This is a multi-part look at the role of armour in recent conflicts, their relevance in the future and a look at current programmes;
Part 2 – Selected examples of recent use
Part 3 – Looking into the crystal ball
Part 4 – SDSR, Army 2020 and the Challenger LEP
Part 5 – Future Protected Vehicle
Part 6 – A Few Ideas on the Future
The SDSR and subsequent work on Army 2020 defined what it thought was the future of the main battle tank.
With many years of operations soon to be behind us, RAC crews going back to their tanks and leaving their Mastiffs and Warthogs behind, there will be a clear drive to re-sharpen the armoured cutting edge.
People tend to rave about the Rheinmetall Leopard because, let’s be honest, it has sold a shedload and has an all-round balance; the Germans of course, always build a nice Panzer and Rheinmetall are not afraid of investing their own money to keep it current.
The Leclerc, Ariete and various exotic flavours of Far Eastern tanks have supporters; again it would seem, not unreasonably.
But when you resist the tempting treats on offer from abroad and look at what we actually have, the Challenger 2 has seen real combat, delivered the good news to the enemies of Her Majesty on a number of outings and despite taking multiple hits carried on.
This means a lot.
Maybe the British experience of Normandy, one that has influenced all subsequent designs that have focussed on protection, is still valid.
Contents
The Challenger Life Extension Programme
In 2007 the Challenger fleet size stood at 385, with 320 fit for purpose. By 2009, the fit for purpose fleet had fallen to 261 with the in service fleet at 345.
(these figures don’t include driver training tanks or Challenger derivatives)
The small fleet of Challenger 2 modified to operate in Iraq have been retained in controlled storage but with the budget pressures of recent years and the focus of the Royal Armoured Corps being delivering capability into Afghanistan the Challenger upgrade programme had been put on hold.
But despite this, the subsequent announcements on Army 2020 have shown the MoD still clearly sees the Main Battle Tank as an integral part of the future.
At the end of last year the Public Accounts Committee delivered a scathing report on armoured vehicles that I briefly highlighted here.
It said;
The consequence of recent cuts to armoured vehicles programme over the last five years is that just £5.5 billion remains in the budget for the next ten years. This is insufficient to fund the Department’s current armoured vehicles programme. The Department has yet to devise a plan for how it will close the gaps in both its budget and vehicle fleets. To deliver better value for money in future it plans to purchase off the shelf vehicles through international competition, with upgrade and support carried out by UK industry for reasons of security of supply.
So the MoD has a £5.5 billion sized pot of cash for armoured vehicles to 2021/2 out of which has to come; FRES (both flavours), the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme, Foxhound, potentially, projects like the Multi Role Vehicle (Protected) and whatever we end up bringing into core, post Afghanistan.
£5.5 billion might sound like a lot but that jam is spread pretty thinly.
It also has to address the rapidly approaching obsolescence of the Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank and possibly its derivatives, the repair and recovery vehicle and the two combat engineering variants, Titan and Trojan, although these are much newer than the main battle tank.
There are three broad options when considering what to do with Challenger 2;
One Ring to Rule Them All
A bolder approach but one which of course has greater risk, is to develop a new base platform that can replace all three vehicle families and massively reduce through life costs via the wonderful world of standardisation and commonality.
Therefore, it is what will not be done.
The MoD’s will only consider development as a last resort and its recent risk aversion means that whatever potential benefits this has, it’s a non-starter.
Buy a load of Leopards
Paul had a look at this option
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/09/challenger-3-or-leopard/
Interesting, but unlikely
Therefore, it is what will not be done.
Upgrade Warrior, buy FRES SV and upgrade CR2
This is obviously the lowest risk and lowest sticker price option because it capitalises, mostly, on what we already have.
Therefore, it will be what is done.
The stated intention of the MoD is to perform a Life Extension Programme. The concept phase of CR2 LEP has recently been launched; the ultimate plan is to upgrade all 227 vehicles to extend their service lives beyond 2035 at an estimated cost of £500m, which is less than £2.5m each. The concept phase is expected to be complete by next March with the assessment and production phases following soon after.
The in service target is, of course, 2020.
Whilst the Challenger 2 is without a doubt one of the best main battle tanks in the world there is still considerable room for improvement and as I mentioned above, many of the electronics are rapidly becoming obsolete, to the point where they no longer become economic to support.
Upgrading Challenger 2 means lot of trade-offs; a limited budget means prioritisation will have to take place so in a crowded equipment programme the ‘let’s do it all’ option is off the table.
The options…
Firepower
As most of the Think Defence readers will know, Challenger 2 uses the 55 calibre L30A1 rifled 120mm main gun, which more or less, the UK is the only user of. This means we are unable to take advantage of research and development of the much more common smoothbore ammunition by the USA, Israel and Germany, especially for non depleted uranium kinetic energy rounds like the General Dynamics KE-W A3 or Rheinmetall DM63
These new rounds are not cheap at about £3-5k each
It uses a two piece ammunition design, unlike the 120mm smoothbore designs that use a single piece with combustible cartridge. There are benefits to this but one of the downsides is that the penetrator rod cannot extend back into the charge housing. This is how the length (and effectiveness) of the smoothbore penetrator is achieved, the length to diameter ratio being one of the determinants of performance.
Challenger tank 120mm ammunition on display
Challenger II Tank Ammunition
Because of this two part ammunition, stowage is split between a number of locations within the turret and hull with a total capacity of 50 rounds.
Challenger 2 Cutout
Swapping the gun itself would not present a significant challenge and was trialled in 2006 by Royal Ordnance Defence as part of the £3.5m Smoothbore Option Technical Demonstrator Programme (SO TDP)
120mm smooth bore tank gun on Challenger 2
But adapting the vehicle for carriage of single piece ammunition would require a major rework and this of course means cost.
Click here for a few images of the ammunition stowage issue.
Challenger 2 uses two basic forms of ammunition, kinetic and chemical.
The L27A1 Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS), commonly called (CHallenger main ARMament gun) CHARM3
L27A1 CHARM 3
CHARM3 uses depleted uranium and there have been ongoing concerns about its legality.
A recent legal review confirmed the Government legal advice is that it remains legal to use.
Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)
I informed the House on 31 October 2011 that I had commissioned officials to undertake a legal weapons review of our depleted uranium (DU) anti-armour tank rounds, known as Charm-3. Although Charm-3 was introduced before the Government were obliged to undertake such reviews, I ordered this review, as a special case, to address concerns that have been raised in Parliament and by civil society.
The review is now complete and has concluded that Charm-3 is capable of being used lawfully by UK armed forces in an international armed conflict. Charm-3 is the only munition within the UK arsenal manufactured using DU. We judge this capability necessary in any land battle to defeat the armoured vehicles of an adversary state and no alternative tank round (using another metal or substance) has been shown to provide a comparable effect on target. It is self evident that use of Charm-3 will be limited to a war fighting role, specifically in tank battles, and likely therefore to be employed only in exceptional and limited circumstances.
Legal weapon reviews are carried out in accordance with article 36 of the first protocol of 1977 additional to the Geneva conventions of 1949 (Additional Protocol I). Article 36 states:
“In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a high contracting party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the high contracting party”.
Such legal reviews are undertaken routinely in respect of weapon systems brought on to the UK inventory following UK ratification of additional protocol I, on 28 January 1998. The acquisition of Charm-3 pre-dates ratification and for that reason only, no review had been undertaken before now.
The legal review process under article 36 of additional protocol I required the use of Charm-3 to be considered in the light of certain key legal principles, namely:
Whether it is prohibited by any specific treaty provision;
Whether it is of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury;
Whether it is capable of being used discriminately;
Whether it will cause long-term, widespread and severe damage to the natural environment;
Current and possible future trends in international humanitarian law.
The legal weapon review considered each of these points. The review itself comprises legal advice provided in confidence, but I wish to set out the rationale for reaching the judgment that the rounds are legal:
The use of DU in weapon systems is not prohibited by any treaty provision.
There have been extensive scientifically based studies, undertaken by the World Health Organisation in relation to the long-term environmental and other health effects allegedly attributable to the use of DU munitions. In the light of the reassuring conclusions drawn by such scientific studies, and noting the continuing military imperative underpinning retention of Charm-3 as a weapon system, it was concluded that use of Charm-3 does not offend the principle prohibiting superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering in armed conflict.
Crew training, weapon design and automated targeting systems mean Charm-3 is capable of being used discriminately.
Where DU ordnance residues have existed, in the aftermath of an armed conflict, annual potential radiation doses have been shown by scientific study to be well below the annual doses received by the general population from sources of natural radiation in the environment and far below the reference level recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency as a criterion to determine whether remedial action is necessary. An environmental footprint inevitably will be left by use of DU munitions but one where a credible and authoritative body of scientific evidence (drawn from both international and national sources) has demonstrated there is no proven link between exposure to DU and, neither, a significant risk to public health, nor, a significant risk of any long-term damage to the environment.
Finally, it was concluded that DU continues to be a material of choice used by states in the manufacture of anti-armour munitions. To date no inter-state consensus has emerged that DU munitions should be banned and the available scientific evidence (developed in the aftermath of the Gulf war in 1991) continues to support the view held by the UK that such munitions can be retained for the limited role envisaged for their employment.
The UK policy remains that DU can be used within weapons; it is not prohibited under current or likely future international agreements. Given the challenging situations in which we expect our service personnel to operate, it would be wrong to deny them legitimate and effective capabilities that can help them achieve their objectives as quickly and as safely as possible.
From a legal perspective, CHARM3 therefore, remains viable
Despite this legal review, I think the government will come under increasing pressure in the near future to look again, especially as more studies on the rise of birth defects in Iraq and especially Basrah, conclude, as they will do in the next few years.
Some of these recent studies are highlighting the significant spike in birth abnormalities and drawing a link between them and high levels of heavy metals in areas where there was significant fighting.
Click the link below for one example;
http://www.springerlink.com/content/u35001451t13g645/fulltext.pdf?MUD=MP
From what I have read none of these are specifically looking at depleted uranium but no doubt more studies will be carried.
There are many more questions than answers with these studies; are accurate before and after comparisons possible, is there a causal link and can they be linked to depleted uranium for example so one cannot automatically assume that the DU CHARM3 round is going to be withdrawn any time soon.
It certainly looks like increasing pressure will be bought to bear though and this might influence decisions on the main gun on Challenger 2.
These studies will also look at tungsten alloys so a change might not offer much in the ‘environmental impact’ stakes.
Even if CHARM3 remains in service we need to assess whether it will continue to provide its performance advantage in the period up to the out of service date of Challenger 2, sometime beyond 2030.
It may be judged that no likely vehicle will emerge in this frame that will offer sufficient protection to defeat CHARM3 and therefore, a risk based decision can be made to marshal our existing stocks (unknown) until this time.
It is unlikely that a depleted uranium development will be funded to replace CHARM3 so any conventional replacement would not only be made in small quantities but unable to utilise existing designs and have to overcome the length limitations inherent in the two piece design.
So with CHARM3 still on the books, a more realistic assessment of future enemy armour capabilities against the capabilities of CHARM3 and the significant upgrade costs of moving to a single piece ammunition design it seems unlikely that a cost constrained upgrade programme will change the main gun.
There has been some talk of improving the L23 round for export to Oman and use by the UK and the tungsten training version of the L27 called the L28 although little has been released on this and information seems sparse.
The secondary ammunition nature of the Challenger 2 is the High Explosive Squash Head, essentially a big lump of HE that deforms on impact and is initiated by the base fuse, it sending shockwaves that create spalling on the inside of the target vehicle.
It is also used against fixed fortifications, soft skin vehicles and other targets that do not warrant the use of APFSDS.
It was a HESH round that is widely reported to be used for record breaking shot that we hear so much about but this from ARRSE seems to cast doubt on that;
There seems to be some confusion about what happened and what shot etc. the range was just over 5100m. We had finished moving forward and had gone firm. i was scanning the horizon when picked up what i thought to be T62′s across the valley. We had been shooting at whatever targets presented. I lased the target and was surprised by the range that came back, we started talking about having a go at the target amongst ourselves and The Colonel ok’ed the shot. it was a normal fin round, and after lasing again i fine laid the ellipse onto the target and fired. It was central hit just below the turret, as to whether the target was manned, i don’t know however the shot I was really proud of is mentioned by Mad Pierre by mistake, which was a T62 mover reversing up and out of a hull down position at about 1500m, and was hit with a HESH first round through the top of the turret, again fine laid without autolay, never did like it much. Hope this helps. I was always a lucky gunner.
Whilst HESH is both useful and effective (about £500 each), in comparison with others now available for the smoothbore 120mm not particularly versatile, has little fragmentation and is point detonating.
General Dynamics offer the M1028 Canister Round that is used against infantry.
The Rheinmetall PELE round uses a tungsten penetrator to reduce collateral damage and the Israel Military Industries even offer a 120mm STUN cartridge that is designed to disperse crowds by providing the same firing signature as normal ammunition. Air bursting and delayed point detonation ammunition are available, tube launched missile (e.g. LAHAT) continue to be perfected and a wide range of other ammunition is also available on the open market from a number of suppliers, all denied to the Challenger 2 because of the choice of rifled main gun.
Another issue is that of insensitive propellant/ammunition, arguably it should be in the protection/survivability section but here because of the relationship to the gun choice.
The only loss of a Challenger 2 in Iraq was due to fratricide, a HESH round striking the raised commanders hatch. The Board of Inquiry into the death of Cpl Allbutt and Tpr Clarke is pretty harrowing reading and there are images on the net of the vehicle, its turret displaced and blown off its mounting, resting on the rear deck, but you will have to search for that yourself.
The report clearly indicated that the initial attack was not survivable but it also makes a number of references to the secondary explosion and fire caused by deflagration of stored HESH rounds inside.
Reading the report it should be clear that insensitive munitions would not have altered the final outcome in this case but newer munitions available from General Dynamics, IMI and Rheinmetall are available in ‘IM’ form.
The Iraq TES Challenger 2’s were fitted with a remote weapon station, the Selex Enforcer. This can use the GPMG, M2 HMG or GMG and would be a simple upgrade to the rest of the fleet in the LEP programme.
Beyond adding the Selex Enforcer to all vehicles in the LEP improving Challenger 2 firepower by a wholesale main gun replacement remains low, in the regard, Challenger 2 will continue to slip behind the state of the art.
How far behind this start of the art is acceptable and how far behind is not acceptable is the main discussion point.
Actually, the state of the art is less important than the state of the enemy art, which is the calculation the MoD must make.
The inability to take advantage of newer ammunition natures will also make the Challenger 2 less flexible than its peers.
Electronics and Optronics
Although the systems are not state of the art it would be silly to argue they are ineffective but equally, some of the electronic components in CR2 are very definitely approaching end of life so even addressing these obsolescence issues will be a major project and no doubt, any new systems will be Generic Vehicle Architecture compliant.
In 2005 General Dynamics were contracted by the MoD to implement the platform battlefield information system application (PBISA) project that integrates the commanders display with navigation and other inputs using a MILCAN bus.
Click here for details.
The commanders (no Sagem) VS580 gyrostabilised sight is no longer manufactured by Sagem (although I did read that Thales Samsung Korea purchased the design rights) although the newer MVS580 is still available and integrated into the CR2E export model.
Sagem MVS580-2
The Gunner Primary Sight (GPS) sight was formerly from Pilkington Optronics who are now owned by Thales.
Perhaps the weakest aspect of the Challengers sighting system is the thermal imager that is mounted above the gun barrel and unstabilised. The Thermal Observation and Gunnery Sight II (TOGS II) was again from Pilkington Optronics, before that Barr and Stroud and now Thales.
The CR2E model used a Sagem MVS 580 for the commander and SAVAN 15 for the gunner, both with laser rangefinders, fully stabilised and available with day and thermal imaging optics. This configuration supported true ‘hunter killer’ operation.
Sagem SAVAN 15
From the CR2E there exists an off the shelf upgrade solution.
Another interesting option would be to take advantage of the work currently being carried out by General Dynamics on the FRES SV Scout programme, especially the Thales Orion system which is receiving rave reviews.
The Orion implementation will be the first major system to be fully Generic Vehicle Architecture and Vetronics Infrastructure for Video Over Ethernet (VIVOE Def Stan 00-82) standard compliant, an important step to ensure maintainability and cost reductions across the Army as a whole.
I looked at GVA (Def Stan 23-09) last year, click here to have a read.
FRES SV Scout
FRES SV Scout
The Thales product page describes the Orion as having 360° continuous rotation, full stabilisation, a long range and wide area TV sensor, long wavelength thermal imager, High Definition outputs, gigabit Ethernet connectivity, automatic target detection and tracking, modular hardware and a number of interface options.
Thales ORION
This would be used for the commander and linked to a new sensor processor unit and the gunners sight to enable the gun to slew onto a target designated by the commander in a ‘hunter-killer’ sequence.
The FRES SV Scout will be fitted with the Thales DNGS T3 (direct or indirect)
Thales DNGS-T3
The DNGS T3 is fitted with the VELT/Catherine MP vision system that has been shown on Warrior
Thales VELT-D
Thales VELT-D Warrior
The Catherine MP Thermal Imager is an impressive sensor and used in a number of systems, the image below shows it output.
Thales Catherine MP Thermal Imager
Operating under armour inevitably reduces situational awareness and in urban environments, a likely more common situation. This has resulted in a number of systems being developed and deployed in Afghanistan.
Selex have provided over 1,200 Road Marshall systems for use on vehicles in Afghanistan including the new Foxhound.
Road Marshall consists of a number of fixed and rotating optical and acoustic sensors linked into a common processor and up to sixteen display units. It is designed to enhance crew awareness of the immediate surrounding area and can be expanded to include threat detection and weapon cueing using the Selex Enforcer remote weapon station for example. It can also link into the longer range optical sensors like the one shown on the mast in the image below.
Selex Road Marshall
Selex Road Marshall
Selex Road Marshall Display
Selex Road Marshall
This kind of system would be a valuable addition for operations in close terrain.
If the CR2 LEP looked at the Thales sighting and the Selex situational awareness systems the MoD would be in very real danger of creating a common armoured vehicle sensor set with attendant training, spares and other support cost savings
Best go and have a lie down!
Independent of the main gun issue, sensors and fire control systems are likely to take the lion’s share of the upgrade budget.
Power
With the full up-armouring package applied, a Challenger 2 is approaching 74 tonnes which is way beyond the initial in service weight of 62 tonnes. The extra weight will inevitably place a strain on the automotive components, increase fuel consumption, reduce the power to weight ratio and ultimately, reduce mobility.
In the late nineties the Army put the Perkins Caterpillar CV12 engine fleet into the AES Machine Care Plus service regime which moved away from time/mileage interval servicing to a centralised one based on engine condition and fluid analysis. It is a sophisticated and innovative service that has driven down costs, massively improved availability and allowed engines to be used far beyond their expected service life. Pattern analysis also provides valuable intelligence across the engine fleet and allows the service provider to predict failure.
On operations in Iraq the Challenger 2 approached 100% availability, despite the well publicised problems with sand filters during the Saif Sarea exercise.
Changing the powerpack to the same MTU unit as used in the latest Leopard designs would provide a number of NATO commonality benefits as well as reducing fuel consumption and improving mobility.
The latest Euro Powerpack from MTU, the 883 Ka 501 is rated at 1200kw or over 1,650shp.
The CR2E export model was fitted with an MTU 883 engine and Renk HSWL 295TM automatic transmission (replacing the David Brown TN54 system). Because this combination was smaller than the Perkins/David Brown combination extra fuel could be carried and range extended.
The Renk 295 is from the same family as the Renk 256B that will be fitted to FRES SV.
This raises an interesting prospect of some engine and transmission component commonality across two of the main Army vehicle fleets with an obvious reduction in cost and logistic effort.
I know you won’t get very far in the MoD with that kind of dangerous common sense 
As attractive as improving the power to weight ratio of Challenger 2 is, reliability and availability is hard won, any change would need to carefully consider the impact of this on availability and reliability.
Protection
That Challenger 2 is well protected is not in doubt but it is not impregnable either as demonstrated by it being reportedly penetrated by an RPG29 in Iraq. This resulted in an increase in armour through a couple of iterations.
If one looks at pictures of the Challenger in Iraq it should be clear that the front and side applique armour goes through a number of changes over time, first being ROMOR-A ERA and then a bolt on module of Dorchester armour at the front for example. Additional belly armour, ECM, cameras and bar armour over certain parts has also appeared.
Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank Near Basra, Iraq
Challenger 2 latest TES
Armour is of course highly secret but unless some breakthrough occurs one would assume that Challenger 2 is as well protected as any comparable vehicle so any scope for improvement might be limited.
Perhaps there might be more protection kits purchased or maybe an improvement to mounting fixtures as part of the programme.
An interesting aspect of protection is staying unseen and being able to utilise the hull down position as shown in the image below
Hull down Challenger in Iraq 2003
Natural terrain is preferable but a mine plough can be used to make your own terrain
Challenger can use the Pearson Heavy Dozer Blade (UDK1) but this task would ordinarily be done by attendant Royal Engineer vehicles like Trojan.
challenger 2 with Bulldozer Earth Moving Attachment (BEMA)
Challenger 2 has a smoke generation system that injects fuel into the exhaust, producing a large smoke screen in a short time as seen in this fun video from Top Gear
It also has a pair of 66mm grenade launchers on the front of the turret. There may be additional improvements to the laser sensor and multi spectral smoke discharger systems from manufacturers like Rheinmetall or Diehl for example.
66mm Smoke Grenade Launcher
Sven wrote a good piece on smoke dischargers a few years ago;
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/smoke-dischargers.html
The conclusion, that some western forces seem to have somehow forgotten about the value of smoke seems to be true.
There are also the new generation of active protection systems such as Trophy, IBD ADS or Saab’s LEDS that might be considered.
Challenger uses a number of signature reduction measures and has been seen equipped both with the Saab Barracuda signature reduction system and with Camotek 2D multispectral cam net.
[The link, by the way, is a fascinating look at how effective multispectral cam nets can be]
Trade Offs
Although the stated desire is to upgrade all vehicles to ensure a completely homogenous fleet I am not sure if anyone thinks this will happen and we won’t end up with a two or even three tier fleet of training and operational vehicles.
Whole Fleet Management will also most likely continue in its current form; a small quantity of vehicles held at sub unit level for local training, another set that is used for large training exercises called the training fleet and a set that is used to rotate between the two called the maintenance fleet. Finally, there is operational fleet, the ones held in Controlled Humidity Environments.
If there is a set number of vehicles and a finite budget then trade-offs are inevitable, do you accept a lower specification or scope of upgrade but create an entirely common fleet or do you create multiple upgrade packages and get maximum capability but in a smaller sub set of the fleet.
How much do you rely on UOR’s for future upgrades, given the Treasury are likely to be less UOR friendly in the future.
Do you look at the total fleet of 227 vehicles and then look at the likely future deployment strength, given current defence planning assumptions, Army 2020 reaction force size and past operations (TELIC had only 116 CR2 deployed)
All these will be factored into these difficult decisions.
Decisions, decisions, dilemmas, dilemmas
Organisation
An upgraded Challenger 2 will sit within the Army 2020 structure.
This changed post SDSR, which envisaged 5 Multi Role Brigades, into the 3 Armoured Brigade plus Divisional HQ plus logistics and force troops.
The Royal Armoured Corps will reduce from 11 regiments to 9 by amalgamation.
From the Army website
The Queens Royal Lancers will amalgamate with 9th/12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales’s) upon completion of scheduled operational commitments and not before October 2014.
The 1st Royal Tank Regiment and the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment will merge upon completion of scheduled operational commitments and not before April 2014.
Each Armoured Brigade will comprise one armoured cavalry regiment, one armoured regiment, two armoured infantry battalions and one protected mobility battalion.
There was a slight change; the Type 56 regiment is different from the previous organisational setup.
The Army has used several structures for armoured regiments, the Type 38, Type 43, Type 44, Type 50, Type 57 and Type 58, plus those created on the fly for operations. These varied the number of Troops and tanks in the Squadron HQ and number of Squadrons to get to the number required.
An Army 2020 Sabre Squadron will have eighteen Challengers which is an interesting number because it is 4 more than the current Type 58 (4 troops of 3 plus 2 in SHQ in a Squadron, 4 Squadrons and 2 in RHQ)
We might guess at the makeup of a Type 56 Regiment but it would be just that, a guess.
Because the Army 2020 wiring diagram says 3 Squadrons of 18 we could assume there will still be two tanks in RHQ but the combinations within the Squadron are interesting.
You could make up the numbers by sticking with 3 tanks per Troop but then increase the number of Troops per Squadron and an extra in SHQ or stay at 4 troops of 3 but add an extra Squadron whilst losing the 2 in SHQ.
Or
You could achieve the 18 tanks by keeping with the 2 in SHQ but increasing the troop strength to 4 tanks each. This means no tanks for RHQ though, hence the reduction of 2 from the Type 58.
In addition, an armoured Squadron will have the usual collection of attachments and detachments from the REME, RLC, RAMC and even the AGC Combat HR Specialists.
Lots of interesting combinations and as ever, subject to variations in peace and wartime establishment, training location fleet, trials & development and whole fleet management.
A lot of people get really exercised by working out exact ORBAT’s but the simple reality is they change on a regular basis and are often improvised on operations anyway so its probably not worth worrying too much about.
We should also note that this has yet to be implemented and is subject to change, there is at least one and probably two defence reviews before the notional Army 2020 vision is open for business.
There are also a couple of issues for the Army to worry about, training and accommodation space as we move back from Germany and the vehicle storage capacity, perhaps British Forces Germany might still have a small role to play after all.
In the next and final post in this series I will be having an out of the box blue sky thought shower!
Not worried about the gun: Leave as is. Armour appears excellant. That leaves electronics and drive-train.
Would love to see a UK-based system (although GD and Thales are as near as good enough to be UK-based) but the issues regarding electronic accuracy and vunerability need to be addressed. If we have to go European for the drive-train so be it: As long as it can pull the 74-tonne beast around what more can be asked (but RR should pull-out of all future EU joint-ventures)…?
If we need to upgrade the gun then post it into the next decade’s budget. We are highly unlikely to be involved in a tank-war for the near-future (and the Euros are more likely to deny us support than offer it) so smoothbore should not be considered.
Don’t need Germany as we can always place the second-tier tanks in Canada. As long as these tanks can share the drive-train all futher upgrade within the fleet should be modular. Must admit am a bit worried that the new REME kit is already considered near-obsolete!
On the face of it the 2020 Armoured Brigade looks like a potent force, in numbers not unlike the American Armoured Cavalry Regiments – but with the armoured infantry those formations lacked. However Armoured Cavalry had integrated artillery and helicopters – transport and tank-busters; and more tanks. Any hope for a type 74 Armoured Regiment with a 4th Sabre Squadron? By my reckoning we still have just enough tanks…and probably enough SP guns to integrate those into the formation as well; we would need to buy helicopters…but then as is generally agreed we need rather more of those in any event. Unfortunately the idea that if we have 25% less soldiers they need more, newer and better kit to remain effective hasn’t really gained much purchase amongst the political class!
@Gloomy
I think we are supposed to measure effects not count heads or engage in top trumps.
If the proposed armoured brigades will acheive the effects we want then it doesn’t matter if they have fewer tanks than an American Armoured Cavalry Regiment. Indeed to change the mindset completely: if we can ahcieve the required effect with fewer assets than our allies use then that really is a good thing becasue we havn’t wasted our resources on overkill.
Also in reality the deploying brigade will get augmented by whatever rotaty and artillary support it needs, based on the threat situation and objectives, whether these elements sit within the peacetime brigade establishment or not.
Now that system is reliant on getting the threat assesment right: which we didn’t do in Helmand first up. But Army 2020 is also supposed to include improvments to ISTAR, forward engagment and cultural learning so that situation ought not to arise again… gulp [fingers and toes all crossed].
The US ACRs had a very specific covering force role on the Central Front.
As is mentioned in the article, on Ops the Type regiment is whatever is deemed to be needed. If we want one regiment of 73 tanks we can have that.
Forgot to say earlier, welcome to TD Gloomy !
So the new structure will provide 3 identical ‘heavy’ brigades with a mix of heavy and light armour plus armoured infantry.
If we wanted to do a Telic style operation with a fully loaded brigade of 100+ tanks would it be a case of taking 1 of these new brigades and swapping out some of it’s component parts for the armoured bits of it’s 2 sister formations?
I guess what I am asking is how modular these 3 brigades are, are they designed to be tailored to individual operations and environments at short notice?
@TD
Good article rooted in gritty reality and thrifty common sense.
As such pretty poor for stirring up a lively debate!
Roll on the fantasy shower including: hybrid drive, electric rail guns, common hull designs and swarms of active defence drones.
@Challenger
I think notice is the key.
We have been told that the UK will still be able to provide a stong division ‘with notice’ which will presumably involve doing a task org of various elements of the RF and AF into what we actually need. This will bugger everything up for months before and months after but we can still do it if we have to.
Without notice (or at short notice) we presumably have to take what is available ‘on the shelf’ in terms of the RF readiness cycle: ie whichever Heavy Brigade is at high readiness plus elements of 3 Cdo and 16AAB as required.
@TD Thanks.
@Peter and Phil; I take both your points, however I am not confident that the improved ISTAR/forward engagement/cultural learning will really be prioritised; and my concern on allocating resource to brigade sized formations as required is that the Mod will hold just enough resource to mass up one Brigade for operations; which won’t work well if we do actually need to mobilise a Division or even two…we will, as always be relying on the Cousins and I am less and less confident they will be there.
Also, the flow of these proposals seems to be towards the 16th Air Assault Brigade Model – self-contained, and resourced to deploy wholesale; with much reduced Army numbers I can see no reason not to aspire to the same for the armoured strike-force; after all artillery and air assets tasked and trained to serve alongside the Lancers Armoured Brigade could be detached for other work at need.
Mind you, and in an ideal world I think we should aspire to a second Air Assault Brigade based on the Rifles and a fourth Armoured Brigade based on the Guards – even within proposed Army Numbers; I clearly need to take more water with it!
These camera systems seem like a universal panacea to situational awareness from an AFV, but here’s something to consider:
The Road Marshall cameras have a 90 degree arc, so at 100m that’s 157m arc size, so on standard video that’s 3 pixels per metre, or 12 pixels per metre for full high definition. AFV displays tend to be somewhere between those two limits. If you are not careful you’ll run out of pixels to discern what is going on. Direct vision optics and eyesight tends to be somewhat more acute.
That said, cameras can operate where eyesight cannot.
@ Gloomy
I’m now just waiting for @X to pop up and ask how all these armoured dvisions you aspire to (no harm in that) are going to depoly to where the action is without more amphibious warfare SHIPS to carry them.
We could always fight the Welsh I suppose. No ships required then. Not the Scots though: they have nuclear weapons and might be crazy enough to use them…
Seriously speaking we need to remember the logistics of deployment and not commit all our resouces to the teeth arms. One brigade that can depoly is worth 100 Divisions that can’t.
Regarding camera systems our old friend James or Red Trousers certainly believed they were no substite for the human eyeball – and he appears to have had the the experience to entitle him to an opinion or two.
Having said that cameras will keep getting better so a tipping point may eventually be reached.
Maybe the answer is a Recce version with light manned turret and hatches and an big gun heavy version without. All chassis componants in commnon. Modular armour fit to suit threat. hat way the Recce waggon gets the benefit of both: eyeballs out in low threat, advanced sensors and cameras in high threat. The tank doesn’t. Not sure if that is acceptable or not.
Where is old @RT by the way: are you still lurking out there James?
@ Peter Elliot
You won’t be able to afford to pay the Tolls on the Severn Bridge and you cant come down the M50 either because their is a width restriction at the moment!
“I guess what I am asking is how modular these 3 brigades are, are they designed to be tailored to individual operations and environments at short notice?”
Any expeditionary force generated w/notice is bespoke for the operation. I cannot think of a single occasion since the war where we have deployed a force larger than Battalion in its peacetime organisation. The peacetime orbats provide a sensible training and planning template but they are unlikely to deploy as is.
The first Selex Road Marshall graphic shows a poor design.
Four spinning (vertical axis) sensors on all four edges would cover the same, reduce the blind sectors and on top of that would have some redundancy in case one or even two sensors fail.
The only disadvantage would be that the sensors cannot reliably serve as laser warners, which is probably no mission of the depicted system anyway.
@Peter Elliot – I hope not, as I find x a bit scary; also as my comments under “listen to Phil” show I think a modestly increased number of ships would also be a good thing; my underlying point is that if we are working with a smaller Army than at any time since before the Napoleonic War; a smaller RN than at any time since the Armada; and a smaller RAF than at any time since it was formed they all need more, better and newer kit if they are to do the jobs I (and others hereabouts) think we will expect them to do within the current planning framework – and many more reservists to backfill on home defence. Furthermore big ticket items must come first because of lead times – and I genuinely believe that we might need Carriers afloat and Troops ashore in the European interest, and without the Cousins in the Med, the Gulf and West Africa by 2025, 2030 at the latest.
However I know it has to be paid for – but then I was an urban regeneration specialist in a big manufacturing City for nearly thirty years; what others see as unjustifiable extravagance I tend to see as rebuilding high tech manufacturing capacity, creating well paid work north of the Thames valley, and re-balancing the economy away from the City. All necessary if the place is to remain worth defending…
Ah, one of my many pet subjects: Why unmanned turrets? What advantages are these perceived to bring?
It’s one of those ideas that has some advantages in certain situations but then they are applied to many situations where the advantages disappear while no-one is paying them any attention. Key amongst these situations are:
Protection. If you wish to retain mission capability, the unmanned turret needs to be armoured to similar levels as a manned one. If you look at the Anders or Falcon turrets, from any angle the area it displays is as large as a manned turret.
Serving the armament. If you want to clear stoppages, reload or change barrels, you need access under armour.
Elevation arcs. If you want the gun balanced (and you do) you need some space to depress the breech into.
Profile. if you put your crew into the hull, you need a taller hull. Hulls are bigger than turrets so you make the whole vehicle more massive.
Etc.
Looking back at the camera calculations, we can see that an HD camera coupled with an HD screen is getting there, but still not up to direct view, but we can use such cameras to augment direct view. Low-light, invisible illumination or thermal imagers can all be used to see things that the human eye cannot, or provide vision in locations that it is impossible to put a direct optical path to, like a reversing camera or for close-in areas.
They are not going to get much done with £5.5billion on all those programmes. I suppose the new armoured brigades will have parcels of equipment for training with the duty brigade having a few more toys and longer to play with them? Better one brigade has all the toys for five years seeing as armoured warfare breaks out about once a decade. Let’s face this isn’t WW2 even with 3 armoured brigades against a peer enemy we would have about what 5 to 7 days at tops. Everybody mounted in Warrior. Scrap FRES and use Warrior or as James suggests other vehicles. And then buy an off the shelf protected vehicle like Bushmaster.
EDIT: Oh yes Chally! That would hopefully leave us with enough in the pot to give us for enough 3 x T58 regiments. One for the standing armoured brigade. One for the rest cavalry to provide a reinforcement to the standing brigade. One for spares and attrition.
Phil said “Any expeditionary force generated w/notice is bespoke for the operation. I cannot think of a single occasion since the war where we have deployed a force larger than Battalion in its peacetime organisation. The peacetime orbats provide a sensible training and planning template but they are unlikely to deploy as is.”
Exactly! So lets shove a brigade down to Salisbury for 5 years and peal off formations as we need them. I believe the expression is “centre of excellence”. Let the rest of the Army train for armoured warfare as break from peace keeping etc. If the RAC can provide one extra regiment of tanks and the infantry supply one extra battalion of armoured infantry then we are good to go even if that is a stretch.
@Mr fred
I won’t say it’s totally no advantages, for one, you get a smaller package than a manned turret, even with protection. This also translates into a smaller target. You’ll find it much easier to hit a turret than a RWS with an RPG considering how small the package is.
You also get less vision loss under suppression fire. Small arms fire over the tank tends to cause the commander to button up due to fear of being hit or of ricohets, but no one really cares if a RWS takes a round or two, so there is a lot more aggressive scanning.
As for hull profile, you already have a gunner/loader and driver in there already, so you’re going to have to build for human sized anyway.
But I do agree there are downsides, the famous situational awareness loss for one, weapons servicing for another, and the limit to the size of the weapon mountable on a RWS.
It’s just another iteration of tradeoffs, nothing comes for free, and it would all depend on how you want to play the game.
@x and the advantages of that is?
@ Phil
Well as I said expertise is concentrated and pro-longed training brings high standards.
You seem to me to be under the impression that our armoured forces will be engaged in some sort of classic armoured war a la WW2. How long does an armoured formation last in the line before it has to be rotated out? No more than day or two at the best. The best we can hope for is that our armour is used to break the back of less than peer enemies, like in GW3, more as use once option, a shock and awe reserve, and not as the primary building block of land forces.
You may now trot out the party line on force regeneration, BAOR, variety of mission, they don’t like it up ‘em, etc. etc.
The expertise will now be concentrated in a division and the LWC.
So you disagree that mass, fire-power and manoeuvre are the bread and butter of warfare of almost all types, even in COIN in Afghanistan it is central to our model of operation.
You’re right, the division wouldn’t last 72 hours in an offensive against a peer enemy but there aren’t any right now we’re looking to invade. Any such undertaking would need a period of rearmament.
Armoured brigades provide the fundamentals and can be dismounted as needed.
just to go totally non tech (not bad for an ex tech) if you look at the cut out of a leopard 2 next to the cut out of the chally you can see the chally driver sits in the middle and has two equal small spaces (well not exactly spaces but bear with). whereas the driver in the leopard is offset, ironically it’s a right hand drive! This frees up space for a charge bin, ie a good use of space.
http://i058.radikal.ru/0911/f1/c956e6b7cb5c.jpg
Problem with replacing the gun on the Challenger 2 is the turret would need replacing as well. When they added a German smooth bore to the Challenger as an experiment a few years back they could only carry six single piece rounds in the tank.
The major issue is the HESH rounds are running out of shelf life unlike the CHARM-3 which are inert. The army have been trialling some new HESH rounds from Belgium, apparently Mecar who have an R&D program for HESH rounds:
http://www.mecar.be/content.php?langue=english&cle_menus=1156495257
Mecar are owned by the British company Chemring so it is logical they have been asked to develop new rounds considering BAE Systems have pretty much lost the capability.
In the end with a 2030 OSD replacing the turret to get a new gun has to be weighed against the cost of buying a new tank outright. Sadly any future Challenger 2 replacement will likely be an off the shelf foreign design as the UK has pretty much given up the capability to develop AFV from the ground up!
@x and Phil – I’m with Phil on this; I think we are looking at a lot of short term expeditionary and bush wars into an “Arc of Disorder” running from West Africa to the Gulf and containing a lot of kit (however poorly maintained) and an almost limitless supply of AK47s and underemployed young men who hate us. In that context we will need to take and hold air and sea ports from time to time to do whatever we judge to be needful; that means the Commandos or 16th Airmobile make the assault, the multi-purpose brigade boys and girls look after the town, and the armoured brigade secures the perimeter against a relief column of technicals and patched up T62s; three sorts of brigade required, and we do need enough of each sort. Surely the lesson of Basra is that we should never again leave brigade to do a job that requires a division; public opinion here won’t tolerate the casualties. Furthermore a time will come quite soon when the Cousins are not alongside us when we need them; they will be on warships in the Pacific glowering at Chine…
GNB
That’s not my position. Other than that bloody war I can’t think of a conflict since 1945 that has involved us swooping in by sea or air and holding a point of entry and feeding in troops.
Phil said “So you disagree that mass, fire-power and manoeuvre are the bread and butter of warfare of almost all types, even in COIN in Afghanistan it is central to our model of operation.”
Rhubarb! How is me advocating a brigade concentrating on one task and have budget concentrated on it as well for the best possible equipment not advocating mass (plus one further regiment of tanks and armoured infantry supplied by rest of Army)? At the end of the Cold War in GW1 the Army just about fielded 3 x Chally regiments and 3 x armoured infantry battalions. All I am proposing is we loose one MBT regiment. Being able to field one very well equipped and one very well trained brigade is better than 3 or so phantom regeneration formations available who knows when. Salisbury to Marchwood and off to who knows where. Ready to go when we need them. This is the 21st century not 1914 the war will be over before we get there. So I am very concerned about mass and speed and firepower. Me thinks it is you who are more guilty spreading valuable resources and diluting expertise. Further this site is called Think Defence not Agree with the Army who struggle to field a light infantry brigade without help from the RN and the other bunch and are never wrong! Try to think outside of the box or you might as well as post over at ARRSE where they have all the answers all the time because all they do is regurgitate their basic training. Then afterwards they will occasionally go on to examine their collective navels and wonder if the British Army is still one of the world’s best. Concentrate armour, let the rest of the infantry and cavalry rotate through what ever peacekeeping/COIN/light infantry task the government of the day has got the UK embroiled in, and we have every contingency covered saving costs and building on expertise..
Why you bring COIN into a discussion about armour I don’t know but I am sure the Army learned lots of valuable lessons on how to do things properly from 3Cdo deployments to Afghanistan………
Phil
Suez – Sierra Leone – Kuwait (1960s)
The 18 CH2 squadron harks back to the Berlin Brigade days, four troops of four and two in SHQ,
@Phil – sorry, no offence intended. It seems we disagree, because I think if we haven’t yet we may well need to in the next ten or fifteen years; possibly Freetown if West Africa implodes and we feel it would be in our interest to keep Sierra Leone stable; possibly Libya if their current endemic disorder worsens enough to threaten oil and gas deliveries at a critical time; possibly somewhere in Syria/Lebanon if that situation falls apart resulting in Jihadi attacks on the tourist beaches of the Dodecanese in an effort to outflank Turkish efforts to contain the crisis.
Taking the long view, much of our history has involved us getting drawn in to trouble in an effort to maintain business interests in places that don’t function very well…and there are more of those all the time, some of them uncomfortably close to home.
Your entire argument is pretty much based on the assumption that the Army won’t resource its division properly. Otherwise it provides mass fire power and manoeuvre and your model simply degrades all those capabilities for no advantage other than wanting to be different and push your post-modern for the sake of it agenda.
No offence taken!
Jim: Suez involved an overland thrust, SL was Bn strength and Kuwait was into a friendly country.
GNB
I agree the Army will spend 90% of its time doing everything short of general combat. But I have always argued for heavy forces because they are the hardest to regenerate and can be adapted to lighter roles. I think the new Army organisation is sensible. Some here think that makes me conservative and a sycophant but for once resources are being matched to ambition.
TD
Brilliant article. Really thought-provoking – the result of a lot of hard work.
I am intrigued by the firepower question. Some seem complacent about the Challenger’s main armament. Fluffy Thoughts, for instance, says, “Not worried about the gun: Leave as is”. I am rather more anxious than that but am not sure what the solution should be. I am the son of a Master Gunner but have inherited none of his expertise or knowledge, so this will probably seem like the most unqualified drivel.
I think like you, TD, that if we are unable to take advantage of newer ammunition, “Challenger 2 will continue to slip behind the state of the art.”
I can understand that changing the L30 for a smoothbore would not pose major problems: As you say:
“Swapping the gun itself would not present a significant challenge and was trialled in 2006 by Royal Ordnance Defence as part of the £3.5m Smoothbore Option Technical Demonstrator Programme (SO TDP)”
but adapting the vehicle for carriage of single piece ammunition would require a major rework and that of course means cost. The ideal solution of course would be to replace the whole turret. Here, however, I must concur with Fedaykin who says, “In the end with a 2030 OSD, replacing the turret to get a new gun has to be weighed against the cost of buying a new tank outright.” so that option des not seem likely. Maybe, though, a compromise could be struck, with, say, only 50 (56?) Challengers benefiting from a new turret fitting. That would provide a “cutting edge” regiment for our armour. After all, are more than 50 tanks going to be needed for most of the contingencies we are likely to face in the immediate future? I can appreciate, though, the problems that would be caused by having two sets of ammunition etc. etc.
Incidentally, I thought that the 2006 Royal Ordnance Smoothbore Option did involve a whole turret change but I might very well be wrong about that.
Anyway to change tack slightly, like Peter Elliott I would like the fantasy shower to roll on “including: hybrid drive, electric rail guns, common hull designs and swarms of active defence drones.” Whatever did happen to all those advanced ideas such as electro-thermal chemical guns, a 140 mm gun using liquid propellant, etc. etc.? I suppose that with the recent reduction in the likelihood of super powers confrontation, such ideas/programmes have been ascribed a much lower priority.
@x
Your suggestion did make a bit of sense, but when you popped off what seemed to be an attack on Phil, it sort of derailed the topic.
@Phil
Think what x meant was to concentrate all the armour into an armour “super training school” and spin off units to brigades and divisions when needed.
I can see some good and bad points to it, good being commonality of training over all units resulting in interchangability, centralised logistics, concentration of skill and experience for training et al.
Bad I can see in less operations time with the parent brigade or division might mean a bit more friction during ops, having to add infantry to the “armour training school” for combined arms training or engineers for engineering liason training etc means that the school has the potential to metasize into a monster organisation.
In fact I think x’s suggestion might actually make it easier to get more armoured units into the field as they would not have been pre-assigned to parent units, making it easier to “borrow” from one brigade to another.
@ Observer
At times I find Phil’s condescending attitude a bit much to take. We all know he has been to Afghanistan and I thank him for his service. But the supercilious way he addresses any deviation from the Army way bores to the put of insult. He seems to forget that others have real world experience in many spheres and have also read extensively on many subjects. It is him not I who turns a fun knockabout discussion into a chore. I know many here like to knock the likes of DominicJ and Fat Boy on Tour for some of their suggestions. But at least they are displaying some imagination. Anyway I shall do the gentlemanly thing and withdraw from the blog.
Thanks for the comments guys, have updated the post with a few extra bits and pieces.
It depends if it is more important for Tank Regiments to train in manoeuvreing with other Tank Regiments or to train mostly in co-operating with Infantry, Engineers etc.
Obviously they need to be able to do both but its a question of prioirities. For my money we are much more likely to be using single regiments to stiffen up an all arms force than to need a true ‘armoured spearhead’ type formation to send smashing up the battlefield.
We don’t have the logistic capability or the numbers for a long thrusting campaign in attack, and if anyone throws a brigade sized tank formation against us we are more likely to dig in and then counter attack it with air power.
If we ever try to fight the massed armour of someone like the Russians or the Chinese on our own we will be fukt either way around so that makes little difference.
@X We all love you really.
How much would the Cloggies charge us for their second hand Leo 2 ? Is it really so unrealistic ?
We want to upgrade ideally to a more flexible smooth bore gun, to the Euro power pack, to upgrade the optics – yes ?
So is it not truly cheaper in the long run to do all this in one go by going Leo ???
As noted their is considerable commercial efforts in the Leo upgrade market, this may allow the OSD to be pushed further out, providing a greater return on investment.
No one seems keen on Abrams, instead favouring Leopard. Why?
Maybe because Abrams is simply not good. Leopard2 has beaten all of its competition in all competitions. Abrams gets foreign sales only through U.S. military subsidies or in deals involving very much political effects such as Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait thanking for ODS.
Leclerq won only when leo2 was not in competition.
Everybody prefers Leo2 because its mobility, durability, endurance and reliability are great while the gun is the same (or better with A5, A6).
Protection appears to differ only in a non-decisive way.
Most notably, there’s still no Abrams with a competitive fuel consumption, even after addition of the APS. Same with Leclerq’s overly thirsty high power density diesel engine. Abrams also has a design fault that means tankers prefer not to rely on one of its fuel tanks, instead keeping it as reserve – which further reduces its practical off-road and road range. Combine a poor such range with the classic problem of moving supplies to armoured spearheads (rarely happens satisfactory) and you got a tank that’s as unsuited for mobile warfare on the operational level as was the M-48.
Yes, they can bash incompetent Iraqis. They would need to be much more careful for logistical reasons when facing Russians, though.
@S O – thanks for a comprehensive answer, however, when you say: “Leopard2 has beaten all of its competition in all competitions.” – I assume you’re talking about exercises, not actual conflicts? Has Leopard2 seen action anywhere? Doesn’t mean it’s not a good tank, just asking.
And Leopard 2 is available second hand, Abrams isn’t, put to SO’s point, no one but massive US Army could support gas guzzling gas turbine engine !
You leave this blog and call people condescending every time someone challenges your view on things x. And it’s definitely pot calling the kettle black on the condescending attitude by the way and we’ll ignore the snideness and dripping sarcasm that accompany a lot of your ripostes.
But I don’t condescend unless someone is being very rude indeed and there really is only one nice chap who truly pushes that button with me
And I make no claims on my experience in anything other than some very narrow matters, you’ve tried that line so many times my eyes rolled when I read it.
My views on the Army and how it should be organised are just that, my views. I post them here because I am happy for them to be challenged and enjoy the learning process that goes with the dialogue. Obviously you’re a more sensitive soul. Fine, I’d suggest you don’t comment on my ideas and thoughts then. We all consume this blog in our own way and some people on here are more up for a heated debate than others, it’s just the fucking internet mate and a bit of intellectual banter to varying degrees for various people.
Jed
Am interested in your idea of acquiring Leopards from the Dutch:
“We want to upgrade ideally to a more flexible smooth bore gun, to the Euro power pack, to upgrade the optics – yes ?
So is it not truly cheaper in the long run to do all this in one go by going Leo ???”
Trouble is I don’t really know whether those tanks are really the latest thing (i.e. with all the recent upgrades). How much updating would they need? I think they are A6s with the MTU(1479hp?)powerpack. I think they probably have the 120 mm L55 gun too but am not sure. So probably not much upgrading needed.
The other problem is how many the Dutch have to sell. I believe that they were about to sell 100 to Indonesia (was it?), but the deal fell through. Would 100 tanks be enough for us? If we need 227 Challengers, then we need the equivalent. Or don’t we?
Mike W – all in all they had about 400, and some already went to Canada and yes I doubt very much they are all A6 – so time to hit the inter-webs and find out I guess
Preparing to be shot down on this, but we went for Challenger 2 as it was deemed easier & cheaper than upgrading Challenger 1. Might it be easier to have a new build Challeger 3 with smoothbore gun & new engine designed in, rather than trying to bodge an upgrade of existing tanks? Also keeps the UK tank factory going.
@wiseape
I strongly suspect the preference of Leo to M1 has more to do with pricing and trade regulations than actual performance, remember, most of the Leo sales were 2nd hand, which meant very cheap prices, along with the fact that it’s easier to approve arms sales in Germany than the US.
If you check most of the users of the Leo, you would find that a lot of stock came from German and Dutch Cold War surpluses, while the sales of the Abrams are more direct sales to countries directly involved in the US, i.e receiving US military aid (notably Iraq and Kuwait). Australia is a notable outlier though, replacing their Leos with Abrams.
There IS better fuel efficiency in the Leo vs the Abrams, think it was 20% better, but it hasn’t slowed down the Ausies, since tanks are never known as fuel efficient in the first place, constant resup is already in place to counter this deficiency.
No offence to SO, but I have a strong suspicion of emotional bias in his analysis and preferences, amidst other things.
I think a new design uk built tank would be a good idea but who would build it john BAE want out of AFV design and build so that leaves GDUK but at what cost the MOD would do there usual 10 year pillar to post to save money and we would be left with nothing if we could build and design a new tank in under 5 years from start to depolyment then yes.
After GW 1 vickers visited my regiment 14th/20th Kings Hussars regarding design features for challenger 2 for ideas to help them be mmpre user friendly if they want a new design they need to do the same now because they need to be looking at the next generation tanks/afv now not 2 months before a RFP.
The problem is were in is we’re not prepered to fund the defence of this country properly every governemnt since the collapse of the cold war has done defence on the cheap when “new labour and chopper brown ” looked at defence they saw a personnel piggy bank to raid for pet projects like the future rotorcraft budget taking £2billion out just when wew need helicopters in Afghan and iraq
We should divert at least 30% of DFID budget to defence to re-equipe our knackered and obselete equipement
The Challenger II should meet our needs with a limited upgrade until its OSD. The CHARM3 round is and will be sufficent to deal with any forseen armoured threats and if the Belgians can provide a new HESH round to replace existing stocks which are rapidly approaching their shelf life even better. I am also assuming we have sourced new charges for an overseas suppliers as we can no longer manufacture them. I don’t see the need for a fleetwide installation of a OWS but having a number available for certain ops would be useful.
I too am a fan of the Leo2 but by 2030 it is also going to be very long in the tooth even in its A6/A7 varients. By then most Eurppean armies that wish to retain a MBT force will be looking for a replacement and a joint programme headed by the Germans could be the way to go. They seem to be able to run and manage AFV programmes competently and have good and well funded R&D. Aimed at existing Leo1 and Leo2 users it is probably the only non US option that would be affordable.
Looking to organisation we are well and truely basing out future on the Brigade, either operation as a whole or providing Regiment battlegroups. We would do well to expand on the curretn ideas of keeping the bulk of our MBTs nicely tucked up and warm in storage and have only one or two squadrons allocated for training. Those in storage would be in two varieties the first being identical to those operated by the regiments for training and allow those to be rotated through maintenance and overhaul. The second variety would be a rienforced Regiments worth (say 5 squadrons) and full warfighting standard.
As operating at divisional strength will only be done in exceptional circumstances and highly unlikely as getting the three brigades moved to where ever would probably be beyond our available means. If done however, the remaining regiments would have to deploy with their standard spec. varients, possibly augmented by kit purchased through UORs.
As only divisional staff will conduct training at that level and only on “Paper”, and as I doubt we will retain sufficient rear support elements for such a formation regardless of PR spin, the excetional circumstances that would need the division to deploy would have to be extremey exceptional.
My personal opinion is that GW1 and GW2 will have been the last time the UK deploys large Armoured/mechanised formation above brigade strength. Whilst the ideas based on ISTAR allowing for lighter and leaner formations doing the jobs of traditional heavy formation have been severely bashed post GW2 and Afghanistan, the planned increase in ISTAR assets will however allow smaller heavy formations to operate over a greater area with increased level of co-ordination and impact, especiallly when other assets such as fixed and rotary platforms are added.
So to sum up
1. We need to ensure the Challenger 2 remain relevant up to its OSD of 2030 but not cutting edge.
2. Its replacement will have to be a joint programme within Europe with a small possibility of US involvement.
3. We need to concentrate on the creation and training of the 3 new Armoured Brigades, ensuring they are fit for purpose.
4. Maintain a Divisional Headquarters to handle multinational operations and maintain posts for senior officers for whom there are insufficient regimental and brigade command posts, and conduct wargames just in case.