To kick off this mini series a piece from Defence Synergia…
Defence Synergia (DS) is determined to try and identify the incumbent government’s strategy and deduce from that national defence and security operational requirements.
Before Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 (SDSR), we recognised that the Ministry of Defence was woefully underfunded for the programmes of all three services which were, in any case, operating in a strategic vacuum; Afghanistan was mesmerising everyone. With a fresh government, the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC), the generation of a National Security Strategy (NSS), the reports commissioned by Dr Fox to improve, radically, Ministry of Defence (MOD) procedures and the imminent SDSR promised much in spite of the severe economic situation. There was a chance that a clear set of intentions might emerge.
Admittedly, the timescale for SDSR production was extremely truncated but the inputs to it still smacked of short term partisanship so, the review seemed to focus on immediate operations (things already well known that should have been planned for some years since) and, otherwise, took a panglossian view of the medium and short term. These errors became exposed very swiftly with our involvement in the Libyan conflict when the risks and rewards of providing the required air superiority, most cost effectively, were called into question. Since SDSR, DS has written or sponsored a number of papers which either support particular aspects of the SDSR or highlight the incoherence within it. We agree, for example, that to go ahead with the Trident replacement system is a statement that we stand “inter pares” with western democracies prepared to deter rogue states but we decry the confused thinking that has led to an ill advised decision that means the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force will not meet their full operational requirements for “state of the art” fast jets.
We believe that Defence is the action arm of Foreign Policy (FP) and that the government is doing FP on the hoof according to prevailing circumstances.
That’s a plan not a strategy.
We need a strategy that allows all departments of State to discern, easily, their own plans. We call this a Grand Strategy (GS). Because there isn’t a GS we don’t have joined up and properly scoped FP, which in turn means we don’t have a well thought out Defence Policy (DefPol). Without a meaningful DefPol, MOD doesn’t know what military power is required or how to equip for national risks. Hence, the Services guess the best they can with Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) not knowing what to buy and industry not being told, accurately, what to deliver.
We deduce from all that has been written and said by the government that the emphasis has got to lie within a “Maritime Strategy” rather than a “Continental Strategy” which, incidentally, the United Kingdom has never been very good at nor truly aspired to and does not chime with present declared intentions for defending the nation. In military terms this means moving away from what might generally be called “standing armies” to flexible, rapidly deployable troops well able to operate autonomously in many and, quite often, distant parts of the world. For this, autonomous air-cover and maritime and air logistical support are vital. More generally, cyber warfare protection, policing and other emergency services need a strategy from which to derive their plans too.
In a very real sense the current situation is a metaphor for the incoherence that stems from a lack of Grand Strategy to steer almost all aspects of government policy and to establish clear directives for security and defence of the realm. This brings us on to the central feature of our argument which is, that a lack of Grand Strategy is clearly demonstrated in the case of the RN and RAF in the reversal of the aircraft carrier fit from Catapults and Arrester Gear to Short Take Off and Vertical Landing?
This one change, seeming so trivial yet applauded in cost saving terms by many, undermines FP, severely reduces our ability to operate effectively with allies at the strategic level and leaves the nation vulnerable because we will be very limited in acting alone whilst retaining little leverage when reliant on others - most importantly the United States of America and key allies in NATO and the European Union.
Contents
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY – FLAWS IN THE MACHINE
It is probably true to say that modern warfare doctrine is less concerned with traditional designations such as, Fleet, Corps, Division, Squadron – terms that may be misleading so much as with overmatching
the enemy’s professional and technical capability in any given strategic or tactical environment. This is not to say that superior numbers are now unnecessary – when facing a peer competitor a combination of superior numbers and capability can be crucial – only that in actual engagements against second tier opponents superior training, utility and capability have been shown to be war winning factors.
However, the National Security Strategy (NSS) has tended towards the view that reducing personnel numbers in HM Armed Forces is justified by 21st century circumstances and this is worrying, not least because, at the same time, platforms, capability and technological advantages are being relegated or lost. It is true that Global Strategic Trends (GST) analyses indicate that the danger of major state on state warfare is receding but it also postulates that threats to resources along the Littoral and sea lines of communication (SLOC) risk domestic security whilst counter insurgency (COIN) operations and asymmetric warfare leading to long term peace-keeping commitments overseas are more likely.
Because COIN operations are often conducted in the face of a belligerent local population inhabiting urban sprawl over a geographically large area a lack of ‘boots on the ground’ (especially special forces SF) and supporting technology can be a ‘show stopper’. So, it can be argued, that personnel numbers (mainly ground) prove the greatest challenge in COIN operations and that a small personnel base may restrict the ability of SF to select suitable candidates. Hence, the army order of battle (ORBAT) should not only provide suitably sized forces for COIN operations but also be balanced to aid regeneration of infantry, artillery and armoured forces (within reasonable warning time frames) to meet state-on-state general war conditions – albeit this is not as clear cut for the RN/RAF that often require years of warning time to procure weapons platforms and to train some personnel to combat ready status.
Therefore, contrary to NSS plans for Future Force 2020 (FF20), the size, balance and capabilities of HM Armed Forces may require revisiting. For example, future combat operations for all 3 services will be heavily dependent upon tactical information systems and open systems architecture that is able to interlink with (and permit) data and control transfer between national and allied forces.
However, systems upgrades such as Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) that offer force multiplier effects as well as improved defence and survivability for the fleet and upgrades to RAF E3D communications suites for international interoperability are being cancelled or delayed by MOD.
FUTURE FORCE 2020 AND THE NSS – A MARITIME CENTRIC STRATEGY IGNORED
The analysis by HM Government – articulated in the NSS – points towards an internationalised foreign policy that calls for a ‘maritime centric’ leaning defence strategy. To that end expeditionary capable ground forces, aircraft carriers, fixed-wing-air-power and highly capable surface and sub-surface vessels to support an indigenous amphibious capability are a central focus of the NSS. However, the NSS offers little by way of explanation as to what naval and air elements should be dedicated to this implied ‘maritime centric’ strategy. Indeed, counter intuitively, the Defence Planning Assumptions (DPA) appear to have been weighted towards scenarios for the use of land forces with the naval and air requirements being referred to in rather nebulous terms such as :“…with air and maritime support”.
Nevertheless, the SDSR 2010 advised on reductions in the size of HM Forces – RN to 30,000 (including 8000 RM); RAF to 33,000; British Army to 82,000 (with 30,000 TA). These NSS assumptions, which are arguably very limiting, were broadly as follows:
1. The British Forces should be configured to conduct 2 concurrent battle group and one brigade size operation/s (the latter based on a single Multi-Role Brigade (MRB) of up to 6500 troops) – one of which could be long term with little or no war fighting but with increased exposure to humanitarian intervention and aid – with ‘appropriate maritime and air support’.
2. Or, HM Armed Forces to be capable of conducting a divisional size one-off operation of up to 30,000 personnel inclusive of ‘supporting sea and air power’ but limited to 6 months of active operations probably in concert with allies.
MARITIME CENTRIC STRATEGY AND CAPABILTY GAPS
Put simply a ‘maritime centric’ strategy (based on the emerging air/sea battle concept) requires integrated naval, air and ground forces. These must be capable of providing effective support for the nuclear deterrent; Littoral, SLOC and Blue Water maritime operations [the latter to ensure anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) can be countered]; expeditionary defence for UK dependent territories and allies and defence of the UK homeland.
The nuclear deterrent task continues but is at risk because of the lack of LRMPA and the potential overtasking of naval escort assets. Beyond the deterrent, other tasks are at risk where concurrency is required because one carrier, one landing platform, 7 submarines, 13 frigates, 6 destroyers and 15 MCMV cannot be in several places at one time (some will be laid-up for maintenance) and the RAF cannot make-up the shortfall because of the total lack of LRMPA and limited Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), air transport (AT) and air to air refuelling (AAR) capacity and Access, Basing and Overflight (ABO) uncertainties. To make things worse, all tasks are at risk if UK forces cannot operate in an Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) environment enabled by integrated joint and multinational open system architecture with interoperable tactical information systems which provide our principle strategic capital assets (the aircraft carriers) with the ability to operate and survive in a high threat environment.
Although FF20 ‘Ground Forces’ will operate with 40% fewer tanks (Challenger), 35% fewer long range guns (AS90) and reduced regular Combat Service Support (CSS) these can be augmented through the use of reserve forces. Therefore, unlike the RN and RAF, the army, with a proposed strength of 82,000 regulars, 30,000 reserves and a revised equipment plan may be able to meet its DPA obligations – with one possible major exception. The Army’s principal problem is not so much its own ORBAT (provided it does not reduce further) but the RN and RAF FF20 capability, which, in operational enabler terms, may not be able to guarantee safe delivery or combat support in accordance with joint expeditionary warfare or emerging air/sea battle doctrine.
As there are known capability gaps (risks in MOD parlance) in current carrier, fixed-wing-carrier-air, LRMPA, air and sea transport, AAR and AWACS the expeditionary nature of the NSS assumptions are at major risk – in some circumstance possibly unworkable. Whilst some of these deficiencies are being addressed in the medium term through the new build QE Class carrier programme and its air component there are no current plans to implement ‘Project Eagle’ to upgrade the RAF E3D to US/NATO standard open system architecture; no plans to replace LRMPA ; no plans beyond those already announced in the A330-200 PFI contract to provide more AAR capability (only 12 of the 14 aircraft will be AAR) and no plans to increase the number of RN escorts.
Yet, counter intuitively, despite opting for the arguably less capable short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the F35, the MOD has cancelled CEC for the RN escort fleet and has not proceeded with open system architecture upgrade (Project Eagle) for the RAF E3D AWACS fleet. The army in particular will lose a useful and successful tactical asset when the Sentinel R1 airborne-stand-off-radar (ASTOR) is retired post 2014.
Therefore, if it is a possibility that the RN and RAF, within current limited capability, would be unable to guarantee protected transit or effective combat support for an expeditionary force, then parliament must surely ask why?
Indeed, parliament may wish to know from MOD the logic of having an implied ’maritime centric’ expeditionary posture, if command of the global commons through effective air and sea combat support, transport and IT enabled force protection is being neglected?
In such circumstances is it not right to ask Her Majesty’s Government if the the overarching strategy, including the NSS assumptions, may be fatally flawed?
To go back to the introduction: Without a UK Grand Strategy foreign policy cannot be coherently formed. Without a coherent foreign policy defence policy is rudderless and British diplomacy, industry and the MOD are largely hamstrung – the whole machinery of national government tending towards reaction rather than proactive planning.
Which is why DefenceSynergia has been pushing for a public debate on UK Grand Strategy – what in the USA is being referred to by Admiral Mullen as a ‘Global Strategic Narrative’ – to unlock the minds within our own government.
“This brings us on to the central feature of our argument which is, that a lack of Grand Strategy is clearly demonstrated in the case of the RN and RAF in the reversal of the aircraft carrier fit from Catapults and Arrester Gear to Short Take Off and Vertical Landing?
This one change, seeming so trivial yet applauded in cost saving terms by many, undermines FP, severely reduces our ability to operate effectively with allies at the strategic level and leaves the nation vulnerable because we will be very limited in acting alone whilst retaining little leverage when reliant on others – most importantly the United States of America and key allies in NATO and the European Union.”
– Who’d have thought just changing C to B F-35 would leave the nation vulnerable? (I can’t do that face thing where the eyes roll).
I love the use of “implied Maritime Centric strategy” as well, or in other words, ‘we just put that in there because it fits an argument we’re trying to make’.
“We deduce from all that has been written and said by the government that the emphasis has got to lie within a “Maritime Strategy” rather than a “Continental Strategy””
I believe you are correct, and your later point about the incoherence of the above remind me of the words of Lindley-French to the Defence Select Committee:
“There is a very great danger that by default, if we hold our nerve, we could end up with quite a sound defence strategy. There will be two carriers, strategic mobility, Astutes-not enough, but in time you could build more over 20, 30 or 40 years-Type 45s and Type 26s. It is a concept whereby there is projectability, not globally but regionally-plus. We could actually have a defence strategy worth talking about, by muddling through and from the bottom up, which has nothing to do with the NSS or the SDSR. The issue is, can we hold our nerve over that longer investment period?”
On the matter of F35b, all i can conclude is that the current budget will not have paid for two carriers with cats-n-traps without bringing some other capability under a useful minimum.
We’ll have to lump it. We’ll manage.
The previous 2 comments by Chris and Jedi sum up my opinion as well, the budget wouldn’t call for the C as well as it would the B.
“Therefore, if it is a possibility that the RN and RAF, within current limited capability, would be unable to guarantee protected transit or effective combat support for an expeditionary force, then parliament must surely ask why?”
The answer is very simple, there’s no funds nor political will, and if there is, its locked in other programes or is miss-spent due to changes in design (how earlier would CVF be in service if we stayed with the original plan?)/requirement (alla TSR.2) and political interfereance…by both politicians and Admirals et al…
I do think in a limited sense both the dark and light blue can do what you ask…very well, the question you should ask is for how long can we sustain it? And with our heavy lift/transport air and sea fleets in a jumbles, I dont think we can last for long on our own, just look at how the French C de G had severe supply issues in Libya, even with USN C2 help, and that was only in their backyard Medd.
I dunno, need to re-read it…its more sensible than the previous ‘synergia’ post, but still is a little jumbled.
Is this another strategy that puts the acquisition of shiny news toys at the front and works everything back from there?
But the government does have a Grand Strategy.
It is the overall driving political and economic imperitive behind the whole coalition. It is to ensure UK security by rebuilding our solvency. Bringing the finances of UK plc under control and protecting our repuation in international markets will, in time, give us the financial muscle to sustain investement in defence equipment and personnel.
“nervos belli, pecumiam”
As Cicero rightly said. Get that right and the actual choices over what to buy and how to use it will become worth bickering about.
A good point from Mr Elliot – although I think an argument can be made that a part of a balanced strategy to rebuild the national finances might reasonably include direct investment in high tech manufacturing industries located in the most depressed parts of our sadly divided country – rebuilding the Navy, and re-equipping the Army and the RAF could do the job nicely given a Government capable of seeing the world beyond Westminster, the Square Mile, the next media opportunity and next Friday’s “Country Supper”!
I do agree that the SDSR had not only an expeditionary posture but also “an implied maritime leaning”.
- would that latter have been because of a certain Dr. Fox?
I also agree with inconsistency showing in the concrete (money-saving choices)
- however, the leading-in article has been written with a very definitive glass-half-empty spin
“Yet, counter intuitively, despite opting for the arguably less capable short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the F35 [1], the MOD has cancelled CEC [2] for the RN escort fleet and has not proceeded with open system architecture upgrade (Project Eagle)[3] for the RAF E3D AWACS fleet. The army in particular will lose a useful and successful tactical asset when the Sentinel R1 airborne-stand-off-radar (ASTOR)[4] is retired post 2014.”
- where is the cutting of amphib lift?
- RE [1], no big deal, and cutting three years from the wait to ISD should be a bonus?
- RE [2], agreed, a bad decision. The £45m already spent should have been followed up with at least two T45s getting an installation, purely for interoperability of an escort force (with USN) for the carriers/ amphibs, and later roll-out to T26s… we’ll only have them, whatever the number tops at, in the mid 30s’!
- RE [3], didn’t the Libya Op once again show a great degree of interoperability? EAGLE is more about the birds becoming independent command centers and relying less on relay to ground; I am happy with that budget prioritisation
- RE [4], I would bet on a reversal of the decision, and as for numbers to deliver that type of capability, the podded solutions are coming up strong
There is no strategy. There is waffle. Vested interests. Populism. Inter-service rivalry. Cash cow milking. And a mañana, kick it down the road, mindset.
I’m actually rather impressed with Hammond. Seems a cut above most of the professional political class. Able to think for himself and not frightened to take evidence based decisions and then see them through the political shit-storm that follows.
Trouble is we are still reaping the consquences of the previous decade of poor mangament (accurately described below). Hammond’s legacy at the MoD can only be assessed by how things will look in SDSR2015.
“There is no strategy. There is waffle. Vested interests. Populism. Inter-service rivalry. Cash cow milking. And a mañana, kick it down the road, mindset.”
@ ACC – “I do agree that the SDSR had not only an expeditionary posture but also an implied maritime leaning. would that latter have been because of a certain Dr. Fox?”
I would be willing to bet that his preferences did help push it in that direction, and thank god, for there certainly appeared to be max’s buddies pudhing for a ‘continental’ strategy:
“My own strongly held view, shared by some much cleverer people on both sides of the Atlantic, is that the only credible way forward is to undertake a drastic restructuring, which explicitly prioritises ground forces. We should plump for a properly funded fighting army with appropriate support, including helicopters and transport aircraft, and a big commitment to unmanned drones. In a rational world the RAF, already smaller than the US Marine Corps’s organic air wing, would be integrated with the army.”
http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/5704518/part_3/the-tory-defence-policy-will-be-simple-cut-brutally.thtml
An Armed Forces capable only of strategic power-projection in a manner:
1. that the public won’t tolerate, so not terribly strategic.
2. and when it matches the priorities of the US for we need their support, so not very sovereign.
The very worst kind of power projection; tokenistic but costing blood and treasure while failing to measurably advance the geopolitical ambitions of HMG.
Obama’s British Gurkha Reserve was never a sensible outcome to aspire to.
Hi PE,
Yes, first impressions, concur “rather impressed with Hammond. Seems a cut above most of the professional political class. Able to think for himself and not frightened to take evidence based decisions ”
- as for the 2015 SDSR… so many things to decide right after (if the election is won); and none (should it go the other way). Sound familiar?
I did like the “evidence-based decisions”; but then part of the evidence is the strategy to derive it from (the PM should be the “quarter back” – rather than the slight bending done by the Rugby SecDef once the ball has been thrown already)
Hi jedi,
The Spectator came out as “page not found” so I respond at my peril (for the detail coming back to bite me):
Yes. I have very high respect for Max H. but I think here I would have to go with you, in the way you pointed out.
This “measurably advance the geopolitical ambitions of HMG” would be a very good measure, indeed. At the same time I have to write off your finishing sentence as hyperbole (overshooting the point you made well).
Sorry their grand strategy seems nothing like the sort. A grand strategy in my mind is one that embraces all policy areas since they all affect our security. Peter Elliot is more right than DS are and funnily enough it’s a view we can see clearly in official government policy documents and in their actions creating a more cross cutting NSC.
A strategy for defence is a different beast. And frankly the strategy has been promulgated many times but because some people don’t like what they read they pretend it doesn’t count. The strategy is to provide for certain model outputs to facilitate force generation which can then be utilised by the Government as it sees fit. We do not have a fixed focus because the threats are diffuse. So the strategy for defence is to give politicians their toolbox. And that toolbox has to fit in the back of the van like every other policy areas toolbox.
Pete said “Trouble is we are still reaping the consquences of the previous decade of poor mangament (accurately described below). Hammond’s legacy at the MoD can only be assessed by how things will look in SDSR2015.”
No this has been going on since the US dropped the bomb. Western governments have to square the “social” bill against the “defence” bill, fiscal policy, and keeping money in circulation to keep the economy going (consumerism).
What is so bad about maintaining a balanced force capable of a broad range of ‘stuff’?
Hi Phil,
What does this “The strategy is to provide for certain model outputs to facilitate force generation which can then be utilised by the Government as it sees fit” mean?
- perhaps the clue is in the sentence that follows (that I tend to agree with)
ACC. It means the armed forces are there to generate certain capabilities like the one medium brigade capability mentioned in the article.
TD. Because then you cant have the UK Marine Corps.
Some think military kit and military objectives should drive strategy. Utter rubbish. Strategy is set higher up and the military broadly speaking gets the kit and is told what to prepare for. Nobody knows what might happen so the military is striving to maintain a balanced force. Because this is real life there will never be a pure balanced force or a pure defence strategy because other factors like the economy and politics compromise it.
So if something happens the Armed Forces are there to offer their toolkit and Dave can pick what he decides upon. Actually writing a grand strategy is impossible except in the very broadest of terms since there are too many dynamic policy areas. It wouldn’t be worth the paper it was written on and a thousand civil servants would be on version 7556675784 by now.
@ AAC – “Yes. I have very high respect for Max H. but I think here I would have to go with you, in the way you pointed out.”
As do I, but we all have our preferences even if his are wrong.
Apologies about the link, yes, it no longer works tho a google search will turn up numerous references to the original article.
As to the hyperbole, it was mainly to amuse X since he coined the term.
Sorry Phil but I disagree. Surely simply maintaining a “balance force” and hoping we can cope with whatever arrives is simply “muddling along”. HMG needs to decide what it is we want to be able to do. For instance, secure UK airspace, lower the budget deficit, secure fuel supplies, act in Defence of UK overseas territories, intervene in place X with Y force for Z weeks either on our own or with our allies. Just a few examples. We also need to draw a few lines in red pen and say, we will not do these as they are neither crucial or within our budget.
Once we have done this we look at the best way to achieve them. These may not always even be a purely military option.
It could be that we still arrive where we are now but at least we will have done so for the correct reasons.
@ Admin – “What is so bad about maintaining a balanced force capable of a broad range of ‘stuff’?”
Because this balanced force would not remain sufficiently sovereign and sufficiently strategic to measurably advance the geopolitical ambitions of HMG. Focus. It is needed when surviving on 2.0% of GDP and marginal medium term growth prospects.
The world will not allow us focus. Simple as that. As for sovereignty, it’s a problem we’ve had from day one and it’s one that has and can be managed. The only time we’ve been a military leader is for about a year or two in WWI. So I see no point stripping us of options for a problem that is completely manageable and has been for 500 years. I don’t see why alliances are such a dirty word? They are not perfect but there is no other option. Hoping our problems fit into a certain artificially delineated model is ridiculous.
And APATs the strategy has been defined numerous times. Jedi links to it all the time. It is there, I just think you don’t like the conclusions.
Focus is not achievable in a world of diffuse threats. And I fail to see how focusing on certain options makes us more sovereign? Rubbish. Anything that happened outside the artificial model would require allied help which brings us right back to where we started.
HMG needs a balanced toolbox because the world will give you unprecedented and novel problems all the time.
When does balanced become salami sliced or Swiss cheese?
Phil, The world does indeed bring diffuse threats but not many of them have concern us.
It is infinitely achievable to look at what we actually have to look after and also areas that will simply not present a threat to UK national security in the medium term.
Note I also said that not all solutions would be purely military in nature. For instance increased fuel storage and diversification of supplies may be easier than securing choke points.
Influence in countries achieved easier by aid and small training teams than the ability to role across the border.
Simply saying it is all too difficult and we will simply pick one course from each section of the menu is a cop out which neither makes for peak op efficiency or fiscal prudence.
We need to look at a wider picture and our ability to deliver effects in support of HMG and in coordination with other departments instead of a “toy based must have policy”
I was going to put this in the business amd politics thread but it seems to go well here:
http://nickharveymp.com/en/article/2012/594944/maritime-security-in-the-middle-east-uk-political-will-and-military-capacity
@ Jedi
And amused one was indeed.
Very interesting Gareth. The reference to freedom of the seas stretching back 500 years is slightly disengenuous.
We did not afford Napoleon, the Kaisar or Hitler with free passage through thr Straits of Dover! I would hope if a similar situation ever arose again we would be as quick to impose the strangle-hold again.
“When does balanced become salami sliced or Swiss cheese?”
When does focus become too prescriptive?
Only 12 out of 14 FSTA will be AAR…?
I heard nothing of this.
Isn’t the plan still 9 in service, of which 5 with 3-points refueling capability, and 5 “on-call” and possibly shared with the French if the negotiation on the price conclude successfully…?
“We need to look at a wider picture and our ability to deliver effects in support of HMG and in coordination with other departments instead of a “toy based must have policy””
I completely agree. About the only toys I consider absolutely necessary are the deterrent and the new carriers and their planes. The deterrent because it is an absolute distillation of what are armed forces are for. And CVF because its supposed to last 50 years and who knows what threats we might face where they might come in handy. Anything else I am willing to debate.
“The world does indeed bring diffuse threats but not many of them have concern us.”
I cannot agree with your premise. The concept of interests is just too intangible to be too prescriptive in defending them and you make my argument for me, there are many different ways to accomplish things and so whilst perhaps one aspect of an interest might be at stake we might not be able to defend it in certain manners because our freedom of action is constrained by external forces. What you end up with when you think about it is any number of evolving, dynamic interests themselves within an evolving and dynamic context – you simply cannot be prescriptive. You see a threat, you thank God you have a broadly balanced force which then gives you the greatest options available, some of which will immediately be out of the question.
“It is infinitely achievable to look at what we actually have to look after and also areas that will simply not present a threat to UK national security in the medium term.”
We, and everyone else, have a WOEFUL track record of predicting anything more than a week or so in advance unless we are instigating it. You can certainly make quite broad strategic assumptions because it is quite obvious that certain capabilities don’t exist in our potential threats without re-generating them, but overall, we tend to more often than not receive the phone call that our horse has been found on the middle of the M4 motorway whilst sat on the toilet taking a serene shit with some Sudoku.
X/Phil One becomes Salami and the other prescriptive when either is unable to support HMG Policy which is after all the job of the Armed Forces. The job of the Armed Forces is not to drive HMG Policy.
“The job of the Armed Forces is not to drive HMG Policy.”
I have made it (or so I thought) completely clear that this is what I believe! Hence the need for a balanced force so HMG has the most options. And I have said that external forces mean you can never have a perfect or pure balanced force because life, as they say, get’s in the way.
But I agree, the Armed Forces are a tool of policy as set by our political “leaders”. Which is precisely why I find the whole strategic raiding / maritime school of thought so absurd as it is a blatant means of trying to use the armed forces to influence policy by imposing structural limitations on them in order to fit forces into artificially delineated operational templates when the world and events (dear boy) have no such delineations and are dynamic in nature.
@ Phil said “events (dear boy)”
One of my lecturers at uni’ used to use that as his catchphrase. The trouble was it when over the heads of all the teenagers who just thought it was a bit odd.
Why did you never go for commission?
What amuses me more is the fact that it starts with the premise that we need more navy and then wraps a pseudo strategic argument around that as a means of justifying itself, not convinced and never have been. Plus, it smacks of the defence industry pushing the gullible to buy more toys
“Why did you never go for commission?”
Because I wanted to be at the coal face.
I was going to go for a commission but since coming home from tour my heart hasn’t been in the Army and I have begun the process of hanging up my boots so I can concentrate on my MSc and to try my hand at something else. Maybe in a few years I’ll go back. But 2 tours in 4 years has really screwed up my civilian job and its time to concentrate on something else now for a while until I miss it again.
@PE – it’s not usual to allow free travel for an enemy through your waters (or his if you can enforce a blockade).
@Gareth
I know – slightly tongue in cheek reference.
The point was that enforcing the global rule of law and UN group-hugs is not the only thing we need our armed forces for, even if some people giving lectures like to pretend it is.
I happen to think Cameron is right to encourage the Eurozone to integrate itself further and would be quite happy if in due course we quietly left the political EU and anchored just offshore in a nordic free trade area.
What worries me about it is that the natural end point for the Eurozone really is a Untied States of Europe. We spent the last 500 years trying to prevent any one governement controlling the whole Atlantic coastline. Now it seems likely we will encourage it to happen. I know the Eurpoeans are now all our peace loving allies, but it still makes me slightly queasy just the same.
Bet that’s what the Iranians say.
“…it’s not usual to allow free travel for an enemy through your waters (or his if you can enforce a blockade).”
Phil
Don’t confuse a maritime focused ‘strategy’ with ‘strategic raiding’ as espoused / defined by RUSI as a doctrinal approach as the same thing – they are vastly different.
as to :
“Which is precisely why I find the whole strategic raiding / maritime school of thought so absurd as it is a blatant means of trying to use the armed forces to influence policy by imposing structural limitations on them in order to fit forces into artificially delineated operational templates when the world and events (dear boy) have no such delineations and are dynamic in nature.”
Seriously ? So ten years of a land war in central Asia has not imposed any structural limitations on all 3 branches, and arguably more on one than that other two ? Not to mention those artificially delineated operational templates which were shown to be sadly lacking in flexibility by ” events (dear boy) TM ” in the form of Libya ?
Isn’t this “grand strategy” and general adaptability a little incompatible? Any strategic plans that the recent governments may have had have been undermined by the financial collapse of western banking. Therefore the strategy has to be rebuild the financial wealth of the country (as PE said).
Once we’ve done this we can pick and choose what our long-term goals are (global domination
etc) but in the mean time everything else has to be cheap to own but adaptable… this is hardly a strategy but I think it’s the best we can expect at the mo – this means the SDSR is about par-for-the-course to me.
“Don’t confuse a maritime focused ‘strategy’ with ‘strategic raiding’ as espoused / defined by RUSI as a doctrinal approach as the same thing – they are vastly different.”
Both are bankrupt.
“So ten years of a land war in central Asia has not imposed any structural limitations on all 3 branches, and arguably more on one than that other two ?”
Of course they have. But events dictated the structure, structure did not pretend that it can dictate events. Things in Afghanistan happened precisely the way they should, HMG had a policy aim in Afghan and the services have adapted to it. Agree with the policy aim or implementation or not this is the correct way to work.
“Not to mention those artificially delineated operational templates which were shown to be sadly lacking in flexibility by ” events (dear boy) TM ” in the form of Libya ?”
There was no such artificially delineated operation template in use by the MoD. It has not subscribed to SR or a maritime strategy. So I don’t see how you can use that to falsify my point that a being overly prescriptive is a massive folly.
Balanced is the way forward and this is official policy. Balanced meant we had a toolbag to get to work in Libya with. There could be a similar intervention in a landlocked country for example. Or another Bosnia or Kosovo, or something else entirely.
The world is novel, straight jacketing your armed forces won’t work and it certainly does not make us more sovereign.
Phil, What are the constant references to Sovereign about?
Jedi wrote:
“Because this balanced force would not remain sufficiently sovereign and sufficiently strategic to measurably advance the geopolitical ambitions of HMG.”
Still rebutting that point at the same time.
Phil, My bad, missed that comment. Jed wants focus, you want broad brush and I guess I occupy slightly more middle ground as in wanting more guidance and “left and right limits” with a bit more thought.
When you are looking to take a Ship somewhere that it may not fit, or is extremely Navigationally constrained and perhaps at night, high tidal stream bad weather etc. The first thing a good CO and No do is look at whether.
A. Do we really need to go there?
B. How can we do it differently and mitigate the risk whilst achieving the end result we want or can accept.
What I am getting at is that the Govt need to take a step back when events happen and consider their version of A and B before they reach for that trusty wrench in your tool box.
Going on from a very old comment of mine in the “summer of strategy” thread, our strategy could be (in no particular order)…
1. Securing UK, EU and world financial stability
2. Upholding international laws
3. Rebalancing the disparity of world wealth
4. Undermining powerful and corrupt belief systems
5. Mediating conflict
1 and 3 are mostly financial
2 and 5 are diplomacy and force projection
4 is (hopefully) covert ops and (probably) force projection
These are all the causes of a small list of threats we might face:
1. Terrorism
2. Piracy (trade disruption)
3. Proliferation of restricted goods (narcotics, firearms, uranium, etc)
4. Resource contention/extortion (oil, oil and more oil)
5. Natural disaster
6. Attack/invasion
What say ye?
Excellent article. I personally see the carrier issue as one of affordability. No matter how great the capability on offer, if the affordability is not there, then the capability will be changed. However we look at it, it was a zero sum game – either find the funding to resolve the CTOL variant issues, which would have meant comensurate cuts that would have gutted the strategy elsewhere, or accept the risk and the benefits accrued from running on two carriers albeit with a smaller capability than before.
However we look at strategy, it must be done through the prism of the all constraining eye of Sauron (aka HM Treasury!)
Did someone say ‘global domination’ ?
“Is this another strategy that puts the acquisition of shiny news [sic] toys at the front and works everything back from there?”
“A Strategy Has Ends, Ways, and Means”
Shiny toys or not so shiny troops are the means.
I don’t subscribe to the ‘austerity’ model.
Economics: The military/industrial complex has served the U.S.A. well.
A dozen F35B are just too few in number, too compromised in performance, and therefore too limited in impact.
See missile boats vs ‘do it all’ major surface elements.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/06/is-there-connection-between-your.html
The tool box approach is not effective when you only have a hammer and a box of screws in the box, as your options are too limited.
At least while the mad axe men are in charge.
For the next 10 to 15 years the Government and MoD are going to have to play a game of smoke and mirrors to maintain the appearance that the UK can project military power. The current budget and downsizing together with the need to rest and reorganise the Armed forces means we need a major reduction in our commitments and rain in are willingness to become involved in operations. The Armed Forces have been run at a tempo that has firewalled its capacity for over 2 decades and the very small amount of new kit has gone nowhere near solving issues of worn out kit that is rarely available in sufficient numbers.
The MoD seems to be trying to square the circle and cannot find a way to truely match resources to commitments, and this will continue even if the fabled 1% budget increase actually happens. Yes we will still be able to conduct a major operation by scraping the barrel but this will only increase the time needed to put our Armed FOrces back on their feet.
Given that every penny counts the issue of the Nation Deterent needs to be looked at. This is a political tool and only happens to be manned by the military. It is of no operational value to the Armed Forces and so should not be part of the core defence budget in anyway shape or form. It is a major national asset and so the Treasury should be funding this from other sources and have the backbone to do so as should the MoD in rejecting its inclusion in its budget.
Given that we are for all intents and purposes having to go “Offline” for a significant period of time the Politicans should take advantage of this and come up with a proper joined up plan. The electorate will give them a pass as everybody is more concerned about other issues and so public opinion should have little or no impact on decisions. If the country’s finances improve them plans can accelerate, but for now we need to work around things being as they are and plan accordingly. They same applie sto unforceen events. As I have said any major operation will further hinder the recooperation of the Armed Forces but they will still be able to act. Assuming any operation is under UN authority or in the national interest, then public support should drive an increase in expenditure to fill capability gaps as always by OURs and even hassen specific programmes. We will not be commiting ourselves to “Global Raiding”, but if we elect to partake in a military operation this will be its nature. Persistent operations are going to have to be, by neccessity, off the table.
We need a 21st century outlook on the world. We no longer have an Empire or have the role of global policeman (or woman). Regardless of how large our defence budget is compared to others we cannot afford to be so. Rather we need to be seen as the UNs special forces, used where other members militaries are unable to cope with a given situation. Other nations from developing and even third world are more than capable of providing basic military forces with Somalia a good example.
Our contribution does not have to be strictly combat power though. Providing command and control and/or ISTAR assets as well as logistics would greatly increase the effectiveness of other nations forces as would the provision of training as a matter of routine. In many operations western troops can actually hinder operations as locals see them as colonial interference and can at in a hostile manner to those trying to help them.
The recent announcement of the reorganisation of the army raised a major red flag in my eyes. This was the reduction in CSS and a greater reliance on contractors. In my view this is the exact opposite of what should be happening. Time and time again including the Falklands we were reliant on logistical support from NATO and in particular the US. The downsizing of the Armed Forces should be allowing us to increase the tip to tale ratio of the military, but the MoD is fixated on the tip as always. If FF2020 is to eb effective we need to be able to move and support in house at least a Brigade and the supporting air and sea assets for the required length of time to conclude operations without relying on others. Yes we can take advantage of other nations supply chaions in joint operations but not be reliant on them.
@ Phil
Perhaps it would help if you told us what you think “we” mean by maritime strategy? And then perhaps in future posts and comments we will know from where you are coming.
It would also help in your re-education process.
I sat down to put my pennyworth into this debate, but really I can sum it up by saying I agree with Phil.
If we need to define a grand strategy it will be along the lines of: fixing the public finances, fixing the education system, exporting more, stopping the Euro pests from imposing more on us than we want, being energy independent, the Scots deciding whether they are in or out, and so the list goes on but with few of those issues having a military dimension.
From a military perspective because we are not needing to defend an empire, beat back expansionist Germans, or fight a Cold War, what we do with our forces is in the main, for the time being, driven by choice not by a fear for our existence.
In times gone by ‘sending in the fleet’ or something similar was a way of applying influence. But, frankly, these days more is won and lost in political summit meetings than the military could deliver, and it’s cheaper. The military is essential sometimes, but it is not the main theme.
The notion of maintaining a tool box of adaptable skills and equipment, balanced across all contingencies, able to react in meaningful strength quickly and a plan to scale up if the need requires, to deal with the unexpected, is a reasonable strategy.
I am confused DS talk about strategy in this article but basically do nothing but complain about kit shortages and lack of CATOBAR. Not one ounce of grand strategy in this article. Not unlike evry thing else I have read from DS in the past. CATOBAR is gone for the RN just live with it and move on.