In September last year a wrote about the Generic Vehicle Architecture (GVA) and how it is probably one of the smartest things the MoD has done recently, how it will have a profound effect on future costs and capabilities in the vehicle fleet and that the MoD will receive almost no publicity or credit for doing so.
A Forward Operating Base
In addition to vehicles, the same concept has been applied to bases and soldier equipment as part of the Land Open Systems Architecture (LOSA)
LOSA Architecture
GBA is defined in Def-Stan 23-13 as an open standard that defines interfaces to power, data, water, waste and fuel.
Forward bases are the stock in trade of an Army, at the end of Herrick IX in April 2009 the British Army had 55 in Afghanistan and by November 2010 this number had risen to 132. Fuel in particular is a major concern, with these forward bases in 2009 accounting for only 3% of actual fuel used but 25% of the fully burdened fuel cost, this latter figure includes the cost of transport and force protection.
Generic Tactical Base Laydown
Not Bastion
The various life support needs such as water, waste and hygiene are considerable and where numerous systems exist in isolation waste and incompatibility will be the result.
Force protection needs, Base ISTAR for example, all need to be united into a coherent environment.
GBA, therefore, seeks to define all elements of a base into single system rather than a collection of disparate parts. The ultimate goal is to reduce construction time, personnel used for life support activities and fuel usage whilst offering capability improvements across each element.
Generic Base Architecture
Ambitious
So, GBA is as important as any major project, despite it being a low key and poorly funded activity.
LOSA will be the major theme of this year’s Defence Vehicle Dynamics event.
GBA2 (FOBEX) was a demonstration exercise that involved many organisations and had a wide ranging remit.
FOBEX10 is seeking to identify potential enhancements to the Tactical Base (TB) capability, specifically in the establishment of an integrated system of a ‘30 person Patrol Base (PB)’and (tba) Control Points (CP) from ‘green field’ to levels 1 and 2, and the subsequent removal/disassembly
FOBEX 10 could provide a specific experimentation opportunity for interoperability and infrastructure rationalisation around ground based ISTAR and ‘Sense and Warn’ equipment.
FOBEX10 will be an evaluation of industry claims that FOB’s can be built differently (i.e. quicker, better, cheaper, or better managed). These alternatives constructs are to consider, but not be constrained by, the themes of the Land Open System Architecture functional model, and current thinking on sub-component elements includes addressing the following:
- Improved quality of infrastructure
- Waste disposal
- Power supply and distribution, including vehicle delivered power
- Water management including treatment testing and bottling, recycling and storage
- Alternative Force Protection Engineering approaches
- Precision air dispatch,
- Immediate medical support
- Integrated Survivability Systems
- Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) dust reduction
- Expedient resurfacing
- Laundry
- Winterisation
- Cover from view capability
Team Castrum was led by Selex Galileo Battlespace solutions and included Marshall Land Systems who provided perimeter surveillance using their Trakkar unmanned ground vehicle (based on the Hobo) fitted with a 3m Clark mast, Roke Resolve EW package and Chess Dynamics Owl surveillance equipment.
Marshall Trakkar with OWL and Resolve
The video below shows the basic Trakkar
The Trakkar has also been demonstrated with a Nordic Power Systems fuel cell auxiliary power unit
Trakkar with fuel cell
From the press release
The fuel cell generator is targeted at users requiring virtually silent auxiliary power to keep batteries at peak operating condition. In the situation depicted on the stand the fuel cell, producing 1kW, is providing sufficient power to maintain the batteries of Trakkar® at peak power so that when the vehicle needs to operate in silent mode it is ready to do so.
The diesel fuel generators are based on a Nordic Power patented technology, named “Cool Flame”. The primary role of the generator is expected to be as an auxiliary power unit to extend and enhance silent watch capability and duration.
“The current development programme is producing an integrated standalone advanced technology demonstrator. At present it is producing 1kW, sufficient to charge batteries, but as the technology is scalable our long term ambition is to produce up to 10kW
The diesel fuel cell at present produces 1kW has a 28 volt output, noise levels of less than 45dBA at 2m and is at least as efficient as a standard diesel generator.
Marshall LS also demonstrated their Safebase deployable armoured sangar.
Marshall Safebase Armoured sangar
Marshall Safebase Armoured sangar
Base security was provided from a Marshall Safebase deployable armoured sangar fitted with a Selex remote weapon station. A sensor fit could also be deployed. Safebase is based on a 10ft Marshall shelter with a rising sentry position, which can be lifted into position in 30 seconds. Once deployed the space in the base of the tower can have multiple uses. It can for example serve as a mini operations room or as an RWS control station
The Selex RWS was the Enforcer model.
Also on show, the Observer 100 is a trailer borne surveillance system using thermal imaging, daylight cameras and radar than can operate for 30 days without refuelling (when operating off grid) and setup in no more than 10 minutes.
Selex Observer 100
Other partners in Team Castrum were IBM, Paradigm, SELEX Communications, MIRA, Rolls Royce, DRS Technologies, NSC, Hertel, BAE Systems and SELEX Galileo.
The recent PowerFOB exercises in Wales and the Episkopi training area in Cyprus demonstrated appropriate GBA technologies but with a focus on power efficiency. Over 30 companies showed a wide variety of technologies.
PowerFOB recognised that a range of technologies would be needed to meet the desired objective of a 50% reduction in fuel use. Better management of generators, renewables and storage would all play a part.
The trials were split into three load classifications; 500W plus for sensors, 5KW for small tactical bases and 50KW for medium tactical bases. Although these thresholds were set for the trials it was emphasised there is nothing typical about each base, solutions should be scalable and modular.
All equipment was required to be transportable in 20ft ISO containers, robust and able to operate with minimal supervision or skilled maintenance personnel. All the solutions would ultimately need to be GBA compliant so that performance and usage data could be transmitted to a single situational awareness display or to other locations.
Using a baseline provided by a similar sized FOB in Afghanistan (FOB Catina) the demonstration showed;
- Energy storage produced a 22 per cent fuel saving
- Energy storage plus demand management produced a 37 per cent fuel saving
- Energy storage plus demand management plus renewables gave 40–50 per cent fuel saving depending on mix of renewables that were used.
CK Solar showed a solar thermal collector
www.youtube.com/watch?v=tRUaWsIq75I
Kraft Maus showed an 8KVa mobile hybrid wind/solar/fossil power platform.
In fuel burn tests, a conventional, 2kW light generator burned 0.6l/kWh of diesel, whilst the Kraft Maus 8kVA burned 0.2l/kWh on its first run of 36 hours, with a total output of 53kWh. It provided 84kWh totally fuel free power for the five day performance test.
Kraft Maus 8Kva
Tradewind Turbines showed their transportable wind turbine.
Tradewinds turbine
Tradewinds turbine
The video shows the turbine at the earlier Wales FOBEX
Silicon CPV had on display an integrated solar/conventional power system.
Silicon CPV
As a means of reducing power demand energy efficient shelters were also shown, the Fortis Shelter from Hertel for example.
Even relatively minor improvements in energy use all add up; moving to lower voltage DC instead of transforming AC down, induction hubs, LED lighting, solar helicopter pad lights that charge during the day and are used at night, glycol refrigeration and low power laundry systems.
Making sure generators are selected on likely loads rather than over sizing which then results in low utilisation and inefficiency is another challenging aspect.
With the increasing use of COTS/MOTS networking, data processing, storage and display systems in bases, a great deal of which is AC, we expend fuel cooling the device and suffer losses because the equipment itself can usually run perfectly on lower voltage DC. It is reckoned that saving 1 watt at the equipment saves another 3 in cooling and other losses.
Sun have a 2Tb storage server that uses only 300 watts for example but is any of this kind of technology being integrated into the numerous data systems, ground control stations and other equipment for example?
Bases start with construction, not smart sensors or wind turbines so a range of building and infrastructure materials have also been trialled, the ubiquitous Hesco Bastion being joined by modular building systems, matting and fortification materials like cuplock sangars or concrete cloth.
Concrete Cloth Layed by Soldiers at FOBEX Demonstration
Enhanced Protection Systems (EPS), of Springer fame, showed the Stalwart protected weapon station.
EPS Stalwart
EPS Stalwart
Despite the allure of all this exciting technology we might achieve similar efficiencies if we simply manage what we have better, improve efficiency, make sure the dots are joined and never forget the human elements of leadership and good equipment care.
That said, the ubiquitous puffing billy might also be overdue for replacement, to the relief of eyebrows everywhere!
Hawkmoor Self Powered Water Boiler
Read more about PowerFOB here and a few videos to end on.
It seems that no one system is a magic bullet, careful selection of technologies with integration between them with GBA compliance being the underpinning logic.
Although the MoD has perhaps been a little less bold than US forces who seem to be able to get kit into theatre on a trial basis much quicker than us the but are working to different constraints and the more cautious and considered approach means that kit should, in theory, get to theatre in a much more coherent manner with all the constituent parts having an effect greater than the sum of their parts. That said, the UK is far in advance of the US in other areas, generator use and management being one notable example.
There is loads of good work going on in with the parallel tracks of GBA, FOBEX and ‘system of systems’, let’s hope it survives contact with the MoD’s budget process and as we see the end of Afghanistan, projects like this sustained.
Actually the tail does benefit the Afghans. There’s several thousand locally employed civilians in Bastion alone, not to mention the jingly convoys and the locally placed orders and all the tradesmen that ply their trade around the bases. We used to hire Afghans to work on the mud walls of the compounds and clear trees and build us roads.
Western troops are not incompetent. You’re being provocative on purpose. You know as well as I do that bases are a necessity and the Taliban have them too. We even discovered a hospital. In fact the less the population suffer them the more they need based too. No they don’t have air conditioned food halls and yes some places have become excessively luxurious but it’s been the private contractors driving that as much as anyone and they organise the pizza huts and so on off their own back since a lot of them work in these bases for years.
I can tell you in my FOB the only two people who never went out the wire were our two chefs and one of them wanted to but wasn’t allowed he was too important!
SO – the Royal Marines tried roughly what you seem to be suggesting a few Herricks ago. “Mobile Operating Units”. Administratively self supporting column based on a company group, marching about trying to surprise the Taliban and being resupplied by C-130s.
Really the goal isn’t to defeat the Taliban it’s to undermine them and dissolve their influence. Very different things. Going out to kill Taliban in mobile columns on its own achieves little. Using them to strike deep and disrupt them whilst holding ground and building influence works best. It’s a cliche but the battlefield is the Afghan population. You can drive around brassing up Terry for 50 years and achieve nothing unless you have a firm footprint on the ground. As ever, it’s a subtle mixture of techniques in a spectrum rather than one end or the other.
@SO
If only troops on the ground “outside the wire” influence the campaign, I wonder where all the airstrikes that have been called in come from? A dirt lane in the desert? And what do you think an airbase is but a fort with hangers and a runway?
You say you know “support”, and that the Taliban can survive without food, that is wrong. They get their supplies by “taxing” the people. a.k.a robbing them. You think that would work well for the International forces?
And I really like to see you tell the Medical personnel that helping the local population is not “influence”.
BTW SO you said you were support, you with a QM unit?
http://grognews.blogspot.de/2012/06/isnt-this-how-we-won-american.html
That’s just not how they work. They are tied to families, tax bases, defended compounds and areas of operation just like us. In fact they are less mobile since we can go wherever we want, they can’t if the local population are hostile. All this ninja stuff is just rubbish. The majority of the Taliban are local thugs and they stay locally. The whole flip flops and flight by night stuff is a myth. They can avoid combat certainly, but they can’t exist in a peripatetic fashion and still be effective.
SO… you’re basing your entire premise on a web burp.. not even an article, but a burp, from something called “GROG NEWS”??
It reminds me of something a co-worker of mine once said.
“If you say ‘gullible’ slowly, it sounds like ‘orange’.”
@ Alex – ” the Royal Marines tried roughly what you seem to be suggesting a few Herricks ago. “Mobile Operating Units”.”
Any reports on the effectiveness of this?
“Any reports on the effectiveness of this?”
We’re still there!
My opinion for what it is worth is that such operations have merit in certain circumstances but definitely pissing into the wind if they are anything like your main effort in theatre. If you have sufficient force density you shouldn’t even have to operate like that so in the big picture their use does represent a big failure.
@Observer:
“If only troops on the ground “outside the wire” influence the campaign, I wonder where all the airstrikes that have been called in come from?”
Do you deliberately show off an incapability to understand what I wrote?
I wrote
“They’re merely not of relevance to the population, and Afghanistan’s conflict is very political.”
Airstrikes do NOT win the political fight, in fact they’re widely and officially acknowledged to be (if relevant at all) more of a problem than an asset in it. Combat troops leaders who need air power support against rag tag fighters like the Taliban should be sent back to basic.
“SO… you’re basing your entire premise on a web burp.. not even an article”
You’re playing with a strawman argument again. I have no respect for this, you are a useless discussion partner to me.
You have NO, absolutely NO idea what I base my conclusions on since I did not disclose this info, and it’s extremely arrogant to think or suppose otherwise.
Fact is the Western forces replay the big failures of the Soviets DESPITE the knowledge about their failures. They hunker down in bases, use lots of armoured vehicles, use airpower, focus on population centres and roads. They accept the secondary challenge (combat) happily and apply their instruments with marginal imagination.
Meanwhile, they are a near-total failure on the primary challenge, the political one. They neither got the “friendly” government to function properly nor do they defeat the opposing political force. It’s a 100% failure and all those stupid forts are horrible monuments of the superficial thinking about the conflict.
The really bad thing is of course that all this crap influences thinking through lessons learned. A generation of soldiers will expect lavish fire support as self-evident, not understand the challenges of formation manoeuvres, not understand the importance of the indirect fires threat, overestimate the importance of mines and bullets and they learn to consider easily recognizable above-surface cover as effective.
We could just as well tell them to shoot themselves in case of major war, at least we’d get over the next one quickly this way.
“Combat troops leaders who need air power support against rag tag fighters like the Taliban should be sent back to basic.”
Been pinned down by a Taliban ambush amongst a bunch of frightened civilians lately Kommando?
“They hunker down in bases, use lots of armoured vehicles, use airpower, focus on population centres and roads.”
You have been told and have not countered the argument that they DO NOT hunker down. Mobile patrols sweep lightly populated areas and protect routes. Airpower is sometimes a necessity and is now rarely used.
“They neither got the “friendly” government to function properly nor do they defeat the opposing political force. It’s a 100% failure and all those stupid forts are horrible monuments of the superficial thinking about the conflict.”
Nobody is interested in the friendly government operating properly. All they have to do is keep enough of a lid on the criminal thugs people call Taliban to stop them allowing terrorist groups a haven to plan mass destruction at their leisure. The details of the government are otherwise completely immaterial.
You completely and utterly misunderstand the mission and so you cannot judge success or failure.
“A generation of soldiers will expect lavish fire support as self-evident, not understand the challenges of formation manoeuvres, not understand the importance of the indirect fires threat, overestimate the importance of mines and bullets and they learn to consider easily recognizable above-surface cover as effective.”
Right, you base this on what? Maybe in your neck of the woods mate but over here the Army is already getting back to basic warfighting operations and preparing for austere entry contingency operations.
Its back to living out of your Bergan.
Everybody in this mans Army recognises the Afghan model has not changed the fundamentals of warfare.
You’re just making stuff up.
“Been pinned down by a Taliban ambush amongst a bunch of frightened civilians lately Kommando?”
See? That’s the problem. You have apparently no idea about other means of avoiding or solving such a problem than with support fires. That’s why you have no clue why the need to call for air power etc in such a situation is a display of incompetence.
“You have been told and have not countered the argument that they DO NOT hunker down. Mobile patrols sweep lightly populated areas and protect routes.”
You have a computer screen which should allow you to read how I wrote that almost all of them do. I did not claim all do so at the same time. The many troops sitting in forts do no doubt hunker down there to avoid the risks that wait outside the wire. Face the reality. They don’t confine themselves to the relative safety of a base only because it’s so nice to be close to each other or for other non-risk-related reasons.
“Nobody is interested in the friendly government operating properly. All they have to do is keep enough of a lid on the criminal thugs people call Taliban to stop them allowing terrorist groups a haven to plan mass destruction at their leisure.”
That’s the same, and it’s is not happening after a decade of Western presence. That’s an utter failure even by ISAF’s own standards of the past decade.
“Right, you base this on what?”
Thousands of years of military history and the continuity of psychology. Compare the troubles of the British against the Boers after dozens of small wars, for example. Add WWI to the pile.
We’re ingraining the wrong ideas in our troops.
Similar story with peacetime exercises and indirect fire effectiveness. Difficult to simulate properly -> rarely “experienced” phenomenon -> badly underestimated. This example is a decades-old, recognised problem.
“Everybody in this mans Army recognises the Afghan model has not changed the fundamentals of warfare”
I doubt that you can speak for “everybody”, for it’s a quite large bunch. Still, even if it was true – lots of subconscious and conscious impressions are in effect and the bureaucracy spends much attention and many funds on the occupation business.
Feel free to point me at any large-scale (Div+) conventional warfare exercise in the field, with long marches on short notice and all the difficulties needed for conventional mobile warfare.
Your claim that I make stuff up coupled with bad misunderstandings (at best) of your own is not exactly compelling.
SO, Phil’s been to Afganistan, so has James I think. If I wanted to know the conditions on the ground, I’ll ask them. Not fantasy land you.
A lot of what you wrote is simply anti-war bullshit and displays a shocking lack of understanding of COIN and “political” acumen. Killing off your opposition electorate while ensuring free play for yours sounds like a vote winner to me. And avoids the problems of them going “vote for me or I kill you.”
And people calling for support fire should be sent back to basic? Where did they dig you up from? Ancient Rome? Is your name Publius Quinctilius Varus, by any chance?
Your lack of understanding is shocking. Ask Phil or James if they understood what I posted as opposed to your ranting. Then ask them who’s the strawman, Emperor with no Clothes.
SO. You’re obviously against the war, fine, but your arguments are based on vapour and stereotypes and they are very confused. You hate that we hunker down, which we don’t, and then we’re incompetent when we get caught in ambushes. So what do you want? We’re not bumbling into smushed because we don’t know what we’re doing, we’re being ambushed because we’re patrolling populated areas and we’re interacting with locals. You cannot do that whilst doing a leopard crawl down an irrigation ditch. If the mission does not call for interaction then a more tactical patrol posture is used. Airstrikes are used to end TiCs because our main job is not to go out there and brass up but to undermine the Taliban and work with the civilians. You call in strikes or mortars to shut them up so you can get on with the real job.
You just haven’t a clue. You disagree with the war fine but your basing your assumptions on myth and bollocks frankly.
Interesting article.
I think a few people have got distracted by the criteria for making all this kit fit in an 20ft ISO. That is just to make it easy to get into theatre, once its there it they may be able to lowload it into to place but it will also all have to be airportable and within the performance limits of the current/planned SH fleet.
The main problem I see with all this will be it wont directly replace the old kit, it will supplement it. You will still need the older kit for your main bases and exercises (plus the Army always seem against you using any of the good kit on training in the UK) so this will just add to the overall inventory adding costs, REMF manpower and expensive but useless civilians.
The size of the MODs inventory is important because Blair/Brown forced the MOD to sell off/scrap lots of its war stock (only to have to buy it back or produce new kit a few years later) it operated with the “Just in Time” system which basically means they wont hold a proper stock of this equipment or spares. Therefore, it is likely that only training units will ever see it and that when the next war comes it wont be ready in time, nor enough people trained on it, so we take all the old kit anyway. Then there will be the extra bureaucratic, lengthily logistics supply, contracts for spares and so on which you can always trace all problems back to a poorly written civilian contract.
Just to give you an example.
If a member of the RAF is told they are deploying to Afghanistan they need to go to stores and give them their clothing sizes at least 8 weeks in advance. 8-10 weeks later the kit arrives, you go to stores and try it all on only to find that your boots don’t fit because they are made by a different company to all your other boots. You then have to wait another 8 weeks for your new boots to arrive as stores are not allowed to hold spare kit for these eventualities, deployment equipment is all centrally held.
Wibble, That is a single service problem mate. Certainly not existing in the RN where you can choose you desert boots from a couple of makes and try on different sizes. Although only a couple of stores issue deployment kit.
The navy will not have the same numbers of people needing deployment kit as the RAF plus all this kit is controlled by the Army.
No such problems in the Army either apart from when they change something or bring in new kit it takes a while for the pipeline to catch up. Also with newer kit I believe that whatever issuing authority there is starts to send new kit to theatre once initial allocations are done so stragglers sometimes met their mk7s in theatre for example.
Hi, Phil.
“Nobody is interested in the friendly government operating properly.” – The Anglo-Afghan Enduring Strategic Partnership Document, signed on 28th January might suggest otherwise.
As for the Afghan Taliban allowing terrorist groups a haven to plan mass destruction at their leisure, if you’re alluding to the 11/9 attack, that was conceived in Hamburg and planned in the main in Germany and the United States.
The Afghan Taliban were only in power for five years, during which time the US and Taliban headed down the route of mutual antagonism. If the US had been more diplomatic; rather than refusing to recognize an Islamist regime while concurrently issuing demands to that regime, then they might have got more cooperation in shutting down the terrorist leadership in that country before 11/9.
Rather than not being interested in the government of Afghanistan, the West has been overly concerned with just that for centuries.
We are not interested in the detailed internal workings of the Afghan government.
They may well have been planned in those places but come on its disingenuous to say that AQ in Afghan had nothing to do with them. It’s kind of like saying that NHS reform is planned in details amongst the trusts and ignoring the massive looming influence Parliament has over the process. It’s the same sort of relationship.
Wibble said “The navy will not have the same numbers of people needing deployment kit as the RAF plus all this kit is controlled by the Army.”
There haven’t been that many more RAF bods in Afghanistan over RN bods. Or are you talking about the future?
And though on principal I believe the MoD should supply all uniform and that it should be the best available, I can’t believe you would not go out to spend your own money on boots.
X
The boots was just in example of the issues of centralised/pooled stores,logistic supply lines etc, please dont get too hung up on the specific example.
RN numbers in the stan will fluctuate depending if the RMs are out there at the time but with the removal of the SK4s then there has been a drop in overal RN manpower in theatre in the last 12 months.
@ Wibble
I wasn’t fixating on the boots. I know you were using them as an example. I had gone off on a tangent. So you are not a RAF bod then? It doesn’t matter what the job what you have on your feet is very important.
As for RN numbers in Afghanistan I think there have been about 1000 there. And about 1600 RAF bods. 3Cdo won’t be going back to Afghanistan and their deployment viz a vie kit is a different matter. Perhaps I should have been specific and used the word “sailor”?
@Phil
“(…) we’re being ambushed because we’re patrolling populated areas and we’re interacting with locals. You cannot do that whilst doing a leopard crawl down an irrigation ditch.”
I didn’t propose the same, so that’s just another strawman attack.
Is use of microterrain the only thing in your repertoire against ambushes or being pinned down? If not, why should it be the only thing in my repertoire?
“ambushed” and “pinned down” aren’t the same anyway. The discussion was about the latter. I’m not impressed by your inability to focus on what was being discussed.
There are tactics to address the “pinned down” problem on the squad to company leadership level. Those who cannot address it properly were either sent on a poorly devised patrol (higher leadership failure) or did/do not use good enough tactics. In either case – go back to basic. Some solutions to the problem have been known for more than 2,000 years.
It’s sad that what Western forces in Afghanistan call “we’re pinned down by fire from multiple directions and need urgent fire support” was known as “we found the enemy and feel forward to get a better picture” not long ago. (Not meant to be exact quotes, of course.)
You’re an abrasive fellow aren’t you.
No there’s several other methods of keeping an eye on events but without using precision strikes there’s not much that can be done about a couple of blokes on a scooter who drive to cached weapons, have a crack and move. You can watch them, you can follow them, but you cannot allow them to prevent you interacting with the population as that is their goal. To undermine you and make you look like cowards. So you suck it up. Tough shit war is hell.
I suppose, Komnando, you went to the Conan the Barbarian NCO school where fire power and using your advantages to mitigate theirs is frowned upon? Otherwise I cannot see why you think using precision strikes are such a bad thing. You think we should feel forward against an enemy several hundred metres away and who can in any instant drop their weapons get on their scooter and be speeding off at 40mph. How could you then counter them I wonder?
I’m unimpressed with your extremely poor idea of what actually goes on over there. Every argument you have presented has been countered. We do not hunker down, we are not incompetent at small unit tactics, strikes have a role, patrolling openly is a requirement and it is impossible to chase the Taliban on foot.
Deeply unimpressive all round really.
I am no expert on small unit tactics(in fact far less than an expert!) but so far I have not heard SO propose an alternative to what we do now. SO can you explain how you would go about doing Afghanistan Ops differently?
Hah, all the bulls-it acusations of strawmen attacks SO? You using a mirror?
First, you set up an imaginary situation with made up numbers, which bears no resemblence to reality or requirements, then castigates others for your imaginary scenario. Who’s doing strawmen attacks here? And I call bullsh-t on your “other sources” if they are of the same quality as the “Grog News” (that you linked to support your argument BTW.)
BTW, you American? Interesting that you would cite an “article” on the American Revolution if you were British. Very odd sourcing.
One of the reasons why I thought the RM column idea was good because it demonstrated to Mr Taliban that UK forces weren’t going to scuttle back to base after a patrol but stay out on the ground.
Perhaps we needed a few chaps on MXs who could run these moped-mounted-Taliban down?
Do you think Phil life would have be easier out there with twice the number of troops on the ground? One half doing the interacting and the other screening?
“Do you think Phil life would have be easier out there with twice the number of troops on the ground?”
The denser the force structure the better. But you kind of create a false model in your second bit, on a patrol only a few of the members would have a reason to interact one on one the rest of them provide the protection. So for example we might do a patrol to assess how the locals are doing building our road, and so CIMIC would come along and the OC of the company and they’d do most of the talking while the rest of us pulled cordons and blocks and overwatch whilst being jabbered at by Afghans for hours.
I am particarly fond of having a snotty kid 50cms from me repeatedly counting to ten for five hours.
So there’s two levels of interaction, shall we say the more general type, ie us just being there as a group and the more focused stuff where people talk business and have chai and shura’s and so forth. So no need to split like you say.
But dear God the more troops the better allthough not necessarily British troops now. More Afghan troops the better. Obviously they interact very well.
i knew one day the COD players would find their way onto a grown up site!
yeah yeah loads of smoke, up the middle and bosh. sorted
“yeah yeah loads of smoke, up the middle and bosh. sorted”
Stop quoting from PAMs.
Phil said “More Afghan troops the better. Obviously they interact very well.”
But what about resentments between the many Afghan peoples?
One more thing. When air support was called in how often was ordnance dropped, and how often was it one of those show of force fly bys?
@ Paul G re COD
More like fish finger……..
Every country has resentments. That’s something for them to sort out themselves. The resentments tend to manifest itself in the Taliban so what is often labelled Taliban might be one village screwing over another. It’s so complicated and so local.
From our tour, we didn’t use air that much. We used mortars shit loads and we used Apache’s a lot. We called in some A10s a few times and I think it was a French Mirage dropped 2x 500Ibs on a compound for us. We did one show of force that I know of.
But to be honest we only used them when we were on a “smash” most of the time we used mortar ambushes, very, very effective. But that was the nature of the unit I was with, the OC made liberal use of the mortars I think its down to the personality of those in charge.
But judging from the RAF operational reports I sometimes read, its rare for a bomb to be dropped and from the J-Chat thing I used to read which had contact reports from RC-SW overall bombs are used less than you’d think even by the Americans.
That said for the first 6 weeks of the tour there were A10s firing non-stop just to our north disrupting the enemy in the brigade battlespace. And I mean non-stop, every day for 6 weeks. Brrrrrp, Brrrrrrrrrrrrp. I wonder if they hit a bloody thing because every time we went north we had a hot reception.
SO is German and I’ve just done bit of browsing on his sight. He is obviously against “wars of choice” but he does have some very lnteresting articles and theories. I think you are being a tad harsh on him. Having said that, I think he needs to explain his prefered strategy/theory for Afghanistan, above the obvious withdrawl.
@ SO – what would your strategy/tactics be in Afghanistan? From reading some articles on your site I’m guessing they would be based upon your Jagdkampf/light skirmishing idea? If so how would this work against a non-peer adversary such as the Taliban? If not, what are you proposing?
@Phil
What calibre motars?
As for mobile strongpoints, wasn’t the Scots DG doing something similar with the Hogs? Move, set up all round armour (I avoid the term overwatch/defence as they were mostly sleeping… ), camp for a while?
I wonder if the Viking 120mm Motar rear module can be used for a Warthog, I always thought bringing your own fire support was a fine idea.
Before you go on to all the “KILL!! KILL!! KILL!!!”, you first need to FIND the bloody enemy, something he has missed out on GJ. It would be a real clown show if you “advanced to contact”… in the opposite direction.
And to do that you need:
1) Humint
2) UAV observation
or
3) Overwatch from long term positions, either a hide or a fort like the ones he kept dissing.
Where is his site? I would love to see how he came up with this insanity.
Observer,
I’ve no knowledge at all of the specific operation you refer to, but I can guarantee to you that SCOTS DG (all capitals, BTW) would not have been slacking or sleeping on the job. It’s a cardinal sin in the Regiment. Also, the CO on that tour was a direct contemporary of mine whom I’ve known for 25 years – and he’s completely mustard when it comes to professionalism.
Sorry, but if that was a dangle to wind me up, it worked.
James, I meant at night when all the good little boys and girls SHOULD be sleeping, not during a stand-to or overwatch.
Think there was a documentry out on their daily life somewhere on youtube?
Your question to SO misses the point. The point is this, combat is secondary to our main effort. Discussing what small unit TTPs are most effective in bringing about the desired end state in Afghan is like talking about what the best type of engine in a car should be. You can have awesome TTPs and an awesome engine, but on their own you wont have progress and you wont have a car.
Defeating the Taliban militarily is simply not possible.
There’s no TTPs that can differently influence the outcome in Afghan because combat is not a decisive factor.
So we are talking about something that makes no difference as long as your TTPs are more effective than the enemies and even the ANA manage that on a daily basis.
he’s right, they were on tv, formed the hogs into a square for the night, stags obviously sorted, 360 protection. It was notable because the subby climbed out of dossbag in harrods PJ’s!!!
PS the loads of smoke quote was given by my mate to a DS when we were on our senior carde, oh how we laughed as went up and down, up and down the hill!! (and it was not directed at anyone with the same first name initial as me)
“as went up and down, up and down the hill!!”
Did you have anything better to do…than go UP and DOWN the hill?!
The Taliban don’t see themselves as soldiers, but as social reformers and leaders. It’s a fundamental misconstruction to think of them as being a military force.
Yes, they are armed, but most Afghan male adults are. Yes, they plot attacks and lay IEDs, but they do so in their eyes as an organisation seeking to protect their social values against in this case western liberalism. It’s a subtle difference from thinking of themselves as an Army.
What the Taliban want is for us to go away. What we want to to come home, but we cannot because the central Government power is completely ineffective in the countryside, and we’ve said we’ll allow them time to grow in capability.
I heard a radio interview with an English-educated Afghan a few months ago. He predicted that within 24 hours of the UK leaving (assuming a dramatic “up and gone” scenario, not a phased withdrawal), the Taliban would emerge and take over from where they left off 11 years ago. I really think that would drive me to real tears at the thought of the 419 UK soldiers dead and thousands gravely injured, all for nothing.
@ Phil – very true. I personally believe SO is wrong on this one but I think he should have the chance to explaon/expand on his comments.
I believe Forts/FOB’s also have a political/psychological role; like the Medieaval Castle, they are a statement of power and intent. For this reason being visible is important. Against an opponent woth serious firepower then being mobile, stealthy or going underground would make more sense.
paul g said “It was notable because the subby climbed out of dossbag in harrods PJ’s!!!”
I find it oddly reassuring that high standards are being maintained in the field.
So true James.
Reminds me of the saying, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.
@Phil
Down and up the hill?
On a more important point, other than the military tactics, I really have difficulty seeing how we can improve the situation with regards to their government position. The global situation, yeah, one less terrorist training location, and for them, no more Fundamentalist government. But where do we go from there? How do we improve the living conditions there to a point where people would get fed up with sniping and IEDs and rather do 9-5 and go home to wife and kids? Economic improvement, surely, but, how? Less corupt government/police, improve army loyalty and morale, but how do we get to these goals?
“do so in their eyes as an organisation seeking to protect their social values against in this case western liberalism.”
I really think this is a misconception. Definitely, there are some Taliban who are motivated in this manner. But, and the evidence I believe backs me up, most are local gangsters with very local interests and very local operations. There are a small number of Tier One Taliban who fit your description James but they are by far and away in the minority.
The insurgency does not exist. It did (maybe), but now it does not.
In reality what was (maybe) an insurgency is now a large number of local, semi independent and more often than not completely independent groups of armed criminals buttressed by foreign ideological fighters and a small core of almost professional fighters and leaders.
The insurgency is fragmented, the Taliban are more an idea than an edifice. They are not even a federation and will fight amongst themselves but indeed retain a particular penchant for fighting us.
Like the whole Taliban in flip flops, living off the land Ninja stuff, the insurgency is a phenomena that is now more myth than reality.
Imagine removing the Police in a western city, add enormous drug money potential and now imagine what you’d get. This is what is going on over there. The western bogeyman is a unifying factor the leadership try and exploit and recruit foreign fighters with, and certainly we are a common enemy they enjoy shooting at but the reality is its more gangsters than freedom fighters. Nationalism is not a significant motivating factor and what residual nationalism there is has been getting undermined as the ANSF grows and will be fatally so when we go.
Then the place will be more like bad parts of Mexico in bad parts of Afghan. Deeply unpleasant but probably controllable with security force which indeed are a bit shit when compared to us but they are fighting criminals in flip flops on scooters so any organised structure which trains in fighting will be better than those lunatics.
“Less corupt government/police, improve army loyalty and morale, but how do we get to these goals?”
That is their problem. The biggest mistake we have made is to try to emphasise the nation building / democracy aspects in order to sweeten the mission.
Generally, I think Afghan will have good enough institutions to allow its economy to grow and undermine the drugs aspect to a reasonable extent. It will always be a problem I imagine but we all have our problems.
I think people (not you) forget that Afghanistan has not been as dysfunctional in its history as people think. They’ll broadly probably get along as I doubt very much there will be a power vacuum to allow anyone to slip into. I think when we leave folk will try in anticipation of Afghan government crumbling, but seeing as its their skins on the line and the money is coming from us, they’ll hold.
@ x
Sounds like the old Rhodesian Fire Force would be up your street.
Indigenous scouts in the field manning covert/semi-covert OPs. Spot something, call in the Fire Force. First on scene is a K-car (Alouette III carrying the ground commander and a short barreled, 20mm cannon mounted in the rear cab to shoot sideways out of the door). Follow on is 3-4 G-Cars (Alouette III’s carrying a 4 man stick of paras or light infantry).
Commander choses where to put the sticks down in order to intercept the enemy. Then the K-car circles overhead and goes after them with the 20mm, trying to kill/drive them into the patrols. They even had a Dakota on call with another 5 sticks if needed (para drop), and sometimes an old Cessna with guns and rockets.
Kill ratios in the region of 80:1. I guess you could do that with a Lynx/Apache.
Doesn’t help with the politics on the ground much, but good for fucking up the ones you can catch.
Um, methane can be reclaimed from cattle & sewage farms + composting schemes. Wonder if a mini version in a container could provide gas to run a generator?
@ Chris B
Yes I have lots of books on Rhodesian Bush War. Amazing what a tiny force with few assets achieved in such a large country. Interesting to compare with UK’s forces performance in Afghanistan. Different times though and different ROE.
As a wheeze I nearly bought a Rhodesian national side rugby jersey to wear to uni’. But thought better of it in the end.