A Guest Post by Somewhat Involved
Over the past months, there has been much talk, discussion and debate on ways to generate additional capability for the Royal Navy. The cold, hard fact of limited (and likely still dwindling) resources and steady state, if not increasing commitments placed upon the UK Armed Forces, is well accepted and there has been a lot of creative debate about generating additional hulls to extend our reach, presence and influence in any number of theatres around the world.
Unfortunately these debates often side-track into one of two avenues – either fantasy fleet time, where we dream up any number of combinations of exciting ships, aircraft and concepts together with truly inspired cost estimates, or simple debate on what the Royal Navy actually does for us in exchange for the many millions spent (wasted?) on it. The problem is that in the first case, we lose track of why we were discussing ships in the first place, and in the second, begin to assign capabilities and requirements to hulls on a more aggressively cost-based basis. There is a wider misunderstanding, I think, of just what it is that Royal Navy ships do for you when deployed, and until this is fully understood, I think the debates will be skewed.
It has, interestingly enough, been quite challenging to try and relate the doctrine, lessons and concepts we believe in so dearly into clear English, and therefore justify our need for high end combatants, and why patrol boats just won’t do.
We have an almost blind faith in our own reasons for existence and assume that others see and understand our effects and capabilities as we do. It’s easy to entertain the wider public with Navy Days or the occasional piracy, drug bust or homecoming story. But we often fail to communicate the wider task of the RN to the more widely read, and daresay more influential elements outside our own environment, so this is an attempt to do just that. No insults intended, and this is entirely The World According To Me.
So, two parts to this post. The first, an attempt to explain what we do, why we do it, and why we should keep on doing it. The second, in response to an excellent post by IXION, is to explore the requirements for the General Purpose Frigate, why this will serve us far better than a Patrol Ship, and why it is necessary for the Royal Navy over the decades to come.
Contents
Bang for your Buck
I am not going to trot out the ‘island nation’ storyline, but the UK does have vested interests overseas. These may be either purely selfish, or selfishly political. In the first case, we are dependent on foreign energy reserves and our primary gas supply is likely to be (if not already) shipped from Qatar. Our economy is also hugely dependent upon cheap manufactured goods from Far Eastern nations and food from many others, and those goods, shipped by sea, pass through contested waters, piracy-infested waters and narrow waters along the shortest and most economical route. I freely admit that the LIKLIHOOD of closing those supply routes is low, but the CONSEQUENCES for our economy are potentially severe, especially given our tendency to only maintain a week or so reserve of gas, food and other essentials. The ensuing RISK is reason enough then to maintain some form of deployable maritime military capability.
In the second case, we have a strongly vested interest in maintaining our standing amongst the international community, in a dozen different ways. If you think we should all just get along and not worry what other countries think, then ask yourself why Russia and China are so stubbornly blocking any course of united international action to bring the Syrian situation under control. International ‘standing’ is not just an essential part of the international diplomatic game, but a position that can influence or even dictate market responses, encourage or discourage international investment, have immediate and long term economic effects, and ultimately win or lose votes at the ballot box. Syria is the current problem, but UK influence and standing has helped shape three significant conflicts and several minor ones in the past 15 years alone. We cannot afford to sit back and let others model the world to their advantage.
Naval presence has always had a disproportionate diplomatic effect, and it is one we harness often. A naval blockade is a powerful statement of intent as Israel has proven, and as Iran threatens. A warship simply entering a new region of water has a similar effect, as Iran again proved with the deployment of a frigate and tanker to the Mediterranean, however briefly. Naval presence can also provide reassurance, as the Armilla Patrol did in the 1980’s and as an international force of ships has done in the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor off Somalia. Small though the physical presence might be, it has nonetheless a disproportionate effect. For this reason (almost alone), we have maintained a presence that began over a hundred years ago, became the Armilla Patrol and continues today as OPERATION KIPION. As an aside, one of the reasons for the disproportionate effect of a single ship is the inherent mobility of that asset and the relative difficulty of locating it if it does not want to be found.
There are two more points to make here – US cooperation, and ‘lesser’ nation engagement. The US has significant political and diplomatic capital invested in the Middle East and Mediterranean. As much as the US focus may be shifting towards China and the Far East, Iran remains a threat and a factor that they cannot leave to ‘others’ to ‘sort out’. But their resources are reducing just as ours are, and they lack capabilities in some areas in which we have an expertise. MCM and ASW are two such capabilities, and as recently proven we can stand alongside US escorts in air defence capability. And do not underestimate the fact that we are one of the only nations to be able to constantly maintain at least one warship in the region, at a high state of readiness and capability, without any international assistance. We are dependable in that respect. By being able to interoperate with the US we gain a lot – access to US intelligence, access to US technologies, a recognition of our ability as partners rather than ‘also-rans’. It also puts us in the same diplomatic court as the US which, as I’m sure you all appreciate, has both its advantages and disadvantages. Everything is connected, and we are not yet in a position where ditching the US as a political, military and strategic partner is even a remotely sensible possibility.
I should probably keep the word count down but ought to mention NATO. NATO is still fundamentally a US supported organisation, but one in which we retain significant influence at the highest levels. Again, staying out of NATO isn’t an option, especially as NATO continues to evolve, and given the way it is evolving it is possible, even likely that the role of the US will dwindle further. Therefore I would argue that we need to keep our status within NATO, which only comes from an ability to contribute to NATO’s military effectiveness.
And so to the ‘lesser’ nations. I mean this not in a derogatory way, but to group those nations where we still have a vested interest, but they are not a part of the wider US-UK-Rest-of-the-world game largely confined to the Middle East. Here you can group the UK Dependent Territories, the Caribbean Nations, the Falklands, and the West African nations that either have significant oil supplies or are waypoints on the international drug trade flowing from South America. In many cases these nations have their own military forces, particularly the Gulf of Guinea nations tackling piracy, or Cape Verde tackling the drug trade. The effect of a visiting warship is diplomatically high profile, and is a political gesture by HMG that the nation in question is important enough to merit such a visit. Refusal of a ship visit is diplomatically serious, as Brazil and Argentina have proven recently. More often, visits are combined with goodwill gestures such as exchanges of personnel, and have a heavy diplomatic flavour with the UK Ambassador inevitably not only invited to the Official Reception, but often hosting it using the ship as a convenient marquee. Furthermore, the Royal Navy is still seen by many to be the international gold standard of maritime capability, and training exercises in stop and search procedures, counter piracy and even the basics of shiphandling and damage repair yield significant benefits in international relations.
Thus the RN has always believed, spurred on by feedback through diplomatic and military channels, that a single warship can have an effect that is disproportionate to its immediate military capability. However, that capability does need to be matched to the potential events, outcomes and consequences of a particular deployment, and thus a patrol ship may not be the best option.
Survivability
I want to quickly look at the concept of survivability. I suspect few would be happy with the idea that a ship can simply ‘survive’ an initial engagement – no, it should not only survive, but emerge supreme the other side! Huzzah!! I think this is less significant than we like to pretend.
In open ocean warfare, any warship will expect to operate as part of a task force, and thus enjoy a level of additional protection. There is a huge array of complex, challenging and lethal weapons available, and anything less than an air warfare destroyer would be hard pressed to last long alone in the face of determined attack. But open ocean warfare is currently a relatively a distant possibility, so we rely on the task force concept and do not need to arm every ship with SeaViper.
In the Gulf scenario, ‘survivability’ has another meaning. If a certain Gulf state were to, as some so eloquently put it, ‘kick off’, then we can expect a sudden and possibly overwhelming attack. Many observers have speculated on mixed raids of short ranged land based and ship based missiles, suicide craft, WIG craft, suicide WIG craft, mines, torpedoes and small arms. Scary stuff. But if such an event was to take place, then the ship must be able to defend itself long enough for help to arrive – and with the degree of supporting strike power available in the region (currently USS ENTERPRISE, USS EISENHOWER and imminently USS STENNIS) help will be close by. Such attacks will have political, diplomatic and military advanced warning, and are unlikely to suddenly erupt out of the blue.
The fact that a unit is therefore not easily knocked out means that an opponent must divert significant resources to eliminate that threat. Against a mobile target, this is made significantly more challenging. Coordinating attacks with asymmetric platforms adds another layer of complexity. All of these must then be balanced against available resources and the area to be controlled/dominated, leading to a measure of DETERRENCE by both sides, equal and balanced.
In looking at self defence capability later on, this then is what I mean by ‘survivability’.
Patrol Ship vs. General Purpose Frigate
In defining a ‘Patrol Ship’, it is important to focus on what we mean by this and make a clear distinction between this and the General Purpose Frigate. Although there are many different interpretations of both concepts, there is a fundamental difference relating to task and requirement for survivability (that word again). The Patrol Ship does not expect to operate in a hostile environment, whereas the General Purpose Frigate must be able to do so.
IXION made the excellent point that a Patrol Ship need not be small, indeed we were looking at proposals for ships the size of a Bay class. By far the biggest driver behind ship size is propulsion, followed by stability. A small ship will be forced to make compromises in engine design, endurance, speed and stability, either by adopting a smaller propulsion plant, a smaller fuel reserve, or by the simple ship design laws that mean a smaller ship moves more than a larger one for a given sea state. Stability is not only desirable for operating boats and aircraft, but for the effective operation of weapons systems and sensors. And where radars are concerned, the higher the radar, the greater its range. Our areas of operation necessarily include regions where the distance between ports is significant, and the weather is often poor, occasionally dangerous, and this tends to favour the larger hulls over the smaller. Advances in technology and the efficiency of power plants will doubtless make ships and crews smaller, but there is little to be saved by trying to cram your capability into a smaller hull. Steel is cheap, air is free – the cost of any ship is not the hull, but the systems.
Any ship operating on ‘patrol’ duties, inclusive of CP, CN and other such tasks, needs a minimum outfit:
- Surface surveillance radar.
- Electro-optic systems, also for surveillance.
- Small calibre gun/guns, for interdiction and enforcement.
- A minimum of two quick-reaction seaboats for boarding duties.
- Sufficient accommodation for embarked forces.
- Effective voice and data communication systems, equivalent to broadband data rates.
However, in order for a ship to be considered ‘survivable’ within the constraints of that proposed above, and thus become the General Purpose Frigate, there is a necessary minimum equipment fit. This would be:
- A medium ranged surveillance radar capable of tracking air and surface contacts, to provide warning of attack.
- Electronic intercept equipment, to provide warning of attack.
- An air self-defence system, which should be able to cope with at least 3-4 aircraft or missiles arriving simultaneously. Such a system should be able to protect another vessel positioned down-threat of the firing unit. This system should also incorporate decoy systems, where hard-kill of missiles is not possible or is less effective than soft-kill.
- A combat computer system that can process all data including that received from off ship.
- Flight deck and hangar, large enough to operate any combination of manned or unmanned types envisioned.
- Redundancy in systems to permit damage control, and appropriate damage control systems.
In order to counter an underwater threat, the most practical option currently available is to simply blast noise into the water column and flood an area with radar, making life as difficult for the submariner as possible. In noisy, cluttered and congested littoral waters, submariners will be focused far more on keeping their boat safe than trying to close for an attack solution. Ship launched torpedoes have limited usefulness, but anti-torpedo systems, now emerging, have far more value. Offensive littoral ASW is best conducted with air assets, but a ship in the General Purpose role with an active sonar system and torpedo launch capability is still a valuable asset.
There are more General Purpose payloads that should be considered; these are very much ‘nice to have’, but are comparatively cheap and easy to provide for. Sufficient storage space, cranes and/or cargo management systems can handle SF boats and stores, autonomous underwater/surface/air vehicles and any number of wacky, containerised ideas. The idea of a payload bay and launch/recovery system has been discussed before, but such abilities belong firmly in the General Purpose role and not that of high-end combatant.
Of course, the RN’s current combatants, Type 23 and Type 45, have all these capabilities bar the last. Type 45 is an extreme case, but the Type 23 is a very capable General Purpose design. The GP Concept in its basic form lacks land attack capability, anti-ship firepower, blue-water ASW capability or anything more than self-defence abilities, but as a naval unit it can still achieve a significant degree of ‘presence’, disproportionate to its actual capability and yet able to deliver the effects that HMG requires in all current theatres, from the Gulf to the South Atlantic.
The Patrol Ship Myth
One of the reasons why I started this post was to try and put down the idea that a small warship of corvette size or smaller, as so often postulated here, could have a reasonable effect in the theatres described above. I would hope by now that it is obvious that such a ship could not function effectively east of Suez in anything other than an utterly benign environment OR ELSE become a vulnerable unit requiring protection. With the sole exception of counter-piracy off Somalia, any ship in this theatre needs to bring, at a minimum, those capabilities which would allow it to survive if hostilities were to commence. On top of that, to make any contribution to the wider security issues as discussed, we then need those niche capabilities that allow us to maintain the position we have established.
In the rest of the world a Patrol Ship might suffice for all conceivable tasks, including reassurance, presence, training, diplomacy, counter-piracy, counter-drugs and so on. This is on the assumption that you no longer require any form of deterrence in those areas; try as you might, a Patrol Ship has no deterrent value against combat forces because it lacks survivability. The challenge then becomes how you split your fleet, how you balance your numbers of high end combatants, General Purpose Frigates, and Patrol Ships.
All RN ships can deliver the Patrol Task. It may not be efficient or the best use of resources at a particular time, and it is an expensive option. However, given the high tempo of operations today in the face of reduced platform availability, we are able to ensure that, even if one ship suffers a major defect or delay, another effective naval combatant is available to replace it and maintain the commitment. If high end combatants are exchanged for Patrol Ships, although you increase the numbers of hulls available you nonetheless reduce the total number of combatants and that increases the likelihood of being unable to maintain a commitment.
Where the risk of conflict is high, the need for ships goes beyond simply maintaining just one on station. In addition to the ship outbound to relieve the first, and the previous incumbent returning home, there is a need to have additional ships ready to form the Response Force Task Group. This formation is not kept permanently formed, but consists of ships at readiness undertaking other tasks, from which they can be pulled if required. By diluting the pool with smaller ships, none of which can have an effect in a Task Group, the ability to form the RFTG also reduces significantly.
Finally, force planning and hull numbers goes well beyond short-term thinking of five, ten or fifteen years. The planners must be able to ensure that the RN remains a balanced force capable of delivering the anticipated level of commitment 30, 40, even 50 years into the future. Whilst many have discarded the DCDC ‘Future Character of Conflict’ document as so much piffle, even they cannot disagree with the assessment that with booming world populations, dwindling resources and an overwhelming dependence on the sea, the world is not likely to be more stable in future. Consider the worldwide impact of everyone in India and China demanding an iPad – the resources to manufacture high tech devices, such as rare earth elements, are already dwindling. By pursuing short term cost savings over long term strategic thinking, a nation is guaranteed to be at a disadvantage in future and must accept a dwindling, less significant role that is unlikely to bring economic benefit. The alternative, as Germany has done, is to establish oneself as an industrial and/or economic powerhouse able to weather all problems, but I do not believe this to be a viable strategy alone.
My point then is that although smaller ships might be available in greater numbers, they are not necessarily suitable for the task they are required to undertake, now or in the future.
The Jack of All Trades – The Future Surface Combatant
My opinion is that the ship type we need for our day-to-day global tasking is a vessel in the frigate class, for reasons of range, endurance, speed and stability. Even if this vessel carried only the most basic sensors and weapons, a minimum size is nonetheless required. However, it does need to be an effective combatant if it is to fulfil 90% of the roles expected of it, and allow for a balanced, manageable Fleet.
The Joint Concept Note on the Black Swan design makes the point that ships need to be able to accept a variety of systems in their lifetime which should, where practical, be modular in design and able to ‘plug and play’ with the parent’s ship’s existing hardware. I agree – but this is hardly ground-breaking stuff. We do this already in many different systems, land, sea and air, and is hardly a design constraint. The key requirement, however, is space – a small ship will have this in short supply and may even face limitations in power generation to support any bolt-on system.
The Type 23 frigate is, in my opinion, one of the better designs of such a vessel yet evolved. It has been by total fluke – a ship conceived in the Cold War, it has been adapted and updated through its lifetime to become an asset that today can be deployed to any of the key theatres discussed above and still be effective for any of the varied roles it is called upon to do. It is far from perfect – sensors, guns and many of the internal systems are not effective in today’s environment, but it provides a basic platform exemplifying the General Purpose Frigate idea upon which I intend to build. It has good range, fuel efficient engines, a high top speed, good manoeuvrability and a useful sensor/weapons fit. It also has limited capacity for further growth, no room for additional boats or embarked forces, the gun is inadequate for current standards of precision attack ashore, its counter-FIAC defences are questionable and it is getting old. Critically it may not reign supreme alone, but it would SURVIVE and thus remains an effective combatant.
A vessel fulfilling my General Purpose requirements discussed above is what I believe we need as our future combatant to replace the Type 23. This can then be upgraded to a more specialist role according to requirement. The options for this are many and varied, but in simple terms a quietened variant, fitted with a towed array sonar system and with the appropriate aircraft embarked, makes a potent dedicated ASW platform. The alternative is to optimise for above-water warfare, including but not confined to anti-ship missiles, land attack missiles, appropriate calibre main gun for NGS and anti-surface duties, advanced electronic intelligence equipment, etc. There is even potential to specialise in anti-air warfare, although we already have the Type 45 in service for this purpose. These are dedicated weapons systems, and require unique hull mounting and integration space such as VLS silos or turret/gunbay structures. However, they need not be permanently embarked or even fitted, thus presenting opportunities for modular systems to be introduced along the lines of the Black Swan concept. The ship can then fulfil the Patrol task, whilst retaining the minimum fighting capability necessary to allow for rapid redeployment.
Summary
I hope to have presented a different view of today’s tasking and requirements, and the associated need to maintain a minimum number of combatants with certain minimum capabilities. I have tried to avoid the ‘fantasy fleet’ trap, and hope instead to have offered some different points for debate. I strongly believe that to maintain our current international standing, in the interests of assuring the UK’s future influence and stability, there are commitments that must be met. That requires a minimum level of investment in combat capability, for which maritime forces remain the most effective.
Soemwhat
You have made a case for ‘more of the same’, I will come back with some questions and some points in due course….
@SI
What are your feelings on the Type 26 plans as they are currently?
SI – good read, but are you suggesting that the RN should have kept the C1 / C2 concept?
Excellent !
Well written and logically laid out matey.
Ixion – perhaps “more of the same” is what is actually required to fulfill the military tasking ?
I was about to, and indeed still might do a post on the actual roles and requirements of a “Patrol Ship”. As I said in the comments on your last posting – there is nothing wrong per se with thinking big and having 4 x ST Eng Endurance 160 instead of 5 x GP T26, but there would of course be disadvantages in small numbers of separate ship classes.
However, what I really think we have to get away from is this use of the term “GENERAL PURPOSE” – A USN Ticonderoga class CCG is a “general purpose” unit, having anti-air, ASW, anti-ship and land attack capabilities.
A T26 with a medium calibre gun and a helicopter, with SeaCeptor for self defence against air-threats is to me, pushing the boundaries of the term “general purpose”. If its only carrying a Lynx Wildcat instead of a Merlin it’s not got a lot of ASW capability has it ? No Harpoon or replacement fitted ? Then not a lot of anti-ship capability either !
Thus it is, in fact a “Patrol Ship” or “Patrol Frigate” rather than a general purpose one – but I am just being a naughty and pedantic ex-sailor…..
Not badly executed, but still the stereotypical “pro-Frigate” attack.
Here’s a question to the author. How did you substantiate 4?
Remember, if we arm that patrol ship with say a CIWS and a gun, it’ll already have a credible ability against 1-2 missiles (fired from ONE aircraft). So, why is this hopelessly inadequate while 3-4 (fired from TWO aircraft) is suddenly OK?
With such an argument, you can substantiate nothing less than 10+ is adequate (which is the position the USN seems to take judging from the fact they’ve been building almost nothing but Burkes these last 20 years), so why settle for 4?
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And here’s another question. Sure, there’s no way we’ll be able to arm the patrol ship until its a frigate, but the backwards question is … is the patrol ship as likely to be attacked?
Sure, the patrol ship is be easier to attack. But because of this it is also very much less “cool” to attack it. Sneaking your planes and subs past a US carrier group and getting even a simulated blow in is “cool”, even if the US gets you later. Attacking this Coast Guard-level armament patrol ship is is not “cool”. It doesn’t show resolve, even to your own citizens, but a bullying act. When political factors are included, it is arguably the patrol ship that is less vulnerable to attack and I’ll argue this is at least as good protection as being able to fend off missiles coming from one or two more aircraft.
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And here’s a final comment: the patrol ship is not necessarily weaker than the frigate in all respects. Because it has more heloes, it actually has a higher surface search and anti-small craft potential. If you can arm the heloes with a ASM, its overall surface warfare potential may be greater than the frigate with its ONE helo.
Gd post having read a number of these thread and comments on this topic and the us experience with LCS I’ve been of the opinion that our current plans do actually appear sensible(shock horror them paid professionals have some idea what there doing!!). Would some rounding out at the edges be nice yes and I do think the navy needs to explain better what it’s ships are doing on task and I know Op sec can preclude that. For example the article in the news paper about what daring got up to east of suez sounds better than having a cocktail party or rugby match with the locals in a run ashore no matter how useful those activities maybe.
In a number of posts both on ships planes ect the simple cheap ship, plane has been proposed a number of times and as we go along capabilty creeps until its a destroyer or arsenal ship and I think this post does well in explaining that capabilty and what’s the right balance.
Having said that i would be interested to hear what SI thinks of hms Clyde and if as some press coverage suggests another sister vessel maybe built could this relieve pressure on the current fleet by fulfilling the carribean role with an rfa in support.
Some good points made here. I think the chances of a new dedicated patrol ship class are very low and MHPC will get pushed back until the Hunts and Sandowns need replacing. If there are to be two new enhanced Clyde patrol craft to be built then fine – as long has they have a decent gun (76mm), hanger for wildcat and space to bolt on a CIWS / seaceptor if ever needed. If they modestly upgrade / upgun Clyde and River as far as possible, then a six ship patrol fleet, in addition to the rest to the fleet will give enhanced coverage options around FI, WI, Gib and UK waters. Commit to build at least 12, but hopefully 13 Type 26 but in batches with a commitment to at least 8 ‘full fat’ ASW and fighty and leave options open on later ones depending on developing needs (eg may need more AAW ships – who can tell now). I’d then look at some sort of “flexible support ship” in the Bay type size with a decent hanger (say 4 merlin type), flightdeck, well deck, range and a decent gun fit (and space to bolt on stuff if needed). The are all sorts of options out there but the first of class could be ‘sold’ to the Treasury etc as an Argus / Ocean replacement and ultimately the class would replace the Bays also as they are scrapped or sold – may be 4 or 5 in total. These would provide a better option for what Bays and some RFAs end up doing often anyway now, low intensity presence, piracy, WI, disaster relief, but in a war situation would cover the amphib lift. Next up a couple of Juan Carlos style, smaller though (being realistic we can’t have two CVFs and two JCs), as replacements for Albion and Bulwark and then the Hunt and Sandown replacement with something that is primarily MCM but has a better secondary capability for patrol or littoral ASW perhaps. Following the continuous improvment theme, the Archers would be replaced by a modestly enhanced class with some fixed armament for coastal patrol. I think that’s a decent, and low on fantasy, roadmap. The only fantasy bit I would suggest would be to build either one more Astute or one more (ie 5) SSBN replacements with flexibility to cover both CASD and allow a conventional TLAM armed boat in times of need. Last but not least, an MPA option – Sea Hercules, commonality, palletised loads etc
Arkhangelsk
If you believe that a patrol ship with a 76mm gun and a CIWS offers anything other than a prayer against 2 missiles inbound then you are the most optimistic person I know. RAM is in my opinion a PDMS system rather than a CIWS. Remember that Sea Ceptor will give type 23 the ability to engage multiple contacts out to 16Nm.
Arleigh Burkes are expensive and multi role combatants with crews over 300. Only the USN can afford to build all its escorts as such expensive all rounder’s. Even it may not for much longer.
Cool is not really a word that one associates with military or terrorist planning in the area of the world that the inferred attack may take place/ yes they do like a spectacular but that did not stop them kidnapping some sailors in a rhib.
They want to embarrass something flying the White Ensign and the easier it is the better.
Your final paragraph takes us back to the “patrol LPD” large vessel again which in order to make it credible internally and survivable would be more expensive than the Frigate in the first place.
@Somewhat Involved – like your article alot, sensible and well argued. I liked Ixion’s article too and thought “these would be nice ships to have – but not at the expense of our frigates,” which pretty much sums up my attitude towards any of the proposed “patrol ships” – yes when we can afford them, but no chance in the near future. The US can afford to build Burkes and LCSes at the same time, but we can’t, so we should stick to the full 13 Type 26s – don’t give the Treasury any excuse to cut their numbers
Interesting point about an “AA” version of T26. Anyone think there’s a chance that, say, the last two T26s built might have Aster sams to supplement the reduced buy of T45s? I’m thinking Aster 15 probably, hopefully 30 and with a fair wind and a blue moon Sampson Lite?
“You have made a case for ‘more of the same’, I will come back with some questions and some points in due course…”
“Not badly executed, but still the stereotypical “pro-Frigate” attack…”
- A bit like the Army continually advocating ‘boots on the ground’ then? Think of DD/FF as ‘waders in the sea’ that can also walk on water, ‘kick ass’ and even run when required. Given their aviation assets, they can ‘fly’ as well.
@WiseApe, I thought Artisan was Sampson Lite?
If the RN went back to (and could afford) 18 C1/C2 ships – 10 C1 and 8 C2, then you would not hear any complaints from me! 10 T26s – 8 ASW + 2 AAW, and 8 lower spec T27s (based on the T26 hull) – fantastic.
Wise Ape, Do not see much advantage in aster 15 over Sea Ceptor really. If you went to aster 30 without Sampson you would need dedicated FC Radars installed which would obviously limit the engagement profile both in terms of missiles that you can control and weapon arcs.
States build OPVs to patrol their own waters (territorial and EEZ) and not impose their will on others. I sometimes think some here think these ships would be patrolling out at 2 miles like some pedalo; territorial waters extend out to 12nm and that is a long way out for a small ship with a tiny gun and no helicopter.
I am hoping this article stops all this GP/ASW rhubarb. As Chally says has suggested we should scrap one T26 if it means the rest get 2087. All I want is 12 T26 with 2087, Sea Ceptor, and Oto Melara gun. Still adamant T26 needs two hangars, but I can’t help being a bit progressive.
@APATS – thanks for clarifying. Is it possible to fit Sampson on the T26 hull then? I wonder if we have any spare sets, given that we were supposed to be getting 12 then 8 T45s. I’ve never seen a price for Sampson – a large part of the £1 billion pricetag of T45?
Mickp said:
“If there are to be two new enhanced Clyde patrol craft to be built then fine – as long has they have a decent gun (76mm), hanger for wildcat and space to bolt on a CIWS / seaceptor if ever needed. If they modestly upgrade / upgun Clyde and River as far as possible, then a six ship patrol fleet, in addition to the rest to the fleet will give enhanced coverage options around FI, WI, Gib and UK waters.”
WHY ?
The RN’s OPV’s are in the “Fisheries Protection Squadron” or whatever it’s called these days, hit the search box to find TD’s recent article and nice photo of 3 Rivers in company. Clyde has a flight deck because the Falklands has helicopters based there, and it gives her a bit more flexibility.
Variants of the River class design have been built for many nations with a 76mm gun – so if the RN wanted it (Treasury bastards permitting) they could have it – but then don’t because what we use the Rivers for is stopping fishing vessels to inspect their gear and catch – NOT for anti-drug ops in the Caribbean, nor anti-people trafficking in the Med, and not for anti-piracy work off Somalia, because they don’t have the speed to chase down a hi-jacked container ship, dont have the range / endurance, cant RAS, and probably dont have the comms / C2 kit required.
So we are back to the cost benefit analysis and the potential upfront savings (?) of 6 up-gunned Rivers versus the utility, flexibility and future proofing (through size, space and weight margins) of 5 x non-specialist T26, that as per the article will have considerably better survivability.
As TD today posted a link to Chucks USCG blog – take a look at this excellent post showing some potential candidates for their Ocean Patrol Cutter requirement – many of which are marketed as Corvettes or even Frigates !
http://chuckhillscgblog.net/2012/07/12/opv-to-opc/
If you really want more “patrol” boats for some reason – then lets drop the political bollocks of building more ships in Portsmiff in order to shore up a dodgy parliamentary seat, or keep some jobs, just buy some civvy hulls (Ulstien SX119 ?)built in cheap foreign yards, man them with the RFA under the blue Ensign and call them “HM Coast Guard”.
(And if your really, really serious about keeping skilled jobs, build an 8th Astute, or god forbid, want LOTS of jobs, build a 3rd CVF as a replacement for HMS Ocean – that could keep the yards going for a while)
Could the new build OPV’s be to replace the existing Rivers? The reason I ask is that recently it was mentioned that we were buying the two River’s instead of continuing to lease them, maybe the purchase price was so high it cost the same to build two new stretched Rivers to the same spec as HMS Clyde?
EDIT just realised that there are three Rivers plus HMS Clyde not two – so my point is likely mute!
What about a patrol ship that is based on the T26 but with some of the weapons left uninstalled? (Is that a type 27?)
Some of the Coast Guards most successful warships were based on a USN gunboat design. They had large weight moment margins, because they were fitted with fewer and smaller weapons and when WWII came they were able to mount very large numbers of ASW weapons that their Navy counterparts could not carry because they were already overburdened with ASuW weapons.
In peacetime these ships operate more cheaply because they have smaller crews and spend less time in training, calibration, system checks, and maintenance.
Chuck – I think what you suggest is “essentially” what the so called “General Purpose” variant of the T26 is – no T2087 towed array, maybe carrying a Wildcat instead of a Merlin and perhaps fitted for but not with the Harpoon replacement.
Over the stern launch for big RHIB’s in place of the towed array and et’voila your “Patrol Frigate” is ready sir……
So we’re talking about a no-frills Type 26 – what counts as frills? Towed array? Anything else?
If the mcmv is to be modularised and the patrol vessels a la river ect are not that useful then should we just build type 26 vessels and scrap mhpc vessel altogether.
Well if the UK could afford 12 T45 + 18 T26 , we could avoid the need for cheap patrol ships. If you only have 6 T45 + 13 T26, then they are too thinly spread. So a stretched Clyde looks good. Would it be cheaper to fit a recycled 114mm gun than a new 76mm?
As for T26, I have been rambling on about the old Canadian Iroquois 4700 ton destroyers with 2 SeaKings. Air is free, steel is cheap. If the hangar is big enough for 2 helos, they do not need to carry 2 helos, but at least you have the option should you need it.
OK had time to read this properly now so here come some points.
I do believe you seem have started from the postion of :-
‘ We need all the frigates we can get’ so I will draw up the spec or the ‘patrol ship’ to equal:- surprise surpise, a frigate.
By and large as you do I reject the corvette for some of the reasons you have outlined. The River class are fine for running around the Irish/ north sea/ western approaches, playing fishery protection, and coastguard cutter roles. But ships that size no matter how specced, as you say, lack range carrying capacity and even self defence capability in any threat environment.
I also reject the old ‘We are an island and a trading nation argument’. If the shit hits the fan over the east west trade, then frankly how the f*ck we are supppose to be able to deploy a meaningful, task group and sustain it in the indian ocean. If it’s that bad the spams will sort it out. It’s the usual WASAWPYK fantasy.
Germany/Sweden/Denmark are as dependant on forign trade as we are in Germany’s case more so. The only other nation who sees it’s world role in those terms is France- who have built several classes of patrol ships. Admittedly they called them frigates, but defo patrol standard, not fleet class.
You seem to be arguing that when not patroling, when the war kicks off, the patrol ship must be able to perform as a t26, rather than as some other unit. I do however take issue with that. Your spec for the self defence capability for the ‘patrol ship’. You have in effect stated it’s ‘all or nothing’ you either have River class defence or it’s got to be balls out. However I disagree.
Many ships in a RN task force- all the RFA for a start, even the elephants, will emphaticaly not have that level of self defence capability.
Any patrol ship will need all the coms fit to fit into a RN task force. However as far as sensor/ weapons fit I think you are wrong.
The primary danger to a patroling ship is not an all out assult by ships and aircraft, from Antiship misiles etc. That is the an outright declarion of war, and given the probability of coalition status that risks destruction. The real danger is the well known ‘whoops sorry technic’. Where a single or pair of land based or air launcehed ASM is launched at a naval target followed by an announcement from (say) the Iranian govt, ‘Whoops sorry you violated our soveringty one of our units responded without authority about that we will investigate what happened etc etc’. One of the main requirements as I expect is the ability to deal with 1 or 2 ASM not necessarily the high tech end, therefore a decent PDMS and CIWs would suffice.
Obviously if we had the budget for everything then we would not be having this discussion.
In effect you and the other ‘professionals’ are frigate minded. You may be right. More (or rather in reality less in terms of ship numbers), of the same is the official response.
@ST: I would also say no Harpoon (or SSM replacement).
@JH: Yes I’d agree – probably with a 6/10/8 (T45/T26/T27) mix, handing over fisheries protection to a coast guard and keeping the MCM/Survey fleet/small patrol fleet there would be little need of debate until these unmanned vessels come of age in the mid 2030′s.
JH said: “Well if the UK could afford 12 T45 + 18 T26 , we could avoid the need for cheap patrol ships. If you only have 6 T45 + 13 T26, then they are too thinly spread.”
Why ? Why are they too thinly spread ?
I know why I think there are not enough of them, but I base my thinking on worse case scenario war time needs, not on peace time MSO tasking – but then again we apparently don’t need to do major war fighting ops on our own anymore, so our ships will be part of NATO or ad hoc coalition “Fleets” or task groups, so if we accept 3 possibly 4, out of 6 T45 will be available, and 5 or 6 out of 8 ASW T26, and these would provide the core of a task group protecting a CV and maybe and ARG, augmented by NATO units such as US Arleigh Burkes, French and Italian Horizon’s and FREMMS, Spanish and Norwegian AEGIS frigates, Dutch Seven Provinces destroyers etc etc then why are we too thinly spread ?
@ Jed
If we are to build 2 enhanced Clydes I was starting on the basic assumption they would be more capable than the Clydes, sort of corvette territory so I don’t think it unreasonable to assume they could cover WI perhaps, extra cover in FI, UK FRE perhaps. That said I am not in favour of them coming at the expense of T26s nor of them being built just for the sake of it. They should only be considered if they can cover some existing lower risk tasking and therefore leave 19 warfighters for higher risk threats. I think like others have suggested if it came to sacrifices i would rather have 12 high end T26s than say 8 and 5 low
@JH
I would suggest that only being able to afford 6 & 13 means that you need to cut your defense commitments, not that you need to build small and effectively useless ships.
A very good original article by the way. I too agree the professionals are getting things right with the frigate program, assuming they all get built.
Is “frigate minded” the new “carrier minded”?
@Repulse – sorry, missed your comment re Artisan. Honest answer is I don’t know. If yes, then could T26 handle both flavours of Aster?
It’s terribly easy to get sucked in to this “fantasy fleet” malarkey isn’t it – hopefully there’ll be a little extra cash in the kitty when we come to build the final T26s. Cross your fingers we might even get CEC. See, gone all fantasy again.
@ Jed
Tell me how many frigates and destroyers were there when you were in the Andrew?
We were only going to get 10 C1 and 8 C2 prior to SDSR. Once the 4 t22 Batch 3 were cut that deal was off as we are now replacing 13 Frigates not 17. So getting 13 like for like is a good deal.
Ixion, neither the Carrier nor the RFA units come out of the escort strength, any OPV/Patrol Frigate will.
France bases many of its Patrol Frigates as support units in its over seas dependencies. It also has a completely different outlook to world Geo politics than we do. The only similarities in terms of Rn and French Navies are the sizes.
SI did not ask for anything other than a good PDMS system but once you have a helo, PDMS, CIWS, Gun< Helo you have a frigate not a Patrol Ship and cost savings are negligible.
many posters on here simply add capabilities to their favoured "patrol ship" option and then still claim it will be cheaper than a Frigate.
SI and fellow professionals are actually "capability" minded!
How do we retain the ability to fulfill peace time roles and the capability to conduct war time operations given the budget?
That is the question and the answer is to maximise escort numbers and intelligently employ the hulls we have including using RFA assets and Escorts for less intensive missions.
I get heartily sick of people wanting the RN to shed hulls to do jobs that are not even core Naval roles. We can only afford to run the 3 Rivers because the DEFRA contract helps pay for them. Disaster relief in the Caribbean, welcome to the real world DFID.
I would lose the 3 rivers in a minute and tell DEFRA to get another service provider if it bought an extra FF.
A good post, and yet more good follow up discussion and ideas on patrol ships and the surface fleet in general.
As X flagged up earlier, I have been thinking for a while that if the only difference in Type 26 variants is the 2087 sonar then id much rather sacrifice 1 ship in order to get the remaining 12 up-to a common and more useful standard.
Id add to this the need to retain a bolt-on ASM, incorporate a large enough VLS to future proof for Tomahawk or a similar capability, and as John Hartley said a hangar with the room to carry 2 helos in an emergency.
As for other options, well some large Bay style aviation/control ships would be nice, and I think perfect for Indian Ocean counter piracy and the Caribbean anti drugs and disaster relief roles. They could probably be snapped up at a fairly cheap price as well (it’s very true that steel and air is cheap), but id be dubious as to whether the political will exists, or if even this modest amount of investment could be found.
With the OPV’S, I don’t think it’s particularly logical to procure 2 new ships, but if they do then they HAVE to have a better armament.
As I have said before, keep the 3 Rivers as they are, but take Clyde and the 2 new ships and give them a 76mm (or a recycled 114mm), a couple of 30mm and space for some AAM or a CIWS, maybe even a hangar for a Lynx if it’s feasible. Then perhaps having 2 of these ships in the South Atlantic would negate the need for a constant Frigate of Destroyer on station, with the 3rd being placed wherever else it’s thought useful (as a fisheries squadron leader, or a Mediterranean patrol ship?).
Lastly as everyone probably knows by now, forget MHPC for the time being. It won’t get through it’s conceptual stage for quite while, won’t be coming in-to service until the mid 2020′s, and even then will be primarily geared for replacing the Hunt’s and Sandown’s. It’s foolish to consider MHPC as a means of relieving pressure on the surface fleet, both because it won’t be around for ages, and also because who knows what the strategic picture will be in 10, 15, 20 years time.
So in general I think maximising the potential of the Type 26 and squeezing some more service out of the OPV’S is the most immediate means of dealing with the problems of ‘patrol’ and a lack of hulls in the water.
I’d like to see a towed array on at least some of our Coast Guard Cutters as a way to deal with the drug runners use of simi-submersibles and even true submarines.
I agree with the comment that the Patrol Ships (and frigates) need hangar space for more than a single helicopter. They will likely need either two helicopters or one manned helicopter and one or more UAS. But any ship with a beam of 13.7 meters (beam of the Perry class FFGs) or more should be able to handle this requirement.
Looks like two RAM or SEARAM mounts could provide good survivability even against a number of ASCMs arriving simultaneously. The Germans are putting two of these even on very small ships. There is a discussion of Phalanx vs RAM here:
http://chuckhillscgblog.net/2012/05/04/alternate-weapons-for-new-large-cutters/
There might be some interest in two other posts. The first looked at possible OPVs that might be modified to serve as the Coast Guard’s new cutter:
http://chuckhillscgblog.net/2012/07/12/opv-to-opc/
The second looked at how the new cutter might be designed to morph into a warship should the need arise.
http://chuckhillscgblog.net/2012/06/27/opc-design-for-wartime-build-for-peacetime/
Ran out of time to edit my previous rant, so continued.
Once I have got rid of the FPS I would look at the Falklands. Share the peace time burden tri service. withdraw APT(S) and make the RAF maintain 8 aircraft down South including an anti Ship capability. Utilise modern sensors for detection, we know the direction the threat is coming from. Lay command controlled mine fields in approaches to possible landing areas. Deploy some of these USVs we here so much about. Stich a Batle Groups worth of kit down South and tell the army to ensure it is manned. We cover at least 7 365/24/7 peace time tasks. I am sure the army could manage 1 6 month BG strength rotation.
@Somewhat and @Ixion
I am sort of considering your articles together, I think you will agree one talks fighty the other talks multi-utility.
Frigates need to be fighty
Rest need to be flexible, and large means flexible. Plus maybe some smaller patrol boats to boost numbers.
I have one question for both of you. Why can we not extend the life of the T23s and keep it simple so that both of your wishes can be granted?
x13 T26 with sonar sets from the T23s etc
Plus Ixion’s bay/my Absalon type for MHPC/GP duties
“I get heartily sick of people wanting the RN to shed hulls to do jobs that are not even core Naval roles.” – we have the UN and a substantial foreign aid budget for such roles, as I said on Matt S’s original post.
“French and Italian Horizon’s and FREMMS, Spanish and Norwegian AEGIS frigates, Dutch Seven Provinces destroyers etc etc then why are we too thinly spread” – yes well these nations and others really carried their weight in Iraq/Afghanistan didn’t they? I think there’s a reason we have a closer relationship with the US than those above – they have greater trust in us.
Frankly I think that SI’s views fit much better with a classic view of sea power. I would rather have capable units I can concentrate into a fleet and move to where it is needed, even if its presence is only a virtual one until needed, than have a bunch of minimalist ships scattered all over the world providing a token presence.
That is pretty much what Mahan was writing about all those years ago really. From that point of view being able to deploy a capable task group in a real crisis is far more important than having a continual presence.
X said – @ Jed
Tell me how many frigates and destroyers were there when you were in the Andrew?
Lots (relatively speaking) over 30 (T42, Leanders, T22, T23 were in before I left) – but what’s your point ?
I would like there to be lots now, but there aren’t, so sacrificing more for sodding “patrol boats” to play world police does not seem a good idea.
@APATS
You’re points on what the force mix should be in the South Atlantic are quite similar to what I was thinking. They shouldn’t be so reliant on having a frigate or destroyer on constant patrol, the fleet is spread too thin for this sort of mentality.
I agree that 8 jets with a dual anti air/anti ship capability would do most of the work in a far more effective and flexible way.
Plus I actually think a battalion rotated down there every 6 months would be a good thing. As people have suggested before it’s the perfect way of provided a decent land presence whilst also doing some very decent mountain and cold weather training.
Jed & Jeremy
You assume that the enemy/bad guys will play ball. What if they do not? With no Nimrods, keeping tabs on drug/weapon smugglers, pirates, terrorists, then a patrol boat lurking on the horizon is the next best thing.
The UK may cut its capability, but the nasties we come up against may not. They are under no obligation to play by our rules.
I am also detecting some big ship bigotry. It should be remembered that FPS is the oldest naval standing formation. In my limited exposure to the RN I always found small ship sailors to be proper sailors they know the proper words for the pointy end for example. While many big ship sailors have a nautical knowledge on parr with WAFU. Does it make a difference? Probably not. But I just find it interesting how offering up the FPS is seen as “reasonable” by a couple of big ship professionals. “Reasonableness” being defined on those well trod grounds here that professional have spoken, how dare you ignorant tax payer question us? Objective? No not really. All on a level with the Army being armour barmy and the RAF being fighter freaks.
@Jeremy M H
I think a lot of people on here (myself included) are coming round to the point of view you put across in you’re last post.
I want to find the money for a few extra large Bay type ships to take on aviation/command duties hunting pirates or providing humanitarian aid.
Equally if they decide to build a couple more Clyde type OPV’S then I think it’s worth up-gunning them a bit to make them vaguely useful patrol ships.
Id also (really getting in-to the realms of fantasy now!) love to see more low-end hulls for patrol work.
However it’s important to realise that all of these ideas are either at best difficult or at worst just totally impossible. The core fleet of surface ships (for my money 12 fully kitted Type 26 + the 6 Type 45) have to be ring-fenced as being more important than anything else.
The real balance lies somewhere between having a certain number of standing commitments (without going down the ludicrous global policeman route) whilst retaining the core ability to concentrate ships in-to a fleet that can pack a punch. This has to take precedence over the idea of scattering resources to achieve a mere token presence.
In an ideal world Id have everything, but in the real world you protect and preserve what’s really important and then work you’re way back.
@ JH
Then you need to spend more money. You are not buying any more meaningful capability. Cutting the frigate force down from what it is expected to fund some hair-brained mutant patrol ship won’t solve much of anything. All it will do is drastically reduce the ability of the RN to respond to something really important if it is called upon to do so.
What it sounds like the UK needs is a Coast Guard more than anything.
The UK needs to decide what it wants to be in the world. It can’t take on a globe spanning role with a military budget of 2.6% of GDP. You either need to redefine the mission to do fewer things or you need to spend more money. No amount of scheming about what bits and bobs to hang on some 20,000 ton elephant is really going to change that. It does nothing but shift the deck chairs around really.
The RN has the makings of being a force able to act globally if it concentrates on fitting out two carrier strike forces and its amphibs with proper escorts to go into harms way. Why not just focus on doing that? You can’t afford everything but if I were to list naval capabilities I would want to have that would be near the very top.
Building more ships that in a real war will need escorts is just moving things in the wrong direction in my view. You can defend UK interest with a fleet capable of transoceanic operations on that scale. If you piecemeal the fleet all over the world to babysit every rock that still has a Union Jack somewhere in its flag you have a pretty hollow force.
X ” Big Ship Professionals”? I have actually been a BFSO at sea. Fantastic 3 week course, 1 week in London, 1 in Lowestoft and 1 in Grimsby. Ful subbies and hotels all the way, though a fish market visit at 0600 can be emotional when you have not poured yourself into bed until midnight. I have served on everything from a Hunt to an LPD size wise. So I am not speaking down to any ignorant tax payer merely offering an alternative position given the current financial crisis.
SI,
Interesting post.
Last time we got onto the T26 I settled on the idea of 8 T26-ASW plus 8 T26-BASIC (half the price of the T26-GP). Yes, I know, I’ve also wandered off onto the Bay / SCS idea too.
Just wondering if the 8+8 is actually a good option. Can you use the T26-BASIC for all patrol and training tasks?
T26-BASIC:
- Main gun
)
- CIWS
- Wildcat (with dipping sonar if you left it to me
- Half-decent hull sonar
The main thing I’m missing is the air self-defence system. Is there a way that Wildcat can “paint” the threat and the ship can carry CAMM but no targetting radar?
By keeping the costs of the systems down we can afford more hulls, which can be upgraded when funds allow.
SEARAM can provide decent self defense against ASCMs without a separate targeting radar.
Perhaps a couple of Rapier batteries would suffice?
Or, the new CAMM version, surely that doesn’t need an expensive medium range tracking radar?
Simon, Sea Ceptor will take its initial feed from 997(Artisan).
Chuck with RAM/SEARAM you have to ensure that you have correct weapon arcs for its own radar to detect the threat so threat has to be initially detect in order to allow correct ships response. that will require a 997 type radar. Once that is fitted I would rather pay the extra for Sea Ceptor and engage at 16 miles or inital detection if at radar horizon with a possibility of a re engagement than 6.
Last comment…
Logic (well, mine anyway) dictates that our fleet should be built/sized to provide everything we need to field the active carrier and amphibs.
What we do with the fleet in peacetime is then the question, rather than what fleet do we need to do peacetime tasks and how then do we use it in war.
This might mean ditching many of our standing tasks (as APATS is hinting) and concentrating only on the ones that truly matter (trade route protection). Build up the installed defensive forces in the South Atlantic, build up the UK border force to police the drug and human traffic, and install land-based air defences in the mid Atlantic islands.
It’s basically why I suggested that building up DG makes the most sense. We could even sell our “International Ocean Police” services to China and India as proper mercenaries
Jeremy
If I was dictator of Britain ( a favourite subject of mine) then DfID & EU contribution money would be halved with the savings going to infrastucture & defence.
I am not against big,fighty ships. I can play fantasy cruiser with the best of them, but I do not see what is wrong with a handful of stretched Clydes when we are not fighting a modern Trafalgar/Jutland.