A Guest Post by Somewhat Involved
Over the past months, there has been much talk, discussion and debate on ways to generate additional capability for the Royal Navy. The cold, hard fact of limited (and likely still dwindling) resources and steady state, if not increasing commitments placed upon the UK Armed Forces, is well accepted and there has been a lot of creative debate about generating additional hulls to extend our reach, presence and influence in any number of theatres around the world.
Unfortunately these debates often side-track into one of two avenues – either fantasy fleet time, where we dream up any number of combinations of exciting ships, aircraft and concepts together with truly inspired cost estimates, or simple debate on what the Royal Navy actually does for us in exchange for the many millions spent (wasted?) on it. The problem is that in the first case, we lose track of why we were discussing ships in the first place, and in the second, begin to assign capabilities and requirements to hulls on a more aggressively cost-based basis. There is a wider misunderstanding, I think, of just what it is that Royal Navy ships do for you when deployed, and until this is fully understood, I think the debates will be skewed.
It has, interestingly enough, been quite challenging to try and relate the doctrine, lessons and concepts we believe in so dearly into clear English, and therefore justify our need for high end combatants, and why patrol boats just won’t do.
We have an almost blind faith in our own reasons for existence and assume that others see and understand our effects and capabilities as we do. It’s easy to entertain the wider public with Navy Days or the occasional piracy, drug bust or homecoming story. But we often fail to communicate the wider task of the RN to the more widely read, and daresay more influential elements outside our own environment, so this is an attempt to do just that. No insults intended, and this is entirely The World According To Me.
So, two parts to this post. The first, an attempt to explain what we do, why we do it, and why we should keep on doing it. The second, in response to an excellent post by IXION, is to explore the requirements for the General Purpose Frigate, why this will serve us far better than a Patrol Ship, and why it is necessary for the Royal Navy over the decades to come.
Contents
Bang for your Buck
I am not going to trot out the ‘island nation’ storyline, but the UK does have vested interests overseas. These may be either purely selfish, or selfishly political. In the first case, we are dependent on foreign energy reserves and our primary gas supply is likely to be (if not already) shipped from Qatar. Our economy is also hugely dependent upon cheap manufactured goods from Far Eastern nations and food from many others, and those goods, shipped by sea, pass through contested waters, piracy-infested waters and narrow waters along the shortest and most economical route. I freely admit that the LIKLIHOOD of closing those supply routes is low, but the CONSEQUENCES for our economy are potentially severe, especially given our tendency to only maintain a week or so reserve of gas, food and other essentials. The ensuing RISK is reason enough then to maintain some form of deployable maritime military capability.
In the second case, we have a strongly vested interest in maintaining our standing amongst the international community, in a dozen different ways. If you think we should all just get along and not worry what other countries think, then ask yourself why Russia and China are so stubbornly blocking any course of united international action to bring the Syrian situation under control. International ‘standing’ is not just an essential part of the international diplomatic game, but a position that can influence or even dictate market responses, encourage or discourage international investment, have immediate and long term economic effects, and ultimately win or lose votes at the ballot box. Syria is the current problem, but UK influence and standing has helped shape three significant conflicts and several minor ones in the past 15 years alone. We cannot afford to sit back and let others model the world to their advantage.
Naval presence has always had a disproportionate diplomatic effect, and it is one we harness often. A naval blockade is a powerful statement of intent as Israel has proven, and as Iran threatens. A warship simply entering a new region of water has a similar effect, as Iran again proved with the deployment of a frigate and tanker to the Mediterranean, however briefly. Naval presence can also provide reassurance, as the Armilla Patrol did in the 1980’s and as an international force of ships has done in the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor off Somalia. Small though the physical presence might be, it has nonetheless a disproportionate effect. For this reason (almost alone), we have maintained a presence that began over a hundred years ago, became the Armilla Patrol and continues today as OPERATION KIPION. As an aside, one of the reasons for the disproportionate effect of a single ship is the inherent mobility of that asset and the relative difficulty of locating it if it does not want to be found.
There are two more points to make here – US cooperation, and ‘lesser’ nation engagement. The US has significant political and diplomatic capital invested in the Middle East and Mediterranean. As much as the US focus may be shifting towards China and the Far East, Iran remains a threat and a factor that they cannot leave to ‘others’ to ‘sort out’. But their resources are reducing just as ours are, and they lack capabilities in some areas in which we have an expertise. MCM and ASW are two such capabilities, and as recently proven we can stand alongside US escorts in air defence capability. And do not underestimate the fact that we are one of the only nations to be able to constantly maintain at least one warship in the region, at a high state of readiness and capability, without any international assistance. We are dependable in that respect. By being able to interoperate with the US we gain a lot – access to US intelligence, access to US technologies, a recognition of our ability as partners rather than ‘also-rans’. It also puts us in the same diplomatic court as the US which, as I’m sure you all appreciate, has both its advantages and disadvantages. Everything is connected, and we are not yet in a position where ditching the US as a political, military and strategic partner is even a remotely sensible possibility.
I should probably keep the word count down but ought to mention NATO. NATO is still fundamentally a US supported organisation, but one in which we retain significant influence at the highest levels. Again, staying out of NATO isn’t an option, especially as NATO continues to evolve, and given the way it is evolving it is possible, even likely that the role of the US will dwindle further. Therefore I would argue that we need to keep our status within NATO, which only comes from an ability to contribute to NATO’s military effectiveness.
And so to the ‘lesser’ nations. I mean this not in a derogatory way, but to group those nations where we still have a vested interest, but they are not a part of the wider US-UK-Rest-of-the-world game largely confined to the Middle East. Here you can group the UK Dependent Territories, the Caribbean Nations, the Falklands, and the West African nations that either have significant oil supplies or are waypoints on the international drug trade flowing from South America. In many cases these nations have their own military forces, particularly the Gulf of Guinea nations tackling piracy, or Cape Verde tackling the drug trade. The effect of a visiting warship is diplomatically high profile, and is a political gesture by HMG that the nation in question is important enough to merit such a visit. Refusal of a ship visit is diplomatically serious, as Brazil and Argentina have proven recently. More often, visits are combined with goodwill gestures such as exchanges of personnel, and have a heavy diplomatic flavour with the UK Ambassador inevitably not only invited to the Official Reception, but often hosting it using the ship as a convenient marquee. Furthermore, the Royal Navy is still seen by many to be the international gold standard of maritime capability, and training exercises in stop and search procedures, counter piracy and even the basics of shiphandling and damage repair yield significant benefits in international relations.
Thus the RN has always believed, spurred on by feedback through diplomatic and military channels, that a single warship can have an effect that is disproportionate to its immediate military capability. However, that capability does need to be matched to the potential events, outcomes and consequences of a particular deployment, and thus a patrol ship may not be the best option.
Survivability
I want to quickly look at the concept of survivability. I suspect few would be happy with the idea that a ship can simply ‘survive’ an initial engagement – no, it should not only survive, but emerge supreme the other side! Huzzah!! I think this is less significant than we like to pretend.
In open ocean warfare, any warship will expect to operate as part of a task force, and thus enjoy a level of additional protection. There is a huge array of complex, challenging and lethal weapons available, and anything less than an air warfare destroyer would be hard pressed to last long alone in the face of determined attack. But open ocean warfare is currently a relatively a distant possibility, so we rely on the task force concept and do not need to arm every ship with SeaViper.
In the Gulf scenario, ‘survivability’ has another meaning. If a certain Gulf state were to, as some so eloquently put it, ‘kick off’, then we can expect a sudden and possibly overwhelming attack. Many observers have speculated on mixed raids of short ranged land based and ship based missiles, suicide craft, WIG craft, suicide WIG craft, mines, torpedoes and small arms. Scary stuff. But if such an event was to take place, then the ship must be able to defend itself long enough for help to arrive – and with the degree of supporting strike power available in the region (currently USS ENTERPRISE, USS EISENHOWER and imminently USS STENNIS) help will be close by. Such attacks will have political, diplomatic and military advanced warning, and are unlikely to suddenly erupt out of the blue.
The fact that a unit is therefore not easily knocked out means that an opponent must divert significant resources to eliminate that threat. Against a mobile target, this is made significantly more challenging. Coordinating attacks with asymmetric platforms adds another layer of complexity. All of these must then be balanced against available resources and the area to be controlled/dominated, leading to a measure of DETERRENCE by both sides, equal and balanced.
In looking at self defence capability later on, this then is what I mean by ‘survivability’.
Patrol Ship vs. General Purpose Frigate
In defining a ‘Patrol Ship’, it is important to focus on what we mean by this and make a clear distinction between this and the General Purpose Frigate. Although there are many different interpretations of both concepts, there is a fundamental difference relating to task and requirement for survivability (that word again). The Patrol Ship does not expect to operate in a hostile environment, whereas the General Purpose Frigate must be able to do so.
IXION made the excellent point that a Patrol Ship need not be small, indeed we were looking at proposals for ships the size of a Bay class. By far the biggest driver behind ship size is propulsion, followed by stability. A small ship will be forced to make compromises in engine design, endurance, speed and stability, either by adopting a smaller propulsion plant, a smaller fuel reserve, or by the simple ship design laws that mean a smaller ship moves more than a larger one for a given sea state. Stability is not only desirable for operating boats and aircraft, but for the effective operation of weapons systems and sensors. And where radars are concerned, the higher the radar, the greater its range. Our areas of operation necessarily include regions where the distance between ports is significant, and the weather is often poor, occasionally dangerous, and this tends to favour the larger hulls over the smaller. Advances in technology and the efficiency of power plants will doubtless make ships and crews smaller, but there is little to be saved by trying to cram your capability into a smaller hull. Steel is cheap, air is free – the cost of any ship is not the hull, but the systems.
Any ship operating on ‘patrol’ duties, inclusive of CP, CN and other such tasks, needs a minimum outfit:
- Surface surveillance radar.
- Electro-optic systems, also for surveillance.
- Small calibre gun/guns, for interdiction and enforcement.
- A minimum of two quick-reaction seaboats for boarding duties.
- Sufficient accommodation for embarked forces.
- Effective voice and data communication systems, equivalent to broadband data rates.
However, in order for a ship to be considered ‘survivable’ within the constraints of that proposed above, and thus become the General Purpose Frigate, there is a necessary minimum equipment fit. This would be:
- A medium ranged surveillance radar capable of tracking air and surface contacts, to provide warning of attack.
- Electronic intercept equipment, to provide warning of attack.
- An air self-defence system, which should be able to cope with at least 3-4 aircraft or missiles arriving simultaneously. Such a system should be able to protect another vessel positioned down-threat of the firing unit. This system should also incorporate decoy systems, where hard-kill of missiles is not possible or is less effective than soft-kill.
- A combat computer system that can process all data including that received from off ship.
- Flight deck and hangar, large enough to operate any combination of manned or unmanned types envisioned.
- Redundancy in systems to permit damage control, and appropriate damage control systems.
In order to counter an underwater threat, the most practical option currently available is to simply blast noise into the water column and flood an area with radar, making life as difficult for the submariner as possible. In noisy, cluttered and congested littoral waters, submariners will be focused far more on keeping their boat safe than trying to close for an attack solution. Ship launched torpedoes have limited usefulness, but anti-torpedo systems, now emerging, have far more value. Offensive littoral ASW is best conducted with air assets, but a ship in the General Purpose role with an active sonar system and torpedo launch capability is still a valuable asset.
There are more General Purpose payloads that should be considered; these are very much ‘nice to have’, but are comparatively cheap and easy to provide for. Sufficient storage space, cranes and/or cargo management systems can handle SF boats and stores, autonomous underwater/surface/air vehicles and any number of wacky, containerised ideas. The idea of a payload bay and launch/recovery system has been discussed before, but such abilities belong firmly in the General Purpose role and not that of high-end combatant.
Of course, the RN’s current combatants, Type 23 and Type 45, have all these capabilities bar the last. Type 45 is an extreme case, but the Type 23 is a very capable General Purpose design. The GP Concept in its basic form lacks land attack capability, anti-ship firepower, blue-water ASW capability or anything more than self-defence abilities, but as a naval unit it can still achieve a significant degree of ‘presence’, disproportionate to its actual capability and yet able to deliver the effects that HMG requires in all current theatres, from the Gulf to the South Atlantic.
The Patrol Ship Myth
One of the reasons why I started this post was to try and put down the idea that a small warship of corvette size or smaller, as so often postulated here, could have a reasonable effect in the theatres described above. I would hope by now that it is obvious that such a ship could not function effectively east of Suez in anything other than an utterly benign environment OR ELSE become a vulnerable unit requiring protection. With the sole exception of counter-piracy off Somalia, any ship in this theatre needs to bring, at a minimum, those capabilities which would allow it to survive if hostilities were to commence. On top of that, to make any contribution to the wider security issues as discussed, we then need those niche capabilities that allow us to maintain the position we have established.
In the rest of the world a Patrol Ship might suffice for all conceivable tasks, including reassurance, presence, training, diplomacy, counter-piracy, counter-drugs and so on. This is on the assumption that you no longer require any form of deterrence in those areas; try as you might, a Patrol Ship has no deterrent value against combat forces because it lacks survivability. The challenge then becomes how you split your fleet, how you balance your numbers of high end combatants, General Purpose Frigates, and Patrol Ships.
All RN ships can deliver the Patrol Task. It may not be efficient or the best use of resources at a particular time, and it is an expensive option. However, given the high tempo of operations today in the face of reduced platform availability, we are able to ensure that, even if one ship suffers a major defect or delay, another effective naval combatant is available to replace it and maintain the commitment. If high end combatants are exchanged for Patrol Ships, although you increase the numbers of hulls available you nonetheless reduce the total number of combatants and that increases the likelihood of being unable to maintain a commitment.
Where the risk of conflict is high, the need for ships goes beyond simply maintaining just one on station. In addition to the ship outbound to relieve the first, and the previous incumbent returning home, there is a need to have additional ships ready to form the Response Force Task Group. This formation is not kept permanently formed, but consists of ships at readiness undertaking other tasks, from which they can be pulled if required. By diluting the pool with smaller ships, none of which can have an effect in a Task Group, the ability to form the RFTG also reduces significantly.
Finally, force planning and hull numbers goes well beyond short-term thinking of five, ten or fifteen years. The planners must be able to ensure that the RN remains a balanced force capable of delivering the anticipated level of commitment 30, 40, even 50 years into the future. Whilst many have discarded the DCDC ‘Future Character of Conflict’ document as so much piffle, even they cannot disagree with the assessment that with booming world populations, dwindling resources and an overwhelming dependence on the sea, the world is not likely to be more stable in future. Consider the worldwide impact of everyone in India and China demanding an iPad – the resources to manufacture high tech devices, such as rare earth elements, are already dwindling. By pursuing short term cost savings over long term strategic thinking, a nation is guaranteed to be at a disadvantage in future and must accept a dwindling, less significant role that is unlikely to bring economic benefit. The alternative, as Germany has done, is to establish oneself as an industrial and/or economic powerhouse able to weather all problems, but I do not believe this to be a viable strategy alone.
My point then is that although smaller ships might be available in greater numbers, they are not necessarily suitable for the task they are required to undertake, now or in the future.
The Jack of All Trades – The Future Surface Combatant
My opinion is that the ship type we need for our day-to-day global tasking is a vessel in the frigate class, for reasons of range, endurance, speed and stability. Even if this vessel carried only the most basic sensors and weapons, a minimum size is nonetheless required. However, it does need to be an effective combatant if it is to fulfil 90% of the roles expected of it, and allow for a balanced, manageable Fleet.
The Joint Concept Note on the Black Swan design makes the point that ships need to be able to accept a variety of systems in their lifetime which should, where practical, be modular in design and able to ‘plug and play’ with the parent’s ship’s existing hardware. I agree – but this is hardly ground-breaking stuff. We do this already in many different systems, land, sea and air, and is hardly a design constraint. The key requirement, however, is space – a small ship will have this in short supply and may even face limitations in power generation to support any bolt-on system.
The Type 23 frigate is, in my opinion, one of the better designs of such a vessel yet evolved. It has been by total fluke – a ship conceived in the Cold War, it has been adapted and updated through its lifetime to become an asset that today can be deployed to any of the key theatres discussed above and still be effective for any of the varied roles it is called upon to do. It is far from perfect – sensors, guns and many of the internal systems are not effective in today’s environment, but it provides a basic platform exemplifying the General Purpose Frigate idea upon which I intend to build. It has good range, fuel efficient engines, a high top speed, good manoeuvrability and a useful sensor/weapons fit. It also has limited capacity for further growth, no room for additional boats or embarked forces, the gun is inadequate for current standards of precision attack ashore, its counter-FIAC defences are questionable and it is getting old. Critically it may not reign supreme alone, but it would SURVIVE and thus remains an effective combatant.
A vessel fulfilling my General Purpose requirements discussed above is what I believe we need as our future combatant to replace the Type 23. This can then be upgraded to a more specialist role according to requirement. The options for this are many and varied, but in simple terms a quietened variant, fitted with a towed array sonar system and with the appropriate aircraft embarked, makes a potent dedicated ASW platform. The alternative is to optimise for above-water warfare, including but not confined to anti-ship missiles, land attack missiles, appropriate calibre main gun for NGS and anti-surface duties, advanced electronic intelligence equipment, etc. There is even potential to specialise in anti-air warfare, although we already have the Type 45 in service for this purpose. These are dedicated weapons systems, and require unique hull mounting and integration space such as VLS silos or turret/gunbay structures. However, they need not be permanently embarked or even fitted, thus presenting opportunities for modular systems to be introduced along the lines of the Black Swan concept. The ship can then fulfil the Patrol task, whilst retaining the minimum fighting capability necessary to allow for rapid redeployment.
Summary
I hope to have presented a different view of today’s tasking and requirements, and the associated need to maintain a minimum number of combatants with certain minimum capabilities. I have tried to avoid the ‘fantasy fleet’ trap, and hope instead to have offered some different points for debate. I strongly believe that to maintain our current international standing, in the interests of assuring the UK’s future influence and stability, there are commitments that must be met. That requires a minimum level of investment in combat capability, for which maritime forces remain the most effective.
@ RT re the world’s sexiest uniform
Hold your foot up as we say around here. Why would the MoD issue you with a female USMC dress blue uniform?
http://www.yourcelebsource.com/gallery/var/albums/C/Catherine%20Bell/Pics/2010%20and%20earlier/Screen%20Captures/JAG/e1b_Catherine_Bell_JAG_9.jpg?m=1311638689
Also, the news this week is that HMS York and Edinburgh are up for sale because they are to be decommissioned next year anyway but are apparently still in really good condition, they did after all each have refits quite recently.
Can’t remember who suggested it (quite a while ago) but who’s up for keeping them in service for another 5-10 years, all gun weapons fit, used as second rate escorts?
I am now measuring to see if a second Mk8 could be mounted in place of Sea Dart…….
EDIT: Yes it could fit. Remove the hanger. Still an expensive ship to run.
X,
Wowzer! (Mrs RT safely watching some TV show she’s recorded, plus she trusts me and has a large knife if ever I get too excited).
Does she come with a sister, and preferably from a redneck state so that our politics and views on gun ownership coincide? I’ve never tried a Democrat, I’m pretty sure I can charm my way into her good books if necessary, but it’s so much easier with Republicans. They are almost pathetically grateful to be reminded of a proper country.
I have tried to return the favour by Googling for images of the 16th /5th Lancers mess dress, but extraordinarily this shows nothing but a few badges of other run of the mill cavalry regiments, and lots of pictures of girls with floaty chiffon dresses. I can’t work it out. Either Google is having a brain fart, or my search history is loading itself.
What you should be viewing is the most drop dead gorgeous uniform a young man could possibly wear, one that slightly disconcertingly won a round of applause for me on the stage of the Warsaw Opera Company when I went up to hand over some flowers to a ballerina in 1988 on a pre end-of-Cold-War little exchange that we did (and I took her out to dinner afterwards, but sadly accompanied by a couple of Polish heavies to make sure I behaved myself).
Didn’t the Argies turn their T42′s in to Commando carriers?
@Swimming Trunks
Yes I believe they turned one in-to a troop carrier (albeit a heavily armed one) whilst cannibalising the other one.
Id keep the main gun, close in weapons and light calibre stuff on our remaining two and run them in-to the ground. Surely without missiles and associated radar they would have smaller crews and be cheaper to run.
They are around 27 years old, so yeah not exactly young, but plenty of countries have ships in service for way longer.
@Jonesy “Chuck, the small problem with that is range. You’ve got about 8000yds in your average LWT at about 1500yds a minute flat out. So thats a running time of about 5 minutes. If your target is an oil rig or a light house it will stay agreeably stationary so you can fire your torpedoes at that maximum range.”
The scenario I keep coming back to is some thing like the Campbeltown’s attack on St. Nazaire, a terrorist attack using a medium to large merchant. A suicide attack, that might be against a CVN in San Diego, the SSBN base in Kingsbay (or Britain), or the Iraqi Oil terminals at the North end of the Persian Gulf.
The situation is most likely to develop when the patrol vessel attempts to stop and board the vessel. Ranges are likely to be close. My current thinking is that, about 4,000 yards is a good standoff distance, outside the effective range of most forms of improvised weaponry that might be added to a merchant, but within the effective range of a light weight torpedo.
I would like to put them on all Coast Guard cutters larger than 150 feet to insure that an asset is likely to be in virtually every port. That is going to be about 91 vessels when the current program is finished.
For the UK, they could probably mount them on the Scimitar and Archers or their replacements, as well as larger vessels.
Heavy weight torpedoes would be more effective, but it is impractical to distribute them as widely as I believe we need the capability to stop a ship.
http://chuckhillscgblog.net/2011/01/20/a-tale-of-two-harbor-defense-organizations-part-one/
http://chuckhillscgblog.net/2011/02/03/a-tale-of-two-harbor-defense-organizations-part-one-2/
http://chuckhillscgblog.net/2011/02/08/a-tale-of-two-harbor-defense-organizations-part-three/
This source indicates max range of the MU-90 Light Weight torpedo is 11,000 meters at 50 knots and 23,000 at 29 knots. http://www.naval-technology.com/contractors/missiles/eurotorp/
Challanger
I suggested the t23 patrol version to a thunderous silence!:)
@ RT
Google Catherine Bell………
@ Swimming Trunks
Yes. The problem with T42 is the machinery. Not using the Olympus engines and just the Tynes means a top speed of just 18kts. Fitting Speys may be possible but then we are spending money. Fitting Speys and then automating everything would cut down on a few crew. Not worth doing me thinks.
X,
how disappointing, she is both British and a Hollywood actress.
Do you know, I very nearly threw everything in life into the corner when I stopped for some coffee in a place called St George, Utah, and the most perfect vision of loveliness was the waitress, filling me up with all of the coffee I could drink for $5. There was no one else in the little diner, so we had lots of time for me to practice my ability to sell snow to Eskimos and to do my little trick of not blinking for several minutes while looking into her eyes and telling her how lovely she was. And then it turned out that her father owned the land behind the diner, and we could shoot off several hundred rounds of 5.56mm from a variety of privately owned M16 replicas. Christ on a bike, that was a good day. What else do you need in life than someone who makes a super-model look as though she has been repeatedly battered with the ugly shovel, lots of land and shooting, and a girl who can speed load a magazine quicker than anything?
I was meant to be driving about 500 miles back up to Fallon, but I didn’t really get going until about 11 pm, had to drive through the night, and was a dog on parade the following morning (still present though – never missed a parade in my life).
@ RT
Is this any better?
http://www.thesniper.us/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/scr_081104-D-XXXXX-004.jpg
@ Challenger 18:49
I think our views are pretty similar
On the Archers, I feel slightly nervous going forward with a coastal patrol / coast guard presence as it is now so an off the shelf enhanced Archer replacement is a sensible idea. All major ports in the UK should be covered by some RN /CG type presence that has an aggressive self defence capability against unexpected challenges. Its just the world we live in. I cite Mumbai as one example
” Our definition of a mothership is a logistical supply and repair, command and control, and reconnaissance enabler for naval forces to forward deploy smaller platforms in forward theaters to address irregular warfare environments. The desired purpose of a mothership is to establish a mobile forward operating base in contested seas that coordinates regional maritime domain awareness through unmanned systems, and persistent maritime presence for manned platforms. The mothership represents the networked command core at sea supporting maritime manned networks for peacetime presence and engagement, and unmanned networks for maritime information dominance.If we use the example of a Whidbey Island class Dock Landing Ship, the mothership would utilize a powerful radar system and electronic suite for tracking regional maritime traffic, conceptionally something like JLENs optimized for tracking maritime traffic instead of cruise missiles, and rooted to the mothership which acts as the network core. Additionally the mothership would support 4 small surface combatants (what we call SSC-135s) with the size and well deck docking capabilities of the ~135 ft LCU-1600s, allowing for 4 to be carried on the LSD-41s instead of LCUs”
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2008/06/international-littoral-strike-group-to.html
X,
latish now (in the UK at least), and Mrs RT has already once come to look over my shoulder and to ask if I have done the budgeting for next year (which I have not, due to looking at your distractions and trying to Google my own mess dress). Have to say I’m happy at home, and Mrs RT can knock the socks off anything a middle aged man is likely to be offered elsewhere, plus she’s my best friend and the mother of the little darlings.
Have to say though, given a free choice in life with all I’ve ever learned, having a thousand acres of some southern or south western state, a warm girl in one arm and a Remington in the other, and a Ford 150 in the drive would not be a bad way to spend your life. Mrs RT in Daisy Dukes and a healthy attitude to hunting, now there’s a thought….
RE: Archer replacement. What about something like this?
http://www.xsmgworld.com/defence/partners.html
I was thinking about tt’s on each beam and a dipping sonar at the stern but. ..
Also largest version is 25m which means its shorter than an RN LCU mk 10 so Albion class can carry 4 ( see mothership quote above)
@ Brian Black,
“…don’t know why the small attack boat concept has fallen out of favour with Western navies”,
– Isn’t it more of a defensive measure? Short ranged and numerous, designed to patrol areas like the channel and the North sea to some extent?
Why? Because they’re not as good as people think.
RE: Swimming Trunks
I’m sure the SBS have a similar vessel like that. It’s been seen on the back of the SBS’s Serco Support Ship in Poole.
I heartily recommend Dogboats at War by Leonard C. Reynolds. An excellent book of the small ship war in the Channel, the Med and the Aegean .
Lest we forget, the Mumbai Terrorists, were intercepted by an unarmed Coastguard Cutter. The Crew were overwhelmed captured and executed. Our own Coastguard/Border Agency Vessels are unarmed..
Maybe we need a 21st Century Dogboat to replace the Archers.
The history of the FAC can be traced back to the 19th century Jeune École.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeune_%C3%89cole
Advances in steam technology and the introduction of the torpedo. The counter was the motor torpedo boat destroyer. Steam for the most got replaced with internal combustion. And as happens one a weapon system is introduced all powers want it and are reluctant to delete it from its orbat. Missiles, radar, aeroplanes, and helicopters filled the FAC gap in most navies. No longer would RN matelots proudly wear caps whose tallies bore names like Gay Bruiser……
@Simon257: seconded. You brought up a very important point, coastguard operations can be military in nature
@ Brian Black,
“…don’t know why the small attack boat concept has fallen out of favour with Western navies”,
Once aircraft started flying and “seeing” well at night the torpedo boats lost their role and became vulnerable. They could no longer ambush heavy units at night. Aircraft can hit them at ranges and altitudes where the FACs’ AAW weapons cannot reach.
They always had problems with weather.
When they took on missiles, without cuing, their detection ranges were limited by their mast height. Ships with embarked helicopters could launch against them undetected.
Not a fan of fast attack craft for ‘proper navies’ certainly if smaller than about 500 tons. They did not do well in Gulf 1 and as a result a lot of navies have started moving up to corvettes for the narrow sea role.
That’s not the same as a whole heap as in hundreds of 50ft rpg and anti tank missile armed boats comming at you Revolutionary Guard style, in suicide missions.
That is not to say there are not reasons to arm small patrol boats with ship stopping weapons.
What is a “ship stopping weapon”
Obviously, it is a weapon which stops ships (despite being a cavalryman, I’m not that stupid). But are there any rules of thumb for amount of explosive needed per 1,000 tons of displacement, or such? Best air-dropped, or underwater attack to more quickly get to the vital bit of the ship, which is the water integrity of a hull? Is there any evidence that pure kinetic energy gives any advantage over sheer explosive power?
Clearly, where the weapon impacts is crucial, so apart from steering with the naked eye, can weapons be targetted to specific parts of the ship? Is a wake homing torpedo more of a threat than a Harpoon going into the bridge?
Can anyone take down to the seabed a Nimitz-class carrier with a single shot, without using a nuke?
Basically, what’s the ideal ship-stopper? Only once that is decided is the question of launch platform an issue.
(I personally lean to the “crew-killing” capacities of weapons, and such exciting things as blast over-pressure, thermal overload and even EMP bursts. It is also greener and more eco-friendly than sinking a ship with all of those oils and lubricants on board, and we have to look after the maritime environment. I also believe that once we can get MLRS mounted onto even quite small ships, then we are going to have an entirely new way of making life totally foul for sailors, as well as providing a pretty damn speedy mission kill for anything with electronic masts and sensors).
…also, a persistent nerve agent such as VX sprayed by some form of dispensing mechanism over the superstructure of a ship is going to royally bugger up mission effectiveness, and a quick Google shows that smoke shells – easily adaptable to Naval 4.5 inch guns – are a good candidate for such a delivery mechanism. Any excess droplets falling into the sea get de-natured very quickly.
Are crews routinely capable of operating under full NBC Black for 3 to 4 weeks, and can carriers work at even reduced capacity if the flight deck is full of nasty sticky lethal VX?
(I’m pretty sure this is not me being uniquely evil and unfair on such a thought – the Russians had a whole Cold War to come up with such ideas, and who knows, the Iranians with a proven chemical capability may well have just such weapons lined up to take out of the equation any American carriers on just such a Day One, Round One engagement, before the ROE have been updated and all of the CIWS ready to react to a salvo of 50-100 incoming VX shells all at once)
Red trousers.
‘
The USSR’s big wake homing torpedo (65-75 Kit’)apparantly is a beasty:-weighed 4 Tons, 450 kilos of explosive, V long range (50 k at 50 knots) with a warhead desinged to pretty much cripple if not kill a Nimitz, with one hit. Read somwhere a few years ago, it was giving USN nighmares as it was virtually impossible to decoy, and was partialy responsible for a flurry of interrest in anti torpedo weapons. A fast attaack craft with 4 of those would be real headache to surface fleet.
@ RT – Most warships have a NBC “Citidel” which can be locked down to protect the crew and a system to wash down the outside of the ship. This applies to the larger ships but I don’t know about the smaller vessels and RFA’s.
RT,
Read something recently that the most effective anti-ship weapon is a torpedo. The trouble is launching the damn thing. A copter would be shot out of the sky, so should a jet or a missile. Another ship is a 50:50 engagement. Smaller “swarm” torpedo boats might work? Other than that you’re on the £1b sub!
In WW2 the big battleships had to trade blow-upon-blow of 15-inch (~1 tonne) shells to “win” the battle.
Perhaps the little turtle type man powered sub and an oxy torch have more chance
@ RT – I hope Chuck doesn’t mind me answering for him with one of his posts but I think he posted this earlier:
http://chuckhillscgblog.net/2011/03/14/what-does-it-take-to-sink-a-ship/comment-page-1/#comment-4175
Simon,
I’m pretty sure a decent defence contractor could design a ship-launched*** sea-skimming cruise missile that turns itself into a wake homing torpedo about 5 miles from the target (ie beyond CIWS range, and also including some serious jinking about in the last few minutes of flight to minimise the risk of being hit by other counter-missiles). If you think about it, the only bit that is not already well-known technology is the transition from sea-skimmer to torpedo, and to my non-technical eyes, that’s mostly a problem of slowing down and not jolting the electronics too much as you enter the “get wet” phase.
I’m pretty sure there’s some several £billion contracts to be had in inventing a robotic swarm of torpedoes based on something like a jet ski. Get 30 of them roaring out of the back of a well deck and OPFOR’s got a problem.
As a matter of non-nautical everyman observation, ships seem to have lost their armour since Battleships went away, and that’s a whole new vulnerability to shrapnel-type weapons, especially with all modern ships being festooned with sensors and comms gear. A good old MLRS strike on any Navy’s frigate or destroyer is going to make it very sorry indeed and not really able to play any more, even if there’s no idea of sinking the boat.
*** I’m saying “ship-launched” as I suspect that by the time you’ve designed it for a 300 mile flight, engineered in the discarding sabot you’d need to become a torpedo, and put enough fuel on board, it’s going to be a bit too big to hang off an fast jet’s wing. But, I may be wrong on that.
@Red Trousers: a naval ship is considerably less vulnerable than an airfield to a VX strike, due to it’s ability to pre-wet, existing NBC citadel, plentiful quantities of water available for decontamination and AA defenses considerably thicker than the average airfield. I would be more worried by the availability of NBC consumables such as suits and overboots, filters etc
Swimming Trunks,
washdowns only work well enough on large flat surfaces, and most P Nerve agents need physical scrubbing away as well. Something like a frigate has got no chance of a washdown being useful – all of those little nooks and crannies, not much flatness about, and the speed of the ship itself constantly working against it as the wind over deck wafts the effluence off even low-volatility compounds into the air con inlets. Even if you have got a citadel (only optimised for fighting from, not operating the ship), how useful is the ship going to be if everyone is squeezed into it, and not doing the engine room jobs or cooking the food or driving the ship from the bridge?
(I appreciate that P Nerve is mostly contact-only threat, but the Russians had developed mixed agents that were both P and non-P Nerve, held together in a gloopy like binder that was about like a drop of glue – it stuck there and also wafted off fumes)
@ RT % Simon torpedo
How about a small submarine, maybe even launched from a mother ship? Back to a Bay?
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/andrasta-submarine/
http://www.dcnsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/61861.pdf
http://www.ultra-os.com/torpedo.php
You test this system much more easily than the anti missile system I would have though.
@ wf,
you make considerable sense, but the airfield is full of Kevins and the location is fixed, so we’d expect it to be hit, and so no one would be much bothered.
@ RT
Something like Ikara perhaps?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ikara-cutway-mod.PNG
@ RT – I believe the crew scub down the ship after the wash down wearing NBC kit – they do have procedures to deal with NBC attack; what they are exactly and how such an attack would affect the capability of the ship I don’t know being a civvy. Some one serving or has served would have better answers…
Welcome to TD ‘Thong’
@ ST,
clearly, there’ll be training and kit for the scrub down. I’m sure the Andrew practice it.
Back in the mid 80s, my Troop got spammed for some tests at Porton Down – a 5 day task to go and help some scientists. We took the wagons down from Tidworth, and they were measured and photographed all over by boffins. We had to do some standard personal decontamination tasks which were timed (if I recall correctly, there was a pamphlet called “NBC 1″ that was the bible for this). My Troop Sergeant also had to produce the personal training records of us all, to establish the fact that we were a representative and “normal” troop.
Then on the next day, we put the wagons through a “wash down” (a bit like the carwash at your local garage) which sprayed something called Winterbourne Green all over us – that was a harmless chemical that mimicked P Nerve, and try to decontaminate them. There was a special instrument the boffins operated to check how well we’d done the task, and the short answer was it took a crew of 3 about 7 hours to properly decontaminate a Scimitar, which is only about the size of an estate car and does not have too many hard to access places.
We repeated these tests for 4 days, each day a bit different in conditions (wind, how muddy the wagons were, temperature (that was in a special cold shed), so it all appeared quite scientific.
I’m a non-techy and a civvy now, but based on those experiences, I think that the 100 man crew of a frigate is going to take several weeks to properly decontaminate a whole floaty little boat. And until they complete the task, everyone is at full NBC Black.
(Thinking about it, there’s no reason for a frigate not to undergo such a test, and maybe it has been done before. Fly a crop-sprayer plane along the length of a frigate spraying out the Winterbourne Green agent while the ship is in normal sailing conditions, then let the crew decontaminate it, and the boffins check the results with their sniffer instrument)
Both Bismarck and Prince of Wales were hit and sunk by what can only say be said, were lucky Torpedo hits!
Bismarck took one, on her Rudder control room, thus jamming them. The crew knew this was the ships one week-point. We all know what happened to her then.
PoW took a torpedo on one of her Propellor Shaft mounts. I cant remember offhand which one. Causing the actual shaft to break loose from its mounting, gyrating madly around and thus smashed the bottom part of the aft to pieces. This caused massive flooding, thus causing the ship to list, exposing the hull of the ship under the Armoured Belt.
Their was a documentry made a couple of years ago, about a Royal Navy Diving Expedition which surveyed the wreck of the ship. They discovered that the Armoured belt was intact, but showed it had been struck, but had not been penetrated. However below the belt they discovered various torpedo strikes, which had caused significant damage. Also they came across the previously unknown damage caused by the loose propeller shaft.
At the time Japanese Aerial launched Torpedoes couldn’t penetrate the Armoured Belt of a KGV Class Battleship. It was always a mystery how she was lost in that way. The expedition proved that it was the Cataclysmic hit on the Propshaft mount which caused the ship to list exposing the one weak part of the ship.. Her Belly.
It was this expedition that recovered the Ships Bell, and will soon ring again on the new HMS Prince of Wales.
No ship is unsinkable, not even a Nimitz!
Flat not room.
@Red Trousers: are you sure that the troop commanders insistence on wearing the same wellington’s and a Barbour wasn’t giving false readings?
Personally, I’m all in favour of the old Soviet method of close down, then motor through a couple of jet engine exhausts injected with decom solution. It’s not a perfect solution, but once you are down to a residual vapour hazard only, most of the suits can be dispensed with.
@RT
Without going into the tactical implications, the NBCD citadel encompasses most of a warship’s internal compartments and allows it to “float, move and fight” while transiting a ‘plume’ of CBRN contaminants. Its design and implementation form a significant part of the build cost.
While visiting HMS Bristol, you must have noticed all the ALFA and BRAVO labelled hatches and doors plus flaps/covers for upper deck ventilation intakes and other apertures together with the built-in air locks and cleansing stations permitting entry and exit from the positively-pressurised hull and superstructure. You might also have seen the ‘special’ ACUs, air-recirculating fans, pre-wetting nozzles, remote monitors and alarms, decontamination gear, etc. If the threat level requires, personnel wear full PPE and anyone venturing on the upper deck (possibly to detect and scrub down affected surfaces) goes through stringent decontamination before being allowed to re-enter the citadel.
Other considerations affecting a warship’s build include signature reduction and emission control (e.g. electro-magnetic radiation, noise and magnetism as well as protection from electronic ‘eavesdropping’ and IR targeting; there’s more to ‘stealth’ than having a small RCS. Then there is structural resistance to armed attack to consider but much of the detail is too sensitive to discuss in a public forum.
Incidentally, the results of most SINKEXs (usually organised by the USN but the RN is often allowed to participate in their planning and execution if it can spare the assets) prove that ships tend to be sunk by letting water in, not by letting air out.
wf,
crikey. But I’d wager that wellies are easier to decontaminate than Boots DMS which being leather will soak in stuff, and have all sorts of laces and eyeholes and other little nooks and crannies. Anyway, we had overboots.
The most challenging part of decontamination was in the fiddly little bits, like the radiator grille, or the curly-wurly lead from the Commander’s pressel unit to the radio. The canvas bin covers you had to ditch, because there was no way you’d ever clean those off when the gunk had soaked into the fibres. There were some odd bits of foam such as internally on the hatch covers and the crew seats that were also pretty uncleanable, and the whole sub-turret floor was a nightmare. We were told that the 353 radios as well would have to be ditched if it was for real – air intakes sucking in air and channeling it to places you could not reach – best we could do was to flush the radios with a jerrycan of water each, which meant they did not work for about 6 hours and were still mounted about 12 inches away from your head and face, giving off fumes that would kill you.
Pretty complex stuff this decontamination and in short, takes away your ability to get out and do the job you are being paid for.
@ Dunservin,
Aye Sir, I did notice all of those things (well, perhaps not all, but that was my ignorance in not looking particularly hard), and I’m sure it was all beautifully engineered, and there were some wonderful procedures to mitigate all sorts of risks. When I was on Bristol, she was a Britannia training ship, so there was not much NBC training foing on, but I can see that it had the infrastructure to do so.
But, hmmm, I’m sceptical that it would all have worked, and even if it did, the “get clean” scrubbing process would firstly take weeks, and secondly and more importantly, and taken the ship out of effective contribution to whatever was the mission.
That’s my real point. Do you need to sink a ship to take it out of the game? I don’t believe you do, and taking it out of the game is the result OPFOR is seeking, whether Bristol is in Davy Jones Locker or simply otherwise engaged with a massive spring-cleaning.
We seem to have been diverted – largely by me, my apologies – into a deep dive on NBC crap. I was rather more excited about thermobaric weapons. But the wider point is still what does it take to achieve a mission kill?
RT,
I could be wrong but the reason that much of a armor has been removed from modern warships was because of the threat from bottom striking torpedoes – older ships only ever really had torpedo belts around the sides of the hull… and because you can’t put heavy armor high up to defend against missile strikes due to stability issues.
I suppose therefore that the missile threat has made the torpedo all the more deadly… further reinforcing your cruise missile / torpedo idea – if it’s both, it’s going to succeed
Mark,
I’m a bit old-school with my Nimitz sinking tactics. I don’t think I’d bother with wake or acoustic homing torpedoes. I’d just go for a broadside spread of 12 torpedoes from 2 Astute.
I’m sure APATS or Dunservin will have something to say about my schoolboy ideas
It’s only an issue surely if the agent is persistent? And then persistent doesn’t mean forever.
And anyway I am sure it is easier fighting a ship in 4Romeo than fighting on land. Not all the vessel would be compromised and so there would be ample opportunities to rest and have some time with the old fart mask off.
And also, make it SOP that anyone with persistent agent all over their suit simply gets thrown overboard. Job done. No cross contamination.
Phil,
(having earlier apologised for diving into this NBC stuff – did not mean to derail this thread, but TD as a site is full of some very good diversions, and the boss does not seem to mind so much)
VX in temperate climates will stick about for about a month, slightly dependent on wind, temp, and the gloopiness of the formula – certainly it lasts a lot longer than a day, and it’s capable of being spread in pretty small droplets over a wide area by being blown up.
VX can be combined with N-P in a cocktail to be both a contact and inhaled threat. The Russians did this with Sarin. From very dim memory, you had about 6 hours of both P and N-P threat, after which the Sarin had burned off in vapours. (It’s bloody years – more than 2 decades – since I did my NBC officer’s course, and even then I managed to blow up the Regimental NAIAD alerting device during a demo***, so you must take my thoughts as being a non-techy person).
Lord knows how difficult the Andrew would find it if the Iranians managed to combine shrapnel and a VX / Sarin mix in a MLRS-type missile and fire it from a coastal battery (all elements of that threat being already old tech). Apart from the Frigate’s sensors and comms being shot to shit, 3 week’s worth of scrubbing off the paintwork is going to stop HMS Brave doing what she is supposed to do.
I am however with you on the dealing with contaminated crew. You get your spare 2m whip antenna, stick a piece of detector paper on the end of it, hold off your crewmate with a pistol or cutlass or whatever the Andrew use these days for short range weapons, and wipe it over him. If it turns pink, shoot him and use a long stick to push the body over the side.
*** I had the wonderful idea of making a proper demo, with real live whizz-bangs and dems to spice up what was a pretty boring subject. Unfortunately, I buried a dem right next to where I later put out the NAIAD, and forgot that I had done so. The QM(T) was greatly displeased with the subsequent destruction of the NAIAD, and later proved to me that it cost about £50,000 (my salary at the time being about £18,000). The CO was also not pleased, and I received yet another 14 extra duties.
@Repulse.
We will need to replace our 16!! Mine hunting vessels there’s a budget to do it the RN wants a C3 vessel and I agree with them. You include the survey ships, guard ships and fisheries patrol vessels and thats 24 vessels!!
So replacing the over supply of of mine hunters and putting the capability of a mine hunter/survey ship/patrol craft into the MCW replacement (MHPC) replaces three ship classes with one which leads to simplification. As well as half a chance of getting those patrol type vessels.
While basing the mine hunting and survey capability on ‘modules’ and ‘drones’ allows those vessels to keep technological pace without ripping a minehunter to bits to update. While if they are based on a good patrol vessel leaves a much better capability than a bog standard OPV. Yes it might not be a patrol frigate with the level of survivability of a full fat frigate but then it won’t cost as much and it’s not intended to replace them.
Having done some reading up on vessel sizes and hydrology designs on recent vessels then it appears to get a hull which can operate at sea state 5, transit at sea state 6 and ‘survive’ at higher sea states, offer cruising speeds of 15+ knots and offer range in the 5000 to 8000nm mark then it needs to be at least 90m long with a draft 4+ish meters and a beam of 14+ish metres.
If you look at the bigger blue water navies all the newer OPV’s/modular fit vessels eg mine clearance, survey are all around 100m long of a tonnage of 2500 tons+ and carry a 76mm gun can operate in the conditions I mentioned. Many of them come equipped with a hanger and support the use of Merlin size choppers also.
The Holland class comes with an integrated mast that supports a RESM and 3d radar if we went for that we could actually fit CAMM to our MHPCs (or at least fitted for not with) after someone explained that CAMM only needs position data from a 2d radar.