A guest post from Sir Humphrey.
This is the third part of the short series on UK Defence engagement in the Far East. So far the article has reviewed our commitments, our force levels and our potential engagement. Now in the short final part, we look briefly at the future, and try to get some mobile phone signal on the crystal ball…
What level of engagement is likely to occur in the near future?
So far this article has focused on the level of UK interest in the region, which it is clear is an area in which HM Government has very significant political and economic interests, but which is not a region that presents a direct military threat to the UK. A good primer on the wider UK level of interest in the region can be seen in the transcript of a speech by the UK Foreign Secretary (William Hague), made in April 2012, which summarises the overall level of engagement by the UK in this region. A copy of the speech can be found HERE.
In terms of the level of future presence and engagement, this author would suggest that the current pattern of activity would seem to be about right – there is a regular flow of staff talks, and international discussions on all manner of issues between the MOD, wider Govt and other nations with whom the UK can work. These are in many ways the main forum for co-operation – by keeping dialogue alive, even at a relatively infrequent or low level, channels of communication are maintained, and make it easier to ramp up relationships in due course, when resources and international interests permit.
A good example of where defence relationships are likely to improve through lower level talks, and potentially exchanges of information in future, is the recent UK/Japan defence co-operation memorandum, signed in April 2012 (link HERE).
Similarly, the current exercise programme, primarily focused on occasional deployments of RN vessels, backed up by the odd wider deployment of an RAF fighter element to support exercises with the FPDA, seems to be a roughly appropriate level of engagement.
While it is fun to consider the world of ‘what ifs’ the reality is that HM Govt has a limited amount of funds to spend, and Defence is even more limited. With no genuinely credible threat to our interests in the region, it is hard to see the justification for a massive upsizing of purely military resources out there. Instead, this is an area where ‘soft power’ should be used to maximum effect to ensure that UK interests are protected.
This authors strictly personal predictions for the next few years (based on nothing more than a spot of thinking) would be though:
- The UK defence footprint in the region will remain relatively static, albeit with the occasional opening or closing of a Defence section.
- The UK will continue to see FPDA as the main focus of military engagement, and deployments to the region will be designed to coincide with major exercises.
- Task Group deployments and solo escort deployments will occur, but not necessarily on as frequent a basis as has previously occurred. Future deployments are likely to showcase specific high end capabilities for training rather than perhaps a fully balanced task force.
- The UK will continue to engage in staff talks and international engagement with most countries in the region, but this will not necessarily translate into any form of meaningful and substantive military engagement in the region.
- Continued operations against piracy will see engagement with some nations that the UK would not normally operate with (for instance Korea and China), and valuable multi-national operational experience will be gained in this manner, even if there are limited exercises in the region itself.
The reality is that in an age where an overstretched defence budget has to cope with many demands, the ability of the forces to sustain a commitment to a region with negligible threats is limited. Although it is currently unlikely that there would be a permanent withdrawal of UK assets from the region, it will almost certainly remain an area where the UK will seek to influence and engage by means other than the military in nature.
Summary
The Far East is the region that most ‘internet fantasy fleet’ discussions get most excited about when talking on ideal future structures of the RN, or how they’d use the existing network of relationships and alliances to put UK troops in the area on a permanent basis.
The reality is that the UK doesn’t need this sort of permanent presence – the threat to justify it doesn’t exist, and the costs associated with permanently basing a large proportion of the armed forces in the region simply can’t be justified by the level of concerns associated with the area.
The current situation, where a primarily diplomatic network, merged with some small exercises and ship visits, works to remind nations of the UK interest, but then exercises, training or co-operation on operations occurs elsewhere, seems to work well and provides for an appropriate level of engagement.
It remains highly unlikely on current international trends that there would be a major shift in UK presence or posture within the region within the next 2-3 years. Therefore, this author would suggest that the current UK military presence in the Far East is entirely appropriate, and in line with the nature of the challenges posed by a vastly complex region.
I hope you’ve enjoyed this short series of posts about a fascinating region. If the interest is there, then over the next few weeks and months, I will turn my attention to other parts of the world.
An excellent and informative series of posts Sir H! I for one would certainly like to read your views on other areas.
I entirely agree with you’re point of view and future predictions Sir H.
We all like to play fantasy fleets, but realistically their isn’t the money for an immediate expansion of military involvement, and furthermore the Far East doesn’t represent a direct threat to our interests and so just isn’t a priority.
I think, as you say, that the best plan for the near future is the soft approach. Maintain our current commitments, have the occasional deployment for some specialist training and keep some of the diplomatic chatter going. Brunei, Singapore and Diego Garcia make provision for a fairly rapid and effective build-up in the region, if, heaven forbid we faced some kind of crises.
The only possible fantasy I would indulge is the idea of an Anglo/Indian partnership filling the prospective void at Diego Garcia if the Americans want to leave in 2016. Nothing fancy though, I reckon that a very minimalist ‘footprint’ in residence would suffice.
Sir H, I agree a very informative series. I also agree with the conclusion that beyond a very unlikely significant event which directly challenges the UK’s or allies existence, nothing drastic is going to change over the next 10 years or so.
I would say though that low level changes such as investment in the naval base facilities at Singapore, a permanent presence at Diego Garcia of a MRV or two and continued training exercises / defence pact initiatives would reflect appropriately the growing relevance of the region.
V interesting mini-series…and we even found three births for the RN in Singapore in the process.
I think this Americans leaving DG in 2016 is a myth created on this site (prior to Sir H taking the baton!). There was a “what discussions” question about it in the Parliament v recently and the answer was “none”.Also the 40 staff there seem to be a pure adjunct to the American base.
Adding to “Brunei, Singapore and Diego Garcia make provision for a fairly rapid and effective build-up in the region” I think I saw a glimpse of the integrated air defence network remaining in place (from the bad Indonesian days) and a couple of RAF bods being with the central node of it; that might be dated information though?
Finally at the time of the SDSR there was talk about a bilateral defence treaty with Australia, the FPDA being seen as too nebulous (a point of view that I do not share). I guess nothing came out of that?
As Sir H says, the resourcing level has been well optimised while at the same time leaving room for rapid growth should that for what ever reason be required.
missed the edit window…”berths” it was meant to be
I believe that, in addition to diplomacy, this nation would benefit from being able to submit a small intervention/stabilisation force to work with other nations in the area (FPDA).
I think that this would constitute something like a single showcase escort and a single RFA (Bay or tanker) and would (I hope) simply be a relocation of assets we had around the Indian Ocean. i.e. no permanent presence, but a nearby presence that can be re-tasked if necessary.
I therefore agree rather a lot with Sir Humphrey’s three posts on East of East of Suez. A very informative few posts. Thanks.
@ Sir H – Great series, However I am not aware of any UK forces committed to FPDA exercises in the last few years. Perhaps you could fill us in. The last deployment I can remember to Singapore was Taurus 09.
I think the UK should commit to sending at least one major combatant every year be it a T45, Astute or T23 for some sort of annual FPDA exercise with a possible visit from an ARG or once we have them again CSG bi annually. This would be well with in our capabilities and it may serve to reinvigorate the FPDA.
While I agree that the UK her self faces little in the way of threat in the area the same cannot be said for our allies. Tension’s in the Spartly Islands and Scarborough Shoal continue to rise. Malaysia in particular as well as Brunei who do not share the same relationship with the USA as the Philippines must be increasingly alarmed and I think they should quite rightly expect some form of support from HMG.
That being said neither we nor they want to inflame the Chinese so our presence would have to be more low key that the USA’s.
Given the wind down in the Stan I think now is the time to start looking back towards such things.
Back in the 1960s the late Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly proposed in a paper that RN establish a task force for the India Ocean area so that there was a force to help support Africa, Gulf, and contribute to FP.
What did for our EoS presence was a need to concentrate diminishing resources on the North Atlantic not because it wasn’t needed. Now, apart from the deterrent, there is no great need for the navy in the North Atlantic.
What surprises me when I read anything about EoS and UK defence today is that younger amongst us (and dare I say those not as steeped in the UK’s maritime history) there is a sense that the Indian Ocean is a stretch, a reach, that it is exotic, and alien to us. Yet for a long time it was “our” ocean. In the space of my short life we have gone from a global security outlook to a parochial one where we abdicate our decision making on security to others and see only as far the Continent.
Churchill definitely did not want to “let go” regarding India
RE “Yet for a long time it was “our” ocean.”
- so, x, what’s the moral of the story?
@ ACC
The moral is “don’t waste time on the internet when there is work to do”……
Quickly, the Indian Ocean is perhaps the best place for us to concentrate our defence efforts.
Got to go.
@ X – I would agree with the point that there is little need for the navy in the North Atlantic or even the med and we should look to concentrate what spare capacity we have in the IO as its the area they are most likely to be useful. We actually have a fair presence in the region in the Gulf and the Anti piracy patrols however for some reason we have refused to categorise this force as a single command i.e. an Eastern Fleet.
Not sure why, half the time I think we outnumber the fifth fleet in the area.
Just checked the fifth fleet and it still larger than what we have out there. Will be interesting to see what happens to it though with the draw down in the region.
martin, google it
- over the next couple of years the 5th Fleet will be the beneficiary of “repivoting”
- only in the longer run the true Pacific fleet will benefit
- guess why the first four of the transoceanic LCSs will be based out of S-pore? So that they will be within a steaming distance from the Strait of Hormuz (they can only cross so many oceans in a hurry)
@ x, a while back you wrote a v considered comment on setting more focus on the IO; it seems that the RN history books get the better of you when you are in a hurry?
Perhaps the Americans won’t leave Diego Garcia in 2016, however I think either way it’s an area where we could do with a bit more presence.
I really believe that without getting too adventurous and fantastical we should have a more coherent force in the Indian Ocean. It would be a good way of staying on the sidelines of both the Middle and Far East as a sort of familiar observer, maintaining some soft power and building diplomatic/military ties with our regional allies.
@ Martin re Med
My main concern for the Med is that Arab Spring turns into a caliphate stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian border. A sort of latter day Islamic commonwealth similar to Medieval Christian Europe but with tangible external threats. All of a sudden the south shore of the Med is no longer friendly. And though not a threat to Europe on the same level as the Warsaw Pact still a threat; armed with Turkish and Chinese weapons, funded by the Gulf, and with a large manpower pool. I am not one of those Islamaphobe whack-jobs. I would be saying this if they were Methodists.
@ ACC
I say it as I see it. We live in a world where sending a navy ship to India is talked off in hushed tones like it is a moon shot. Whilst conveniently forgetting how much of what we buy comes from Asia in ships. No not the island don’t you know argument more pointing out a disconnect. I see the West needs to balance China and India. To do that it needs to position itself to be in contact with those two powers. We need to sit across the SLOCs to Africa and Australia. And I still maintain Gulf Oil is Chinese Oil and that if the interconnected world argument was total we wouldn’t be sitting here discussing defence.
I’d like to see three “fleets”:
1. Based in Blighty.
2. Based in Ascension.
3. Based in Diego Garcia.
They seem strategically sensible places to be based.
@ x, aren’t they already balancing each other?
“the West needs to balance China and India”
@ Simon, the USAF 60′s/ 70′s concept of Bare Base comes to mind,
“2. Based in Ascension.
3. Based in Diego Garcia”
as in: there’s nothing there, you bring it all with you (once you deploy, BUT only for a limited period)
@ ACC
Three powers in competition, just like just three legs, is more stable.
The major issue with basing in Diego and Ascension is that we don’t have amy ship’s. We are stretched thin covering half the standing patrols. When the carriers come back they will suck up most of the escort fleet.
We already deploy a fair bit in the way of assets to the IO. Diego Garcia is a good place to use for resupply ship’s etc. I think we could do with out the need for any major land based facilities out there. However I do think having a two star in the region with a fleet command is important. As Sir H points out having the people in place working on alliances can often be more important than the machines. a fleet HQ with offices in somewhere like Qatar would help us continue to build on the great work we already do in the region. If the USN does scale back dramatically on the 5th fleet which they may then we will be much better placed to capitalise. At present if congress does not gets its act together the US military is going to have to cut $ 1 trillion off its budget over ten years. They are working on the assumption at the moment that congress will work it out however I am not so sure.
A Eastern Fleet would also put us in a better place for training with FPDA. Even stretched as we are to have a T45 in or near the gulf, the four MCM’s we currently have and maybe a one or two T23′s with an assortment of RFA vessels and an SSN is doable with our current fleet and budget. Indeed this is pretty much the force we have at present. Through in an annual visit from either an ARG or CSG conducting exercises’s with Gulf nations, India, FPDA and Indonesia and we could score a major diplomatic boost in the region with out having to spend much.
These annual exercises especially in MCM, ASW and AAW could help us better show case our capabilities and may give a major boost to UK defence exports. We might even be able to start going back to RIMPAC once in a while.
@ x- “Three powers in competition, just like just three legs, is more stable.”
ohhh – the number of essays and articles debating that statement….
The tsunami kept Japan away from the 13th year of this kind of exercises, between India, Singapore, US and Japan (may have missed out one?)
“conducting exercises’s with Gulf nations, India, FPDA and Indonesia and we could score a major diplomatic boost in the region with out having to spend much.”
- I think what we are trying to invent, has been invented already
- how to barge into a party (are we late, uninvited, or both?)
ArmChairCivvy,
I get your point about the “bare base” but just think that our naval forces seem focused for rapid intervention. The best way to be rapid is to be in the vicinity already.
DG is about a week away from most nations with coasts in the IO.
Ascension is about a week away from most of the west coast of Africa and two weeks from, ahem, the Flaklarns – trying not to say it
Trouble is I can’t decide where I’d like the carrier fleet to be based and where I’d like the assault fleet to be based – certainly not the UK, there’s no point (other than maintenance).
Sir H
Just wanted to say many thanks & BZ for your contributions here and over on TPL – they are much appreciated.
If you are doing requests, then might I suggest West Africa?
Our backyard, lots of historical involvement (including the only war we’ve unequivocally won in the last 20 years), rising strategic importance thanks to increasing production of oil and other resources, which in turn allow weapons procurement to pursue old ethnic divisions. Good microcosm of the Cold War against China. Plus it would be a perfect place to play with some SIMSS’s….
Would be particularly interested in your take on what the USN are up to – my sense is that they’re paying lip service to the importance of the area but it always seems to be sacrificed to higher priorities. But that may change as the focus moves away from SW Asia.
@ Swimming Trunks
Yep. Right up with define the national interest , 2500 words, abstract not included.
@ Simon re Ascension
No those islands would be a better bet because of distant and anchorages. The FI were a coaling station at one time. A force in the IO is just as far from the FI as the UK.
IO
I agree (I think) with Sir H.
Not a long way to go, not a long way to ship things thru, happens all the time. Not a long way to send a ship on a goodwill trip
But it is a long way
: To base anything other than ‘Forwards presence squadron’ (See the MCM’s and our contribution to the anti piracy team)
And way to far to support any kind of serious solo military operation.
Lets not get fantasy fleetish about this.
x,
“No those islands would be a better bet because of distant and anchorages. The FI were a coaling station at one time. A force in the IO is just as far from the FI as the UK.”
Sorry, I don’t understand.
Are you suggesting FI instead of Ascension (plus DG and UK)?
@ Simon – I love playing fantasy fleets myself. However to base both a carrier and assault group over seas means we are going to need three of each.
That’s a hell of an increase in the RN. I take your point about being close however we can move these type of forces from the UK relatively rapidly to the Med, Western IO or mid Atlantic.
I just don’t think being able to save a few days on deploying forces warrants the massive extra cost. Also if we split up the assault and carrier task force then you risk a situation where neither can do the job until the other arrives. If we needed both in Sierra Leone for example and the assault force is at Ascension with the Carrier at DG then its going to take quite some time for the carrier to make it round.
martin,
I don’t think we’d need three of each (although I understand your concern). I’d work on one active carrier/LPD with the other in refit for 1-2 years. This means we’d need to rotate the crews (every 6-8 months) who would be based in Ascension or DG.
As for getting things together I appreciate what you’re saying. I just think that for the most part we need to “fly the flag” and do intervention ops that could (and are/have been) conducted by carriers and/or assault ships.
It’s only when things go “pear shaped” that we need to bring both fleets together and deploy them to the same location.
Statistically it is not efficient to have them based from the mid-point of our reach. By this I mean it would be best to have them based in the UK if we might deploy them on our doorstep, but we wouldn’t, we’d use the RAF for those kinds of rapid response ops.
@ ACC – You are correct there is a FPDA annual exercise but as far as I know our attendance has been somewhat lacking as of late. While nations like Singapore send units to RIMPAC it’s not a substitute for conducting large exercises closer to home where more of their fleet can get a chance to participate. The USN holds massive exercises in East Asia with Korea and Japan but as far as I am aware they do not hold anything similar in SE Asia. Certainly not regularly anyway.
Giving Singaporean and Malaysian forces the chance to practice ASW against SSN’s and the like will I think be well appreciated in an area where Chinese naval ambitions are a concern. Show casing our kit which really is world class can’t hurt either. Many of these nations are beginning to purchase new kit to deal with the Chinese threat. If we bring in RAF units as well it could help with possible future sales of Typhoon to Malaysia and maybe even the Philippines.
Using this as a format to work with Indonesia as well can’t hurt. It’s not trying to re-invent anything just simply meeting our existing commitments in a better way.
As for India, I am not sure if they get the chance to train with anyone on a regular basis. The exercises the carried out with one of our T boats in 2010 during David Cameron’s visit seemed to go down well.
Progressing further I don’t see what would be wrong with a RIMPAC type exercise for the entire IO possibly centered of DG. This would give EU navy’s as well as the USA a chance to participate. It should not be too difficult for us to send a decent sized force to DG once a year.
My point about us attending RIMPAC was more as a chance to gain export sales for ASW, AAW and MCM kit all of which the Japanese, Koreans and others need. Just because we know its the best and the Americans do doesn’t mean that others do. Nothing sells a Sonar like having your subs located over and over again by one.
Actually, the more I think about it, the more I think we should base both carrier and assault fleets to DG in the IO.
It spreads our global influence the most.
You can’t station carrier or assault groups oversea’s, both because of the unjustified costs and the acute lack of vessels to actually do the job. As Martin said, a few days or weeks sailing time is worth the flexibility it brings the rest of the time. Plus without major installations I think you would find these capital ships heading back to UK far more often then one would like.
Better to have low-end assets acting as forward presence. Heck even without ships, just maintaining overseas bases as potential jumping off points would suffice.
As many other people have pointed out, soft power, such as training and very limited infrastructure, coupled with strong diplomatic associations is the way forward.
Keep a vigilant, bystander role 99% of the time, with the ability to rapidly build up a credible force on the off chance it’s required.
@Martin
‘Nothing sells a Sonar like having your subs located over and over again by one’.
I think you hit the nail on the head. All of the talk and specifications can’t compare to a real-world demonstration. It’s only then that observers say ‘wow, this thing really does what it says on the tin’.
@ Simon
Yes I mean the Falklands.
I think we’re going in to fantasy fleet territory here; Sir H did say the current set up is more than adequate. However, Never one to pass up play fantasy fleets…
In the past we have deployed squadrons as well as fleets; with the CVBG/ARG at home ready to sail in an emergency (Home Fleet?), could squadrons be deployed abroad? The smallest I can imagine with current and planned vessels would be 1 Type 45 and one Type 23/26 to compliment each other, with perhaps an Auxiliary in support?
An alternative using suggested vessel ideas would perhaps be a squadron of (4?) Sloops (Black Swan, etc)with an auxiliary acting as depot ship with UNREP and different modular mission packages to increase flexibility, perhaps JSS or MESHD?
Such a squadron could perform forward presence, theatre security, training, SLOC patrols, etc. If the threat level rises then the Home Fleet (or elements) can be called to give support
I thought the point in FF2020 was for rapid reaction.
Isn’t the reaction you’re suggesting no quicker than a load of ferry/container ships packed with regular Army/tanks and tankered Typhoons flown into the nearest friendly airstrip?
Fantasy fleets, lovely!
I would use DfID money to build an airstrip & deep water quay on all those remaining British dots. So Pitcairn for this region. Not base anything there, but know we have somewhere to operate from in an emergency.
For Diego Garcia & piracy patrol, one permanent ship. I want something handy & cheap to fill the gap in the shipyards. My fantasy was a new Engadine, 2 Merlins, 2 Wildcats, but armed this time, with a 114mm gun & 20mm Phallanx taken from a retired T42.
@Simon, the first place to base a new fleet would be Gibraltar, no question. The facilities are there and they can move south or east just as easily.
The dedicated power station in GIB is now running the biggest server park in Europe – as we have two patrol boats there, and no power is needed at the moorings or in the repair docks (are they still there?)
They can move east if the canal is open.
Repulse,
Sounds sensible, but it still doesn’t put a “fleet” within minimum reach of nearly every 2nd/3rd world country – i.e. the ones that have (or will have) “problems” in the future.
Just look at a globe – if you’re positioned at Ascension and DG (and the UK) you’re no more than 4000nm (ships range) of a lot of “interesting” places
@ ACC
They used to be a mini power station under the rock at Gib. The tunnels that aren’t yet open to the public have some interesting stuff all abandoned now of course, left to rot but interesting all the same.
@ Simon
At 500miles per day that’s a week sailing.
Ascension isn’t suitable. If you are wedded to the idea look at Sierra Leone.
X, I agree, I think Sierra Leone would make an ideal forward location but the facilities would need some serious work or we might accept that the type of support it would offer would be minimal
Re; The Indian Ocean,
Not quite sure why everyone is so keen to put a major combined arms/service battle group on Diego Garcia? What is it going to do? Why do you need it there? What Immediate international crisis do you forsee it having to respond to?
If you want to put a permanent overseas naval presence anywhere you’d be better off putting it at both/either Gibraltar and/or Oman. You have forces then on both sides of the Suez canal and at either end of the med.
More importantly, these are close to actual areas of interest for us. The Middle East is a large source of export orders for our military equipment, so being very close to them makes sense. These are also countries that Britain actually has some semblence of influence over.
Gibraltar puts us close to the next source of plausible Al Qaeda tension, that being the Mahgreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), and is close to Western Africa, which is likely to be a much more interesting place as far as our economy and energy is concerned in the future than the Indian Ocean.
El Sid was right to highlight Africa. It is incredibly more interesting and important to our future than guarding ships full of plastic toys from Taiwan through the Indian Ocean.
@ X
“My main concern for the Med is that Arab Spring turns into a caliphate stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian border”
– Only in Al Qaeda’s warmest dreams is this likely to happen. The Arab Spring isn’t quite the democratic revolution that the press would like it to be.
“Whilst conveniently forgetting how much of what we buy comes from Asia in ships.”
. If Greece wants a way out of its current plight it’d do well to look at all the stuff that’s being imported from the East and considering manufacturing some of that itself.
– Toys, shoes, plates, cups, all the life essentials
@ Martin,
“The major issue with basing in Diego and Ascension is that we don’t have amy ship’s. We are stretched thin covering half the standing patrols. When the carriers come back they will suck up most of the escort fleet”
– On this point I have to agree with you 100%. We are struggling to cover some of the standing tasks. The last thing we need is to start permanently sending ships to go wondering around the Indian Ocean.
x,
Well it’s 4-days sailing for most coasts around DG and yes, 7-days sailing for the furthest islands to patrol in the South Atlantic
Not sure what your reference to Sierra Leone is about?
I’m not wedded to the idea it just looks like a point central to our interests rather than at one end (i.e. the UK).
x,
I think TD beat me to it.
Why base a fleet (or capability) in SL when you have UK soil a few miles south? What’s wrong with Ascension?
I admit it might need beefing up a little.
Sir H
Much enjoyable read over the three posts a really interesting region the far east and a area which will grow in importance significantly. With the instability along the north african coast and across the suez canal area I for one would be interested in hearing your thoughts on the med region given our bases in cyprus and gib and a popular holidaying region I suppose makes UK interest high I would have thought.
Ive always seen the the RNs frigate force standing deployments as a sort of early warning system in each region offering time for the UK to ready a further contributions to a region should that be necessary I dont see why that should change greatly and for that reason a regular far east deployment maybe of benefit as opposed to deploying the fleet to Diego Garcia.
@ Chris B
Unlike Santa I don’t believe in Al Qaeda. Wahhabism, America turning to the Pacific, and “open elections” are probably more dangerous.
As for the comment about life’s essentials I wasn’t on about what was shipped but the mode of transport and distance covered .
@ Simon
http://www.internetbs.net/faq/images/Image/ccTLD/AscensionIslandMapHiRes.jpg
http://mappery.com/maps/Freetown-Map.mediumthumb.jpg
http://www.portsdown-tunnels.org.uk/images/portsdown/Maps/portsmouth_location_map.jpg
x,
Ahh, the penny drops
And I always thought South East bay looked like a great place to put a ship… perhaps my dingy will be okay moored there!