This is a five part series on the A400M Atlas transport aircraft
Part 1 – Background, Progress and Keeping and Options
Part 2 – What is So Good about the A400M Anyway?
Part 3 – Beyond Tomorrow, a Multi Role Platform
Part 5 – Say Hello to my Little Brother
If you look at the Think Defence Archives (click here) the very first post I published on the site was called; Are We the Only People that Like the A400
It’s not a very well written post with a number of errors and a massive 12 comments, interestingly, ArmChairCivvy, Mark, X and Richard Stockley were amongst them. Those four are still regularly commenting on Think Defence, wow, have to say thanks guys! For an even bigger laugh, pop over to a 2009 post on A400 predictions or another in 2010.
Since I started writing on Think Defence I have been a consistent supporter of the aircraft despite it being subject to as much scrutiny and negativity as the F35 Joint Strike Fighter.
The history of the A400M should be required reading for those wishing to enter multilateral and ambitious development programmes. There is no doubt that the A400 was ambitious; with the benefit of hindsight, developing a new aircraft with every imaginable modern feature and a new record breaking engine at the same time was risky. Giving this mammoth development programme to a company with a modest track record in developing large military airlifters and who were also developing other innovative aircraft (the Airbus A380) added to that risk.
That basket of risks have come to be realised and combined to produce the inevitable delays and cost inflation that equally have resulted in expensive stop gap measures, reductions in numbers ordered and a softening of the original specifications.
The development and test programme continues apace and despite a blip this week when Airbus announced a couple of months delay due to engine problems, the direction of travel is plainly obvious.
Civil certification, water ingestion, soft field operations, air despatch, equipment loading, high altitude, icing, in-flight refuelling, hot and high operations and myriad of other items on the to do list are being slowly ticked and indications are that for the most part, predicted performance seems to being validated by test.
Many people either fail or refuse to realise that a test and development programme will find faults, issues and problems; that being entirely the point. It has parallels with criticism of the Typhoon or F35.
First planned deliveries will commence next year with France being the launch customer. They will receive three and Turkey two. The following year will see a total of ten aircraft delivered including the first handful to the UK (MSN16) and Germany.
For entry into RAF service, the national training centre opens in 2014 and Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is planned for 2015 and set at three aircraft. Full Operating Capability (FOC) is planned for 2018 when twelve aircraft should be in service. 2018 is also the planned Full Operating Clearance milestone with the first aircraft being delivered with partial clearance.
From AIN Online
The first three aircraft will have IOC/entry-into-service (EIS) release, which allows them to operate as logistic transports. In 2013, the Service Operating Clearance (SOC) 1 will be released, providing initial aerial delivery capability. Subsequent releases will be SOC1.5 (2014: full aerial delivery and initial tanker), SOC2 (2015: enhanced tactical mission and additional performance), SOC2.5 (2017: enhanced tanker and search and rescue) and SOC3 (2018: low-level flight). Earlier aircraft will be brought up to later standards as appropriate. The IOC/EIS standard has no defensive aids subsystem (DASS), while a partial DASS is fitted to SOC1 and a full DASS implemented at SOC1.5.
The latest National Audit Office Major Projects Report stated that all 8 of the key Performance Measures are forecast to be met although performance against some of the defence lines of development were assessed as being likely to be met, but with some risk.
There are plenty of online sources that one can look at for the back story of the A400 with its political/industrial shenanigans but whilst not being in any way immune to the cost and delay issues this is an optimistic look at the aircraft itself, export potential, why it is perfect for the UK, possible alternatives and how the UK might use it going forward.
Have a nice video before I start
In no particular order
Contents
Would Additional C130 and C17 Have Made More Sense?
Many commenters and no doubt many in the services think the best outcome would have been a larger buy of C17’s beyond the eight we already have and a like for like replacement of the C130’s as they leave service, thus leaving the RAF with a three type Air Transport (AT) of the C130J, C17 and A330.
Simple maths dictates that for a given budget this would have resulted in more aircraft than the planned A400, C17 and A330 mix as planned. This is undoubtedly true if we were to use the A400M budget entirely for C130J’s and maybe a greater number of C17’s depending on how the budget cake was sliced.
As attractive as this proposition might appear on face value, more aircraft for the same money, I still don’t find the argument compelling or realistic.
That the C17 is hugely capable is not in doubt but we should not be blind to its issues either.
Operation austere conditions like in the video above is dependent on a number of factors such as load, altitude, runway length, surface load bearing factors (California Bearing Ratio), operating restrictions and whether one wishes to use the runway surface again or repeatedly. A USAF operation into Camp Rhinowas only able to support a small number of landings before heavy engineering plant (bought in by C17) was required to repair the surface for example.
When the RAF was operating the C17 under a lease, before they were purchased outright, all operations into such locations were prohibited by the terms and conditions.
11. However, under the terms of the lease the full capabilities of the C-17 will not be available and the aircraft can only be used as a strategic long-range transport, albeit with the ability to land on short runways. The C-17s will be restricted in operational use and their capability for para-drop, airdrop, rough field, low-level operations and air to air refuelling will not be used.
The reason for these restrictions is obvious, they add risk and cost and in the then commercial arrangements, those risks and costs would have been borne by Boeing and their finance provider. We are no longer leasing the aircraft but this simply means the MoD carries the risk and cost.
When the C17 does operate from these rough conditions it needs extensive inspection and maintenance, the USAF might be able to afford this but the RAF cannot.
Whilst more C17’s would never be a bad thing to routinely operate then in conditions that the C130 and A400 will be required to operate in is an expensive hobby and therefore, done only on an exception basis.
A turbofan aircraft like the C17 will display flight envelope issues for role, the reason most tactical transport aircraft use turboprops is because their drag allows them to decelerate rapidly at lower altitudes and thus perform a steep approach, flare and landing. Turbofan aircraft are much more limited in this respect and therefore less survivable in higher threat areas, i.e. exactly the environment the C130 or A400 will be required to operate in, if not all the time.
As we all know, pinning down the cost of individual items of military equipment if fraught with difficulties but piecing together various snippets it should be obvious that the C17 is very expensive to buy and operate, unlike the usual internet nonsense of quoting the very lowest price, usually without engines for example.
Boeing supports the RAF’s C-17s through the C-17 Globemaster III Sustainment Partnership, a performance-based logistics programme, at RAF Brize Norton, the RAF’s main operating base for strategic air transport and air-to-air refueling. This arrangement provides the RAF with the benefits of complete “virtual fleet” access and an extensive support network. The virtual fleet concept enables C-17 customers, especially those with smaller numbers of aircraft, to benefit from worldwide parts availability and economies of scale when purchasing materials, all good stuff.
In 2008 the estimated UK cost of participation in the GSP was $225 million for six aircraft and in 2010 the seven aircraft resulted in an estimated cost of $390 million. I have seen other figures which suggest a much lower prices, £44m for example, here
Purchase cost depends very much on the optional extras and how many you are buying. The ‘all option included’ price for 10 to India was reported at $.5.8 billion, Australia’s 4 at $2 billion and Kuwait’s1 at $690 million.
It should therefore be clear that the oft mooted $200m price for a C17 is way off the mark for export customers who would have other costs to consider A closer figure would be around $580 million or £360 million for an aircraft in a usable condition, fully supported or about £300m as a straightforward purchase.
Inserting C17′s into an already established user, like the UK for example, does mean the unit cost will be much lower. a recent Parliamentary Answer for example, puts the figure at around £200m but it is not clear whether this includes any government furnished equipment.
It is here that we enter the murky world of national and international defence economics, there have been one or two studies to suggest that buying from your own shop and not someone else’s can reduce the overall cost by as much as 30%. We should also note that the UK does not have a majority stake in the A400M but it is still significant nonetheless.
More C17’s would result in close to zero UK industrial participation and tax revenue, putting my Treasury hat on, that makes it more expensive to the public purse.
The National Audit Office 2011 Major Projects Report lists the A400M budgeted cost as £3.105 billion for 22 aircraft and associated items.
The programme cost is therefore, a very rough £141 million each.
But don’t forget those ‘associated items’ like training facilities and the economic benefits overall to the Treasury that will depress the unit price of the aircraft.
There is also the strategic industrial benefits of reducing dependence on the US and maintaining highly skilled jobs that can be used for other aeronautic projects.
Critics of the A400 point to the low $200m price of the C17 and compare its Wiki performance unfavourably to the A400 but there is more to it than that and in the real world, the C17 costs nowhere near $200 million either.
What about more C130’s?
The obvious trend in vehicle, equipment and engineering plant weight and size means that the C130 is becoming less able to move them and this problem will only be greater in the future.
As a means of countering this many point out that the majority of tactical transport loads are not vehicles or engineering plant but pallets of stores and personnel and for the rare occasions when the big stuff is needed the C17 can be used.
Looking at this alone puts the C130J in a much better light but as I have explained above the C17 is not as cheap or capable in the required conditions as the headlines would have us believe.
A tactical airlifter exists to move men, materials, vehicles and engineering plant, not just the first two. The Hercules has been overtaken by the reality of larger vehicles and engineering plant so no matter how cheap it is or how many you can combine for a large total payload if your single tactical airlifter type cannot lift the majority of your kit the rest doesn’t matter a jot.
Going down this road we condemn the forces to having to rely on a small number of very expensive C17’s to move outsize equipment by air and I do not think this is a desirable state for any number of reasons.
But even for this people and pallets requirement the A400 is actually very good as I will describe later in this series.
The RAF was the launch customer for the C130J and according to the National Audit Office Major Projects Report 2001, the 25 C130J’s cost the £1.049billion, or £42m each, but don’t forget, this excluded many systems that come as standard on the A400 and we would have ten years of defence inflation to tot up.
So
More C130’s, I think, is not a desirable option.
The last fundamental problem of binning the A400 and buying more C130/C17’s is a combination of political, industrial and economic reality.
The A400 programme will support 10,000 European jobs, a large, diverse and multi-national supply chain, billions in tax revenues and re-establishes European skills in large military aircraft/turboprop design, thus countering current US and Russian domination in the sector and potential challengers in China, India and Brazil.
The A400 makes perfect sense from a geo-industrial perspective.
Many people see industrial issues as either irrelevant to defence needs or if the word ‘Europe’ is involved automatically a bad thing. The former Labour Defence Minister, Lord Gilbert, was famous for calling the A400 a ‘Euro wanking make work programme’
He was of course correct in many ways and one might perhaps wonder what the in service date and final cost would have been should the original engine proposal from Pratt and Whitney been pursued but this is a spot of wishful thinking and somewhat naive.
So whilst detractors might point at the total programme cost of the A400, divide it by the production numbers and then take a sharp intake of breath the actual economic value has a bit more depth.
With the US being plain about desiring Europe to be more responsible for its own defence needs, especially in transport, air refuelling and ISR, the A400 will address a number of these concerns and if one looks at the military airlift capability available to European nations as a whole, post 2020, it will be very impressive indeed.
One does sometimes get the impression that the US wants Europe to have a greater military capability just as long as it buys the kit to do so from the US and I suspect that is the root cause of much of the criticism of the A400.
The A400M Atlas makes sense and is here to stay.
Keeping the C130 in Service
The A400M Atlas was nominally due to replace the C130K fleet but the SDSR indicated that all C130 variants will be out of service by 2022 as the Atlas comes into service. The original Out of Service Date for the C130J’s was 2030 but this was bought forward.
We are currently selling the C130K’s and with the C130J’s working flat out, the A400M Atlas is sorely needed.
It has been recently reported by Jane’s and others that the RAF has desires to keep some of the C130’s in service beyond their planned out of service date. The news reports indicated Special Forces concerns about size of the A400 and even the risk of tyre damage from unprepared operating runways.
That this is news should be newsworthy in itself as problems with the C130K Out of Service Date have been widely predicted for half a decade or more.
In 2008 the National Audit Office produced a very comprehensive report on the Hercules fleet including details of operating conditions and costs. It went into some detail about the process of bringing the C130J’s to a level of capability that would allow them to operate in the SF role by virtue of participating in the international C130J Block 7.0 upgrade programme and transferring selected items of equipment such as the advanced DAS from the existing C130K’s (C3) under Project Hermes, page 29if you fancy a read.
The Block 7.0 upgradeincludes a range of improvements such as instrumented flying civil certification, Link 16, improvements to short field performance and avionics and was to start in 2011 but with technical delays from Lockheed Martin this is not likely to be completed until after 2013 and is currently in flight testing. The Block 7.0 upgrade was cost shared amongst the C130J operators.
With the delays to the A400M Atlas and an uncertain funding pathway for this work the NAO recognised it as a significant risk to operations.
The issue surfaced again in April this year with a Defense Newspiece describing how some of the C130K’s would be retained in service whilst the C130J’s were being upgraded.
Britain’s Royal Air Force may delay taking its C-130K Hercules special-forces fleet out of service for at least a year while it waits for a delayed upgrade of the newer J variant.
The last of the Hercules K fleet was to exit service by the end of the year, but sources said that’s unlikely to happen. The availability of a vital upgrade to allow the J version to fully take on the special forces role will not be ready until at least 2013.
One Ministry of Defence source said the RAF could decide to retain maybe five or six of the K fleet for special-forces work while getting rid of the rest.
In the RAF’s C130K fleet were two variants, the C1 and C3. The C3 was a stretched version with the C.3P’s (a sub variant) equipped for in-flight refuelling. Another sub variant was the C.3A that was fitted with a range of defensive aids equipment, avionics and other equipment, there were 6 of these conversions.
HERCULES C3A XV304
There are only a handful of C130K’s left in service and they look as if they are up for sale
This is a convergent set of risks and timing issues caused by delays in both the C130 and A400 programmes.
As reported by the NAO and others, the existing C130J is sub-optimal in the Special Forces role until Block 7.0 is in service but this is not due until 2013 at the earliest and this assumes the RAF can make C130J airframes available for the upgrade work whilst still maintaining operational commitments, especially as one considers the likely uplift in demand as the Afghanistan withdrawal process begins.
The simple fact is the RAF’s C130′s are working flat out but hamstrung, as are all the services, by tight as a piano string support arrangements. The maintainers have to perform daily miracles and the problem with any of these aspirations is the back office support infrastructure.
The C130K can and does fulfil the SF role but they are due out of service this year. With plans already advanced to do this including training, aircrew and maintenance draw-downs it might not be possible, or at least very difficult and expensive, to keep them in service until beyond 2013 when the C130J Block 7.0 and Project Hermes work might be complete.
The A400 can’t help; even the A400’s planned Initial Operating Capability (IOC) will be after the Afghanistan withdrawal, let alone Full Operating Capability (FOC)
With memories of the Chinook HC3 fresh in the MoD’s mind there seems to be little desire to go outside the international C130J block upgrade programme and contract with industry for a stop gap or hybrid C130J. Marshall Aerospace have recently been certified to replace C130 centre wing box sections, the only company other than Lockheed Martinto be accredited to do so and this might be significant in any decision making.
The MoD disposals website linked above shows both the C1 and C3 variant being for sale, how significant this is one can only wonder.
It could indicate that the decision on keeping the C130K’s (C1 and C3) has already been made, they are gone.
This would leave the sub-optimal C130J’s for the SF mission until the upgrade work potentially completes and then when A400 comes into service.
Alternatives might include borrowing or leasing from others or asking Mr UOR for a hand; then of course there is always the ‘capability holiday’ option.
If the C130J upgrade goes to plan they will be in service for less than a decade so the final block upgrade that the USAF have just contracted Lockheed Martin to develop would seem rather unlikely to find itself in service with the RAF.
It is easy to be critical of the MoD here; they have known for half a decade of the problem and on face value, have sleep walked into a crisis by failing to implement mitigation measures. The MoD makes its own decisions on funding priorities and has self-evidently decided to allocate funds to other projects.
That said it, is equally easy to sympathise, they have been faced with delays that are not of its making and the existing fleet was and is being worked to death on operations. What could they have done, withdraw aircraft from operations in order to upgrade them outside of the Block Upgrade programme?
One can just imagine the headlines.
We are where we are though and if the MoD disposals site is an indicator of no more C130K’s then the C130J’s are just going to have to make do.
Beyond 2022, by which time the C130J will be out of service, will the A400 be a worthy successor in the special-forces role?
There have been several reports indicating that the A400 Atlas is on the large side for the SF role and the users want to retain the C130J. This would leave the RAF with a C130J, A400m, C17 and A330 transport fleet instead of the A400, C17 and A330.
It is difficult to argue against the position of those with custody of the requirement but one of the reported problems with the A400 compared to the C130J for the Special Forces role is its size, presumably for getting into and out of small landing strips in exotic locations, turning for the return journey and perhaps weight or low flying issues.
Comparing dimensions of the A400 and C130J (not the stretch version) the wingspan difference is less than 5% or 2m. The height difference is under 3m or 20% but would this be significant? The big difference is length, at 45m the A400 is 15m or nearly 20% longer than the standard C130J although this falls to less than 15% for the J30 stretch. Again, would the length difference necessarily be a barrier to operating in smaller locations, not entirely sure?
Ground turning circles, silhouette, low flying ability, approach angles, conspicuousness or perhaps there are other reasons but the A400 has much to offer the Ninja in many other areas that would presumably be advantageous, ability to operate in civilian airspace (altitude and speed) for example or the obvious ones of payload and range.
Perhaps the main advantage for the C130 in the SF role is its ubiquity, this means interoperability with our principal allies, reduction in support costs and higher availability when operating away from main operating bases. This might be a large or small issue depending on one’s world view and predictions for where, and more importantly, with whom we will be doing the secret ninja stuff.
As ever, swings and roundabouts but If the C130J is to be retained in service just for SF use the user will have to demonstrate a very robust case to overcome the cost, industrial and political barriers.
The Sea Hercules
If the Special Forces community can make a strong case for retaining a small number of C130J’s in service then that would add to the argument for the Sea Hercules.
At the 2012 Singapore Air Show Lockheed Martin unveiled the ‘Sea Herc’ concept that would use the C130J and combine it with a range of sensors and palletised mission systems taken from the P3.
In the second video above Jim Grant from Lockheed Martin mentions the UK, clearly the Sea Hercules is aimed squarely at being a Nimrod replacement, even as an interim.
The SDSR acknowledged some risk in cancelling the MRA4 and the MoD has been investing in the Seedcorn initiative to retain airborne maritime patrol and ASW skills. Jed and I have looked at maritime patrol quite a few times including this detailed recent post. I didn’t consider a conversion or new build Hercules in that particular post but it is an interesting option in and amongst a whole sea of others.
A number of factors would need to be considered;
If this would be an interim, what would ultimately be the objective and do we actually need an interim anyway?
Would sufficient airframes be available in serviceable condition for the conversion?
How much would a conversion be including work to refurbish the existing fleet, or elements of it?
Would it offer a capability that is better and/or cheaper than the many alternatives?
The palletised mission system is also attractive because it provides some measure of flexibility to re-role as needed. It would not likely be swapped out often but good nevertheless.
I do like the notion of reusing what we already have and the C130J has a mature supply chain but I also like the idea of reducing equipment types, ‘ruthless commonality’ being one of my favourite concepts.
Perhaps a small fleet that could be used for both SF and maritime patrol could be justified but the likelihood of a new buy would seem remote which means an upgrade/relief of the existing battered C130J fleet.
This would also mean absorbing the cost of future upgrades to the C130J (Block 8.0) and maintaining a completely different aircraft.
Parts 2, 3 and 4 to follow
Am I right in thinking Luftwaffe A400M will be built to a higher standard than those for the RAF?
Thanks to you too TD for continued construction of interesting articles. Hadn’t realized that was your first post cant believe it was that long ago. I look fwd to reading the coming chapters.
Picking up on a couple of points. Turbofan engines can have difficultly with FOD on rough strip landings. Also there was a change to the low level terrain navigation system on a400m. It now uses the Goodrich TERPROM system as seen on c130 which I believe may be of particular interest to the SF community. A400m will get in and out of c130 sized strips (but not at anywhere near its all up weight) certain german inspired spec’s make sure of that but physical size may mean visually its harder to disguise.
The risk to airbus was really 3 fold. This was the first time the company had done a turbo prop a/c, it was the first time a carbon fibre wing had been put on a large aircraft resulting in a number of firsts and technical challenges and the turbo prop itself is the largest and most powerful ever developed and all this with a pretty stretched workforce.
Nice article TD!
Seen as the Luftwaffe want to get rid of a few of their airframes shortly after they enter service could the RAF perhaps snap these up second hand as a way of boosting it’s dwindling numbers?
I’ve just clicked on the link to TD archives – OMG!
“TD
Perhaps another reason for SF preference for the C130 is they are in service all over the world. To the untrained observer or even slightly trained 1 C130 looks the same as another.
I am sure we can all work out how that may be beneficial for Sf Ops.
Hmmm, still not convinced by the A400.
I wonder how much of an issue the rough field performance of the C-17 really is. I mean how often do we actually require it to “go austere” and put down in the dirt? For me that’s normally the sort of job you would just delegate down to the C-130.
And the simple fact is, the C-17 represents a much greater capability in terms of payload and range.
If SDSR is carried through the UK is going to end up with 8 C-17, 22? A400′s and then a big hole until you get down to the CH-47′s.
It won’t matter much while operations remain in the ‘stabilisation/pearce keeping’ mode but it could get interesting if you run up against anything more demanding.
The RAAF out here will soon operate C-17(6), C-130J(12) and 10 C-27′s. The figures are quite stark. the C-130 can get into around 500 airfields in our area of interest, the C-27 can get into double of that number. Your bottom is looking a bit exposed.
Hi TD,
Great article and nice to see someone putting a positive spin on the A400M. I remember when they were developing the C17 and the comments were much the same. Its too expensive, too small for strategic lift too big for tactical and its generally crap. Now its the best thing since sliced bread.
I like the idea of a combined use Sea Herc with SF C130J but I agree with your assessment given the draw down from the stan there just are not going to be enough spare airframes. Op’s in the stan rightly take precedence over everything else. If we are talking new build C130J’s for the MPA role then we may as well go with a P8 as I can’t see there being much in the price.
Could the C27J Spartan not be a better option for SF. I know some where they are being sold off for cheap.
I think one capability that is over looked with the A400M by the RAF is AAR. I think it would have been much better to just simply buy 6 or 7 A330 Voyagers then increase the buy for the A400M buy 8 or 10 of the AAR kits as a reserve AAR capability.
@ Aussie – I would agree with you. However I am not sure why but the US has now gone cold on C27J. Does anyone know why?
Oh, I have no doubt that the A400 could finish in some form. It is really little different in concept to the An-70 and if the Ukrainians can bring that to accomplishment with skeleton funding, it seems clear using the combined powers of Europe the A400 can be finished.
And I do agree there is a niche for a medium transport aircraft in this class.
But the An-70/A400M tragicomedy is one of the reasons I really don’t like the A400M. At the moment, it seems that between A400M fighting through waves of minor and major technical problems and An-70 fighting through waves of financial problems, they’ll both struggle bloody to the finish line at more or less the same time (2013).
Unless you want to nitpick something like the sophistication of the flight software, it is difficult to see what the A-400 does that the An-70 doesn’t or couldn’t. The An-70 can certainly lift ~10 more tons (or is it 15?), which is actually a major threshold breaker because it means Russian style tanks can load. It isn’t quite so bad for the Brits but the AS90 SPH is one piece of equipment that can go on a Antonov and not on a A400. For the Germans, there’s oh, their Puma IFV – it squeezes on the A400 if you take the additonal armor off first (unless of course the news that it can now lift only 29t is true) but you can leave it on for a An-70.
If only Europe actually was willing to make peace with the Eastern bloc with real gestures, all of Europe (remember, Russia and the Ukraine are actually part of Europe) could have had these capabilities, for a much lower price (which equates to beneficial shockwaves throughout the entire very tight defence budget, I must add!), something like 10 years ago! There will still be plenty of jobs for both West and East Europe, making it correct from the “geo-industrial” perspective.
For the point of political vulnerability, I’ll only say this. The West places great emphasis to arrange things (sometimes at huge cost) so it won’t have to care what the Russians think. There is minimal emphasis on arranging things so the Russians care what the West thinks. Then we wonder why the Russians don’t cooperate on Syria, Libya, Iran … etc.
US went cold on c-27 was due to a poor op valuation which suggested additional spend to put things right and it’s high cost of ownership for a limited capability that may of course be political but it’s the reasons that appeared.
If you want a small transport cn-295 in the Istar or sf role perhaps. Cheaper than refurbing herc or buying and owning c27.
Martin, the US offered up the C-27 as the USAF squeesed the US Army out of the C-27 program, and ended up with a ‘little’ aircraft they didn’t want. The air national guard ended up with it.
When the pre-sequestion cuts ($450B) came along the USAF had to had to cut somewhere and the aircraft wasn’t defended by either Lockheed or Boeing.
However Congress is still playing around with the cuts the DOD put forward (C-27, Block 30 Global Hawks, early CG47′s)so I am not sure what the final answer was.
@arkhangelsk, you won’t get many arguements on here about eastern equipment. To date i can recall praise for An-124,MI-26,SU-34 as well as the An-70, which has an engine that puts out 3000 more horsepower without the problems the A400 has had with it’s 10,000 engine.
However if i remember rightly (must check wiki), didn’t the germans make a serious bid for the 70, only getting knocked back as antonov wanted to build solely in the ukraine and the germans wanted to assemble in germany. I feel a cut and paste coming on!
In October 1997, the German defence minister Volker Rühe announced the intention to study whether the An-70 could be the basis for the FLA/Airbus A400M. Evaluation was in competition with the newly-designed, paper-only A400M proposed by Airbus Military Company. The An-70 participation in the 1998-2000 tender process for the FLA was very successful and was the best bid from a financial, technical and operational point of view.[citation needed] The plane was checked thoroughly by MBB Munich, and presented to Air Transport Command in Cologne after Le Bourget airshow in 1999.[citation needed] However, for political reasons and under pressure both from the newly founded EADS company and the French government, the A400M was selected for the FLA.[citation needed] The French claimed that their projected Airbus A400M, although more expensive, would have lower life cycle costs (LCCs) than the An-70. Antonov lost this opportunity to sell its An-70 to Western European nations.
No mention of the location of the build there but i’m sure i read it. Reading the above comments on future/replacement aircraft perhaps we could look at sub 20tonnes being split into stratregic and tactical, heavy and light. The point i’m (badly) trying to make is 2 sets of prop aircraft heavy being the A400 and light, for the insertion of SF or just for carrying light loads a 2 prop aircraft, to avoid as TD has pointed out in the past having very expensive troop carriers a lá C17.
Seeing as we want the brazillians to get on board with T26 why can’t we copy the swedes,french with a trade deal, they are offering to purchase the KC-390 if brazil buy rafalé or gripen. It looks a good aircraft (on paper i know!) and it would be ideal for long range SF insertion being able to use civvy airspace, could double/triple hat as MERT, more ecconomial than C17 and AAR (if the shitty PFI can be altered). We wouldn’t be trying to get in on the aircraft deals so would stand a better chance and obviously we stay pally with a south american country, seems it’s going to be bought by quite a few countries, handy for spares.
wikki page here for readers
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KC-390
edited to add i meant the kc-390 as the strategic light aircraft, so c-17/kc390 is strategic heavy and light and then A400m/and c27 or 295 or anything else is tactical heavy and light.
edited again to add a smaller aircraft will also lower bills in peacetime when training airborne troops as i can’t see the A400m being cheap to fly!
Whether rightly or wrongly, the problem that Eastern European airframe companies face is the perception of how they assemble their offerings contrasted with the perception of a Western factory with well publicised clean-rooms and precision robotics.
The recent spate of passenger jet crashes in the last two years hasn’t helped that perception in the commercial domain.
Would a majority rather fly regionally in an Antonov 148 or a BAe 146?
Those perceptions often cross the divide from civilian to military mindsets.
It is poor maintenance more than poor design. And I also wonder whether some of the health and safety stuff in Europe is more to do with protectionism than the aforementioned reasons. When Eastern aircraft get mentioned I normally get all excited and start buying dozens of helicopters for the price of one Western airframe. Usually then Mark comes and rains on my parade.
For sub-20t loads we do have an answer. It isn’t Chinook. And certainly isn’t tilt wing. It is the humble Fairey Rotordyne. A similar aircraft built with modern technology would be simpler and quicker than a Chinook. And certainly have better STOL capabilities than Spartan. We are only talking lifting what 12 or so tonnes.
x
Not me surely. Its interesting the Internet love in with eastern block aircraft if you’d seen some the sh1t they pass a manufactured parts your opinions may change.
It’s also worth noting that as soon as any country that’s operated those eastern aircraft are allowed to operate western equivalent aircraft they jump at chance quicker than a rat up a drain pipe.
The Germans kept there migs a gd while after all.
As for an-70 I believe the first 2 prototypes have crashed in testing over the years but hey least it cheap
@X
Any idea what altitude the Fairey Rotodyne could achieve? And its nominal lifting capacity?
@Paul G: Well, the Germans were the most enthusiastic for the Western powers. As for your memory, Yefim Gordon does mention:
“… At the same time, it was noted neither Russia nor the Ukraine had any intentions to promote the launching of the An-70 into production in Western Europe.”
So at one time this probably was the Russo-Ukrainian intention. Though later, the plan was to make a limited liability company between the Russo-Ukrainian and Western companies so this would likely be one of those things that was soon rolled over in negotiating.
But let’s stop imagining a “might-have-been” where Russia and Ukraine has a happier relationship w/ the rest of Europe and comment on some aspects of the article:
=
For the C-17, I was a regular reader of boeingc17.blogspot.com until it disappeared in 2010, about 2-3 months before a C-17 finally crashed, so I agree with the performance stuff, but
The Cost section: First, allow me to note that the quote from Peter Luff has since been corrected to TWO hundred million pounds
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120223/corrtext/120223c0001.htm (at the bottom)
2nd, with the exception of the F-35, the flyaway price DOES AFAIK include engines. Besides, an interpretation that the ~US$220 million flyaway price excludes engines, and the true cost with engines being ~300 million pounds will entail the engines being more expensive than the rest of aircraft, which seems a little unlikely.
3rd, it can be inferred from the renewal intervals that the GSP Sustainment Partnership programme only lasts for about 2 years per payment (assuming there isn’t a renewal for 2009!), so, as of 2010, the C-17′s annual maintenance cost per plane is somewhat under $30 million.
Meanwhile, the sales agreements do not seem to specify any duration for the support programs. It would seem a better estimate is to presume that the Indian, Aussie and Kuwaiti deals included support for a long (say a decade) period of time, which would apparently better account for the cost difference.
So Flyaway = $220 millionish, Procurement Unit Cost = $300 millionish, PUC+Multi-year support contract =>$500 million would be my guess
=
>Many people see industrial issues as either irrelevant to defence needs or if the word ‘Europe’ is involved automatically a bad thing.
I think a fairer representation of this is not to the extent that it is “irrevelant”. However, IMO the People know that:
1) The British arms industry has long passed the stage when it can be fully (or nearly so) independent like the US, Russian, Chinese and French industries. There will always be things it must rely on the United States for. The US can veto operations of a country with a partially independent arms industry almost as well as it can veto operations of a country with none – all it needs is to crimp supplies of the parts it does control. So there is no strategic reason to support the British arms industry regardless of cost efficiency.
2) Even so, where the cost-efficiency is close I’m sure most Brits will support British arms. But where cost-efficiency disparity is great, things are different. The Defense Ministry does not get a bigger budget when it chooses to buy local. So when it buys less capable local items the army simply gets less capable. And how can any good Brit supporting his troops tolerate this?
3) The decision to have a arms industry does have an opportunity cost to society as a whole by sucking up some of the talent and capital. So in keeping the arms industry alive, in a sense society as a whole gets a bit poorer.
So they don’t count “industrial issues” very heavily.
@ Mark
Yes you!!
I don’t do flying. So as long as they aren’t falling on my head or crashing on perfectly good ships I don’t really care as long as they are cost effective.
@ Peter E
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:zXGTQkp3ZUQJ:www.gyropilot.co.uk/downloads/Rotodyne%25202%2520RTF%2520Mod.pdf+&hl=en&gl=uk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESg7qQDZNqKZwPZ53_3586N6CnqS6BCnWzfQ5Hu9oP8WBOYbtYaDPPsiVS_v_sg9AvIA6LUNpGTGwn0IZtRxzqBq6-X8cf2fqCyM6VTH50hOx9S_FlNCLJw2Ld6YDWvKx8s3nOO1&sig=AHIEtbSO5bUjfH-zXus2aGklkZUvYyFefw&pli=1
I’ve been under the impression that the people at the top of the RAF really want to limit the numbers of aircraft for reasons of costs; logistics and training which, while it makes sense from their position leaves out the possibility of delivering niche capabilities that the SF need.
This is why I’m so sceptical of the ruthless commonality line, sensible commonality works much better for me, there’s also a large part of budgetary bias in the decision of the RAF. If they have only two fighters and two transports and in-flight refuelling is “OFF BOOK” then one presumes they feel they can support aircraft numbers and still afford the hotel bills.
So I advocate moving the budgets to increasingly lower levels of command, take some from the RAF and give it to a separate budgetary line for SFs providing them with limited, but actual choice in what aircraft of what ages they feel suit their needs….. if they want C130J or K or C295 or whatever, let them pay for it as they see fit.
They know best what works for them and part of the deal should be allowing them to “buy” the surplus stock of the RAF at knock down prices which is what they will go for in the end if they are given to the disposals people. They need to get a better deal than the nonsense about moving cost into the core budget…if the treasury ask for full wack or even partial vale for assets taken into the core all they hurt is themselves! the stuffs been paid for!! If it’s then paid for again at a silly theoretical price who wins? More to point if for accounting reasons it’s not taken up then everyone loses
Much of the MOD accounting for asset values is sheer nonsense; that has travelled from the treasury and has not really been understood. The future costs of maintenance and many other factors should be considered but sunk costs of Treasury support really shouldn’t be any part of the equation.
Have updated the post with Arks corrections, cheers by the way
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kawasaki_C-2
I am curious about your cost comparisons. You go to great lengths to show the true ownership cost of a C-17, and they are not cheap to own and operate certainly. But the cost you are quoting for the A400M is “Unit production cost includes the main production contract only” according to the report you cite. The C-17 has a large and installed user base. The engines on the C-17 have a user base spread across the 757 and C-17 so there are lots of parts and a great deal of knowledge on just how the things work. More than that you could fairly easily put new engines on the thing off the latest commercial jetliners if you felt the need later in life if you run out of parts sources from 757′s over the life of the frame.
The A400M does not have the same. No other aircraft uses that engine or is likely to use that engine and it has had a lot of teething problems already. I don’t think anyone can really estimate the operating cost of a platform that is not in service but I think it is fair to say the A400M would have something to prove if you want to call operating cost lower.
The best way to measure them would be in cost per ton or cubic volume of cargo moved a given distance(kind of like a cost per seat mile for an airline). Not getting into details it seems fair to state that the A400M would have to have an per flight hour operating cost of half the C-17 to be comparably efficient in the strategic airlift role. The C-17 lifts basically twice as much a little further and a fair bit faster than the A400M so just call all that a wash. I just don’t see it. You have twice as much everything (engines, pilots, maint. people, fixed facilities ect)to have the same capacity. You swap out jets for turbofans but I would imagine you would have a hard time convincing someone that those engines are more reliable than some that are in commercial airline service. I just don’t see one making back the cost they expend doubling up on all those things to gain equal strategic lift capability.
The A400M has to make its case in my view being able to do both the mission of the C-17 and the mission of a C-130. But the UK has decided it needs both. For the UK the important discussion is if the A400M is overkill as a C-130 replacement or not. It has to make its case to exist there.
For other powers that only have the A400M the discussion is if it can really replace a proper strategic lifter (or if they need that sort of thing to begin with)at a slightly lower cost.
The thing that some don’t mention is the A400M can lift an IFV without removing most of its armour. For me that is an all important issue.
Ark
Given the huge trade gap then any UK production helps close that. Abandoning UK industry & relying on imports just speeds up our national bankrupcy.
A partial industry can reverse engineer the parts it imports. If you have no industry, you will find it hard to do that.
Will be looking into payloads, runways and that kind of detail in the next part by the way
Jeremy
TD posted these a while ago but this one in particular should answer some of your points http://www.slideshare.net/robbinlaird/airbus-military-product-update-2012
The constant issue time and again is c130 max’s out in volume before weight and thats what a400m solves. It also gives a very capable tanker capacity which the UK is ignoring.
C17 had significant problems in development include a complete wing redesign due to failure at 126% limit load. Also the c17 is not identical to the civil engine on the 757 it is a derivative it also has an extremely complicated thrust reverser which integrates with the engine.
The cost figure TD quotes is I believe total UK program cost for a400m not unit price.
@Mark
The cost quoted is not program cost. It is the cost for the main production contract only and does not include operational or maint. expenses. It says so right in the report linked by TD.
I get the AAR capability but as you said, the UK is not using it so its irrelevant. Any transport aircraft could be modified to do it if one wished to spend the money. To me it is just not that big of a deal.
Yes the C-17 parts are not identical to the commercial engine, but at its heart it shares a core and many parts. At its heart, it is a commercial engine built to be reliable and has been so in both military and commercial service.
I also find the discussion of a transport gap to be somewhat amusing. No one has really every fully explained what this gap is and if it needs to be filled. I find the marketing material for the A400M unconvincing at best. It can carry more than a C-130 which may be useful at times, it might not. Depends on if I need a full load all going to the same place. Strategically it can’t do what a C-17 can do. It can’t carry in a tank. It can’t carry many self-propelled guns.
I get that one can create a marketing gap this is suppose to fill. I am just not sure it is really a gap operationally. What I think the A400M really is, and can excel at, is being a poor mans C-17/C-130/Tanker replacement all rolled into one. The UK is not buying it for that though.
RE: Rotodyne. The US Army in the 60′s, while developing its air mobile forces, envisigioned a V/STOL replacement for the CH-47 and the fixed wing Buffalo, called the medium tactical tranport (MTT). They also suggested a light tactical transport (LTT) using the same tech to replace the Huey.
The 50′s tech Rotodyne appears a good fit for the MTT role; a modern version could replace our Chinooks and boost our lower end tranports. The Groen brothers claim the rotodyne tech can be used to convert any high wing transport (probably have to change the tail):
http://www.groenbros.com/images/gyrodyne_tech_clip_image006.jpg
For the LTT (and going back to the East European aircraft topic)?
http://www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng/groen_gyroliner.php
We (Luftwaffe) should have gone with the An-70T/An-77.
That aircraft promised better performance and a tri-national project to fund its development fully and to produce it would have been good for political relations with East Europe as well.
My related blog post: http://preview.tinyurl.com/cl7qpwu
@ SO
I am not so sure getting involved with the AN-70 would have worked out for the better. That thing is a political football in the ongoing love/hate relationship the Ukraine and Russia have going on.
IMO, a lot of the Russo-Ukrainian “love-hate” relationship is caused by the Ukraine veering towards a NATO Russia perceives as hostile and if Ukraine goes NATO Russia feels as if the stretch of border (already too long for its economic and human resources) it has to defend gets longer and the correlation of forces (unfavorable since the end of the USSR) get worse.
In a world where NATO buys An-70s, the overall NATO-Russia relationship will probably be better.
Further, as regards the An-70, IMO the dominant factor is not so much political as financial. There is no money and for some reason in democracies the world over the Defence Ministry finds it hard to say
“Yes it is a perfectly good piece of kit. Problem-solving is well under way. We actually need this kit too, and it represents a significant advance in capability. We are also aware the program if allowed to continue will lead to jobs and improved relationships with our neighbor (which we need if we want to stop them from going to NATO I might add).
But you didn’t give us enough money, and after assessing all our needs, we decided to settle for 2nd best in this area (in this case, an upgraded IL-76).”
So, when they are forced to throw something out the window they find something, anything, to diss it.
It is not a very different process from the British MoD claiming Sea Harrier can’t shoot down antiship missiles when they decided to scrape it.
If NATO buys the thing, it suddenly becomes very supportable. The An-70 could start exploding in the air and the Russians will still be defending it.
“In a world where NATO buys AN-70s, the overall NATO-Russia relationship will probably be better.”
It’s not a Russian aircraft. It wouldn’t do anything positive for NATO-Russia relations; if anything it would steer Ukraine towards the West.
Russia’s cooling of interest in the AN-70 clearly shows their wish to support their own aircraft industry. Russian development money was turned off some time ago, sunk costs, they have no stake in the success of a foreign competitor.
Jeremy
If you include maintenance ect then that would be considered total life cycle costs. The a400m figure above includes development costs and that is a choice for the uk.
If you think it’s not needed why is lockheed looking at a new transport with a larger cross section than the c130?
Again full load is not so much a issue as volume.
The turbo prop cost in sfc is considerably below turbo fan equivalents And maintenance personnel have been involved from very early on in this program unless of course you think airbus don’t make efficient aircraft.
Why are you looking to transport large self propelled guns by air? This a/c will move all equipment to support the rapid deployment forces and medium weight coin vehicles as well as helicopters.
@Brian
Antonov fell on the Ukrainian side of the border and thus became an Ukrainian company, but the An-70 is very much a Russo-Ukrainian aircraft. The forecast was IIRC originally that the production would create as many as 50,000 jobs in Russia and 27,000 in the Ukraine (note where the “50″ is). There’s more than enough Russian content in the aircraft for the Russians to care and for a NATO deal to push both Russia AND the Ukraine closer to Western Europe.
Russian government money was indeed turned off for a few years while they played around with upgraded IL-76s and a Tu-204 variant called the Tu-330. The tense Russo-Ukrainian relations had something to do with it, but so did pure financial hopes of cheaper aircraft. Recently, however, they’ve turned around again, started placing orders and you don’t even hear much of the Tu-330 anymore.
Did the Groen Brothers heliplane ever make it to later phases with the DARPA funding?
Last I can find was a Lewis Page article a few years back.
@ TOC – all I can find is this “GBA completed Phase I of the Heliplane contract and also participated as a subcontractor to Georgia Institute of Technology for tip-jet noise reduction work for Phase IB, which was also successful. To date DARPA has not announced funding for Phase II and the future involvement of the Company in the DARPA contract is unknown. The Heliplane could be the next generation rotor wing aircraft, meeting economy and performance goals not considered achievable by any other type of VTOL aircraft.”
http://www.psfmagazine.com/2011/02/groen-brothers-to-produce-gyroplane-in-china/
It appears they had trouble getting the 400mph target and the old problem of noise from the rotor tip jets – I thought this was solved in the original project?
just thought i’d add this vid, bit of slick production from airbus of course but 5 a400m taxi-ing and then formation flying it is a bit good!!
@ST
Thanks. Looks like they haven’t really gone anywhere and that we’re unlikely to see a GBA Gyroplane in a Western military.
Movement in the future segment described (Cargo, VTOL, Fast, Range) seems to be back with Eurocopter, Sikorsky, Kamov and Boeing.
Does an estimated $30m unit price for the AW609 prevent AgustaWestland from playing?
If Airbus don’t sort out the Engine issues, which will cause even further delays, in getting it into service. I can see the RAF, having to order more C-17′s. Boeing have allocated a further 4 serial numbers for potential future UK orders. They wouldn’t have done that if they knew their wasn’t any chance of further orders. What chance that Boeing and MOD/RAF, have come to a gentlemans agreement on further single yearly purchases on the quiet?
As Britain and the EU, are at loggerheads with Ukraine on the treatment of the former Ukrainian PM, and the Political opposition. I cannot see any EU country purchasing an AN-70.
Hi, Arkhangelsk. As you suggest, Russian/Ukrainian political relations didn’t help the AN-70 project.
Tensions may be magnified in this kind of project as they’re dealing with largely nationalised industries on both sides of the border. Further rationalising the Russian aircraft industry -something we did extensively from the ’50s to ’70s- to leave fewer companies producing fewer models would leave a tighter, more efficient industrial base, more able to compete internationally; and then privatising both countries’ defence groups would make cooperative projects easier, as well as making them both more competative in the wider global defence market.
@ Mark
The report linked here (as I have said now three times) very clearly states that the unit cost of 141 million only includes the main production contract for the A400M. That means that cost does not include maintenance or operational expense. This is very clearly stated by the government in the linked report in the main article.
And I want to state clearly that I don’t think the A400M is a bad aircraft. For nations not operating a C-17 it is a great compromise. Given unlimited funds I would certainly rather have A400M’s than C-130′s even if I were operating C-17′s. But for nations that have a reasonable number of C-17′s I see the A400M as a bit of a luxury.
The UK has a lot of underfunded defense needs. Is the extra capability of the A400M (particularly when the UK is not using the tanker capacity of the thing) worth the massively increased acquisition cost of the A400M over the C-130J? When the military is busy scrapping its MPA fleet and penny pinching on escorts does it really make a ton of sense to spend your extra money here when you already have C-17′s?
There has to be a reason that none of the other 6 Air Forces that operate C-17 have bought the A400M and that both Australia and Canada opted for the C-130J with their limited funds.
For a C-17 operator the A400M is a very nice luxury to have. It has extra capabilities that will be useful. But is it really a luxury the UK needs or can afford? This speaks to your point about Lockheed looking to make a wider bodied turboprop transport. They could do so in short order if a big buyer really wanted such a product. The fact that they are not speaks fairly loudly in my view.
A good way to put it in context is if you would rather have the $100 million or so per unit purchased to do something else with. In a military that is being cut and hacked at I am guessing you could find something more useful to do with that money.
Apologies if discussed before:
I’m aware of manufacture of wings in the UK (still at Filton?) for the A400M. Beyond the potential in maintenance, are there other significant industrial incentives for the C-17 or C-130 in the UK?
Personally I would appreciate that any cost discussions here also take the sovereign economic multipliers into account. I think we were talking in the region of 20-30% direct tax claw-back, and a potential 1.8 overall economic Keynesian multiplier was mooted while discussing foreign designs/shipbuilders for CVF/Bay/MARS/MHPC/Whatever a few months back.
In a nutshell, take into account the effects of “three or four” supply chain jobs created or sustained for every manufacturing job that is oft-quoted. We’ll always need the likes of stationary, lunches and clean work spaces.
It may sound protectionist, but provided capability isn’t compromised I’m happier for my taxes to be spent on more expensive contracts if that converts to a decent order book for national workers.
@TD
Given the above, looking forward to Parts 2 and 4 in particular. You know I always love the “Beyond Tomorrow” aspects anyway!
Jeremy, wait until the next part for discussions on the ‘air transport gap’
ToC, good points on the economics, will cover that a little bit in the coming piece as well
@TD
I am aware of what people (marketing people in particular) say is in the transport gap. It certainly exist. I just am not convinced it is operationally relevant for the most part. As I said, the A400M gives you nice capability over the C-130 but I am not sure it is worth a billion or two pounds in the end.
It is kind of like saying there is a “booze gap” between beer and scotch. I suppose I could fill it with something if I wanted. I am just not sure it is really necessary. And if that something cost me somewhere in the ballpark of what my scotch does I start to wonder if it is worth the trouble.
Jeremy
. If we were to buy aircraft 23 it would not cost 141m is the point I’m making badly it appears.
I’ll wait to next section off this post but as an aside a400m is not a luxury and c130 can not do the job in the future.
We do not have a reasonable number of c17s more a small number. So the answer to you question is yes absolute sense.
Canada and australia needed transports now there were operating c130k aged fleets so could not wait for a400m.
TOC
A400m finally assembly is in filton. Sub assembly design and build takes place at various locations across the uk. The uk will have national thru life facilities at Brize norton but airbus will have a multinational facility in Spain it remains to be seen if a European maintenance and training option will develop. As far as I’m aware c17 returns to the us for major maintenance.
@ Mark
What are you suggesting it cost then? That is from the report linked in this very article from the UK government. Are you suggesting they are wrong?
And I fully realize the A400M can do missions the C-130 can’t. The question is if that additional capability is worth the added expense of the platform, particularly given how tight the defense budget in the UK appears to be.
Everyone here for the most part agreed the P-8 was way too expensive. If you one for one bought C-130′s instead of A400M’s that would buy 8-10 P-8′s in terms of pure unit purchase cost. You would lose transport capability to gain something else somewhere else in the spectrum.
If you are looking for it the unit cost is given on page 11 of the PDF.
@Mark
final assembly of A400M is NOT at Filton its in Spain; the wings for A400M are built in Filton. they are the only Airbus wings built in Bristol all the rest are made in Broughton
with the sale by BAE of the Filton Airport if it goes to housing Airbus may have to move the 400M wing as well…geting the wing out is fine going straight to a Belluga but is a headache to move by rail etc…
@Mark: *we* were a user of aged C130K 17 years ago, who *had* to order C130J. Since the government of the day, doubtless to favour the euro constituency, decided to order 25 and then participate in a boondoggle for 20 years which will hopefully produce the A400, rather than order just C130J/C17. In the meantime, the end user has been screwed over through two wars and two decades.
We do way too much split decision making, and it does us no favours in the long or short term.