This article in the Telegraph caught my eye earlier this week (click the image to view)
It describes tentative progress in Mogadishu
Whilst the prevailing military and security trend is to proclaim the end of enduring deployment, the death of COIN and the rise of a warmed over version of the Revolution in Military Affairs called Strategic Raiding it is interesting to note that away from the spotlight the African Union, supported by a range of capabilities from Western nations has just got on with the job and is now achieving good results.
This tells me a couple of things;
- The fashion as described above is just wishful thinking; engaging with the local population, confronting the enemy and staying in for the long haul is as effective s ever.
- Forward presence, mentoring, collaboration with regional forces and providing a range of technical, training and other capabilities is an effective model where we lack the manpower to provide the force densities required across a given area.
What does this mean for the UK?
We still need to maintain a balanced force but and the illusory attractiveness of strategic raiding is no compensation for having forces capable of enduring operations in coalitions with others.
We might discuss numbers, relative proportions and partners but retreating behind the shield of long distance air and sea power whilst proclaiming the end of land campaigns is no substitute for active engagement with the problem.
there are nearly two hundred thousand coalition troops in ghanners.
Even counting anti piracy patrols, there isnt a tenth of that in somalia.
Providing fire support, istar, c4, logistics and training to a local partner is a perfectly valid use of a strategic raider fleet.
Pick a local partner to provide light infantry, we provide the rest.
Spot on DOM, the crucial point is that it is African Union troops on the ground not British or US. This helps prevent the Islamists rallying support against the Western Invaders as it is their neighbours sorting out the problem. In the mean time we do anti piracy off the coast, provide ISTAR and specialist support that the AU is not capable of providing.
“The fashion as described above is just wishful thinking; engaging with the local population, confronting the enemy and staying in for the long haul is as effective s ever.”
Few would argue it doesn’t work and isn’t effective, however, one would be foolish to ignore the issue of public consent, or lack thereof. Indeed, we would look pretty foolish if the publics bactrian spine was broken by the next Iraq, the result being a new paradigm as Britain-the-UN-peacekeepers with a budget to match. We are close, we are not there yet, but we are close. This is not purely a military circle-jerk, elective war requires a public mandate accepting of the price of great power ambitions/responsibilities.
“Forward presence, mentoring, collaboration with regional forces and providing a range of technical, training and other capabilities is an effective model where we lack the manpower to provide the force densities required across a given area.”
All of this is good and useful, none of this has anything to do with the global-guardian/strategic-raiding debate.
Again, you make two mistakes:
1. Forgetting that politicians want to maximise political effect with military action, and that budgets no longer give us the whole menu to select from.
2. Seeing the land/maritime focus as an ideological absolute designed to crush the lower, rather than meet the requirement above.
I forsee many more rants about the evils of strategic raiding, and I forsee them as becoming ever more shrill as reality becomes harder to ignore.
Just like carriers in years past.
Face it now, the decision has been made. ThinPinStripedLine knows it.
One of the ‘lessons learned’ in Afghanisatn is that we were slow off the mark in setting up ‘Sandhurst in the Sand’ to train the Afghan forces. If we’d got the whole training programme up and running from year 1 we could perhaps have avoided being caught up in some of the worst recent years of insurgency.
If you take this approach to its logical conclusion we ought now to set up ‘Sandhurst on the Savanah’ as a semi-permenant hub to help train our African allies’ leadership cadres. A few years ago this would have been a non starter becuase practically every African ruler was a more or less bloodthirsty and corrupt nationalist dictator. More democratic, and more western aligned, states are now around so the game has changed.
There does not seem to be any problem with using ‘stratetic raiding’ forces as the support and ‘Heavy mob’ to a local partner light infantry in jobs like this.
The AU forces in this case seem mcuh better suited for the job- a lot less susseptable to the ‘dirty western imperialists’ charge.
Indeed the success of this opperation would seem to be in stark contrast to the IRAQ/AFGHAN experience.
In short TD I take a directly opposite conclusion from this article. Light touch dtrategic raiding type forces used with local partners 1; Long endurance heavy troop commitment by west 0.
Whe posted I hadn’t seen Jedibeeftrix post.
Could I be associated with the remarks of the last speaker.. Save of courss e I am one of the (anti)’Carrier ranteers’ and believe a good for or against carrier rant to be theraputic.
There is a real difference between
On one side:-
What we should do, what it is rigth and propper we should do,what it is in our interrests to do….
And
What we can actually affford economically and poitically to do.
That has been at the base of our strategic mess for years.
It’s never been bettrer put that by Mathew Paris in article some years ago. (I summerise)
Is it in our interrests to drive AQ (and other islamic extremists out of afghan and establish a long lasting western style demcocracy, or at least a western tolerent govt:- yes
Are we able to do all the above:-
No
@Jedibeeftrix
I actually see this more as an end-of-empire thing.
One key reason why Malaya and Northern Ireland worked (and perhaps USA in the Phillines) is that everyone knew we were in for the long haul. There was no exit strategy and no need or appetite for one.
As we stand now we have that enduring level of commitment to England, Scotland, Wales, Channel Islands, NI, Falklands. Everywhere else we have to have an exit strategy: for reasons of resources, domestic and interntaional politics.
The point about the Afghan & Iraqi missions is that they have painfully and jerkily adapted COIN doctrine to this new reality. It is now possible to plan a COIN campaign with an exit strategy. It just depends how long it takes to train the local forces. That is effectively where the main effort has to go becuase that is how you limit the extent of your militaty, finacial and political exposure.
I grant absolutely that UK and USA are unlikely to engage in another dusty COIN campaign soon – but I don’t see the doctrine as dead and I don’t see that a better planned, orgainised and executed version with an explict handover and exit strategy from day 1 can’t be sold to the public at some time in future.
Peter Elliot, You theory relies on 1 thing. That is how well the Afghan security forces do post NATO withdrawal. Hopefully they will cope, if however they do not then good luck selling the “we are there to train the local forces” line to anyone. COIN is not dead but it will be seen more a s a last resort rather than a first option for a few years.
@ Gareth – re enduring stabilisation not being dead.
Well it kind of is, as you note, it has become limited stabilisation via Sandhurst in the sand.
Plus, it was never an absolute, the sdsr explicitly retained five identical MRB’s for the purpose of harmony in persistent ops. But it is also a lower scale as a result of its reduced priority.
“Few would argue it doesn’t work and isn’t effective, however, one would be foolish to ignore the issue of public consent, or lack thereof.”
This is an argument oft used. But it can be immediately falsified simply by noting we ARE conducting such an operation in Afghanistan, and that we elected a government on the back of continuing that operation amongst other things. It wasn’t even that big of a deal during the election. People constantly mix up agenda driven media drivel with public opinion and yes whilst plenty of folk will give negative opinions in a gallup poll or some such that has simply not translated into actually giving a shit when push comes to shove.
People realise the difference between Iraq and Afghanistan. Their mental models are more complex than we give joe public credit for on the whole. There is consent for Afghan style operations, if there was not, we simply would have withdrawn earlier like France, like Canada, like the Dutch ad naseum.
“The point about the Afghan & Iraqi missions is that they have painfully and jerkily adapted COIN doctrine to this new reality.”
APPLES and ORANGES.
“as reality becomes harder to ignore.”
Ah the irony! The reality is there has not been one intervention that was worth a damn in the last probably 100 years that has seen a force disappear after a good scrap and everything has stayed rosy afterwards.
Someone draw up balance sheet of long term interventions versus anything approaching the vapid definition of strategic raid and then correlate results. The reality is almost all interventions will last at least several years. And before anyone brings up Libya or Grenada I can bring up Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghan, Iraq (twice), Falklands, Borneo, Malaya, Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Rhodesia, South Africa, Somalia, Japan, Germany, North West Frontier, Northern Ireland, Chad and these are just the ones involving the West.
Reality is not strategic raiding. Wishful thinking might make force structures appropriate to this bollocks, but the chickens will come home to roost I guarantee it.
Which is why I am thankful that our force posture will still include the need to deploy an enduring force. And I foresee this happening and that force having to be made bigger than the SDSR requirements, again…
Here today, gone tomorrow is bollocks.
Pure bollocks.
Strategic raiding is a budget exercise and a masturbatory fantasy for fools.
Phil, Considering both major parties supported Iraq and Afghanistan who were the electorate going to vote for? The current Labour party in opposition would be quick to oppose any ground deployment over next few years as it will be a vote winner.
Out of your list Kosovo and Bosnia were peace keeping/enforcement rather than COIN. Nobody arguing about those Ops. Falklands and Iraq 1 were short conventional campaigns, again in and out although maybe we should have stayed a while longer in Iraq first time round. Korea was a conventional war, Vietnam a disaster. malaya and Borneo good examples of what can be achieved and I would add Oman. Japan and Germany were WW2. Northern Ireland a homeland security problem
The willingness to use suicide bombers and IEDs has changed the rules somewhat and we need to adapt. It is about looking to the future rather than the past. The use of local forces like the AU troops in Somalia or rebels like in Libya allowing minimum Western footprint has to be the model of the future wherever possible.
I for one am not arguing that we should not retain the ability to fight a high intensity ground conflict be that traditional state on state in nature or as an expeditionary assault as a precursor to some sort of enduring COIN op/regime change.
What I would want to know and the public will is that every other possibility has been explored(including simply leaving them to it) before we leave several thousand bodies on the ground in a 6 month rotation with a weekly coffin flights to Brize.
If we want to supply Istar logistics training ect while allowing local infantry to do the most of the patrolling ( has lots of benefits) can someone explain why we’re cutting logistics engineering istar and the like and keeping more infantry.
What about Sierra Leone?
@ Phil – righto:
“This is an argument oft used. But it can be immediately falsified simply by noting we ARE conducting such an operation in Afghanistan, and that we elected a government on the back of continuing that operation amongst other things.”
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0710ch_yougov_survey.pdf
“Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?
The UK should remain a great power, with substantial armed forces and our own seat at the United Nations Security Council as one of the ‘big five’ permanent members: YouGov 49% GB 62%
The UK should accept that it is no longer a great power, cut its defence budget significantly, and in due course give up its seat on the United Nations Security Council: YouGov41% GB 22%
Don’t know: YouGov 10% GB 15%”
“Strategic raiding is a budget exercise and a masturbatory fantasy for fools.”
Lol, another person making the same two mistakes:
1. Forgetting that politicians want to maximize political effect with military action, and that budgets no longer give us the whole menu to select from.
2. Seeing the land/maritime focus as an ideological absolute designed to crush the loser, rather than meet the requirement above.
“Which is why I am thankful that our force posture will still include the need to deploy an enduring force.”
To wit, i give you exhibit one above. Strange that you might believe i don’t hold exactly the same view?
“Considering both major parties supported Iraq and Afghanistan who were the electorate going to vote for?”
If the wasn’t consent one party would have stood for pulling out.
This has happened in several European elections when Afghanistan has been a point of public contention.
The fact there was no schism over Afghanistan proves my point.
“Out of your list Kosovo and Bosnia were peace keeping/enforcement rather than COIN”
They were still enduring operations and SFOR and IFOR saw the deployment of heavy British forces for extended periods of time. Same difference. We had to generate an enduring heavy / medium force.
“Falklands and Iraq 1 were short conventional campaigns”
So we don’t still have a garrison in the Falklands? And we didn’t spend 12 years enforcing a no fly zone and then go back and stay another 7 years on the ground in Iraq then? Iraq 91 goes some way to proving my point that here today, gone tomorrow is bollocks.
“Korea was a conventional war”
That required several rotations of British and Commonwealth units. And there is still a US garrison there.
“Vietnam a disaster”
With hindsight yes. It was still an enduring operation lasting for years that saw a gradual escalation of effort (sound familiar?).
“Japan and Germany were WW2″
So? We smashed them both to bits and still maintained garrisons there as occupying powers for a decade afterwards in both countries.
“Northern Ireland a homeland security problem”
So? Another enduring operation, which was a lot more controversial than Afghan or probably any other operation including Iraq 2003. Nobody blew anyone up over here over Iraq.
“It is about looking to the future rather than the past.”
Every night I go to sleep. Now, perhaps you might argue that that doesn’t mean I will sleep tonight. But, it does doesn’t it because the underlying reason why I sleep every night runs throughout time. The reason interventions are long and messy as reasons that run through time. Nothing has changed.
Blowing yourself up as well as the enemy is nothing new and it hasn’t changed anything. The context of the operations where SIEDs have been used makes the problem different, but the use of these weapons has not changed a thing in the long run. SIEDs are not cross bows or nuclear weapons.
“The use of local forces like the AU troops in Somalia or rebels like in Libya allowing minimum Western footprint has to be the model of the future wherever possible.”
Define minimal? What happens when this minimal footprint starts to get bigger and bigger? This happens more often than not. And before you know it this minimal footprint (Vietnam 1962, Afghan 2001 / 2006) grows and you have a medium enduring operation. And even hanging around a few years with a minimal footprint is still an enduring operation it is hardly a bloody “raid”.
“What I would want to know and the public will is that every other possibility has been explored(including simply leaving them to it) before we leave several thousand bodies on the ground in a 6 month rotation with a weekly coffin flights to Brize.”
I don’t believe that HMG goes to war on a whim. You might disagree with Iraq and Afghan, but both were conducting with broad international support and were several years in the decision making.
The coffin count is a result of the mission being hard to achieve. And people too often these days associate difficulty with we should never have bothered in the first place. A vile attitude and one amplified by the agenda driven media.
Peter
Why is our effort to afghanise the war going to wor better than the USSRs?
Or Vietnamisation?
Phil
Yes Phil, we know, you still believe the army won in iraq and we have some mythical influence there, and you call us deluded…
Mark
Because we have a completely dysfunctional military with no attachment to reality.
See phil for examples, as far as he’s concerned, the UK won iraq and afghanistan and the whole world quakes in fear at the very thought of the americans ferrying us in…
Jedi
I talked about surveys. And it is a very well known validity problem for such surveys that attitudes represented more often than not do not conform to people’s actions. People will present an opinion based on their world view, it doesn’t mean it occupies much of their mental effort or that this opinion translates into action. Decades of research bares this out.
You can ask me if I think EU subsidies to farmers are too high, I could give you an opinion, but it’s not going to be an election issue for me and I’m not going to march on London over it. Sorry but your surveys lack validity it doesn’t rate how important the issue is to the people being asked their opinions.
“1. Forgetting that politicians want to maximize political effect with military action, and that budgets no longer give us the whole menu to select from.
2. Seeing the land/maritime focus as an ideological absolute designed to crush the loser, rather than meet the requirement above.”
Sorry mate I just don’t understand what you are saying here. If you think I think that we must always crush the loser to be succesful in any intervention then you are certainly wrong on that count and I have argued many times on here the exact opposite, that we have become too expectant of decisive victories when they are the exception rather than the rule.
“Strange that you might believe i don’t hold exactly the same view?”
Im questioning your use of surveys to show support for or against things. And I am questioning whether or not Afghan has public support and whether a future similar intervention would.
Otherwise my points are more general.
“Japan and Germany were WW2″
So? We smashed them both to bits and still maintained garrisons there as occupying powers for a decade afterwards in both countries.”
So your point is we need a million strong army?
Because 100,000 men aint occupying diddly squat
Phil, I do not disagree with enduring Ops simply enduring Ops of limited benefit riddled with strategic mistakes that lead to casualties we should not have suffered. I did disagree with Iraq, I disagreed with our dishonest portrayal of the reasons behind the invasion. the fact that we did no planning for the post conflict period and we disbanded the Security apparatus that could have worked for us in order to sell contracts to US private security companies. I appreciate the difference Democracy has made to some people lives and still keep in touch with some of my terps from my 2 Op tours in country.
I agreed with Afghanistan as an article 5 mission but once again we simply failed to have any clear policy and direction once the initial combat phase was over. The decision to seriously train and organise local forces took far too long. The fact that we have allowed the enemy a safe haven in Pakistan due to geo politics and US attitudes has not helped. I must admit my time in Afghanistan was mainly spent in Kabul so am less familiar with the situation on the ground than the corruption of the local Politicians.
As for “the mission being hard to achieve”. if we actually occasionally had a clearly defined mission and end state it would be easier to justify.
@ Phil – “So we don’t still have a garrison in the Falklands? And we didn’t spend 12 years enforcing a no fly zone and then go back and stay another 7 years on the ground in Iraq then? Iraq 91 goes some way to proving my point that here today, gone tomorrow is bollocks.”
Is this purely a problem of language?
I would never argue against an enduring commitment, the examples you list above demonstrate this adequately, as will the post 2014 mentoring and training mission that will happen.
All that i would argue won’t happen is open-ended commitment to controlling theatre level ops with 10,000 british boots for five+ years.
“Sorry mate I just don’t understand what you are saying here. If you think I think that we must always crush the loser to be succesful in any intervention then you are certainly wrong on that count and I have argued many times on here the exact opposite”
Ah, no, there is a misunderstanding, let me expand:
1. Forgetting that politicians want to maximize political effect with military action, and that budgets no longer give us the whole menu to select from. [i.e. keeping 10,000 boots on the ground persistently [and] keeping the assets for interventions such as carriers is not something we can afford on 2.0% of GDP. Obviously a choice has been made.]
2. Seeing the land/maritime focus as an ideological absolute designed to crush the losing [service], rather than meet the requirement above. [i.e. choosing SR demands that HMF becomes the UK Marine Corps / choosing GG demands that we go all Bundeswher and turn the RN into a coastguard]
It is not an either/or choice, it is merely recognition that a ‘balanced’ force may not provide HMG the policy options it wants when it comes to Security Council showboating.
Re: public aquiesence to elective warfare – look across the water, we are becoming more ‘continental’ to our aversion for spilling blood to further the national interest.
Re: overblown expectations for decisive victory – happy to agree, but we are where we are, so politicians had better wield HMF with due care for public sensibilities.
@ Jedibeeftrix
Are you batting for or against “strategic raiding”? I am busy I can’t wade through rhubarb today.
The AU has been effective by being on the ground. And that effectiveness comes from their race or nationality being more welcomed by those on the ground. And the West can help by providing recce, training, and “logitics” as mentioned above.
But where the West can even leverage more is by having the ability to introduce in theatre at will a formation and sustain that formation for a month. Whether is it is from the sea or even from the air.
Recently when I spoke here of having a battle group ready to go from the sea some here questioned it usefulness. I think those individuals don’t quite realise how effective even one all arms groups formed around a single battalion can be against irregular non-governmental forces found in the Third World. Or indeed in a less than war situation whether it be civil unrest or natural disaster.
Perhaps those who think enduring operations like Afghanistan have support amongst the people of the UK should attend a service funeral. There are always wider contexts behind interventions and the greater good. But for most black and white, prima facia is good enough. And perhaps that is forgotten by the political elites. Remember Tony Blair’s sons haven’t been running around Afghanistan……..
“All that i would argue won’t happen is open-ended commitment to controlling theatre level ops with 10,000 british boots for five+ years.”
I argue that we rarely start a mission off on that assumption but that the missions tend to control us rather than we control it. Fine, shit happens, but we’re being blind to the lessons of the past (and I am not arguing for a ruthless deterministic outlook, simply some common sense) if we think that we can avoid the above happening again. Politicians set the context of the intervention, and when they fuck it all up, they set the context of the digging out of a hole phase and that is when Afghanistan’s, Bosnia’s and Iraq’s occur.
Frankly if we bit the bullet from day one on operations we’d be far better off in the long run and by structuring our forces in an overly raiding manner and start to think we can smash the doors in, duff people up and fuck off we’re setting ourselves up for a very big fall indeed.
Is it a problem you can ever solve, probably not as politics will always trump, but the trouble is you lose a lot of capital over the wasted years. 2006-2009 in Afghan were wasted, we got nowhere until NATO bit the bullet and sent in forces with sufficient density to get the job done, but by then we had burned through a lot of good will and capital and by the time we got going properly we were near our withdrawal limits with regard to some opinion makers and the media.
If we had gone into Helmand in 2006 with the forces there in 2010 and the attitude we had then we’d be in a far stronger position now. By buying into this strategic raiding bollocks, we’re further attuning our minds to the 2006 mindset. And no good will come of it.
“Phil, I do not disagree with enduring Ops simply enduring Ops of limited benefit riddled with strategic mistakes that lead to casualties we should not have suffered”
I won’t argue against that. I am merely pointing out that almost every intervention we have conducted in almost a century has been a long slog. Raids and short term contingency operations are very much an exception.
“I agreed with Afghanistan as an article 5 mission but once again we simply failed to have any clear policy and direction once the initial combat phase was over. The decision to seriously train and organise local forces took far too long. The fact that we have allowed the enemy a safe haven in Pakistan due to geo politics and US attitudes has not helped. I must admit my time in Afghanistan was mainly spent in Kabul so am less familiar with the situation on the ground than the corruption of the local Politicians.”
Building capacity through the ANSF was an objective from day one week one.
The safe haven in Pakistan is a big problem, and let’s face it we have to make the calculation, what would be the cost of removing this threat and is it worth it when we can probably achieve a good enough end state without prompting a global war.
“As for “the mission being hard to achieve”. if we actually occasionally had a clearly defined mission and end state it would be easier to justify.”
The mission in Afghan is clear, it is to build capacity to ensure that local forces can prevent AQ or another bad organisation using the place as a camp to strike us. It is just that the means of doing that is a long, hard slog with many set backs and numerous other frictions. C’est la guerre.
Phil, I agree that if you are going to do the job do it properly, rather should we be doing it at all and what is the best way to do it? More consideration in future to alternative means and definitely more pressure on other countries to front up.
“It is not an either/or choice, it is merely recognition that a ‘balanced’ force may not provide HMG the policy options it wants when it comes to Security Council showboating.”
Our policy options have always been limited by allied commitments though when we are talking about state level intervention. We’ve always had (since 18th century) the unenviable position of having global and European interests but not having the strength to assure these interests on our own. I can’t see how a balanced force puts us in a fundamentally different position.
“Re: public aquiesence to elective warfare – look across the water, we are becoming more ‘continental’ to our aversion for spilling blood to further the national interest.”
I don’t agree, I see no evidence for it. I see the media amplifying nonsense and driving their political and social agenda’s but I do not see evidence that a great swathe of public opinion has shifted.
If anything this pathetic resurgence in Falklands posturing shows otherwise.
“If we had gone into Helmand in 2006 with the forces there in 2010 and the attitude we had then we’d be in a far stronger position now. By buying into this strategic raiding bollocks, we’re further attuning our minds to the 2006 mindset. And no good will come of it.”
Bull Shit
Afghanistan was won in three months back in 2001 in a strategic raid
Who went into Hemland in 2006?
Why, your precious army.
Who said they could get the job done with 3000 men?
It wasn’t me.
If that was bollocks, can you provide the list of generals who resigned in protest?
“What will we get for of our blood and treasure in Afghanistan we would not have got by withdrawing in 2006?”
How can I argue against that I can’t prove what would have happened in an alternate time line. But the chances are there would be terrorist groups operating under Taliban support in the south of the country and enjoying the stability and security there to plan further outrages across the world at their leisure.
Afghanistan is an important place, there’s a reason why people keep getting sucked into it. As we all know. Having a broadly friendly government kept in power by a security force maintained with our money is a good thing to have. We just have had to set the conditions to allow that ideal to get off the ground.
In my mind, Afghan is a very old fashioned real politik mission that the Government has moved forward with but has shot themselves in the foot by emphasising the nation building aspects of the strategy.
“Are you batting for or against “strategic raiding”? I am busy I can’t wade through rhubarb today.”
Truly, all i am batting for is the notion that although a choice was necessary* it would only result in a shift in emphasis rather than total transformation of capability**.
* how does HMG buy its influence in geopolitics:
a – sustain two brigades in the field with divisional control
b – brigade level rapid reaction with supporting assets like carriers
because we can’t have both on 2.0% of GDP
** i.e. despite choosing:
a – punitive intervention we can still provide brigade level persistant effect
b – theatre stabilisation we could still a high-readiness battalion and destroyers/frigates
I would never argue against keeping the ability to persistently sustain force in theatre, it would be just as stupid as having a single carrier available part-time, bit i believe limiting it to brigade level is a much better allocation of resources given the other capabilities that be built into the defence budget.
this is why i persist in using the terms (SR and GG) even tho it winds people up, in fact because it winds people up – because the misapprehension that they represent total transformation needs to be broken, brutally!
SR/GG = a shift in emphasis
“because the misapprehension that they represent total transformation needs to be broken, brutally!”
That might seem like a no-brainer to you but it very well may not be to other people. If you shift the mindset to one where people think we can go in and come home as part of some sort of SR doctrine then you are setting the context for a brutal and fatal reality shock.
Using labels that deliberately imply short term interventions (raid is a loaded word) shows that there is a deliberate agenda amongst some with a lot of influence frighteningly enough, in advocating a short term, swift, surgical, punitive intervention which flies in the face of all reality.
It may be a shift in emphasis in objective force generation terms, but it is certainly capable of becoming a mindset because it uses words that deliberately appeal to a sought after type of operation (relatively cheap, easy, little political capital at risk, clean cut, surgical, precise, glorious) that exists almost entirely in myth.
Mark my words, if this “doctrine” if you can call it that gets its claws in we’ll see a marked inclination to conduct such a strategic raid and we’ll reap the whirlwind of another 5-10 year engagement or else watch the place go to hell in a hand basket as we withdraw (retreat?).
Actually, isn’t the examples of “strategic raiding” failing due to the targets not having a coherent government to “teach the lesson” to?
I do know of some cases of strategic raiding that worked, the most prominent that comes to mind is GW1 and China attacking Vietnam to curb it’s westward expansion. The difference between these and GW2/Afganistan is that the attacking forces overdid it, and the government that these were supposed to teach to “toe the line” ended up totally deposed, resulting in the attacking force needing to take the role of “supplier of necessities” (and unfortunately the appearence of “occupiers”).
Sort of like driving a tank through a building only to have the roof drop on you. A bit too much force mayhap? Afganistan, not sure if the Taliban could have been allowed to continue, but Iraq, it could have been avoided.
“I do know of some cases of strategic raiding that worked, the most prominent that comes to mind is GW1″
You should know better!
Another danger of SR is a for more invidious and subtle one.
Its simply in using these neat little turns of phrase which treat war like it is a HR problem to be solved.
It reduces a very messy, chaotic, disgusting, horrendous and terrible affair into something akin to driving forward strategic transformation in a council or something.
In short, it takes away the gravitas of the consequences that result from making a decision that sends blokes off to fight and die.
War is not HR. The MoD is not the BBC. Language is very powerful, we debase the whole concept of war by using neat, fashionable statements, and the result is we risk despite everything, lowering the threshold for launching an operation.
“Mark
Because we have a completely dysfunctional military with no attachment to reality.
See phil for examples, as far as he’s concerned, the UK won iraq and afghanistan and the whole world quakes in fear at the very thought of the americans ferrying us in”
You’re such an offensive little man. Detached from reality? Says you from your computer. Why don’t you leave the debates to people who have some facts rather than your lame political sound bites. I’ve told you before to save them for the council chamber.
Field Marshall Phil strikes again
He cant explain the UKs stunning lack of gain in world influence after his precious armies victories in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But he can say anyone who hasnt worn green for 6 months in afghanistan cant comment.
Chaps, can we wind it down a bit?
Don’t worry I won’t be replying he brings out the worst in me. That and he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. Out.
“If you shift the mindset to one where people think we can go in and come home as part of some sort of SR doctrine then you are setting the context for a brutal and fatal reality shock.”
Honestly Phil, I recognise the potential problem you describe, but:
Language – it is a handy way to communicate ideas.
The choice we needed to make (IMO) was an idea that needed articulating.
RUSI achieved this for us in a useful timeframe (i.e. before the SDSR).
I would argue that evidence suggests the premise of the idea; the choice, was accepted by the SDSR process.
Thus, RUSI successfully achieved its purpose.
That such terminology ‘might’ be abused or misunderstood is not sufficient justification for me to engage in double-speak, by pretending ‘nasty’ words don’t exist. By extension, i refuse to let people pretend to themselves that such a choice doesn’t exist by dint of refusing to hear the words “SR/GG/Contrib”.
I fully accept that such terms are ‘lite’, and that proper discussion of the merits and pitfalls were being discussed long before RUSI coined such soundbite friendly terminology, and their deep consideration of the issues go well beyond the simplified pre-packaged messages spun out in the FDR document. However, by definition that sophisticated internal debate excluded the wider public, even the wider military for the matter.
RUSI changed that. For the better (IMO).
“Language – it is a handy way to communicate ideas.”
Well quite, but its not a neutral thing either.
I could call it the Home For Christmas Strategy (HOFOCS) and obviously that invokes a very different set of thoughts.
“The choice we needed to make (IMO) was an idea that needed articulating.”
Why? Why does organising a balanced force with an enduring operations element, some rapid contingency elements and a one off large effort capability need articulating in the context of Strategic Raiding? The phrase doesn’t even make any sense, it muddies well known and accepted definitions of what strategic means (in a military sense) and what raid means (in a military sense).
The thoughts etc were already there. Strategic Raiding is marketing and its “hello look at me, please notice me” from the authors. It’s about creating a stir more than anything. They have deliberately juxtoposed two words to show how out the box they are.
Well they’re not, they haven’t discovered some hirtherto unknown law of armed operations. All they’ve done is invent a snazzy phrase that muddies the conceptual water and which debases the subject matter at hand. They have not discovered or articulated anything new or anything that has not already been thought of except in non snazzy terms.
It’s packaging, its polystyrene. It’s marketing. And although that annoys me enough, the fact that it deliberately sounds attractive: the idea of having “strategic” effects (in a HR sense rather than a military sense) in a short time-scale is an attractive proposition, makes intervention more likely rather than less likely in my mind and when it occurs you watch SR turn into Strategic Slog.
We consistently fail to get into these things with our eyes open. Calling something SR is wool over our eyes. We will be repeating the mistakes of the past, again. Except this time at least it will have a snazzy name that one can write in CAPITALs.
I submit that the articles below demonstrate what TD has referred to as “…active engagement with the problem”. They describe the exploitation of mobile sovereign territory, trained personnel possessing an impressive range of skills and capabilities, together with a plethora of other resources, all applied as a significant force for good whenever and wherever required around the globe. This sort of activity, quietly conducted by RN and RFA vessels throughout the year, not only exemplifies the projection of soft power / defence diplomacy but is also a manifestation of hard power, discreet but instantly available should the situation require.
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/regional/artikel.php?ID=241231
http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/news/local/hms-dauntless-brings-trade-charity-and-golf-on-visit-to-sierra-leone-1-3912313
Evidence of success is often intangible and invisible to those who have not experienced it personally during bilateral operations / exercises including cross-training at sea and peripheral humanitarian work, training activities and social events ashore. Such ignorance not only applies to the GBP but also to members of the more static ‘barrack-based’ services who are, perhaps, less accustomed to mixing with foreign ‘movers and shakers’ such as government ministers, civic leaders, senior military personnel and influential businessman at typical flight deck cocktail parties or reciprocal receptions.
Call this ‘constructive strategic raiding’ if you will but if there are any more telling examples of such benefits routinely derived for such a minimal service footprint in the promotion of our interests and those of our allies, I’d be interested to hear of them.
“Why does organising a balanced force with an enduring operations element, some rapid contingency elements and a one off large effort capability need articulating in the context of Strategic Raiding?”
I misspoke, the SDSR vision is most definitely not a SR one as envisaged by the bloke who described it.
@ Phil – “Why does organising a balanced force with an enduring operations element, some rapid contingency elements and a one off large effort capability need articulating in the context of Strategic Raiding?”
Because the choice we were facing pre-SDSR was one that might have gone in the direction of sustaining our ability to earn Framework Nation Status with a ~15% commitment, thus earning command input via the 2IC slot.
HMG gets to swing its big military willy to achieve political effect.
Old Max certainly felt this was the best way forward:
http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/5704518/part_3/the-tory-defence-policy-will-be-simple-cut-brutally.thtml
“My own strongly held view, shared by some much cleverer people on both sides of the Atlantic, is that the only credible way forward is to undertake a drastic restructuring, which explicitly prioritises ground forces. We should plump for a properly funded fighting army with appropriate support, including helicopters and transport aircraft, and a big commitment to unmanned drones. In a rational world the RAF, already smaller than the US Marine Corps’s organic air wing, would be integrated with the army.”
So what you call a balanced force above, i call a force that was designed to achieve punitive interventions as well as limited stabilisation, i.e. something resembling SR rather than Max’s GG.
@Phil
Why was GW1 “enduring ops”? Sure, there were some units left behind as stiffeners, but by and large, the Kuwaitis policed themselves. It was only after someone wanted Round 2 and went into Iraq that the “Coalition” ended up entangled in COIN.
And why would “strategic raiding” be muddled? Strategic in terms of effect on large scale theatres and raiding as in hit and run. Which I submited as an example, the raid by China on North Vietnam to dissuade them from advancing past Cambodia into Thailand. Hit and extract? Check-raiding. Strategic? Check-stopped an advance into a country 2 borders away. What was wrong with the definition?
The problem is not “Strategic raiding”, it was with the targets and the anticipated effect, someone totally screwed up in trying to match the goal of “strategic raiding”- persuading a government by punishment and force, to the end effect-regime change. Hard to “teach a lesson” when you get rid of the person you taught a lesson to in the next minute.
The trouble is you are constraining real world events in a straitjacket of words.
What is limited stabilisation? Where are the boundaries to the concept? What happens when limited becomes more than limited, when events, as they are want to do, carry us away? What about the “enemy” and their say in what is or what is not limited? Same with punitive intervention, what is it, when does it not become so?
You decide broadly what the armed forces are to do in the most general sense, you then give them a pool of balanced resources so open your options and then decide if the task is likely to be achievable given the resources available and if it worth doing.
Everything else is putting the cart before the horse, structuring the armed forces to take up quite specific tasks that really have no meaning outside of a policy document or without hindsight.
Once you’re in, you’re in and you need to be prepared to go the whole hog. Countless interventions have taught us this. The Cheshire Regiment in 1992 turned into IFOR, SFOR a bombing campaign and then KFOR rocked up with another bombing campaign and very nearly a general ground campaign.
You’ve either got it, or you don’t.
If you don’t, don’t go near it.
If you still have to, wait and build up and then go do it.
Don’t go do it thinking we’re only here for a limited purpose because events and the enemy will not allow that to happen. It’s basics in my mind.
SR does exactly the same, places a limitless and dynamic real world into nice little conceptually pleasing straitjackets.
It’s why I think its bollocks. Amongst other reasons I have mentioned regarding the agenda behind it and the marketing bollocks that gives it its sheen.
“the African Union, supported by a range of capabilities from Western nations has just got on with the job and is now achieving good results.”
Indeed, having ships around off the coast helps but its the ground and the people that really produces results.
As often the case, the quiet successes are always neglected by the media, perhaps better that way, but tentative is a good word to use for this.
The AU have been doing pretty well given their equipment and training, secondline/niche skills involvement would be more agreeable for us post Afghan when it comes to something like this (with any escalation equaling the situation), but we need to prevent mission creep… no dithering.
“Pick a local partner to provide light infantry, we provide the rest.”
I agree with Dom on that, wonder how Afghan would have been like with Pakistan and neigbours involved… probably just as much as a fubar :/
“Why was GW1 “enduring ops”?”
Because we enforced a no fly zone for 12 years, then invaded, and then got stuck into a horrible campaign on the ground for 7 years all with the same underlying reason behind it. What was the grand strategic effect? We destroyed a ground army but that made little difference to the actual problem.
More than happy to drop ‘strategic’ from the raiding.
How about long term tactical raiding.
Anything to put an end to the Phil like fantasy of British armies(shiped, logistically supported and part paid for by the spams)* engaging in long term 5-10 year cluster fucks like afghan and Iraq.
(I was getiing thrown out of pubs for starting fights with Jnr officers over the stupidity of letting AQ of the hook in 2003 by saying we had beaten them and could now deal with Iraq).
* Encyclopedia Ixonius:-
Long term coin opperation: Verb
Def:- How the hell do we get out of this without looking like we screwd up and got our butts kicked.
Equipment,traing and mentoring of local forces,to take over when we leave: Verb
Def:- A bunch of corrupt thugs, who we can train which end of a gun the bullet comes out of and can be trusted not to turn on each other, or us IF THERE IS ANYBODY WATCHING! long enough for us to declaare victory pack up and fuck off.
(see vietamisation)
I’m almost glad that I don’t have much to bring to the strategic raiding vs enduring operations debate. At least it means I won’t glue myself to the computer and spend hours getting worked up arguing!
The Grand Strategic Effect of GW1 was that we stopped Iraq being a threat to its neighbours and regional stability. We then invented WMDs and AQ links as an excuse for someone to finish his Daddies work. AQ made an appearance in Iraq when we handily provided tens of thousands of western targets.
“I’m almost glad that I don’t have much to bring to the strategic raiding vs enduring operations debate. At least it means I won’t glue myself to the computer and spend hours getting worked up arguing!”
Smart guy. Wish I had the brains to do that…
“At least it means I won’t glue myself to the computer”
I wish. It’s off now to watch Snow white and the hunter or whatever with the Mrs. Payback for dragging her to Prometheus.