The dust has settled, Twitter has calmed down and even Con Coughlin has stopped writing disreputable drivel so what do people think about Army 2020?
My thoughts, in no particular order
Contents
The Fat Lady Hasn’t Finished Warbling
The announcements covered the major units but sub unit changes have yet to be fully briefed so expect more information to come out in dribs and drabs over the coming months and perhaps even years.
Army 2020 is a process with a future end state, how it gets there is still very much work in progress and will be for some time.
When we discuss these matters I also prefer to keep things at a high level because ultimately we are talking about service personnel, their careers and families. If it is not in the public domain I will not be making assumptions or speculating on sub unit changes unless it is in the broadest sense.
Did We Need to Go This Far?
I don’t think anyone would question the need to put the MoD back on a proper fiscal footing or that national security ultimately comes from financial security so deficit reduction is very much the only grand strategy the nation should be pursuing but spending is all about priorities.
Legitimate questions about these priorities can and should be asked even though in the light of the subject of this post the answer is irrelevant.
A Lack of Moral Fibre
The Government has shown a complete and utter lack of backbone.
It started with the diktat that no one preparing for, on or recovering from operations would be selected for redundancy. It might seem somewhat cruel to give someone their P45 whilst in Afghanistan but in order to avoid negative headlines in the media the Government has actually created a more serious problem. Not only has it tied the hands of those planning the force reductions by focusing on a subset of personnel who had the somewhat random fortune to be on operations at the appropriate time it has also reportedly created the unintended consequence of a rush to volunteer for Afghanistan and thus stave off the brown envelope.
The second is the apparent unwillingness to address the tough issues of Gurkhas (who are widely believed to now cost double that of a British soldier), the Household Division and Scottish regiments.
None of these are terminal to the reorganisation but they do add unwanted complexity and restraint, inevitably compromising the final outcome.
A Two Tier Force
Organising into the reactive and adaptive force is a neat way to retain combined arms manoeuvre combat power at the same time as resourcing enduring operations ‘on the cheap’ it represents a risk of a two tier Army emerging.
Soldiering or peacekeeping might be a simplistic way of viewing the split but if the best and brightest gravitate towards the reactive force there will emerge a two tier force with a clear poor relation in the adaptive force.
Some think the reactive force will attract all the high flyers, funding and kudos, leaving the adaptable force as the poor relation.
An alternative may see the adaptive force deploying all over the world on a regular basis in the upstream engagement mission whilst the reactive force stays at home, filling sandbags for Local Authorities and training on a wet Salisbury Plain with a handful of kit they have prised out of the whole fleet management pool and surrogate main battle tanks, or that would be Land Rovers to you and me.
Avoiding this split will be difficult; those at Kentigern House are going to have to work ever harder to avoid this fear becoming a reality, as I am sure they now understand only too well.
The Whole Force Concept
The ‘Army Reserve’ is to be built up to a trained strength of 30,000 personnel, integrated more closely with regular forces and contractors with about a third of the adaptive force comprising of reserve personnel and a tenth in the reactive element.
Greater use of civilian ‘contractors’ is nothing new; we have the RAF’s Voyager tankers, numerous training PFI’s, the Army’s C Vehicle and Heavy Equipment Tractor arrangements and of course one might view the Royal Fleet Auxiliary as being a distant relation. For expeditionary and sustained operations using contractors for everything from water provision to transport to catering is a simple fact of life and this is just a recognition that it will continue.
Recruitment for an enlarged reserve will be difficult based on recent historical experience although with the broader range of deployments on offer with the adaptive force it might be less of a problem than thought. Leveraging the civilian skills of reservists is tempting and in many regards a perfectly reasonable expectation but not all truck drivers, welders, IT specialists and medics join the reserves to do the same stuff they do in the week, except with a little more varied scenery.
The MoD made a great deal about increased funding for reserve forces, £1.8 billion over the next ten years. Doing a quick spot of mental maths that equals a paltry £180 million per year. We have just spent just under half a billion pounds for a Typhoon software upgrade, £50 million for an A400 simulator and we even spend £10 million a year on the Red Arrows.
An additional £180 million across 30,000 personnel really isn’t a great deal of money, £6,000 a year.
On equipment, there already exists a significant disparity between equipment (training v deployment) used for regular units, let alone the TA. If we look at the cost of communications equipment, weapons and personal equipment it is difficult to see how the additional investment will make a large impact. This is before we look at additional needs for training provision, estate, welfare, medical and other operating costs.
Most TA centres have been backloading their stores and vehicles for some time. With greater reliance on the White Fleet and centralised equipment and with a reduced regular force there will inevitably be equipment freed up but even accepting this, providing the same equipment provision is going to be a challenge.
We also assume that this big pot of cash is for the Army exclusively, it is not. The increased RAF and RN/RM reserve (4,900 in total) will also share this money.
Is £1.8 billion over ten years anywhere near enough?
There is a planned consultation with employer’s representatives but whilst the MoD may be hoping for legislative change I just cannot see this happening, at least not in a significant manner. If the new model foresees reservists spending a maximum of 6 months plus pre-deployment training (which is likely to be another 6 months) out of 5 years that is a big potential commitment for both the reservist and their employer. Whilst the civil service or NHS might be able to cope the vast majority of people in the UK are employed by small to medium sized organisations. No matter how they are compensated for legislated against this would be a big problem. Expecting a business to employ someone and then for that person to only be available for 1 year in 5 plus normal recurring training might be a difficult proposition to sell, especially given it is an elective activity, not in response to an immediate or obvious threat like in the Cold War era.
Given the desire to have a reserve with more specialist skills might exacerbate this problem as those in possession of these skills and employed by a small business become much more difficult to replace with contractors or temporary staff. If recruitment discrimination against reservists does occur it will be almost impossible to prove and if proven, any sanction against employers will only increase that discrimination, albeit with more subtlety.
If the reserve has a tour cycle of 1 in 5 and so does the Regular army but without many of the benefits and the added bonus of career disruption and likely recruitment discrimination it is tricky to envisage an avalanche of recruits and more importantly, a high retention rate. Without a higher retention rate the Reserve will be limited to lower ranks and lesser experience personnel.
Decisions on terms and conditions of service, employer engagement and legislation changes will be made early next year but this remains a significant risk to fulfilling the Army 2020 vision.
A large increase in trained strength, changes in commitment and terms and conditions of service, not a great deal of extra money and a poor prospect for additional strong employment protection legislation, now that is definitely a big ask.
Do we have a Plan B for if the Army Reserve fails to achieve the significant increase planned for it?
A New Found Love of Civil Resilience
For many years the MoD has been working to wean Category 1 responders off reliance on the Army, the Civil Contingency Act, subsequent guidance and activity and JDP 02 makes it abundantly clear that civil resilience support is pretty much the domain of civilian organisations with the armed forces providing only specialist and very much last resort support.
Expect this to be rewritten any time soon but JDP 02 (Defence Contribution to Resilience) makes interesting reading, all 317 pages of it.
The new found interest in all this ‘homeland’ stuff might be viewed by some as clutching at the relevance straw and likely to be ditched as soon as interesting operations abroad come back into fashion (they inevitable will)
A cynic might wonder of the Army’s new found love of the previously ginger stepkid style civil resilience mission (sorry, I refuse to use the term homeland any more in this post) is an opportunistic grab at relevance, ground based air defence for the upcoming sports day being arguably a good example.
The responder community has for years been told by the MoD to basically jog on so I would not expect the MoD to be welcomed back like the prodigal son as it tries to muscle back in on resource budgets, missions and influence in the resilience space.
If Cat 1 responders do take the opportunity to reduce resilience budgets and have the Army on speed dial instead is the Army setting itself up for a rude awakening?
Comparisons to Haldane and Childers and an Opportunity Lost
As good as Army 2020 as a piece of work is, and it is, it starts with the premise of preserving cap badges and avoiding tough political decisions, hardly a recipe for decisive and innovative thinking.
I usually like the writing of Allan Mallinson but in comparing Phil Hammond to Richard Haldane and Edward Cardwell I think he is reaching.
Both the Haldane and Cardwell reforms resulted from near disasters abroad and had a massive impact on the Army, transforming its capabilities, morale and professionalism. The Hammond reforms are simply a means of doing less with less. General Nick Carter and his team have no doubt pulled a rabbit out of the bag and Army2020 represents I think, am extremely well thought through process with much to commend it.
Some have hailed it as genuinely revolutionary but again, I think that might be a stretch because much of it is simply a continuation of things that are already the norm or already in place.
One of the things that has completely overshadowed the review is the Regimental system, is a curate egg if ever there was one; so much is just right but it does create a barrier to innovation and change and we just might be at the point where it is time to do a Haldane or Childers and undertake a serious reform that frees the Army of much of its historical drag, including the Regimental system.
The fundamental building blocks of the Army, the Corps, Regiment, Squadron and Battalion have not changed in any significant way for several decades, if not more.
One of the desired outcomes that the review was predicated on was a minimal or zero reduction in cap badges which has concentrated all focus on this rather than the actual effectiveness of the process.
It is an easy claim to make that the Army has too much fat in it and needed to be cut in comparison with the heavy reductions already made in the RAF and RN, especially given it has remained untouched whilst the defence main effort in Afghanistan and Iraq were/are in full force. Critics point to its inability to resource Afghanistan without resorting to OP ENTIRETY, dragging in significant numbers of the other services and generally complaining of overstretch but whilst many don’t understand what the ‘rest of the Army’ do whilst they are not in Afghanistan and therefore many of the comments are fatuous and rather unpleasant the way the Army is organised does create difficulties.
There are an increasing number of joint arrangements but having a review that has hard boundaries between services is an opportunity lost.
The UK has many sets of light infantry, 3 fixed wing aviation operators, 3 rotary wing aviation operators, 3 sets of military police, 3 sets of military intelligence, 4 sets of ordnance disposal, 3 operators of small boats, 3 organisations that look after communications, logistics, engineering and medical capabilities. Even within the Army there many anomolies, the split between the RLC and RE for EOD tasks and fuel handling to name but two.
It is also curious that the Royal Marines and RAF Regiment were excluded from the Army 2020 review.
It is across the whole of defence that we should be looking for efficiency savings, not just in three neat service centred blocks.
A radical review would have started with a clean sheet of paper, worked back from there and frankly, not given a flying you know what for whether regiment A forged its reputation amongst the entrails of johny foreigner. This might not mean a single defence force whatever the comparative experiences of Canada or Israel might tell us, it might not mean the abolition of the RAF or FAA, the merger of the RLC, REME and RE or any other predisposed ideas that might be conjured up by thinking radically.
But it should mean we question mini empires that are getting smaller, based on dubious justifications and arcane reasoning.
This is why SDSR and Army 2020 is a lost opportunity and why comparisons with Haldane et al are false, in the wider context it was ,and is, hobbled by corporate timidity, small mindedness, service and cap badge politics.
The After Show
More amusing was the depressingly inevitable squabble between the noble Lords Dannatt and West. Maybe one day we will have a set of grown ups (and former grown ups) that realise squabbling over an increasingly sparse set of crumbs is not a strategy that serves UK’s defence forces well. As much as one can have huge respect and admiration for these kinds of people sometimes you find yourself wishing they would just be silent.
So, on to SDSR 2015 reductions and more talk of homeland warfighting.
Plenty of time for that but can’t help thinking the announcement about the MoD’s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transsexual conference at more or less the same time as that describing how because we are so stretched, resource poor and basically skint we are making thousands redundant was rather poor timing.
This was one of the posts lost during the recent hosting outage
You can view the original and comments at that point by looking at the web cached version
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:3JiLtimsZbcJ:www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/07/army-2020-a-few-thoughts/
Sorry about that!
I thought it might be useful in evaluating Army 2020 to examine the objectives and claims made in the document and see how successfully they have been achieved.
Army 2020 lays out its objective as follows:
It will provide a range of highly adaptable capabilities that can respond to meet the nation’s security needs at home and overseas.
In order to achieve this objective it proposes it makes claim to the following:
It seeks to integrate fully Regulars and Reserves within a single force structure.
Army 2020 creates a 2 tier army with the Reactive Force containing only 10% reserves.
In many ways it harks back to the days of BAOR, albeit on a smaller scale and without the variety provided by the Arms Plot.
It places adaptability and responsiveness at the core of its design.
Army 2020 abandons the structure developed under Future Army Structures which was initiated under Jackson and later developed under Dannatt and latterly under Richards. The rationale behind this was laid out by Dannatt.
“The past few years have taught us that the days of specialising the ground manoeuvre brigades as either armoured or mechanised, may be at an end. The emerging concept of homogeneous, or identical, brigades means that we can develop dedicated organic capabilities at Brigade level. This gives us the advantage of being able to train as we fight – we must start to equip our brigades routinely with the capabilities that they use on current operations. Now this does mean that we will have to spread some of our heavier elements more thinly across the brigades, but this (will also) reduce our logistic drag.”
No such rationale is advanced for the Army 2020 structure which is heavily dependent upon Armoured Infantry Brigades which are neither adaptable nor responsive, consisting as they do of heavy tracked armour with its inherent demands on transport, maintenance and logistics.
It incorporates lessons learnt from recent operations
Perhaps someone can point out what these incorporated lessons were as they appear to be noticeable by their absence.
Operations in Afghanistan have identified the need for a new formation, the Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF). Each new brigade going into theatre has constructed its own BRF on an ad hoc basis. Force 2020 was an ideal stage for formalising such units in the ORBAT, but one sadly missed.
Over the past few years all of our key allies, France, Germany, Holland,Italy, USA (Army and Marines), Australia and Canada have already or are making substantial investments in wheeled AFVs. The UK is alone in pursuing a heavy, tracked armoured vehicle for reconnaissance. This, despite the improvements in mobility of modern 6×6 and 8×8 vehicles and the inherent vulnerability of tracked vehicles to mines and IEDs.
Fewest number of cap-badges to be lost from across the army to sustain the regimental system.
As well as MRBs, another cornerstone of FAS, Future Infantry Structure (FIS) with its fostering of large regiments has also been abandoned by Army 2020. Despite the lessons of Op. Telic and the success of the newly formed Rifles (and the pleas of 2 RRF), modernisation has been sacrificed on the altar of political expediency.
Long term planning based on recruiting demographics
The North West of England is, according to the BBC, the most productive area for recruitment in the UK. So obviously 2 RRF predominantly recruited from Lancashire, should have been safe from disbandment using this criteria. On the other hand, perhaps not.
The pairing of reserve and regular units will allow closer links to be built with the local communities to aid recruiting and engagement with UK society
One wonders how closer links with UK society can have been fostered by disbanding one battalion from the North West, one from Yorkshire and one from the West Midlands whilst retaining two battalions from Nepal.
There will need to be a step change in the relationship between the Army, its Reservists and their employers…………….. establishing a framework of strategic partnerships with private and public sector employers
This is the elephant in the room. The whole plan relies on this but there is no indication of how it is to be achieved. Perhaps General Carter is relying on the tried and tested way the intrepid hero extricated himself from an impossible situation – With one mighty bound he was free!
“One wonders how closer links with UK society can have been fostered by disbanding one battalion from the North West, one from Yorkshire and one from the West Midlands whilst retaining two battalions from Nepal.”
Three battalions that had good recruiting records too.
“No such rationale is advanced for the Army 2020 structure which is heavily dependent upon Armoured Infantry Brigades which are neither adaptable nor responsive, consisting as they do of heavy tracked armour with its inherent demands on transport, maintenance and logistics.”
The context is crucial here. Dannat was looking at the Afghan model, the model of enduring stabilisation campaigns. Army 2020 notes that the Army must be capable of an enduring operation but the context is that of defence and deterrence with contingent strike forces essentially. The two models are rooted in different paradigms.
I doubt very much that an MRB would have had a much smaller logistical footprint if any considering the range of vehicles it would have employed. And I doubt very much it would have been any faster to deploy. This model gives us the best of both worlds, a fighting core and a pool of forces able to bespoke the RF and provide bespoke follow on enduring formations.
Let us also not forget that the RF infantry are not surgically attached to their Warriors and will be able to remount or dismount as they do now with some warning. For example as part of Op ENTIRETY all mechanised battalions were dismounted from Bulldog and one armoured infantry battalion was dismounted to light infantry.
“Perhaps someone can point out what these incorporated lessons were as they appear to be noticeable by their absence.”
Hmmm, that statement doesn’t work now does it. How can you know lessons are absent if you don’t know the lessons?!
“This is the elephant in the room. The whole plan relies on this but there is no indication of how it is to be achieved.”
This is the second main point – this is not a completed project! The career model is not finalised, the basing model is not finalised, the reserve structure work is still on-going, consultation on terms and conditions is about to begin – these announcements are being made as work progresses since it was impossible to keep it all under wraps for another year or two once all the work is completed.
So
Army 2020 exists as part of a different paradigm to the older MRB assumptions and Army 2020 is still a work very much in progress. The details are being ironed out, this is why detail simply is not available.
Yes the big question is the use of reserves but let’s not be damning of the work done thus far as it is not finished.
I was under the impression that armoured infantry is flexible and responsive, much more so than pure infantry or pure armour (or even light armour, as it enables the engagement of heavy vehicles). Improved mobility over infantry combined with the ability to infiltrate terrain that tanks cannot or conduct MOUT without corresponding urban renewal.
This statement here: “[Armoured Infantry Brigades which are neither adaptable nor responsive] [with its inherent demands on transport, maintenance and logistics.]” meshes two ideas which are independent of each other. Demands on transport and maintenance are not indicative of adaptiveness or responsiveness, but are indications of logistical support requirements.
Phil
Context
Dannatt set out his views in the mists of antiquity (aka 2008) and MRBs were a feature of SDSR 2010. So your argument for different contexts seems difficult to sustain.
Logistic Footprint
I think that doubling the numbers of AI battalions in a brigade will significantly increase the logistic footprint. Why do you not agree?
Lessons Learnt
I (helpfully, I thought) provided two examples of what ought to have been lessons learnt.
Incomplete Project
There is a big difference between proposing a model where some of the details are still to be finalised and proposing one which relies entirely on external factors for which no solutions have been proffered.
No doubt serving in the TA can be made more attractive to volunteers but what’s in it for employers, especially SMEs?
Criticism
I criticise Army 2020 because it is an ill thought out attempt to preserve old certainties and ignore modern realities.
If opinions on ARRSE are to be believed, The Rifles have proven the efficacy of the large regiment model. Why was this pattern not adopted?
All of our key allies have shifted emphasis from heavy, tracked AFVs to 8×8 and 6×6 vehicles. Why is Army 2020 the only one in step?
How does creating a 2 tier army with the TA kept at arms length from all the shiny toys in the RF provide for integration?
How will the army persuade employers to provide the support so vital to the success of the Army 2020 model?
Perconator – Perhaps our allies might put their money where their political rhetoric is and deploy a few more of their super duper wheeled AFV ‘s in the future ? If France and Italy are mostly wheeled, then are we not doing a good thing by providing NATO and ad hoc coalitions with a different set of core competencies / capabilities ?
FF2020 docs released note that Mastiff will be replaced by FRES UV, which may be 6 x 6 or even 8 x 8 family of armoured vehicles, won’t that be good enough for you in the context of financial constraints and the fact that we already own all the Challengers and Warriors ?
Plus let’s face it, Afghanistan convinced the Canadian military to NOT go all wheeled !
@ Perconator
“I think that doubling the numbers of AI battalions in a brigade will significantly increase the logistic footprint.”
– Compared to having a brigade that mixes multiple vehicle types, a brigade that contains just AI (at least from the infantry’s point of view) should have a lower logistic footprint on account of not needing spares etc from multiple types.
“All of our key allies have shifted emphasis from heavy, tracked AFVs to 8×8 and 6×6 vehicles”
– Not really. The Americans are planning a replacement for the Bradley and the original Stryker optimisim seems to be gradually fading with every passing year. The Canadians have been (in some corners apparently) positively livid with the performance of LAV’s in the wetter, more rough areas of Afghanistan. Countries like Holland, Norway, Denmark etc are all moving towards the CV90, a tracked vehicle. It would appear the wheeled revolution maybe dying before it really gets off the ground.
And on a brief note, tracks are not really that bad on roads in a COIN environment versus wheels. The problem comes when you start driving over curbs which it would appear have a tendency to fall apart. So stay on the roads and you’re all gravy.
RE “Canadian military to NOT go all wheeled !”
- yeah, they followed the US transformation blindly and got disappointed (in the US, there was no transformation of the heavy bdes; does that ring a bell?)
The Canadian selection for the companion for Leopards will be interesting, to compare with our SV
- Puma did not even get entered (was it the indicated price envelope or the demands for local participation; the manufacturers don’t say)
- we might see the next-gen CV90 (emphasis on 90; like CB90, it came out of the Swedish review for FF1990) fielded, if they win the competition
Love the Cv90. Thing that annoys me about FRES and CV90 not getting it is that the ’90 already has a 40mm gun. Alright, it doesn’t have telescoping ammo, but you can bodge a solution to that later.
Yes 2008 was indeed in the mists of antiquity. A time of an over committed Army that was being dismantled and then re built into fire fighting units effectively. But, Dannat clearly had a different paradigm to Carter where the Army is assumed to not be in an enduring stabilisation operation hence the contingent strike force rather than the 5 infantry brigade concept.
It is hardly ill though out, there is plenty to show that broadly it has been an evidenced based approach incorporating lessons learned and indeed the lesson that Afghan has not set the model for the future.
As for the regiments, get over it. Anyone who thinks what regiment got what cut was a military decision is fooling themselves. The regimental reorganisation was and always will be driven by the politicians. Theres no doubt in my mind that the Army was told which lines they couldn’t cross. Yes a shame but the Army are the servants at the end of the day.
If we think about the likely number of FRES, about 250 and the cost, anyone think it won’t be anything south of £6m each?
Thats about a billion and a half, plus the support contracts etc
So likely in excess of £2b for 250 vehicles PLUS the costs of the development programme, all the arsing about with TRACER and CVR(T) UOR’s
The final bill will be in the region of £5 billion for 250 vehicles
The soldier of Army 2020 will be riding around in £20m vehicles
TD, yes, but let’s look at it this way:
10 bn minus the one and half; what is the eight and a half going to be used for over the next ten years?
Percontator said “So obviously 2 RRF predominantly recruited from Lancashire, should have been safe from disbandment using this criteria.”
That is interesting. You see 2RRF recruits from an area just to the north of the Cheshires and our county regiment also with a good recruiting track record to the east of the Cheshires. So putting the units in Germany to be disbanded theory (fact) to one side. I wonder what the Cheshires’ recruiting track record looks like?
Of course in the 20th century the biggest logistic burden on armies has been artillery ammunition. It has pretty much dwarfed everything else. It’s worth remembering that early last decade UK abandoned its pursuit of M777 for light forces (the subsequent attempt was a differnt role) when they let in an adult with a pocket calculator to run the numbers and what it meant for helicopter requirements! Definite case of game over.
The MoD 2020 brochure notes some change of emphasis from suppression to precision. This will reduce logistic footprint.
@Obsvr: indeed. However, you would think the requirement for precision would rekindle interest in a 155mm option
The RRF recruits from Northumberland, Tyne and Wear, Lancashire, Warwickshire and London all the old fusilier county regiment locations. Seems to me there were some Geordies in the army last time I looked.
@ChrisB, Percontator et al
“All of our key allies have shifted emphasis from heavy, tracked AFVs to 8×8 and 6×6 vehicles” (Percontator)
– Not really. The Americans are planning a replacement for the Bradley and the original Stryker optimisim seems to be gradually fading with every passing year. The Canadians have been (in some corners apparently) positively livid with the performance of LAV’s in the wetter, more rough areas of Afghanistan. Countries like Holland, Norway, Denmark etc are all moving towards the CV90, a tracked vehicle. It would appear the wheeled revolution maybe dying before it really gets off the ground.” (ChrisB)
Perhaps someone could explain to me. I was talking to a British Army Colonel a few years ago and the conversation got onto half-track vehicles. I asked him why such vehicles were no longer considered for miitary use and he answered that advances in tyre technology were so great that wheeled vehicles had traction almost as good, if not as good, as tracked.
That being the case, why is there this turning away from wheeled vehicles (such as Stryker) mentioned above? (If there really is a turning away.) You can’t really bring other factors such as firepower or armour strength into this. It is purely a matter of tracks versus wheels, isn’t it? Sorry if this sounds naive.
@ Mike,
There’s lots of demonstrations of wheeled vehicles tackling tough terrain. The problem is that it often takes them a few minutes to traverse the kind of things that tracked vehicles will just breeze over.
And this is 8×8 wheeled vehicles without turrets or additional armour. Usually they’re only proof up to about 14.5mm, whereas most tracked IFV can take anywhere between 20-30mm hits, at least over the frontal arc. You can put add on armour on a wheeled vehicle, but the mobility goes with it.
Then you start putting turrets on them with 25-40mm guns, along with the required armour. All of a sudden the wheeled vehicles are struggling even more and start having serious issues with vertical stability. Or in other words, you have to be very gentle handling them lest you roll them over.
Hi Chris B,
You call that a gun “Then you start putting turrets on them with 25-40mm guns”??
I am with you, and don’t think we should go all wheeled. But for anyone thinking of doing so, there are only two families that make up a serious proposition
- AMV, with the Polish-inspired addition of the Belgian Cockerel (BMP turrets don’t count, even though nominally they are 100mm as in the UAE)
- Freccia/ Centauro II family ( a fair bit of commonality between them)
Though I am happy with the idea of wheels for infantry vehicles I think the idea that the cavalry get anywhere it is needed at any time means tracks for me.
Hi, Mike W.
I don’t think there is a turning away from wheeled vehicles as far as the Americans are concerned. The US Army has nine Stryker brigades (eight regular and one guard), the Marine Personnel Carrier will be wheeled too.
They have reduced their orders for new Stryker vehicles, but that is set against the army reaching its requirement for the number of Stryker brigades, and increasing spending on upgrading existing vehicles. Incidently, there were 100 Strykers in the US army’s 2012 budget, and 58 for 2013 – all NBC reconnaissance vehicles, all 158, which does put some perspective on our two NBC squadrons’ capability.
I think wheeled vehicles have a place, but that place is behind a leading formation of tanks and tracked IFV’s. So once an area has been cleared or at least over run, then wheeled vehicles mainly using roads can follow on, where lighter protection and the fact that they’re on roads is not such a huge issue. They can use hard ground as well obviously.
But they’ll never replace the mobility, firepower and protection offered by tracked IFV’s.
If tracked vehicles form the “front line” then how do logistics (especially fuel) get to this front line?
I thought most of this is transported on wheeled vehicles?
If so, the “front line” is limited to pushing forward only to places that the supply vehicles can get to.
Do we have any tracked fuel tankers?
How quickly can the Army lay a road behind the “front line” of tanks and tracked IFVs?
Hi Chris.B.
July 13, 2012 at 18:07
- have a look at the UAE orbat (OK, their landscape is not typical, but very likely, regardless)
- I think it reads exactly the opposite to yours?
Anyway, horses for courses, not that I want to dive into the cavalry discussion
“If so, the “front line” is limited to pushing forward only to places that the supply vehicles can get to.”
That is exactly what happens. Which is why roads, bridges and junctions will always be key strategic objectives. Until we have hover tanks the notion of an Army being able to float across the battlespace essentially, is a myth. Any large formation will be completely reliant on roads and wheeled road transport. Tracks come into their own at the tactical level where you need to drive over that wall or skim across that muddy field to get into cover etc
“Anyway, horses for courses, not that I want to dive into the cavalry discussion”
Back to cavalry is it? Well…
Wot? No hover tanks – What’s an Apache gunship then
“Any large formation will be completely reliant on roads and wheeled road transport”
In the broader sense, yes. But the spearhead needs the flexibility of tracks, to envelope or bypass enemy strongholds (which I suspect is where Phil was headed with the comment about tactical mobility). Modern tanks and IFV’s can travel a surprising distance on their own fuel. I wouldn’t want my spear head driving around in 8×8′s.
And now off for a few beers.
Wot? No hover tanks
- talking about supply, the Soviets had an over-reliance on tanks in Afghanistan, but their Mi series lifts a lot, and kept the fuel supplies
- Americans are not short of helos, either
- even the experimental Chengdu air-assault/ air-mech bde in China has been sized (vehicles, mainly) in such a way that it can keep going air-supplied (with organic helos) for 2 weeks
@jed
I believe that USA, France, Germany, Holland, Australia and Canada are putting their money where their potential rhetoric is in Afghanistan.
I agree with you about already owning the Warriors. It would be much cheaper to use upgraded WRs rather than to develop FRES Scout for a heavy tracked recce vehicle. Although I would still argue that only one squadren per Cav regiment should be equipped with a heavy tracked AFV.
@Chris B
Logistic Footprint
Spares are only one element. What about maintenance, transport and fuel?
Tracks v Wheels
USA is investing in double V hulled Strykers, the Dutch and Germans are buying Boxer, the French VBCI, the Italians variants of the Centauro family and the Australians and Canadians have LAV.
So, yes really.
@ACC
I said our key allies had shifted emphasis towards wheeled. I did not claim nor do I advocate going all wheeled.
@Phil
Dannatt did not propose a 5 infantry brigade concept but rather 6 homogeneous brigades which became 5 MRBs in SDSR 2010. What is the rationale for this change from less than 2 years ago?
You claim that Army 2020 is evidence based and incorporates lessons learnt. Any chance you might provide some examples to substantiate either or both of these claims.
I don’t accept your view on regiments but as neither of us is privy to the discussions, we’ll have to let it lie.
Are you going to tell us how Carter will get employers to support his new paradigm because if he doesn’t it will be a failed paradigm.
X and Jim
2RRF incorporates the Lancashire Fusiliers and apparently circa 30% of recruits still come from Lancashire. So, I should have said substantially rather than predominantly.
According to a poster on ARRSE the Cheshires were over subscribed but as 1 Mercians have been bolstered in Afghan by a Gurkha support company.
“You claim that Army 2020 is evidence based and incorporates lessons learnt. Any chance you might provide some examples to substantiate either or both of these claims.”
TD has posted a link, Agile Warrior. That is evidence of an evidenced based approach.
“What is the rationale for this change from less than 2 years ago?”
I have said, it is no longer assumed that the Army will be committed to a long term enduring operation. The ability to conduct one is retained but takes a back burner to contingent defence and deterrent.
“Are you going to tell us how Carter will get employers to support his new paradigm because if he doesn’t it will be a failed paradigm.”
I rang him but was told to piss off.
“I believe that USA, France, Germany, Holland, Australia and Canada are putting their money where their potential rhetoric is in Afghanistan.”
What does this mean?
“What about maintenance, transport and fuel?”
Well exactly, you make his point for him. Infantry Brigade Groups would probably have had broadly the same logistical requirements, especially in food, water, fuel and artillery ammunition and other expendables.
“USA is investing in double V hulled Strykers, the Dutch and Germans are buying Boxer, the French VBCI, the Italians variants of the Centauro family and the Australians and Canadians have LAV”
And we will have Maistiff, Jackal and Foxhound. The only Army there to bin all its tracked vehicles I believe is the Netherlands but I might be mixing them up with Belgium. Anyway, the Dutch MBTs were officially binned for budgetary reasons, not doctrinal reasons.
@ChrisB
Thanks for your reply and comments on some of the shortcomings of wheeled vehicles – quite enlightening.
@Brian Black
“I don’t think there is a turning away from wheeled vehicles as far as the Americans are concerned.” Agreed.
“there were 100 Strykers in the US army’s 2012 budget, and 58 for 2013 – all NBC reconnaissance vehicles, all 158, which does put some perspective on our two NBC squadrons’ capability.”
Precisely. And we’ve even gone and retired the Fuchs! Bring it back or at least give it to the TA. They’ve handled it before.
ACC,
Re: Wot? No hover tanks.
Trouble is we don’t seem to value copters as much as our American cousins. The lack of spots on our amphib fleet demonstrates this as does the recent media reports of “we need more copters” – and that was just for front line troops, not front line armour!
I know very little about our land forces but I must say they don’t look particularly well balanced… unless you strip out all the armour, then things looks a bit more sustainable.
“unless you strip out all the armour, then things looks a bit more sustainable.”
Just like if you stripped out the radars from warships or combat aircraft.
The Army is there to fight. The new documents released over the last few weeks show this. It is also there to adapt to whatever is around the corner, which nobody knows. I believe it is balanced, we have a fighting division and a pool of adaptable and versatile forces.
As for helicopters. They are not a panacea. Against a peer enemy, using them anywhere near the FLET would be tremendously dangerous.
@ Simon,
“I know very little about our land forces but I must say they don’t look particularly well balanced… unless you strip out all the armour, then things looks a bit more sustainable.”
Where do you think the cost of land forces lies? In armour? Oh good grief. Here’s two little factoids: Bowman cost double the Challenger 2 buy, and WAH-64D cost nearly three times, and both cost nearly triple the annual sustainment cost of Challenger 2.
If you do some research, you’ll find that nearly all of your preconceptions are wrong. The cost of land forces is predominately in manpower, but that’s the price we pay because in end, it is individual men who do the dirty work. You’ll also find that the vast majority of campaigns are only carried to conclusion by putting men on the ground. That is not to denigrate the Andrew or the Kevins – they have vital roles to play, but very rarely do they close campaigns in our national favour by themselves.
After doing all of the usual cost saving measures to do with efficiency, if you still want to strip further cost out, start by designing ships so that the crews are smaller. Ditto for aircraft. Equip both with better smarter munitions that have the same effect as 2 of the previous generation. Cut any fat you find in the Army (there’s still lots). Retrain anyone competent as a fighting soldier, and post the sick lame and lazy to civvy street. But do not cut down the numbers of fighting men, because there is no substitute for them. That’s not an emotional view, it is a simple fact.
“but very rarely do they close campaigns in our national favour by themselves.”
Oh dear here we go!
@Phil
Your resort to puerile sarcasm suggests that you are unable to muster any cogent arguments to substantiate your viewpoint.
Logistic Footprint
Are you really claiming that a tracked AFV will not require more maintenance, more fuel and additional transport than an equivalent wheeled AFV across a range of typical operations?
Wheeled AFVs
Please keep up. I have already said that I am not advocating going all wheeled,
Ah here we go.
Point out my puerile sarcasm? If its the bit about what does this mean, it is because I genuinely haven’t a scoobies what you are talking about in that sentence.
“Are you really claiming that a tracked AFV will not require more maintenance, more fuel and additional transport than an equivalent wheeled AFV across a range of typical operations?”
Erm, I am saying that an MRB would use broadly the same amount of fuel, ammo and consumables as an armoured infantry brigade in a combat operation.
“Please keep up. I have already said that I am not advocating going all wheeled,”
Bless me.
Phil,
please find me enough examples of the Andrew or the Kevins closing campaigns in our national favour by themselves to prove my contention of “very rarely” wrong.
Point proven.
RT,
I’m not arguing against you, we agree on this, I am just pointing out that that sentence dangles some bait and expect some bites!
Phil, aaah, OK. you are on the correct team. Sorry for misinterpreting.
As for wheels against tracks, I’m agnostic. Whatever does the better job in the majority of likely circumstances. There’s a bit of a limit to wheels though in the MBT class – too much deadweight concentrated into only a few contact patches, and too much firing wobble unless you are firing from dead ahead.
So sorry Phil.
I genuinely thought that when you claimed that you had phoned General Carter but was told to piss off that you were being sarcastic.
Once again my apologies,
Oh that bit. Yes that was sarcasm. I’m not sure how you expect me to know the answer to your question when there is nothing in the public domain about it. Namely because no decisions seem to have been made.
Evening all
@Percontator, I think there is sadly but inevitably a smorgasbord of buzzwords in papers like this, sign of the times. Adaptable and responsive is an interesting turn of phrase but it is meaningless without some means of comparison, was the Cold War forces of 1982 not adaptable and responsive, did we not respond and adapt to simultaneous operations in Northern Ireland to Sierra Leone. All three services are adaptable and responsive, its what they do after all.
Army 2020 is far from perfect, it is overly constrained by external and internal politics, has to be done in the context of a current difficult operation and reducing budget but with these in mind I think it is a competent, intelligent and well thought through piece of work.
On the reserves I am with you that it is very much a strategy of hope and see rather than tangible and credible roadmap but it is still very much work in progress.
You would be surprised on the logistics footprint for wheels v tracks, especially the big 8×8’s. We have covered this a lot on older posts but the general wheels v tracks debate boils down to horses for course. Instead of one versus the other you seek situations where one makes more sense than the other but fundamentally, you need both.
@Obsvr, interesting comment about the M777 and heli logistics but how do you see the shift to precision natures reducing the logistics demand over time?
Hmm… with all the wheels and tracks discussion, have anyone considered the experiences and utility of a very old wheeled system called the BRDM? OR the BTR? How did the Russians do with their wheeled vehicles in frontline combat, considering that these are frontline equipment (and even a bit ahead of front line in the case of the BRDM).
At this point in time, I think the UK has a very good opportunity to restructure their armed forces, not just prune the structure down to a leaner version of the old shape. It is a good time to take stock and see if new tech can be better used in different force structures and to adjust accordingly.
@ percontator,
“Spares are only one element. What about maintenance, transport and fuel?”
– 8×8 wheeled armoured vehicles are not exactly Fiesta’s in terms of their fuel needs. They can be transported by road under their own power, but that’s still not ideal. And part of the reason for that is because of the maintenance issues. You’re talking about an 8×8 vehicle with multiple transmissions, diffs etc. The part count versus tracked vehicles is much higher. If you mix a formation up with mutliple types and sub-types of vehicles you’ll likely have more issues than just an all tracked brigade. Wheeled vehicles are not the panacea of low logistics that I think you think they are.
“USA is investing in double V hulled Strykers, the Dutch and Germans are buying Boxer, the French VBCI, the Italians variants of the Centauro family and the Australians and Canadians have LAV”
– The US is filling out its previous orders of Strykers, and giving them to previously pure infantry regiments or Hummer mounted scouts. They still plan on purchasing large numbers of armoured, tracked vehicles to replace the Bradley in time. The Dutch are buying CV90 and I forget what the German tracked vehicle is now. The French are indeed buying VBCI, but not as a replacement for tracked vehicles. The Italians are buying Centauro as a kind of scout, but their needs are slightly different from ours (they don’t seem to do much day one line crossing cavalry actions, lets put it that way).
The Australians I’m not sure about, but the Canadians are the worst example you could possibly have brought up. At one point they were considering divesting themselves of all tanks and replacing them with the MGS version of Stryker, along with all Stryker vehicles for their protected mobility needs.
Then they took their LAV III’s to Afghanistan.
And now they seem quite content again with Leopards and plans to purchase tracked vehicles in the future. Why? Because the LAV III proved to be a bloody nightmare in Afghanistan. Mobility and maintenance not quite being what they were cracked up to be, with almost one third of the fleet ending up in an unusable condition.
Note that the Canadians plan to spend about $1billion on upgrades to their LAV III’s, while planning on spending $4 billion on something like CV90 or Puma (The German option!).
I’m not saying wheeled vehicles are trash, but much of the early high optimisim about how they were going to be super efficient, super reliable and replace all tracks is starting to melt away. Generally speaking armies are only purchasing 8×8 wheeled vehicles to replace things like HMMWV, Saxon, Bushmaster and other previous light wheeled vehicles, to give them a little more protection and a little more firepower.
Tracked, properly armoured IFV’s are here to stay fella and increasingly everyone is investing in new designs. The emphasis for the future is that the tracked IFV still has pride of place.
@ Mike W,
– Not a problem
@ wf @ td
I seem to remember that Excalibur was cleared for AS90 firing about a year ago. Whether or not it is worth the bother, given GMLRS, is a matter of opinion, and I’ve no idea what lead time is like if you wanted some in a hurry. But there’s also things like Smart155 and BONUS which are potentially very bad news for all AFVs if they become widespread (although stationary ones may be able to use concealment in buildings).
UK seems(?) to have cancelled the order for Smart155 and again production lead time is a good question. It’s an interesting point, UK adopting armd inf bdes as the primary fmn type, implying a role for armour, but apparantly dropping the order for one of the most effective anti-armour wpns (because it can start attrition of armour 20km out, long before they hove into view).
Greater use of precision munitions should mean less need for area fire and hence less ammo carried.
That said precision munitions like Excalibur need precise targets and mensuration. There will be a need for area fire for the foreseeable future because not all target areas can be reduced to a set of precise point targets. Then there’s suppressive fire, which by definition has to be delivered continuously for a period of time and doesn’t need to be precise. Add to this things like smoke (a form of suppression) and black light illum which can go on for while (I once fired 360 rds of white illum in one mission of about an hour, that got the gun end rushing around to find enough ammo! – but it made the cav customer feel safer). And we musn’t forget the possible emergence of bomblet shells carrying a small number of largish well fuzed sub-munitions (ie treaty compliant).
@Phil
There would seem to be no meeting of minds between us on this issue so perhaps it’s better to let it lie.
@TD
I am not so much concerned with the buzzwords as in the tools provided for implementation.
The model of the homogeneous brigades with heavy, medium and light elements and with CS and CSS units as brigade assets rather than divisional assets was developed over a number of years. Indeed it was General Richards before his promotion to CDS who said that the army would be moving to an mainly medium force whilst of course retaining some heavy and light elements.
This approach has been abandoned in the year and a half or so since SDSR 2010 and despite Phil’s best efforts the reasons for the change, at least to my mind, have not been made clear.
You refer to external influences, politics, budgets and the Afghan operations. These would however apply equally to any model. The army will have withdrawn from Afghan before Army 2020 is established anyway and as for budgetary restrictions, they would only determine the outcome if the new approach was somehow cheaper or more cost effective than that proposed in SDSR 2010.
It may indeed be competent, intelligent and well thought through, but to what end. It is clearly an attempt to preserve the status quo and to park the reserves on one side so that the “real army” (RF) does not have to concern itself with them.
An additional issue with the reserve is that Army 2020 envisages them deploying as whole units up to company or even battalion level. This is a step change with serious implications for the level and amount of training required.
Wheels v Tracks
I claim no expertise in this matter. I merely point out that the British army is out of step with all of its key allies.
On the subject of logistic footprint, I hesitate to cross swords with you regarding your own blog, but it is my recollection that when you suggested in an earlier post (sometime last year?) that modern 8x8s imposed a greater maintenance burden than tracked vehicles (complete with a diagram of an H type transmission) you were swiftly corrected by a poster who did possess the relevant expertise.
I am not proposing that wheels completely replace tracks rather a reversal of the ratios espoused by Army 2020. So, for the sake of the argument, an AI/Mech brigade would have 1x WR battalion plus 2x wheeled battalions rather than the reverse. In addition the recce regiment would be equipped with a mix of tracks and wheels. This would be funded through the abandonment of the FRES Scout programme. So far as funds will allow, the work done on development of Scout (e.g. power pack and band tracks) could be incorporated into a more comprehensive WR upgrade.
@Chris B
Please see my reply to TD above.