Although certification to operate in non-segregated airspace and a number of minor technical issues have caused delays and cost over runs the Watchkeeper unmanned aerial vehicle system is scheduled to come into service later this year.
A spot of history first…
Contents
Prior to Watchkeeper
The first proper UAV in UK service (accepting the 1939 Queen Bee target system) was the MQM57-Falconers bought into service by 94 Locating Regiment Royal Artillery in 1964 which then comprised three Batteries with 57 (Bhurtpore) being the one to operate the Midge. There is a very brief glimpse of a Falconer at this British Pathe video clip, 2 minutes in. The Falconer was never called that in UK service but SD-1, an abbreviation of the US designation, ISD-1.
Replacing the Falconer was the Canadair Midge 501, a UK version of the CL89. The Midge was more or less a recoverable missile that flew a pre-planned route and was fitted with an IR linescan and traditional optical camera. Launched from a truck mounted rail and recovered by a parachute the Midge was primarily used as a divisional resource to locate the enemy’s artillery so they could be destroyed in a proper big guns artillery duel.
Bought into service 1971, again by 94 Locating Regiment Royal Artillery.
The videos below shows the CL-289 or AN/USD 502, an improved version of the CL-89.
The cameras from the Midges were also mounted on Army Air Corps De Havilland Beavers, still flown in the AAC Historic Flight.
Unmanned Drone AN/USD-501 Midge Salisbury Plain 1978
Unmanned Drone AN/USD-501 Midge Salisbury Plain 1978
Although not a huge success they were used during the 1991 Gulf War but reportedly not to a great effect.
Because the Midge did not provide real time imagery the Westland Supervisor programme was started although by the end of the seventies it was cancelled. In 1982 the Marconi Avionics Phoenix programme was initiated as a system to provide a real time, day/night interface, to the Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System (BATES). Initial studies for BATES started in 1976 and progressed to full project definition in 1980, entering service many years later.
GSR 3486 defined the Phoenix system requirement, real time video imagery and the ability to retask in flight were key aspects. Trials commenced in 1987, evolving through a number of airframes and sensors until in 1995 Troop trials commenced and final trials commenced in 1997.
It entered service in 1998, yes, nearly 20 years after the requirement was outlined although to be scrupulously fair it entered ‘trials’ in the early nineties.
The system was supposedly named Phoenix because it rose from the ashes of the Medium Range Unmanned Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition System (MRUASTAS) programme. This was to be an unmanned rotary platform from Westland’s but proved to be impossible to bring to an adequate maturity.
In 1967 the Westland Helicopter future projects team developed the concept of an unmanned rotorcraft fitted with an electro‐optic sensor to provide the function of battlefield surveillance and target acquisition. The concept envisaged deliberate penetration of hostile air space with a small “semi‐ disposable” aircraft as an alternative to manned systems that were seen as increasingly vulnerable
Phoenix was actually more forward looking than many people gave it credit for, bucking the trend for completely integrated air vehicle and sensor payload it consisted of the Air Vehicle Taxi (AVT) and Air Vehicle Pod (APD), with the pod containing the sensor and communications equipment.
We might even give it credit for the fast jet targeting pod that was to follow; the thinking was the pod could be upgraded or different payloads developed without expensive integration work on the air vehicle. The payload included a daylight sensor and thermal imager (BAE Systems Thermal Imaging Common Module (TICM II)), both of which could be locked onto a ground location for continuous coverage whilst the taxi was moving. Completing its bag of tricks was a data link into the artillery system, BATES; that could adjust the fall of shot.
The images below show the air vehicle and launch and recovery equipment
The fixed wing GEC/BAe Phoenix had Its first operational debut was in Kosovo where 13 of the 27 deployed were lost and despite a spot of face saving by the MoD was widely considered to be a bit of a failure, despite catching the Serbs in the act of flying Mig 21’s that had survived the NATO air campaign out of the airport at Pristina, least said about that the better, we would not want the sky gods to be faced with evidence of a lack of success of the air campaign!
Losses included two to enemy air action and three to training mishaps.
Operational use of Phoenix and others nations UAV’s in the Balkans clearly demonstrated their sheer usefulness and utility beyond the artillery spotting mission that had generally characterised similar tactical systems. Much was also learned, the hard way, about operational management and control of UAV’s, especially in a complex air environment with multi nation components.
The UK tried to circumvent the problem of slow authorisation by proposing to use a forward air controller in a Phoenix ground control station to direct Harrier GR7 strikes but the USAF senior leadership in the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) refused to sanction the idea unless a satellite link could be installed to allow the CAOC to view the imagery and give the final authorisation of any strike. Needless to say, we ran out of war before the red tape could be untangled.
Operations in the Balkans also exposed slow and predictable UAV’s to enemy ground and air attack, the Serbs even had some success with flying a helicopter parallel to the airborne system and simply machine gunning them out of the sky, no need for MIG’s and AA missiles as used by the Russians in their spat with Georgia.
Perhaps the biggest lesson learned, apart from their vulnerability to even half competent air defence forces, from operational use of UAV’s in the Balkans was the difficulty of matching a strategic air campaign to what were in effect, tactical assets being used for an operation type for which they were not designed for.
The ‘ownership’ of these tactical UAV’s was never, apparently, challenged.
A detailed analysis of UAV operations in Kosovo can be found at this link.
A few later during Operation Telic the Phoenix UAV had its brief moment in the sun.
Despite its relatively poor showing in the Balkans Phoenix was credited by General Brimms (GOC 1(UK) Armoured Division), along with Challenger and Warrior, as being the top 3 war winning assets in the initial stages of the Iraq war, operation TELIC.
The Phoenix provided for the first time situational awareness commanders had not had access to before. We flew in front of the commandos before they went into attack and provided up to date, real time information to commanders on the ground, enabling them to make key decisions before they went into battle and during the battle itself
Despite this glowing reference the bald figures were not good.
During the 138 sorties carried out by Phoenix in Iraq by 22 (Gibraltar) Battery, 23 were destroyed with 13 damaged, only 15% of these losses due to enemy action. The hot weather caused considerable problems which rendered it unusable from May onwards and enduring problems of radio interference on the data link were never resolved.
The last operational flight of Phoenix was carried out by Koehler’s Troop in May 2006, at Camp Abu Naji in Iraq. In 2008, Phoenix was withdrawn from service in March 2008, the image below shows the out of service parade at Roberts Barracks, Larkhill, on the 20th
Pheonix Out of Service Parade
Despite the limited success in Iraq how it ever got into service is one of the enduring mysteries of defence acquisition.
If anything, it described what we didn’t want.
In fairness to the Army, the RAF didn’t seem interested in UAV’s and some might be forgiven for thinking that they were having a head in sand moment whilst humming the Battle of Britain March, aircraft without pilots, a bloody outrage! That is probably unfair because the RAF does have a long history with unmanned systems but during the period in question, there was very little investment or activity in unmanned systems from the light blue.
It is all credit to the Army that they stuck with the concept through much pain and embarrassment. UAV’s have traditionally been used for artillery spotting, observing fall of shot and target assessment; hence the Royal Artillery’s vice like grip on the subject matter and glimpses of the potential provided by tactical UAV’s such as Midge and Phoenix clearly informed the requirements for Watchkeeper.
Watchkeeper
History
It was obvious that Pheonix would need replacing even before it entered service so a year after Phoenix limped into service in 1998 the MoD had started funding replacement studies.
DERA demonstrated the Observer system to serve as a test bed for future systems and this flew in in late 1998. Based on elements of the Cranfield Aerospace XRAE1 UAV it was rail launched and parachute recovered.
Observer
The Observer system was a short range and short endurance system but it incorporated advanced flight control and sensor systems.
Observer work was carried out under the Battlegroup Unmanned Aircraft (BgUMA) programme
BgUMA eventually evolved into two discrete requirements, SENDER and SPECTATOR. To complicate matters, SENDER was also part of the emerging reconnaissance trio, the others being ASTOR and the TRACER armoured reconnaissance vehicle. This was actually logical and fully coherent although it did make the programmes somewhat complicated and ambitious.
SENDER was a battalion relevant system with a 30km range and an electro-optical and IR sensor payload. SPECTATOR was a larger system designed for higher levels (divisional) than SENDER with a 150km range and dual electro optical and synthetic aperture radar payloads.
The requirement called for both to enter service in 2008
In 2000 SENDER and SPECTATOR were merged into the newly created WATCHKEEPER programme.
In 2002 it was revealed that the following air vehicles were being considered; Hermes 450, Predator, Eagle, Firescout, Shadow 200, Hermes 180, Ranger and Spectre 3.
The original SENDER and SPECTATOR split requirement was retained although the range and endurance of SPECTATOR was increased considerably.
Two consortia were down selected in 2003 for the Systems Integration Assurance Phase;
Northrop Grumman; with General Dynamics, BAE Systems, Ultra Electronics, Detica and STASYS offering the Fire Scout and RUAG Ranger air vehicles.
Fire Scout
RL-09 - RUAG Ranger
Thales-UK; with Aerosystems International, Elbit, and QinetiQ offering the Hermes 180 and Hermes 450 air vehicles
Hermes 180
Hermes 450
The statement of user requirement did not actually specify weights or indeed that an unmanned solution should be proposed but a collection of requirements for persistence, all weather operations and deployability.
In July 2004 Thales were selected as preferred bidder and contract award was in 2005 with a planned in service date of 2007. It was also announced that the smaller vehicle would now no longer be part of the programme although subsequent deployment/UOR purchase of the Lockheed Martin Desert Hawk UAV would tend to confirm an enduring requirement.
The Watchkeeper air vehicle first flew on April 16th 2008 from Megido airfield in Israel
And from Parc Aberporth in 2010
Watchkeeper has had a bumpy development ride but nothing like earlier systems and many of the most recent problems have more to do with certification for operation in civilian airspace than the more familiar technical.
Thales have assembled a broad collection of UK industry participants including;
- Major sub-assemblies and components; Boeing, Cobham and Wimborne
- Data links; Cubic Corporation, Ultra Electronics and Greenford
- Air vehicles; Elbit and Lola
- Digital battlespace integration; LogicaCMG and Leatherhead
- Ground station shelters and vehicles; Marshall SV, Cambridge
- Programme safety; Altran Praxis
- Inertial Navigation System; Athena Technologies
- Ruggedised hardware; Secure Systems and Technologies
- Airworthiness consultancy and image data management; QinetiQ
- UAV engine; UAV Engines Ltd
- Training; Vega and SELEX
Thales and Elbit formed a joint venture called UAV Tactical Systems Ltd to produce and support Watchkeeper.
As a stop gap for use in Afghanistan, the MoD has leased a number of Hermes 450’s from Thales in 2007 under Project Lydian, operated by a military/civilian mix of personnel. Civilian personnel manage the take-off and landings whilst members of 32 Regiment RA take control of the mission, or the bit in the middle. This Urgent Operational Requirement has covers 5 task lines and has clocked over 60,000 hours so far Some of the operational and logistic experience has also been fed back into the main programme.
The equipment is provided by Thales on a ‘by the air basis’ and the 6 air vehicles have reportedly collected the majority of airborne imagery collection.
Hermes 450 in Afghanistan
Operational trials were due to start last October but technical issues discovered in flight trials and software integration have delayed the start date to ‘soon’
Introduction to Afghanistan will be on a rolling basis once these trials have concluded.
Air Vehicles and Associated Systems
A number of MoD programmes like DABINETT and DII(F) have coincided with Watchkeeper and the UOR deployment of the Hermes 450 and Desert Hawk have considerably moved the programme on. We can complain that it has taken too long and that at nearly a billion pounds for 54 air vehicles is hideously expensive but we should look at what the programme actually consists of.
The basic air vehicle is the Hermes 450 as per the video below
It is crucially important to understand that whilst the Hermes 450 and Watchkeeper have more or less the same air vehicle they are not the same, far from it.
The additions include;
- Substantial redesign of the existing air vehicle to provide greater payload, structural integrity and ease of maintenance
- Enhancement of EO/IR sensor resolution
- Addition of a SAR/GMTI radar sensor
- Addition of a Laser designator/rangefinder
- Redesign of the undercarriage to allow rough strip operations
- Addition of an Automatic Take-Off and Landing (ATOL) system
- Secure UK datalink and communications infrastructure
- De-icing system for improved survivability and operating envelope
- Integral expeditionary and mobile capability
- Organic training facility
- UK airworthiness qualification and Release to Service for UK training
- UK logistic infrastructure, manufacturing and repair facility
Watchkeeper also sets out the infrastructure framework for other systems, this is absolutely crucial.
The twin sensor will allow one to cross cue the other without requiring a separate airborne system, the data link is encrypted, designed to avoid standing out in the EM spectrum and the engine has additional silencing.
Many see Watchkeeper as a simple unmanned air vehicle (UAV) but it has been more correctly described as;
A network enabled, end-to-end ISTAR and information management and exploitation system that provides accurate, timely and high-quality imagery and image Intelligence, collected, collated, exploited and disseminated to satisfy land manoeuvre commanders
Watchkeeper
The basic air vehicle is the Elbit Hermes 450 but it has been significantly modified to support additional payload (150kg) and operations in a wide range of environmental conditions. The Automatic Take Off and Landing system from Thales (called MAGIC, click here for brochure) uses portable microwave sensors to avoid reliance on GPS and Differential GPS although it can be augmented by GPS
The 450kg air vehicle has an operational altitude of just under 5,000m with an endurance up to 18 hours. Trials have also demonstrated operating the air vehicle near to the 150km distance from the ground control station requirement.
A take-off distance of 1,200m is needed which will no doubt limit deployment options even though the undercarriage has been strengthened to support rough field operations.
The Hermes 450 can be rail launched using a Robonic launcher but these have not been specified as part of the Watchkeeper programme. (click here for a brochure)
Sensors
During the initial bid phase the US Government gave permission for the APY-8 Lynx Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) to be used on either the WK450 or Fire Scout.
The 32Kg 620W Thales I-Master (Ku-band 12.5 to 18 GHz) synthetic aperture radar / ground moving target indicator (SAR/GMTI).was eventually selected for Watchkeeper. I-Master was developed from the Racal POD SAR and includes technology from the Searchwater radar.
I-Master SAR-GTMI, called Viper when fitted to Watchkeeper
It can rotate trough 360 degrees operate up to 20km in strip mode and 15km in spot mode, able to detect slow moving targets such as vehicles or people out to 20km.
Working in conjunction with the I-Master is a 38Kg El-op CoMPASS IV (compact multi-purpose advanced stabilised system) electro-optic observation system that also includes a laser range finder and target designator.
Elop COMPASS IV
From the product page
COMPASS IV can be configured with a variety of sensors to optimize your mission specific objectives. Optional sensors include an eyesafe laser rangefinder, daylight TV, spotter scope, laser area illuminator, laser pointer, and diode pumped laser designator. A step-stare function allows the capture of full-frame digital stills, which are geo-registered at the pixel level and can be tiled for high resolution area coverage.
Brochure here
The Compass is mounted in the front position and the I-Master, the rear.
The dual sensor system can be used to determine patterns of life, a reduction in road use might indicate presence of an IED, analyse moving targets, detect changes in the ground (footprints, tyre tracks) and cross cue the visual sensor for a closer look. There is a problem with this though because SAR works best at altitude and offset from the area of interest for a wide area view, the cross cuing currently in Afghanistan takes place between ASTOR/ASaC and Hermes 450 and takes advantage of the optimal operating conditions for these two different sensor types.
As usual, trade-offs have to be considered.
Watchkeeper I Master Ground Moving Target Indicator
Additional payloads may be developed in the future to include SIGINT and radio rebroadcast although these would need to be low in weight.
Ground Equipment
Watchkeeper will have a dedicated Tactical Vehicle and Communications (TAC) party that will be embedded into a theatres Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) because of increasing airspace management and integration issues. As Watchkeeper will be operating in the same airspace as helicopters, other UAV’s, indirect fire and aircraft this high level of integration is vital to avoid accidents.
The Ground Control Station is housed in a 20ft ISO format container (happy days) supplied by Marshall and carried on a DROPS type vehicle or Pinzgauer. A complete system equipped for 24 hours operation will be deployable in a single C130 lift.
Much work has gone into operator workload reduction with two personnel in a single Ground Control System able to simultaneously operate 3 air vehicles using up to 4 ‘operators’ and a commander.
13 GCS will be delivered for operations with an additional 2 for training.
There has also been some work on developing a common ground control station infrastructure underpinned by a common standards based approach. Much like the General Vehicle Architecture (GVA) and emerging soldier and base architectures, a common physical, metadata, control, mission planning, analysis and dissemination standard would have far reaching implications across all three services.
What we definitely don’t want is the RN, Army and RAF each operating UAV’s, each of them having completely different ground control systems.
Operating
Watchkeeper will be operated by 32 Regiment Royal Artillery with a dedicated training facility at Larkhill.
Watchkeeper Training Facility - Larkhill
Watchkeeper training
32 Regiment was planned to deploy 4 Watchkeeper batteries, each with 16 air vehicles.
A battery is designed to support a Brigade and two Battle Group HQ’s
Because of the operating altitude of Watchkeeper compared to Phoenix the training requirement has risen significantly, this was a challenge. All operations are governed by the ‘Flying Orders Book’ which means they are conducted under the same rules as manned aircraft.
Other Arms and Services are also involved with Watchkeeper.
The FAA, MoD, and Watchkeeper partners have been striving for operation in non segregated airspace and beyond Parc Aberporth a limited area of Salisbury Plain has now been cleared with more work to follow.
Watchkeeper training area
The Royal Artillery have been evolving the UAS operating matrix taking into account experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and when the Future Force 2020 Army and Multi Role Brigade organisation is confirmed we may see other organisational structures emerge.
We sometimes complain about wanting an 80% system but Watchkeeper is a great example of the flip side of that argument. After several decades continuous experience it is finally looking like the technology and operating concepts will have matured and converged to finally deliver on the promise.
The Future and Questions
I am not sure the capabilities of Watchkeeper are fully appreciated, especially the ability to cross cue sensors, but how much growth is left in the air vehicle is unknown. Of course, discussing growth potential in a system that has yet to come into service might be unusual but although sensors generally get lighter there is a natural desire to ‘add more’
Growth potential is therefore a key factor.
Quantities
The first question is will we end up with too many?
The programme will deliver 54 air vehicles 13 ground systems
Given that the SDSR clearly states that the maximum deployed scale for the British Army on an enduring basis will be at a Brigade (MRB) strength, is that far too many air vehicles.
Although the Army details of Future Force 2020 has yet to be announced and how this might dictate organisation of the operating Regiment(s) it is difficult to see the need for so many, even if the ‘with notice’ assumption of a Divisional scale deployment is retained.
Don’t forget, the operating Regiment or Battery in theatre does not need to have exactly the same equipment scale as those elsewhere in the deployment cycle, Whole Fleet Management could be equally applied to Watchkeeper as it is Challenger 2′s.
Can we make savings in support and manufacture costs by reducing numbers or should we simply let the programme run through to completion and accept those quantities as either attrition spares (not a ridiculous notion given the high UAV accident rate), re-purpose some of them or even offer some of them up for a multi-national, European or NATO pool.
Which brings me on to the next point; export.
France and Export
Thales has recently stated;
The French army has similar requirements to the British Army and is interested in replacing its SDTI [Sagem Sperwer] system with a high-performance, certified and financially attractive solution
A formal evaluation of the Watchkeeper system for the French armed forces will commence this year and conclude in 2013.
Given the recent announcements about the joint UK/French agreement on Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV development one wonders if France will follow through on this and seek another option, although of course, Thales is ultimately a French company.
What Watchkeeper does offer as a unique is the significant experience gained in civilian certification and the dual sensor integration.
Although there are no concrete proposals it might be a reasonable proposition to offer the system to NATO or European nations as a pooled resource.
Armament
During an interview at the 2011 Paris Air Show Major Matt Moore RA indicated that investigation into arming Watchkeeper had begun with the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) as a leading candidate. It is probably fair to that progressing the main project is a higher priority that arming but it is an interesting proposition and one which is definitely on the development roadmap, funds permitting of course.
To provide scale, the image below shows LMM mounted on the BAE Fury UAV
Fury UAV
For fleeting or targets of opportunity acquired by Watchkeeper an organic weapon would reduce the engagement cycle (FIND-STRIKE) time considerably.
Low yield and precise weapons such as the LMM would be ideal because not only is it fast and precise, it also has a low yield and warhead design that suits the likely target types.
A number of options exist should the LMM not be suitable and there has been some considerable developments in 5-10kg guided weapon class such as the LM Shadow Hawk, ATK MAW and MBDA SABER
MBDA SABER
ATK MAW
LM Shadow Hawk
Trading off endurance for payload is not unreasonable but if the output of the air vehicles engine could be improved then payload might be increased.
It would certainly be desirable to arm Watchkeeper but then a couple of political issues hove into view.
The first is that of differentiation between an armed Watchkeeper and the Fire Shadow loitering munition and the second is that of treading on the toes of the RAF’s Reaper and future Reaper replacement programmes.
Given the already stringent training regime for joint and precision fire controllers I don’t think that would be an issue but I have to confess to scratching my head about Fire Shadow and wondering what it offers that a Watchkeeper with one or two LMM’s or free fall guided mortar bombs does not.
Maritime
I have looked at potential maritime UAV’s in a couple of posts but not considered Watchkeeper.
Operating the air vehicle should be physically possible from CVF if the Robonic rail launcher and a simple arrestor system installed but this would no doubt impinge on flight deck operations and whether the Watchkeeper air vehicle is suitable for maritime use is open to question.
Integrating the MAGIC automatic take off and landing system with the complex electromagnetic environment on CVF might present another challenge.
Even if it were possible the question should be asked, why?
It would of course provide a great deal of benefit for an amphibious operation but the sensor fit might not be best suited to open ocean work.
Having a Ground Control Station onboard CVF, an Albion class or even as a modular fit might improve flexibility but because of the launching and recovery requirements, again, this might not offer much in the way benefit.
Probably a better approach would be to ensure the product of Watchkeeper can be disseminated throughout the maritime domain via DII and other systems and that work done on control systems, training and other aspects of the development is applied to other programmes.
Ownership
Although the notion of ownership of equipment is sometime ridiculous because they operate in a joint environment there are a number of intriguing questions about where it sits within the armed forces as a whole.
The Royal Artillery have persevered with the concept of UAV’s despite little interest from the other services and are deserving of all due credit, especially given the sophistication of Watchkeeper and the training, doctrinal and operational concepts they have pioneered.
The Intelligence Corps provide image analysts and no doubt there will be representation from the other services in much the same way that the ASTOR/Sentinel system works.
However, in a reducing armed forces and given the likelihood that Watchkeeper will be operating from exactly the same deployed infrastructure and airbases as other fixed and rotary wing assets does it make sense to retain this legacy. They are no longer used for simple fire adjustment and the system will be closely integrated with other services.
Where do the Formation Recce units come into the Watchkeeper family, would they be best placed to operate them.
Is there merit in either AAC or RAF operating Watchkeeper and can we leverage the ASTOR/Sentinel working arrangements or should we just let the RA get on with their excellent work?
Another question is that of contractor support.
The Project Lydian Hermes 450′s have been operating well in Afghanistan and before that Iraq but with Watchkeeper, the Army will be reverted to a more traditional wholly owned and operated model. Could that be replicated where on enduring operations, elements of operation and maintenance are carried out by contractors under an availability type arrangement.
I don’t have an opinion, just asking if there are efficiency savings to be had by culling a few sacred cows?
Excellent review, TD. I’ll certainly come back to this one. I was the Army desk officer at HQ LAND for WATCHKEEPER from 200-2003 so saw the inside story emerging.
Bit busy this afternoon, but a couple of initial thought which I’ll try to elaborate on this evening if anyone is interested:
JUEP sprang out of WATCHKEEPER, then became SUAVE, then the UOR procurements of armed UAVs.
Service politics! All sorts of “interesting” debates once the RAF woke up to UAVs in 2002.
WATCHKEEPER programme a good example of how a really switched on IPT Leader can run a complex programme well. Key personnel decisions included retaining the DSTL Scientist and Army Requirements Manager through a double posting.
There was very nearly a spin-off programme to use UAVs in the “armed recce role” as part of the whole attack aviation piece that was running in parallel with WATCHKEEPER. Would have happened if we’d gone for Firescout. However, the Thales CONOPS was significantly better than N-Gs, and I believe the logistic support costs of Firescout were significantly higher.
There’s a whole piece still to be fully explored on the Common Ground Station elements of both the ASTOR and WATCHKEEPER GCS – I’d long left, but heard later that it actually works pretty well.
Modern data radios can deliver FMV, allowing for many additional users to view imagery (i.e. without GCS).
We used Predator a lot in Bosnia in 95 – many of the Lessons Identified from that went straight into WATCHKEEPER URs.
Ditto the non-deployment of Phoenix to Afghanistan (too hot / high) – adjusted the WATCHKEEPER URs.
oh, finally, the use of civilian airspace in the UK for training was always a worry. I’m not sure how that one got resolved – as far as I can remember Salisbury Plain was just about OK, but there were worries about a UAV going rogue and flying off by itself to crash somewhere, no doubt onto a school. And of course Parc Aberporth got heavily involved as an economic regeneration measure.
So 150kg payload could carry 2-3 Brimstone?
I’m a little disturbed by the fact that this is not satellite controlled. An enemy therefore has an easier job jamming the control signals due to that inverse-square-law that appears to have been overlooked. As soon as that is solved and we have satellite control these are excellent and we should be proud of them.
I remember asking my Dad when I was young why the Army didn’t have radio controlled aircraft. This was at the same time that I was totally hooked on RC copters and planes. Neither of us could figure out a good reason other than control jamming and TV picture relaying.
As of 2010, the RA was told that arming Watchkeeper would be a no-no for at least 4 years. No funding, other priorities.
The latest rumors are that Watchkeeper might very well not be armed. The MOD was shown the Raytheon Common Ground Control System (CGCS) offered for Scavenger. The notional idea is to have the CGCS compatible with Watchkeeper, Scavenger and Reaper for british service.
It would be manned by a RAF Flight Lieutnant as commander, and Royal Artillery/RAF UAS operators, and bring together Watchkeeper and Scavenger operations, with the Keeper’ doing the “simple” ISR work and the Scavenger carrying weapons, SIGINT pods and other equipment.
The compatibility with the Reaper is mainly sought because it is expected that Reaper will bridge the gap between the end of ops in Afghanistan and the arrival of Scavenger.
It is not even excluded yet that Scavenger ends up being a variant of Reaper: the joint BAE/Dassault development at the moment is only an option, not necessarily the solution.
And the Holland government has just said that they want to take a look at the MALE program already. They have no big liking for Dassault, and they might come up with decisions that might be unpleasant for Dassault, for BAE, and for the UK.
Also, i think the 4 batteries of 16 in 32 Royal Artillery have long been abandoned as a plan:
4×16 for a start gives 64, 10 more drones than are being bought;
4 batteries are insufficient to have one available for enduring deployment;
47 Regiment has re-roled to UAS and the Army has just finished the process of transforming 32 and 47 regiments into a combined UAS force composed of 5 homogeneous batteries, each with Desert Hawk III, T-Hawk and Hermes 450/Watchkeeper. The two regiments are both under 1st Artillery Brigade.
It is likely that this arrangement is maintained in the future as well, unless there have been recent, dramatic changes in the Army Restructuring work: the UAS force restructuring has been going on from when the SDSR was published, and was re-confirmed even when they announced the further cut down to 82.000 regulars.
Can anyone (maybe @James?) expand on the story behind the reasons for selecting the Hermes 450 platform over the others being considered?
Regards civilian certification: Autonomy and School-Crashing aside, my understanding is that one of the hurdles is noise from the rotary engine.
Other technicalities, such as the vehicle re-broadcasting voice from the Ground Control Station for Air Traffic Control purposes and transponder issues, had been overcome.
Simon,
all 4 bidders entered with pretty much the same systemic solution: big UAVs***, small UAVs, ground control / L&R capabilities, and a whole set of solutions covering each of the lines of development (only 6 back then), and of course a price. So it was not really that the Hermes 450 was chosen, really more appropriate to say that the Thales system which included Hermes 450 was chosen.
The selection of the Thales system was the IPTs choice, but they sub-contracted some of the work to DSTL, HQ LAND, HQ DRA, and DGD&D. We were asked to mark and give opinions on all of the lines of development solutions – I was responsible for marking the Training and CONOPS sections (CONOPS should have been DGD&D but the SO1 ISTAR post there was gapped, so my COS said that I’d do it to keep me out of trouble).
There were therefore about a dozen categories of scoring, and Thales would have come out on top overall, but how the marks were scored in all of the categories I don’t know.
I don’t believe that the price was ever discussed outside of the IPT, maybe with DEC ISTAR. I heard a whisper that the N-G solution was pricey in logistic support terms, but that’s only hearsay and could even be wrong.
*** While they all had both big and small UAVs in their solutions, numbers varied. The requirement was to provide a certain level of coverage in both geography and also in time. Depending on the capabilities of the big UAV (speed and endurance) drove the number of small UAVs that filled in the gaps.
@James
Appreciated, thank you.
Interesting, I didn’t know Watchkeeper was getting a SAR/GMTI radar. Goes some way to explaining why the army was so relaxed about SDSR early retirement of the Sentinel R1/ASTOR. Means they get full control over an asset that the RAF muscled in on with the Sentinel R1.
As a side note the AN/APG-81 fitted to the F35B will have an excellent SAR/GMTI capability in its own right which will be a very useful capability for the Marines and Army over any beachhead.
http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/solutions/f35aesaradar/assets/apg81video.html
Good piece with lots of research put into it. I felt that more should have been said by Reaper though. While I know it is a different system and used differently, a lot of the lessons learned fed back into Watchkeeper, including some of the project drivers.
For example, the Americans are incredibly sensitive about Reaper and the MOD always struggled to be able to do anything more with it outside of use in Afghanistan and Nevada. In short, it is a platform the UK cannot use or support outside of Afghanistan due to ITAR, airworthiness and lack of technical understanding. Watchkeeper was specifically intended to avoid these problems. Without knowing the details, I would speculate that this may have been a reason why some of the other candidates in the competition were rejected. The French are interested in this system for very much similar reasons and because Thales are involved.
One of the “nice to haves” which certainly the Hermes 450 had (and I think also the 180, can’t quite recall exactly though) was a “future” ability for AH-64D to both control the UAV directly via data link, and also receive the imagery direct into their cockpit and display it on one of the screens. At least, there was payload space on the UAV for it, and Boeing confirmed that the AH-64D could be retro-fitted with a suitable datalink. i.e. the work was not yet done, but some engineers had spent time thinking about it and had some idea as to how they would go about it. Apparently this engineering design had been done in response to an Israeli requirement, and Elbit ported it across to WATCHKEEPER.
There’s a NATO working group that looks at this sort of thing, and have come up with 6 levels of UAV / AH interoperability, levels 0-5. This may drive some future development.
@ Desk Jockey,
I’m not convinced that Firescout was rejected on ITAR grounds – clearly there were some ITAR issues, but I always found N-G to be really proactive and as open as they possibly could be within the bounds of US law. But I suppose it is unknowable about how it might have panned out if they’d won.
@James – N-G and General Dynamics are nice and helpful people to work with. Certain aspects of the US Government, not so much! As they call the shots, that is where the power lies. The US were having significant issues with certifying Reaper, as you know the UK’s airworthiness requirements are possibly even stricter. I am sure these factors were in play, it is a common issue across many projects.
The US companies know this and know they have lost a lot of business as a result of ITAR. But as the US military has a bigger budget than everyone put together, they are hardly going to bite the hand that feed them.
I am doing another similar piece on Reaper and Scavenger etc so will dovetail into that.
@TD
Good stuff.
TD,
no doubt there’ll be a full competition, but it would be a no brainer for Thales and Elbit to team together and offer the Hermes 900, and the complete interoperability of systems and support with WATCHKEEPER. I am not personally familiar with the Hermes 900, but good old Wiki says it can carry a 300 kg payload, which is quite a lot of ATGW-style or LMM missiles, or a hefty SIGINT sensor.
Just think, a family of three completely inter-operable UAVs and GCS, with an integrated support, training and logistics system, spanning all needs from tactical through to strategic – far too sensible!
Here we go: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sl_JGtZGXQg
While im sure the hole system is very gd and the armys used foresight here but it does strike me the air vehicle has been flawed from the start and would guess it maybe still causing issues.
With all the modes to the airframe TD has mentioned it sounds like we pretty much designed a new a/c in the shell of what looked like a hermes 450 the question must be why. With adding all the necessary requirements for civil airspace operation im sure the weight growth is almost gone with continued worries of data link integrity and the possibility of some form of sense and avoid capability they air vehicle is looking very limited for the outlay. The london area has been class A airspace for sometime!
Why was the basic hermes 450 not procured and incremental upgrades over time introduced (we are effectively paying twice for that now albiet out of the uor budget). Was small manned a/c such as the dimond twinstar ever considered by the army solve a lot of issues and can carry the similar sensors and links.
Astor is wide area stand off sar i doubt watchkeeper is anywhere in the same ball park. I think its time to ditch the air vehicle or seriously truncate the buy and purchase a different aircraft off the shelf or possibly transfer reaper to the army instead.
Mark,
the basic driver for an unmanned system was endurance. Going right back to the original requirements, it was open to the companies to offer a satellite solution, or manned aircraft or airships or anything else which might have done the job. However, as much as we tried to write the requirements to be as “solution neutral” as possible (and this was in the early days of Smart Acquisition, when everyone was genuinely trying to make the system work properly), the requirements as stated implied an unmanned system as being the best blend of technology and maturity to meet them.
It is the companies themselves who select which air vehicles they will offer: MoD can only judge what is offered to them. So your question about 450 is perhaps best aimed at Thales, not the Army. I can’t speak for Thales, but I strongly suspect that what they did was to review the requirements, and find a UAV that most nearly fit them, and then work out how to make the required changes to meet them all.
Now, it is theoretically open to the MoD to review the market itself, decide what it wants, and just go straight to the company, but that’s not how the system works for major programmes. It does for some UORs or legacy kit upgrades. However, the MoD is trying to fill capability gaps, not to write requirements that meet exactly what an off the shelf system can already do.
If the MoD turned around to Thales now and said “ditch the 450″, the NAO would have puppies, and Thales would think “brilliant, we get paid for our previous work, now we’ll get paid more for new work”, and the end user wouldn’t have a capability at all until 2017.
ASTOR and WATCHKEEPER were always meant to be complementary and nested solutions. You can see that in the requirements for the previous generations of CASTOR and Phoenix.
How stealthy are these systems?
What is stopping a peer enemy putting their own drone in the sky to shoot ours down?
Somebody must of thought it?
Thanks james interesting. The endurance issue is interesting I assume from reading TD piece watchkeeper needs a trained pilot on the ground at all time in the control room? If so the only advantage a uav will have in endurance is fewer airframes. But the reason i mentioned diamond is we now have bought some and also now operate them on contract as a uav replacement in UK based exercises. There very cheap, the basic civil jet less costs less than 1m dollars each and very very fuel efficient. The even have a optionally manned version which granted may not have been available in 2002 but again things have moved on.
Can I ask on the negotiating stage once preferred bidder is selected can the MOD then decide on modifying its requirements or deferring requirements or not introducing them all at the same time or would that trigger another whole bidding process. I just get the feeling reading this that the hermes 450 was selected to be a cheap and quick off the self buy which required so many mods to meet the requirement we would have been as well to design a new a/c.
The nao may have puppies but moving reaper to the army shouldn’t lose capability or delay it further much more capable air frame with proper growth potential I see it a better fit than hermes 450.
@Mark
There are quite detailed technical issues involved in these platforms that have significant affect on their usefulness. Probably one of the main advantages is that we can do what we want with the platform and develop it as needed, e.g. satcom, increased engine power, plug and play sensors.
@Simon
Your proposal to fit satcom is an excellent issue of the “hidden” issues with UAS. If we did everything over the satcom we could simply not afford to operate these platforms. Data rates are extremely expensive and you’re transmitting FMV and possibly SAR information as well. Going with a conventional system limits range but is far cheaper with much more bandwidth available.
@Desk Jockey
The UK has now set up an additional squadron of Reaper to operate out of RAF Waddington rather than Creech AFB. I would guess that UK personnel would remain at Creech until post-ghan but future operations will be from Waddington. But your main point of the issues with Reaper are fairly spot on.
@TD
You may have to rejig your Reaper/Scavenger article soonish depending on what comes/came out of PR12.
@x
Signature isn’t really reduced enough to be useful when coupled with limited manoeuvre performance.
Nothing to stop a peer enemy arming their drones for air-to-air, but our Typhoons or F-35s will have already shot them down…
These platforms are not currently survivable in contested airspace, but how likely are we get into that situation. Destruction of enemy air defences (including fighters) is pretty much the first task of any decent campaign we’ll run.
@x
Is there an LMM package planned for the smaller F-35B weapons bay to defend the drones?
Why do I get the feeling these expendable drones are getting less expendable by the hour?
Mark,
WATCHKEEPER does not need a trained pilot. LCpls operate them. The Kevins have a different opinion for the large UAVs they operate, normally justified by having to operate in mixed airspace. I don’t think that’s really true. We operated JUEP (a Hermes 450) in highly congested airspace alongside the US Navy, and once some deconfliction routines had been established, not a problem at all. To me, the Kevins are on a job-saving push. There actually is an argument for a pilot to be involved in the mission planning, but actually flying the thing, not really.
On the contracts, there’s always a negotiation, and things can move around a little. However, they cannot move around too much as the companies that lost will complain. There’s some EU law on this called Alcatel, I think.
You missed my earlier point. Hermes 450 was not selected for WATCHKEEPER. The Thales WATCHKEEPER system was selected. I think you are getting too focussed on the air vehicles and not other equally critical, and possibly more risky or more capable, elements. Comms, for example, or training and logistic support. The air vehicle is little more than an expensive model aircraft. The system software for example costs more to develop than all of the air vehicles to buy, which makes some of the media’s obsession with hardware look a bit silly.
I’m not sure the Army would want Reaper. It does Deep Strike, which is what the Kevins are set up to do.
@ Hannay & TOC
My thinking is a peer enemy would know what toys we would be bringing by just a quick flick through Janes’.
I find it hard to believe in these days of RADAR systems that can track tennis balls at super sonic speeds there isn’t a cheap system that can detect something the size of a small car, doing a hundred knots, and loitering above likely targets. Isn’t that why the fighter ‘plane was developed to shoot down ‘planes doing spotting for artillery during WW1? Just a thought.
x,
I’m with you on the stealth thing.
Why do they have a V-tail if it’s not to avoid radar reflection – it’s not the easiest thing for control!
So why the V-tail and no other stealth features – massively thick wing profile (yes, I know, for low-speed efficiency, but allthesame) and a cylindrical body?
They may be great against the Taliban, but a credible opponenet I’m not so sure. Is it possible they are supposed to operate within the dome of protection offered by Aster?
James
CAP 722 unmanned systems operations in uk airspace mandates a trained pilot is required for any aircraft over 150kg in weight so if there not training pilots regardless of rank its not flying in the uk and must meet EASA aircraft airworthiness requirements.
The other systems are important i agree but I assume the aircraft is the primary means of launching the sensors to gather the data i fear the air vehicle chosen may end up comprising the whole system but if you thinks its acceptable ill not argue.
Reaper isnt deep strike its benign over the horizon recon.
Mark,
I’m not an expert on airspace regulations, but the UK has been flying Phoenix (well over 200 kgs) in the UK for quite some time, and other types of UAVs. There must be some let-out clause in the regulations as I am unaware of any Army-operated UAVs having had pilots. The WATCHKEEPER establishment does not include any pilots either unless something fundamental has changed that I am unaware of in the last couple of years.
Reaper seems pretty heavily armed to me to be an benign over the horizon recce asset. Strictly speaking, it is an intelligence asset with a Deep Strike capability – recce is a tactical activity. It has had integrated onto it Paveway 2, Hellfire missiles, Sidewinders and the JDAM. I don’t know where to find figures for the number of lethal missions it has flown, but every week we are hearing of Afghans or Yemenis being blown apart by Reaper strikes.
@ Simon
I don’t think the dihedral tail is a stealth feature more to do with the low speed of the aircraft.
What I want to know is how visible is it to the opposition? If it isn’t any use against a peer enemy really it isn’t much use at all. And if it is worth using against a peer enemy it is worth them shooting it down.
“Why do they have a V-tail if it’s not to avoid radar reflection – it’s not the easiest thing for control!”
Guesses:-
Weight reduction;
Volumetric efficiency in stowage (especially in reducing the machine’s height).
@James
I can definitely see your point regarding not needing trained pilots to “fly” UAS. I’m pretty sure the US has an intake at the moment that has completely sidestepped manned aircraft but it’s early days to see how it turns out. Feedback from the UK guys at Creech are that having experienced pilots does make quite a difference. Personally I think this is probably just due to the experience issue – do you want Flt Lts/Sqn Ldrs with multiple tour experience providing your support, or some fresh faced chap on his first real operation.
@x
I’m not really sure I see your point. It’s not overly difficult to visual id, and with any sort of radar you’ve got no problems. However, in a low-threat environment you simply fly above manpads and gunfire altitude. In a medium threat environment with medium range rf sams and some fighters (e.g. Libya) then you use other forces (e.g. Tomahawk, Stormshadow) to take out those defences to allow you to operate in a lower threat environment.
@Simon
The butterfly tail seen on quite a few types saves mass and drag at the expense of control power. Cramming as much fuel on board as possible and reducing drag is very important for endurance, whilst lower control power can be accepted as higher risk of aircraft loss.
You require a Commercial Pilots Licence to Instrument level to pilot a UAS in UK civilian airspace, though you don’t have to be rated on a manned aircraft.
See sections 4.7.1 and 4.8:
- http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP722.pdf
@x
What scenarios are we going to go up against a peer enemy? The West as a whole has a massive overmatch. It is definitely worth a peer enemy shooting down these assets – but aren’t their fighters/bombers likely to be toting anti-ship missiles and cruise missiles at whereever we’re operating from rather than being concerned with some small reconnaissance assets.
As I’ve said before, first priority should be establishing air superiority through the destruction of the opposing air defences (SAMs+fighters). This then enables us to blow the crap out of what we want, look at what we want, and most of all it stops James’ mates complaining when they get bombed by the opposition.
UAS like Watchkeeper or Reaper are definitely not the gold plated solution but are much cheaper for common lower-tier wars.
@ James/mark
I would think that it more related to the level of training and the definition of ‘trained’ rather than trained or untrained.
@ James
What level of training are the operators given?
@ Hannay
‘I’m pretty sure the US has an intake at the moment that has completely sidestepped manned aircraft but it’s early days to see how it turns out.’
I understand it’s more than one intake. The USAF have now a branch of UAV operaters up and running that aren’t from a manned aircraft background. Mainly due to manning shortages, they just couldn’t get enough ex fj pilots and cost as well. There was also a similar trial within the RAF.
The UAS also needs to be able to rebroadcast voice communications with the ground station to and from air traffic controllers and other aircraft in the vicinity.
It also needs the usual navigation lights and transponder, together with the ability to detect and avoid potential collisions to a degree.
@ Hannay
Well you don’t do recce for the fun of it. It is done so you can find out where the enemy are so you can drop ordnance on to them.
If it flies above MANPADS or AAA you need another system to shoot it down so why not another drone?
As for no peer enemy I keep forgetting all this defence equipment is purchased only so middle aged men can discuss it on the internet, that all future events are predictable, and that we live in an interdependent age where worth isn’t a worthwhile venture. It slips my mind all the time…….
TOC,
I read that link as though “there’s going to be some future regulations” i.e. start reading from the top of that Section, called “Policy”. So I’m going to take that as “No Manned Aircraft Pilot Required”.
No doubt there will be some qualification issued by the Army to Watchkeeper operators, having done an acceptable course. But they won’t be pilots, nor will it be anything like a pilot’s course. I’m also uncertain as to whether military airspace gets a let out clause as well.
The old Phoenix operator course was 14 weeks IIRC. WATCHKEEPER is meant to be much simpler to control, but maybe they’ll load in other requirements.
@x
I have seen some anti-drone drone concepts. Really it’s a very cheap surface to air missile or a drone armed with manpads. Apparently the Serbs had quite some success at shooting down drones with the door gunners on helicopters as well…
My point about about peer enemies is rather to say that this issue isn’t likely to be the highest priority with everything else that would be happening in such a campaign.
@ Hannay
I know where you are coming from with your very reasonable questions. I would say that with long range PGM munitions and UAVs proliferating I think counter-UAV is a bit of priority. Have you seen the number of countries that operate these things?
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?14303-Weapon-Concept-for-anti-UAV-role
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a252727.pdf
http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%253A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%253A30d6ef68-330e-4d35-9d8d-5940537bdc05
I think the counter-UAV problem is real, and difficult. As UAV technology moves onwards, it is not going to get any easier. Stealth UAVs with slopey surfaces, composite materials, increasingly low-signature engines. There’s also the multiplication factor – any modern battlefield is going to have dozens of the things, of all shapes and sizes. The enemy may develop some TLAM-like capability. Eventually, there are also going to be loitering munitions cruising about waiting for a bruising.
The problem we face is that a £20,000 model aircraft with a Go-Pro camera and a memory card is sufficient to royally screw us if it gets a look at the right thing. Iran successfully flew a UAV around a US carrier filming it, so second and third tier nations are fully capable of fielding UAVs. Of course, the USN would have blown the thing away in an instant if the ROE had allowed, but still indicative.
I think the solution will keep evolving – a bit like the armour / anti-armour cycle – but if we were to go to war against a UAV capable enemy next year, what would be the best solution in 2013? Repeatedly firing £150,000 missiles at £20,000 UAVs is getting expensive. Putting lots of UAV hunting radars all across our frontage does their work for them – we tell them where we are. It also consumes troops.
My view is that in 2013, we are going to have air superiority at the very least, so let’s capitalise on that. We’ve got AWACs in the sky, with a hugely capable radar. Let’s use that. That’s the STA and detection elements sorted, what about the kill aspect?
A Cessna, or similar, with a cannon. Buy a Squadron of 12 and put one up in the air 24/7, turning lazy circles. Hotline to the AWACS, and a lowish cost radar onboard itself for the last 10 miles. A Cessna will cover a Divisional front and depth in about 10 minutes maximum. A Cessna is faster than most UAVs, but has the low speed to hang behind one while it lines up the shot. Mount a mini gun in the side door, with a Loadie to operate it.
That covers all of the cheaper UAVs, flying up to about 15,000 feet. Anything bigger and higher is going to be out of reach, so that’s what the AWACS assigns to a FJ with a Sidewinder or cannon.
It may seem odd to send a plane after a UAV, but I think it’s a simple idea, we can do it in UOR timeframes and a bit of airspace coord thinking by the Kevins. £4M buys you 12 Cessnas (if we can’t repurpose some of the Grob trainers), but after that your kill costs are some bullets (I’m going to rule out crew and support costs as they’d also exist for batteries of missiles and land-based radars, plus too complex at this time of night).
@x
SOP for us is the light/medium stabilised turret for anti-UAV work, 7.62, 0.5cal or 35mm would work. One IFV would always be designated as AA, job is to watch for UAVs or careless helicopters. And the Air Force would do their part too of course.
As for the UAV itself, as someone who often end up as the test target for those flying lawn mowers, I can say that they are fairly stealthy. You won’t know they are there unless you specifically look for them visually or they turn the engine on. They would climb high, cut the engine, then glide past the target area soundlessly before turning the engine on and climbing again. As for radar, well, that thing is small, and ground based sensors have to contend with terrain and ground clutter, so you can use something similar to FJ/AH doctrine regarding penetration of enemy perimeter defences. Keep slightly above the biggest hill with vegetation and try to keep something between you and the nearest SAM site. The UAVs that kept playing tag with me were the Searchers though, not Watchkeeper or Reaper.
….could even be a composite / war only / RAFVR Squadron. Activate it when needed, aircrew from advanced training, or pilots doing a ground tour who have volunteered. 2 day refresher on the Cessna, two days firing the mini gun at some cheap aerial targets at Parc Aberporth, one day of refresher radio and AWACS procedures, deploy to theatre. Have a CLS contract for the Cessnas so no military maintainers needed.
Result: good enough capability, total cost going to be less than £10M for the first deployment and 6 months, £5M or less for each 6 month block. Given how much damage a UAV could do to us, I think it’s a bargain.
Or use Apache chin guns for a fly by shooting? Missed? Hover and try again?
…if we’re feeling really flush, a Squadron of Super Tucanos. Already come equipped with 2 M3 MGs, plus various AAM options. Will do 300+ knots, right down to 80 knots. Stays airborne for 6 hours easy, will go up to 30,000 feet. Can also do CAS easily enough with Maverick or bombs.
Call it an “Army Cooperation Squadron”. Going to cost a lot more than a Squadron of Cessnas, but can do a lot more.
Or use what you already have and Apache/Merlin door gunner/Puma door gunner them down. No extra cost.
Plus Starstreak, LMM on the way.
Does anyone fancy tackling the questions I posed at the end of the post?
TD,
Not specifically about Watchkeeper but generally I’m not sure I understand why all assets do not go back to the manufacturer for deep maintenance. That would leave the RAF (for example) to do field maintenance on Typhoon with essentially the “sustainment” fleet residing with BAe. Same with Astute, same with Merlin, etc.
In other words, if it’s broken, hand it back to the manufacturer for extended warrantee replacement/repair. That leaves the forces to concentrate of preventative/routine maintenance and operation.
Is this mad?
A bit of correction/amplification on the history.
The term Falconer etc was never used, in RA service it was always SD-1 (abbreviation of USD-1). The first unit formed in UK, for trials in 1959. This seems to have grown into the eventual capability. SD-1 took photos by day and night (it had a flare pack). It was controlled from the ground station with a tracking radar and really advanced technology, a real-time moving light dot over a paper map between two perspex(?) sheets, this enabled the operator to fly it where wanted and take pics when required (for the so inclined this ensemble was Rdr,FA,No 13). Obviously it was all wet film stuff with forward processing.
However, the background goes back to WW1 and the vital role of air recce in the CB batle, on thewhole the RFC did a good job, particulary photo wise with airfields within a reasonable trot of corps heavy arty HQ. Air observation of fire was less successfull, a few RFC/RAF pilots were very good but most wer at best ‘ordinary’. In fairness conditions were dificult and good observation is not as easy as it is sometimes assumed. WW2 was a new problem but the airfields were within a shortish jeep ride of their Corps HQRA. However, the arty/R procedure proved less that great although the SAAF sqn in Italy did a pretty good job and eventually an RAF sqn got up to speed, but in NWE, forget it. The problem was stooging around over the German gun areas was not real healthy and needed capable resources if the Luftwaffe had got out of bed that day. Come the Cold War airfields were ever further back, the tachnology of transmitting high qulaity photos was in its infancy and the propesct of fast jets stooging around the Sov gun areas was really a prospect. Given that the Sov artillery arm was a far more potent force than WW2 Germany, then there was a seriousw problem that most of the army and RAF was more than happy to ignore. However, the Gunner folkmemory was long and unmanned aircraft owned and operated by the army were the obvious solution.
Midge was a general capability but probably more used on CPX by arty int staff than G Int. However, Midge had an analoge flight control computer and it could only be programed for a very small number of turns, height changes and image exposures. Actual imagery was not normally provided, the requestor asked questions and the Int Corps image analysts in the battery reported the answers. Midge had a problematic development and probably wouldn’t have entered services if it hadn’t been for the persistance of the TIG assigned to project.
MRUASTAS was chopped by the MGO when the CEO of Westlands was explaining the problems they were encountering and said that they were running it as a ‘hobby shop project’, 4* sense of humour failure ensued. However, on a lighter note there was also the WRAC driver who fronted up to the offrs mess at Larkhill and said she’d come to collect Mr Rastus.
Having staffed CASTOR and UAV requirements, I’d comment that we recognised that the problem with the latter would be that realtime imagery would take on a life of its own, everyone would want it, and could be to the detriment of the CB task, but it was mission critical for MLRS and having any chance of winning the CB battle (the intention was to run Phoenix out of the Depth Fire Direction Centre assigned to each division). Of course the issue with Phoenix was the requirement for zero length launch/zero length recovery for use in a divisional area and the close coupled issue of flight time. IIRC Phoenix was ‘piloted’ by the operator flying the ground spot, the aircraft piloted itself from these insrtuctions, there was a huge terrain facsimile of the are south of Hanover built in Filton or somewhere with moving gantries to develop, test and evaluate the human factors issues for this ‘non-piloting’ operator ‘flying’. BATES was not the driving issue, although the PM did try to use BATES as an excuse for Phoenix delays (I seem to remember him being rather obnoxious one day), actually all BATES did for Phoenix was pass formatted messages, ie Calls for Fire (FM.CFF) and its relatives (FM.MTO, etc). BATES was not designed to pass imagery (the bandwidth was nowhere near enough) and the comms protocols hadn’t been invented.
I’m happy to be corrected by James, but I understand that Watchkeeper also includes a fair number of Tac Parties equipped to receive Watchkeeper imagery and provide advice and liaison to bde and BG HQs, etc. This capability is critical for integrating into the land battle. Obviously like the AD tac parties, and other arty elements, they are under control of the arty commander at each HQ. Much of the infrastructure being built is a Boscombe Down which is the actual operating base and a short flight from Salisbury Plain.