In a previous post on the Talisman route clearance system I made the point that ‘defeating the device’ was a single part of a more complex strategy including ‘defeating the network’.
The IED makers in Iraq had plenty of military explosives, artillery shells and mortar bombs to use so resorted to homemade explosives less often. n Afghanistan it is reported that homemade explosives are the norm, over 80%.
The most common form of homemade explosive is ammonium nitrate fuel (ANFO) that mixes ammonium nitrate fertilser with diesel to form a powerful explosive. Although illegal in Afghanistan it is still produced in quantity in Pakistan and smuggled across the border.
A recently published US GAO report highlights the scale of the problem.
This testimony discusses the collaborative efforts of U.S. agencies to detect and prevent the smuggling into Afghanistan of calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) fertilizer produced in Pakistan. Approximately 80 percent of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan contain homemade explosives, primarily CAN smuggled from Pakistan. These IEDs have been a major source of fatalities among U.S. troops in Afghanistan and have been used by various insurgent groups in Pakistan to kill thousands of Pakistani civilians and members of Pakistani security forces. U.S. officials recognize the threat posed by the smuggling of CAN and other IED precursors from Pakistan into Afghanistan, and various U.S. departments, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), are assisting Pakistan’s government in countering this threat. This testimony is based on our May 2012 report on this issue.
According to the Department of Defense (DOD), CAN is produced in Pakistan at two factories. DOD estimates that about 240 tons of CAN—representing less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the two factories’ total annual production capacity—is used by insurgents to make IEDs for use in Afghanistan. When processed and mixed with fuel oil, CAN fertilizer becomes a powerful homemade explosive. DOD officials noted that only a small amount of CAN is required to make powerful IEDs. According to DOD, a 110-pound bag of CAN yields about 82 pounds of bomb-ready explosive material. This small quantity has the capacity to destroy an armored vehicle or detonate 10 small blasts aimed at U.S. forces conducting foot patrols.
Afghanistan outlawed CAN in 2010, but because of demand for CAN as fertilizer and for IEDs, smugglers bring it into the country, for example, on trucks hidden under other goods. Afghanistan and Pakistan face challenges similar to those that the United States and Mexico face in trying to prevent smuggling across sections of our shared border. U.S. officials note that Pakistan maintains two primary border crossings along the approximately 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan, and only a small percentage of the trucks crossing the border are inspected. Our May 2012 report contains a video of activity at border crossings along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Click here to read the full report.
It should be obvious that cutting off the supply of ammonium nitrate fertiliser would have a significant effect on IED availability.
The report notes that only two factories in Pakistan produce the fertiliser and yet efforts to interdict the supply across the border are self evidently not working. Although Iran and China produce it and there are alternatives that the Taleban could easily switch to, the simple fact remains that two factories in Pakistan produce the majority of the precursor materials that produce the majority of coalition casualties.
Dropping a cruise missile onto these factories is not an option so there have been many initiatives to stop or reduce the flow.
Just because there are alternatives such as urea or potassium chlorate should not mean we give up on ammonium nitrate reduction.
This is a complex issue with no easy answers but in 2009 I wrote about Sulf-N-26, a non explosive fertiliser and again in 2011, it is an issue that has always puzzled me.
The reason I have been continually puzzled by this is because the west spend billions of pounds on aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan, would it not be cost effective to simply buy the licence to these non explosive fertilisers, set up a number of factories and subsidise production?
How much do we spend on development aid, counter IED equipment and medical care?
Am I being a little simple minded?
Rumours spread, guess the sources, that ISAF fertiliser was shit. And it is thus been even harder to get conservative people to buy into anything other than what they have used and trusted before. Would you put your entire years salary into a bank that you didn’t trust? You could try forcing it but you will win no friends. Maybe trust will grow but change to something as fundamental as crops, poppy or food, is not something done lightly.
I would say there is no easy way of quickly assuaging the conservatism and suspicion of millions of farmers who are screwed if their crop fails.
I don’t know but if the intro of a different fertiliser coincided with a poor crop then you’re about screwed when it comes to change.
Could just have Pakistan take over the running of the two factories. Get your license for the new fertiliser and stick it in the same bags that the old stuff used to come in. Then your Afghan farmers don’t have much of a choice, if they even know it’s different.
Or just conduct more thorough searches at the checkpoints? I presume the Afghans man a checkpoint on their side of the border?
Chris B, it is not a matter of getting a licence and move on to a non exclusive fertiliser. You would have to replace much of the existing factories. This could be done as aid but by the time new plant was up and running it will be 2014 and ISAF force will be very largely gone.
It just demonstrates the whole Afgan operation was ‘catch up’ which never did. No way to run a war.
Point for discussion –
‘What will happen in Afganistan after ISAF leaves’.
How long will the West continue to fund the Afgan government/army/police force?
Can a limited SF/UAV presence be maintained to wack unpleasant faction leaders (as it appears intended) without becoming a target itself?
Afghan will remain relatively corrupt. There will continue to be low level criminal and terrorist activity in certain areas which is broadly contained by the Governemt which will fight hard since it is their necks on the line. Afghan will become a somewhat better place to be overall in most areas.
But there will be spots where the Government is pushed out of and then retakes for some time.
Once we’re gone and if we bolster ANSF then central Government should hold. The rest will be ebbs and flows. But no terrorist organisation will have the liberty to operate with impunity and as guests of the regime.
You may as well try and ban diesel for all the effect it will have. The whole point of using chemical fertilizer is that its cheap and very widely available all over the world.
Did the UK ever stop the IRA getting hold of fertilizer for its bombs?
“But no terrorist organisation will have the liberty to operate with impunity and as guests of the regime.”
Once western forces leave, the Taliban will get back in power.
No they won’t
The ownership structure of the factories is too complex to simply take them over. The key figure is that the IED supply problem is less than one tenth of one percent of production. The costs outweigh the benefits when even if you own the factories you will not be able vet all the buyers in Pakistan.
‘It should be obvious that cutting off the supply of ammonium nitrate fertiliser would have a significant effect on IED availability’
I’m not convinced, any effect would only be temporary. When faced with a shortage of fertiliser, they’ll just adapt new methods, whether that be different suppliers or explosives. There must be a reasonable amount of ex-soviet or even ISAF munitions lying around that can be harnessed.
‘But no terrorist organisation will have the liberty to operate with impunity and as guests of the regime.’
Again, I’m not convinced- if Pakistan can’t control its territory with its experienced army of half a million, then I don’t have much faith in the Afghan military to be able to.
I think what’s been missed in our strategy in Afghanistan is that in order for there to be a stable Afghanistan, you need a stable Pakistan too. If either country is failing, then the porous border provides an excellent hiding ground/escape route for insurgents to plague the other country.
Is there anyway to control the border? Many methods have been used in the past to close/regulate borders, with varying degrees of success. Is the terrain too difficult or have we not bothered, preferring to concentrate our resources elsewhere?
@ Aussi Johnno,
If there’s only two factories it should be fairly simple to turn them over to a new fertilizer blend. Essentially all you’re doing is changing the composition of the end product by altering the chemical inputs. Depending on what’s going in you might need some new machinery, but it really shouldn’t take all that long.
@ EMC2,
“You may as well try and ban diesel for all the effect it will have. The whole point of using chemical fertilizer is that its cheap and very widely available all over the world”
– The key really is that it’s locally available and every farmer has some. If you have to specifically import it from outside of Pakistan then it makes the whole process much more difficult and it’s easier to trace the chain of buyers.
“Once western forces leave, the Taliban will get back in power”
– I think it’s a little early to be deciding either way. The Afghan security forces have been given control of some very wide areas of responsibility now. Don’t forget that the capital will probably still play host to a reasonable presence of ISAF security elements, whether overt or covert, private or government employed.
@ Tom,
“The ownership structure of the factories is too complex to simply take them over,”
– If the Pakistani government wanted control of the factories it would be relatively easy. They would simply assume control, compensate those with previous ownership claims, and then fight any legal battle on the principal of national security, assuming they didn’t just opt to bribe this entire process from start to finish. You’d be surprised how quickly things can move when there is the will to do them.
“The key figure is that the IED supply problem is less than one tenth of one percent of production. The costs outweigh the benefits when even if you own the factories you will not be able vet all the buyers in Pakistan.”
– You don’t need to vet anybody if the product you’re producing is unsuitable for explosives. They can buy as much as they want.
CAN has a negligible effect on soil ph, while SULF-N 26 is acidic. SULF-N 26 may not be suitable for local soils. Broadly speaking, soil in Afghanistan is already acidic; additionally, their agricultural land suffers from pollution and over-farming due to the continuing loss of available land to erosion, desertification and other factors. The farmable land is very fragile and there is a heavy over-reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilisers – using the wrong fertiliser could be damaging. SULF-N 26 isn’t expected to go into large scale production in the US until 2013 anyway, so don’t expect it to get rolled out across Pakistan any time soon.
BB is right about acid soils. They are a hugh problem in Australia.
Back to the matter of future Aghanistan, the Afghan Army and administration put together by the Russian’s was able to sustain itself, atleast in major urban areas, for quite a while until the breakup of the USSR cut off aid and supplies.
The risk is this will happen again once the West’s attention moves elsewhere. I am not sure how much the UK is kicking in but Aus is committed to $250m a year for the 3 years after we withdraw in 13/14. It is hard to see this sort of commitment continuing into the future but that is what is required as there is no prospect of an Afgan administration supporting itself in the short or medium term.
There are long term mineral hopes but these will probably require the chinese which will make neither the US or India happy.
Thanks Brian, I knew there must be a good reason!
It’s so satisfying when an apparently bizarre matter is explained. Perhaps the rumours about the different fertiliser weren’t rumours after all but based on lay person interpretation of more scientific facts. Which shows that people tend to know more than we give credit for.
Very interesting cheers BB.
I wouldn’t count on the country’s mineral wealth to provide future stability, Johno. In such a corrupt state, and with such a fractured society -a composite of ethnic, tribal and political self-interest groups- mineral exploitation in any one region might just give folks something else to fight over.
Resources in the hands of a partisan government will only benefit the regions and groups on that government’s own preferential list, leading to the resentment of those who are excluded; and resources in the hands of regional or tribal leaders will create power blocs within the country that would rival the official national government. Also, states that recieve most of their income from mineral resources, rather than from industry, agriculture and services, have little or no incentive to help the people – who remain simply a burden rather than an asset, so those at the top will get very rich while those at the bottom get poorer and angrier.
Not directly Afghan war related, but this NaCTSO site lists thirteen notable international terrorist attacks that between them killed over 700 people, caused billions of pounds of damage, but used less than 12 tonnes of fertiliser in total. At current UK market prices, AN fertiliser costs around 300 quid per tonne.
http://secureyourfertiliser.gov.uk/threat.htm
BB, are you talking about Afghan or the UK?!
You decide, Phil. Heads I was talking about Afghanistan, tails the dis-UK.
That NaCTSO link benefits greatly from a few dubyas.
http://www.secureyourfertiliser.gov.uk/threat.htm
On a serious note, tribalism is not a recipe for perpetual conflict. We have tribes in this country but they are bound by ideas and status rather than kin largely speaking. A corrupt government might antagonise certain tribal groupings but there are ways and means of managing this and again it doesn’t necessarily mean combat. Afghanistan has been around for a while, there is a strong feeling of nationalism and a practical attitude there to business and peace. It won’t be perfect by a long shot but there are plenty of other states with tribal societies that exist in relative peace.
Brian, isn’t it time your wrote something for TD, on fertilisers maybe!!
Is it entirely in our interest to stop this supply. Yes it makes ieds but is it better to track the routes it takes the people involved and were the money comes from ect especially as it appears the source is well known. The dirty war so to speak.
Hi, TD. I never seem to have the time to commit to writing something – or at least looking up the references and checking what my brain has stored as ‘facts’, which I would feel more obliged to do if I presented something in an article rather than a comment on one. This is what passes for a day off, but I’ve still got paperwork to do, and I’m going into work this afternoon too.
If I ever get around to writing something, I would probably expand on the topics in a couple of my more lengthy previous comments on this site, written back when I had too much free time on my hands; though fertiliser is a worthy topic – where would Western civilisation be today without thousands of years of horse shit?
Phil
what makes you belive the northern alliance of 2014 will do better than the northern alliance of 1994?
@Dom
I’d say the lack of Pakistani troops masquerading as Taliban would help a lot.
The fact that the entire context has changed. And the fact that the Northern Alliance wrested power from the Taliban in 2001/2
But they did that with our support, and with russian support.
Historicaly, thats always been the limitation, and i dont see whats changed.
For example, french unification more than anything broke spain, and german unification broke france. The scouring of the north secured the normans hold on england
I dont see whats changed long term to allow the mayor of kabul to control afghanistan.
We’ve killed a lot, but ten twenty years from now, the population will have recovered.
Why not just split the country up on Tribal lines? Or is that to simplistic?
“But they did that with our support, and with russian support.”
Yes. Seeing as Afghan has been re-affirmed as one of the most important US allies I don’t see Karzai having to fight any such challenge without NATO air support. Also the Taliban did their worst whilst being openly supported by Pakistan and other states, a level of support that would make their international existence very difficult were they to try it again.
What has changed (arguably it is not change but the re-emergency of a contiuum disrupted by the Soviets) is a strong centralised ANSF centred on Kabul.
The whole context has changed. And I don’t understand what the unification of Germany and its consequences for France have to offer here.
@Dom
The inclusion of Pakistani troops fighting alongside the Taliban was one of the key reasons for the fall of the region to the Taliban. Estimates were that at the time, almost 50%+ of the troops fighting were actually Pakistani. Without that support, it is going to be hard to repeat 1996.
And if Pakistan were to be stupid enough to do it again, India will have their heads. They still owe the Paks for Mumbai. Why I didn’t say the US? The US will trash the armed forces but are less inclined for “war crime” like activities. India is furious enough to line up firing squads for their entire government.
Simon
On a small scale, that would be fine, the joins the uzbeks / tajiks ect, the south, well, that destabilises pakistan
Phil
The unification of Germany was a solid even that changed the entire dynamic of Europe.
The Scouring of the North broke the power of the north, its population was so reduced it took 500 years to revert to mean.
Whats happened in Afghanistan on the scale?
A firm commitment on behalf of America?
Ask the Poles and the Czechs what foreign promises are worth.
“What has changed (arguably it is not change but the re-emergency of a contiuum disrupted by the Soviets) is a strong centralised ANSF centred on Kabul.”
I’m afraid I’m going to have to ask for names
Which Kabul Shah has been able to dominate the Pashtuns?
“The unification of Germany was a solid even that changed the entire dynamic of Europe.
The Scouring of the North broke the power of the north, its population was so reduced it took 500 years to revert to mean.”
Im just not following.
“Ask the Poles and the Czechs what foreign promises are worth.”
Ooh can I play the game where you select one event from 2,000 years of history to prove your point?!
Shall we ask Belgium what foreign promises are worth? Or France?
“I’m afraid I’m going to have to ask for names
Which Kabul Shah has been able to dominate the Pashtuns?”
Ah the mythical Pashtuns. Never at peace unless they are at war.
Shall we ask which Kabul leader has the largest security force Afghan has ever seen at his disposal? Effectively with the US Air Force and RAF to boot.
Let us turn this around and ask you the questions Dom. So what would you want to do to prevent the “reoccupation of Alfganistan” that you see is going to happen? Leave ISAF forces there for another 50 years? Easy to complain, hard to find a solution.
Ball is in your court now. Better impress us with the answer or we’ll just see you as a whinner out to score points against the “system”. On a game only you are playing.
Observer
To “win” Afghanistan?
Easy.
Go chemical and depopulate the area
Or if we want to play nice, have left by early 2002.
Inform survivors if they misbehave, we’ll come back and slaughter another 20,000.
Sorry, but me not having a solution, doesnt mean the option is viable.
The Durani cant control the Ghizali.*
They couldnt 200 years ago.
They cant Today.
And unless we nerve gas 90% of the Ghizali, the Durani aint gonna be able to control them tomorrow either.
Thats reality, I suggest we live with it.
I suggest we accept the Ghizali can and will rule their own affairs, and ensure their leadership know we can and will kill them personaly, and their families, if the Ghizali annoy us, by, for example, hosting terrorists.
Far from perfect, but its an imperfect world
Perhaps its not as rosy a fairy tale as Kharzai wins and enforces life liberty and egalitarianism, but it does have the singular advantage of maybe being possible.
It is admitadly possible that the leadership wont be able to control the populace, even on pain of death.
*I got bored of trying to remember the more intricate relationships between the pashtun clans