This is a multi-part look at the role of armour in recent conflicts, their relevance in the future and a look at current programmes;
Part 2 – Selected examples of recent use
Part 3 – Looking into the crystal ball
Part 4 – SDSR, Army 2020 and the Challenger LEP
Part 5 – Future Protected Vehicle
Part 6 – A Few Ideas on the Future
Surely the main battle tank is a cold war legacy item, something our transformational paradigm shifting, seamlessly connected new model Army 2020 is supposed to be dispensing with?
A few examples;
Vietnam (Australian forces)
A quote from Wiki about the Battle of Coral – Balmoral in Vietnam;
Ultimately though the firepower of the Australian combined arms teams proved decisive. Indeed, while the value of using armour in Vietnam was originally questioned by the Australian Army, the performance of the tanks during the fighting at Coral and Balmoral demonstrated their advantages once and for all. Indeed, whereas before the battle some infantry had doubted the usefulness or necessity of the Centurions, afterwards they did not like working without them. Over the next four years the tanks would provide invaluable close support, particularly during the clearance of bunker systems, proving to be powerful weapons in both offence and defence and were later credited with limiting casualties among the Australian infantry
And a great video
Yes, oldies, that was an SLR!
Although the history of armoured warfare in Vietnam has been subject to much historical analysis I think the above provides a pretty good snapshot.
Iraq 2003 onwards
For OIF/TELIC there were four heavy brigades, 3 from the US 3rd Infantry Division, a total force of 200 M1’s and the British 7th Armoured Brigade, with 116 Challenger 2’s. The USMC also provided a considerable heavy force by reinforcing their forces with pretty much every M1 they had.
On the drive to Baghdad the after action report from the US 3rd Infantry Division clearly stated;
This war was won in large measure because the enemy could not achieve decisive effects against our armored fighting vehicles. While many contributing factors helped shape the battlespace (air interdiction, close air support, artillery), ultimately war demands closure with the enemy force within the minimum safe distance of artillery. Our armored systems enabled us to close with and destroy the heavily armed and fanatically determined enemy force often within urban terrain with impunity. No other ground combat system currently in our arsenal could have delivered similar mission success without accepting enormous casualties, particularly in urban terrain. Decisive combat power is essential, and only heavily armored forces provide this capability
Read more below
In operation in the South, the British Royal Armoured Corps played a key role.
Learning lessons from the drubbing in the Gulf War, Iraqi forces had set up extremely effective defences in and around Basrah. Making up for their lack of firepower their defences included concealed firing pits, positions inside buildings, killing zones and an extensive network of mobile telephone linked spotters.
General Brimms (GOC 1(UK) Armoured Division), credited Challenger and Warrior, as being the top 2 war winning assets in the initial stages of the Iraq war, operation TELIC.
One of the official lessons learned from Operation TELIC (0.161 to be precise) was very clear on the value of armour;
The value of armour providing heavy direct and indirect firepower and high levels of ballistic protection when operating in support of lighter forces has been reinforced by Operation TELIC. Combined arms training for light brigades needs to be addressed
In the latter stages of Operation Telic, Challengers were often used to carry out strike missions, provide visible deterrence, compound wall breaching, route security and convoy protection.
Bosnia
Phil wrote a nice case study on the Danish Army last year so a look at the Danish tank experience in Bosnia is in order.
In an operation that was subsequently called Operation Bøllebank (hooligan bashing) the Danish Army Jutland Dragoons were sent to relieve a Swedish observation post called Tango 2.
The Danish force consisted on seven newly upgraded Leopard 1A5’s and an armoured personnel carrier. Tango 2 had been receiving heavy fire from Bosnian Serb forces and it was decided to send the tanks because, in the words of the squadron commander;
Actually, we intended to move up with the tanks because they tend to stop the shooting
The tanks were ambushed by Bosnian Serb forces with anti-tank missiles. After realising that the concerted ambush would continue and being refused close air support they decided enough was enough and returned fire in a rather spectacular fashion.
Read the details at the link below;
http://www.milhist.dk/post45/boellebank/boellebank_uk.htm
The Serbs clearly intended to destroy the Danish force but clearly did not anticipate the response, characterised as the ‘mouse that ate the cat’
Afghanistan
The lessons learned during Operation MEDUSA by the Canadian Army leadership included the importance of maintaining heavy armour as part of a balanced force.
Beginning in December 2006, the tank squadron and armoured engineers featured prominently in all major combat operations undertaken by the Canadian Battle Group, including at BAAZ TSUKA and ACHILLES, working side by side with Afghan National Security Forces, American Special Operations Forces (SOF), and ISAF troops. The Battle Squadron was initially responsible for establishing attack-by-fire positions in support of infantry companies and in forming the nucleus of a Battle Group counter-moves force capable of responding throughout the entire Canadian area of operations. Many Taliban insurgents learned the hard way of the capabilities of the Leopard’s main gun during the following years when attacking Canadian strong points with rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and indirect fire.
During these operations, the tank squadron proved its ability to conduct sustained combat operations at great distances from the re-supply nodes at each of the forward operating bases (FOBs). Additionally, Leopard mine ploughs were used to clean up an old Soviet minefield. Since May 2007, the tank squadron has fought almost constantly alongside Canadian and Afghan infantry in close combat with the Taliban.
Supported by the artillery, combat engineers, attack aviation and fast air groups, mechanized combat teams from the 2 RCR BG have achieved decisive victories against insurgents in the Howz-e- Madad, Nalgham and Sangsar areas of Zhari District where vineyards and imposing compounds render wheeled vehicle movement particularly difficult. Leopard tank crews have extensively used the 105 mm High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) round to eliminate insurgents attempting to attack dismounted soldiers. More importantly, tank rollers and ploughs have continued to mitigate risk to coalition soldiers by clearing routes of pressure-plate detonated IEDs while providing intimate support and a breaching capability to dismounted infantry companies.
Danish Leopards have supported the British led Helmand Task Force, even in the Green Zone, where they have provided overwatch. Operation Sond Chara and Abbi Toora made extensive use of the Danish contingent.
Op AABI TOORAH began with the pre-positioning of the Danish tanks, previously used on Op SOND CHARA in December to great effect. At the same time the Danish Leopard tanks were in an overwatch position on high ground to the north and west and were used throughout the battle to engage, from range, the well dug-in enemy positions.
Sven provided a link to the document below (cheers) on the Canadian experience with main battle tanks in Afghanistan.
Perhaps most obvious of the lessons we have relearned is the importance of the combined arms team in full spectrum operations, and the continued significance of the tank and armoured engineers in the COE. While our understanding of the threat and the complexity of operations in the modern battle space is sound, we have been excessively optimistic about our ability to find the enemy and determine his intentions without having to fight for information. We will strive to achieve knowledge-based and sensor-led operations, but we are not there yet. Until we can deny the enemy a vote, it will be necessary to form and deploy flexible combined arms teams capable of advancing to contact, and crushing opposing forces with overwhelming combat power and manoeuvre in extremely complex terrain, by day and by night
Although it is a few years old, it is a very interesting read;
So there you go; a handful of selected instances of the continuing viability and plain old usefulness of heavy armour across a range of conflicts in recent memory.
The examples highlight the use of armour in support of infantry operations and against light forces, and many like to suggest that modern weapons and airpower have made armour manoeuvre and widespread tank-on-tank shootouts a thing of the past; however, the Iraq experience -particularly GWII- shows that despite overwhelming air and information superiority, a switched on enemy force simply following good basic routine can hide away a suprisingly large and dangerous amount of armour in the field.
I’ve used longer sentences before.
” Leopard tank crews have extensively used the 105 mm High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) round to eliminate insurgents attempting to attack dismounted soldiers. More importantly, tank rollers and ploughs have continued to mitigate risk to coalition soldiers by clearing routes of pressure-plate detonated IEDs while providing intimate support and a breaching capability to dismounted infantry companies.”
And
” Op AABI TOORAH began with the pre-positioning of the Danish tanks, previously used on Op SOND CHARA in December to great effect. At the same time the Danish Leopard tanks were in an overwatch position on high ground to the north and west and were used throughout the battle to engage, from range, the well dug-in enemy positions.”
Why don’t we have Challengers out there again?
@Swimming Trunks
“Why don’t we have Challengers out there again?”
Local level diplomacy?
Anyone know how much rebuild work we’re doing at the moment on the compounds and villages after a typical engagement? Structural and relations wise?
Is there typically a relationship to rebuild after an engagement in someone else’s house?
If we sent in tanks as well, would there be more or less fallout, both materially and socially? Would we use them more often?
How would they be deployed in Afghanistan? Would they be in the right place?
Finally, how much would it cost to ship enough tanks out, spread them around, operate distributed maintenance sheds, retrieve them when they’ve been damaged/broken down/etc?
The other Chris
I think that gets to the heart of the problem.
It is often forgotten that the original spec for the tank called it, a ‘Shelled area vehicle’ . It was anticipated as a way of carrying infantry and supporting firepower over rough terrain under fire.
The nature of that enemy fire has changed dramatically but it still remains the major point of armour on a battlefield:-
1) It allows to be mobile- to a degree pick the time and terms of an engagement, or indeed if one happens at all.
2) It allows you protection, to close with your enemy, under protection that presents him with at best a limited ability to destroy you.
3) It provided a means of effectively destroying the enemy.
I was one of those who saw the tanks demise:- Heavy armour atheist if you like.
The considered arguments by those on this site have reawakened my faith:- somewhat!
My Tank facebook status, is now probably specifically – Tank agnostic. (BTW thats not the same as being armour or even medium armour agnostic, There I remain a true believer.
MY doubts come with the idea of the modern tank, you kno- 70 tons with hyper velocity non standard gun on it in a turret.
Very heavy, Heavy to the point of being very difficult to shift around and deploy. To a degree your comment makes that point- Chally maybe brilliant but frankly if it aint there, coz we can’t afford to get it there, it may as well be made of chocolate.
Very maintenance intensive and about a resource and logistically demanding as anything the army uses.
It does a job, but in the modern battlefield is there a better- more mobile less expensive way of doing the job? An extreme and gruesome example is, you can kill a soldier by driving over him in a tank, or you can shoot him. the latter is vastly cheaper and easier to accomplish than the former. In short if something cheaper to buy and run could do the same job then we should ditch the tank and move to that.
Why I remain agnostic, is that some of the examples given refer to the use of 1st and 2nd generation MBT of weights and armament rather less than Chally and Merkava. Using 105 mm guns firing shells at targets which are not what those guns were designed by and large to deploy Heat/ hesh for example, not ideal for engaging field fortifications or troops dug in – standard exploding shells would be quite a lot better, But the ‘ pure tank ethic’ of modern tank theory does not by and large literally have room for them.
In all the above examples, have they done anything that say a 40 ton MICV derivative with a 105 mm light gun could not? (Think Anders style).
It is worth remembering that the Amx 30 derivatives used by the French in Gulf 1 had a very good kill ratio v Iraqi Tanks. The amx 30 was something a joke in tank circles by then. On paper a t72 or even a t62/4 should have mullerred it.
So I remain unconvinced.
@IXION: it’s interesting to wonder if the conventional “tank” is really practicable. Just to chuck in my 5 penno’th…
- really, given air transport capacity, strategic deployment of anything larger than a squadron of CVR(T) is impracticable, and hence CR2 really has the same strategic deployability as any other armoured vehicle. This is probably the case even if we buy another 20 C17 (which I think makes great sense anyway!). I suspect the issue with CR2 now is that it’s “trafficability” given existing road networks in likely conflict regions, where a 50 tonne limit would probably suit better in that all those ISO compatible trucks (just for you @TD!) weigh that much
- There are ways of mitigating tank weight, primarily in moving to unmanned turrets and replacing the long gun with high velocity missiles. They have their disadvantages too, but the balance is shifting I suspect. Even the ability to be “AMX30-like” and motor about on wheels for long road wheels would make tanks much more practical for theatre level moves
- the need for similar protection for all vehicles within armoured units, the universal intermixing of tank and armoured infantry and the need for relief drivers and commanders drive you towards a single “heavy” vehicle with a crew and infantry fire team on board. With the crew in the hull, we are looking at a crew compartment much smaller than an IFV’s, with reduced armoured volume to protect. Easily enough to bring us to sub-50 tonne if we assume 40mm cannon plus HVM missiles rather than a main gun
wf
yes I should make it clear I am not a big fan of ‘Flying armour’; i am sure it has some tactical use on occasions, but in reality not even the US could fly tanks around in any numbers and only in aircraft that would have the devil’s own job landing.
I am more concerned about ‘trafficability’ as you put it, weight as you say about 4o tons max, road/ rail bridges, rail loading gauges and road widths etc etc. the availability of tractor units to tow low loaders. Most commercial 48 ton tractor units could pull a low loader with a 35-40 tons vehicle on it. Its a serious specialist job to pull a 70 ton C2. Even in shipping Ro Ro Lane widths and deck strengths come into play.
It is remarkable how much more even a Warrior is strategically mobile than a C2. Ideally I would like everything to fit on an ISO container flat rack, but I suspect that is going a bit far in compromising capability…
@IXION
The problem comes when a medium weight tank bumps into a heavyweight MBT. Then heavy armour gives a very worrying advantage. If you need to flank him to get killshots into his side armour, whereas he can simply put you out from whatever angle, then he has an incredible advantage in the conditions for winning. Same as the soldier analogy you put up. If he’s under cover, you have to set up a base of fire, send a fireteam to flank him and finally do an assault rush on his position, all the while worrying that his shots don’t hit, because if it does, you might be trading lives for a life. Lots of effort, lots of risk. A tank simply drives over him.
I do agree MBTs are a pain logistically, but it’s all about trade-offs. Light, air mobile, logistically convenient but with weaker armour and weapons or Heavy, road/rail/ship bound, logistical hogs with heavy armour and heavy guns. You can’t have everything. Honestly, if you can get a light, air mobile, logistically convenient tank with heavy armour and a big gun with a good price, I’d say you’re well on your way to becoming a rich man.
Right tool for the right job. Against top of the line MBTs, another MBT is the safest. For scouting and quick reaction, CVR(T). Not to say MBTs are not a pain. For either side.
@ The Other Chris
How come the MOD have managed to deploy RE Trojan AVRE’s to Afghanistan.
The non-deployment of Cr2 and As90, has to be a political one. Tony Blair vetoed the deployment of the RA’s MLRS Regiments to Kuwait for GW2, because he thought they were to “Terrible a Weapon”!
If the Canadian and Danish have managed to deploy successfully their Leopard 2′s, I’m sure we could have put have a Cr2 detachment into Helmand as well.
As a really really funny aside, during the 90s, Singapore did a few studies to determine what direction weapons and equipment development should take for the next generation. One of the problems faced was that our infantry heli-mobile forces were too lightly armed/armoured for setting up an airhead (don’t laugh, it’s the actual term. lol), given time, an enemy could concentrate armour against them and overrun their AO, which means you can kiss goodbye to your battalion.
One of the experiments tried was to pallet drop an AMX-13 scout tank from a C-130. After setting up a drop zone, the theory was to parachute the tank down to give the infantry some armoured support. The landing broke the suspension of the tank. Project shelved.
The final evalution was to give up airborne armour as a lost cause, instead concentrating on boosting firepower to compensate, which evolved into 3 strains.
1) Milan ATGMs for the infantry (OTS, so no worries there)
2) Spike ATGM/120mm motar equiped heli-borne light strike vehicles
3) Heli-borne 155mm artillery
The Russians tried airdropping tanks too I think. They were more successful because they used retro-rockets + parachutes.
Observer
And there is the cause of my agnosticism!
Once upon a time I would have gone on the attack over the assertion that in effect ‘That extra 20 tons of armour really is needed’.
However far to many people who have been there and done it believe it does for me to be so cavalier! I still would like to see some work/study/ analysis dealing with these questions:-
Given the need for mobile armoured visual range fire support,medium armour, is concentrating on the armour V armour issue really helpful?
Can we give a lighter vehicle the protection to counter and the armament (not necessarily a 120mm long gun), to tackle REALISTICALLY, in normal combat terms the conventional MBT.
It’s a bit like my argument with the boys in dark blue that they tend to have a role which needs doing so they seem start from the – what kind of kit do we need to put on a frigate/ destroyer to do that? Rather than ask ‘do we need a frigate or destroyer to do that’?
Army reasoning = We need armour to tackle MBTs, so what kind of MBT do we need to do that?
Simon 257
They equally might not be there because of cost. – Back to my chocolate Chally 2…
Ixion
Unfortunately, Sad but True.
When GKN Sankey designed the Warrior. Didn’t they propose a variant fitted with a 105mm Gun or something similar, for close support work?
I dont know why they are not there. It is interesting that the US doesn’t seem to have MBTs in Helmand either. The Danes operate in an AO with plenty of desert so they have a good roam. I can see arguments for and against to be honest. The main benefit the MBTs bring are their optics. But you don’t need a monster MBT just to mount good optics.
And to be honest, we massively overmatch the Taliban as it is fire power wise. I think the effects in terms of firepower would be marginal and confined to small areas.
Phil
and
Simon 257
Yes they did, and in the era of 60,000 T/whatevers due to come storming over the German plains, it was received with a thunderous silence.
I still thing the 105 light gun is man enough for most visual fire support jobs, and commonality makes it shoe in for the job. If the abbot could carry it so could a low profile warrior hull. and ammunition commonality would be a big help – no new calibres etc. stick a box of some serious anti tank missiles on it and it would do 90% of what we actually use tanks for an a big chunk less cost. It’s the other 10% that I worry about.
There we go then! Like I say I can see that there could be some logical arguments for leaving them at home. And with ROE they don’t add quite as much as you’d think in firepower as you might think. I would like to see the official reason why they aren’t there though.
Ixion
It’l be better than your Chocolate Chally though?
@Phil: the official reason would be “they are not needed”, followed by the swift scrubbing of those MOD articles about how helpful the Dane’s were being with their tanks.
Unofficially, it’s probably more that the light infantry mafia would prefer to give the impression that tanks are obsolete, and a CR2 squadron might puncture that impression
The Danish tanks (called Alpha Troop if you’re interested) operate in the old NES(N) AO around Gereshk, I’m not aware of how often they move out of that area. But seeing as NES(N) was a combined DA, GBR AO with DA lead then the tanks were employed as per the AOs CO as fit. We used them a few times and they’d nearly always escort the CLPs to the FOB but they couldn’t use the bridge and stayed out in the desert on overwatch.
Unless they can get up onto elevated terrain they are not useful in the most kinetic areas which are areas of fields and compounds. Useful out in the desert but then we had or have a Sqn of CVRT out there around Route 601 doing a job the Danes have no equivalent vehicle with which to do it with and so use Leapords.
I’m agnostic really as to the utility of CR2 in Helmand. Useful in the desert but has only marginal firepower advantages over CVRT or Warrior and next to useless in built up terrain given the ROEs and hearts and mind stuff which tend to take a beating when you drive 70 tons of armoured beast over 54 villages yearly income.
Hmm… wonder if the desire for heavier armour is reflective of sensitivity to troop losses. The Danes have never lost personel at the rate/numbers that some other countries are used to. So maybe we’re looking at it backwards, the heavy armour isn’t there to defeat the enemy but to provide a safer working environment for their troops.
@IXION
Despite the road to greater firepower as compensation for lack of armour, one thing still bugs me. The concept was never given a live fire test. 2 of the 3 solutions were ATGMs, and IIRC, a CR2 was pelted by dozens of anti-tank rockets without cracking in GWII, including a MILAN, so there is a serious chance that it might not work. If ATGMs can’t cut it, there’s only the 155mm left, and that’s an artillery piece, not an anti-tank gun. It’s the best we could come up with for the air mobile side, but it might not be enough. The main body of the army got the Leo2s for an mutual MBT headbutting if it devolves to that, it’s the forward deployed guys that get screwed if their anti-MBT measures don’t work.
For Afganistan though, unless the Taliban somehow got a squadron of MBTs over the border, I’d say using CVR(T)s is pretty safe. And if they did get MBTs over the border, killing them would be the least of your problems, CAS can handle them, the border loophole would be a greater worry.
@Phil
“I’m agnostic really as to the utility of CR2 in Helmand. Useful in the desert but has only marginal firepower advantages over CVRT or Warrior.”
Would you care to explain that comment in a little mpore detail, young man? 120 mm versus 30 mm. Only “marginal advantages”? Seems a no brainer to me.
I’m not even sure that I agree with your comment about their next to uselessness in built-up terrain? Can understand it if you think that Helmand is a very special case because of “hearts and minds” etc. but as a general principle, MBTs are considered invaluable in urban “FIBUA”-type situations, aren’t they? The Russians found that out to their cost as far back as the Second World War, when they sent infantry into urban situations without armoured support and came to the conclusion that they needed far more of an “all-arms” approach.
Personally I think it comes from having an AO that includes a good bit of desert and not having large numbers of other types of AFVs like Maistiff or CVRT.
I know 120mm is a big gun, but its effectiveness against what amounts to light infantry is marginal over 30mm HE, Javelin, 40mm GMG, mortar, GMLRS, air support and other weapon systems, especially when you add in the fact that the 120mm is severely restricted in its usage and is effectively useless across a lot of the terrain because it cannot be bought to bare without driving over crops and fields and churning up the countryside.
To cover the areas CR2 would be useful in we have Mastiff, CVRT and WARRIOR which already have good optics and have overwhelming firepower advantages over the Taliban as is. And Mastiff arguably offers as much IED protection as an MBT for all intents and purposes.
You’re fighting light infantry Mike. Armed at best with RPGs. The suite of weapons out there now can smash that threat to bits ten times over. And in areas CR2 can’t reach or bring its firepower to bear on. You’re thinking in absolute terms. Which is incorrect.
We have hundreds of vehicles that are well armoured against RPGs and also IEDs that have more than enough firepower to defeat the threat and can go places CR2 can’t. Just his much value would CR2 add? Other than in the hard on length of Internet fan bois?
And don’t call me young man. I’m not young anymore.
I think that at a basic level the desire for the additional 20 tonnes of armour comes from the idea that the user is sitting in a metal box full of propellant and high explosive and people will be shooting it with the biggest guns they can get their hands on. If that 20 tonnes can give the user some confidence then you get a more effective unit.
If you could afford to tailor your vehicle to suit the situation it is deployed in then that could be valuable. A 40t base vehicle that can be expanded to 70t depending on the situation would be good.
Modular armour, distributed and modular powerplants on a hybrid drive system, fuel tanks to match the powerplants, use different charges in the gun to stress the platform less depending on the all-up weight. Maybe have different length gun barrels, change the stowage capacity (smaller charges when you are not going tank-on-tank, fewer main armament rounds but more co-ax)
It should be possible to use this modularity to use some of the same systems such as drive train, motors and powerplants to create similarly sized and modular APCs, IFVs RRVs or whatever other TLAs may be required.
And Mike. I’m talking about Helmand. Yes in FIBUA where full use can be made of that 120mm HE lobber then yes, MBTs are very welcome indeed.
@Phil: the Canadians reported getting good use out of Leo I and II in forcing their way into compounds and over obstacles via main gun or just weight
But yes, of limited use in Helmand. Kandahar, another matter I suspect
I don’t doubt the efficacy of the MBT when the context allows its advantages to be exploited fully.
You’re really talking assault guns or infantry tanks here, not tanks / main battle tanks.
There’s no essential difference.
Phil
Thanks for the interesting replies.
“And Mike. I’m talking about Helmand.”
Yes’ I thought you were talking about that specific context from your previous comments. Your point about fighting light infantry is well taken, as is the following point: “I know 120mm is a big gun, but its effectiveness against what amounts to light infantry is marginal over 30mm HE, Javelin, 40mm GMG, mortar, GMLRS, air support and other weapon systems”.
However, I don’t think that I was wrong to think/argue in absolute terms. Although he gave specific examples of the use of the tank in various campaigns, the main thrust of TD’s post was about the use and future of the MBT in a broad, general sense, wasn’t it?
Sorry about the use of the appellation “young man”! I’m so used to playful badinage, that I forget sometimes that it does not amuse in some cases.
No it’s fine really it was just me misinterpreting your tone.
I broadly agree with TD. The MBT is a useful weapon when used correctly but they are no panacea and Helmand shows how their efficacy can be limited by the context they have to operate in.
As to tank vulnerability in the future to ATGWs. Used properly in concentrations and with combined arms I think enough will survive to be useful. When thinking about how vulnerable they are we must again take in the context, combat is incredibly costly to the attacker and taking heavy losses doesn’t necessarily mean the concept is bad just that such losses are intrinsic and inevitable.
Phil
“As to tank vulnerability in the future to ATGWs. Used properly in concentrations and with combined arms I think enough will survive to be useful.”
I’m not so far removed from that opinion myself. Of course, in the absence of ATGWs held by the opposition (admittedly a situation not likely to be encounted that often), I would imagine that in a tank on tank battle, sophisticated Western MBT like the Challlenger 2 would be more than enough to see off opposition MBTs, which in most of the contingencies or conflicts we are likely to encounter, would certainly be inferior vehicles. We are not likely to encounter Leopard 2s or M1s.
In fact, there was a skirmish (not much publicised) between about a dozen Challlengers and some Iraqi tanks somewhere south of Baghdad. There were only about a dozen Challengers involved but they routed the greater number of opposition tanks in next to no time. I wish I could find the reference to it but do not have the time tonight.
And what about the sheer ability of something of the size and power of the Challenger to instill public order in a situation? Apparently in Iraq, the mere sight of a large MBT positioned at a crossroads was often enough to bring about such order.
It depends. CR2 on the attack against dug in enemy MBTs will take probably heavy losses. It’s the nature of the attack against a broadly peer enemy sadly.
I know about the skirmish but I believe that it turned out the Iraqi tanks were probably not manned.
As for tanks being intimidating. It’s a one shot thing suitable only for the general public in a public order scenario. It wouldn’t take long for the effect to wear off and the enemy to start trying to crawl over the things or move about under the MBTs arcs if it did not have support.
I really can’t see the role for a big, heavy, well armoured, well armed, mobile battle wagon diminishing for a very long time indeed. It combines what you need on the battlefield, a dirty great big death machine combining endurance, weight and fire-power that is just looking for half a chance to kill you in a number of nasty ways.
Mount a flamethrower on a CR2 and you have a monster FIBUA, fortified bunker weapon.
Phil
A great reply. Thanks very much.
“I really can’t see the role for a big, heavy, well armoured, well armed, mobile battle wagon diminishing for a very long time indeed.”
Well, that’s re-assuring! I thought from the way you were arguing thatyour views were rather different from that!
Flamethrowers are against the Geneva convention, aren’t they? (Although I’ve no doubt that, if a major European war were ever to break out again, they would be used.)
Sorry, no more time tonight but the exchanges have been most interesting.
“Phil says:
October 29, 2012 at 20:43
There’s no essential difference.”
OMG.
I thought mankind had left that idea behind decades ago.
The differences are huge. It’s late, so only a short list:
* importance of road range is different
* importance of fire on the move is different
* importance of automotive reliability is different
* importance of ability to cross bridges is different
* importance of automated target pattern detection or automated target tracking features is different
* importance of rate of fire is vastly different
* importance of ammunition load is different
* importance of traverse is different
MBTs need to be suitable for mobile warfare, while assault guns / infantry tanks do not need to be so. The demands placed on an assault gun-like tank can be satisfied by a Centurion with improvised slat armour.
The demands placed on a MBT on the other hand can -depending on doctrine – exceed even what a Challenger2 is capable of.
A peer enemy would not kill tanks from the ground in such a case he who has air dominance wins. That’s why it’s unlikely we’ll ever see a peer tank on tank engagement. It’s why we bought apache and brimstone after all.
If you want to smash the defences of an enemy country, hit it with Tomahawk/Storm Shadow cruise missiles, then laser guided bombs, followed by Apache gunships,MLRS & 155mm artillery, but to prove to the regime & inhabitants that they are conquered, you need your tanks on the lawn of their presidential palace, like the Vietcong did in Saigon in 1975, with T54/55.
(Is that sentance longer?).
There is no point in having some super wonder weapon stuck in Britain. You need something deployable. The Vickers Mk3M, 39 tons, 105mm gun, or EE-2 Osorio, 44 tons, 120mm gun. A modern version of these would be good. Medium armour by itself is vulnerable, but if backed up by helicopter gunships, it is pretty much unstoppable.
NVA not VC.
@ Mike W
“MBTs are considered invaluable in urban “FIBUA”-type situations, aren’t they? The Russians found that out to their cost as far back as the Second World War, when they sent infantry into urban situations without armoured support and came to the conclusion that they needed far more of an “all-arms” approach.”
I thought built up areas was one of the main places you didn’t want to put your tank?
It would depend on situation and doctrine, as like all things. Some countries would throw the tank in to provide mobile cover for infantry moving in (Israel), some would go infantry 1st with tanks as mobile support guns (Most western countries), and of course, it would all depend on the amount of anti-tank weapons the enemy has.
@SO
Siege tank (/Assault gun) and cruiser tank (/Tank destroyer) is a very, very old classification system that went out of use with the MBT since they combine the broadly similar firepower of the siege tank with the 105/120mm gun and the cruising capabilities of the cruiser tank. Don’t think any army has ever created a new assault gun in decades, maybe even before the Vietnam War. The closest thing I can think of to a modern siege tank are CEVs with their monster demolition gun (usually 165mm IIRC), but that is a demolition vehicle, not infantry support. An MBT firing HESH is enough to make life living hell for any infantry in fortifications. Having the wall you’re hiding behind start spewing high velocity rock shards is never good news.
Was watching that series ‘Our War’ earlier.
I think those guys (Welsh Guards) might have enjoyed a bit of Challenger fire support. With their sat comms busted they had no way of communicating back to next echelon of command to call in air support or even helicopters.
Having challengers close by would have made a hell of a difference for those guys. With the ability provide precision 120mm fires, two additional medium machine guns and the ability to act as a moving bullet magnet during their casualty extraction, not to mention the ability to lay covering smoke would have gone a long way.
I’ve worked with soldiers who have seen service in Iraq post-invasion and they couldn’t speak highly enough of the Challenger. HESH rounds being used to demolish structures (the shockwave carries through simple buildings and almost literally shakes them to pieces) being used as firing points was a common story, as was using APFSDS rounds to hit targets behind thick walls that even 30mm rounds from an Apache couldn’t penetrate.
The firepower argument has to be put in perspective. Is a 120mm HESH round as effective as a 155mm artillery round? Maybe, maybe not. But the HESH round can be fired with a degree of precision that the 155 cannot. It can be called for using short range radios or even hand signals, and has a much quicker reaction time, while achieveing a high degree of persistence, plus the ability to add additional machine gun fire when needed, fire that almost cannot be suppressed by the insurgents.
Provided you got enough Challengers to assign 2 per infantry patrol, and that infantry isn’t going to go through gullies or alleys.
I can forsee the counter argument though. Wouldn’t a Warrior firing 30mm give the same effect seeing as the opposition doesn’t have much to effectively counter tanks? Worst case, you drive closer before letting lose a burst of rounds.
Don’t get me wrong, I’m pro-MBT, more or less, but they do have a point in terms of effectiveness. If the enemy can’t shoot through either Warrior or Challenger armour, then killing them is just a matter of driving to the right location.
You’d have to ration the tanks – in no less than troop size – to the areas decided to be in most need and where the effect was most useful. Realistically, if you’re sending Challengers you’re probably sending Warriors as well, as opposed to an either/or situation. So it’s not a case of “do we send this or that asset”, it’s a case of sending all the assets you can afford to spare, rotations considered.
Much of the combat operations appear to be taking place in relatively flat terrain, but that’s one of the things I’d assume they’d look into as to who gets what assets.
Not sure a 30mm cannon is going to deliver the same effect as a 120mm round though.
Chris I don’t disagree that a CR2 would have helped their immediate situation but as I have said the trouble is they can’t get to a lot of the most kinetic areas without literally destroying the infrastructure and land. Even TDs example shows the DA tanks were placed on high ground. That can’t always happen and even then the insurgent can still find cover. Iraq was far more urban and had fat better roads and CR2 was consequently far more mobile and far more useful. Also Iraqi weapons were potentially a lot more of a threat to AFVs.
Instead of CR2 we have hundreds of other AFVs with weapon suites more than capable of smashing the enemy along with mortars, GMLRs, air support, Apache and EXACTOR. 2009 was a different environment. Arguably CR2 would have been more useful then when we cared less about hearts and minds and had less infrastructure in place.
SO whatever your theoretical distinctions and definitions the fact is the world has left those concepts far behind. A modern MBT is useful enough
@Mick 346
“I thought built up areas was one of the main places you didn’t want to put your tank?”
Hi, Mick. Are you using “your” as a possessive adjective referring to my personal opinion? Or are you perhaps using it impersonally, referring to a more generally received opinion among experts or others?
If it is the former, in which particular sentence have I expressed that view? I can see none. The view that armour should not be a part of an all-arms approach to urban warfare is one I certainly do not hold.
OK, not a tank, but for infantry support in places like Afghanistan, I think it a shame we do not have a few updated 16 ton Abbots with their 105mm guns.
Send in just AFVs you’re looking at annihilation. Send in just infantry you’re looking at very, very heavy casualties indeed. Send in both into urban terrain in a fight you’re just looking at very heavy casualties for both.
Chris, I watched that on the Welsh Guards last night as well, not wanting to divert the thread but I thought the guys were really thoughtful and eloquent and conveyed perfectly what they experienced. What struck me equally though was the way in which the big old Army machine let them down, nothing to do with the friction of war, nothing to do with bad luck and nothing to do with risk.
Shit comms from the multi billion pound BOWMAN programme, lack of spares for basic items like antenna cables, being stuck out in the ulu with no clear objective, no ability to look beyond their immediate area and poor life support in the PB
I know this was a couple of years ago but whilst we can afford multi billion pound programmes like Typhoon, JCA, CVF and FRES the poor infantry get the shitty end of the budget stick
Abbots would have precisely the same problems.
There is a perfectly good way of delivering suppression and precision fires in Helmand: Apache. Expensive as hell but c’est la guerre.