 30.000 mentioned before sounded like an awfully big number, but being involved in rotation, through the twinning, could explain that

  6. tweckyspat

    We must not allow sacred cows – such as the indispensability of on-board pilots – to rule the day. The Chief of the Air Staff is leading the change. By giving ‘wings’ to UAV pilots the Royal Air Force is recognising the capability of the platform and skill of the pilot.

    but only if they are commissioned officers, of course !

  7. Phil

    “The JEF is neither the 1980s Canadian model nor, whilst there are some apparent similarities, is it a British version of the US Marine Corps.”

    Muhahahahahahahahahaha.

    And good, I’ve advocated for some time that the Navy needs to stop sending billion pound warships off to hunt bloody pirates.

    All in all, sensible.

  8. x

    tweckyspat said “only if they are commissioned officers”

    Can’t have chaps who aren’t chaps flying kites can we?

  9. Simon

    JEF sounds a bit like my Expeditionary Force.

    Who knows, eventually they might integrate the non-expeditionary “Home-Island Defence Force” too and properly stop all this bickering.

    They’ll probably call it the Joint European Defence Initiative ;-)

  10. jackstaff

    Proper thoughts tonight (I hope, yes it’s that man again…)

    @ X

    Well, when something fails spectacularly, rule of thumb is call it a success and gongs all round, so Knighthoods would seem to follow naturally from your suggestion.

    Alternately, if they really want stable, eastward-facing forward presence to develop both key relationships with potential partners and a support infrastructure for such contingencies, why not just set up a little purple talking shop in Mombasa and call it Forward Unified Command (Kenya)-Allied Logistics Liaison ? I suspect there’s an acronym in there somewhere.

  11. jackstaff

    On my first idea: they would of course work closely with a rotating team of short-term, forward-deployed mixed regular-and-reserve overseas orientated cyber-warriors (my Mastermind special subject waa bullshit bingo.) We’ll call ‘em the Special Warfare Electronic & Expeditionary Total Force (Advance).

  12. Repulse

    At last… This seems to be the beginning of a joined up strategy that actually addresses what global role the UK can play within it’s financial constraints.

    Rename the JEF to replace the J with a B and hey presto we are back to a pre WW strategy.

    It’s also what we’ve discussed a thousand times before, forward lite presence with a big enough stick to back it up.

    I feel an order for a couple more Portsmouth built OPVs coming :)

  13. mike

    Repulse,

    Would you like to be part of a force that, historically, didn’t turn out so well? ;D

    Anyway, Joint is everything… the Marines, Navy and Air Force weren’t quite part of the strategy until the brown stuff hit the fan with jerry!

    Also,

    X

    You do know the crux of the RAF pilots during WW2 were more working class than anything? It was the actors portraying officers in films during and after that sorta produced this myth of the toff pilot.
    Same goes for RN and Army officers… to some extent ;)

    (Yes, I watch QI damnit!)

  14. x

    Jackstaff said ” Forward Unified Command (Kenya)-Allied Logistics Liaison ”

    What I would give to see that on a cap tally. :)

    As for Michael Palin did you just like Lassie there has been more than one of them? True.

    @ Repulse re Kippers

    I think if we leave the EU those OPVs will never leave the Southwest Approaches as they will be needed to chase away El Spaniards away from our fishing grounds.

  15. Alex

    I was thinking more of setting up the cyber reserve in the Curtain Rd TA centre. 201(V) Sigs Sqn (Cyber) aka Hell’s Hipsters. Torn, skinny red trousers.

  16. x

    Mike re Pilot Sergeants

    Yes many of The Few were Pilot Sergeants.

    http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/categories/c55653/

    WW2 was great leveller when it came officer recruitment. When it came to the navy who you were was as an officer was clearly evident as your jacket cuffs and shoulder boards told all; RN, RNR, or RNVR.

    Um. I remember that scene in The Cockleshell Heroes where Trevor Howard asks Jose Ferrer not to call the Marines gentlemen as they were other ranks. Good film that one.

  17. martin

    @ Mark –

    “It will also be interesting to see how the ships part plays out is it corvettes like opvs or type 26 with fewer weapons installed I suspect the first which suggests the later might be reduced the mod pus was particularly evasive when discussing type 26 numbers with the defence committee recently.”

    So it will be 8 T26 then and 7 or 8 Black Swans. I think the RN should start a shipping line. It’s going to have an awesome ability to move containers around the world. Lets just hope no one starts shooting at us with just 14 Surface combatants we can only have 3 maybe 4 at sea. Would be nice if the CDS found the budget to properly arm the few we will have left but at least he won’t be able to complain about billion pound destroyers chasing pirates. Now it will be nothing chasing pirates.

  18. Not a Boffin

    It’s b0llocks as is thw whole Black Swan idea.

    Sounds perfectly good in practice, right up until you work out that the biggest cost-driver through life is manpower. If you buy more small corvette size ships, the one thing you can bet the ranch on is the manpower establishment ain’t going to get any bigger. So you’re paying an overhead to man ships that will be little short of useless in a shooting war on the vague premise that you’ll get more platforms.

    Given that the “peacetime” ops tend to be manpower drivers, rather than actual warfighting, what do we think the result is going to be?

    Broadly same number of high-end warfighters, plus some corvettes?
    Much reduced number of warfighters, plus some corvettes?

  19. Peter Elliott

    @NAB

    You are right about the corvette crews. We need to know they are not coming out of the Frigate pot or it all gets a bit futile.

    The proposed revisit to the Amphib fleet may provide an answer. Unlike Frigates, Destroyers or OPVs the ARG does not need to be in two places at once. In any serious duffy we will have just one ARG. But we currently have 6 ships (Ocean, Albion, Bulwark, 3 Bays). If we replaced these with just two 40,000T LHDs then we would potentially save some RN and RFA crew. These could be redeployed onto the corvettes without cutting into T26.

    In a neat circularity the corvettes would then pick up some of the taskings we have been forced to use Bays for: supporting mine clearance and pirate and smuggler bashing.

    Fringe benefit: more ship design and ship building to boost the econonomy and create jobs.

    (Although while I can see us building Frigates in Scotland and Corvettes in Portsmouth I suspect any new LHDs might have their hulls fabricated in Korea!)

  20. All Politicians are the Same

    We all love to talk about manpower costs but forget the political ramifications of cutting overall manpower. Required sea going manpower and overall RN manpower do not adjust in ratio.

  21. martin

    I liked the Blackswan idea and I could see a need for some possibly as a river replacement. However LCS is rapidly proving you can’t run a warship or even an auxiliary combatant like a container ship. If the CDS has an issue with billion pound destroyers chasing pirates then maybe we should stop chasing pirates. There are plenty of navy’s in the world with old cheap vessels better suited to this task. It’s about time some one else picked up the slack.

    @ Peter Elliott

    I like the 40K LHD idea however I am dubious if the vessels would be large enough on their own 80K of shipping to replace 120K. However if we get the correct MARS SSS design then it could maybe have one or two in toe to carry the rest.

  22. Challenger

    I wouldn’t be surprised if the T26 numbers get eaten in-to to build perhaps 6-8 corvettes. If we do see some low-end ships then I really hope they’d be of a Black Swan or Khareef type and not just a stretched River design.

    I think the crucial aspect is balance, I don’t mind if 1 or 2, maybe 3 T26 at most get cut if the remaining 10-12 get 2087 plus all the other mod-cons and we see a meaningful batch of low-end ships, and by that I mean enough in numbers and cheap enough to build/man/run in order to take some of the pressure off of our dwindling high-end vessels.

    If on the other we see a big chunk taken out of T26 with only a paltry 2 OPV’s in return then it will be a very worryingly situation to get in-to.

  23. Challenger

    I like the idea of adaptable brigades working with African partner nations (although I don’t know just how achievable it is).

    I also like a renewed focus on Amphibious warfare as a means of us exerting a level of influence that’s far above our ‘on paper’ strength.

    All in all it’s a very interesting speech, I just hope this is more than words and we get to see some real implementation over the next few years.

  24. All Politicians are the Same

    Challenger

    Exactly any cuts in T26 numbers need to be compensated with enough extra hulls to reflect that we will no longer have enough FF/DD numbers to undertake non core roles. So we cannot send an FF/DD to the windies or somalia. Will also be fascinated to see if we are still meant to keep 2 East of Suez and 1 down South as well as TAPS and FRE with further reduced numbers and I have not even provided a single escort for an ARG or CBG yet.

    I look forward to seeing exactly which tasks any new “Corvettes” are used for.

  25. Challenger

    @APATS

    Fully agreed, it’s all very exciting to see how this pans out, if anything gets down at all!

    Has anyone seen this talk of a return to ‘East of Suez’ with a new British barracks and Typhoon hangars in the gulf?

    If it was in the speech I must have missed it. All sounds pretty good, I have always maintained that we should keep some forward presence stuff there after Herrick, in addition to the current RN/RFA assets that is.

  26. Topman

    I think it very unlikely that more forces will end up stationed overseas. It’s very expensive, there’s pressure to bring as many back as possible and therefore little likelyhood, to me, of upping numbers on an overseas posting.

  27. Mark

    I would concur with the numbers think if you can’t get 3/4 “corvettes” for a cost and crew equal of a single frigate I don’t see the point. Always liked the idea of a river stretched 10m to allow a lynx hanger and a 76mm gun to replace the 30mm one but don’t really know what which tasks we would replace frigates on. I assume the 4mcmvs operate in the gulf without a ff/dd always present. Call them the flower class. The French have a similar arrangement with opvs maybe were following them.

    Challenger did we ever leave east of suez. A/c ships troops have been based out there for decades.

  28. WiseApe

    “The new Armed Forces Committee mandates the Chiefs to resolve problems in the interests of Defence as a whole.” – I trust this will be the place for the banging of heads that I mentioned on another thread.

    “As Einstein said, “imagination is more important than knowledge”. – Einstein also said: “Only two things are infinite, the universe and human stupidity, and I’m not sure about the former.”

    Would it be completely bonkers for us to build OPVs/sloops/corvettes and to then lend or lease them out to other nations as their needs require? We currently send all manner of vessels around the world training foreign armed forces in all manner of things, e.g. stop and search. How about lending these nations some vessels once so trained?

    Edit: @Mark et al – Not a bad marketing ploy to deploy some Typhoons in the ME?

  29. All Politicians are the Same

    Mark

    The 4 MCMVS operate from the same Manama jetty as the US 5th fleet MCMVS. There are lots of assets in the gulf and we maintain at least 1 Frigate or Destroyer more recently 2 in the AOR.

  30. Topman

    ‘Not a bad marketing ploy to deploy some Typhoons in the ME?’

    They deploy out there quite often normally anyway.

  31. Think Defence Post author

    I think this is a very encouraging speech because it shows that the grown ups have finally realised business as smaller is not an option anymore.

    The more I read the more I see the TD ‘Forward Presence’ idea, a smaller but harder central core and a range of specialisms combined with a greater range of forward deployments that engage in conflict prevention and relationship building.

    Think I might just be a smug bastard for a few moments.

    Mmm, that was good

    The only thing I don’t get is a sense of joined up thinking across the three services and with the civilian aspects of diplomacy, foreign aid and trade etc.

    Still feels a bit Army centric

  32. Simon

    How about scrapping/selling the T45s and building 24 x T26s? You’d only need a few more sailors.

    Is it possible this is on the cards? T45 would be a good asset for a nation with no carrier air power (us at the mo, Saudi Arabia in the future). Sea Ceptor packs much more tightly for a more efficient PDMS anyway.

  33. John Hartley

    A lot of flannel to hide the fact the UK can no longer defend itself. Money that should have been spent on defence, infrastructure & industry has been given to fund the luxury lifestyles of third world dictators instead.
    Why say UAVs are the future then say cyber warfare is serious. Cyber warfare will cripple UAVs.

  34. Repulse

    @Simon, I agree with your approach that the T45 could be replaced by a modified T26, but not on the timing. Having a single high end multi-role class makes sense, sure you need compromises, but the overall fleet benefits. HMS Daring will be due for replacement late 2030s, just about when the last T26 has been rolled out to replace the T23s.

    I would personally like to see all T26s fitted with 2087 sonar and. SMART-L long-range air and surface surveillance radar, even if it means slightly fewer T26s. One trick expensive ponies are the thing of the past.

  35. martin

    @ Challenger – The return East of Suez is part of the deal David Cameron recently negotiated with the UAE. Not sure about barracks but we can rest easy as there are plenty of five-star hotels in the area to accommodate any RAF contingent :-)

  36. martin

    I could probably live with 10 T26 if we got 8 or 9 corvettes to replace them. However I seriously doubt we would get anything like this amount.

  37. Repulse

    I think what is being discusseed is not a radical departure from what was already planned, but perhaps a slight change of emphasis and a recognition that the navy has too few platforms.

    Assuming that the FF/DD numbers are not being drastically changed here, I do not see an issue with going with a stretched Clyde approach. A hanger, larger calibre gun and perhaps a bit more speed would be absolutely fine. Even better (though not essential) would be space to fit a VLS if ever needed in the future.

    Build 4 of these and permanently base them in the FI, Caribbean, Gibraltar and Diego Garcia with rotating crews and you’ve helped relieve the pressure. Also then buy HMS Clyde and bring her back to the UK – she can help patrol UK waters and support ASW Merlins who are clearing the way for the SSBNs on patrol.

    What would this cost, probably £400mn plus annual running costs around £100mn per year. This is small change for the MOD, even in it’s current austerity state.

    One thing I do agree though is that the RN would need more manpower, especially as they will want to find some more to keep both QE and POW active. However, another 500 should be enough, I’d be surprised if that couldn’t be found by moving overall resources around in the MOD.

  38. Phil

    Custard is a variety of culinary preparations based on a cooked mixture of milk or cream and egg yolk. Depending on how much egg or thickener is used, custard may vary in consistency from a thin pouring sauce (crème anglaise), to a thick pastry cream used to fill éclairs.

  39. martin

    @ Repulse

    Think you would need at least 5 stretched Clyde’s for your plan as they will still need to return home every few years for refit. I do like the idea of forward basing, especially in the FI however I would prefer to see some heavier armament if this is to be the sole RN vessel in the FI. I think Bahrain probably makes more sense than Diego Garcia as the facilities are already there and I am not sure about the Caribbean. The RFA seems to be doing a better job with the likes of Argus than the RN ever did. I think the Caribbean is the ideal location to use the amphib fleet when not needed for operations else where.

  40. wf

    Custard also very useful for demonstrating how some liquid behave like a solid under pressure :-)

    Didn’t Sea Slug have a “custard” surface to surface mode?

  41. Challenger

    @Mark

    ‘did we ever leave east of suez. A/c ships troops have been based out there for decades’

    The article I read kept referring to a ‘return to east of Suez’ and I was para-phrasing it’s content. However yes you’re of course correct, with Brunei, Diego Garcia, Hong Kong until 1997 and the Gulf we have never really, fully left the area, just reduced forces to the bare minimum.

  42. Challenger

    @Martin + Repulse

    I agree that any forward deployed ships, however cheap and cheerful will need an extra hull in the water so that they can be rotated back home for the inevitable maintenance and refit periods.

    I agree with you Martin that Bahrain is a better choice than Diego Garcia for a base, if not either then perhaps Oman? If we had any permanent assets for the Caribbean then Bermuda, although not that close, is probably the best bet, although it does seem that RFA vessels do a good job out there which does pose the question of whether it’s worth the change.

    Repulse I like you’re idea of brining Clyde back home to use as Merlin platform and general home waters ship. She could maybe take on some training tasks as well.

    RE British basing in the gulf:

    It was more media speculation than anything else, I’m dubious over whether any-more permanent assets will be forward deployed after Herrick as well, but it looks like we will at least have deals in place to provide Typhoon facilities and barracks IF they are ever needed.

    The odd visit from a few jets would be great PR as well as providing some useful training. Win win!

  43. Challenger

    What I’m really concerned about is trading 1 or 2, or more T26 for the same amount of OPV’s or Corvettes, the whole objective would be to sacrifice some quality for quantity, otherwise what’s the point!

    For example id be OK with T26 dropping as low as to 10 units, IF all 10 got the full bells and whistles Type 2087/everything else and it allowed for at least 6 low-end units to be purchased. Any other outcome means ending up with a similar number of surface ships but fewer qualitative advantages.

    Id aim for a reasonable increase of 3 units, so that’s either 12 T26 and 4 low-end ships, or 10 and 6. Any other ratio or lower number would in my view be unacceptable.

  44. mickp

    @Challenger

    Share your concerns. I think there would need to be at least 6 low end units to make things work in terms of rotation etc

  45. martin

    @ mickp With a river costing £50 million and a T26 cost £300 million its no inconceivable to get 6 for 1. The main issue would obviously be manning. I could defiantly go for 12 T26 and 6 expanded rivers. Could it make more sense to crew them with RFA personal with RN manning weapons etc. Helicopters would also be an issue Future Lynx is no exactly cheap. Would it make more sense to use something like the Eurocopter AS550 Fennec. It comes in at around 80% cheaper than the Lynx. MAybe mic and match with Lynx in FI and Fennec in the Med etc.

  46. Phil

    I’ve been arguing for some time to go down the French model road.

    Essentially construct a first rate core of a CVBG+ surface fleet buttressed by a number of second rates suitable for sloop type roles. They could be minimally manned with sailors since they won’t need to engage in first rate conflict and could be augmented with DFiD, FCO staff and Royal Marines who should have an expanded ship borne role akin to in Nelsons day. I would accept a first rate fleet of about 16 and see all MCMVs and Patrol vessels and Survey vessels replaced with about 10-13 such vessels constructed in slow time and continuously improved in an incremental manner.

  47. x

    French model is a hollow one. It doesn’t bear replicating. Not to see the flaws in the model reveals a lack of understanding of naval warfare.

  48. Phil

    Lack of imagination, lack of knowledge! Goodness I am a wretch.

    Please, elaborate x. Anyone can say what you’ve said.

  49. x

    We don’t need fewer T26 we need more than projected 13 even though we will probably get less. We need an additional 6 units worth to provide escorts for CVF. I am very pleased that many of you have grasped that the hull in the water is a fundamental but we need hulls that carry weapons and can range out. Um. If 6000 soldiers sitting in country have little impact on a situation, what will 30 sailors sitting 12nm offshore in little more than a fast trawler do? Not much. That is why sending a frigate to do the occasional piece of constabulary task works because it is a minor periphery thing, a sub-set of the frigate’s true wide capability set. These constabulary tasks are more about showing something is being done than about achieving any real impact on the problem. (To achieve real impact is more a question of ROE than platform.) You build an OPV it can do nothing but surveillance; if the balloon did go up it would be of little use. You would think a soldier would understand seeing the body of work that suggests that the soldier isn’t really suited to peacekeeping, so why does he think a navy with slender resources should follow the same model? Rhubarb! Rhubarb! And thrice rhubarb!

  50. x

    @ Chally

    No. I am too busy. Phil is entitled to his opinion which is probably the product of much considered thought on some very wide reading. To give him his due he does take this far more seriously than I do. To me this is just diversion between the chores of the day. What you have to remember is that somewhere in the middle of all our collective ramblings there is the answer. But I don’t think any of us quite know what the question is…..

  51. All Politicians are The same

    The key to any decision to embark upon a program of cutting FF/DD hull numbers in order to increase overall numbers by building OPV/Corvette type vessels is a full examination of tasks and the capabilities required for each task.
    At the moment we are keeping 2 FF/DD East Of Suez and 1 in the FI AOR. We also provide a FRE and duty Towed Array patrol Ship (these can sometimes be combined but this is obviously dependent on capabilities and if the single ship is activated then a another stby unit need to be provided.
    We do not currently provided an FF/DD to either of the NATO standing groups (SNMG1 or SNMG2).
    We also have to have units available to be escorts for the Readiness Task Group.
    We infrequently use an FF/DD for Atlantic Patrol task North and have a requirement to provide hulls for PWO and aviation training.
    So what is required is a review beginning on a blank piece of paper that looks at exactly what we will require FF/DD hulls to do and how we deploy them to maximise their efficiency, for instance if we already have 2 East of Suez then they can supplement any escorts that sail with a TG deploying E of Suez.
    Once this review is complete and we have decided where we actually need an FF/DD hull and where we can replace the capability with 1 or more Corvettes then we can look at proposed numbers.
    Of course any review will be dependent upon the capabilities of both the FF/DD hulls and the proposed Corvette.
    I feel a longer post coming on but have to drop a colleague at the airport (some people get home for xmas :) )

  52. Phil

    “These constabulary tasks are more about showing something is being done than about achieving any real impact on the problem. (To achieve real impact is more a question of ROE than platform.)”

    They are the bread and butter of what the Navy has done for 400 years. It’s unglamarous, it’s maligned but it is part and parcel of having a Navy. It is how most western Navies have organised themselves since there were such a thing. The big expensive vessels were husbanded for fleet actions and open warfare and the remainder performed the daily taskings which you refer to as constabulary actions.

    It makes no sense whatsoever to send modern frigates and destroyers on missions that need nothing more than a sloop. As for 30 sailors, I suppose once again we have the Allies Blinkers™ put on that are passed around this site so often. More often than not our vessels are working on multi national task forces tying in with multi national aims and mutual interests like mine sweeping in the Gulf or having a crack at pirates or trying to stop drug smuggling.

    It’s like the Army sending an armoured brigade to Sierra Leonne or the Army Catering Corps to Kosovo. We have these wild swings in the assets being used for mundane but vital tasks – from sleek frigates designed to shoot down the most bad ass planes and hunt the quietest submarines to what amount to massive cargo ships with a completely inadequate sensor suite.

    If the balloon goes up old boy, it won’t remove the mundane taskings and we’ll be part of a co-alition, a proper CVBG would be an enormous contribution to a multi national Task Force. We wouldn’t need to pull ships from hither and thither and the main fleet could train as such. If you look at the history of the Navy prior to WWI its big theme is Navy admirals complaining they could never exercise their battlefleets properly because their vessels were doing other jobs and the fleet was not up to strength.

    Keep a first rate core, and train it for proper open warfare.

  53. Phil

    @x

    Hope you’re wrapped up warm must be chilly on the morale high ground ;-)

    If you plotted a graph showing the intensity of my daily posts against Masters essay deadlines, there’d be quite the correlation!

  54. mickp

    The other angle on this is ensuring the existing rivers / clydes and archers are not lost in the process. All these could be rationalised in due course int a common fleet of coastal / fishery patrol vessels. Must be a fair few off the shelf designs

    I think the sloop / corvette idea is the right one but the difficult bit is striking the right balance so its neither useless in a reasonable threat environment, but not gold plated. Helo facilities, 76mm gun, couple of 30mm, space for a module of CAAM / harpoon perhaps if ever needed – fitted for but definitely not with

    I agree with the poster who suggested a blank sheet of paper view of commitments is required

  55. Phil

    The trouble with doing a blank canvass review is that the specific contemporary commitments it addresses might not be the commitments being undertaken in 10-15 years.

    Far better to underpin such an analysis with a look at historic commitments over far longer periods of time. The future is enormously uncertain and at the moment we are sacrificing first rate peer warfare capability running around after drug smugglers and pirates or else using vessels which are wildly unsuited to the tasks.

    I think it was APATs who mentioned the RFA vessel which didn’t even have FLIR capability.

  56. Lord Jim

    Is it just me or can anyone else see the beginning of a return to the C1 and C2 plan, with the T-26 meeting the C1 requirement and something less capable and expensive fulfilling the C2 role. It is just like the CVF, changing to CATOBAR then realising we cannot afford it so reverting to STOVL.

    Again we have senior management spinning things to keep their political masters happy and to make sure they are on the honours list. We ARE trying to do more with less and it is going to bite us down the line as equipment burns out faster through greater use with little capacity to spread the load. The same will go for manpower. We need honesty from the top in what we can actually take on with what we have not what we aspire to do

  57. All Politicians are The same

    Phil

    These constabulary tasks are more about showing something is being done than about achieving any real impact on the problem. (To achieve real impact is more a question of ROE than platform.)”

    ROE is useless without the capability to make use of it. You also make an assumption based on an opinion about why certain vessels are in certain areas and label them all “constabulary tasks”. The reason we have kept a 45 and a 23 in the Gulf AOR recently has a lot more to do with their core capabilities and a certain country beginning with I than any constabulary tasking.

    If you look at the history of the Navy prior to WWI its big theme is Navy admirals complaining they could never exercise their battlefleets properly because their vessels were doing other jobs and the fleet was not up to strength.

    Since WW1 we have sort of gotten away from Ship manouevring into a battle line using flags to fire guns at the enemy. The advent of link, missiles and simulators has made training far more efficient, as has the FOST syllabus.

    Even historically the RN when it was huge kept quite powerful squadrons deployed in trouble spots around the globe. We can no longer do that.

    The future is enormously uncertain and at the moment we are sacrificing first rate peer warfare capability running around after drug smugglers and pirates or else using vessels which are wildly unsuited to the tasks.

    I agree to a certain extent though as someone who has every day visibility of precisely who is doing what the whole FF chasing pirates thing is massively overstated.

    The only way to actually ensure that we achieve the correct force balance is to look at what we will require certain assets to do. that is in terms of the capabilities we will be able to field and where we can field them. Both very day of the year and also in cases of emergency.

    That is the only way we will not end up with the usual UK armed forces position of being “ready to fight yesterdays war tommorow”.

  58. x

    @ APATS

    So who are you bashing there me or Phil? The problem with piracy is ROE not the platform. If the West’s navy were a bit more kinetic in the way the problem was handled, if pirates were detained and hauled off to some prison somewhere then there may be less of a problem. It doesn’t matter whether pirates are shot at from RFA’s, OPV’s, or frigates. What does matter is when WW3 breaks and the RN is short of ASW ships because budget has been a trot of patrol boats.

    EDIT: All constabulary tasks are about the legal framework, the rules, etc. to be enforced.

  59. Phil

    Because world wars are in the habit of breaking out spontaneously these days?

    If there is going to be a world war, or a large conflict, there will be some warning. No nation on Earth possesses the force to start something like that without a period of re-armament unless it is nothing more than a conventional skirmish and a nuclear finish.

    The risk of such a conflict is at an all time historical low at the moment. And I can’t see anyone being in a position to kick off without at least 5 years build up even if they have a master plan which they won’t. Instead we’ll see a gradual increase in tension. For the odd conventional cat fight a Navy contributing a CVBG as part of an integrated allied force is enough.

  60. All Politicians are The same

    X,

    I am not really bashing anyone. At the end of the day we have to do what our Lords and masters decide. I am merely pointing out that the only way to make the suggested idea of increasing overall hull numbers but cutting traditional FF/DD numbers work is to go right back to basics.
    Look at everything we currently do and what we may be asked to do and then decide if we can still do it or even do it better with a different force mix.
    The one thing I am not doing is pre judging the outcome of such a review.

  61. Phil

    “what we may be asked to do”

    Which I argue would be mostly operations other than war to use a short hand phrase. For which a first rate vessel is simply not necessary and the other extreme, an RFA, is just not acceptable. Whether we agree that a lot of the OOTW taskings are rationally important or effective doesn’t change the fact that that is what has been asked of our Navy for hundreds of years.

    Anyway, it seems the big decision has been made. The details are the most important part now and I doubt they’ll be along in any less time than a few years.

  62. All Politicians are The same

    Phil,

    Anyway, it seems the big decision has been made. The details are the most important part now and I doubt they’ll be along in any less time than a few years.

    That is exactly what I am getting at. You are not HMG and with no disrespect intended are not a subject matter expert on capabilities required to even sustain a self defence posture in the face of a perceived threat.

    So in order for this to work the SME and HMG need to sit down and thrash out things such as, will HMG be happy with 1 F/DD permanently E of Suez and maybe a couple of Corvettes? Will they be happy with a Corvette down South instead of an FF/DD. (could we use RAF/Army assets to make up for the perceived downgrade)?
    What notice are we required to sail a CBG or ARG and how many escorts are needed? Will we be expected to sail a CBG and ARG simultaneously and without Allied support?
    Is HMG happy for a Corvette to be FRE if a TAS T23/T26 is duty TAPS?
    What level of threat environment is a Corvette expected to be able to operate in?
    How will this affect our pereived suport for our allies? (the US quite like having a T23 in the Gulf for instance).
    These are the questions that have to be asked and answered before we even look at capability requirements for a new vessel never mind costs or numbers.
    Only once these have all been answered will we know if we can make it work.

  63. x

    Even if wars don’t come out of nowhere navies have to be sustained. It takes years to build a class and months to train crews.

    All this OPV talk smells of budget cuts more than considered strategy.

    We shall see.

  64. martin

    @ APATS

    Would be interesting to see your thoughts in a longer post on what standing tasks could be performed with additional vessels and what we could look to give up. I think in the past having so many frigates and fewer platform’s such as the Bay’s lead us to send frigates to do task were they were not required such as Caribbean. Deployment’s to the FI also raise questions. Forward basing Clyde there seems to have worked well although I am sure you will have more knowledge of that than me. Sending billion pound destroyer’s or half billion pound frigates to an area as rough as the South Atlantic also does not seem wise. The massive transit time required would also seem to eat into our scarce escort fleet. If an armed naval presence is required down South do you feel this could be provided effectively by something like Khareef? Also would a similar type of vessel be able to perform the FRE role?

  65. Phil

    “Even if wars don’t come out of nowhere navies have to be sustained. It takes years to build a class and months to train crews.”

    The baddies have the same constraints.

    “You are not HMG and with no disrespect intended are not a subject matter expert on capabilities required to even sustain a self defence posture in the face of a perceived threat.”

    As has been pointed out to me several times not being an SME does not exclude you from the debate on an internet forum. And let’s be fair I haven’t exactly been overly perscriptive, all I’ve done is argue for a very general model which in a general sense fits what was said in the speech. As to capabilities and types and numbers I wouldn’t know where to start and freely admit it.

    I just argue that we need a Navy with powerful ships and not so powerful ships. Even my use of the word sloop simply stems from the fact I think it sounds cooler than Corvette and more traditional.

    So I don’t claim to know the details. Just the general direction I think we should be heading. I don’t think that’s being too presumptuous.

    It’s either that or all I can ever talk about on here from now on is who is fitter, Kylie or Danni.

  66. All Politicians are The same

    Phil,

    I was so definitely not having a go at you not being an SME. Simply trying to illustrate the difficult questions we must answer before we can definitely decide it is workable.
    Encouraging debate on my specific points maybe?

    Perhaps trying to highlight some of the things that make it more complicated than simply saying “we are going to have Corvettes”.

    I am worried that nobody has actually looked at these things, I have certainly heard bugger all on the grape vine.
    I am not hugely opposed to the idea but would feel better if I saw some evidence of the correct thought processes being brought to bear.
    My nightmare scenario is we cur T26 numbers buy Corvettes and ens up working our FF/DD to death doing what they are doing now but with fewer numbers.

  67. Not a Boffin

    Before people start extolling the Al Khareef (no doubt based on the Wiki bang for tonne displacement theory), they ought to ask why those ships are currently projected to make a £600M+ loss for BAE last time I looked (might be worse now!) and why BAES are having major trouble finishing them…….

    One might also wish to consider whether the “30-man” crew postulated on here for the River+ OPV would actually work in an environment where there is a credible surface threat and associated FP requirement, as opposed to some obnoxious French/Spanish fishermen. The FP requirement for ships in the Gulf (and by extension the Op Atalanta AOR) is a significant manpower driver. And that’s before you start adding boarding parties, boat crews etc. Turn that into three watches, plus an ops room picture compilation requirement and I’d be surprised if you got much change out of 80 bods. And that’s 80 bods in UK accommodation, which all of a sudden will have your ship teetering at the 3500-4000te mark, but with only minimal weapons systems. I wonder how they’ll be described then?

    As for first and second rate assets, can we assume that the RAF would be content to sacrifice their F35 or some of the Typhoon squadrons for an aircraft something between a Strikemaster and a Warthog for CAS in a COIN scenario? Cos lets face it, having a top-end fast jet like Tornado burning flight hours where there is no significant air or SAM threat is a bit of a waste surely?

    I’m obviously being facetious there, but the principles are the same. Yes on the surface it’s daft to have “billion pound destroyers” chasing pirates. But the nice thing about them is that they can have a proper fight with a proper foe as well, just like Tornado / Tiffy. A sloop however, will not be able to contribute much to a fleet action and therefore dilutes combat power from a fixed pot – just as asking the RAF to delete high-end airframes for a low-end CAS COIN frame would.

    It doesn’t quite apply to the army, because light infantry is light infantry. It can be reroled much more quickly than building a new ship or type of fast jet.

    Oh. And Kylie. Definitely.

  68. Phil

    I don’t particularly want to see a cut in first rates. My saying I would accept 16 was just an acknowledgement of what is likely to happen, probably anyway with or without these vessels.

    I’d rather see an MHPC programme that bought the Rivers, MCMs and Survey vessels up to second rate standard. I remember arguing this with you before.

    I remember when the US Army Stryker brigades were being introduced and people were moaning that the US Army was having its claws clipped. But what was actually happening was that it was light infantry being upgraded to Stryker not armoured brigades being downgraded.

    That’s what I would like to see happen to the RN.

    An increase in flexibility by having an MHPC programme. Ideally the first rates would be left alone – fingers crossed – but there’s always some give and take sadly.

  69. x

    Phil said “The baddies have the same constraints.”

    True. How many ships have the Chinese built this year? How many do they plan to build next year? And the year after? And by what degree are they improving year on year? As I said a navy needs to be sustained.

    @ All

    I consider OPVs to be third rate.

    First Rate; Area wide capability like Sea Viper or complete ASW package (TAS, hull mounted sonar(s), ultra-quiet machinery, large ASW helicopter (or two) etc.) Plus base ASuW fit out of gun and AShM.

    Second Rate; Point defence systems like Sea Wolf or hull mounted search sonar (plus ASW helicopter) Plus base ASuW fit out of gun and AShM.

    Third Rate: Medium/small gun, flight deck (perhaps hanger, perhaps utility helicopter), air search radar. Perhaps CIWS. No organic ASW capability.

  70. Phil

    The Chinese are not just our problem. If somehow we ended up in a shooting war with them, we will take our place in an international coalition to defeat them in which we would be operating in integrated Task Forces.

    It will be Tiger Force and the Pacific Fleet (writ smaller) all over again. Which means 1x CVBG and some sort of air component.

  71. Repulse

    Another 4 OPVs would not significantly change the balance of the navy, nor does it suddenly turn it into the MN. What it does do is give options and at a relatively cheap price.

    To say an OPV has no value in war is ignoring the roles lesser war vessels have played in previous conflicts.

  72. WiseApe

    “…not being an SME does not exclude you from the debate on an internet forum.” – Phew that’s a relief. I don’t even know what SME stands for. It’s nothing like X’s FFS is it? The internet is a free country and we all have a perfect right to be wrong when we think we’re right.

    @Phil – “I just argue that we need a Navy with powerful ships and not so powerful ships” – I think that’s what Sir DR was saying; the key word being “and” not “or.”

  73. Not a Boffin

    For OPV it’s all about relative reach. In previous conflicts where OPV / sloop made any sort of contribution, the relative reach of protagonists was pretty small. So you could roll depth charges off the stern and have an active sonar and be useful. Similarly a 4″ manually laid gun was some use against surfaced subs.

    In those days picture compilation had latencies of hours if not days and small distances. Today picture compilation tends to have much smaller latencies, multiple sources of data and significant ranges.

    The same relative reach no longer applies. A 76mm armed sloop, even with a crude SAM added is going to be c0ck-all use in a threat environment where fast jets exist. Nor are you going to ping away with active and deploy short range weapons against a sub, unless you’re lucky and he isn’t….

    There is nothing wrong with OPV provided they are not at the expense of major surface units. Unfortunately, that ain’t going to be the case here, if CDS gets his way…..

  74. Simon

    Last time we were discussing the T26 I suggested 8 T26 + 8 T26 with the second set being “fitted for but not with” almost everything.

    The idea being that we get economies of scale of hull production and can retro fit/upgrade the lesser T26′s when the time arises. Obviously they’d still be able to carry and operate a medium copter which carries much of the ASW/ASuW capability anyway… I remember getting on my high horse about Wildcat not having a dipping sonar in order to be a 2nd rate ASW/ASuW copter.

    This means we have slightly large 3rd rate vessels that can easily be upgraded to 2nd raters (assuming a destroyer is 1st rate, and a frigate is 2nd rate, etc).

    Is there enough savings in the “fittings” to pay for the extra hulls and crews required?

  75. x

    CDS will be pruning his roses or getting a directorship with a defence company or three before anything concrete happens. 1SL should stick out for 12 T26 and even push for more. CDS might have risen to be the uniformed head of the UK services, doesn’t make him always right. Especially when it comes to naval matters. Don’t see the 40mm gun for Warrior programme being scrapped because the Army will only be fighting terrorists…..

  76. WiseApe

    Hello all. Only one more working day to go before I have to pretend to be happy to see relatives I haven’t seen since I pretended to be happy to see them this time last year.

    “…not being an SME does not exclude you from the debate on an internet forum.” – Phew that’s a relief. I don’t even know what SME stands for. It’s nothing like X’s FFS is it? The internet is a free country and we all have a perfect right to be wrong when we think we’re right.

    After a bit of sales patter, Panetta talks about his 5 point Defence Strategy:

    http://brahmand.com/news/US-seeking-to-boost-defence-trade-with-India-Brazil/10523/1/13.html

  77. All Politicians are The same

    NAB

    I do not believe anyone has suggested using such an OPV in a threat environment. As I have painstakingly highlighted in previous posts there are numerous questions to be answered and parameters set before we can talk about numbers and capabilities.
    One of the biggest being what do we expect a Corvette type vessel to be able to achieve.
    We have to ensure that we retain enough FF/DD capability to conduct tasking that requires an FF/DD but there may be an opportunity to pass off current FF/DD tasking to smaller combatants.
    What I have not read on here other than my musings is any attempt to look at what we currently do, the capabilities required and an analysis of alternatives.
    Instead we have either, yes it is a brilliant idea or no it will never work.
    maybe think deference should be renamed “post our prejudices”?

  78. Phil

    It’s not prejudice. It really doesn’t bother me. And to be honest I’d still be thinking that the RFAs being used in the Caribbean were a good idea if it wasn’t for you mentioning about not even having FLIR. I’m just offering an opinion I don’t have a dog in this hunt.

  79. Ant

    @WiseApe

    I think SME = Subject Matter Expert (where Expert = drip under pressure)

    Good luck with the relies and SARS! (Smile And Retain Smile)

  80. All Politicians are The same

    I guess predjudice is a pretty strong word but I do not see any actual examination of where and how we could cut back FF/DD current roles and replace with Corvettes to allow CDS thoughts to happen.

    For instance the FI, I know a Political hot potato but could we replace the permanent FF/DD cover by other means?

    Can think of 3 options.

    1. Increased army presence making any landing a definite no go.
    2. RAF offer up a strike capability, even 3 or 4 GR4 with maybe Kormorant missiles bought and integrated from germany.
    3. A purchase of shore launched NSM, similar to the Polish purchase, they have paid about $140 milion for 60 missiles and launchers, we would need a third of that.

    Given any of those 3 options we may be able to lose the FF/DD presence and reinforce Clyde with a new ” Corvette”.

    The Gulf, we could only provide 1 FF in the Gulf, make it a TAS T23/T26 but base 2 “Corvettes” in Bahrain for EEZ duties in the NAG in support of Iraq and chasing pirates in the GOA.

    Utilise further 3rd rates for APT(N) tasking.

    Ensure that any future Corvette was capable of FRE tasks such as shadowing and SF support tasks. To be undertaken when an FF/DD is not available.

    You already cut out the requirement of 2 permanent tasks. You need 6 or 7 “Corvettes to make it happen but if you only shed 3 T26 then you actually have more FF/DD available for core and contingency tasking.

    Of course it completely depends upon vessel capabilities HMG decisions but is perhaps not unworkable.

  81. Mark

    APAS

    You raise a fair point and I think we’re guilty as charged. I’ll have a go going with the adaptable fwd engagement idea suggested by cds i can see us perhaps taking on additional tasking in the areas the general mentioned Africa, Caribbean and Far East essentially conducting anti-piracy, sea control and denial, counter-terrorism, drug interdiction and anti-smuggling operations, oil and gas platform protection, search and rescue, fisheries and possibly the delivery of special forces. Now I can guess at what the two frigates are doing in the gulf probably what the us carrier groups are doing doesn’t seem like we can change that.

    The TAPs I guess looks after the ssbn fleet again cant see that changing much all other standing operations could be open to options I don’t see a high level of significant threat in any other tasking i dont know where all the ships are so that maybe a sweeping statement but to provide some insurance could we keep additional fleet ready escorts instead of 1 perhaps 3/4 this may allow covering taps without dedicating a ship and should an incident spring up were a less capable ship is operating one of these ships sail to reinforce. Could ships assigned to the task groups operate on a similar process to the capital assets eg a high and low cycle readiness.

    Don’t know if this reduces overall ff/dd numbers as i don’t know what level of redundancy fleet ready escorts require or the task group ships require I guess the gulf ones are 3:1.

  82. Repulse

    NAB,

    OPVs able to operate helicopters or UAVs are not useless. Nor are ships capable of supporting stop and search operations or ones able to search a radius of up to 90nm (like HMS Clyde).

    I agree they are not replacements for DD/FFs but far from worthless.

  83. Think Defence Post author

    If you chaps remember I did a ‘future of’ series ages ago, 2010.

    Going back through it, its pretty embarrassing to be honest but I like to think of TD as a journey of discovery :)

    Very fantasy fleets…

    http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/11/the-future-of-the-royal-navy-02-tasks-and-general-approach/

    http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/11/the-future-of-the-royal-navy-03-single-task-group/

    http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/11/the-future-of-the-royal-navy-04-forward-presence-squadrons/

  84. WiseApe

    “Batch 2 Type 45’s” – Fantasy indeed. Like Typhoon Tranche3B! Really we’re all just treading water until SDSR 2015 aren’t we. The worrying thing is that whereas a year or two ago we were projecting a loosening of the purse strings (as our economy surged forwards!) we are now faced with the very real prospect of further cuts. At best status quo?

  85. John Hartley

    A World war breaking out is more likely to be WW1 style rather than WW2. So not a nutter taking 7 years building massive masterrace forces, but a terrorist act sparking off war by accident. Ring any bells? 9/11 has cost the UK £17-20 billion in Afghanistan + how many hundred lives? Imagine a 9/11 style incident sparking off war between states thanks to alliances & old grievances.
    Sadly Britain is not ready. Army, RN & RAF are all too small.Industry crippled by green taxes & lack of investment. Money that should have gone on infrastructure has been pi**ed away by DfID.

  86. Not a Boffin

    APATS – You are of course correct that the requirement for a given task must come first. Otherwise it’s the usual “solution looking for a problem” game. However, implicit in the thinking is that with the possible exception of APT(S) and what was WIGS it’s difficult to think of a standing task where the potential threat capability does not exceed that which an OPV might safely be exposed to, were the threat intent to change suddenly.

    To make it capable of that,you end up with something much bigger than what people are speculating upon here, which makes it a more expensive beast than all the cost guessers suppose. Just the manpower required and accommodation will do that before we start putting extra systems on it.

    Repulse – if it needs someone else to look after it (ie in a threat environment rather than peacetime) it’s a liability, not an asset. No-one argues that OPVs are useless in non-warfighting situations – it’s when intent changes where a capability exists that you need to worry.

  87. Challenger

    Has anyone considered that perhaps Richards is looking towards MHPC delivering a ‘Corvette’ type force multiplier in the 2020′s or later?

    If that was the case then it would leave all of our talk about T26, OPV’s and the like even more academic than usual!

  88. martin

    @ Simon
    Last time we were discussing the T26 I suggested 8 T26 + 8 T26 with the second set being “fitted for but not with” almost everything.
    One big issue is you will have to pay for new radars for your second rate T26 as we only have 13 Artisan sets to transfer across. Given that many systems will transfer across from T23 anyway I am not sure if the savings you envisage are there.

    @ APATS
    Thanks for your thoughts on standing patrols. Would you see the Khareef Class OPV being able to fufill these roles in its current configuration?
    @ NAB
    You quote a cost of £200 million per Khareef class on a previous post but you also indicate a total loss of £600 million for BAE which would indicate a £330 million price tag per vessel. Are these figures accurate? I can’t find reference to them anywhere else. It’s obviously a vital question as Khareef is the nearest example of a corvette built in the UK today and if it can be done for much less than a T26 then the entire debate is academic.

  89. martin

    @ John H
    “Sadly Britain is not ready. Army, RN & RAF are all too small. Industry crippled by green taxes & lack of investment. Money that should have gone on infrastructure has been pi**ed away by DfID.”
    Is anyone ready? Last time I looked most countries were in an even sorrier state than us militarily and economically. Even the much vaunted Chinese are having some major issue’s at the moment.
    @ Challenger
    “Has anyone considered that perhaps Richards is looking towards MHPC delivering a ‘Corvette’ type force multiplier in the 2020′s or later?”
    The problem is the MHPC’s are rumoured to be coming in at £180 million a pop and that’s with out turning them into better armed corvettes. The prediction is for just 8 to replace the 12 MCV’s + 2 Hydrographic vessels. There numbers are going to be even more stretched than the FF/DD.
    @ NAB
    I agree about OPV’s in war time however if we can keep more of our FF/DD’s at home it gives us the ability to surge larger numbers in war time. However if they are all out on a 1.2 rotatio schedule covering standing task’s then we lose that ability. Even if we have to send the fleet of to China for WWIII we would still need vessels in home waters, the FI and Carribean performing more mundane tasks. A fleet of OPV’s would give us more flexibility in war fighting. The real question is how many high end hulls we would need to loose for a fleet of 6-7 of these vessels. If it’s 1 T26 then it’s a no brainer. If its three then it’s a tricky decision.

  90. martin

    Maybe a better option is to look at forward basing T26. Part of the issue is the need for three vessels to carry out one task. If we forward based 1 T26 in the FI and 1 in Bahrain then we would essentially save nearly four vessels for other tasks. Of course the big issue will be the extra crews to fill the boats.

  91. Repulse

    NAB, I haven’t explained myself properly, in war time I would see OPVs to operate in UK and overseas dependency waters. They would be acting as part of a layered defence backed up by air and other assets, this would free up DD/FF and MCM assets to do what they are supposed to be doing.

    I agree with Martin, it’s all about how many DD/FFs you would need to sacrifice (if any).

  92. Repulse

    @Martin, are we not also getting 3 Artisan radars for the Albions and Ocean? If Ocean is canned as expected and we decide that escorts deserve this radar more than Amphibs, you’ve got your 16 sets.

  93. martin

    @ Repulse – I did not know that about Artisan. I think though to get the entire fleet of 16 we would need to go a bit further such as making the entire fleet diesel only with no GT’s and also cheaper sonar in the GP version’s.

  94. Alex

    The problem is the MHPCs are rumoured to be coming in at £180 million a pop

    *eaten my hat*

    how? what are they spending it on? there is no design, no contractor, but money pours out of Bath through the plughole…

  95. Challenger

    @Martin

    I hope we see some action on OPV’s or Corvettes sooner rather than later.

    I just suddenly had a bad feeling that whilst we are all getting excited and discussing fleet numbers, types of vessel etcetera perhaps Richards simply meant it would be ‘nice’ to find some extra hulls for standing commitments out of the much promised MHPC whenever it arrives.

    I agree with Alex as well, how do you know MHPC is slated as being £180 million a pop? It isn’t off the drawing board yet and won’t be in service until at least the mid 2020′s.

  96. martin

    @ Challenger and Alex

    Pre SDSR 2010 when the MOD had budgets and made long term plans to replace capabilities rather than just let them go on holiday the indication was a budget of £1.5 billion for eight vessels. obviously now that Phil has balanced the books by cancelling everything we have no idea what it’s likely to be or if their even will be a budget. However I am fairly sure given his distane for expensive warships chasing pirates that the CDS was not referring to and hopeful MHPC budget but instead raiding the funds for the T26 program.

  97. Challenger

    @Martin

    Yeah I remember the £1.5 billion for 8 ships thing that circulated before 2010, I was assuming that any figure approaching £180 million per ship would be for specialist mine-hunting and hydro-graphic kit which you hypothetically wouldn’t need if some extra hulls were procured for a Corvette type role. Who knows what’s going on with the MHPC programme now!

    I agree that Richards was probably referring to a different solution, most probably by altering the T26 procurement to get some OPV’s or something similar going in the not too distant future.

  98. ArmChairCivvy

    Exactly “Who knows what’s going on with the MHPC programme now!”
    - it is almost a year since the one year contract for Frazer Nash to consolidate the requirements ended (meaning that normally a design would follow)
    - it is under OCCAR who tells us that it is running wonderfully and so-oo many nations are onboard… but that is just for the MCM systems part of it
    - how they will be deployed is the UK-specific MHPC bit (as well as the remaining letters of the acronym); a mystery
    - Sandowns (while v good & v expensive) have been deemed too small to carry the next-gen systems, whereas the other class at least have been honoured with the title “Test Beds”.

    As per much of our discussion, the letter “P” is either missing, or is calling for a stop-gap, in order to optimise the future class of hulls (that is a heroic assumption in itself… that there will be just one class, to deploy on)

  99. Challenger

    @ArmChairCivvy

    I agree with most of what you say, but if you look at what MHPC is supposed to be replacing, the Echo’s and Rivers aren’t a decade old yet and the Hunts seem to be having a fair bit spent on them to keep them up-to date. The main issues seem to be the small size of the Sandown’s and the increasing age of the Hunt’s, these are the elements that are really going to drive exactly how and when we actually see some results.

  100. Lord Jim

    If and its a big if, we allocate the T45 and T22/26 exclusively to supporting the CVBG and ARG, each having 1 of each in a similar way to the number of escorts the French use for CdG We could get away with the 6 T45 and maybe 6 to 8 T22/26, allowing for an extra escort for one of the groups is needed or a FF available for the Falklands. Other RN tasks such as the Carribbean could be handled by a less capable vessel and I have no problem halting the deployment of RN assets to the Gulf on a permentent basis.

    A “Corvette” can still show the flag and probably carry out 80% of naval operations leaving the CVBG to handle high threat areas when needed. I would however follw the French idea rather then the OPV route giving the platform a decent medium calibre gun, ability to carry a helo and SSMs (when needed) and a rudimentary AAW capability through the gun suplimented with MANPADS and or 20-30mm cannon. I would make the hanger capable of holding a Merlin and this would give a basic wartime ASW capability as well. The electronics fit would be basic but there would be scope for improvements during their service lives. In a nutshell it starts to resemble the C2 concept but efforts would need to be made to stop capability creep within Abbey Wood, trying to turn them into fully fledged platforms. With 6-8 of these we could have vessels available that could do the tasks required leaving the T45/22/26s to carry out training and operations as peremnent groupings.

    IN the same vain I always thought the RAF should have bought 50-60 SAAB Grippen to replace the Jaguar, and the Army should have stayed in the Boxer programme to replace the majority of the FV430 fleet and saxons. In both cases these would have been in service already and we would not have had many of the problems that required UORs in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Mind you I still think we should purchase the latter as it is turning out to be an outstanding platform with bright future with its levels of protection and modular flexibility in a league of its own when compared to other wheeled platforms in service.

  101. All Politicians are the Same

    Lord Jim,

    With 6 to 8 of your C2 and 6 to 8 T26 you have just traded away capability for probably no increase in numbers (:

    I think in order to obtain numbers we would have look at something closer to the Spanish BAM than the French Floreal or La Fayette.

    The Spanish paid 100 million pound per hull for the BAM. So we are in the ball park of 3 for 1 on T26. Replace the old 76MM on the front with the STRALES version, put a RAM launcher aft and you have a pretty capable OPV/Light Frigate.
    Yes it can only carry a wildcat and not a Merlin and would have no sonar but we have to accept it would have no ASW role. It would be there to carry out Phils “Constabulary” duties.
    However with STRALES/RAM and Wildcat carrying FASGW then it is no sitting duck.
    There would be numerous issues of course, the minute we touch something it automatically becomes more expensive. Fitting a RAM launcher necessitates a command sytem of sorts, so possibly SEA RAM may be a better option.
    Ayway just a thought.

  102. Chris.B.

    Wouldn’t we be better off with something a little cheaper? More along the lines of HMS Protector?

    So a converted working vessel with helipad and hangar, the ability to launch some small boats and some basic self protection weapons. Restrict it to theatres like the Carribean and the coast of Somalia. Stuff where the likelyhood of it coming under any kind of serious attack is very, very small?

    There might even be scope there to work with various nations that aren’t normally able to contribute to something like the counter piracy ops by playing host to their helicopters/marines?

  103. ArmChairCivvy

    Hi APATS,

    The Spaniards paid about a mln euros (stronger euros) per meter of BAM, and I quite like the upgrades “However with STRALES/RAM and Wildcat carrying FASGW then it is no sitting duck.”

    The main weakness of BAM is quite short legs, but the 130m version was [year?] quoted at 130 mln. That would provide the legs, and can be ice-reinforced which is not that expensive.

    All of this would put the “P” back into MHPC, and would also provide a number of ocean-going MCM platforms when such are needed.

  104. All Politicians are the Same

    Chris B,

    It depends upon what you want it to be able to do. That goes back to my blank sheet review. Protector is quite unuique in that she operates in an area where weapons are not welcome.

    It would be embarassing off Somalia to be chased off by someone who happened to have an RPG or even some drug smugglers with an RPG. Also how many work boats knocking around have a hangar? Protector does not and she was extensively modified at some cost.

    I think the slight extra investment to obtain a vessel between an OPV and Corvette would be well worth it in terms of what you gain both in capability and perception.

    The sort of nations you talk about us working with would be far more impressed with a “Corvette” than a Oil rig support ship that has a hangar welded on and 3 50 cal machine guns.

  105. All Politicians are the Same

    ACC

    All the figures I can find for BAM indicate a range of 8,000Nm at 15 kts. Not sure how true this is but I do know the Spanish deployed one from cartagena to the GOA and it did not fuel until it reached Djibouti.

    Given that a T42 has to cross the pond with 1 Tyne only trailing 1 shaft at 13 kts then I think we could live with the range.

    My only rail against going to 130m is that everyone will look at it as a Frigate and I would not get my 8 or 9 for 3 T26 swap as the price increases.

  106. Chris.B.

    @ APATS,

    Let me take you back to where I was, thought wise, earlier in the year. People like Admiral West were making the case that navy was over worked, that it didn’t have enough escorts to manage all the tasks that were required of it. Back then I strongly supported the idea of a cheaper, smaller vessel, to carry out some of the more mundane tasks.

    Then you gave quite a comprehensive review of the fleet and its tasks, and it appeared from that that most of the moaning from the Admiralty – at least as far as I could see – did not match the real world data you were giving us, and that the problem wasn’t nearly as acute as was made out.

    From that point my support for this whole corvette/sloop thing has waned quite a bit. Unless it can be done on a cost scale that would see 3 “sloops” replace one T26, which would require the “sloop” to come in at no more than around £100 million then I don’t think it’s really worth it.

    For that reason I personally can’t support anything that would cost over and above that amount. That’s what leads me to something along the lines of Protector.

    Now yes, she doesn’t have a hangar. What she does have though is a bloody great crane just ahead of the flight deck, that probably wouldn’t be needed for the sort of tasks we’re talking about, so that could go to make room for a hangar (on a similar vessel, I mean).

    I suspect that such a ship would carry a helicopter similar to a Lynx, so something with a bit of punch, and that it would embark some form of Marine unit to handle the boarding tasks and the like, which represents an opportunity to take along a few Javelin.

    Would a pirate skiff risk coming into RPG range of something like this vessel? The half inch Browning has a longer range, and Javelin would do some serious damage to a little skiff. There is footage somewhere on the interwebs of Dutch Marines using .50 calibre sniper rifles to put holes in small pirate vessels as well.

    And don’t we always put helicopters and small boats at risk of an RPG attack anytime we send them to investigate a contact?

    That’s just my personal view. It either has to be a cheap vessel which operates solely in non-warfighty environments, and trades some risk in favour of lower cost, or we don’t do it all.

  107. All Politicians are the Same

    Chris B

    Exactly why I was impressed by the BAM. These cost 100 million each, now swapping the older 76MM for a 76mm Strales and fitting a RAM launcher would cost but a 76MM super rapid mount is quoted at approximately 3 million pounds, so even if the STRALES variant is 5 million that puts the price up to 105 million.

    The beauty of taking a design that is meant to be a warship even a large OPV is that we can ensure that we have EODF capability, link if required, mil comms etc. Rather than try and retrofit.

    Now RAM is not cheap and a launcher and missiles will set you back close to 8 million pounds. The Sea RAM version is cheaper and it may be that we would delete this to save costs. Even if it was included we would be at 113 million and close to the 3 for 1, certainly close to 8 for 3.

    So by the time BAE are finished I would predict that we could get 4 for 3 :)

  108. Chris.B.

    @ APATS,

    Hmm, I see where you’re going with that. My worry is that the price is already on the up! Does it absolutely need the Sea RAM?

    I wonder what the conversion cost would be if you could pick up say 4 commercial working boats and convert them? Ideally the less T26 that have to be sacrificed the better, so finding the cheapest way to produce an adequate “sloop” is paramount.

  109. All Politicians are the Same

    Chris B,

    @ APATS,

    Hmm, I see where you’re going with that. My worry is that the price is already on the up! Does it absolutely need the Sea RAM?

    I wonder what the conversion cost would be if you could pick up say 4 commercial working boats and convert them? Ideally the less T26 that have to be sacrificed the better, so finding the cheapest way to produce an adequate “sloop” is paramount.

    The inherent capability depends upon what you want them to do as I expanded in an earlier post. Once tasking was decided then you would look at numbers and force flow.

    If you could cheaply convert a “work boat” to be an adequare OPV/Sloop and save money then other people would be doing it!

    It would have to be massively cheaper as you are compromising in every part of the design from the propulsion, to the ability to create citadels, to isolations, to air conditioning etc.

  110. All Politicians are the Same

    X,

    Thx for the link. I have never seem so many “buzz words” used to completely fail to make a valid point in my life.

    The first poster did have a point, an Amphib can dominate a large area of water and actually deploy separate boat groups if required, as Bulwark did in 2006.

    The second poster used all the correct buzz words about ISR, systems etc but completely overlooked the fact that the systems do not need to be based on 1 platform.
    He mixes a systems and platform based approach. The platform is only 1 part of a system which starts with satellite AIS and live feed radar from all platforms and from UAV, AWACS, MPA, Helos, Ships etc. This is then fused together to allow deployment of assets.
    As for the mumbo jumbo about needing twice the number of Ships company to manage 24 hour surveilance. well if you cannot man an ops room and run a single environment non threat RMP 24/7 with no air or sub surface threat at all with what you have onboard then you really should not be there in the first place.
    I must admint it is the first time I have heard anyone argue that you actually need an FF to chase after 6 men in a Skiff :)

  111. Mark

    APAS

    Interesting opinions on the BAM ships have you had any experience of the holland opv the Dutch are doing along similar lines maybe to what were looking at.

    Sir Humphrey did a piece a while back he thought they were not bad with interesting pros and cons.

  112. All Politicians are the Same

    Mark,

    Only what I have read about them. They are a bit bigger and a bit more expensive than the BAM. They carry an incredibly complex integrated Mast, comms and command suite system. Phased array radars capable of weappon direction as well as detection, link 11, 16 and will be link 22 capable.

  113. John Hartley

    Perhaps we should look at the stillborn FN 15.5 mm HMG. More range/clout than the .50 , but not overkill like heavy cannon. Ideal for pirates, I would have thought.

  114. Challenger

    If you went absolutely bargain basement and went with a stretched (flight-deck/hangar) River that’s fitted for but not with most of the expensive stuff (so at most a 76mm gun and smaller calibre stuff, no missiles) then how much would it cost?

    If you could get 4 or 5 of those by sacrificing 1 T26 then it may be worth it.

  115. Chris.B.

    @ APATS,

    I certainly don’t think we should be sending a “sloop” anywhere near an environment where it might have to deal with a serious air threat by itself.

    HMS Protector was converted on a reasonable budget. I think it’s more of a case that other nations need their small vessels to do more than just chase pirates or drug smugglers.

  116. tsz52

    When we’re looking at swapping Type 26′s for sloops-of-war, isn’t part of the problem that you also need to account for the Duke upgrade cost/kit?

    So if you upgrade all the Dukes but don’t transfer their expensive bits and bobs over to the new frigates on a like for like basis then you’re wasting money (not getting the best return on money spent); but if you want as many decent sloops as possible then you can maybe get an additional one per Type 26 you don’t build* if you buy them now and retire rather than upgrade the corresponding Type 23? [Though aren't all of the Artisan sets paid for now?]

    [*I know that it wouldn't work out exactly that way when factoring in manning etc, but just as somewhere to start, before breaking down the costs more precisely.]

    APATS: I agree that it’s pretty endlessly circular to keep discussing this without your detailed tasking requirements study first, but most of us aren’t in any position to realistically do that worth a squirt of piss; I’m sure that you’re a busy, busy man but it would be really interesting and deeply informative if you were to drop a guest post having a crack at that yourself (saying as much as you’d be comfortably allowed to say, naturally).

    Just so we know what we’re looking at, what would be the difference in price between your upgraded BAM and a modernised Floréal and La Fayette? Assume that all share the same sensor, weapon, countermeasures and CMS fit out, and that the modernised French constabulary frigate types have the newest French levels of automation (say a bit less automation but add ~12 sailors each to what they would have, for around 95-ish?).

    It’d be really nice to have more of a solid core of proper info to hang some of these ideas and suggestions on, rather than just going aimlessly round and round everywhere.

  117. Challenger

    @Chris B

    ‘I think it’s more of a case that other nations need their small vessels to do more than just chase pirates or drug smugglers’

    I’m not sure exactly where you stand on this whole debate, but I agree with that last statement.

    It’s an important aspect to this whole problem of quantity vs quality, because it doesn’t take much to leap from sloop to corvette to light frigate, with all the associated bits of increasingly sophisticated kit jacking the price up. Before you know it (especially where BAE are concerned!) you will be trying to fund an expensive and multi-purpose platform once again.

    The reason why so many navies have those kind of small but well armed surface ships is because they compliment they’re destroyers and frigates (if they have any) as a force multiplier, which is something we broadly aren’t trying to achieve.

    A well armed light frigate or corvette would be lovely, but taking money away from T26 to fund that kind of beast seems counter-productive. Maybe it’s better to have a very clear division between our high-end escorts and some VERY cheap OPV’s that take over some of the more mundane roles.

  118. Jed

    Wow, serious de-ja-vu – have we had this conversation (BAM, Sloops, Corvette’s) a million times in the SIMMS threads, and countless others ?

    The problem is, we (the nation) are being budget led, not strategy / requirements led.

    The defence planning assumptions state a worse case scenario of UK only action against a hybrid threat – e.g. something akin to Hamas, a state sponsored terrorist organization, where the sponsoring state is “neer peer”.

    In which case, a BAM type ship with the anti-missile capabilities of STRALES equipped 76mm gun, and SEA_RAM would probably be needed.

    HOWEVER

    If the CDS just wants to show the flag and undertake constabulary duties, which may not include sailing into harms way against state sponsored terror orgs with modern AshM, then I thought we had agreed that TD’s SIMMS concept was a pretty good idea; personally I would make that the smaller end, based on Ulstein SX119 with a Lynx Wildcat and two x 40mm CTA in fancy mounts…..

    EITHER way, any numbers should be considered in the light of the number of DDG (T45) and FFG (T23 / T26) required to protect a CBG and an ARG from a particular threat (including the use of NATO allies vessels within the task groups).

    BUT

    It may well come down to doing nothing properly or seriously, and just buying some more River class to keep Pompi’ viable as a dockyard.

    Muddle on through, same old same old…….

  119. WiseApe

    @Jed:

    “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”
    Albert Einstein

    Edit: I’ve never really understood this “flying the flag” business. What’s the point if you have to run away when someone else turns up with his flag attached to a big stick?

  120. x

    @ APATS

    Well those Army guys (and their camp followers) are at the forefront of the maritime security debate.

  121. All Politicians are the Same

    X,

    Really? The forefront? As for Army, the first claims to have just returned from a CP patrol but his little Avatar says sod the Navy? Educated booty? The second is most definitely RN.

  122. Lord Jim

    Given manpower and financial restraints the numbers I mentioned are an idea of how we won’t end up going backwards in numbers but rather maintain them. Banging the same drum, we need the Politicians to be honest about what we can and cannot do within our budgetary limitation. I cannot see the RN going down the enhanced OPV route but more taking a similar path to the French navy to keep the numbers of hulls around 20. Yes we lose some capability but we retain sufficent high end platforms to operate the CVBG and ARG at high intensity and sufficent second tier hulls to cover a reasonable number of standing tasks but with a platform that can carry out the vast majority of tasks and even work wiiht the High end units. The French navy often allocates a second tier platform as the third escort for the CdG.

  123. mickp

    @Lord Jim – are you thinking more of a La Fayette sized / type ship than an extended River / BAM type? That to me would be more cost effective than a GP Type 26. Its almost back to the C1 / C2 route, perhaps no bad thing. Its then down to numbers. Can see them going for 8:8, but a 10:8 option would give a decent number uplift and enough T26s for CVF escort and high threat tasking. We really need a big run of T26s to get efficiencies of build. The OPV options remains then as part of MHPC

  124. George

    Just finished the whole thread and came to the same conclusion as Mr Mickp above.

    Ruthless commonality, steady drumbeat, steady flow of Type 26s either gp or ASW (maybe AAW too?) More use if things get serious…

  125. McZ

    Given that the current tendency in the T26-programme (a bit larger than a SIGMA, a bit more capable, a lot more room reserve, a better electronics fit, and affordable at £300m per unit) we should just try to get the utmost out of it. Personally – having proposed a SIGMA-variant to fulfil the task – I’m very pleased so far.

    IMO, this includes a steady run of one vessel per year, and it should include at least two AAW-variants to push export sales and to make up for T45 not being built.

    If we accept that there is a place for a complementary, constabulary vessel, we need the professional environment to avoid mixing requirements and letting politicians sell them as warships. And this means: Coast Guard.

    If we further accept that showing-the-flag is a RN-task, then T26 will turn out ideal for those events. The very concept of showing-the-flag is the fact, that the audience – the professional naval staff and the public of the host country – has to be impressed by what they see. IMO, they would turn away their eyes, shaking their heads if a nearly 10k ts hog-uva-Ulstein comes into port (we have to accept, that especially Asians will be disgusted if we send auxiliaries).

    Finally, when we once need a MCM-replacement in the middle of the 2020s, a combination of helo-UAVs and barged equipment fitting into a Bay-class, onto a MLP or – to a lesser degree – on a T26 “mothership variant” may provide a better solution, ultimately.

  126. Jed

    McZ

    Personally I have never seen TD’s SIMMS concept as anything other than Coast Guard, and would use the CBG / ARG on “world tour” for “showing the flag” in Asia.

    As we will never stand up a new Para-Military Coast Guard, as I have noted before, such vessels could be manned and operated by the RFA, with members of various government agencies / military aboard for Caribbean, Mediterranean, or African “constabulary” operations. This would provide a cheap route to fulfill anti-piracy, anti-narco, anti-people smuggling tasking while as you note above keeping a professional separation from the “military” RN and thus not allowing HMG to depict such maritime policing vessels as “war ships”.

  127. Think Defence Post author

    Jed’ tend to agree with you there. Simss was an exercise in getting the thinking juices going but I think we need to be far more creative in our thinking because frigates’ destroyers and carriers are starting to look like the rn sacred cows

  128. tsz52

    Dunno TD; there’s certainly something holy bovine about the Carriers, but Frigates (even if they were called Cruisers at various times) have always been the bread and butter ships of navies – no new or emerging technologies will change that for a long time in the future.

    I’ll admit that I never really got over my admiration for the C1/C2/C3 concept… and have always loved me them La Fayettes; if we’re doing the usual ‘look at how these things have actually been used recently’ test, then I can’t stop thinking about the Type 21s in ’82, or the La Fayettes who performed such sterling work vs Libya (you wouldn’t have sent BAMs etc into that environment to perform NGS etc). So rather than having the binary war-fighting/non-war-fighting, semi war-fighting might be more cost-effective for the latter.

    Something like a La Fayette, that can ideally be fitted with some of the expensive bits and bobs from the specific Type 23s that wouldn’t then be upgraded (the diesels?, the 4.5″ and gunnery radar etc), with some kind of RAM for defence. Can be used exactly as La Fayettes are, and if a major war is brewing, then CAMM VLS launchers can be fitted into the ‘B’ position space, and one of the Artisan sets slapped on top (ensure structural strength and CMS upgrade margins are built in).

    Might be able to get two of these (all-in cost, including manning and increased unit price of the remaining Type 26s) per Type 26 not built (including some of the Dukes also not being upgraded first). That price seems about right for a low spec light Frigate (looking at the costs I’ve been able to find for the likes of Taiwan’s La Fayette variants – adjusting for allegedly dodgy deal and media f*ckwittery – and the roughly comparable South African Valour class, our ship being lower spec, in default cheap and cheerful configuration, than the latter).

    Better to have two of these minor actual warships (that also look the part), rather than three strictly not actual combatant (and with zero potential to ever make them so) crappy and ugly OPVs/little freighters, per Type 26 reluctantly lost? Thinking about comments made here in the Gibraltar thread and elsewhere… I just keep coming across non-war-fighting ships being a false economy.

    Bearing in mind that the sticker price exchange rate for different ship options rapidly erodes when you then start looking at manning them – in some respects, cost-effectiveness per man trumps cost-effectiveness per £ spent on ship and systems.

    I’m also not convinced about how successful the move to exclusively off-board MCM systems will be, ever, so we could get economies of scale going on this slick light Frigate being the P (and H, if done right), and build dedicated hulls for the M role of MHPC; since they will probably end up having to do that anyway… let’s not waste a fortune on also discovering for ourselves that off-board UxVs, mission modules (as opposed to reconfigurable modular spaces) and containers are not the future for a long time yet, and let’s spend that money on proper ships and sailors instead.

    By the same token, let’s not give BAE a fortune to re-invent the fairly reconfigurable light Frigate concept either, or delude ourselves that a home-grown design will have export potential (it’s a thoroughly saturated market) – OTS with minimal tweaks. I’d be looking at a modernised (especially in terms of automation) La Fayette, with as many UK systems as possible – the deal being that we give France this and in exchange they vow to not play the usual silly buggers on some shared procurement programmes that we have with them, that we really care about and need to go well, for once.

  129. mickp

    @tsz52

    That’s where I’ve got to with all the versions of this same debate. We need a number of fully equipped first rate T26s. By fully equipped I mean 5″ gun, phalanx, TAS, TLAM (strike length silos), Sea Ceptor, Helo, some sort of AShM. These ships are primarily battle group based but are sufficiently armed to act alone in high threat taskings. Current suggested specs meet this As to the number, well some reports suggest 13 T26s, but some suggest not all will be fully equipped – some will be ‘GP’. There are any number of permutations but I propose 12 First rate T26s as above in the initial commitment.

    I see potential then, given the timeframe for follow on orders of an AAW variant to supplant the T45.

    At the same time order, for sake of argument 6 La Fayette type patrol frigates, 76mm strales, RAM / Sea RAM / Sea ceptor, OTS sonar, radar and deck space for a Harpoon equivalent. 2nd rate ships to boost the escort fleet and provide vessels that could cover APT N/S and Anti Piracy in time of peace or act as secondary escorts in times of war.

    I’d have a rethink on the whole aspect of OPVs and Inshore Patrol. A couple more River type with a 76mm gun (if only a stop gap to save portsmouth) would allow a stronger presence in Gib, boosting FI patrol if low threat incursions increased. Longer term I’d be seeking a follow on class of 8 OPVs to replace Rivers / Clydes – 2 FI, 2 Gib and 4 UK. The UK ones could act as FREs (UK). I’m thinking BAM size. I’d then look for a larger class of EEZ / fisheries patrol vessels, let’s say Armidale size, in essence replacing the Archers in enhancing capability. The final layer is port protection craft – armed to the teeth craft to protect naval bases and other key ports from potential threats. For the MH aspects of MHPC I’d design a separate class, possible based on the Venator model – flight deck but no hanger, gun armament (Strales for consistency perhaps) with Mine Warfare as the primary design objective (I don’t believe, yet, that this can’t be done without a dedicated class). There may be an option to fit these with TAS, to serve as SSBN protection also. Possibly 8-10 craft.

    I feel trying to derive a one size fits all ship forces too many compromises and when you start from scratch, we need layers of ships to suit progressively more risky tasks. To me its all about eliminating the embarrassment of out forces been outgunned in a specific situation. Two or three fully loaded T26s (or even 3 T26 plus 1 T45) would be a sufficient deterrent force for most situations without sending a full carrier group.

    I would not rule out a couple of SIMMS type vessels as being suited ideally to WI guardship role or a mothership type for to MCMs perhaps.

    So where should we aim (ok I know its verging on fantasy fleet type stuff, but it is Christmas)

    6 T45s (please add Harpoon or equivalent; and in midlife upgrade lets max out the Aster cells and replace 4.5″ with 5″)
    12 T26 (5″, 2 phalanx, Sea Ceptor, 2 30mm, TAS, 12 Strike length TLAM cells, Helo – plus harpoon if it fits))
    6 ‘T27′ (76mm strales, 2-30mm, Searam / RAM, Helo and hanger, space for Harpoon / CAAM)
    8 OPVs (76mm strales, 2-30mm, Helo deck only, space for something else)
    12-18 EEZ patrol craft to cover Uk and dependencies
    8-10 Mine warfare / Hydro / TAS
    Fleet / Harbour protection squadrons

    This will need more money, undoubtedly, but I feel the RN is running understrength for future risks

  130. mickp

    Having seen the SIGMA variants, the ‘T27′ and OPV variants in my proposal above could both be covered by SIGMA options – frigate / corvette respectively. I’d further add a Karel Doorman JLSS as a replacement for Argus / Ocean.

    BAE have got plenty of work on T26 etc, I think we have to bite the bullet and go off the shelf for a 2nd rate patrol frigate. With the SIGMA having ASW capabilities that could move to a 10-8 T26/T27 split. I feel 24 first and 2nd rate DD/FF force is right for the navy with CVF in operation.

  131. All Politicians are The same

    MickP

    Morocco paid close to 800 million pounds for the three SIGMA vessels ( the first being bigger than the second 2) in 2008! Fast forward to 2015 prices and we would be just as cheap building extra T26.

  132. mickp

    @APATS – OK fair enough – GP T26s then (to be my Type 27s) unless there are other off the shelf modern 2nd rate patrol frigates out there that are cheaper. I wonder how much cheaper a GP version of the T26 can be whilst still keeping it an effective 2nd tier and the same basic structure for simplicity of production

  133. px

    How MOD and the Chiefs are understanding the strategic drivers is pretty clear from Army 2020… Europe is no longer a potential theatre for general war, the middle east is the primary threat, and Africa second… but these calaculations are suggresting short-sharp limited intervention (AKA Gulf 2002) or enduring and preventative operations to protect the global economy from ansymetric threats (espically in the emerging oil rich areas of East and West Africa)..

    Direct threats to the UK and overseas territories are more likely to be asymetric – e.g. cyber or terrorist. Although ne has to keep a weather eye on Argentina.

    The Pacific is an issue, but less volatile that ME and Africa. And UK will almost certainly play a very subsidiary role in any regional conflict. Putin reamins a wildcard and the Caucasus are important, as are the Baltics and destabilising influenbces in Belarus and Ukraine.

    So CDS and HMG want two core war fighting forces – the JEF is driven by US cajouling for Europe to take a bigger burden of global power projection, and that’s clearly a RN lead – Carrier Strike, SSNs + ARG/3 Cdo Brigade – plus a defense partnership with France (whatever one may think, in Europe its UK and France that do the business in expeditionary operations). I’ll repeat, this is what the US wants us to do.

    The ‘reaction force’ is the deterrent and safeguard if additional high internsity war fighting is necessary, and provides a spearhead ‘land’ intevention force beyond JEF: Typhoon can be placed in this category, as can the SSNs.

    The adaptable force is to provide enduring capacity to protect UK trade by provdinig supprot for managing conflict in the Middle East and Africa, as well as surge cpacity for enduring operations (which are NOT at all fashionable in Whitehall after Afghansitan and Iraq).

    The RN and RAF need to mirror this requirement, which looks much more like a mid-victorian threat analogy, rather than the run up to WW1 or WW2, or even the Cold War (if one imagines “the West”, rather than the “British Empire” as the sovereign idea to be defended). In this sense DFID funds can be seen as investment the “colonial office” alongside defence spending.

    So what are the adapable force requirements for the RN and RAF? Plenty of platforms that can cover the trade protection and conflict prevention mission, addressing mostly asymetric and often littoral threats – MCM, C3, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, insertion and ISTAR missions with additional capacity for disaster response and supporting joint operations and traning missions with regional partners. Modular mulit-role oceanic patrol vessels, helicopters and autonomous umanned vehicles, primarily.

    For the RAF, the somehwere between ‘Strikemaster and Warthog” option already exists (although it is a lot more sphisticated), its called Reaper – and more of these armed MALE UCAVs will be prioritised over conventional (albeit more survivable in general war) fighter-bombers. While in this environment buying more Chinook and more strategic lift over more Typhoon is an obvious choice.

    For the RN the issue is how many high intensity platforms are needed/affordable to i) maintain carrier strike (CVs, AF-35s, SSNs, T45s and T26s fitted for ASW, ii) deliver the global trade protection mission (the new “Corvette”?)… Right now the escorts are all high end “war-fighters”, and most of the other hulls are either innapropriate, too small, or too few too few to deliver the ‘low-end’ mission.

    Looking at David Ricahrd’s text, and listening to the wind, it seems that the “outward looking” 3rd Divsion HQ and 7 Adapable Brigade HQs will be much more about the “trade protection and conflict prevention mission” – it seems that a battlegroup will be established on Cyprus (presumalby with a weather eye on Egypt, Libya and Syria, and repercussions in Lebanon, the mlitary assistasnce and training teams ands training facilites in Jordan and Oman will be enhanced, and a new ones created in Bahrein (and maybe Qatar?) with ongoing support to Kuwait, Afghanistan and UAE. Military assitance and training teams, trtaining facilies (BATUK liht infantry traing facility in Kenya and the jungle warfare school in Ghana) and support for peacekeeping training centres in Kenya, South Africa and Ghana will be upgraded, as will support to the African Union’s Peace and Security archetechture in Addis Abeba, to ECOWAS and the Nigerian forces, and probably to Somaliland/Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, DRC and Mozambique – while presence in Sierra Leone will be sustained as a low level. All of these countires have made globally significant new oil and gas discoveries in recent years, and Somalia and Nigeria have significant conflcit driven ny islamist terrorists. UK will also want to work with the African Union, ECOWAS, the US and France to curb islamist terrorism in Mali.

    Add to this an enduring lower level presence in Afghanistan and a westher eye on Pakistan, and a greater committment to joint security realtionships with Malyasia, Singapore, australia and New Zealand (and possibly Burma) in SE Asia (with upgraded support to Bruneii as the focal point), in addtion to the need to sustain ongoing comittments in the Falklands and Gibraltar, then the Carribean seems to be the least of our worries!

    An expanded naval committment to the Gulf as well as the greater sttragtegic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea, and a comittment to provide more naval inreraction in SE Asia will require more hulls. soWe know where budgets stand, and even tinkering in 2015 is not going to change much unless the world economy does a lazarus, so like it or not, the RN is going to have to develop its very own ‘adapatable force’.

    A globasl mission has ever been the same. From frigates to sloops and gunboats… Even in Nelsonian times the Frist raters spentr most of thier time in port – it was the cruisers that did the business. If one looks at the cruisers of the the late victorian navy, not many were “ships of the line”. That’s what we need now.

  134. Simon

    “So what are the adapable force requirements for the RN and RAF? Plenty of platforms that can cover the trade protection and conflict prevention mission, addressing mostly asymetric and often littoral threats – MCM, C3, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, insertion and ISTAR missions with additional capacity for disaster response and supporting joint operations and traning missions with regional partners. Modular mulit-role oceanic patrol vessels, helicopters and autonomous umanned vehicles, primarily.”

    The problem with “patrol vessels” is that they don’t have the legs to protect our trade routes. In addition, I don’t really see how trade or conflict protection/prevention points towards littoral warfare… surely it’s quite the opposite? – helicopter lift/assault against under-equipped foes and military force projected quickly from range.

  135. px

    simon,

    I uinderstand where you are coming from, however the missions you are referring to are the “short sharp” operations that JEF (or 16 AAB) are likely to be tasked with. The enduring mission will very likely not involve UK forces on the ground – or a UK led strike mission – for example counter-piracy in the Indian Ocean, or the insertion of diplomatic/intelliegence/SF teams (as also ocurred recently in Somalia)… Littoral in the sense of having ot deal with Iranian fast atack craft or Somali pirates, Niger Delta militias, piracy in the straights of Malacca, or supporting regfional forces to respond to terrorist threats to offshore oil and gas facilities in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania… The key word is “prevention”.

    When I say oceanic patrol vessels, i mean with legs. Very likely based on commercial maritime technology, and not necessarily that small. But that’s my choice. One could go for a more tradistional ‘patrol frigate’ if it could be bult cheap enough – a Lafayette (-), although for my money these are neither fish nor foul – not much good at either mission. I would go for something of offshore support vessel size.

    I’d go for a JEF Carrier Strike TF of 2 QEs, 6 T45s, 6-8 T26s (both T45s and T26s with full weapons fit) and an adapatable flotilla of 16-20 of these new “cruisers” with containerised modular capacity for MCM, ISTAR, survey, HELO and UAV operations, SF support and disaster response.

    I’d replace the reamaining T23s, all of the current OPVs, MCM and survey vessels with these new ships. I’d also buy 6 fast inshore attack craft, which could be transported by and operate from the new ships (or the LPD/Bays)for the littoral mission and focus the RNVR on operating these boats.

    In my view the naval role in protecting trade routes is not about defending against submarine or surface attack, or protecting ‘convoys’, its about preventing and neutralising, and most importantly helping our regional partners neitralise, littoral asymetric threats. These are ongoing tasks.

    Libya etc. are occiasional higher intensity tasks, requireing the JEF and reaction forces. One would build 20 new hulls to make sure that these “war fighting” forces were releived on this ongoing tasks and actually available when a Libya occurs (which was not the case last year).

  136. ArmChairCivvy

    RE “I don’t really see how trade or conflict protection/prevention points towards littoral warfare… surely it’s quite the opposite? – helicopter lift/assault against under-equipped foes and military force projected quickly from range.”
    - I can see the relevance of units focussed on green water, as opposed to blue water ops (and they should carry boats/ hovercraft that can persecute “who ever” into brown water, too)
    - we have discussed littoral ops/ warfare here mainly in the power projection/ amph. ops sense, but it does not necessarily involve setting one foot on the ground (even though terrain that can be directly influenced is part of the definition)

    “Having legs” naturally follows as an issue when you try to have designs that are useful for both blue and green water ops
    - but aren’t we supposed to be doing the protection/ prevention bit together with local nations, until the point is reached when the Single Task Force needs to gather and be ready to appear on the horizon?

  137. Simon

    px,

    But these enduring operations you speak of will require 3-4 vessels to simply maintain a presence in a particular area.

    The ability to neutralise the FAC threat is the domain of the Lynx isn’t it? That adds the requirement of a hangar, flight deck, copter and flight crew.

    I think you’ll simply end up with a T26, which is a pretty expensive way to counter piracy ;-)

    I’ve suggested a stripped down T26 for this purpose before. Simply a T26 without anything other than a gun and copter. That way the RN can scale up when needed rather than having large numbers of slightly useless ships which would only be useful as missile or torpedo fodder for a task force.

    Picking up on other things being said at the mo, perhaps the ships you speak of would constitute the backbone of an effective coastguard which can also guard the coast of foreign lands too.

    I just don’t think we can afford a dedicated coastguard… Perhaps this should be a service provided by the EU.

  138. px

    We have been fighting a war in Afghasnitan for the last ten years in which the army found out the best way to go to war was in an armoured commercial truck with an athropologist at one’s side.

    We have to understand strtategic reality to shape our forces. No reason why a modiefied offshore support vessel cannot operate a Wildcat at the fraction of the cost of a T26, or better still an armed fire scout UAV.

    Since we will probably have left the EU by the time these ships are built, a coastgaurd is hardly an option. anyway we would never agree the budget ;)

    We need to defend our interests in this world, not cling onto historical ideas of what a fleet looks like.

    T26 is a good looking ship. We need to make sure all of them are available when we need them rather than dispersing them over the globe on policing duties. In the Victorian navy 60% of ships were designed for and carried out colonial duties. If a really coherent conventional threat to the UK emerged that required a 100% blue water navy, I’d agree with you. But right now that is not the case. What we face is just as dangerous, if we do not adapt to that changed strategic reality we will not defend our nation’s interests. And, after all, that is what our forces are for.

  139. Repulse

    Px, I agree that based on the structure and funding available a middle of the road Lafayette would not be the right approach, it should be either an extended Clyde, Black Swan or SIMM. Re-reading the Black Swan concept document does potentially give more insight into what the RN is thinking.

    Perhaps even with tight budgets a 30 strong surface fleet is still possible, 6 T46s, 12 T26s, 8 Black Swans and 4 Rivers.

  140. px

    Repulse,

    I agree with you. Black Swan is the way to go, but also to resist attempts to over cook it, and make it unaffordable. LCS comparisons have to be avoided – its a new concept suited to UK needs and UK budget (we have a temptation to want soemthing like USN these days)..

    Historically, during the halcyon days in the 18th and 19th century, the RN had inferior ships (on paper) but more of the right kinds of them, and better men to fight them.

  141. Simon

    The “strategic reality” is currently financially biased and wasting money now to create a fleet that cannot adapt for future conflicts seems a waste of money to me.

    A dozen dinky utility ships will never be able to do the things a proper warship can. I admit the converse is also true. But this is defence not swanning around shooting a few chaps in skiffs – something that a cargo ship with a few RPGs and GPMGs can repel.

    I would not feel happy reducing the number of warships we have in order to be able to afford to do things that are less critical and hardly matters of national security.

  142. px

    Or swanning around preventing a few chaps with stanley knifes flying airliners into the world trade centre. Get real. This IS defence now.

  143. Repulse

    Simon, correct “A dozen dinky utility ships will never be able to do the things a proper warship can” but these platforms can do more than just than just hunt pirates. A couple of Lynx’s or UAVs could have a real impact.

  144. px

    Simon,

    I also should say, I’m a lover of beuatiful ships – so take it with a pinch of salt. But I think characterising this work as non-essential, or optional is misleading. Its not coastguard. Even if it may look so.

  145. x

    @ Simon

    The Norwegian Coastguard costs £100million per year (give or take) for 14 ships and 800 or so staff.

    The UK pays the EU £50million per day.

  146. px

    Oh to be Norway – but we are not we are Brits, with global committments and many reasons to be proud of that.

  147. Think Defence Post author

    X, do you have a link for that, its really interesting.

    Have been thinking about expanding some of my earlier thoughts on an expanded UK Coastguard for a while, might be interesting to draw a comparison

  148. Simon

    x,

    Isn’t that Norwegian Coastguard figure based on 800m NOK in 2005?

    There’s little to say that it doesn’t cost more in a different year (when they buy a ship for example). Also, it will be 2-3 times that if adjusted for inflation depending on if you want to use gold or USD as the exchange basis.

    £50m per day for straight bananas? Ouch! ;-)

  149. Simon

    px,

    “Or swanning around preventing a few chaps with stanley knifes flying airliners into the world trade centre. Get real. This IS defence now.”

    I was under the impression that culling al-Qaeda was a land and political war. How do a few cheap ships help?

    “…characterising this work as non-essential, or optional is misleading…”

    I think piracy is non-essential… at the moment ;-)

    Also, I’d very much hope that if you did get your way and build 20 of these utility ships that they would be beautiful :-)

    Repulse,

    I’d rather spend the money on a couple of LPH which would add some proper impact and in addition some staying power on task in wartime.

    One has to look at the opportunity costs.

  150. Repulse

    @Simon, I understand the view, bur the crew requirements for 2 (or even one) LPH would kill any chance of getting 2 QEs active, which have already been paid for. A Black Swan ciuld have a core crew as few as 8, supplemented by other JEF personnel / assets.

  151. x

    @ Simon

    2005? Where did you get that from? I used to spend an awful lot of time poking around this subject. I even have one book in French on the USCG. So I have lots of odd facts that pop up; I rely on more poor imagination not to make figures to outlandish. I just recall that the figure is about £100 million per year and there were 800 coastees. I remember the 800 because it is a nice round number. Even if it cost the Norwegians £250million a year it isn’t a huge sum.

    EDIT: As for buying ships well we didn’t buy a submarine for a decade it didn’t stop the submarine service costing an amount per year. It is pensions and pay that are the big cost. Even if we decided to add 5 vessels on to our orbat it would cost what £300million or 6 days EU contributions or 5 F35x.

  152. Simon

    Repulse,

    I was working on 20-30 crew, which neatly works out to 400-600 crew over 20 hulls, which is what 2 x HMS Ocean type LPH would require.

    I can’t see a crew of 8 managing to achieve very much?

  153. McZ

    “Perhaps even with tight budgets a 30 strong surface fleet is still possible, 6 T46s, 12 T26s, 8 Black Swans and 4 Rivers.”

    This is interesting. Tight budget? Currently, the equipment budget is £6b+ per annum, with roughly a third of this number RN. We could buy 6 T26 a year.

    If each vessel has a 25 year lifeframe, sustaining 30 vessels requires a constant drumbeat of 1.2 vessels a year. Which in T26 terms – given that the baseline costs £300m and dedicated add-ons approximately £100m – makes £480m (this expludes savings through economies of scale).

    For anything qualifiing as policing ops, we can built cheaper-than-Black-Swan-vessels. We colour them white, with a nice coat-of-arms and a big fat ‘COAST GUARD’ pennant. As it happens, both together is exactly mirroring the japanese model.

    This would still leave more than £1.5b a year to pay for extravaganza like a TLAM-upgrade to T45, Astute #8, another CVF, successor-SSBN, you name it. Over 25 years, this would make £37.5b!

    The simple fact is, that we currently pay for delayed projects of the 2000s, so we may look a bit tight at the moment.

    And finally, the reality bites: why will we never get 30 surface vessels again? Because warships don’t result in votes, while dropping bombs on camels combined with tax reductions (right wing choice) OR adding appointments and non-jobs (left wing choice) do.

  154. All Politicians are the Same

    I have read numerous posts about using modified OSV etc but the fact is that by the time you buy them, man them and fit them with the comms and link required to let them interact. A hangar and helo handling facilities as well as weapons magazines etc which have to conform with explosive safety. The actual costs make a mockery of the claimed 5 for 1 frigate claims.
    As for modularisation well that just makes it even more expensive.

  155. Repulse

    APATs, sorry do not agree. If the RN can get 4 30k tonne tankers with helo facilitates and CIWS for 425mn (probable approx cost of a T26) then I’m sure they can get at least 4 Black Swans for the same. Not to first class warship standards I agree.

  156. x

    McZ said “We colour them white, with a nice coat-of-arms and a big fat ‘COAST GUARD’ pennant.”

    I actually fancied black hulls, white superstructure, and buff uptakes and masts. (A really tall mast so dressing ship is a good display.)

    http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4a/HMS_Victoria_(1887)_William_Frederick_Mitchell.jpg/781px-HMS_Victoria_(1887)_William_Frederick_Mitchell.jpg

    A nice big teak covered (or suitable sustainable replacement wood) quarterdeck so the embarked band had somewhere to play. Embarked band? Yes. Nothing says “We are your friends, do not shoot or runaway please. Thank you.” then a medley of British summertime novelty songs delivered at just the right time.

  157. All Politicians are the Same

    So now T26 has gone up from between 250 to 350 million to 450 million and we are comparing to Korean built tankers with no link, command system, limited comms and built to non military standards.
    We could probably get between 2 or 3 decent 90 to 100m OPVs for each T26 but not 4 or 5 mythical modular Black Swans

  158. Repulse

    Fremm estimated unit cost is 550mn EUR, inc production costs. I know that Artisan and CAMM will come from the T23 but do you really believe the 250 – 350mn unit cost for a T26?

  159. John Hartley

    McZ
    There are no votes in 30 warships, however elections will be lost by the government that presides over a military defeat & national humiliation.

  160. ArmChairCivvy

    Hi McZ, RE
    ” to pay for extravaganza like a TLAM-upgrade to T45, Astute #8, another CVF, successor-SSBN, you name it. Over 25 years, this would make £37.5b!”

    So, let’s name it:
    From a recent report to the parliament “we remain
    within the 2006 White Paper estimates of £11-14Bn (at 2006/7 prices) for the Successor
    platform costs (assuming a four boat fleet).
    Wider Programme Costs
    The 2006 White Paper also recognised that investment of £4-6Bn (at 2006/7 prices) would
    be required for supporting infrastructure and a replacement warhead (£2-3 Bn for each
    element).” … call that 20 (bn)?
    - a good 17 to go
    - not sure what had already been accounted for, but as we are looking over 25 years now, the through-life cost for the planned Canadian F-35 fleet came out at $ (US? CAD?) 1 bn /yr, a fleet not too dissimilar in size to our planned one, so make it 50% towards RN and that makes 1/3 of a bn/ yr, times 25 = appr. 8 bn… so half of the residual accounted for (yes, proc. is only part of thru-life costs, but looking for the extravaganza… where is it?)

    - 5 bn for the T26s (proc. only, as they replace units already operated) and 1.4 bn for MHPC programme (likewise for them)
    … now 3.5 to go (if the above were not already counted in)

    Well, the hulls of two carriers to be delivered outside that number, but only one crew factored in
    - how much will the other one be, over 25 years?

    Where is the change?! Best to hang on to the amphibs we’ve got, as any change would be going towards SSS’s (assuming the tankers are already in the numbers)

  161. ArmChairCivvy

    Re: the question I ended my contribution with, RAND Corporation did provide the answer to HMG in their 2005 report (p.45 out of 214):
    “Royal Navy will get 21.65 available ship-years out of the CVF fleet.
    If we divide £4.5 billion by 21.65 available CVF ship-years, we get
    about £200 million per active ship-year, or about £570,000 per active
    ship-day, in 2003 pounds.”
    - this is without the cost increases incurred since
    - it is for 2, over 50 years

    Luckily they have dimensioned the data, so
    - we take what ever “change” was left, divide by 25, and get £ 140m available, just to operate the second carrier and then… nothing else (additional)
    - that’s per calendar year and before proc. costs (already in the figures, save for the airwing). But in 2012 pounds

    What am I trying to say? Every dime, and penny, has been spent already, and all you can shuffle is fleet composition and manning intensity (through the fleet composition and also through the technical design and weapon fit).

  162. Challenger

    @APATS

    ‘We could probably get between 2 or 3 decent 90 to 100m OPVs for each T26 but not 4 or 5 mythical modular Black Swans’

    Agreed! For me until we eventually see some movement on MHPC it’s a direct choice between T26′s and cheap River style OPV’s. Slotting a third type of ship into the mix, some kind of fairly decent, mid sized, modular, heavy corvette/light frigate is a wasteful divergence of resources and an ineffective doubling up of capabilities.

    Having something too expensive to be numerous/cheap + cheerful and too small/under-armed to be an effective high-end escort is the worst of both worlds.

    Give me enough T26 to do everything the RN requires or replace a handful (1-3) with some as cheap as possible OPV’s (4-8) in they’re place, nothing else will do!

  163. Chris.B.

    If it helps this debate at all, then the Dutch Holland Class OPV’s appear to come in (according to the more reputable sources) at around the £95-110 million mark each. That’s with a 76mm Oto/SR gun, a 30mm remote gun, I-Mast (which has an air warning radar, surface search & track, optical systems and Link 16 compatible), davits for 2 small boats and hangar, no CIWS, and indeed no air defence system other than what you could squeeze out of the guns.

    Type 26 is probably going to fall in the £350-450 million mark per ship, depending on what they finally put on them.

  164. Challenger

    I really think their should be a clear distinction between full fat or diet, anything in between doesn’t make any sense.

    For me the Holland class represents the higher end of the scale if we are looking for some affordable OPV’s. I wonder if it would be possible to order some to be built in the Netherlands and build the rest here, or maybe try and buy a couple of the pre existing ones.

  165. ALL Politicians are the Same

    Challenger

    When I say decent 90-100m OPV i was thinking a Ship closer to a Holland than a River though possibly without the integrated Mast which uses a lot of Dutch technology.

    As I have posted previously on here I would expect to get 90-100M 20-25kts on Diesels, 76Mm Strales, 2 or 3 Seahawk SIGMA (RAM or SEARAM may be too expensive). Couple of Bridge wing 50 cal. Hangar for a wildcat, off the shelf bridge and nav radar/suite. Off the shelf air/surface search radar similar to Clydes. Small Ops annex to allow remote control stations for the SIGMA and STRALES. Basic mill comms and Link 11. Ability to operate 2 good sized rhibs.

    As for T26 costs, well depends upon whether the current design work is included but going across from t23 will be Artisan, Sea Ceptor, 2087 and i am willing to bet swathes of comms and EW kit. The current command system on t23 DNA 2 should be used even in a slightly modified shape. Accommodation etc should come from the T45 and CVF designs.

    What I am saying is that we are inventing very little if anything for this class of Ship and taking many expensive systems from another. It is not a joint project in anyway so if we cannot bring this in on target then we never will.

  166. mickp

    Isn’t the General really alluding to the MHPC concept- OPV sized but more flexible than just patrol. The money, when it is available, goes on payloads rather than basic ship.

    @APATs, I agree with your outline weapons fit and envisage something on the lines of that with a degree of modularity like the venator / black swan concepts. Ultimately a more sensible and vastly more affordable LCS concept

    What I fear is that we’ll just end up with a Clyde Mk2 with one 30mm gun and no utility other than basic patrol

  167. ArmChairCivvy

    APATS, could not agree more on the hull size ( e.g. BAMS is a bit short for heavy seas) and weapons and sensor fit. The Hollands only got their CIWS after much criticism (the crew seems to have gone from 32 to 50, even though all mounts are remotely operated), RE
    “90-100M 20-25kts on Diesels, 76Mm Strales, 2 or 3 Seahawk SIGMA (RAM or SEARAM may be too expensive). Couple of Bridge wing 50 cal. Hangar for a wildcat, off the shelf bridge and nav radar/suite. Off the shelf air/surface search radar similar to Clydes. Small Ops annex to allow remote control stations for the SIGMA and STRALES. Basic mill comms and Link 11. Ability to operate 2 good sized rhibs.”
    - the design compromises were in speed and use of commercial steel
    - after 1 Goalkeeper + 4 Oto HITROLE turrets (two installed) the coverage near and far is as good as in any OPV, or better
    - three boats are carried, even though there are only two launch systems; there’s even a space for two containers

    As you point out, the sensor fit is overly expensive, but that investment was done as an “export promotion” to get referencable use of the new system

  168. x

    MHPC is rhubarb. MCMV are constructed the way they are for a purpose. Same with hydrographic vessels. Same with OPV.

  169. mickp

    @x as a replacement for dedicated MCM and Hydro vessels, I agree. Dedicated MCM is one area where the RN excels and Hunt / Sandown should in due course have direct replacements.

    Having said that, the modular aspect of the MHPC concept that would allow such vessels to be fitted with remote mine gear, or a TAS say if circumstances dictated gives added capabilities as we head into the uncertain future. So building a platform with a basic weapons fit as APATs suggested but with a modest ‘mission bay’ and top side provision for bolt ons would seem the best use of limited resources

    I think the way forward for the next 20 years is to have at the high end a drumbeat of T26 production, at least 13, and at the other end a drumbeat of the 90-100m flexible vessel / venator / black swan / holland derivative / MHPC / call it what you will. If there is thought being given to two OPVs for Portsmouth, I think they should be first in class of this type rather than just one off ‘Clyde 2s”

    This gives us the potential to up the fleet numbers

  170. x

    @ mickp

    No. Obviously you are bright chap eager to learn and discuss this topic but no. Sorry. Absolutely no. If I was to put it in terms of aircraft you are saying a Gulfstream G6 can be an MPA, fighter, and tactical transport plane because it has wings and engines. Go read about the current hydrographic fleet, look at MCMV, and have a long hard look at some OPVs. Um. Sorry. No. :) ;)

    (I mean that sincerely in good humour! )

  171. Phil

    “MHPC is rhubarb. MCMV are constructed the way they are for a purpose. Same with hydrographic vessels. Same with OPV.”

    Rheum rhabarbarum, Rhubarb is a species of plant in the family Polygonaceae. They are herbaceous perennials growing from short, thick rhizomes. They have large leaves that are somewhat triangular, with long fleshy petioles. They have small flowers grouped in large compound leafy greenish-white to rose-red inflorescences.

    Now that’s been pointed out to you again let’s move onto the issue.

    Which is that I think you are wrong. By your strained logic vessels can do one, and only one mission because that is just how they are built. Which is bollocks. With the emphasis shifting more and more onto MCM by remote the structure and engineering of the mother vessel itself becomes far less important. Designing a hull that could achieve all three aims is nothing more and nothing less than a question of engineering. Now I don’t support the idea of modularity, but again it is a simple question of engineering to make the mission specific areas easy to re-fit thus bringing about a vessel which can be re-tasked during a scheduled re-fit. It has been done with vessels before without there having been any consideration for it in the design stage of that original vessel and it can therefore certainly be done with a common hull designed with changes in role in mind when the drawings are made.

  172. mickp

    @x – good humour taken!

    Using your analogy, take the fighter bit out of the equation (that is the T26). Its then very reasonable to have one aircraft that could be configured to MPA or transport. Hercules being one

    I am primarily envisaging a vessel with patrol as its primary mission, but with space for add ons. We don’t need the add ons yet, we possibly don’t know what they will be. Perhaps in 10 yrs someone will have developed an MCM package that works.

  173. Mark

    I do wonder about our ship strategy especially with this increased focus on regional engagement. Why for example has the German Meko class been very successful in overseas orders with numerous overseas countries and why was the type 23 not. Was it price or was it systems or both? If we could get a design that we can use and can sell then that must help are regional engagement.

    I would add I’m less convinced by the us modular approach and much more along the semi perminant config. I would also say I’m quite sceptical about non specialist mcmv vessels I would want to see very demanding trials done to prove the off board modular approach before making a call there.

  174. Phil

    There are many ways to skin the MCM cat and you’ll find examples of all used throughout the world.

    I am clearly no expert but the basic principle is to find and destroy mines using something to find the mine (sonar usually) and something to neutralise (diver) or blow the mine (a remote weapon): what is the drama with making the sonar remote from the vessel? We already use remote weapons to destroy the mines and divers are de-facto remote so why not remote the sonar too?

    That way if it goes bang you just lose kit, not a vessel and its very valuable crew and experience? I can see there being big dramas in a high sea state using a little remote vessel with a sonar on but can you reliably sweep or hunt mines in such conditions anyway without unacceptable risk? Presumably it would not take a leap of imagination to engineer a design that gave you the option of using the sonar from the mother ship and bearing that extra risk?

    I’m not convinced there is any real insurmountable problem to using a common hull for MCM duties other than having an appetite to do so. It’s all a question of engineering. If the world’s naval architects, scientists and naval designers say it cannot be done I’ll concede but otherwise it just an engineering problem to be solved.

  175. Mark

    Phil

    You maybe right but i would be of the opinion if it was that easy people would have done it by now. The us in particular have or are having real problems getting there mcmv modular working on lcs with rumours the module will now cost north of 60m dollars and that’s not including buying helicopters which will be required as part of the system. The question I guess is the cost of off boarding such a system worth it?. I’m not saying don’t try it or do it but at least have the case proved one way or the other before going down a particular route.

  176. Phil

    I don’t believe the modular thing works very well. It may well do in the future but I say let the US spend the billions needed and the rest of us can ride on their pioneering nature!

    But I think that it is perfectly achievable to design and build a common hull that has a semi-permanent role but which could be swapped out in a future re-fit if a re-balancing was needed or there developed a medium term need for more numbers of specific vessels.

    The US used to use and I believe still may helicopter towed mine sweepers and a number of nations use remotely operated vehicles to clear and sweep mines too. It is all there, but in bits and bobs around the world because the technology all came good at different times and in forces with different needs and philosophies. I can’t see why it cannot be merged together into a common hull, designed primarily for the more demanding role of MCM, with semi-permanent fittings for a remotely operated sonar vehicle and as now, remotely operated mine destroying weapons. This isn’t a big intellectual leap, it is a de-risked and already operational technological step, it just needs the appetite and vision to design and build them and accept cheaper, versatile ships which can still perform the most demanding MCM role and operate as “good enough” second or third rate patrol vessels and the even less demanding survey role. If you went entirely remote on the MCM matter you wouldn’t even need to optimise the hull for MCMs, which again is perfectly doable right this minute if someone comes up with a design, the money and the appetite.

  177. ALL Politicians are the Same

    On MCM systems and Ships. Things such as “lead throughs” and route survey work is still best done by the Ship itself. At the moment sea fox gives a semi systems based classification and disposal capability based on a “mother” that itself is fully capable of operating close in to the threat.
    We are in no desperate need to replace either the SRMH or Hunts so i say let us see how these more autonomous systems develop and the sort of vessels that they are embarked on before we make a decision.

  178. Observer

    Actually Mark, the US LSC concept fails not because the concept is flawed, but because they were idiots in how they went about it. For example, 2 designs whose original purpose was to select the best (I don’t believe the “both are so good we can’t decide crap), which ended up with both being selected, a ridiculously overblown top speed and an idiotic idea of having to develop everything themselves even when there is an OTS solution (NLOS from Netflix when there is already the Spike NLOS. To be replaced by the Griffin. Morons.).

    “We are in no desperate need to replace either the SRMH or Hunts so i say let us see how these more autonomous systems develop and the sort of vessels that they are embarked on before we make a decision.”

    Probably a good way to go about it. No urgency, so why force the issue so soon?

  179. Mark

    Observer i wasn’t commenting on the lcs ships or how they suggest employing them, there very typical American low cost approach!!! . More concerned with the issues they have with the mcm module making it work on non optimised hull.

    As apas has mentioned there is clearly other issues were are not aware off. Ive been on one of the rn minesweepers as one visits my home town on a regular basis and talking to there crew who did the tour they appeared unconvinced but that was a couple of years ago and this is a changing tech area. I suppose these ships have a very low signature in all fields which is probably a gd thing considering how exposed they would be close to shore in a war, roles in Libya Iraq ect I don’t fully now how these roles are transferred to the cheaper vessel if significantl stand off can’t be achieved.

  180. Chris.B.

    @ APATS,

    I think RAM is selling at about $500,000 a unit if you want one of them. No idea what Sea RAM costs, but given that it’ll come with it’s own radar it’s likely to be a nice chunk more.

    Holland class OPV basically meets all the specs you wanted, if not goes above them, bar the CIWS issue.

    With Type 26 it looks uncertain at the minute what will go across from T23. The oldest T23 aren’t getting 2087, so that’s that out of the running for the early T26 by the look of it. Artisan might be different, as it looks like even the oldest t23 will get the radar which can then be transferred over. Some of the biggest cost questions probably centre around the propulsion.

    Overall though, Type 26 does look for the minute like it will buck the trend for major warships by coming in reasonably cheap (anything under £400 million should be good).

  181. ALL Politicians are the Same

    Chris B

    Unfortunately that is per missile. SEARAM has only a12 cell launcher versus the 21 cells of the standard system. I have heard that the latest block of missiles with an improved capability against high performance missiles is closer to £450,000 a missile, making an entire system somewhere North of £10 million, hence my comment about expense.
    It is a very good system capable of engaging targets out to nearly 6Nm. Its exact performance capabilities will depend upon the command system and sensors that it is linked to. i would however most definitely classify it as a Point Defence Missile System (PDMS) rather than a CIWS.

    The Holland class do pretty much fulfill the specs i am looking at. As the BAM nearly does. Basically a british 90-100M version of similar armed as i specified earlier but hopefully saving money on the integrated mast. Though an EOD device fitted to a standard mast should definitely be fitted.

    The order the T23 fleet will be taken out of service will depend upon the refit schedule. It may be that T26 production sees a non tail built then a tail then a non tail then 3 tail fitted etc. Assuming we assemble in blocks I just hope that common sense rules and only 1 stern block is designed that can all take a TAS if required.

  182. Challenger

    I agree with Chris B that the Holland class offers most of what we should be looking for in a cheap OPV. If not that then a River mk2 is fine with me as long as it doesn’t end up as a project that spends a lot of money for very little difference to the original design.

    As I said earlier I think it’s best to keep a very clear high/low distinction. I really don’t want to see some mid sized, reasonably armed light frigate of corvette because it wouldn’t fill either high intensity task group or constabulary roles particularly effectively for the money invested.

    Either sacrifice 1 or 2 T26 on the clear understanding that it brings about either a Holland or stretched River with something like APATS suggested weapons fit or simply build more T26 hulls without all the expensive stuff installed.

  183. x

    APATS said “only 1 stern block is designed that can all take a TAS if required.”

    You don’t think they would do it differently do you? Say it ain’t so! Oh gosh. I hope not. Then again this the MoD we are talking about.

  184. Ali

    I know this comes up a lot but wouldn’t something like Singapore’s RSS Endurance for the MHPC role?

    With the recent cost for Thailand being 200 million SGD with associated landing craft.

    With the loss of RFA Largs Bay a few of these vessels could provide 80% of that capability, provide the patrolling task with its hanger and well dock for small craft and mothership usage. And with the amount of space and the utility of the well deck could provide some of the other missions?

  185. Repulse

    Pre SDSR 2010, the RN had 47 significant surface vessels outside of the carriers / amphibs – 1 T45, 5 T42s, 4 T22s, 13 T23s, 8 Hunts, 8 Sandowns, 4 Rivers, 2 Echos, HMS Scott and HMS Endurance (albeit with a hole in).

    Current plans would give 33 – 6 T45s, 13 T26s, 8 MHPCs, 4 Rivers (?), HMS Scott and an ice breaker.

    I would be interested if anyone thought 33 was enough hulls based on the current commitments. In my view ww either need to cut commitments or come up with a way to get back to pre 2010 levels (atleast).

    Whilst I agree we should wait to see how things progress before throwing away our MCMs the MHPC concept is probably a good place to start with an early patrol focused batch.

  186. IXION

    I’ve been over fed and over drunk over the christmas period. I have caught up on my recorded TV (coz so much on telly was crap). I am now an instant expert on the subject of several navel matters having watched about 8 hours of relevant telly and caught up on few internet bloggs an sites.

    (Those of you who have ‘flogged the hoggin’ whatever a hoggin is and why it needed floggin elludes me but there we go, please feel free to role your eyes at armchair experts.)

    Traditional MCMs have been built to the absolute rule of reducing magnetic and accoustic signitures. Whatever else that does, it has resulted in some vessels which are less that robust either mechanicaly or in terms of ‘knocks and bumps’ nor neceseceraly that good at sea keeping. They really are ‘one trick ponies’. Now that does not mean you cannot use them as for example OPV’s (The old Ton class were much used in this role, but their wooden hulls were tougher than modern GRP ones); its just that (to suposidly paraphrase the Emperor Claudius) ‘You can kill a cat with horn porridge spoon but you often break the spoon in the process’, in other words they were used because they were there not coz they were any good. They were also often the exception to modern ships, in that the hull and machinery costs are fully the equal of the special kit fitted to them.

    Phil& others (I think) and I are suggesting that perhaps a steel hulled holland style GP vessels can be used for several roles IF a proper MCM kit can be fitted to it that actually works, and makes up for noisy standard diesel, and all that inconveniently magnetic steel. Now it seems that the US in particular is getting that part of the Kit wrapped round its neck.

    For the life of me I cannot see why?

    Lets face it we are talking about ROPV Sonars scaners and imaging systems, and Manipulating arm ROPV’s of exactly the type that are being used in the offshore Oil, survey and salavage industries. They are already not bothered with trying to get ships into tricky situations, but sending them in instead. Ok we may need the red hot millitary spec best there is, but in principle it simple.

    I am not particulary wedded to the container with a view that such ships can swap roles the history of that kind of thing (and the pest if smaller example was the flex 300), is that such ships would rarely swapp assingned roles, but it would be cost effective if when we do need to start ordering them by 2020 or so we could order a batch of both. BTW could we get an anti sub kit worth having on a Holland class type hull? Could someone in the know say yea, nay or poss

  187. IXION

    Janes had an article in their 79 (I think), review of the year, about how F*ckin wonderful offshore support vessels would be as OPV’s MCM’s and towed array vessels, Sorry TD you are a rampant plagiarist:)

  188. Jed

    X said: “MCMV are constructed the way they are for a purpose. Same with hydrographic vessels. Same with OPV.”

    I am afraid your just showing your age matey :-) Technology moves on, you dont need to build the worlds most expensive plastic, non-magnetic ship in order to do first rate MCM anymore; new sensors, new techniques, USV’s, UUV’s etc.

  189. Chris.B.

    Regarding RAM, Raytheon won a contract worth $45.2 million for 70 Launching Canisters, 65 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 1/Mod 3, 25 RAM Block 1/Mod 7, and replenishment spares in support of the RAM Program for the United States Government. That gives a basic idea of the cost. There doesn’t seem to be a firm cost anywhere for the main unit, or how much it costs to integrate it.

    My worry is that once you set about building a British version of the Holland class, with some kind of air defence measure, then you’re quickly creeping towards a threshold of spending more than 50% of the cost of a Type 26, which means you’re not going to get a 2:1 ratio of OPV versus T26.

    That means to get 4 OPV, which is basically the minimum we would need to cover one task like the APT(N) is going to cost us two Type 26 and leave us just 11 frigates. I’m not sure that’s a worthwhile trade off?

  190. x

    @ Jed

    I am not really sea keeping is still sea keeping. Sidescan sonars are still dependent on size for a given resolution and need a given amount of power still requires a given size of generator. A given hull shape will still push water that produces a given signature. Water is still water. Steel still has the same properties. Sound moves the through water in the same way. The sea bottom is still millions of square miles in its coverage. I know in your day valves (both for steam and electric) were very exciting and new technology and so modern advances probably seem like magic. But please don’t get carried away with the technology too much eh?

    If you think this,

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Echo_class_survey_ship_(2002)

    can be replaced with a container’s worth of equipment without need for a platform with azimuth thrusters for precise positioning then you have probably drunk to much modular container kool aid.

  191. ArmChairCivvy

    Thanks Mark, for the great RUSI link (had passed me unnoticed that Prof. Clark also is the Director General of RUSI)
    - the last two minutes of the less than five pretty much outlined all the themes and conclusions I have been banging on here for the last two years (how do you do the smug smile with those moodies?)

  192. mickp

    None of this works without some more money and an acceleration of shipbuilding otherwise we still have around about 19 escorts until the mid 2020s.

    We can’t have anymore warship programs like T45 that stop at 6 and hardly gain any benefits of scale

    It seems to me there should be two programs starting soon and running through the 2020s

    T26 – at least 8 fully equipped as per the brochures; at least 13 hulls in total but recognising the other 5 may be more GP versions but still with upgrade potential

    ‘OPV’ – 90-110m boats – Holland type but potential for greater flexibility for some degree of modular add ons in mission deck or top side for self defence, UVs, TAS (and even MCM!) etc. Sensible self defence and flying the flag weapons fit (see APATs post)- 76mm main gun. This is not as radical as the Black Swan concept. These are more patrol oriented with less modularity but a greater basic weapons fit. Start out building 8 – asap to get fleet numbers up. This is where an initial increased budget is needed

    I would hope that then with two mature platform designs, we can avoid starting from scratch again and instead develop incremental develop ‘flight 2′ versions of both to see us to the right mix of types for the future. Ultimately an AAW version of the T26 to supplant / replace T45. This then allows greater future focus on payload rather than platform

  193. ArmChairCivvy

    Hi APATS and Chris B, to me
    “$45.2 million for 70 Launching Canisters, 65 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 1/Mod 3, 25 RAM Block 1/Mod 7, and replenishment spares in support of the RAM Program for the United States Government. That gives a basic idea of the cost. There doesn’t seem to be a firm cost anywhere for the main unit, or how much it costs to integrate it” sounds like 6 systems operational and about $ 7.5 mln each, exactly the same as the base system (with the throw-away gun) … well, not exactly, but integration is out of factory, so costed into the profit margin
    - so basically the new system costs twice as much, but reaches out 6 times (and should have a more assured kill ratio)
    - not a bad deal, and the 50% re-use should be considered a discount from the buyer’s perspective?

  194. Challenger

    @Chris B

    ‘My worry is that once you set about building a British version of the Holland class, with some kind of air defence measure, then you’re quickly creeping towards a threshold of spending more than 50% of the cost of a Type 26, which means you’re not going to get a 2:1 ratio of OPV versus T26′

    Exactly! If you’re going to go down this road then keep it cheap and cheerful, otherwise why bother!

  195. IXION

    X

    Surely the point is that ‘traditional’ MCMV opperated by ‘dragging’ there sensors into an area behind them or fitted to their hull, so the hull had to be as amagnetic and quiet as poss.

    Newer technology would seem to offer the possibility of ‘pushing’ the sensors in first, avoiding the need for super delicate expensive unobtainum hulls and engines. Like I said much of the necessary kit seems to be of a type readily available.

  196. ArmChairCivvy

    The interesting bit of all this ‘how many Hollands in a trade off for one Txy’ is that the Dutch navy got rid of their corvettes,in order to get these ocean-going vessels with legs
    - not all of the corvettes, because the Belgians had got some of them, and one could not pull the rug from under the whole fighting end of the Belgian navy, by terminating their long-term support arrangements

  197. ArmChairCivvy

    Hi Mark, I have always thought that BAM is v good VFM

    Length overall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93.90 m

    Full load displacement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,840 t
    Full load draught. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.50 m
    Total accommodation capacity. . . . . . . . . . 35 + 35 p

    But, at 108m the Hollands will also have 60% more range, 50 crew, 40 other operatives, 100 evacuees, and thinking of going into e.g. Syria, to fetch them, a citadel against CBRN
    - so almost double of everything, despite only 20% more in length and cost (almost double in displacement, as one would guess)

  198. Mickp

    Thanks Mark and ACC

    I think the sweet spot is somewhere in the BAM to Holland range of capabilities.

    Anybody know how much does the strales 76 mm costs v a normal 76mm? The former at least gives some degree of missile defence without needing to consider adding searam / ram / seaceptor / phalanx at the outset. Although deck fittings for one of those would allow retrofitting in times of need.

  199. ALL Politicians are the Same

    ACC

    The BAM actually has longer legs than the Holland by a decent margin. It specifies a Citadel but has no info on sub citadels, it also makes no mention of what “facilities” actually are for 100 evacuees. Not sure if a BAM has a citadel or not. It can however carry 3 containers ;)

    I think mark is correct in that if and I say if it was decided that we could use and should build such a vessel that we should look at what we want it to do. Although that should not rule out a foreign design as the basis.

    I have already laid out what i would be looking for and I calculate the Ships company would require to be somewhere in the region of 50-60 including a Ships flight.

  200. jedibeeftrix

    Did we lose a load of comments at some point?

    Admin linked three of the naval-future articles back on page two of the comments for this RUSI post:

    http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/11/the-future-of-the-royal-navy-04-forward-presence-squadrons/

    Bizarrely there is a big reply from admin directed at half a dozen people, including me, but there is no sign of the post from me that he might be responding to……..

    I seem to recall there were a few glitches some months back, maybe this is one of them.

  201. Think Defence Post author

    Jedi’ had a quick look there. The comment count of 22 seems a bit low on that thread doesn’t it. Will do a spot of digging. At the end of then post are links to the other posts in the series’ for some reason they are broken because they have an extra couple of hyphens, the posts are there but just delete a couple of hyphens until I can change

  202. IXION

    What I dont get is that when you look at the Hollands, which are nothing more than a decent design for relativly big OPV of a type (See BAM) that other nations have looked at and decided to adopt; what in the name of Noel Edmunds, made the spams pay what they did for their big national defence cutters?!

    I like the Hollands for all sorts of reasons and agree with other posters that the upgraded 76 mm gun at the front, and at least a phalanx at the back would be a better armamemnt. Than the 2 hi tech 50 cal mounts. However those are details.

    The question is more can we see these in the RN replacing Mine Sweepers, Rivers, Survey vessels,etc? and a couple of t26?
    If they did replace t26 could they be made with the option of a workable anti sub fit (towed array, targeting sonar, and helicopter) suitable for say working the coastally in uk water under land aircover and aew, releasing t26 for elephant herding duties?

    BTW I do say the option of so if we need to we could rather that reinventing the t26, the old ‘fitted for not with’.

  203. mickp

    @IXION – I agree. In a wartime environment, they have to have a use, even if its just escort of RFAs to theatre or standing in for UK FRE and TAS for SSBNs. They therefore need a limited degree of adaptability (but perhaps greater than the Holland design) to bolt on a TAS module say at the rear, or maybe a Seaceptor / harpoon / ram module topside. Its not Black swan levels of modularity but just a sensible degree of forethought into whatever design we go for

  204. ALL Politicians are the Same

    ACC

    The Navantia link at Marks post has the BAM range as in excess of 8,00NM at 15kts.

    Ixion,

    They NSC is 127M long. it has a GT for 30kts plus yet a range of 12000NM at 12kts. They have a 3D air and surface search radar as well as the EW suite from an Arleigh Burke. They also have a hangar for 2 MH60.
    Despite this it still has only the 110 57MM gun and no missile system so I am not sure why they have ended up costing £400 million a pop either. More expensive I can see but that expensive i cannot.

  205. Challenger

    @mickup

    Just to clarify, are you fine with having a Holland sized and capable ship as long as it has the room for adaptability in a crises?

    I agree that no matter how cheap and cheerful a class is it makes good sense to have some ‘fitted for not with’ margins included. My only fear is that we could take a very simple and cost effective design and start adding all sorts of modification and expensive bits of kit from the off, thus sky-rocketing the price and bringing the whole point of the project into question.

  206. IXION

    Yes Challanger

    Very important to keep costs down otherwise no point.

    I just wondered if there was any intrinsic problem with giving a Holland style ship room for a proper anti sub fit in a wholey beningn invironemt Ie UK home waters or even the mid atlantic where there is no real air threat other than bears whisch must be the easiest millitary aircraft target in the world.

    APATS

    I am familier with NSC spec. I have a very good, large, detailed, book on the history of the USCG.

    In the 1970′s, BEFORE they gave up their axuillery Anti Sub role in the 90′s; the commanders were screaming can we PLEASE have no more super complicated specmachinery ships! KISS was the principle they wanted for all the machinery fit. God knows what happened between then and now, but not I suspect unconnected with the NSC builders now touting the platform as a replacement for the Perrys and LSC.

    Hollands sensor fit is far from shabby, indeed they have been criticised in that element for being way over spec. I still think someone saw them comming when you consider we are supposed to be getting t 26 for about that price!

  207. Mark

    From what I can gather the proposed idea was these sort of vessels would be for standing patrols or for regional engagement. I guess there role in a more major conflict would be similar to the mcm and hydro fleet at present and possibly escorting STUFT to an area were I can’t see the threat being really high. This then frees up the proper ff/dd ships to do the major war/high end bit. We did gap or even sent and rfa to the Falklands for that very purpose in the last few years likewise Caribbean and I guess even pirate chasing with fort Victoria.

    I mean if you look at recent conflicts going by wiki then we sent 9 proper ff/dd to the gulf in 91, 6 in 2003 and 5 to Libya (though not all at the same time and with less than there full weapons fit as the press kindly highlighted) the RN currently says it needs 8 with trailing sonar to meet its requirements there and way back in the 60s when cv01 was on the go did it not have a requirement for 4 type 82s to be built to protect the carriers we have 6 daring for that purpose today. And from reading a number of naval piece here and else where it’s not really the war fighting bit that’s driving numbers but those standing task requirement.

    The fitted for not with requirement I think drives costs to high by all means ensure we know what can and can’t be done with these vessels but adding a citadel and link 16/22 to a bam type vessel would be about as far as I’d go. Ensuring a merlin can at least land on the ship would enusre at least some form of extra capability.
    As in all walks of life money or the lack there off changes attitudes there is no extra coming and commitments ain’t gonna reduce so something is gonna have to change.

  208. mickp

    @ challenger – yes. Holland is an example, but the venator design, an expanded Clyde, BAM type could all be in the mix. I agree that the challenge is about getting the spec right at the outset. Basic sensor fit, commensurate with weapons fit, helo deck and hanger, 76mm main gun, 2-30mm guns and mini guns / GPMGs. The only ‘gold plating’ I’d look to extend to would be the strales version of the 76mm and the only other debate would be whether to fit a Phalanx (gun) at the outset or leave it fitted for but not with. These days, think having a CIWS is probably a price we need to pay to give a base level of self protection. Missile options such as CAMM / RAM / Searam and TAS option would be fitted for but not with

  209. Waddi

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khareef_class_corvette

    To me these things kill several birds with one stone, they are more capable and rangy than a River class, have some decent weapons Exocet/Mica. They are cheap, £130m each, have RN compatible systems and British built.

    A flotilla equipped with Lynx/Wildcat could cover all the various standing patrols e.g. APTS, plus anti-piracy leaving the DD/FFs to do the heavy duty escort stuff. This is the approach the French have with their small patrol frigates. They are also very close in size and spec to the dear old Leander class. Small but still fighty, more so than a BAM.

    Added bonus is that they would keep BAE Portsmouth going as well. My vote would be a reduction in projected T26 fleet and enough of these to cover say 3 standing patrols 8 and 9?

  210. Challenger

    @mickup

    Yeah that’s all along the same general lines as what I was thinking, the most expensive items being the 76mm and a CIWS, the most important element being a flight deck and hangar, with some extra space being the only concession to missiles.

  211. mickp

    @waddi

    Khareef is also a possibility, not sure why it needs 100 men though, nor if it has decent long legs or any capability to throw a TAS off the stern from an ISO container

    On the plus side as you say, its a design we have to hand, sort of like an evolved Clyde. I’d drop any pretence of missiles for an original fit, and just put a phalanx on

  212. ALL Politicians are the Same

    Personally I am not sold on the requirement for a CIWS for these vessels beyond the capability offered by something like a Seahawk Sigma mount. Even with the older French Mistral missile in the cansiter that gives you an engagement range of 2.5NM. 2 or 3 of these combined with the integrated 30MM mount gives 360 degree coverage and good self defence capability against air and surface targets.

    Waddi

    I believe that the Khareef class have suffered several problems, not the least of which being a large cost overrun which is going to see BAE taking a big financial hit on the class. If we asked for the same vessel today the quote would certainly be around £200 million each.

  213. mickp

    @APATs

    I suppose Phalanx has commonality in its favour but I’d probably accept a couple of seahawk sigmas instead; especially if it already has strales 76MM. Seems to me its a versatile system that could retrofit Rivers / Clyde, guns on Amphibs / RFAs

  214. mickp

    Ok – Phalanx hi end, Sea Hawk sigma low end. Still can have phalanx / searam as a bolt on option if things get hotter

    Of course, knowing the RN / Government, if we ever get a ship out of this, it will just come with one 30mm…

  215. Waddi

    A patrolling RN ship has the very important role of waving the national “willy” and as it is New Year’s eve I might just get away with saying that in this role size does matter.

    Replacing a Type 23 with an “upgunned” River in my view is not right. A modern Leander, say 2500t with a gun, AA missiles and ASH missiles is the minimum if the flag waving role is not to be diminished. With imagination should be able to be done at reasonable cost. As per most T23s currently on patrol the launch tubes can be empty but having them fitted “with” rather than “for” is important especially if whomever we wish to be courting is not be left feeling underwhelmed!

  216. x

    A Leander was the T23 of its day; a first rate ASW/GP frigate. You mean a 2500t OPV which is BAM which has been mentioned above. Personally I would go 1000t bigger for the ice strengthened hull and go for a Thetis.

  217. ALL Politicians are the Same

    Waddi,

    A modern Leander, say 2500t with a gun, AA missiles and ASH missiles is the minimum if the flag waving role is not to be diminished”

    So what you want is a GP T26 compressed into a smaller hull form, given that steel and air are the cheapest components that we use in ships how many do you think we could get for each T26 we cancelled. The OPV concept being discussed here is really dependent upon what we may be able to use them for but the additional costs involved in adding a built in SAM system and AsHM will push the price up into frigate territory and simply mean we would be better of sticking with hard worked but full fat FFs instead of gaining an every few extra hulls.

    As per most T23s currently on patrol the launch tubes can be empty but having them fitted “with” rather than “for” is important .

    I can only assume that you are talking about VL Sea wolf. Harpoon tubes when fitted are armed.
    You can tell if a VLS sea Wolf tube is full or not by the type of Cap on top of the tube so spoofing someone with any intelligence is not as easy as we make out.

  218. Repulse

    I have been convinced by various arguments previously against pimped corvettes vs the need to maximise the number of real warfighers. As such I see these vessels supplementing rather than replacing a significant number of dd/ffs. Therefore, costs should be kept to the absolute minimum – the idea is that these are simple presence platforms where the capability is in what they carry rather than what they have built in. That is why tge Black Swan concept is so interesting.

  219. Waddi

    @ APATS

    I refer back to Khareef, accepting that the cost may now be more than £400m the Omanis are paying for three they are still very much cheaper than a T23/T26. I quote a Leander as a reference point to size and tonnage not of capability. A T23 is significantly larger, 5000t, than a Leander 2750t.

    There are a wide range of 2500t, diesel powered Patrol Frigates/Corvettes/Avisos in service around the world all with Exocet/Mica/Otomat/Harpoon etc. etc. The point I am making is that it has been done for many navies especially the French/Italian/Danish and to simply have a 2500t Patrol vessel with a 30mm replacing a T23 is not right. Replacing a T23 with a similarly armed vessel but smaller one is, especially if it is not needed for escort duties.

    I don’t accept that would come at the same cost as a T23 as all the navies that currently operate these Corvettes/OPVs would have come running the BAE’s door to buy T23′s, they didn’t. They took the lower purchase price and operating cost option.

  220. WiseApe

    Don’t get me wrong, I like the look of those Holland/Venator/Khareef “mini-frigates” as much as the next man, but I agree with those who say we either need more Rivers or more Type 26s; we don’t really have a role (or a budget) for anything in between.

    Also, what’s the rush with MHCP? We have about a dozen perfectly good mine-hunters in no immediate need of replacement. I say let’s wait and see if the US (or anyone else) can develop a worthwhile remote MCM capability, in the meantime crack on with Type 26, then look to put remote MCM on a new ship class or even an extended run of Type 26s, use the hulls without all the expensive whoosh/bang bits, diesels only.

  221. px

    , some excellent ideas here…

    I’ll go back to where I think the strategic analysis is taking us..

    Firstly the good news.. Its a bigger role for RN..

    Then the difficult to digest news, its not the one we are are used to.

    And a teaser – when folks say in “wartime” – what do you really mean? Conventional WW2 all over again? Not going to happen. Van Creveld’s seminal book “the transformation of war” suggests (and has largely been proven out), that the days of Clausewitz – of war as inter-state politics by other means – are over. All of the biggest states and economic blocs need each other too much for old fashioned inter-state conflict to be a means to an end – yet their are many other ways they can gain economic advantage by *%&ing each other through asymmetric or cyber threats. Much more worrying are peripheral powers and transnational organizations… So we need to be ready for Argentina (although I doubt they would really be so silly again so long as we are resolute – much more likely to use these new methods of making war).

    Lastly… precision already has (and remote technologies are) changed the way we fight. Fire Shadow (if it works?) will much much more useful than a big gun, shipboard UAVs will be much more effective than Wildcat.

    So I’ll imagine my fleet.

    A hard core for supporting expeditionary operations, either alone or with our allies, focused on a Carrier Task Group (one CV to two in a major crisis) and an amphibious landing group. This will have 8 dedicated escorts assigned (T45, T23/26) from a pool of 12 (4 in refit). All will have full weapons fit. I would go for Sylver for all ships to allow an joint Anglo-French carrier TF to cross deck, and get the new supersonic cruise missile/anti-ship missile.. laser CIWS.. ok I know Sylver is not as good a T41, but lets not have too much wastage on either the perfect solution (but only one ship
    ) or logistically and maintainance complicated multiple systems..

    This battle fleet will exercise regulatory in the main high risk regions – eastern Med and Gulf-Indian ocean with French, US and also Aus, Kiwi, Singapore and Malaysian forces.

    Then 16 “Black Swans”…

    A six ship Gulf Flotilla – based in Bahrain – covering high threat areas the gulf and Indian ocean – these would be high spec (I accept Phil’s point on modular being hard to achieve – so maybe in between refits)… with MCM remote, UAV, some good ISTAR and maybe some kind of Fire Shadow arrangement, + some remote system for close in defence against surface and air threats.. They should probably have the capability to operate fast attack craft too. I’d rotate one of the Bays with this flotilla, plus a MARS tanker and an ASaC Sea King or Merlin…

    A second South Atlantic/Mediterranean flotilla would have 6 Ships with a lower level outfit – good ISTAR is essential in this world (first line of defence, and a force multiplier par excellence – you know where the other guy is and what he’s gonna do next), so I would not cut back there, but no need for the MCM, UAV or Fire Shadow suites, and more limited self-defence kit can be fitted. They could also have a survey suite to carry out droggie missions. For me these ships would be fitted for Wildcat, and be able to provide Falklands, and Gulf of Guinea waters patrol – perhaps with 2 forward based from Gibraltar and 2 on Falklands duties on rotation, any Caribbean deployments can come from this flotilla.

    The last 6 vessels would be UK-based with a joint ‘homeland security’ CT/OP/MCM mission, and be fitted out accordingly, with HELO facilities to support longer range SAR or even ASW operations. Some of this group would be in refit at any one time, to keep the two ‘front-line’ overseas flotillas up to strength.

    I think some sort of deployable land-based MR will be required in time, but not at the expense of ships. Maybe 6 P8s and 8 MALE UAVs.

  222. ALL Politicians are the Same

    Waddi,

    I have not suggested replacing a T23 with a 2500t patrol vessel, I was suggesting what would be required if and I say if general Richards speech was talking about introducing such a class.
    I am talking about 90-100M 20-25 kts 6000NM at 15kts. 76MM Strales, 2 or 3 Seahawk Sigma mounts giving 360 degree missile CIWS out to 2-3Nm with a couple of 50 cals and a hangar capable of hosting a Wild Cat with FASGW/L, hardly a “River Class”.

    Neither the Italians or the danes operate modern 2,500 tonne SAM and AShm classes. The Italian Minerva class Corvettes are ASW specialist units built last century and are only 1200t . the Sirio class do not carry as urface to surface missile. The Thetis is purely gun armed.

    The French have the La Fayette but they are not cheap. Most other nations that deploy such vessels do so as they have no need capability or requirement to have a full sized frigate.

    Wise ape,
    I can see a role for the type of ~Ship i have outlined, i cannot envisage a role for more Rivers?

    concur on MHPC.

  223. Mickp

    @px

    Not far from my thinking

    Would like to keep high end escorts closer to 16 or 18 in total. Are you saying t26 fleet would be just 6?

    Lets say 18 and then 18 ‘corvettes/black swans/whatever’

  224. Waddi

    APATs

    re Khareef:-
    100m
    25kts
    4500nm (bigger tank needed)
    1 x 76mm Oto Melara Cannon
    2 x 30mm MSI DS30M 30mm cannon (replace with Seahawk Sigma)
    8 x MM-40 Block III Exocet SSM (?)
    12 x MBDA VL Mica SAM (replaced by Seahawk Sigma with LMM)
    1 x medium helicopter

    So by taking off the Exocet and adding a bigger fuel tank we can agree.

    Happy New Year!

  225. px

    Reading the sloop of war concept, its clear that they see these ships as able to work together in groups, rather as escorts did in WW2. They also see them as able to operate systems between the group (i.e. each ship is not system specific), they are also mother ships to the emerging technology, unmanned systems. So UAVs, USVs and UUVs. These ships could also operate Wildcat or Merlin, and manned fast attack craft. This is very different type of ship from a patrol frigate or corvette, indeed it is a new type of ship altogether adapted to making the best of emerging technology, to future war. We definitely don’t want a ship that cannot operate these systems, or only in a limited way’

    We need flotillas of ships, which are adaptable and less easy to kill – which is what the concept is about.

    For me , no-one is suggesting that)this is what we need. How is a Lafayette, (lets forget about a River, no-one is suggesting that solution) going to operate the greater numbers of these unmanned systems as they become mature, more effective and cheaper to build? Its not. And will not such vessels soon be of minimal use and obsolete as a result? Also what happens if you loose two or three of these quite expensive nearly T26s? Give up and go home? 18-20 Blacks Swans please.

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