Ones of those amorphous definitions that seems to change depending on your viewpoint is the ‘littoral’
Whilst catching up with a spot of twitter this evening I saw this being re-tweeted
Importance of the littoral : 61% of world’s total Gross National Income comes from within 100 km of the coastline
Why not 200, or 5, or 5?
So, off to Google Map Tools.
Two other definitions
1. A coastal region; a shore.
2. The region or zone between the limits of high and low tides.
So by the Tweet definition, proclaiming 100km as within the littoral, it would seem the residents of Leeds are now in a coastal region.
Is this another example of using dodgy and misleading statistics to reinforce a point of view, clutching at straws in order to desperately make your perspective sound impressive or just a reasonable statement of fact?
We are an island as well you know 
@James
Not in broad daylight where everyone is stood to and the MGs manned and every little dinghy that approaches you can be seen and warned off or alternately filled with holes?
I would think night would give a greater chance of someone coming closer to your ship to do a mischief.
Observer, It is a question of balancing the OPFORS greater difficulty in identifying and targetting you at night vs your greater difficulty in identifying and targetting them. Given modern forces use of NVGs and EOD lots of COs prefer to do it at night.
APATS,
if Gib itself is such a potential problem, then don’t bother and just go balls out in the frigate for 20 miles through the straits themselves. Pull in at Marbella for the cocktail party if the Admiral really wants to put his white mess kit on and for a whole load of whistling action from the Bosun.
The Gibbos don’t really have much of a choice if the Andrew starts by-passing them. Where else are they going to go?
Observer,
radar, and NVGs. Sort of stuff Al-Q speedboat invisibility, or if they don’t then we’ve got a serious problem.
Oddly, last time I was down there (and also offshore), there were lots of noises through the night of “cigarette boats” running illicit fags from Africa to Europe. Probalby also the wacky baccy as well, or worse. There could be a bit on an ROE embuggeration with that.
James, wait a minute? So anywhere that there is a potential threat we just do not go anymore? You see the problem with Marbella is it does not have a Z berth(cleared for Nuclear vessels). It also does not have a massive munitions depot. I never said that Gibraltar was a massive problem but surely mitigating any threat is what we get paid for. MOD armed police routinely escort all vessels in and out of RN dockyards as that is the point of max vulnerability and they are available.
For commercial Ports the threat assessment is looked at and a FP posture agreed. each Ship should will have a document in force detailing the different FP postures in relation to weapons to be manned and ops room manning etc.
The favourite name I have seen was Bulwarks ‘Op Bristle” a plan for max self defence without deploying any assets offship. The 4 LCVPS were kept in their mountings onboard but each rigged 2 50 cal facing outwards for 4 each side. A Javelin team was deployed on Flyco roof aft. The 2 30MMs on the bridge roof were manned. Port and Starboard side both had 4 GPMGs and 3 Mini guns to provide 360 degree coverage.
@APATS
Re: Op Bristle
Now that is what I was talking about.
Personally, I prefer running in daylight, increased reaction time, lots of time to wave off accidental traffic, increased accuracy (depth perception) without NVGs from manned guns, less chance of accidentally running something over.
*And I’m scared of the dark.*
And honestly speaking, better some warship getting hit than a crude carrier. No country needs an oil slick offshore. Unless they can sell it as a tourist attraction?
APATS,
I’m quite intrigued by this nuclear powered frigate that needs a special dock in Marbella. Why didn’t we think of this before?
Not sure what the purpose is of a port visit in Gib anyway. It’s only about 1,000 nm from Pompey, so the tanks are only showing “not quite full” on the dashboard. The Gibbos aren’t going anywhere nor getting less loyal. What’s the problem with making a full speed run through STROG, and bypassing the Genoese bloodsuckers completely, then pulling in to Marbella for a proper party where Kylie will probably turn up?
James, It is traditionally used for Submarines but had I posted that someone would have corrected my terminology. As for visits to Gibraltar, well for starters we do not pay for berths or services there at commercial rates. Often a ship will actually take on ammo in Gib, it serves as a base for the ranges of Gib where a lot of NGS and missile firings occur. Politically it makes statement to the Spanish.
Oghh and most importantly you have to get in a rock race! Best cure for a late night in the Casino is running up the rock at 0730!
I sense some hostility? Did you have a bad time there?
What about buying some of the Flyvefisken class second hand? Would give us a secondary MCM/ASW capability as well if we buy the modules/produce our own?
Edit: Sorry – clicked on a link and was taken to the fourth page rather than the fifth; conversation moved on a bit – was refering to the idea of beefier patrol boats.
APATS,
not really a bad time in Gib, but more an experience of feeling completely fleeced financially. You can’t move in the place without someone trying to charge you money for services at completely rip-off prices.
But that’s all a bit far from my original point, which is a suspicion that the case for “needing” an escort through STROG is over-made, which deepens when you discover that the escort is a poxy little PB. Other solutions are available, ranging from “don’t bother with an escort”, through to “run the STROG at night at ramming speed”.
Plus, I suspect there are easier targets for the Al-Q speedboats, being the several hundred commercial vessels daily that don’t have an escort.
AQ’s 2002 operation was specifically aimed at warships.
FF/DD are fine. It’s amphibs and auxiliaries that are vulnerable.
@James
““strategic” is an adjective applied to “effect”, in the doctrinal definition Britain uses. “Strategy” is a political game. Neither are to do with distance.”
You miss my point. A strategy is a combination of setting goals and resourcing ambitions.
The UK has a goal which is simply to keep an influential power in the world despite being put (by choice) to the periphery of Europe, which itself is being put to the periphery of the world. Clearly, the UK is vastly dependent on influence abroard. Ask BP, Rio Tinto, Shell, HSBC, BAE, Rolls-Royce.
So, what are the remaining cornerstones of influence, apart from purely economical ties, which are dependent on free movement of goods?
One is the seat in the UNSC. We have used this seat at two occasions in the last 11 years to invoke an extended land war, which has lead to decreased reputation. While the air- and naval-campaign against Libya has helped a lot. Before someone wonders what we bring to the FPDA, it is precisely this seat.
The second mainstay is the Commonwealth of Nations, at least if we are farsighted enough to accept this (or what institutional body would fit for Sri Lanka or Burma?). The main weapon here is the DfID. When asked what we could provide in terms of security or military, what would each of these countries choose? Occasional, reassuring warship visits, maybe including an army batallion for two-week execises, or the same batallion delivered by air, or baracks?
So, we speak of strategy fitting into current post-heroic and post-imperial reality.
Btw, ‘littoral’ is a definition made by the US joint chiefs to define the expected future hotspots not only of naval warfare. Look at Irans and North Koreas sea-denial capabilities, and you will find this focus rather vindicated.
McZ
“you will find this focus rather vindicated.”
How so? The latest US LCSs are estimated to be totally unsurvivable in an anti-access area and with the latest Chinese Cap-ship killers, the US has switched to a more “standoff” strategy. They are not “getting into” the litorals, they are conceeding the close range envelope to the defender.
Just a casual check in the last decade would show that most of the media drama involved with the word “litoral” has not been about strategy but about a specific class of ship and many people trying to justify the construction of something over budget, over time and under performing.
Other than Iran, I’ve not heard much on “litoral warfare” involving N.Korea and China, 2 of the 3 “hotspots” on the US radar. So, no. It is not strategy. Just marketting.
I really cannot get my head around LCS, not certain that some really clever but creepy guy has not just invented a need and a solution in the same sentence both of which belong to his company. I would love to see an effects based review where they justified the requirement and the means by which they would fill it in a more operationally beneficial manner than current and other planned assets.
@APATS
Grumman did a “study” claiming that 7 LCS can take over 20 conventional ships in anti-piracy in the Indian Ocean, but I really have my doubts on that study. My guess is they took a fixed amount of space and ran ships through the area to see how many ships it took to “sweep” the area. The LCS of course has the paper advantage, having an obscene theoretical top speed. Unfortunately, pirates don’t work that way, a “fishing boat” when you are passing by might go for different “fish” when you leave. You need persistant surveillance, not just touch and go.
Essentially the LCS is just an under sized Albion with a gun and a higher top speed, plus about $300 million of unnecessary cost.
Having built the first Seaside Combat Ships, the USN is indeed reviewing how they will be operated. The Independence class seems set to become a straight swap for the Perry class frigates – a conventional escort used in lower threat areas, defending supply lines for example, or used as a supplementary escort in the main battle groups. Only, where the Perrys were intended to be a cheap minor frigate from the start, designing the Independence class will have been a massive waste of money – I expect to see the later ships of that class losing some of their unnecessary speed to reduce costs, and perhaps gaining a more permanent mission fit to meet that escort role, rather than swapping out mission modules as envisaged.
Observer, I share you doubts, anti piracy is about a persistent foot print.
Brian, nice
Brian, That would make an LCS a massively expensive less capable OHP. The true test in the mission suite, If that fails they will be scrapped. remember an OHP was designed as an ASW FF
I can’t help noticing the similarities between the Seaside Combat Ship and the Black Swan 2 concepts and the big differences, essentially speed and cost. If the LCS had been designed with a more moderate speed (say 35kts, give or take) it could have been cheaper and have more endurance; a common buy with the USCG might also have been on the table.
El Sid: With you on the Klub-Ks: I’m always mindful of things like that, but this isn’t the forum to discuss such things is it? ‘No one would ever do anything like that would they, lol?’
Observer: Whatever dastardly agendas are being pushed by the self-evidently effective pro-sea power lobby in altering the definition of littoral, I honestly think you’re off track in thinking that the Little Crappy Ship has much to do with it *now* (though might have a while back).
You’ve pointed out yourself a couple of times how utterly unsuited the ship is to effecting much in the littoral (especially with the expanded/evolved definitions), and I think that a fair few folks ‘up there’ have noted this themselves. If it was all about LCS marketing then the definitions would be written really differently.
This is the US Joint (not just USN/USMC) DOD definition:-
“littoral
(DOD) The littoral comprises two segments of operational environment: 1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.
Source: JP 2-01.3.”
Not too LCS-friendly. The definition encompassing the EEZ and ~100km inland is the UK Joint (not just RN/RM) MoD one. This is also not very LCS-friendly, but even if it was, why would it be set up to market a foreign ship that we have no interest in buying (praise the gods!)?
I think that you’re attributing too much influence to some failed programme that only has a sliver of support at the top of one country, which will only keep decreasing as those ‘Transformational’ types get gradually shuffled off, and increasingly scarce money stops getting thrown into black holes. Wouldn’t be too surprised if the whole thing just gets considered to be a test-bed, canned, then radically re-done incorporating ‘lessons learned’ at some point in the near future.
* * *
TD: Can I ask again: Has the BA or RAF gone on record as disagreeing with our newer definition of littoral, distanced themselves from it, and attempted to get it changed? Given that it’s so obviously driven by the fiendish RN lobbyists (and yeah, everybody takes fiery bird and large carnivorous fish bloke *so* seriously – they’re in no way a complete laughing stock that many just simply hate, despise and avoid), then if not, why not?
BTW:-
The aforementioned wankers seem to be increasingly seen as running some kind of false flag scam… I’m certainly coming round to that idea, judging by what happens now whenever anyone tries to sensibly talk about sea power in any way. Best to just boycott them, then get your objectivity back, then this aspect of Defence can be discussed properly in good faith. Angry reactions against them are just playing their game (whether face value or false flag), and you should never do what the enemy wants you to do, which you are;
Imagine when yourself and some of the others here of a similar mind accuse and dismiss folks who want to sensibly discuss aspects of sea power of being PTT followers, what an insult that is when chances are they hate PTT more than you do. Imagine that whenever you mention SIMSS, or anything like that, folks scornfully accused you of being a Lewis Page fanboy (he suggested something similar a while ago [I don't read anything he writes now, or PTT etc]), and laughed you out of town every single time. Then you have to constantly spend more time defensively saying what you’re not saying (‘What, you can’t possibly be comparing me to the likes of Lewis Page, come on fellas… no, I hate Lewis Page honest… no this isn’t really like his proposal, no…’), than what you actually do want to say. See how far you get trying to discuss SIMSS sensibly then;
What we have now is an unprecedented ability to both benefit from the horizon (defensively or in achieving surprise) and overcome its limitations in C4ISTAR, and a huge jump in weapon reach and precision (and helo range/payload etc). This is what’s allowed the definition to evolve naturally, and it’s extremely, extremely Joint. It’s another world from the baby steps of helos in Suez or NGS in WWII, and its time is now (well, and near-future).
In your map above, sitting off Southport, NGS from WWII through the Iowas (*Battleships* with their BFGs) in the early 90s would have involved flattening a few streets in Preston (Bolton would be way out of reach) to take out a single terrorist’s house. Now a *frigate* can precisely take out a terrorist’s house in Leeds with her puny little MCG. That’s just guns on ships. OTH networked Joint forces working in unison, further inland and out to sea, is the real big deal difference… ummm ‘game changer’ *cough*.
It’s a good definition to reflect current reality (and particularly aspiration), even if ships only play a minor part in supporting such a Joint op.
You’ll also note that, despite the new and improved definition being obviously pushed by them cunning and influential RN-lobbyists that are *everywhere*, that they’ve actually pushed a fairly self-defeating definition, where the defence of our littoral (and the littorals of our Dependent Territories) is concerned. The most cost-effective ways of defending them (according to the new definition) extremely obviously sideline the RN, in comparison with the other Forces and agencies, as several of you have pointed out. Since you’re so convinced that there’s a pro-RN agenda, could you explain why they did that?
I’m usually the first to be cynical and paranoid, but I call bullshizzle on there being a pro-RN (or pro-LCS) agenda here.
@tze
It was with the LCS marketting. Unfortunately it seems to have now taken a life of it’s own. This is also helped along by anti-LCS and pro-LCS partisans. The “pros” will wax on and on about how the “litorals” are important, the “cons” will expand the “litoral” definition to show how unsuitable the ship is.
The 100km guy is most likely a “pro” who shot himself in the foot…
Seriously tze, I have not heard “litoral” as a term in more than 20 YEARS. All of a sudden, it’s a fad. And fads don’t start themselves. Someone is to blame.
Hi APATS. RE
“I would love to see an effects based review where they justified the requirement and the means by which they would fill it in a more operationally beneficial manner than current and other planned assets.”
-Rebalancing the Fleet, Proceedings, November 1999, Vice Admiral A. K. Cebrowski, USN, and Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.). It had all the right ingredients… and after that it has gone spectacularly wrong (because of gold plating?)
- The New Navy fighting Machine (GoogleDoc) is an ONA funded study in which nine members of the Naval Postgraduate School faculty attempted to develop a force structure that reflected the three Sea Service Chiefs’ vision in “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”.
- The above proceeded by building an illustrative fleet on paper. The study builds upon the Streetfighter debate of 10 years ago and develops a force structure on a budget that gives the US Navy options for executing strategy in war time or peace time.
- Thus, the study looked at the SCN budget and divided into three parts: 10% for strategic platforms – this would include SSBN but also AEGIS BMD/ 10% for green water platforms – this would be a littoral battle fleet/ 80% for blue water platforms – this dominates both the doctrines, concepts, specs and the procurement (up to) today
The study concluded with 12 recommendations
Galrahn on http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/01/streetfighter-2010-new-navy-fighting.html has then done some work on these recommendations (he was also invited to USN simulation-based war games to test the original (not the original-original, but the one reheated in 2010) concept… we don’t seem to get those invites, somehow)and I very much agree with what he came up with (for that 10% of the overall budget):
400 Inshore Patrol vessels similar to the US Coast Guard Defender class boat.
160 Offshore Patrol vessels similar to the Australian Armidale-class patrol boat.
30 Coastal Combatants similar to the Swedish Visby class corvette.
12 Fast MIW vessels similar to the Norwegian Alta class minesweepers.
12 Gunfire Support vessels similar to the Finish Nemo Navy program except bigger, with AGS.
12 ASW Inshore vessels similar to an ASW dedicated Sa’ar 5 class corvette
12 Global Fleet Station vessels similar to the vessel recommended in the often discussed NPS GFS design study (PDF).
8 Light Aircraft Carriers similar to the Italian Cavour class but dedicated to VSTOL aviation.
2 Coastal Combat Tenders intended to support 10 Coast Combatants a piece.
The link let’s you read quite a detailed rationale (and loadsa good comments. It all being a blog, and the thinking & ensuing discussion not being restricted too much of what actually has been decided for)
- for those who don’t have the time to dig into the second-order links, behind the one quoted above, the opening broadside of the study is a good one “Early in the twentieth century, the introduction of the torpedo and mine pushed the battleship’s domain to seaward. Starting with the Russo-Japanese War and culminating in World War I, battleships and other surface warships were sunk in significant numbers off enemy coasts. The modern analog to the first wave of submarine and mine attacks is the missile—not as lethal in terms of sinkings, but equally fatal in terms of a firepower kill… The foundation of understanding twenty-first century littoral warfare starts with the missile threat from the land or fast attack craft.
Experimentation with green water vessels is cheaper, faster, and more tolerant of mistakes. Improved designs should emerge rapidly and at affordable costs.”
RE: Gareth Jones says:
June 12, 2012 at 23:50
Agreed. You get about four Visby’s or these http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/baynunah/ for the price of one
- talking about littoral combat
- the US LCS designs had to incorporate fast interception missions in the vastness of the Pacific (they are not only 3-4 times the size now, but alsobenefit from that in the way of endurance, in comparisons with the above cited examples)
And, before going back to us and the RN budget, the difference between the two platforms I compared with LCS is that Visby has a full ASW suite, and a lesser emphasis on ASuW
Operating in the littoral (or having to stay well out):
“”With the coastal environment being the one more likely to operate in during future conflicts, you need to have as much reaction time as possible if you’re putting £1bn ships in harm’s way,” the commander said.
The £500m CEC programme is aimed to provide fire control quality sensor data integration into a single composite data source for use by multiple CEC ships and airborne units for direct and remote missile engagements.
“With the coastal environment being the one more likely to operate in during future conflicts, you need to have as much reaction time as possible if you’re putting £1bn ships in harm’s way.”
The programme, which has already spent £45m, would further reduce the UK Navy’s ability to operate alongside US ships.
…
UK defence equipment minister Peter Luff had told Parliament in January 2012 that the £1bn Type 45 destroyers would be fitted with CEC in 2018, valued at £24m for each ship, and followed with estimated 13 future Type 26 global combat ships.”
- source: 11 June http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsroyal-navy-warships-more-vulnerable–enemy-attacks
Observer: Cheers for calling me ‘tze’.
Point is that it might have all kicked off with the LCS, and I’ll agree that folks jumped on the ‘me too’ littoral marketing bandwagon (and horribly so in some cases), but as it stands now (which is what matters) the Joint DOD or Joint MoD definitions of littoral:-
Have almost nothing to do with the LCS (in fact all but excluding it);
The MoD Joint definition does not especially favour the RN (and especially so in terms of defending the littoral, which now includes the vast EEZ – favours RAF MPA yeah?);
Show where it’s at in terms of priority in defence and projection, in that interconnected region; so is useful now whatever marketing BS might have spawned it initially (language evolves, and don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater).
The definitions could still use a bit of work though [it was me who mentioned the SLBM - I was being a bit cheeky and reductio though].
ArmChairCivvie: £24M per ship for CEC? Holy cats!
Cheers tsz, as I said, it took a life of it’s own. I still feel like biting the marketting “genius” who inflicted this torture on us though, along with the guy who came up with the term “warfighter” (as opposed to what? Peacefighter?)
ACC said “Visby has a full ASW suite, and a lesser emphasis on ASuW”
How does a 57mm and 8 ASM compared with just a 57mm in LCS come in as a lesser emphasis?
Or did you get the ship’s the wrong way round?
Or is the Swedish maritime doctrine of supporting land operations yet another thing I have written down in half a dozen places yet have failed to comprehend?
Yes.
Seconded.
But x, if you point me to one of these places, I will try to respond
“Swedish maritime doctrine of supporting land operations yet another thing I have written down in half a dozen places”
Hi, APATS. “The true test in the [LCS] mission suite, If that fails they will be scrapped.”
The funding is in place and block-buy contracts signed for the first dozen of each LCS class. The contracts would be difficult and expensive to undo, and that’s before states’ job lobbyists get involved, so the USN will have LCS come-what-may, though perhaps not the 55 ships planned.
The mine hunting kit seems to be giving them problems atm. Dropping that role for a dedicated MCM vessel might be a way of cutting the second block-buy – an ots design though, just to get them in time. And twelve ASW Independence class would be an expensive way of replacing OHPs, but hey-ho, got to use them for something and nothing else is there to fill the hole. I think the Freedom class is more secure though, not ideal, but they need the numbers of the next purchase.
Which one of the two is it that is experiencing alu problems in the hull?
- keep the other 12 for the Pacific interdiction role… the very opposite of littoral!
- keep those 12 close to shore (surely you can go fast in calmer waters?)
– 4 for the Malacca Straits
– 4 for Hormuz
– the other four on rotation, or around Bab el Mandeb
It was the Freedom I believe.
ACC yes you can go faster in calmer waters. Unfortunately, “calmer waters” also contain things like reefs and sandbanks and shallows.
It’s going to be hilarious if the Litoral Combat Ship became the Litoral Combat Tank
TBH though, the LCSs in the Malacca Straits are a bit of a headache for us. Technically, we’re supposed to be neutral between America and China, basing the LCS here really stretches the definition of neutral to near breaking point. The US harping on it also isn’t helping, just brings the imbalance more into the public eye. Wonder if we should offer to station 4 PLAN corvettes to balance it out?
@ ACC
I am trying to shove one of my books down the network cable now.
@X
You have to burn it to ashes, mix in water, then pour it into the cable.
ACC will then gather the fragments and dry them before reassembling them like a jigsaw.
The Street Fighter 2010/New Navy fighting Machine document is very interesting and though specifically about the USN I think certain ideas could be taken on by the RN/RM. For example, would 10% of the RN budget for Green/Brown water (seaside/punnting?) be a good investment for the nation, considering gaining access to the coast is considered important/vital? If so do we purchase something like the list of craft mentioned above, obviously in far less numbers, or would different craft suit our needs better?
If we take the amphib fleet (also the moth balls part of it) and all copter support that is not specifically ASW, I wonder how close to 10 % we would get?
- of course, quite a different profile from the missions envisaged in The Street Fighter 2010/New Navy fighting Machine document
Observer,
interesting on the neutrality posture – I was not aware that Singapore was in that position. Can’t be easy. I would suggest buying cash dollars, some US Eagles, and ensuring that your transferrable skills are recognised by the US Immigration Department. Maybe even a 2 year exchange posting so that you can test the water with Mrs O and the kids.
You always need a Plan B.
Baynunah are a very good design. I like that is a good helicopter facilities. But a second mount back aft would probably more useful than a hanger. And the aviation support handled by a depot ship/mother ship/flotilla leader.
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-f0GHmkJd_AQ/Tvwic3AekcI/AAAAAAAAAeI/lnHV67_Qhco/s1600/Saar45nirit011.jpg
I always think somebody within the IDF has a deep understanding of how a naval gun fight pans out by having the 76mm in the Z position.
Further I think the Baynunah are too small for a navy from a little island a long way from anywhere. If we need a “gunfighter” it needs to be able to move with and support the fleet.
A better solution for the RN would be something like the BMT Venator.
http://media.bmt.org/bmt_media/bmt_images/33/New%20Image.JPG
A 5in mount at A. Two 57mm on each beam (in the illustration where the RIB davits are found.) A third 57mm at Z. Back up by tertiary mandraulic 30mm and heavy small arms.
Big enough to move with the fleet. More than adequate fire power.
@ Gareth Jones,
if access to the seaside is considered vital, why would you only want to spend 10% of your maritime budget on it? Should be more like 90%. Wasteful wannabe-USN stuff like CVF and jets come later, once you’ve done the important stuff.
Tsz52, thoughtful comments; I don’t think anyone has gone on record as disagreeing with any definition but then I haven’t looked and as I have said a few times, it’s not the definition that vexes me but how as soon as anything like that is mentioned, however remotely, certain characters are all over it like a tramp on chips. It niggles me.
The tweet in question didn’t actually come from those flame covered birds but from one of their fellow travelers but I don’t think mine was an angry reaction, just pointing out the absurdity of it. I even asked them, no reply of course, they never do. As for them being a false flag, you are wrong, however much that might seem like the only logical choice, as if admitting the reality is actually too hard to comprehend, people really do think like that, they really do make submissions to the HoC Defence Select Committee and they really do have a very vocal campaign to convince everyone the RN is a victim and it is all so terribly unfair.
I don’t mind discussing the transformative nature of modern land attack weapons as compared to yesteryear and how that might actually change things, in fact, if you look back through a few posts I have often wondered how a navalised ATACMS with its 300km range and ability to accurately deliver a military significant payload at that range could have a serious impact on things so I am not at all blinkered to the possibilities.
Your circular argument about asking why ‘they’ would promulgate an argument that sidelines them is interesting but to be honest, I don’t think they are that aware!
You might not think there is a Pro RN lobby but I do, I actually think this is a good thing, but, and here is where we may part company, I don’t think that the lobby should be pro RN at the expense of the others services and use wholly inaccurate claims, which they are, and do.
LCS and aluminium problems – both types. Freedom is mostly the structural problems you usually get when giving a fairly large and high performance warship a steel hull and aluminium superstructure (nobody ever learns…). From some publicly available info, there *might* also be corrosion problems where the two different metals meet.
Independence was corrosion where the steel engines meet the aluminium hull, which was completely and routinely avoidable, down to a dodgy maintenance issue due to one corporation sulking (following the letter of the maintenance contract rather than the spirit of it).
Visby: Hard to talk about what the lovely Visby is because there’s what she was intended to be, and what she actually is due to lack of dough and the dreaded FFBNW. She’s really, really far from any incarnation of what she was intended to be at the moment.:(
MoD’s paddling in a near-peer’s seaside doctrine seems to be ‘Go Big, go Joint, or go home.’ Piddling about with little aluminium boats doesn’t seem to have much to do with it. [I'm not taking Black Swan II too seriously.]
Observer: Agreed on ‘warfighter’. I don’t mind ‘war fighting’ (two words) as much though (to distinguish it from constabulary work etc). Interesting about your neutrality problems at the moment – I always like to keep up with what’s going on in Singapore: I’ve got a tonne and a half of admiration for you guys.:)
TD: I’ll martial my thoughts and reply to your good self later.
TD: There’s certainly a pro-RN lobby, but I don’t think that they’re as influential, effective (judging by results) or as ‘reds under the bed’ style *everywhere* as folks like yourself seem to think. What they are is a crap joke who get on most people’s nerves. Even when given a totally open arena and a captive audience, they still can’t ‘sell’ the RN properly to the media/public [abolition enforcement, abolition enforcement, abolition enforcement! FFS! Come on!]. They’re just rubbish incompetents.
How bad must they truely be when the more sensible folks who love them floaty things, and the RN particularly (though not to the exclusion of anybody else), wish that ‘they”d all just f*ck off and die!? ‘They’ are more hated by sea power advocates than you, believe me, because ‘they’ have all but killed the ability to debate this properly by queering the pitch so much.
It’s exactly the same mechanism in play as (just for example) the impossibility of sensibly discussing multi-culturalism because then the debate is killed by your having to prove that you’re absolutely not a racist (and you’re insulted by the accusation that you might be something so disgusting), and you never get past that point: here you never get past the point of proving that you’re absolutely not a ‘them’ follower (and you’re insulted by the accusation that you might be something so disgusting).
I’ve seen it loads here and elsewhere. That horrible not-debate that I got sucked into on another thread (that I left out of respect for everyone else here, though it still rankles that I did that) all started because my comments were being viewed through a ‘he’s one of ‘them” lens.
The other day on this thread, a serving officer who has consistently demonstrated his ability to think Joint and put Defence ahead of a particular Service mentioned the gas tanker problem and it was immediately in with the ‘Aha! ‘Them’ argument!’, though he was personally doing nothing of the kind; which then did what it always does which is unfairly put him on the defensive and have to justify himself: ‘No I’m not arguing that more ships is the optimal solution, yes storage might be a better solution, no I am not anything to do with ‘them’ and it’s insulting to be tarred with that same shitty brush (though he put it more nicely)’. Why should he have to keep doing that? Why hasn’t he earned enough respect and benefit of the doubt yet that a ‘them’ agenda won’t be assumed in his statements, so that they can be read at face value? Guilty until proven innocent is BS: Debate can’t happen without good faith.
In your reply to me you wrote [my starry emphasis]: “You might not think there is a Pro RN lobby but I do, I actually think this is a good thing, but, ***and here is where we may part company, I don’t think that the lobby should be pro RN at the expense of the others services and use wholly inaccurate claims***, which they are, and do.”
Why on earth do you think that we might part company on that? Because I love the RN (and RM and RAF and BA, as it happens [I'm a working class boy with way more family in the BA than anywhere else]), that means that I don’t value truth, objectivity and integrity, or putting the Defence of the UK above my fondness for ships? I mean seriously, why assume that?
Bearing in mind that in the post that you were replying to, I’d made it pretty clear that I hate, despise and ignore ‘them’, think that they’re a laughing stock, and referred to them as wankers; then really really why did you imagine for even a second that we might part company over “I don’t think that the lobby should be pro RN at the expense of the others services and use wholly inaccurate claims.”? Course not mate – that’s why I fu*king hate them.
It’s this going on under the hood – your (and those of a similar mind) reaction to these strokers, and seeing their shit *everywhere* where it isn’t – that led to that 1SL interview dodgy (IMO) interpretation of yours, the comments you got and that ‘Accusation of Bias’ malarkey last year. It’s not that you’re biased against the RN, but that you’re so fed up with ‘their’ BS that you see it everywhere, and respond accordingly. So it makes you seem less objective than you actually are, and makes it hard for others to get a fair crack at sensibly debating anything that involves sea power (beyond the conventional and minimal anyway – yes you have loads of posts about the RN, but that isn’t what I mean).
It’s much more ‘their’ fault than yours, but you’re still playing ‘their’ game: if false flag by making it pretty much Just Not Worth It trying to discuss certain aspects of sea power even here; if face value by confirming that the poor RN really is embattled on all sides.
False flag: Dunno. Haven’t quite made my mind up yet, though I’m sure that anybody with enough authority and investigative heft would turn up some interesting things were he to do the ol’ follow the money thing. Wish somebody who could would, and expose them; so that I could talk about my take on the role of sea power in future UK *Joint* doctrine without being tarred by their shitty brush every time.
Hi tsz, I wonder about what features you were specifically thinking with this “Visby: Hard to talk about what the lovely Visby is because there’s what she was intended to be, and what she actually is due to lack of dough and the dreaded FFBNW. She’s really, really far from any incarnation of what she was intended to be at the moment.:(”
- yes, the limiting of funds was criminal (but they got the hulls into water, rather than cancelling)
- they have now been through 5 incremental “upgrades” and the only thing I am aware that is missing from the original spec is the Umkhonto SAM installation (it was cut before they decided cutting their fighter fleet down to a hundred; a reasonable trade-off at the time but does not look that sound now)
The yard is now part of a German group (just like the AIP subs production going that way, too). They advertise a Visby+ and an even bigger version.
Finally, (to put into context what could be gained from such a “stretch”) in that Strait of Hormuz simulation that both GJ and I have been linking to, Visby came out as v good VFM, but also received two recommendations (how feasible w/o the “stretch?):
1. Improved ASuW capability,basically more guns as you will soon run out of missiles when dealing with a swarm attack (a bit like x’s 3×57 above, on a bigger hull though)
2. Two helos, to have one up all through for ASW (can help with ASM, too, but small helos are carried, so multiple payloads perhaps not an option)
- this one is interesting from the RN point of view, too. Baynunah (of UAE)don’t need the aviation support handled by a depot ship/mother ship/flotilla leader, as they don’t venture that far from the home shores. Any RN frigates/ destroyers deployed there can gain a two helo capability by flying them in rotation from Oman and just filling up and rearming on the ship?
Hi (again) tsz,
Isn’t this a contradiction? “MoD’s paddling in a near-peer’s seaside doctrine seems to be ‘Go Big, go Joint, or go home.’ Piddling about with little aluminium boats doesn’t seem to have much to do with it. [I'm not taking Black Swan II too seriously.]”
- you and I seem to agree with that leaning in the doctrine?
- its incarnation is in ‘Single Task Force’ – TD had a tread about it under the Future of RN thread? And also in the retaining of amphibiousity as a capability
- if all your escorts are dispersed across the seven seas – in want of those little alu(?) boats – how feasible would it be to put that task force together with any meaningful speed?
I think you have misunderstood on the parting ways comment. I didn’t mean that you think the RN should be emphasised at the expense of others, like the chumps, but that we differ in our view of their existence or not. I think you doubted it in a previous post, thats what I meant.
Sorry for the misunderstanding
That said, you might think they are ineffective and I would tend to agree with you now but they were very active across multiple media channels, submissions to the Defence Select Committee and other channels so they were definately informing opinion and continue to try and do so.
There is no doubt they are viewed by people who know about these things as chumps but it is not they that we should be worried out, as we know, decision makers don’t always listen to sensible advice (or get it) and it is these people that they target with their seemingly sensible views.
In the land of the blind the one eyed man is king
Hence, why I try and counter some of their more obvious nonsense and will continue to do so.
Maybe I have become over sensitised to it all, not sure, perhaps I need to get back to talking about bridges and metal boxes!
@ TsZ – “There’s certainly a pro-RN lobby, but I don’t think that they’re as influential, effective (judging by results) or as ‘reds under the bed’ style *everywhere* as folks like yourself seem to think.”
I also don’t believe that the naval lobby is quite so Bilderberg as TD seems to imagine, however, that its public effect accelerates so quickly to take such a wide hold in the media is the result of public sympathy.
“We are an island you know” are not just words trotted out by retired admirals to the Daily Mail, they are the reality as recognized by the nation.
It is effectively a public mandate, and it colour’s the expectations and tolerances the public have to military action and its costs.
The Navy has had Trafalger and Falklands
The RAF had the BoB
The Army was looking for its own modern legend in the absence of Commie hordes in the Fulda Gap and they thought they had found it in Iraq & Afghanistan.
Sadly, the legend must be bred in the public consciousness and the public rejected protracted and nasty counter-insurgency wars that had no heroic (and bloodless) cavalry charges, and no tangible ‘victory’ that could be (swiftly) wrapped in a flag.
It’s unfortunate given the heroic job by the army, especially since it has achieved it end (in iraq at least), but its called tough-shit.
It’s the way the public rolls, and has rolled for some centuries.
Really, it’s starting to sound like someone needs to slam all the service heads together, kick their arse, and toss everything back under one HUGE joint umbrella.
When they said the 3 services are supposed to fight together, I think they meant against an external opponent, not each other.
Maybe an Expeditionary Corp? An independent fighting unit needs 3 things. Sufficient ground forces (armour-heavy and light, infantry, artillery), sufficient air cover, sufficient shipping and naval defence. Enough work for all 3 to go around.