A guest post from Repulse
In this post, I would like to pose the question – “what is (and should be) the RN’s global peacetime role?” This is the role outside of the defence of the United Kingdom (and dependencies) and the ability to project power through expeditionary warfare.
It seems to be an area that is poorly understood (or undervalued) by both the government, the public, and dare I say, even amongst the senior people with the MOD and Royal Navy, yet it is the one that actually keeps the RN relevant to modern day Britain.
Everyone is familiar with Libya, Iraq and even Sierra Leone style expeditionary operations, and even the nuclear deterrent – but what is it that the RN does / should be doing on a day to day basis? How do these capabilities translate into equipment requirements?
Whilst, national defence is a requirement for all armed forces in the world, and the ability to project power as needed is the stamp of global / regional power, in a complex world of increased day to day instability I’d argue that this day to day peacetime role is as important for the Royal Navy than either of these two, as it is the ‘back-bone’ of the navy’s role and relevance.
Contents
Before you can start to discuss what the RN’s global peacetime role is, we need to look at the role of the Royal Navy as a whole.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and demise of the threat from hostile submarines streaming through the Iceland / Greenland gap and running amok in the North Atlantic, the Royal Navy has struggled to clarify its role in the modern world; not only to the decision makers, but also within the organization and the public as a whole. Some could even argue that this role has been in doubt since the collapse of the empire.
The recent SDSR has actually made things more unclear than before, with the government championing the importance of certain naval capabilities (carrier strike and amphibious assault) on one hand but cutting them with the other, to satisfy short term financial constraints with the backdrop of a costly land campaign in Afghanistan.
Whilst, there are a number of roles the Royal Navy (and also the UK military as a whole) could fulfill, beyond the responsibility to defend the UK (and territories) they can probably be refined down to three options:
- Regional+ – close integration with European allies with operational capability focused primarily on the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, but with the limited ability to jointly project power beyond this region.
- Junior US partner – close integration with the US, focused on deploying specialist skills and a small number of highly capable assets globally that compliment the USNs (and their other primary partners).
- Global contributor – working closely and building partnerships with allied navies on a global basis (including Europe and the US) at a lower capability level, but retaining the ability to project independent expeditionary power (on an exceptional and limited basis) as and when required.
Currently, I feel the government is trying to do all three (though probably less of the 3rd point). Whilst this on paper seems to be pragmatic, with the current and foreseeable budgetary / political tensions the reality is that it is means that the UK performs all three of them badly. Therefore, the time has come to decide on which one the UK should follow (an East of Suez moment). Trying to do all three not only leads to an unbalanced patch work military, but also a misplaced over reliance on other nations goodwill and alignment of strategic aims.
I would argue that with Europe in a downward spiral of internal strife and isolationism, and the US becoming increasingly less interested by the monogamous UK “Special Relationship” (concentrating on building new alliances), the time has come for the UK to focus on where it has historically been comfortable as a “global contributor” to world stability. This is not to hark back to when Britannia ruled the waves and imperialism; it is a pragmatic hardnosed view that the UK’s interests are global and complex, yet our national influence is limited.
To allow the UK to retain the ability to project limited expeditionary power, I think it is reasonable to say that the RN needs the ability to deploy and sustain a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), an Amphibious Response Group (ARG) or a combination of both (Response Force Task Group – RFTG) with short notice and without capability gaps (for refit etc) anywhere in the world. I know that some people may argue this, but I have not yet heard a convincing argument for an alternative.
I am not going to expand on this further as this is not a carrier post and the composition of these groups is a great source of debate in itself as we have seen. The reason why I have mentioned it is to help define what the peacetime functions that the RN are and should be performing that outside of this.
For the Royal Navy, I would say the following are the global peace time roles in order of relevance:
- Evacuation of safety of nationals in war zones.
- Maritime intelligence and surveillance.
- Support of special force (SF) operations.
- Contribution to multi-national global stability task forces – covering:
- Protection of SLOCs (including MCM)
- Anti-piracy
- Anti-narcotics
- Humanitarian disaster response.
- UK diplomacy (flying the flag and training of UK allies).
I will not go into each in any detail as each probably deserve individual posts in themselves. However, needless to say, these are things that the RN have been doing for a very long time and I cannot see any of them changing or being not required soon.
Next, I would like to discuss the current plans for equipment to fulfill these roles and question if the RN has it right.
Where does the T26 / MHPC programmes fit in?
The publicly stated government aim of the type 26 programme is to replace the current aging Type 23 fleet with a new breed of frigates. Learning from the ‘mistakes’ of the Type 45 programme, the majority of equipment will be taken from the current vessels to minimize the cost and risk of the new build, (hopefully) allowing the current 13 vessels to be replaced on a one to one basis. Various press and official reports have suggested that the target price per vessel varying from £500mn to as little as £250mn – but, recent quotes calling it a £5bn programme.
Of the 13 planned vessels it is expected that 8 will be configured for an ASW role (utilizing the world beating 2087 towed array sonar) and the other 5 configured for a General Purpose (GP) role.
With the backdrop of confusion over the role of the RN, it is hardly surprising that there are significant divisions over the Type 26 programme; especially in the design, cost and lack of confidence in numbers. Various senior members in government and the RN have described the T26 as providing the backbone of the navy for the next 30-40 years. To get this (or substitute) programme wrong could be disastrous for both the navy and the country as a whole for many years to come.
Assuming that the Royal Navy does go down the “global contributor” path, then based on possible similar current Marine Nationale CVBG and RN RFTG escort structures, and the need to have a one T26 based in UK waters (as Fleet Ready Escort and SSBN support), I would argue that all 8 of the planed T26 ASW variants would be tied up covering these duties. This would leave the 5 GP variants available for rotation for other tasking.
Whilst the Mine Counter Measure, Hydrography and Patrol Capability (MHPC) programme has gone quiet recently, it is still the publically stated aim that this will proceed at some point and will replace the current mine countermeasures (MCM) and survey fleet assets. Current, expectations is that the MHPC design will be based on a 3000t vessel similar to the BMT Venator concept. The range would be in the order of 7,000nm with a maximum speed of 25kts, and the vessel would be lightly armed with a small caliber gun and close-range weapons. Planning assumptions are that 8 vessels will be required, though this could be expanded to as many as 12 if the River class is also replaced at a later stage by this class.
Taking 12 MHPCs as the most likely outcome, I think it is likely that only 5 would be realistically available for rotation for other tasking. This assumes, 4 would be required for “River” style EEZ patrolling, 3 for domestic MCM operations and on-call to operate with task groups as required.
Current Peacetime International Fleet
Whilst CVBG and ARG assets will be able to play a limited peace time role – especially flying the flag participating in NATO exercises and global exercises (such as TAURUS 09), the brunt of the work will be need to be shouldered by the rest of the fleet.
Based on the current fleet and expected contributions from the announced future programmes, the asset pool available for global peacetime operations could be:
- 4 Astute SSNs (allowing 1 to 2 to be on station at one time)
- 5 GP T26s (allowing 2 to 3 to be on station at one time)
- 5 MHPCs (allowing up to 3 to be on station at one time).
- 2 Fast Fleet Tankers (on average 1 on station at one time).
- Other RFA vessels (on average 1 on station at one time drawn from RFA Diligence, the 3 Bay Class or RFA Argus)
There is little doubt that the 5 MHPCs available will be busy with the Gulf MCM, MCMFOR and hydrographic survey duties. The latter is particularly important if the UK is to retain the ability to effectively conduct submarine and amphibious operations.
The 1-2 available SSNs will also be fully utilized on maritime intelligence, surveillance and SF duties with the possible odd training exercise.
Recent trends have seen the RN using an RFA as the Caribbean guard ship – this realistically leaves on average 2-3 T26s and 1 Fast Fleet Tanker to cover the rest of the world.
It doesn’t take an expert to see that this means that either the RN’s budget needs to be increased, the government limits its global peacetime ambitions, or it goes down a different equipment procurement route.
Budget increases in this economic environment are not going to happen, so the first option is off the list. Limiting the RN’s peace time role will, in my view, actually devalue the value of the RN and will make it even less relevant to the public (and the world) leading to further cuts and a downward spiral to insignificance. Therefore, the only real option is to re-evaluate the planned equipment procurement programmes to get better (and more appropriate) coverage for the limited budget available.
A proposed global peacetime fleet composition
Reviewing the current equipment plans, the only item that I think is open to question is the Type 26 programme. The Astute SSNs are critically low in numbers already and they already have a place in meeting peacetime roles, so although the price per unit is high it would be foolish to find money from this programme to fund other equipment. Equally, the MHPC numbers is expected to be low and the Survey and MCM capabilities are key to retain the overall abilities of the RN.
Looking at the requirements for national defence and supporting the projection of expeditionary power –it is right to question the construction of the 5 GP T26s. Not doing this, could free up around £1.5bn (assuming £300mn per vessel which is probably the lower end of the expected cost).
£1.5 bn could buy a number of things, for example any one of the following:
- 2 Astute SSNs (one is almost paid for)
- 23 Blackswans
- 15 MHPCs (based on the Venator design)
- 50 SIMMs
However, in my view none of these classes alone can fulfill all the capabilities above and still allow the RN to be a global force. 5 vessels is not enough, and 15-50 “snatch” vessels means that the RN has to deploy first rate assets as soon as it looks like things are going to go “warm” or not deploy at all.
It would be easy to dream up new classes and their associated costs, though firstly they are likely to be wrong and secondly, this is not supposed to be top tier so off the shelf is good enough.
A single ‘fits-all’ vessel design, whilst theoretically attractive, is not I believe realistic as the capability / cost equation means that either the ship is useless in hostile environments or costs the same as the T26 we are trying to find an alternative to.
Could mission plug-and-play modules help here? Possibly, but where is the money to build these modules? I would argue that the funds required would probably mean only a handful of hulls, if any, would actually hit the water at all.
So how many classes are required? I propose a mixture of 2 classes;
- A large multi-role vessel (MRV):
- Size @10,000 t
- Slow (<20kts)
- Range @10,000nm
- Light self defence armament
- Good aviation capacity (hanger for 3-4 Merlins sized helos)
- Capacity to accommodate comfortably a company of RMs and equipment.
- Capability to act as a mothership to small boats / RHIBs (not necessarily via a rear dock though).
- A small corvette:
- Size < 1,000 t
- Fast >35 kts (at a sprint)
- Range @2-3,000nm
- Offensive weaponry including limited ASuW, AAW and ASW capability
- Small flight deck, but no requirement for a hanger
- Stealth capability
The MRV could be the mainstay of the RN global presence, capable of long patrols and equipped as standard with one or two Merlins / Lynxs depending on the perceived threat level and regional need. Additionally, embarked would be a small RM detachment with RHIBs or other assault craft. This class would be able to handle all peacetime roles in low threat environments unescorted.
The purpose of the small fast corvette is to be able to reach trouble spots quickly and be able to ride shot gun to a MRV if the environment has the potential to get hostile (e.g. like in the UK national evacuation from Lebanon in 2006). These ships would be based in say Gibraltar and Diego Garcia so would be able to get to any MRV operating region within a week with a combination of resupply from RFA tankers or other UK naval supply bases.
In terms of numbers, I believe the Royal Navy should have one MRV on station within one weeks of sailing time of anywhere they would be needed – also, with a couple of back-ups to cover maintenance periods etc. This means at least 8.
In terms of corvettes, ideally there would need to be one available to be dispatched at all times in both Gibraltar and Diego Garcia at any time (say 3 in each in total) – therefore, requiring at least 6 vessels.
So, this is when we get to the fantasy fleet bit – for the MRV I would suggest a properly managed NZ Canterbury class (£80mn per unit) and for the fast corvette, I would proposal Visby style warships (£120mn per unit).
What would you propose?
Interesting topic for debate Matt
I’d love to harp on that the whole RN fleet design is wrong for this nation’s economy and global interests but I won’t. I’ll simply say that I think we should look at a basic “intervention” ship to replace Albion, Bulwark, all three Bays, Argus, and, as you say, the 5 GP T26 frigates.
I don’t know what the budget might stretch to but I’d estimate somewhere in the £4-5b region.
These “intervention” ships would be focussed on providing the kinds of services you listed: humanitarian, ISR, policing and diplomacy.
To me this points to the need for a few copters, a few landing craft, a hospital and a reasonable weapon and sensor fit. As soon as you have copters, LC and a hospital you also have a pretty effective assault ship (which is why I proposed to replace them).
I would suggest we could procure 6-8 x Rotterdam class equivalents (~€400m in 2008) allowing 2-3 on station (Indian Ocean, N. Atlantic and S. Atlantic).
I am sure that this exact topic was how we finished off the Type 26 thread. Will have to check.
I expected you to discuss things like is a contribution to anti piracy more important than having a FF/DD on NATO standing groups? Could we combine ATPN/S outside hurricane season.
Is the forward basing of the 4 MCMVs working and should we consider expanding it to having 2 escorts in Bahrain and swapping crews over?
In other words finding ways of making what we have and what we will get work harder and smarter.
“even amongst the senior people with … Royal Navy”
I think I will wait for APATS and Somewhat to comment on that. And then I will read the read rest.
I think various times we have come up the idea of largish helicopter capable patrol ship.
The Endurance class keeps comming up.
Your MRV would be similar to something along the lines of an Austin Class Amphibious Dock really wouldn’t it? I think the issue with it and cost control is going to be just what exactly constitutes “light self-defense armament”.
A lovely article; instead of the normal “fantasy fleet(s)” actually tied down to 1. tasking; and 2. agreed budgets
So if I criticise, it is all against this overly positive back drop:
Right conclusion; wrong premises
“would argue that with Europe in a downward spiral of internal strife and isolationism, and the US becoming increasingly less interested by the monogamous UK “Special Relationship” (concentrating on building new alliances), the time has come for the UK to focus on where it has historically been comfortable as a “global contributor” to world stability.”
This all sounds sensible, but are there any facts/ announcements to back it up:
“Current, expectations is that the MHPC design will be based on a 3000t vessel similar to the BMT Venator concept. The range would be in the order of 7,000nm with a maximum speed of 25kts, and the vessel would be lightly armed with a small caliber gun and close-range weapons. Planning assumptions are that 8 vessels will be required, though this could be expanded to as many as 12 if the River class is also replaced at a later stage by this class.
Taking 12 MHPCs as the most likely outcome, I think it is likely that only 5 would be realistically available for rotation for other tasking. This assumes, 4 would be required for “River” style EEZ patrolling, 3 for domestic MCM operations and on-call to operate with task groups as required.”
The normal hot potato:
” question the construction of the 5 GP T26s. Not doing this, could free up around £1.5bn (assuming £300mn per vessel which is probably the lower end of the expected cost).
£1.5 bn could buy a number of things, for example any one of the following:
- 2 Astute SSNs (one is almost paid for)
- 23 Blackswans
- 15 MHPCs (based on the Venator design)
- 50 SIMMs”
Astute (1) not paid for by waste along the way
Blackswans OK, but rebase the costing on the very similar BAMS for some realism
Venator was for patrolling (how much more to make it into an MHPC?)
50 SIMMS?? I had to battle FBOT on this; the hull, engine and commercial navigation means are only a start, and you won’t end up much short of £70-100m for one “fit-for-purpose”
Well, the Visby was recognisable early on in the text; and then the Canterbury to be thrown around like a cork on the bigger seas?
I do agree with the “loitering” presence and the fast and sharp intervening assets, but the loitering presence surely needs to be based on some other design (and the Visby would need to be the Visby+ design for range and endurance; or put in a Mighty Servant with a litter of 8 Haminas to be delivered?)
@ Matt S – an excellent post. I’ve been being suggesting something similar for awhile. A large(ish) spacious multi-role vessel can do a number of roles depending what equipment and vehicles it carries.
The smaller vessel is also useful but I wonder if instead of a fast combat vessel we should have more of a long endurance sloop/OPV?
@Matt S
A your title was ‘The Royal Navy’s Peacetime Role’ can I suggest it also increases its interaction with the public and taxpayer.
I went to the RIAT at Fairford and the Americans just did it so much better. I know they have the best kit and that I’m talking about planes and you boats but all of our air components were represented there, including the Dark Blue.
Walking past the Royal contingent they were the ONLY aircraft on display without their provided aircraft name and specifications poster completed. All of the craft were inassessable, unlike the US planes, and worse still most of the crew huddled out of reach and didn’t interact either. I peered into one RAF Merlin (its back door was open) and it looked like a messy box room…… oh dear.
If we are to encourage people to get involved with the armed forces, particularly the reserves we need to take a leaf out the US Forces book and have some truely spectular Navy Days. Does that fit a peacetime role?
Lots of little floaty little boats with Captains with some form of “bollocks to the lot of you”*** attitude would be good. I’d like to see an Andrew with several dozen fleet escorts, and either the TLAM or ASW capabilities to not be ignored. Add the uncertainty of half a dozen Astutes, whereabouts unknown. Couple that with an ARG capable of delivering a Brigade anywhere in the Atlantic or Indian Oceans in less than a fortnight and we’ve got a winner.
We can buy the boats, but do we have the right sort of Captains?
*** Frankly, we all know that ROE are shite. A bit (well, a lot) of razzing up of pirates and drug runners in international waters would not go amiss, and if the odd genuine fishing boat gets caught up, well we’re a P5 member and can sling a couple of hundred thou to the bereaved families quietly.
@APATS: I considered a few angles for the post, but squeezing it into a manageable size was a challenge. Also, it’s amazing how things move so quickly on this blog whilst you are trying to put ones thoughts to paper.
I ended up focusing at a high level on the what the RN should be doing and how it could be met by future equipment procurement, rather than just an assumption that the purchase of 5 GP T26s was the way to go.
Forward basing and sweating existing assets are interesting topics in themselves.
The highly theoretical discussion of Great Power, or otherwise, on another thread reminded me of just how sound this thinking is:
” Couple that with an ARG capable of delivering a Brigade anywhere in the Atlantic or Indian Oceans in less than a fortnight and we’ve got a winner.”
- if we say that we and the French are the “something” as for Europe, then
1. the French first wave is as good as ours, or better, because of more vertical insertation capacity
2. second wave about the same (they have much better landing craft)
3. it is the third wave that makes the difference; we have planned for James’s army brigade to follow through, but there is no such capability in the “French books”
Now, this statement has been purified of carriers
On this one ” A bit (well, a lot) of razzing up of pirates and drug runners in international waters would not go amiss”
- Mauritius has now agreed to put them on trial (and in jail), so the “catch and let go” does not need to go on, as a farce
IXION: “The Endurance class keeps comming up.” – yes, I agree it is an interesting design and is in the same price bracket as the Canterbury class.
The reason why I suggested the Canterbury is that it has longer legs (8,000 nm vs 5,000 nm), faster and has a bigger helicopter hanger. Also it really look like a warship which could be quite important, when you are dealing with humanitarian relief or other peace time roles.
Jeremy M H: “what exactly constitutes “light self-defense armament”.” – good point and one that always ends up with a cheap ship ending up being as expensive as the frigate it was supposed to be an alternative to. Suggesting only small calibre weapons on the MRV (Canterbury on has a 25mm), means that it cannot be thought of as a ship that could go solo where there is a whiff of serious trouble. Having small and fast warships to add muscle when required means that you do not end up with an expensive compromise.
@ACC: Appreciate the comments.
“Well, the Visby was recognisable early on in the text; and then the Canterbury to be thrown around like a cork on the bigger seas?” – possibly Canterbury is not the optimum asset. But, trying to work with what is already built / inservice and within the budget. Something like a Rotterdam class for example is 3 times as much, meaning you only get a 1/3 in terms of numbers of vessels (and has a shorter range).
“I do agree with the “loitering” presence and the fast and sharp intervening assets, but the loitering presence surely needs to be based on some other design (and the Visby would need to be the Visby+ design for range and endurance; or put in a Mighty Servant with a litter of 8 Haminas to be delivered?)” – Visby+ is an interesting design, but is just a design on the drawing board. Also, it seems like a step towards the extensive frigate type vessel that we always end up trying to replace the T26 with. Like the Haminas, but with a range of 500nm they would need a “slow” mothership to carry them and therefore not give the rapid response I’m suggesting.
@Swimming Trunks: Thanks.
“The smaller vessel is also useful but I wonder if instead of a fast combat vessel we should have more of a long endurance sloop/OPV?” – a MRV can fufil the role of an OPV in my view. The problem of insisting in a one size fits all design is that you have to compromise on higher capability & fewer hulls vs low capability & large number of hulls.
If we were to have a Fighty Bay, for dare I say it Colonial Duties. I would much rather, we would use the improved design for the Johan de Witt. A much more capable ship than the standard Rotterdam design. Though whether it needs to be fully armed and manned by the RN is another matter. At least a visiting RFA doesn’t need a Governments prior permission to enter said countries port, as a RN Warship does.
A RFA de Witt, say being used as the West Indies Guard Ship would be perfect for facing the regions two occurring problems. Natural Disasters, whether it is the Hurricane season or Earthquakes. The other Drug Smuggling.
A ship carrying Heavy Plant Equipment, A small Field Hospital with Ambulances. You wouldn’t need to carry the personnel to man the stored equipment. Using the TA or volunteer staff to man the embarked equipment would be a cheap option. You could fly them in from the UK, when the need arrises. Whilst a de Witt carrying, say 4 of the Future RM patrol craft for anti-drug smuggling patrols, may be a better option, than a single warship. Also having the large hanger would be a huge bonus. This would be a great way to “Make friends and Influence People” in the region.
I wouldn’t swap a Proper LPD for a glorified ferry like HMNZS Canterbury. At least an LPD doesn’t need a port or even a harbour jetty or mole to disembark its kit.
However, whilst desperately trying not to go fantasy fleetish! I wouldn’t give up the GP T23/T26 warships. How many RFA De Witt’s permanently covering the West Indies and the Coast of Somalia would we need? A minimum of 4 at least.
@Opinion 3: “If we are to encourage people to get involved with the armed forces, particularly the reserves we need to take a leaf out the US Forces book and have some truely spectular Navy Days. Does that fit a peacetime role?” Agreed – the loss of the Navy Days is actually one of the biggest SDSR blows in keeping the RN engaged and relevant with the public.
Thinking outside the box: Could a Absalon type vessel with say 50 Rafael Protectors armed with Brimstones reduce the need for lots of big ships? It could never be in more than one place at a time but coverage would be immense for lots of differing tasks
I am sorry, the title led me to believe there would be sensible discussion of the RN’s peace time tasking, such as Anti-narco, anti-piracy, instead we rapidly descend into a discussion about the T26 and then into fantasy fleets.
It might have been a good article, if the title and lead paragraphs had not led me to expect completely different content
Matt said: “for the fast corvette, I would proposal Visby style warships (£120mn per unit). What would you propose?”
Erm’ anything except a poxy 1000 tonne corvette which is no use to man nor beast unless, like the Swedish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Denmish navies of the 1980′s we want to stop the Soviets making an amphibious invasion of the UK……
Thousand tonne corvettes are small even for UK policing duties in peacetime – believe me I have been thrown around in the North Sea, Channel and Atlantic approaches in a bloody 600 tonne Hunt class enough times !
As for ‘global’ peacetime roles – you would need to re-instate the Empire to find bases for them all, or massively enhance the RFA with “Corvette Tenders” – not so cheap and cheerful after all then.
@ Matt S – do you envisage your MRV having the same roles/capabilities as the USN Global Fleet Station concept?
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA495485
Hmm.. can we turn the scenario around and instead of highlighting all the high points of top end military equipment, go the other way round and ask -
Militarily, what are the weaknesses of the UK, and how do we counteract them?
I can think of one right off. Less manpower than those countries with large land area and population to draw on.
This is counteracted by increased mechanization in the Army and automation in the Navy until the recent financial crisis.
Any others?
Observer, I can only assume that you are talking about in terms of a total effort scenario. UK forces have not been limited by man power to draw on since WW2. They are limited by money to spend.
At the end of WW2 we had almost 5 million personnel serving in the armed forces or 10% of the entire population at the time. Post SDSR restructuring we will have approximately 150,000 out of 62 million or 0.24% of our population.
So, in other words, how do we get the cheapest possible stuff out so that numbers can make a difference.
That simplifies the equation.
In this case, a swarm of cheap PVs might be worth a look. Limits you to coastlines, but hey, nothing wrong with coasthugging, especially since that is where you want to be to cause trouble. A throw back to the torpedo boat squadron days?
@ Jed,
“It might have been a good article, if the title and lead paragraphs had not led me to expect completely different content”
– I have to agree. Generally there wasn’t anything wrong with the article, except that at first I was looking forward to reading all about some of the details of the Navy’s peace time operations, and then it turned into a fantasy fleets article
@ APATS,
“UK forces have not been limited by man power to draw on since WW2. They are limited by money to spend”
– Aye. Easy to forget that really.
Edit: Left a note for myself at the bottom and didn’t follow it up!
So the West Indies Guard Ship. Is it possible we could purchase some second hand vessel and just refit it specifically to this task? Crews flown in to rotate through.
On a second more detailed reading I think you are going to run into a major problem with your proposal on the cost end. If you try to hack 5 of the 13 ships you are losing nearly 40% of the ships. Your cost for the remaining 8 are going to skyrocket.
Honestly I think the best answer is just to build the 13 type 26 ships, in whatever form they are and move on with life. Unless you are going to build more ships you need to drop the idea of global presence. You can have a global capability with your CVBG and the ability to deploy ships in a limited fashion but the CVBG(s) is(are) going to eat up half or more of your surface fleet much of the time.
Guys, I do not see how the CV is going to eat up, half of our surface fleet. People seem to be under the impression that it will not go South of Outer Spit Buoy without 4 escorts 24/7 CAP and AEW.
The US deploy their Carrier Strike Groups to the Gulf through the Med the minute that they clear the Strog they bomb burst on Port visits reforming N of Suez for the Southbound Transit. Even then 4 escorts is the norm.
CDG is deployed with one ASW escort and one Horizon although she is not East of Suez. Considering that CV Deployments will be planned in the schedule and escort programmes tied in, whilst an unscheduled operational deployment will justify the effort required I really cannot see what the massive hype is about.
You also have to take into account that on a routine deployment the CBG will be able to undertake the mission that the unit in the AOR normally fulfills. So the 2 escorts we have in the Gulf area may be replaced by the 2 accompanying the Carrier if the threat is low or use the 2 already in the AOR to augment 2 accompanying units. Alternatively 4 accompany the CBG and relieve the 2 on station. That is why we have Fleet Planners.
@ Matt S – Great article and I agree with much of what you say. However with the Visby class even a Visby + as you describe I think the rang limitation is too much for us to bare. The RFA support these vessels would require to operate would cost a fortune.
Spending money on stealth also makes little sense. The vessel is really suppose to be visible to do its job. If we want stealth then we can use SSN’s. At your quoted price of £ 120 million each you could buy something like a Khareef armed with Sea Ceptor and with space to operate a Lynx in a hanger. I think this type of vessel is likely to be of more use. It could for instance easily replace the South Atlantic Patrol task especially if it was forward deployed to the FI.
With Sea Ceptor and perhaps NSM or Exocet it’s almost just as capable as a type 23 in any none ASW role.
@ APATS
“Guys, I do not see how the CV is going to eat up, half of our surface fleet. People seem to be under the impression that it will not go South of Outer Spit Buoy without 4 escorts 24/7 CAP and AEW.”
I agree with you on this point. However I would feel more comfortable in CVF was armed with an AAW capability like Sea Ceptor.
The relatively cheap instillation of such a system and its saving on escort numbers makes a lot of sense. I dare say it may even make sense to consider a Aster 30 capability if it could be done relatively cheaply.
Martin, Sea Ceptor yes. Aster 30 definitely not.
1. Requires greater space to fit.
2. Requires a new radar.
3. The range and steerable beam control increase the MEZ and interference with normal ops massively.
4. On top of all that it is more expensive.
@Jed at 23:38 – Sorry to disappoint… the main thrust of the post is meant to be what are the optimal type / types of vessel design and numbers, given the UK’s day to day global aspirations (and thus RN’s peacetime requirements) and very limited budget.
Having fast corvettes can offer a quick and visual increase in muscle when required – the most likely areas of operations in today’s world would be off the coast of Africa, the Mediterranean, Gulf and the Malacca Straights / South China Sea. All of these are within reach of Gibraltar, Oman, Singapore or Diego Garcia – no big expansion of the Empire required.
Also, Visby type vessels are good “poster ships” for the navy. A little raw power even at the expense of comfort, could be a great advertisement for the modern youths looking for a bit of adventure – very much as the original destroyers where in the late 19th / early 20th centuries.
@ST at 00:05 – Yes, very similar – great find on the link. The hanger seems a bit smaller on the Global Fleet Concept than I envisaged, I like the Canterbury as it has space for upto 4 medium sized helicopters.
@APATS at 04:33 – “I do not see how the CV is going to eat up, half of our surface fleet.” – it won’t, but if you are committing to having the ability to have 100% availability to project a CVBG/ARG/etc then you can’t rely on the fact that you could easily grab ships on peacetime duties to fill the gap. Look at what happened for Libya, the RN had to divert the APT(S) vessel to cover. We struggle now with 19 vessels, and there is not a CV to escort.
@Martin at 04:57 – I like the Khareef, but it is at least 10kts slower than a Visby – the idea is to have fast muscle to support lightly armed MRVs. The problem is (as far as I understand it) the larger the vessel, the more expensive it is to get to shift at high speeds… I’m trying to be realistic which means accepting you cannot have everything in one design on a limited budget – the USN LCS is a great example of not what to do in my book.
@Jed at 23:38 – Sorry to disappoint… the main thrust of the post is meant to be what are the optimal type / types of vessel design and numbers, given the UK’s day to day global aspirations (and thus RN’s peacetime requirements) and very limited budget.
Having fast corvettes can offer a quick and visual increase in muscle when required – the most likely areas of operations in today’s world would be off the coast of Africa, the Mediterranean, Gulf and the Malacca Straights / South China Sea. All of these are within reach of Gibraltar, Oman, Singapore or Diego Garcia – no big expansion of the Empire required.
Also, Visby type vessels are good “poster ships” for the navy. A little raw power even at the expense of comfort, could be a great advertisement for the modern youths looking for a bit of adventure – very much as the original destroyers where in the late 19th / early 20th centuries.
@ST at 00:05 – Yes, very similar – great find on the link. The hanger seems a bit smaller on the Global Fleet Concept than I envisaged, I like the Canterbury as it has space for upto 4 medium sized helicopters.
@APATS at 04:33 – “I do not see how the CV is going to eat up, half of our surface fleet.” – it won’t, but if you are committing to having the ability to have 100% availability to project a CVBG/ARG/etc then you can’t rely on the fact that you could easily grab ships on peacetime duties to fill the gap. Look at what happened for Libya, the RN had to divert the APT(S) vessel to cover. We struggle now with 19 vessels, and there is not a CV to escort.
@Martin at 04:57 – I like the Khareef, but it is at least 10kts slower than a Visby – the idea is to have fast muscle to support lightly armed MRVs. The problem is (as far as I understand it) the larger the vessel, the more expensive it is to get to shift at high speeds… I’m trying to be realistic which means accepting you cannot have everything in one design on a limited budget – the USN LCS is a great example of not what to do in my book.
All – this is intended to be a serious post to discuss vessel type / fleet mix based on the hard financial realities and the UK aspirations for global peacetime capabilities (and how they translate to RN requirements).
Discussing “Fantasy Fleets” is sometimes hard to avoid because the easiest way to visualize the options (and bang per buck) is to actually compare different vessel classes and their capabilities / limitations.
If the RN could afford 12 GP T26s which had significant aviation capacity beyond the expected design, then I wouldn’t have bothered with the post.
@ Matt S,
The problem was just the title. It didn’t fit the post.
@Chris B: Fair point.
RE “you could buy something like a Khareef armed with Sea Ceptor and with space to operate a Lynx in a hanger. I think this type of vessel is likely to be of more use. It could for instance easily replace the South Atlantic Patrol task especially if it was forward deployed to the FI.”
- aren’t the three built for Brunei v much Khareef-like?
- they are at the moorings somewhere in the UK, and for sale because they came out too heavy/ slow or something like that
- in the PC Plod role that would not matter much
Matt, I think the fantasy fleet criticism is unwarranted
- varying the fleet composition within the existing financial constraints is not fantasies; it moves into that territory when you remove the constraint
@ ACC
It’s still a fantasy fleet of sorts. Perhaps “Fantasy” is just an inappropriate word? It’s designing or suggesting a design for a fleet that does not exist and is not planned. Speculative fleets? Preferred fleets perhaps?
It was just yesterday there were stats published that Gulf of Guinea had again surpassed waters around Somalia in pirate incidents
- it is often forgotten that Somalia only knocked it off this “highest stand” in 2008
Yeah, preferred fleets, to meet also peace time tasks (no doubt that meeting wartime tasks should be the first priority)
@ACC: “Yeah, preferred fleets, to meet also peace time tasks (no doubt that meeting wartime tasks should be the first priority)” Like the term preferred fleets – meeting wartime tasks is the first priority, but shouldn’t be the be all and end all as the navy can lose it’s peacetime relevance.
ACC
‘Yeah, preferred fleets, to meet also peace time tasks (no doubt that meeting wartime tasks should be the first priority.’
Thats fine IF you then except that any peace time role is totaly limited to what your navy can do with it’s war fleet, And that therefore there no consideration when working on budgets designs etc, should be give to manning (or shipping?), tasks like West indies patrols anti piracy etc. In a time of shrinking budgets- it is becoming an either or situation.
The ‘We are not floating rozzers’ brigade must accept that as consiquence of a fleet designed to do just one thing – fight a top end war.
RE Nellie and dumbo and their support committments, I thought we were not going to be sending them east of Suez to fight wars… So perhaps the support requirements can be kept down. to say 2 ships.
Matt,
I’d love to read this, it’s always interesting to see what the world outside the RN thinks of our role. But I’m not going to read any further than your third sentence, for fear that you have no idea what you’re talking about.
“It seems to be an area that is poorly understood (or undervalued) by both the government, the public, and dare I say, even amongst the senior people with the MOD and Royal Navy, yet it is the one that actually keeps the RN relevant to modern day Britain.”
What exactly makes you think that the RN has no idea what it’s peacetime role is? I absolutely assure you that our role is abundantly clear, fully understood and implemented to the fullest extent possible in the face of disastrous and shortsighted decisions to waste lives and money pursuing two pointless wars, the utter ignorance of government and the relentless politicking by politicians, government and senior military personnel. Not a promising start.
SI, you are right in that sense that the maritime doctrine has been updated, whereas no one seems to be able to tackle the overarching joint publication
- do you know of any plans; would make an interesting read
Just to follow up, I thought I’d been a bit harsh and had a read through. As you can see by the timestamp, it didn’t take long. It’s just a bit of fantasy fleet thinking.
If anyone is going to have a discussion about roles, please, PLEASE start from the basics! The basics are the National Security Strategy and the Military Tasks, all of which dictate our role in peacetime as well as wartime. I’m expecting a barrage of abuse now, but there is a damned good reason why we spend so much time writing doctrinal publications as well as assess what the future character of conflict will be. I don’t expect to see referenced essays, but some basic awareness would be encouraging.
Oh well, here we go…
@ SomewhatInvolved: oh well. The fact that I am a fairly well read enthusiast should highlight how far removed the doctrines you reference are from the man on the street, who vote the our politicians in and ultimately pay the bills.
Always dubious of the GP26.
Would rather have 9x ASW26 and just three GP, with the change thrown into the mhpc pot.
Repulse, on every previous occasion when I have raised the existence of the doctrinal publications, I have been rubbished not for their lack of accessibility, but for their total irrelevance to the world of today. With all due respect, they are not that difficult to read and understand – everyone seems to have seized on the Black Swan concept well enough. You cannot pick and choose which bits you choose to refer to.
Military Tasks – SDSR, page 18, paragraph 2.14. Happy to help.
http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=sdsr
cannot remember any such?? ” I have been rubbished not for their lack of accessibility, but for their total irrelevance to the world of today.”
- as I’ve said: a good document, shows that someone is on the ball… where do the services meet (joint doc badly out of date; does this mean they do *not* meet?)?
@ SomewhatInvolved: thanks for the link, thought it might give me the answer to what I was missing, sadly it did not. Sad really a bunch of wooly words trying to justify cuts, rather than try and address aligning equipment to actual needs. Forget “fantasy fleets”, seems more blind “austerity fleets” to me.
“this is intended to be a serious post to discuss vessel type / fleet mix based on the hard financial realities and the UK aspirations for global peacetime capabilities”
The issue is that there is a fine line between fantasy fleet and real attempts to make sense/a valid fleet/deployment. Only those in the loop at the RN know what can be done atm.
Its an alright post, but I dont fancy these fantasy fleet posts… I’ll echo somewhats’ comment in that the RN knows its peacetime role very well, as does the junior service, it’ll be the Army (I think anyway) that’ll struggle to establish its peacetime role, through no fault of its own.
What we can do is discuss/debate/shout what the RN could be doing with its current assets and how the new assets it’ll have in a decades’ time will fit into its peacetime role or if these new assets would require a change in the current role, eg, one less RFA and escort vessle as they shadow the carrier (I think that was your aim in this post?).