A Guest Post by Somewhat Involved
Over the past months, there has been much talk, discussion and debate on ways to generate additional capability for the Royal Navy. The cold, hard fact of limited (and likely still dwindling) resources and steady state, if not increasing commitments placed upon the UK Armed Forces, is well accepted and there has been a lot of creative debate about generating additional hulls to extend our reach, presence and influence in any number of theatres around the world.
Unfortunately these debates often side-track into one of two avenues – either fantasy fleet time, where we dream up any number of combinations of exciting ships, aircraft and concepts together with truly inspired cost estimates, or simple debate on what the Royal Navy actually does for us in exchange for the many millions spent (wasted?) on it. The problem is that in the first case, we lose track of why we were discussing ships in the first place, and in the second, begin to assign capabilities and requirements to hulls on a more aggressively cost-based basis. There is a wider misunderstanding, I think, of just what it is that Royal Navy ships do for you when deployed, and until this is fully understood, I think the debates will be skewed.
It has, interestingly enough, been quite challenging to try and relate the doctrine, lessons and concepts we believe in so dearly into clear English, and therefore justify our need for high end combatants, and why patrol boats just won’t do.
We have an almost blind faith in our own reasons for existence and assume that others see and understand our effects and capabilities as we do. It’s easy to entertain the wider public with Navy Days or the occasional piracy, drug bust or homecoming story. But we often fail to communicate the wider task of the RN to the more widely read, and daresay more influential elements outside our own environment, so this is an attempt to do just that. No insults intended, and this is entirely The World According To Me.
So, two parts to this post. The first, an attempt to explain what we do, why we do it, and why we should keep on doing it. The second, in response to an excellent post by IXION, is to explore the requirements for the General Purpose Frigate, why this will serve us far better than a Patrol Ship, and why it is necessary for the Royal Navy over the decades to come.
Contents
Bang for your Buck
I am not going to trot out the ‘island nation’ storyline, but the UK does have vested interests overseas. These may be either purely selfish, or selfishly political. In the first case, we are dependent on foreign energy reserves and our primary gas supply is likely to be (if not already) shipped from Qatar. Our economy is also hugely dependent upon cheap manufactured goods from Far Eastern nations and food from many others, and those goods, shipped by sea, pass through contested waters, piracy-infested waters and narrow waters along the shortest and most economical route. I freely admit that the LIKLIHOOD of closing those supply routes is low, but the CONSEQUENCES for our economy are potentially severe, especially given our tendency to only maintain a week or so reserve of gas, food and other essentials. The ensuing RISK is reason enough then to maintain some form of deployable maritime military capability.
In the second case, we have a strongly vested interest in maintaining our standing amongst the international community, in a dozen different ways. If you think we should all just get along and not worry what other countries think, then ask yourself why Russia and China are so stubbornly blocking any course of united international action to bring the Syrian situation under control. International ‘standing’ is not just an essential part of the international diplomatic game, but a position that can influence or even dictate market responses, encourage or discourage international investment, have immediate and long term economic effects, and ultimately win or lose votes at the ballot box. Syria is the current problem, but UK influence and standing has helped shape three significant conflicts and several minor ones in the past 15 years alone. We cannot afford to sit back and let others model the world to their advantage.
Naval presence has always had a disproportionate diplomatic effect, and it is one we harness often. A naval blockade is a powerful statement of intent as Israel has proven, and as Iran threatens. A warship simply entering a new region of water has a similar effect, as Iran again proved with the deployment of a frigate and tanker to the Mediterranean, however briefly. Naval presence can also provide reassurance, as the Armilla Patrol did in the 1980’s and as an international force of ships has done in the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor off Somalia. Small though the physical presence might be, it has nonetheless a disproportionate effect. For this reason (almost alone), we have maintained a presence that began over a hundred years ago, became the Armilla Patrol and continues today as OPERATION KIPION. As an aside, one of the reasons for the disproportionate effect of a single ship is the inherent mobility of that asset and the relative difficulty of locating it if it does not want to be found.
There are two more points to make here – US cooperation, and ‘lesser’ nation engagement. The US has significant political and diplomatic capital invested in the Middle East and Mediterranean. As much as the US focus may be shifting towards China and the Far East, Iran remains a threat and a factor that they cannot leave to ‘others’ to ‘sort out’. But their resources are reducing just as ours are, and they lack capabilities in some areas in which we have an expertise. MCM and ASW are two such capabilities, and as recently proven we can stand alongside US escorts in air defence capability. And do not underestimate the fact that we are one of the only nations to be able to constantly maintain at least one warship in the region, at a high state of readiness and capability, without any international assistance. We are dependable in that respect. By being able to interoperate with the US we gain a lot – access to US intelligence, access to US technologies, a recognition of our ability as partners rather than ‘also-rans’. It also puts us in the same diplomatic court as the US which, as I’m sure you all appreciate, has both its advantages and disadvantages. Everything is connected, and we are not yet in a position where ditching the US as a political, military and strategic partner is even a remotely sensible possibility.
I should probably keep the word count down but ought to mention NATO. NATO is still fundamentally a US supported organisation, but one in which we retain significant influence at the highest levels. Again, staying out of NATO isn’t an option, especially as NATO continues to evolve, and given the way it is evolving it is possible, even likely that the role of the US will dwindle further. Therefore I would argue that we need to keep our status within NATO, which only comes from an ability to contribute to NATO’s military effectiveness.
And so to the ‘lesser’ nations. I mean this not in a derogatory way, but to group those nations where we still have a vested interest, but they are not a part of the wider US-UK-Rest-of-the-world game largely confined to the Middle East. Here you can group the UK Dependent Territories, the Caribbean Nations, the Falklands, and the West African nations that either have significant oil supplies or are waypoints on the international drug trade flowing from South America. In many cases these nations have their own military forces, particularly the Gulf of Guinea nations tackling piracy, or Cape Verde tackling the drug trade. The effect of a visiting warship is diplomatically high profile, and is a political gesture by HMG that the nation in question is important enough to merit such a visit. Refusal of a ship visit is diplomatically serious, as Brazil and Argentina have proven recently. More often, visits are combined with goodwill gestures such as exchanges of personnel, and have a heavy diplomatic flavour with the UK Ambassador inevitably not only invited to the Official Reception, but often hosting it using the ship as a convenient marquee. Furthermore, the Royal Navy is still seen by many to be the international gold standard of maritime capability, and training exercises in stop and search procedures, counter piracy and even the basics of shiphandling and damage repair yield significant benefits in international relations.
Thus the RN has always believed, spurred on by feedback through diplomatic and military channels, that a single warship can have an effect that is disproportionate to its immediate military capability. However, that capability does need to be matched to the potential events, outcomes and consequences of a particular deployment, and thus a patrol ship may not be the best option.
Survivability
I want to quickly look at the concept of survivability. I suspect few would be happy with the idea that a ship can simply ‘survive’ an initial engagement – no, it should not only survive, but emerge supreme the other side! Huzzah!! I think this is less significant than we like to pretend.
In open ocean warfare, any warship will expect to operate as part of a task force, and thus enjoy a level of additional protection. There is a huge array of complex, challenging and lethal weapons available, and anything less than an air warfare destroyer would be hard pressed to last long alone in the face of determined attack. But open ocean warfare is currently a relatively a distant possibility, so we rely on the task force concept and do not need to arm every ship with SeaViper.
In the Gulf scenario, ‘survivability’ has another meaning. If a certain Gulf state were to, as some so eloquently put it, ‘kick off’, then we can expect a sudden and possibly overwhelming attack. Many observers have speculated on mixed raids of short ranged land based and ship based missiles, suicide craft, WIG craft, suicide WIG craft, mines, torpedoes and small arms. Scary stuff. But if such an event was to take place, then the ship must be able to defend itself long enough for help to arrive – and with the degree of supporting strike power available in the region (currently USS ENTERPRISE, USS EISENHOWER and imminently USS STENNIS) help will be close by. Such attacks will have political, diplomatic and military advanced warning, and are unlikely to suddenly erupt out of the blue.
The fact that a unit is therefore not easily knocked out means that an opponent must divert significant resources to eliminate that threat. Against a mobile target, this is made significantly more challenging. Coordinating attacks with asymmetric platforms adds another layer of complexity. All of these must then be balanced against available resources and the area to be controlled/dominated, leading to a measure of DETERRENCE by both sides, equal and balanced.
In looking at self defence capability later on, this then is what I mean by ‘survivability’.
Patrol Ship vs. General Purpose Frigate
In defining a ‘Patrol Ship’, it is important to focus on what we mean by this and make a clear distinction between this and the General Purpose Frigate. Although there are many different interpretations of both concepts, there is a fundamental difference relating to task and requirement for survivability (that word again). The Patrol Ship does not expect to operate in a hostile environment, whereas the General Purpose Frigate must be able to do so.
IXION made the excellent point that a Patrol Ship need not be small, indeed we were looking at proposals for ships the size of a Bay class. By far the biggest driver behind ship size is propulsion, followed by stability. A small ship will be forced to make compromises in engine design, endurance, speed and stability, either by adopting a smaller propulsion plant, a smaller fuel reserve, or by the simple ship design laws that mean a smaller ship moves more than a larger one for a given sea state. Stability is not only desirable for operating boats and aircraft, but for the effective operation of weapons systems and sensors. And where radars are concerned, the higher the radar, the greater its range. Our areas of operation necessarily include regions where the distance between ports is significant, and the weather is often poor, occasionally dangerous, and this tends to favour the larger hulls over the smaller. Advances in technology and the efficiency of power plants will doubtless make ships and crews smaller, but there is little to be saved by trying to cram your capability into a smaller hull. Steel is cheap, air is free – the cost of any ship is not the hull, but the systems.
Any ship operating on ‘patrol’ duties, inclusive of CP, CN and other such tasks, needs a minimum outfit:
- Surface surveillance radar.
- Electro-optic systems, also for surveillance.
- Small calibre gun/guns, for interdiction and enforcement.
- A minimum of two quick-reaction seaboats for boarding duties.
- Sufficient accommodation for embarked forces.
- Effective voice and data communication systems, equivalent to broadband data rates.
However, in order for a ship to be considered ‘survivable’ within the constraints of that proposed above, and thus become the General Purpose Frigate, there is a necessary minimum equipment fit. This would be:
- A medium ranged surveillance radar capable of tracking air and surface contacts, to provide warning of attack.
- Electronic intercept equipment, to provide warning of attack.
- An air self-defence system, which should be able to cope with at least 3-4 aircraft or missiles arriving simultaneously. Such a system should be able to protect another vessel positioned down-threat of the firing unit. This system should also incorporate decoy systems, where hard-kill of missiles is not possible or is less effective than soft-kill.
- A combat computer system that can process all data including that received from off ship.
- Flight deck and hangar, large enough to operate any combination of manned or unmanned types envisioned.
- Redundancy in systems to permit damage control, and appropriate damage control systems.
In order to counter an underwater threat, the most practical option currently available is to simply blast noise into the water column and flood an area with radar, making life as difficult for the submariner as possible. In noisy, cluttered and congested littoral waters, submariners will be focused far more on keeping their boat safe than trying to close for an attack solution. Ship launched torpedoes have limited usefulness, but anti-torpedo systems, now emerging, have far more value. Offensive littoral ASW is best conducted with air assets, but a ship in the General Purpose role with an active sonar system and torpedo launch capability is still a valuable asset.
There are more General Purpose payloads that should be considered; these are very much ‘nice to have’, but are comparatively cheap and easy to provide for. Sufficient storage space, cranes and/or cargo management systems can handle SF boats and stores, autonomous underwater/surface/air vehicles and any number of wacky, containerised ideas. The idea of a payload bay and launch/recovery system has been discussed before, but such abilities belong firmly in the General Purpose role and not that of high-end combatant.
Of course, the RN’s current combatants, Type 23 and Type 45, have all these capabilities bar the last. Type 45 is an extreme case, but the Type 23 is a very capable General Purpose design. The GP Concept in its basic form lacks land attack capability, anti-ship firepower, blue-water ASW capability or anything more than self-defence abilities, but as a naval unit it can still achieve a significant degree of ‘presence’, disproportionate to its actual capability and yet able to deliver the effects that HMG requires in all current theatres, from the Gulf to the South Atlantic.
The Patrol Ship Myth
One of the reasons why I started this post was to try and put down the idea that a small warship of corvette size or smaller, as so often postulated here, could have a reasonable effect in the theatres described above. I would hope by now that it is obvious that such a ship could not function effectively east of Suez in anything other than an utterly benign environment OR ELSE become a vulnerable unit requiring protection. With the sole exception of counter-piracy off Somalia, any ship in this theatre needs to bring, at a minimum, those capabilities which would allow it to survive if hostilities were to commence. On top of that, to make any contribution to the wider security issues as discussed, we then need those niche capabilities that allow us to maintain the position we have established.
In the rest of the world a Patrol Ship might suffice for all conceivable tasks, including reassurance, presence, training, diplomacy, counter-piracy, counter-drugs and so on. This is on the assumption that you no longer require any form of deterrence in those areas; try as you might, a Patrol Ship has no deterrent value against combat forces because it lacks survivability. The challenge then becomes how you split your fleet, how you balance your numbers of high end combatants, General Purpose Frigates, and Patrol Ships.
All RN ships can deliver the Patrol Task. It may not be efficient or the best use of resources at a particular time, and it is an expensive option. However, given the high tempo of operations today in the face of reduced platform availability, we are able to ensure that, even if one ship suffers a major defect or delay, another effective naval combatant is available to replace it and maintain the commitment. If high end combatants are exchanged for Patrol Ships, although you increase the numbers of hulls available you nonetheless reduce the total number of combatants and that increases the likelihood of being unable to maintain a commitment.
Where the risk of conflict is high, the need for ships goes beyond simply maintaining just one on station. In addition to the ship outbound to relieve the first, and the previous incumbent returning home, there is a need to have additional ships ready to form the Response Force Task Group. This formation is not kept permanently formed, but consists of ships at readiness undertaking other tasks, from which they can be pulled if required. By diluting the pool with smaller ships, none of which can have an effect in a Task Group, the ability to form the RFTG also reduces significantly.
Finally, force planning and hull numbers goes well beyond short-term thinking of five, ten or fifteen years. The planners must be able to ensure that the RN remains a balanced force capable of delivering the anticipated level of commitment 30, 40, even 50 years into the future. Whilst many have discarded the DCDC ‘Future Character of Conflict’ document as so much piffle, even they cannot disagree with the assessment that with booming world populations, dwindling resources and an overwhelming dependence on the sea, the world is not likely to be more stable in future. Consider the worldwide impact of everyone in India and China demanding an iPad – the resources to manufacture high tech devices, such as rare earth elements, are already dwindling. By pursuing short term cost savings over long term strategic thinking, a nation is guaranteed to be at a disadvantage in future and must accept a dwindling, less significant role that is unlikely to bring economic benefit. The alternative, as Germany has done, is to establish oneself as an industrial and/or economic powerhouse able to weather all problems, but I do not believe this to be a viable strategy alone.
My point then is that although smaller ships might be available in greater numbers, they are not necessarily suitable for the task they are required to undertake, now or in the future.
The Jack of All Trades – The Future Surface Combatant
My opinion is that the ship type we need for our day-to-day global tasking is a vessel in the frigate class, for reasons of range, endurance, speed and stability. Even if this vessel carried only the most basic sensors and weapons, a minimum size is nonetheless required. However, it does need to be an effective combatant if it is to fulfil 90% of the roles expected of it, and allow for a balanced, manageable Fleet.
The Joint Concept Note on the Black Swan design makes the point that ships need to be able to accept a variety of systems in their lifetime which should, where practical, be modular in design and able to ‘plug and play’ with the parent’s ship’s existing hardware. I agree – but this is hardly ground-breaking stuff. We do this already in many different systems, land, sea and air, and is hardly a design constraint. The key requirement, however, is space – a small ship will have this in short supply and may even face limitations in power generation to support any bolt-on system.
The Type 23 frigate is, in my opinion, one of the better designs of such a vessel yet evolved. It has been by total fluke – a ship conceived in the Cold War, it has been adapted and updated through its lifetime to become an asset that today can be deployed to any of the key theatres discussed above and still be effective for any of the varied roles it is called upon to do. It is far from perfect – sensors, guns and many of the internal systems are not effective in today’s environment, but it provides a basic platform exemplifying the General Purpose Frigate idea upon which I intend to build. It has good range, fuel efficient engines, a high top speed, good manoeuvrability and a useful sensor/weapons fit. It also has limited capacity for further growth, no room for additional boats or embarked forces, the gun is inadequate for current standards of precision attack ashore, its counter-FIAC defences are questionable and it is getting old. Critically it may not reign supreme alone, but it would SURVIVE and thus remains an effective combatant.
A vessel fulfilling my General Purpose requirements discussed above is what I believe we need as our future combatant to replace the Type 23. This can then be upgraded to a more specialist role according to requirement. The options for this are many and varied, but in simple terms a quietened variant, fitted with a towed array sonar system and with the appropriate aircraft embarked, makes a potent dedicated ASW platform. The alternative is to optimise for above-water warfare, including but not confined to anti-ship missiles, land attack missiles, appropriate calibre main gun for NGS and anti-surface duties, advanced electronic intelligence equipment, etc. There is even potential to specialise in anti-air warfare, although we already have the Type 45 in service for this purpose. These are dedicated weapons systems, and require unique hull mounting and integration space such as VLS silos or turret/gunbay structures. However, they need not be permanently embarked or even fitted, thus presenting opportunities for modular systems to be introduced along the lines of the Black Swan concept. The ship can then fulfil the Patrol task, whilst retaining the minimum fighting capability necessary to allow for rapid redeployment.
Summary
I hope to have presented a different view of today’s tasking and requirements, and the associated need to maintain a minimum number of combatants with certain minimum capabilities. I have tried to avoid the ‘fantasy fleet’ trap, and hope instead to have offered some different points for debate. I strongly believe that to maintain our current international standing, in the interests of assuring the UK’s future influence and stability, there are commitments that must be met. That requires a minimum level of investment in combat capability, for which maritime forces remain the most effective.
@all Politicians are the Same
SeaRAM is a stand alone system, Putting one forward and one aft would cover 360 and not require a targeting or illuminating radar. That was my point.
RAM would require cuing from an air search but not an illuminator.
There appears to be a wish to remove things like fisheries protection to coast guard type functions SAR ect and the other services the same with similar tasks.
Two issues I see coming with this. 1st these types of tasking can be useful for introducing future larger ship commanders to the command position.
Second is public visibility. Some may not see this as important but I fear post afghan all the forces being small and tasked overseas they will drift from general publics view and as such the services will struggle for future funding. If the public only see ships with coastguard or helicopters ect then the question will be why do we need a navy/airforce/army and none of the services are particularly good at explaining that now to the general public.
JMH
‘The UK needs to decide what it wants to be in the world. It can’t take on a globe spanning role with a military budget of 2.6% of GDP.’
AMEN to that.
‘You either need to redefine the mission to do fewer things or you need to spend more money.’
AMEN to that!
No amount of scheming about what bits and bobs to hang on some 20,000 ton elephant is really going to change that. It does nothing but shift the deck chairs around really.
You miss the point; the point is to preserve a core ‘fighty fleet’ and expand the capability to do what we actually spend out time doing.
The RN has the makings of being a force able to act globally if it concentrates on fitting out two carrier strike forces and its amphibs with proper escorts to go into harms way.
Thats just carier junky wet dreams. The funding and projected ship numbers are utterly unable to support two carrier battle groups and an amphib force, we would need at least 9 t45 and 18- 24 t26 to do that with a serious upgrade to our RFA (which would itself require further protectio by escorts).
Why not just focus on doing that? You can’t afford everything but if I were to list naval capabilities I would want to have that would be near the very top.
Because that really is ‘fantasy fleet’ time. having dismissed the patrol ship idea as unafordable you have wriiten the spec for a surface navy twice the size of the one we will have!
I have said before and as TD has suggested ity reduces the RN to a total 1 trick pony.
All
It remains interresting that even those who oppose the Patrol, ship (of whatever dimension), principle, often then go on to talk about a British, US style coast guard for the ‘floating rozzer’ role. Then they talk about the wartime role for such ships, without ever asking where the money will come from when the only answer can be from the RN budget.
So, why does a patrol ship covering APT(N), smuggling in the med, and Counter Piracy of Somalia need an AA system again? Or a main gun (heavy calibre)?
Surely it just needs a radar that is sufficient to locate and track surface vessels and unarmed drug running aircraft. Then a helicopter. A small boat launching facility. And a few GPMG/Miniguns/.50 cal/snipers (delete as appropriate) to defend itself/threaten others.
You must be able to build those on a 2:1 ratio with a £250 million Type 26 (assuming T26 incurs no cost growth). Build two, lose one T26, and have one T26 that now no longer needs to cover these tasks.
The whole point that sparked this discussion is the continual insistence from the Admirals that they don’t have enough ships to cover all of their tasks, that they’re stretched to breaking point. So they either need more ships in the fleet, with a budget that is not going to increase as a share of overall defence anytime soon, or the Navy needs to can some of its tasks.
You can carry on as normal with Frigates and Destroyers and no patrol vessels at all, and do all the tasks previously requested, but if that’s the solution then the Admirals need to stop talking about being stretched.
You can’t have it both ways.
With guest posters I tend to have a rule that I stay out of the conversation but given my well known anti RN position I couldn’t resist:)
Do we think there is a degree of tasking snobbery at play here just a tiny bit? Talk of tasks that are not for a proper Navy, things that should be done by a coastguard or police force, trading patrol ships for frigates etc?
Is there a danger of this talk leaving the RN vulnerable to more cutting as those outside see it as increasingly irrelevant as defence inflation bites leading to the inevitable reductions in real budgets?
How would one outside the service see this as akin to the RAF wanting to fight the Battle of Britain and the Army pining for BAOR?
If I am honest I only see the Army as having had a lightbulb moment (even it was forced on them by budget reductions) in defining a two tier force with channels between the two. If we look at Army 2020 it is clear to me that there is a realisation that high intensity war which is very rare and the plethora of security or peacetime taskings, upstream engagement and conflict prevention that are very common cannot be fulfilled with the same equipment and structures.
Hence the reactive and adaptable force, the more I think of it the more it actually makes a huge amount of sense.
Neither the RAF or RN seem to be doing anything anywhere near that radical.
I could be dead wrong but the impression I get from both shades of blue are services that are dominated (perhaps understandably) by high end equipment, configuring for the high intensity tasks and treating the most likely, regular but unglamorous roles as diversions, giving them crumbs from the Kings table.
That’s probably unfair but still.
When the shit does hot the fan that approach may well be vindicated but I always come back to defence planning assumptions and strategic realities and ask what credible scenario exists that requires the UK to either stand alone.
So maybe, the high end full on crash bang stuff should be the secondary role, with the ‘other stuff’ actually getting a higher priority.
Just a thought!
PS
Would also add that before we talk about kit we should really talk about strategic drivers that underpin the standing and contingent tasks and ask ourselves if, for example, we can deliver against the counter narcotics or disaster relief requirement with other means. Instead of sending an RN vessel would the UK be better served by a police training mission, paying for a civilian manned maritime patrol aircraft or a shed load of fast interceptor craft.
Just one example
PPS
Does anyone else think the RN grown ups cling on to the standing tasks with a vice like grip so they can constantly demonstrate how stretched they are, have they become a bit of a crutch?
TD said “If I am honest I only see the Army as having had a lightbulb moment (even it was forced on them by budget reductions) in defining a two tier force with channels between the two. ”
Rhubarb!!! Do you think the Army would opt for two tier force if they could afford to put all the infantry into Warrior and have RAC all mounted in export Chally in T58 regiments? Really? “Light role” is Army double speak for “we can’t afford”. Stop trying to dress the Army up as innovators. They are blokes with rifles, just as in a previous age they were blokes with spears. In tertiary history we are told to stay away from using the word “bias”. But here at times, oh dear………
Chuck hill, exactly what i was getting at, given the location of the RAM/Sea RAM radar the only difference between the two is the integration of Phalanx into SEARAM they could quite possibly never even detect the missile that hit the ship. A 997 radar on top of mat offer true 360 degree coverage out to 12NM.
Chris B, Admirals will always whinge but the fact is that we do not cover our NATO standing groups but manage the rest and can still almost scrape together a war fighting capability. Yes we are stretched but it is just about manageable.
@TD list me the peace time commitments that requite an army Battalion 365/24/7 versus what the RN has to supply a hull to? Also look at those roles that we are asked to fulfill and see how many of them actually require an FF/DD.
I am not an establishment supporter in general but for once I come down firmly on the side of the people who control the budget, the intelligence, the threat assessments, the capability briefings, the refit programme and a whole host of stuff that actually allow us to determine policy. remember that full on high end bag stuff can never ne a secondary role for the vessels that people on here expect us to sacrifice high end hull for. it is the equivalent of asking the army to sacrifice 4 infantry battalions to buy 8 high end police units but say they will be ok in combat!
Also when the army sends a company or 2 of infantry to be peace keeping policemen in anon threat environment do we hear cries for the culling of a few infantry Battalions and the creation of a gendarmerie?
With you just a thought moment, you explain to the HMG why we now have a CG and not a navy and cannot actually influence events anywhere there is a threat?
I have yet to read a single post where anyone can explain how we meet our FF/DD level commitments and have the ability to put together a war capable TG with any other force mixture than what we are going to get. Not without claiming we can have a 12k tonne Helicopter carier and Aster 30 shooter with full C2 capabilities for less than a 45.
Or a 110M OPV with 2 helos 76mm gun sonar, and Sea Ram for 80 million.
Or claiming that a 76mm gun and CWIS is a credible AAW defence in a threat environment.
Grumpy Out!
Except TD has the army not just re name it’s home regional divisions as adaptable. Will be interesting to we if it improves the pretty poor for e generation in the army I however predict the adaptable army well be seen as the second rate army were those not destined for the top end up.
As for the high tech equipment has that not be driven by the need to significantly reduce head count allowing the tech to take up the slack?
TD said “Does anyone else think the RN grown ups cling on to the standing tasks with a vice like grip so they can constantly demonstrate how stretched they are, have they become a bit of a crutch?”
Didn’t somebody here once try to pass off a list of Army standing tasks as something substantial when about 99% of them were a QM WO2 and a clerk advising some Third World army on how to stack blankets? At least RN standing tasks involve a ship that carries ordnance out on that international arena, that global common, called the sea.
@ APATS
It was a leg pull. I was fishing to see who would bite……
My mother’s family used to run trawlers out of Lowestoft.
Can someone explain to me what is wrong with the RN doing ‘coastguard’, ‘fisheries protection’ and ‘SAR’ duties?
They need to learn the skills, have the kit, and have the free time.
More grouchiness I will play fantasy fleet for a minute on a realistic note.
I would have taken the Pre SDSR deal of 10 C1 T26 2087 Sea Ceptor, Merlin, Oto Melara 5 inch, NSM and CIWS plus 8 C2 same hull 76mm, RAM, 25mm bushmaster typhoon turrets, hull sonar and helo any day.(representative possible fits)
That however disappeared in the SDSR and now if we dropped to 16 escorts we would be lucky to get 3 C2.
Surely a better comparison between ships and the army is the army being told to cut back on Tanks and reducing the number of IFV’s in favour of more protected mobility stuff for lower threat operations?
Yet whenever someone mentions Tanks being needed for high end warfare it’s always “blah, blah, the Fulda Gap is dead etc”, but the alternative suggestion that maybe the RN could replace some high end warships with something a little less shooty for the less complex tasks it’s all “but how will we fight a full scale naval war without them?!”
Or hyprocrisy, as it’s otherwise known.
Surely a better comparison between ships and the army is the army being told to cut back on Tanks and reducing the number of IFV’s in favour of more protected mobility stuff for lower threat operations?
Yet whenever someone mentions Tanks being needed for high end warfare it’s always “blah, blah, the Fulda Gap is dead etc”, but the alternative suggestion that maybe the RN could replace some high end warships with something a little less shooty for the less complex tasks it’s all “but how will we fight a full scale naval war without them?!”
Or hypocrisy, as it’s otherwise known.
Excellent article and one that really does make a key and salient point. There is a minimum size which, if we dip below, we lose too much capability to make worthwhile.
There is a flip side to that coin though. That is that our current numbers 6/13 DD/FF are, simply, not enough to meet the taskings. As we’ve been told on here we’ve pressed any number of disparate grey-painted hulls in patrol duty in the name of administratively ‘ticking a box’. The dits of Dili’s radio calls on such tasking are cringeworthy. Maintaining those numbers, in escort terms, while reducing the LSD fleet by one hull and putting the second LHD at extended readiness is merely perpetuating the existing inadequacy.
Its unforgivably stating the obvious that we need more hulls and we need hulls that can give us multimission capability per deployment. It being noted that combat operations or at least ‘coercive force potential’ does fall into that mission spread…the average third world pirate/drugrunner may be poorly educated as to the relative merits of the 57mm Bofors against the 76mm OTO….but a very visible and sizeable gun turret on the pointy end creating a number of large shell splashes close aboard is one of those comms mediums that translates well into many languages.
Its also facile statement to say that additional resources will be insanely hard to prise out of the treasury. We cannot therefore look forward, with any optimism, to any more than 13 FFs replacing 13 FF’s. The comment has been made this is ‘good’…my view is, the best you can say about that is ‘it could be worse’.
The job then distills down to a simple question: “How do we get more fighty hulls, than the 13 frigates currently plotted that we know to be insufficient, without breaking the budget or stealing funds from other vital budgets”.
If we define the critical-to-deliver capability for T26 is 2087, in the same fashion as PAAMS/Sea Viper is for T45, T26 has to be 8 hulls – no more. The next question then is “is there a way, in the budget, to get a 7000nm, 18knt cruise, main gun, FLAADS, 997, MLTS, MF hull sonar, softkill, CDS, ESM/CESM vessel that can be built in bigger numbers than the tail-less 26′s without the costs of adding a unique 3rd shooty class to the logistics train?”.
……or, shorter, if we have PAAMS and 2087 deployed is it more important for the non-specialist hulls to be T26′s or to be as numerous as possible…if there is another way of deploying that force potential.
As to the point that we are trying to do more than we are funded for I think its important to note that we are already gapping tasking requirements…last time we deigned to contribute a frigate to SNMG???. Hard to see which of our remaining taskings could be considered irrelevant?
@ Opinion3
There is nothing wrong with the RN doing that stuff. Our “borders” start 12nm out. If I were in charge the FPS would be beefier. Of course if I were in charge we would be outside the EU so the FPS would be busy chasing Iberians out of waters.
Opinion 3, absolutely nothing until such roles effect our core war fighting hull numbers to an extent where we can no longer carry them out if required.
X maybe you can explain why Lowestoft has that weird Beatles tribute pub then? Never saw the connection.
Surely a better comparison between the army and Navy is the fact that the army has been told to cut back on things like Challenger and AS90 in favour of lighter forces.
But dare anyone mention the utility of tanks and AS90 in a full on war then immediately a storm of criticism about the Fulda Gap not being a credible threat is thrown up.
Yet do the same about escorts and all of sudden it seems to be a different tune. “How will we fight a high end Naval war with just 10 T23 instead of 13!!!” etc.
Or as it’s otherwise known, Hypocrisy.
@Somewhat Involved makes an excellent case against replacing Frigates with small patrol craft. Small patrol craft are not survivable and have a very limited wartime role.
The case against large patrol craft is not made so well. They are still not as survivable as a frigate but do have a wartime role tucked into an ARG. Even a few limited systems make them more survivable than a standard LSD.
I am happy to let @SI keep his frigates. Keep 13+6 fighting ships. Send one or two _large_ patrol ships into the unfighty areas like West Indies and East and West Africa. In those roles a big patrol ship is *better* than a frigate. That will increase the ability of the 19 fighty ships to cover the Gulf, the Falklands or wherever else it might’kick off’.
Funding wise I think this can be acheived (over 20 or 30 years) from raiding MHPC and RFA bugdets rather than the T26 budget, which I would cheefully let go as it is.
Chris B
Does the Army have standing tasks requiring a CH2 or AS90 lime we do in Gulf, APT(S), FRE, DUTY TAPS, PWO Training, aviation training, Nav training and stll have to be able to generate a standby readiness group?
I wait with baited breath the 365/24/7 operational commitments that the CH2 and AS90 draw down will affect.
ADM Zummalt tried to get a hi-lo mix in the USN:
” An all-High Navy would be so expensive that it would not have enough ships to control the seas. An all-Low Navy would not have the capability to meet certain kinds of threats or perform certain kinds of missions. In order to have both enough ships and good enough ships there had to be a mix of High and Low”
The debate continues:
http://innercolumnist.blogspot.co.uk/2009/02/high-low-mix.html?m=1
http://blog.usni.org/2012/03/09/four-questions-to-shape-our-navy/
At a minute ago you were planning on disposing of the APT(S). And how come suddenly the Navies training counts as a standing task while the Armies does not?
The Army provides ready to deploy reaction forces, just like the Navies FRE and task group. It takes part in a number of UN and NATO peace keeping tasks. Oh and, that whole Afghanistan thing.
What I find the most derisable is how people can keep crying about Typhoon and Tornado, and saying that both need cutting etc, along with Challenger and AS 90, despite the fact all of these assets have been used in their primary roles within the last 10 years. Suggest that they might be needed in the future and it’s swept aside with “we won’t be engaging in any of those sorts of wars that require them,”
Conversely T23 hasn’t sunk many subs lately and nor has Astute, Albion/Bulwark haven’t conducted many Amphibious Assaults lately, T42/45 haven’t shot down many aircraft lately, but suggest that any of these assets might be cut and it’s like someone had walked in at Christmas and pissed all over your kids as they unwrap their presents.
Your position is essentially;
Assets that have been used thoroughly to fight in their main role recently = ripe for cutting, future be damned.
Assets not used thoroughly for their main roles = untouchable, because we might need them one day.
Chris B,
We have not use the nuclear detterent recently either.
You cannot differentiate between operational tasking and exercises I never even mentioned the Neptune Warrior exercises we also have to host and run.
My position is the RN uses far more of its available high end assets in peace time activities dictated by HMG than the other services. The Army has worked bloody hard over the last 20 years and done a sterling job, I habe spent 3 separate 6 month deployments working with them. However in peacetime they have very few HMG operational tasks that require CG2 or AS90, you named precisely none.
While researching hi-lo concept came across this interesting post from Jedi and the RUSI work it is based around. The c2 was only priced as being 10% cheaper than c1. If that is still true of ASW T-26 and tailess T-26 is it worth it? The RUSI work sugests any c2 “General Purpose” ship has to be one third the cost of a c1 or even less.
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/08/23/britain%E2%80%99s-future-strategic-direction-12-%E2%80%93-naval-deterrence-presence/
APATS,
They’ve been used on operations. Surely that is the prime requirement and more important than peace time? And the army runs regular exercises with their equipment, preparing for their main wartime role, so how are these any less valid than the Navy needing ships for exercises?
As for the deterrent, essentially it is in “use” every time it puts to see. It’s a deterrent, thus it works by deterring. If it actually fires it’s not doing it’s job, in a bizarre manner of speaking.
I just don’t understand why so many people hold the position that we can’t replace some warships with patrol ships, because we might need them at a later date, but think it’s ok to cut back on prime fighting assets from the other two services, despite them being more heavily used in the recent past and just as likely to be used in the future.
The only possible answer to that curious dynamic is to say “because their navy”.
Before getting started on whether we need corvettes or GP Forgates I think we need to look at what commitments the RN has now and in the possible future. Off the top of my head we have:
Gulf
Falklands
Home waters
Caribbean
There are also NATO standing TFs but we have not participated in these for a while stating other committments, and we have the current anti-piracy patrols of the Horn of Africa.
Of the above how many need a full spec high end platform? I can see only one and that is the Gulf with a prescident having been set to allow other NATO nations with a stay at home mentality to contributr to its ctanding TFs.. Others would only need said spec level in times of tension and in these cases such a vessel would need to be moved form other tasks.
So duties around the Falklands, in the Caribbean, home waters and anti piracy could be carried out by lower speced platforms, and should with the exception of the last duty be supported by port facilities in these areas, either dedicated or shared. With crew rotation we would need as few as 8 platforms with roughly the following spec.
Air and surface surveillance radar
Medium Calibre gun (BAe 57mm)
2x HMG mounts
2x Fast response launches
SAT comms and Data links to Mil Specs.
Accomodation sufficient for crew and additional space for attached boarding teams etc
To this I would add the ability ot operate a single helo or at least have space for a landing pad.
This platform is not to engage in major hostilities but to carry out patrol and maritime policing duties. Its existence will allow high end platforms to operate and train for the roles they are actually intended but not prevent them from carrying out additional duties if assets are available to do so. They would be the natural decendants of the smaller frigates etc designed for and stationed through out the empire in days gone by.
I do believe there is a place for a “Patrol” vessel in the future RN but this will go against those who belive that all RN vessels should be able to operate in all threat environments but where and what are these threats. This is something often avoided on the Forum. There are some who seem to still believe there are monsters under the bed and see high level threats everywhere. Iran and China are often named but in both cases the threat level is actually very low and will according to most reasonable estimates remain so. Are we going to fight another Falklands war, well not really likely as the Argies assets are poor at present and getting more so. Ideas that Mr Chavez would send his airforce sould are bordering on lunacy. Will hoards of civilains try to invade, well Patrol boats could handle that.
IF we only have high end assets and have to repond to every possible threat howeveer likely we will need a fleet the size of the USN. As it is we will have both a pretty capable CV Group and ARG. By supplimenting these with a number of patrol assets whose role would include mine hunting in addition to the duties above we could probably do with as few as 12. Other tasks such as Ocean Survey should be passed to the RFA or a civilian agency.
As an interim I would like to see 6-8 T-23s retained but stripped of their ASW and AAW systems leading a significant reduction in crew numbers. They will be old platforms by then but able to carry out the patrol none the less whilst the new T-26 are assigned to the CVG anf ARG along with the T-45s. With these platforms we can examine new operating and basing ideas prior to the introduction of newer hulls and get a firm understanding of what capabilites these should have and just as important what are NOT needed. Nations like France, Italy and Spain, all historical maritime powers have lon had to two tier approach to naval vessels and maybe it is time we took a leaf from their book rather than hanging on to our old ways
Chris BG,
Please name the peace time roles that require a CH2 or AS 90? That is why they can mothball including the extended notice for land assets to deploy as the RN and RAF have to be ready to deploy them. ON a separate note we can deploy every single escort not in refit at least twice in 2 years as required by HMG on peace time op tasking.
Lord Jim,
1 Question only. Do you believe that the Geo Political requirements of HMG that require RN support mirror those of France, Italy and Spain?
Well by that line of thinking APATS then APT(N) does not require a T23. So we can automatically mothball one of them. Just hold it at readiness. The Somalia operations don’t need a T23, so that’s another put into readiness. Operations in the med don’t need a T23. So that’s three down. FRE could be covered by a T45. That’s four down. See where I’m going with this?
What’s good for the Goose is good for the gander, no? We could deploy Challengers on peace keeping operations if we wanted to. Nobodies going to mess with 60 tons of the latest armour and a 120mm gun. But we don’t? Why? Because it’s a waste of a high end asset and there are better options.
Likewise with the Navy.
Chris B, APAT(S) still requires a presence as does APT(N) as does Somalia all permanent so where do you get the extra 9 hulls form?
The Army may have different options the RN does not!
Now you see what I am getting at?
Sorry for getting into the discussion quite late;
@ SI: The kind of article I like because you included political aims, cost constraints and capability alternatives in equal measure
- E of Suez is the current focus, but with the planning horizon you mentioned I would say that our own Ocean (the extreme South and North of it included)will gain in relative importance
@ WiseApe, RE
“The US can afford to build Burkes and LCSes at the same time, but we can’t, so we should stick to the full 13 Type 26s”
- I think they have hit the same kind of fleet balancing problem that (fundamentally) we are discussing, even though “on the surface of it” it looks different
- namely, the LCS and Zumwalt classes are both specialist ships, optimised for effects on or near coast line (OPVs are also specialist ships, in the sense of not being GP – Jed, I think it was, gave a good definition for GP)
- without modifying the current plans the surface fleet will end up 50/50 coastal and blue water, meaning that the latter capability will be much diminished; How does that fit in with the Pivot to Pacific which has plenty of blue water?
RE ” I’ve never seen a price for Sampson – a large part of the £1 billion pricetag of T45?”
- some one else might be in the know, but I have seen Sampson/ Aster quoted as half of the 600m build cost (there was no link to an authorative source, though)
- I bet that the 400m difference (1 bn a piece with prgrm costs included)includes a lot of Sampson – went our own way – and some Aster – as we stuck with the shared prgrm all the way – so the half of total estimate would not move that much?
Hi Simon, Seawolf only became a capable system when they borrowed the low-level tracking radar from Rapier, RE
“Perhaps a couple of Rapier batteries would suffice?”
Also, SeaRAM has an anti-surface capability quite far out, meaning that the installed gun can be much smaller and something else (hangar?) becomes feasible
Hi ST, RE what you picked as a quote
“The c2 was only priced as being 10% cheaper than c1. If that is still true of ASW T-26 and tailess T-26 is it worth it? The RUSI work sugests any c2 “General Purpose” ship has to be one third the cost of a c1 or even less.”
- someone on TD quoted 2087 as £ 20m a piece. If you strip that off but keep the stern launch (+RHIB)for later addition of a towed array, you are only halfway to getting your 10% (assuming 350-400m for a T26)
- it must be a reflection on how hard the RN has tried to match the target price, that not only the 7 sets at sea, but also the the 8th which is currently held for training, will go to sea on new hulls (eventually)
- building on that, we will be well into the 30′s before the last T23 bows out… I presume the T27s will slot into the intermediate building slots so that A. the utility from T23 upgrades will be maximised, and B. the T26/7 build programme can be executed with the slowest economic drum beat possible
On RUSI target price, the Black Swan was under-priced in that MoD “research” paper (which came first of the two papers, btw?), but that would be about what you get for a third of the currently targeted T26 price tag
Chris, you can put a 60 ton tank in storage, in fact, it’s common.
But it is an entirely different matter to house a 3,000 ton frigate in a warehouse. It’ll take a drydock.
Massive difference in scale and support structures. A tank won’t require scarfolding for one. Civilian boats warehouse often, but they are much smaller and lighter.
One thing I have noticed is that while people say “Patrol Vessel” here, they sure dispatch them to some really non “Patrol Vessel” places like the Gulf of A or off the waters of Iran.
With a weight limit of around 600 tons, if you want a decent fit of weapons on your ship, something has to give, and that something is usually range. However, if you’re going to deploy halfway around the world, then you can’t sacrifice range, which backlashes into the weapons and capabilities fit itself. Either/or.
That is also the reason why most “Long Range PV” recommendations here push for a bigger ship, to try and squeeze both range and fit into a box that can fit both.
Just a thought – we are always seem to talk about reducing the RN’s duties (me included) such as giving fisheries protection to another agency.
Would it actually be more efficient to give other agency duties to the Royal Navy – the point being made a single ship on station can do multiple roles. This would be a way of increasing the Navy’s budget and ability to scale if needed (i.e. training junior officers etc). Also, common vessel designs and support arrangements would bring cost benefits.
I’m thinking about the RN taking over:
- The HM Revenue and Customs Cutters (5 ships)
- British Antarctic Survey (2 ships)
- Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (3 ships)
Also, has anyone looked at the cost of the provision of SAR from a OPV Helicopter, which is also on other fishery / custom duties? Not sure how ridiculous this would be? No base costs etc.
APATS,
“…Not without claiming we can have a 12k tonne Helicopter carier and Aster 30 shooter with full C2 capabilities for less than a 45…”
Ahem, I didn’t put the C2 in there, you did
Lord Jim,
Keeping the newest 6-8 T23 (stripped) is actually a pretty good idea.
How much would it cost to SLEP these?
ACC,
I believe Sampson is about £100m, each tube is £1m and each missile is £1m = ~£200m for Sea Viper. Obviously that excludes the R&D already written off within the T45 total costs.
Thanks about the SeaRAM/Rapier – I think this would be my cheap anti-air/anti-ship system on my T26-BASIC.
Observer,
I’m aware of that, I was using the term mothball somewhat tongue in cheek, in the sense of “find somewhere to park it and let it rot,”. Obviously we’re not going to take four ships and just dump them. The point is that APATS’s argument is that because a Challenger is not needed on a peace keeping task we can afford to essentially bin it for anything other than a major, major war, but apparently that principle does not apply in reverse to a T23 for “insert any number of tenuous arguments that could just as easily apply to the Challenger here”.
APATS,
The tasks “need” to be covered, but how you go about doing that is up for debate. You don’t need a T23 to cover APT(N), so you find something else that can it do cheaper. Bob’s your uncle, task covered.
The trouble with this whole patrol ship thing is people constantly pushing the spec somewhere that it doesn’t need to go. You don’t need a CIWS to chase drug runners, Somalia fishing trawlers or to do stop and search missions in the med. Something along the lines of the Wave tankers or the new MARS, but minus a lot of the complicated gubbins that goes with them.
Or screw it, expand the RFA by increasing the order number of MARS, with the foreknowledge that they’ll pick up a lot of the less dangerous (relatively speaking) patrols, while still having a wartime use. You can get two for the expected price of one T26, lovely job.
Everybody else is having to economise. The army, through choice or coercion (or a little bit of both) is cutting back on the heavy stuff to move towards this new engagement model. The RAF is putting radars on business jets, and gradually spending more money on things like transport and ELINT in support of the ground forces.
You can’t have the last service just sit in the middle of the room and protest about all its biggest and shiniest toys not being traded in for something a little more cash flow friendly when everyone else is.
Chris,
“The trouble with this whole patrol ship thing is people constantly pushing the spec somewhere that it doesn’t need to go. You don’t need a CIWS to chase drug runners”
The trouble is that its not being recognised that the ship that is sending off sea boats to upset Somali skiffs one day can be sat off Latakia a few days later rendering assistance/evac to friendly nationals. Sitting in a threat littoral you very definitely DO want a minimum level of self defence….otherwise you have a ship sat offshore waiting until it can be escorted in…which, if just for the cost of a Phalanx and a decent softkill fit, is absurd.
Chris B,
But Somalian pirate chasing is not the only thing the ships in the region do is it? They are there for some serious “heavy” presence aren’t they?
Is the Caribbean patrol not something a little similar. Yes, there’s the drug chasing and the hurricane relief but our presence there is also to do with the fact that we own islands there and are making out presence felt regardless of the local nation’s lawlessness.
I sort of understand both your and SI’s arguments and think that if the only requirement for us being near Somalia and in the Caribbean is for “patrol” tasks then yes, by all means, use a patrol craft (not sure how you’d get a short, low-range ship out there without it essentially being frigate sized, but hey), but if we need to be there for other reasons to provide an emergency defensive force for example then I think we need to up the capability of the ship we have on station.
Hi Simon, I am not in favour of the stripping down idea.
Wiki says about SLEPs “The class are currently going through mid-life refits which last 12–18 months and cost £15-20m”
- Artisan is done in the same go, so one can only assume that it is in the figure
- conversely, CAMM will be fitted later, so probably extra on top
So even if you only did the eight (with 2087) and skipped the oldest five and ran them to ground without deep refit, that will be
- going on to the end of this decade, but only cost “half a T26″
- new build programme (assuming planned numbers) will run for another decade
Money well spent?
Can’t help thinking Chris B (and TD) are right about the RN’s seeming attitude, of unless its a top notch warfighing asset it has no place in the RN.
What (it has to be said burns me up about this attitude), is completly ignores its own history.
Blackwall frigates blockaded France in the napoleonic wars. Napoleon himslf blaimed them more than Trafalger for his defeat. 3rd rate ships were frequently sent on missions that they would not risk a 1st rate on.
Flower and castle class corvettes in ww2, were vastly more use use than any of the battlewagons, which pretty much sat out ww2 apart from being sunk by aircraft or shore bombardment.
Stuff like Corvettes and the escort carrier, got precious little thanks, and were dumped ASAP after the war.
Sometimes the RN still talks like it’s tooling up to re fight Jutland this time with, and verses Aircraft and subs. In effect the all battle ship fleet.
In the modern case ‘If it can’t herd elephants it no use to us’. seems to be the official view.
Chris B
The point is that APATS’s argument is that because a Challenger is not needed on a peace keeping task we can afford to essentially bin it for anything other than a major, major war
That is not my argument at all. My point is that why do people argue that the RN should lose escorts and buy OPVs ad thus lose capability despite Escorts having peace time Ops roles; yet nobody ever suggests mothballing heavy armour which has no peace time operational role at all.
My opinion is we should maintain both.
Some question occur to me:-
what is the ‘faulda gap’ scenario the RN want all this stuff for?
What does a high naval war look like?
what is the scenario that needs all this kit?
Who are our potential enemies whose fleet we could not destroy with a couple of SSN?
Why not reduce the surface fleet to a big ‘heavy’ long range coastguard.
After all RN haven’t sunk a sub since ww2.
Thoroughly minded and brilliantly stated. Well done, SI!
The minimum requirements on equipment for this GP-frigate in fact equal a former definition I made myself as “irreducables”, parts of equipment without which we should not discuss surface vessels. And I’m well in your boat pointing at long-term planning cycles, something which is constantly messed up IMO.
The question is, will a sensible approach alone help us out of the current dilemma, which is basically cut & delay. Over a 30 years planning cycle, the results of current disastrous planning are getting into effect 10 years later. According to current tendencies, in 2020, we will fall down to around 12-16 frigates and destroyers. Zero chance, the wellfare-state-obsessed politician of any colour will add new vessels to the fleet.
We can solve this problem by simply making a commitment to at least add one surface combatant per year to the fleet, following the japanese model. Sounds easy so far. The problem arises, when we hit tight budgetary years, then the brilliant £300m+ frigate gets cancelled.
We need a straight way ahead. If T26 produces a GP-hull form, costing £200-240m in it’s basic form – which is the bottom-barrier from which cancellation produces short-term savings – then we should be fine with that. The top-class equipment can be taken over from older vessels or funded in separate budgets, just like the “Typhoon capabiltiy upgrade”.
Still, the question remains, if the RN could and should handle the low-spec maritime security tasks? IMO, we should have a coast guard as the prepositioned and dispersed policing element, and the RN as the highly-mobile strategic reserve.
Ok – any idea yet what the cost per hull of the Type 26? What will be the difference between tail and no tail?
I am no wondering about AAW T26 variants; even if it means going sans hangar. I wonder if T26 will have parallel hull sides…
@Lord Jim
“Nations like France, Italy and Spain, all historical maritime powers have lon had to two tier approach to naval vessels and maybe it is time we took a leaf from their book rather than hanging on to our old ways”
Spain has only the Canary Islands, Italy only Pantelleria and Lampedusa as “overseas territories”. So, the comparision is apples to oranges.
The fact that France has a second tier is much due to their possessions in the southern Indian and Pacific Oceans, where it makes sense to have a local policing force. The french vessels are also a long shot away from any direct threat.
At the same time, the british possessions are concentrated in the Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean Territory and Pitcairn are clearly not a top-priority when HMG talks about policing the oceans. The last crown colony requiring extensive policing and giving an equal benefit was Hong Kong. When we donated HK to China, the second tier vessels used there (Peacock-class) where sold.
Apart from this, we currently have a second tier of vessels. So, “our old ways” are actually not that much different to the French.
Worth another look is the question, if protecting sea lanes is not a spot, where private venture using governmental approval could take over more efficiently. Something, which is very much “old ways” to the RN, wiki “Bombay Marine”. Currently, there are some signs into this direction.
Swimming Trunks,
If you mean 2087 by “tail” then about £60m each in 2001. Could be quite expensive in today’s money!