Found this online and thought it worth posting because it was produced from one perspective so soon after and without the benefit of much of the relevant materials that have come to light in the years since.
Would be interesting from a dark blue perspective is to see the impact of this on resultant doctrine and equipment design, especially interesting is how the USN learned and adapted from these lessons.
Finally, were those lessons actually heeded or forgotten about over the last thirty years and are we condemned to learn them again?
“the tactical surprise of landing where they ain’t”
Quite a few “it wouldn’t happen to us” conclusions – including some cases where it later did. No doubt the Royal Navy thought the same before the war.
(Mind you, they proposed that they would’ve dispatched 2 Carrier Battle Groups and a Marine Amphibious Brigade!)
A bit repetitive but interesting read none the less, thank you TD. I would say that some of the lessons have already been forgotten by the RN.
Layered Air Defence.
Proper CAP from full size carriers.
SSKs are hard to detect.
Intelligence is important.
NGS was important.
Merchant vessels are incapable of looking after themselves.
Nothing shocking there just a lot of obvious lessons and common sense.
@APATS – don’t want to rekindle an old argument (especially since you won it!) but if we’d had “full size carriers” with a couple of squadrons of strike craft (e.g. Buccaneer) would we still have needed NGS? If CVF ends up carrying Apache would we still be looking to undertake NGS?
Wiseape, i’d suggest yes. Not much of the Falklands is really far from the sea (especially considering modern NGS capabilities). It is relatively easy to get rid of an Apache than it is a frigate sat miles off the coast in terms of weapons and resources you’d need to commit to the effort. One lucky shot with a MANPAD against a small number of countermeasures versus a fast jet sortie carrying advanced anti ship missiles against a vessel carrying multiple layers of defence and countermeasures. The ship can also stay on station much longer, and lay fire down much more cheaply than the equivalent number of Hellfires.
TD, you come up with some interesting brochures, but I note a lot of them look quite long reads, any chance of summarising them for us in the post in future? (Couple of executive bullet points?) Some of us don’t have the luxury of much free time i’m afraid
.
I’d humbly suggest that some of the points being made in the report on the larger vessels are being missed:
- Damage control;
- Stores;
- Facilities;
- Endurance.
To me, this endorses CVF size decisions vs smaller vessels such as CAVOUR, if not choice of power generation.
We’re also looking at the endorsement of the Helicopter as one of the primary weapon systems.
Another tick in the “For” column for CVF with the intention to operate a STOVL carrier that is known to impact Helicopter operations less than STOBAR.
@TD
ARAPAHO AVIM discussed in the report also portrayed around p148 in the below document:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CSI/docs/Gorman/06_Retired/01_Retired_1985_90/28_88_TABO_May.pdf
“Another tick in the “For” column for CVF with the intention to operate a STOVL carrier that is known to impact Helicopter operations less than STOBAR.”
But the UK has no shortage of naval helicopter pads.
“If CVF ends up carrying Apache would we still be looking to undertake NGS?”
Isnt a ships gun equivalent to a full gun battery?
Upgun the 113′s to 155′s, share shell types with the army, and you erase a GIANT logistical strain, no need to move your guns and shells to shore.
@TrT
We’re currently short the landing points from Ark Royal and Illustrious, a significant portion of our capacity.
If these are to be replaced, along with Fast Jet capability, a STOVL carrier to reduce the impact of two launch and recovery types on the two operations is a sound choice. And we do want Fast Jet cover for CAP and Air Superiority at the least.
Incidentally I don’t see a suggestion that Helicopter operations should supplant NGS but the use of both is advantageous.
The larger capacity of the 65kT CVF design addresses some of the lessons in stores and facilities noted in the public report, over and above the Invincible class and modern contemporaries such as Cavour.
I’d also go so far to suggest that the larger sizes of the Types 45 and 26 over their predecessor designs is not simply to fit more luxurious accommodations and weapon systems.
Also interesting to note the acknowledgement of British capability to continue operations in severe weather conditions (land, air and sea). It’s one of two topics that isn’t accompanied by the author harping on about how easily the US could match the performances. Silence speaks volumes.
The other topic appears to express surprise at the difficulties experienced with shallow water ASW given British expertise and quiet acknowledgement that this isn’t an easy task.
@Wiseape
‘If CVF ends up carrying Apache would we still be looking to undertake NGS?’
Yes, for many, many reasons, however I think the most direct argument is that said frigate or destroyer is going to be part of a task group anyway, so why wouldn’t you want to give it a half decent gun and increase it’s utility.
@APATS
‘Nothing shocking there just a lot of obvious lessons and common sense.’
I think the shocking bit is that these obvious lessons and common sense needs to be relearned and reapplied every few decades.
To me one of the most tragic aspects of the whole conflict was that two key capabilities, CIWS and AEW cover were absent for all of the actual fighting, but then very quickly/cheaply put on-to Illustrious just weeks later.
ToC
Except we also have Albion, Bulwark, along with Lyme, Mounts and Cardigan.
I’m sure the albions have at least service capability, although the Bays, I’m not even sure they could fuel them?
And of course, all of the escorts have a full engineering capacity for their onboard helicopters do they not?
Its a compromise, and a bad one.
One assumes Team Army would not be nodding so much if AS-2030, Challenger 3 and Warrior Replacement were being merged in to one…
@TrT
We had the Albion’s and Bay’s while we had all three of the Invincibles too.
No, the “escorts” do not have full facilities for their hangared aircraft.
The inflatables aren’t exactly ideal.
I wouldn’t want to send the Bay’s into heavy opposition either.
The other services need equipment too. Let’s not mistake my support for CVF as being in exchange for other programs and assets.
Finally, you may see compromise, I see Options, Options, Options.
It is worth noting that at the time a reason given for the lack of CIWS was that the Soviets did not have sea skimming anti ship missiles! As has been mentioned the lack of AEW and Phalanx was rectified within weeks. I assume the problem was know about well before the Falklands conflict.
The same mistakes of under arming warships seem to be a particular skill of the UK ship designers. The current self defence fit for the carriers is a cause for some concern. Although the T45 should always part of the carrier escort, with only six available, they all be committed, leaving few if any to cover other deployments.
Fitted for, but not with is budgetary issue not a design issue. Just as say T41 B1/2 being short and narrower than intended was a budgetary issue which impacted on systems availability down south.
I think I can safely as a group here we all want CVF to have SeaCeptor. Also though T45 numbers are a concern it is inner layer escorts that we lack. T45 won’t be playing goal keeper, it isn’t its role.
I don’t see how suggesting putting copters on CVF helps with a comparison with the Falklands campaign. As soon as you park CVF ~200 miles east of the Falklands, the only copters that are of use are AEW and ASW. Apache doesn’t have the legs, and neither does Merlin with a useful load. You then need fuel and maintenance facilities closer to the action… which we simply will not have when Ocean goes.
The Americans have got it right. Big CATOBAR carrier and a copter platform closer in. As soon as you mix jets and copters you’re stuffed for range (jets too close or copters to far out)… unless I see an order go through for some V22
@Rum Cove
The lack of AEW in particular was because the early 80s RN wasn’t anticipating any scenario which was ‘out of area’ and didn’t rely on land based NATO assets. So I guess in one sense you can’t blame the powers that be for not investing the money or having the foresight, but then again the speed and simplicity with which Sea Kings/Illustrious were fitted out and utilised does show how tragically easy it would have been.
Also to add to you’re point on CIWS, the USN had only started adopting Phalanx a couple of years earlier so I doubt their was any feasible way of the RN getting it’s hand on the system before it did.
@X
Surely the T23/26 are the ships to play goal keeper for CVF? Not saying the RN is exactly flush with escorts, but if a carrier group has a T45 providing outer defence then it will have other ships closer for inner defence.
That said I totally agree on CVF having Sea Ceptor and all major warships having plenty of layered defensive systems, you can never be too careful.
It is swings and roundabouts, the reason they were based further out was a lack of AEW, BVR interception capability, group AAW coverage and fighter aircraft. That goes away with a bigger Carrier and modern escorts.
@Simon
It just means that for an emergency sovereign expedition we would send both QEC: one standing off to provide CAP, ASW & AEW; the second close in to provide CAS, vertical insertion & tactical mobility.
Put it another way: PoW _is_ the Ocean replacement.
Now when 15 years further down the line the Albions wear out their replacements should also have sizable aviation facilities. But in the short term we could cover the gap in a true emergency by sending both carriers.
@Simon
Consider:
- Further out: Air superiority, CAP, ASW, AEW
- Closer in: CAP, CAS, Helicopter, etc
The USA may be able to afford a separate CATOBAR full-deck carriers surrounded by LHA’s.
If the UK wants a chance to support upcoming RAF and Army acquisitions as well as RN toys, this class of vessel gives us the capability options within a level of engagement size.
@ Chally
Yes. Um. To be clear I didn’t mean a frigate on each beam of the carrier bobbing up down as Brilliant and Broadsword did in 82. I mean in a close screen. You right though if CVF has one T45 and two frigates as its escort then it doesn’t leave much behind. In later years Invincibles were escorted by just one ship.
APATS,
I suppose it is a little “swings and roundabouts”, but I really don’t think the RN would put all their eggs in one basket and then put it within missile saturation range of the target.
Peter Elliott,
I’m glad you think you’ll manage to get the other CVF ready in time. I think you’d be better off with three hulls (even if one of them is a cheap – and possibly decrepid – Ocean type vessel).
@ Simon
I agree – it would be ‘nice to have’ spare capacity to cover contingencies. I’m sure the finest minds at the MoD are pondering how to do it within a realistic budget even as we write.
Imagine the Albion/Bulwark replacements as being a pair of 40 KT flat topped LHDs named Hermes & Centaur and I think the box will eventually be ticked. Then we’d have a total of 4 flight decks to rotate through maintenance and taskings ensuring the availability of 2. Just not until about 2035.
That’s the price we pay for the decisions taken in the 1990s. Not ideal for the medium term but these things have to run their course.
Simon, the reason they were so far out was due to an inability to control the airspace closer in.
A CVF at 100 miles with AEW, CAP out at 100 miles, T45 and Sea Ceptor actually defence the air space in between, totally different scenario.
What is “missile saturation range”?
The SOF distance in any scenario is based upon threat range and sophistication, detection range and ability to counter with soft and hard kill assets. The mission, how far do we need to project power and of what sort? Rotary wing or fixed wing? Load outs, AAR availability and enemy AAW defences.
Too many people jump on one scenario and take it as gospel, it is a lot more complex than that.
@X
Ha-ha, Yeah I wasn’t suggesting a repeat of Brilliant and Broadsword hugging the carrier, you were just a little vague on the lack of close defence.
One has to hope that the recent lack of escort ships is a result of economising in low threat situations and that in any kind of high threat environment either QE or POW would be accompanied by more than one frigate or destroyer.
Layered defence can’t be stressed enough, it’s probably the single most important lesson to be taken from 1982. Part of that is some decent last ditch systems for close in kills. That means Sea Ceptor on CVF and all major warships fitted with CIWS.
@Peter Elliot
‘Then we’d have a total of 4 flight decks to rotate through maintenance and taskings ensuring the availability of 2′.
I agree, that is the best case scenario and the one that we need.
Two larger LHD’s primarily geared for amphibious operations but with extensive flight deck and hangar space would offer massively enhanced capability! Four capital ships, with one of each heading up a task group and the other in reserve is a pretty good deal.
Lets just hope that when it gets to decision time those operating the purse strings share our views.
APATS,
“Simon, the reason they were so far out was due to an inability to control the airspace closer in. A CVF at 100 miles with AEW, CAP out at 100 miles, T45 and Sea Ceptor actually defence the air space in between, totally different scenario.”
I don’t quite see it like that since they were operating CAP at the other side of the island! They started off not believing they could control the airspace and still never closed in… I believe due to the Exocet threat. That kind of threat still exists.
As for what we have now and what we had then, granted we have AEW, but surely your layered air defence theoretically existed in 1982 with Sea Dart illuminated by over-the-horizon frigates and destroyers?
Bottom line (to me) is that the Royal Navy are not going to park CVF within anti-ship missile range of Blofeld’s island when he’s clearly been hard at work building missiles
@ Grim – “TD, you come up with some interesting brochures, but I note a lot of them look quite long reads, any chance of summarising them for us in the post in future?”
Could we trust him? :p
1. carriers were rubbish, constantly running aground
2. RAF alsation units deployed from mexoflotes would have rocked
3. stealth containers packed with booties and airdropped into stanley would have won the day
Setting up an AD posture is a whole round of trade-offs. Depending on what your capabilities are in terms of detection range, time to ID, time to intercept, asset numbers you can do all sorts of calcs, but essentially you’re varying the threat arc, “kill-line” etc against the threat capability and raid size. For a fixed capability that doesn’t cover your required threat arc, all you can do is stand-off, thereby reducing it.
As for Dart illuminated by OTH frigates and destroyers, that capability (equivalent to CEC) didn’t exist then and has only just been fielded by teh USN.
NAB,
“For a fixed capability that doesn’t cover your required threat arc, all you can do is stand-off, thereby reducing it.”
Agreed.
Just not sure what ~30 F35B (plus AEW/ASW) actually adds to the mix if we were ever asked to go down south again. I think 30 jets is a good number (certainly better than the 20 we set out with in 1982) but still very limited if you are to put a couple of 24-7 (‘cos that’s what it would have to be now) CAP stations 200+nm west. They’re essentially all accounted for with just a handful remaining to provide the outer layer intercept air defence for the carrier group.
My point is that a fully laden CVF does not carry enough firepower to get in close, defend the fleet, and provide CAP/CAS for landings the other side of the island.
This all changes with Ocean providing air support for the amphibious landing with Apache (or even Lynx) and T45 with AEW (again from Ocean) monitoring the skies west of the Falkland Sound.
Roll on Albion and Bulwarks replacement… as long as they’re ~30,000 tonne LHDs
PS: The only way I see CVF working in a rerun of 1982 is directly supporting the amphibious landing right in the thick of the action. I’d shake the hand of every single sailor/pilot that ends up part of this for their utter bravery as it scares the bejesus out of me.
Simon
A Merlin(AEW) at max altitude has radar horizon of 170NM against a target at 200ft. The F35 sensor fit is also very good. Given the fact that the Argentinian air force has barely changed since 82 and we would be fielding a 5th generation fighter with superior BVR capability combined with AEW birds that could extend teh range out to 250Nm from the HVU and vector the F35 which if radar silent would represent a very challenging detection for the OPFOR.
Then tie in the capabilities of SAMPSON and Type 45, Sea Ceptor armed frigates. The fact we would know the threat detection, intel of take offs from various sources. The limited range and AAR capabilities of mthe OPFOr aircraft and total absence of any AEW coordination and I could draw up a pretty impressive screen given a few hours.
APATS,
I see what you’ve done there
New RN, old enemy. I was comparing either CVF against a newly modernised enemy (e.g. Brazil in few years) or CVF with Sea Harrier FRS against the same enemy in 1982.
In other words I was changing only the relative platform that the aircraft operated from. If, by introducing the single TLA CVF we also mean F35B, Merlin, AEW, T45, Aster, Astute, Tomahawk, etc against the old enemy then crikey yes, we’d whoop their rear ends to Timbuctoo and back.
Point being if you had 1 x CVF in 1982 you’d still be 200nm to the east… or, if you have 1 x CVF now and the enemy has gotten a bit better, then you’ll still be 200nm to the east. And in both cases operating Apache, Wildcat or Merlin HC4 from that distance will be a bit difficult.
Simon
I’m not sure where you get your idea that a 2-ship CAP would consume all of a 30 cab CAG from.
First off, it’s only a CAP if you need it to be. If your detection ranges are good enough (depending on the required kill-line), you can maintain a Deck Launch Intercept posture, particularly if your AD aircraft can go supersonic and has a BVR missile capability. Now there are very few threat AS missiles with a range greater than 100nm, so I’m struggling to see where your 200nm+ CAP station comes from. They still have to be targetted correctly as well, which isn’t easy to say the least and is actually the first point in the chain we would attack.
I think 100nm from mother might be a more feasible CAP station (if actually required), which if you assume say 20 mins out and back to a mid-level station would probably give you about 1.5-2 hours on station. You could actually use drop tanks for this role (punch em off if you need to go stealthy or manoeuvre for ACM, otherwise bring them back) to get you even more ToS. Anyway, that gets you a pair launching every 1.5 to 2 hours and forty minutes later you recover two.
It would be entirely feasible to run that sort of profile 24/7 with 10-12 cabs, which would include 2-4 on deck at varying stages of alert. 800/801 were capable of doing an essentially identical mission (albeit without the alert cabs) for at least three days, 24 hours a day, with only seven cabs. Admittedly SHAR was a very agricultural beast with consequently high serviceability, hence my allowance of 10-12 for F35, which also allows you to run deck alert cabs which then launch as the next CAP pair.
Obviously depending on intel you could ramp up (or down) the number of cabs on CAP and / or alert – the thing is to have sufficient deck space to park them in the first place. As APATS says we then have the highly capable defensive screen – carriers are nowhere near as easy to get at as people suggest.
That then leaves the best part of twenty cabs to make friends and influence people elsewhere, which is of course what we’re buying the ships for. So plenty of CAS or other missions can be serviced.
However, your point re helo ops from 200nm is entirely valid, which is why some of the premises of CEPP are utter b8llocks. You just can’t / wouldn’t do it that way.
CEPP… often mentioned and very lightly documented (in the public domain).
One thing for the lessons learnt would be (?) the three-fold command structure
- the reason I mention this is that a year ahead of the latest Alligator exercise the reading list given to those participating in any command role included no fewer than three (!) Falklands titles. In the covering letter the workings (or otherwise) of the structure that was in place was invited for scrutiny in the multiple sources, with possibly conflicting accounts given by those who were there