A Guest Post from Sir Humphrey, author of ‘The Thin Pinstriped Line‘ defence blog
Contents
East of East of Suez – the UK commitment to the Asia / Pacific Rim.
The Far East is an area which has long held a fascination for many in the UK – both as a tourist destination, a source of economic prosperity, an emerging powerhouse of influence and dynamism, and a location where over many years the MOD has been engaged in one form or another. The region conjures up images of UK forces fighting in the jungles and seas of the Pacific, of the fall of Singapore, of great national humiliation, and immense pride, in wars such as Korea in the 1950s. Even today the UK contribution in Malaysia and the ‘Confrontation’ Campaign are seen as good examples of how to successfully handle low level insurgencies or military clashes.
The phrase ‘East of Suez’ seems to sum up a generational policy shift in the 1960s, when the UK began the process of recalling the legions, and withdrawing the tens of thousands of troops from the Asia Pacific region, and the drawing down of the great naval fortress of Singapore. In the public eye, the UK ceased to be a military power in the region in the 1970s, and to many our final withdrawal was completed in 1997 with the handover of Hong Kong. Yet, against all odds, and despite the expectations of many, the UK retains a small military presence in the region, and continues to enjoy strong relations with many of the nations present in this fascinating and immensely complex part of the world.
The purpose of this short series of articles is to review the UKs military commitments to the region, to gain an understanding of where UK defence interests lie, and review what it is that the UK is being expected to deliver, and my own personal view as to why it benefits the taxpayer to retain an influence in this region. It will be structured over three parts, and should be seen in the context of the wider TD series of Strategy Posts. It does not represent any official viewpoint, and should not be read or construed as being anything other than a personal interpretation of the current UK level of military commitment to the Asia Pacific region.
UK Commitments
For the purposes of this article, the Asia pacific region is deemed to be those nations east of the Indian Ocean, from Singapore through to the pacific coastlines of the Americas. It does not look at the roles played by UK forces in the Indian Ocean itself. Since 1997, the two main physical locations for UK forces in the region have been Brunei and Singapore.
Brunei: The role of the garrison in Brunei has been, at the request of his Majesty the Sultan of Brunei, to provide security for the country as a whole. The UK has had a military presence in Brunei since 1962, when troops landed to provide additional security. Today the garrison comprises some 900 personnel, predominantly drawn from the Ghurkhas’, for whom one battalion of light infantry is usually based in the Kingdom. Additionally, a small flight of helicopters and the UKs primary jungle warfare school (the other being in Belize, which has been downsized in the last year), as well as assorted other staff.
The Sultan meets the costs of the provision of the battalion, and also much of the infrastructure costs associated with their presence. The garrison arrangement is renewed on a five yearly basis between Brunei and the UK. At present the UK presence is scheduled to continue until at least 2015. An excellent summary of the UK defence commitment can be found at the FCO website, click here
Singapore: The UK presence in Singapore is not known to many in the MOD, let alone outside it. Until 1971 Singapore was home to a not inconsiderable number of UK warships and support vessels, using the dockyard facilities and support networks to provide the Far East Fleet. This organisation continued in a much reduced tri-national (Australia, New Zealand, UK) format until 1976, when the UK then withdrew its final contingents as economic problems forced a final withdrawal from the region.
Despite this, the UK retains to this day the ownership of a large fuel depot, and berthing wharves in Sembewang dockyard. Having been to the site a few years ago, the author can personally attest to its size, which provides berthing access for up to three escorts at a time, plus access to fuel and spare parts. Reportedly the fuel depot is the second largest in the Asia-Pacific region, and provides useful access for UK and allied warships to fuel. The FCO website has a good description of current UK military assets in Singapore, click here
These two facilities constitute the only permanent UK military presence in the region in terms of formed units or military installations. There is a wider set of individual exchange posts, particularly in Australia and New Zealand, where a plethora of UK personnel work as integrated members of these nations militaries.
Defence Attaches: One of the most significant UK military contributions in the region in terms of influence is the Defence Attaché network. Although many people are often sceptical of the value of defence attaches (a recent Daily Mail article referred to them as the so-called ‘Ferrero Roche’ network’), there is a strong argument to be made for the retention of these posts.
Attaches provide the UK with the opportunity to put military personnel into the region, to meet with and understand the military issues facing a country, and to get a better feel for strategic developments in a region. Many countries genuinely appreciate a UK Defence Attaché presence – it is seen as a sign that the UK takes their nation seriously from a military perspective, and this presence can often be invaluable in opening doors in an emergency.
In a region like the Far East, the Defence Attaché network represents one of the best means of the MOD to engage with local military forces and continue a relationship, particularly in nations which may rarely see a UK visit. As of November 2010, there were DA’s located in Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. (Source). Additionally, since 1998, posts have closed in the Philippines and Thailand.
Some of these posts are of particular interest, and worthy of note. The two posts in Korea and Japan owe much to the Korean War for their continued existence. As one of the main participants in the war, the UK continues to have a place on the UN Military Armistice Commission, and the position of a 1* helps ensure the UK is engaged in this particular diplomatic issue. Additionally, the presence of military personnel in Japan, where the DA holds the position of UK Liaison Officer to the United Nations Command (Rear) helps ensure that the UK can invoke access to Japanese ports and airfields at short notice under UN resolutions dating back to the war – and as seen during the North Korean nuclear tests some years ago, where the UK sent a radiation sampling VC10 to the region, this is a useful access right to be able to invoke (and also a means of demonstrating continued interest and influence in the region). For further information on the role both sections play, see these links – http://ukinjapan.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/our-embassy/how-we-can-help/defence-section and http://ukinrok.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-korea/defence-relations/
For the relatively small outlay of two defence sections, the UK is able to remain not only engaged in, and kept abreast of developments in the Korean peninsula, but also is able to safeguard access into the region. This helps the UK play a small, but influential role, and when coupled with the wider diplomatic presence in both Seoul and Pyongyang, means that the UK can help punch above its weight when it comes to influencing both these nations, and others involved in the delicate diplomatic situation in the region. While this may only be a small example, it does show that often a deft touch with the presence of a military attaché can have significantly wider ramifications for the UK as a whole.
Wider Exercises / Deployments: Although the UK has not had a major permanent military presence in the region for some time, until late in the last decade, regular task group deployments to the region ensured that there was a routine RN presence at least once per year, often in substantial numbers. The Ocean Wave 97 and Taurus 09 deployments are both good examples of the UK deploying substantial forces into the region, using enablers such as amphibious assault capabilities, and also wider surface ship capabilities, to visit a range of nations, conduct exercises under the auspices of regional alliances (such as the Five Power Defence Arrangement), and generally show the UK flag in an area which rarely sees a substantial UK military presence.
The combination of a smaller RN and a busyoperational tasking schedule means that deployments such as these have been less frequent for some time. Although there has been a limited RN surface presence – such as HMS RICHMOND in 2011, the reality is that for the time being, there is likely to be only a limited engagement in the area. The RN is very busy at present, and with a smaller escort fleet and reduced amphibious capability, all of which are in demand for real world operations, it is likely that future deployments to the region will see physically fewer, but materially vastly more capable, vessels operating there. Sadly the days of 10 – 15 vessel deployments such as OCEAN WAVE 97 are likely to have gone forever.
The RAF is also unlikely to see significant non-operational deployments into the region for the time being. The RAF operational fleet remains committed for operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and for as long as support to operations in Afghanistan remains the Defence Main Effort, then this is the priority for resources. That said, it is likely that exercises or small deployments, for instance to showcase Typhoon, will continue. As ever, it is important to remember that numbers of aircraft does not directly equate to capability, as both Typhoon and Tornado are immensely capable aircraft.
The Army is the service least likely to deploy in any substantial numbers to the region, although this is in keeping with the wider reality that since the 1960s and the end of Confrontation, the Far East region was far more an RN / RAF operational environment than an Army one. At the same time, the Army has the largest laydown of personnel of any UK service in the region, through the Brunei garrison.
Therefore, at any one time the UK military presence in the Asia Pacific region is just under 1000 permanently based military personnel, including Singapore, Brunei and the Defence Attache network. There are reasonably regular visits by RAF aircraft, and RN vessels, and although vastly smaller than the 1960s, there still remains a relatively substantial UK military presence to the East of East of Suez.
Having considered what the current UK military capabilities and commitments are in the region, the next instalment of this article will consider what possible challenges and threats exist in the region. This will also focus on the role of the FPDA, and wider UK engagement.
very interesting Read Sir H, I live about two miles from Sebawang and had no idea the MOD maintained a facility there. Its just a pitty we are unable to permanently base any vessels there. I wonder if we might consider renting it out the US Navy for their new LCS deployment in Singapore. It seems the ideal size for a fleet of 4 LCS.
A good one, as always!
The oddity in Brunei is the Bell 212s listed as UK assets; maybe they are the same ones as flown by the Brunei Air Force, and will then soon disappear (wiki tells us):”10 Bell 212 and the 4 Sikorsky S-70. The Bell 212s are to be replaced 2013-2015 by 12 Sikorsky S-70i”
- as a minimum, the shared logistics will disappear; or maybe the type is widely used by the oil sector and the technical support contracted out
- not a point of significance; just wondering why things are done differently for one garrison (Observer made good points recently about the minimum clearance needed for Puma/ Chinook types to land)
No joke on the facility martin, I even mentioned to Anixtu that those guys have the F-22 beat in terms of stealth.
LCS basing… er…. big problem, that one. Singapore must be seen to be netural, though it’s more or less an open secret it’s “neutrally” leaning towards the US. If there is marked bias, then it becomes a very important question on if the country is reliable enough to leave ~50% of all your trade in their control? If they decided to play games, it’s almost instant economic recession with “closure to X shipping”.
IMO, deploying (cough.. not basing… as both parties keep reminding us…) the LCS there on a permanant rotational basis was seriously stretching it, and honestly, I think it’s a stupid idea. It stretches diplomatic credibility for both sides and people are not too fooled by the “deploying there, not basing there” argument, and all for 4 ships that are of limited combat capability and are probably just there as a symbolic gesture. Why can’t they “diplomatic gesture” in the Philipines? It’s seen that they need American support, and that they are already staring eye to eye with China, so it is expected for them to lean far towards the US, being former US territory and all.
As for the US using Sembawang, not likely. The new facilities at Changi are more catered for them, complete with fuel and ammo storage. Which, now that I think of it, may be why LCS got deployed here in the 1st place. Storage of their damn “modular mission” system.
A good post, very informative.
Most of the information fits well with what I would like to see in the future.
A battalion for a land contingent is fine by me, it’s enough to act as a regional reserve and as a starting point for a quick increase should the need ever present itself.
As for the rest, Id really like to see a small Royal Navy squadron based at Diego Garcia, using Singapore for regular forward presence visits. The same goes for the RAF, a handful of aircraft in the Indian Ocean that can conduct stopovers further east when desired.
These commitments wouldn’t cost the earth if we decided we really wanted them. Furthermore I think a low level of activity would be very useful over the next few decades, it would be enough to show that we remain in support of our Five Powers allies and can contribute to the bulwark against Chinese expansion.
Under Five Powers and other agreements, the British fuel depot in Sembewang apparently supplies all British, Malaysian, American, Australian and New Zealand navy ships using the dock.
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We don’t do to badly as to a Royal Navy presence in the far east, though not all that extensive. HMS Echo, for example, has seen several long stints out east, including last year. If we did want to permanently base a ship in Sembewang, a survey ship like Echo or a transport/logistics ship -providing humanitarian cover and regional mobility for the Brunei garrison- might be the best choices. Wouldn’t achieve a great deal putting a single frigate out there.
@Brian Black
Yeah I get what you mean in terms of ships being permanently based out there. I don’t think it would really matter what kind of presence you had, as long as it was British Armed Forces and ‘flew the flag’ I think it would prove it’s worth.
A carrier group (if we actually get one) could occasionally head that way to hook up with East of Suez assets. It would be a clear reminder to everyone in the region that we still have that kind of reach and power…just!
@ Sir H – an excellent and informative arficle.Looking forward to the next post.
Challenger
Row upon Row of carrier junkies, has told me off on this forum, for suggesting we might send the elephant(s)East Of Suez in any kind of a shooting war.
It is also worth saying that the costs of doing some ‘Cruise of the great white fleet’* would use up a years defence cash, so won’t happen anyway.
I got accused of the great sin of setting up my own ‘straw man’ when I suggested it would be utterly stupid to do that. Got lots of quotes about how that was not what they are for, and no one has suggested they will ever be used like that etc etc. Of course
So strike such heresy from your mind, QE and or POW will never set foot east of Suez.
* If I recall correctly:- An operation by the US Navy circa 1907 to show the flag by cruising around the world: – So called because until then US Battle ships were painted white, soon after their return, and to show the US was entering the naval power game, they were painted a more warlike grey.
I’d like to pose the question of what tangible benefit, as opposed to notional, do we get from having DAs or even a ship stationed in the far east? Why are we maintaining jungle warfare shools in Brunei and Belize? Give me an example, where having a DA or a ship stationed out there in the past thirty years that has earnt us anything in the defence sphere. Happy to be corrected and put back in my box. The thinner we spread our forces the less credible we are in Afghan, the Falklands, for NATO commitments, counter-piracy and in terms of availability for the next crisis. No more pointless standing commitments like the Carribean patrol please…we can’t afford to do defence diplomacy anymore, leave it to the foreign office backed by a well resourced, well trained, credible expeditionary warfare capability.
@IXION
I was suggesting a small group of half a dozen ships heading east of Suez every 5 or so years, I have heard of the great white fleet and it doesn’t really compare!
What’s the point of 2 gigantic carriers if they can’t take the odd holiday further than the channel?
Challenger
‘What’s the point of 2 gigantic carriers if they can’t take the odd holiday further than the channel?’
No point whatsoever:- and thats my point:- they are ‘pointless’.
@badrobot
Very few places in the world for triple canopy jungle training. That place is hell, but in comparison, once you get used to it, anywhere else is easy. Just don’t throw thunderflashes into the water. It used to frighten the crocodiles away, but after a few decades, it’s now like the dinner bell to them.
@IXION
Well.. if you want a low cost way of showing the flag, the carrier probably isn’t it. We’d be more impressed with a 4 ship squadron (2 destroyers, 2 frigates). It shows… balance.
On a more painful note, what good is a carrier with a chopped down air wing? And frankly, the F-35 delivery schedule is very impressive. In the wrong way. I got a bit paranoid about the F-35 after the dead silence post-”first flight”, and did some checking up. The MoD forced some cost reductions on LM and the cost cutting LM did was to worker pensions and benefits. The assembly line is now on strike.
Painful lol. What a mess.
There is little doubt that a Carrier and her associated assets will deploy East o Suez pretty sharply after her being declared operationally ready.
Obviously ongoing ops may look different but in today’s climate she would probably do something along the lines of sail in to Med. Utilise Gib exercise areas. PASSEX with NATO standing forces in the Med.
Transit Suez provide assets for a short period to anti Piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden.
Transit Straits of Hormuz to demonstrate freedom of Navigation. Exercise with US and RN forces in Gulf. host a British trade fair/delegation in Dubai or Qatar.
Leave Gulf conduct defence Diplomacy mission in india along with exercise with Indian naval Units.
Back across Indian Ocean transit through anti Piracy areas enroute to visit in South Africa.
Make an unnaounced appearance IVO the FIs and fly a few jets overhead.
Then split the TG to conduct visits and tasking in either West Africa or the Caribbean enroute UK.
6 or 7 months contributing to NATO, Anti piracy, sending a message to Iran and cooperating with Gulf States and 5th fleet. Working with the Indians and South Africans. Send a quick message to the Argies and contribute in Caribbean and West Africa.
A useful deployment. The best use of a CV 25% of escort strengths an SSN and RFA? Discuss.
Thanks for the comments – hopefully parts 2 & 3 will expand on some of the questions raised here, and in particular basing, which I highly doubt will occur.
As to the tangible value of DAs. I am a huge fan of DAs – its not that you can point to a spreadsheet and go ‘they delivered X’. Its more that they provide access, influence, the ability to provide a discrete message, to be a conduit for communication. They can represent the UK interest, provide useful warning or advance notice, and a good read out of mood music. My judgement is that a good DA is the equivalent of a decent J2 cell in most locations – not because they gather intelligence, but because they give a good idea of what is going on, and more importantly why.
Carrier hunting pirates? Ouch to be them. OTOH overkill? And you guys really are stuck on the Falklands ain’t you?
The rest is probably very likely. Maybe RIMPAC as well? Having it perform well in an international exercise would go a ways to silence its detractors.
If the carriers go out to the Far East, bringing a few container loads of oriental electronic goods and car parts back to Europe would help offset the costs.
Plenty of spare room on them big ships.
Observers, US CBGs regularly detach escorts to take part in anti piracy ops in the GOA when the group is outside the Gulf itself. A few days’ utilisng jets and AEW assets to build a clear picture and detach a couple of escorts for a convoy in the IRTC would be useful.
Yes RIMPAC would be an option; though it would turn the deployment into a global!
Observer,
The Falklands represents almost 30% of the UK’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) – i.e. our mineral rights. What I find astounding is not the importance I/we attach to them now, but the lack of importance we attached to them 30+ years ago!
As for the carrier task group going East of Suez – I think it’s highly likely and like APATS first outing
@APATS
That was meant to be tongue in cheek. Emotion doesn’t carry well online, my bad. But I’ll really love to watch the face of the first pirate to have an airstrike called on him. lol. Or have a huge carrier chase after him. Sorry, watched too many Road Runner shows when young.
Simon. 30%? That’s a fair chunk, more if they dug up oil.
@IXION
I have to disagree on the likelihood of a carrier deployment east of Suez, I think, like a few of the previous commentators that it will most probably happen at some point, although I have no idea what the context will be or whether it will become a semi regular tasking or simply an isolated show of force when they are shiny and new.
I do agree however with the sad truth that the carrier project has been so regularly underfunded and appallingly mismanaged that any substantial deployment will look hollow to the point of national embarrassment.
We will most likely see either QE or POW head east with barely any aircraft on the deck and an equally pitiful task group accompanying it.
I’m a carrier advocate, but a 65,000 ton leviathan with 6-12 jets, maybe half a dozen helicopters and even fewer ships in tow is from my point of view not a justification for the billions spent.
Challenger, CDG regularly deploys with 2 or 3 escorts. If you looked at my post ref a possible deployment based on a few different ones I have been on you would have seen that actually it is not all about a show of force.
1 QE Class with 16 F35B, an AEW detachment and perhaps 3 Wildcats, 4 CHF helos or Chinooks and 3 Grey Merlin supported by an RFA 2 T23 or T26, 2 T45 and an Astute or T boat would be anything but a national embarrassment.
APATS, it would not have been, if not for the shining example of the Thais with THEIR aircraft carrier, at least in Asia. India might be far enough that the connection isn’t automatic, but a carrier with ~1 squadron on board is just begging for comparison.
Messages can be misread in the wrong light.
India, carrier deployment, maybe. Asia? Best not. Escort squadron might be a better idea.
Observer, What about the Thais 11k tonne Carrier? It does not even operate fighters off it anymore, it is a disaster relief LPH with a ski jump.
@APATS
A carrier group that had 16 jets, plus more than a dozen helicopters and a decent escort of several RFA’S, around 4 high-end frigates and destroyers and a submarine would indeed be an impressive sight, it’s the kind of force mix and strength I would see as very desirable for a blue water navy to be in possession of.
However, I honestly think it is going to take a very long time to reach that level of capability, if ever. What’s more is that it would be a pretty occasional event, stretching naval resources to breaking point in the process.
What’s the point in this show of force if 1. anyone observing knows that the Royal Navy will need months of downtime, gasping for air after such an almighty effort and 2. that if a real all out carrier operation were called for they wouldn’t be able to find the auxiliaries, escorts, aircraft, pilots etc to do it.
I want to be an optimist and believe that everything will work out in the end. But my honest opinion is that we will end up with 2 very large ships completed, but which will lack all the support structures and investment that make carriers the formidable and potent military tools they should be.
Challenger, Where did I say several RFAs and why should we be gasping fo air after such a deployment? Also how do you justify your point 2 against the future force structure?
I hate to say this, but, the military resources of individual European nations have declined to the point where single nations (UK or otherwise) would have little prospect of influencing events in Asia. If Europe wanted to exert influence, the only practical option would be the equivalent of a NATO Standing Force.
A say UK, German, Dutch force based on Deigo Garcia with rotating presence from other countries like Denmark, France and Norway, would sustain a useful force without straining (financially or numerically) the resources of any individual country.
Of course it would require European co-operation and unity of purpose so it would seem to be in the pigs might fly category.
True AJ.
What I find more likely is a banding together of Asian nations to form a more convincing deterent against *cough* you know who. Especially all those with claims to the Spratleys. Unfortunately, military equipment and co-ordination wise, the region’s a mess with Soviet, Chinese and Euopean equipment in a mish-mash. Credible players would be Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and Australia. Japan is 50/50, their constitution forbids external adventures. Russia? Who knows? Their inclusion will make things extremely “interesting”. AKA complicated…
James might find some business here, someone who can come up with a common system to link all the equipment together in Link 16 quality is going to clean up.
“What I find more likely is a banding together of Asian nations to form a more convincing deterent against *cough* you know who”
– This is precisely what the US wants and what the Chinese do not want. Unilaterally, the nations of the South China Sea cannot hope to negotiate reasonable deals with China over access to the resources. Multi-laterally, they have a significantly greater chance of negotiating a good, mutual deal.
They do need to come up with some sort of union though, like an asian version of NATO that is focused on that area.
I believe that the Indian Ocean is of more interest to the UK, for 3 choke points (Suez, Hormuz and Malacca), and for influence into east Africa, and we retain Allies with port facilities all around the Indian Ocean. However, there’s nothing at all wrong with the lay down Sir H describes. I’ll wholeheartedly support his views on DAs – the old man was one in his final tour and I spent some time with him. It’s damned hard work, can be hugely influential, and takes a certain type of person to do it well.
I do think the Andrew have a potentially greater role to play in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, but not necessarily in the warship sense. A ship capable of cruising at 25 knots based at Diego Garcia can be anywhere in the Indian Ocean in 100 hours, and into the western Pacific as well (I’m sure Sir H’s future analysis of the hotspots will reveal them to be almost exclusively in the western Pacific). If the MoD initially stationed an RFA on Diego Garcia, there’s a useful asset that can:
1. Support normal RN operations in the Gulf.
2. Support (or lead) anti-piracy operations in Suez or Malacca.
3. Act as a disaster relief ship for any country that needs it (tsunamis, cyclones, etc)
4. Forward operating base for NEO operations, with the ability to take British nationals offshore.
I say an RFA initially as I’m convinced that a ferry-type ship would be better suited long term, crewed by the RFA who fly in and out for 4 month stints to operate the ship. The ship would need helicopter handling / hosting facilities, but a ro-ro design is suitable for civilian ports, can store containers for disaster relief aid, and probably provide accommodation for 500-1000 people as well, whether they are embarked troops or rescued civilians. I’m sure the MoD would also use it in conjunction with the Brunei Garrison for some annual power projection / FPDA exercising on an annual basis.
How much are reasonably decent ferries on the used market?
I’d suggest QE, Daring, Astute and an RFA tanker are all that is needed as a show of force.
I don’t quite see the difficulty in getting a dozen jets on board along with a commando battalion, half a dozen Chinooks and a dozen Merlin.
You’re not going to war you’re just saying “we can put these chaps on your turf and you can’t do a thing about it”.
Furthermore I don’t see it as stretching the RN, in fact, I’d suggest the deployment could (not that we would) be sustained indefinitely – well until the hulls rust through.
I think the Pacific, beyond aid to Australia and New Zealand, is an ocean too far.
X,
agreed. I noted Sir H’s definition (“…those nations east of the Indian Ocean, from Singapore through to the pacific coastlines of the Americas“), but it didn’t quite fit with the hobby horse I wanted to ride….;)
Sorry, Sir H, but in seriousness I’d include the Indian Ocean in Asia. Using your definition it would be hard to argue in Whitehall that we’ve got a serious national interest, so would be unlikely to attract any funding. I appreciate that you are not making a case for that, at least in this article. Maybe your analysis of the hotspots will indeed throw up something we should be thinking about and possibly preparing for, in which case my idea about making better use of Diego Garcia could be a contributory resource – a sort of stepping stone and safe haven most of the way towards the trouble.
Simon; a carrier with only 12 jets is hardly a show of force, it is more a statement of helplessness. The Astute would provide the carrier group with an impressive degree of surface/sub-surface protection but with the carrier air group you suggest the QE/T45 couldn’t do much more than sit off shore and watch in most likely scenarios.
Observer; the chance of Asian nations forming an alliance to counter balance China is remote. People are prepared to fall in behind the US but that is about as far as it goes. I will give you an example the Australian 2009 White paper postulated a much stronger RAN. Our Defence Minister recently visited China. Unfortunately for him some of the force studies backing a stronger Navy had also leaked. Not surprisingly the studies described supporting the US in various action against China. When China demanded he expain the threat we consider China to be…… To say that he crawled away on all fours is to be polite. Trade with China is just too important.
People are pinning their hopes on the US sticking around….., and joining the fan club …., and getting a free ride.
P.S. The 2009 White paper lasted around 9 months, in the two budgets since none of the additional funding on which the white paper was based has eventuated. Situation normal?
@ RT
I see the Indian Ocean “area” as a rough triangle that extends to cover the Antipodes and NZ, and even reaches around the Cape of Good Hope to include the FI. Deigo Garcia being just as a close as the UK to the those islands.
(A lot depends on whether the southern shore of the Mediterranean stays friendly (and Turkey too.))
Aussie Johnno,
I know what you’re getting at but 12 jets would cover a battalion of marines with T45 covering the fleet. I doubt many nations could repel that kind of focused power?
I think we all tend to underestimate how effective modern jets actually are. Especially when we look at the likes of Nimitz. Kuznetsov carries a single squadron for long range air defence and a stack of anti-ship/air missiles along with the ability to deploy a small force to land. I’d suggest this too is a little more effective than many think. It would seriously unsettle this country if it let rip off the shores of Scotland.
if we are to accept that unit-selection is driven by desired outputs on MoD scenario planning, and not purely the chequebook, then we can be pretty sure that we will be getting a larger fleet of F35b than would have been the case if we had stayed with “c”.
i will put money on the fact that:
1. an every day gin-palace cruise will have twelve jets.
2. an ATG with a job to do (like Libya) will have twenty four jets.
3. an event like the islands-that-must-remain-unnamed will have thirty six jets
4. and likely the second carrier alongside as a spare airfield with twelve hot-spares and lots of empty deckspace
we’ll buy at least 72 F35b, even if over a period of time.
The view from is the region is that a UK is presence nice to have, but don’t count on it. Its like the Queen monarch, mostly ceremonial.
All the big operational exercises are US-focused; Cobra Gold, Talisman Sabre, RIMPAC etc. Very few UK hardware have been involved.
Do we really want to send HMS Prince of Wales to the Far East, look what happened to the last one.
jedibeeftrix,
I’d bet (not much mind you) that we’ll never see more than 24 jets on QE.
However, if we get Albion/Bulwark replaced by a couple of proper LHDs then I’ll up my bet to 30 (three squadrons of ten).
lol Jim, good one.
@AJ
I remember that incident. The Australian media didn’t help. Should have handwaved it away as “possibility studies” “similar to what you guys do for the US.” etc. Oh well. As for military alliances, it all depends on how aggressive China behaves I guess. Aggressive enough to scare everyone together is the needed level of tension for this to happen.
@Simon
Most countries in Asia yawn at a Battalion. Seriously. Their manpower pool is so huge, and their labour costs so low, they can afford scary amounts of soldiers, not to mention their “militia”(not soldiers) tend to be fighting rebels year in, year out. Very experienced jungle fighters. Unless you go in as part of a huge force, I’d recommend “don’t”.
As I mentioned before, and AJ concurs, unless you have 40+ jets on your carrier, don’t expect us to be impressed. All we’ll think of is “Another Thailand, wanted a carrier, can’t afford the aircraft.”.
Observer,
I’m not sure I’d be terribly interested in simply impressing. It’s a matter of what a dozen stealth jets can do to your barracks and air-defences whilst you’re asleep that matters. The battalion is there simply to wipe away the mess that’s left.
Sorry that sounds a bit ratty but we’re not talking about 12 Harrier from 50nm – we’re talking about 24 x 1000lb Paveway (or cluster bombs if I could have my way) from outside most Asian’s countries early warning range for stealth jets.
Simon, China has the J-20. The F-35 is simply a “sanitized” “cheap” version of the F-22 intended for export. It’s stealth characteristics have been degraded to “Acceptable Congressional limits”, not to mention it’s primarily configured for anti-air radar, it’s weaker against ground based radars which uses different frequencies. I’ve always considered the “stealth” part (LO actually) to be a lot of LM propaganda.
I suspect you seriously underestimate the region. Ask AJ if he’s going to be worried about 24 Paveways from mythtical “invisible jets”. Which we are going to use too, results pending. In batches of 100-150. As opposed to…. 12.
Wasn’t the point of “showing the flag” meant to impress? Or did you want to skip the preliminaries and go straight to the bombings?
As for cluster munitions, you’d have to ask HMG why they signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions treaty. And guess who refused to sign it?
Better to focus our efforts as currently deployed and leave the Far East/Pacific to the US… Our forces would be more effective relieving US + other partner nations forces in the Atlantic/Med/Indian Ocean, freeing up their forces to deploy there.
As stated we just dont have the combat power to effectively deploy to the Far East/Pacific in anything more than a token gesture with all the committments the UK has abroad.
True Brian.
I always thought it was a mistake for the UK to disassociate with Asia so fully. Militarily and administration wise, there was no choice, sentiment of the time didn’t support it. But economically? There was a total shift to Europe, which chopped almost 1/4 of the world market away from British companies with some exceptions (e.g BP). Admittedly, it might have looked to make some sense then as Asia was fairly undeveloped as a market, but it failed to take into long ranged account that regions grow. Oh well. We can only wait and see.
@ Brian,
“Better to focus our efforts as currently deployed and leave the Far East/Pacific to the US… Our forces would be more effective relieving US + other partner nations forces in the Atlantic/Med/Indian Ocean, freeing up their forces to deploy there”
Precisely. I think this is the most value we can offer to that region, by allowing nations like the US to focus their efforts there. Our contribution to the region is likely to be marginal at best.
Observer, the Australian media never help, in a rather even and stable environment they tend beat up stories. They are currently making a dogs breakfast out of boat people.
Getting back to what Europe might do east of Suez I stick to my original point ‘no european country individually has the resources to have much impact alone’. Defence spending is growing significantly across Asia. It is patchy but countries tend to fall into 2 categories, growing economies with growing Defence forces or countries which (for what ever reason) are missing out on growth but are not particularly target rich unless you are prepared to go for the civilian infrastructure.
If Europeans want to extend there influence you really have to coordinate your assets somehow. Take AWD’s for interest, you have 6 modern T45′s (not enough). But the Dutch have 4 AWD’s, the Germans about 2 or 4(building I think), the French have 2 with more AWD Fremms coming, the Italians have 2, the Spanish have 4 or 5. That is suddenly a force of over 20 vessels.
Oh, I forgot Denmark’s 3 AA frigates based on the Absalom hull. Thats around 25, and second only to the US, and you can do similar calculations with other vessel types.
@AJ, re ‘no european country individually has the resources to have much impact alone’ – you are right of course, but the UK does have interests and historical ties to the region and could bring to bear sea / air military assets even at that distance that only a handful of countries in the region could even try to emulate.
The area where we cannot have much impact (outside of total war and drafting civilians) is on the ground. Sure we could provide SFs, Training, weapons or even a limited short duration intervention from sea, but beyond that a token battalion or two is all we could realistically offer.
Having significant naval / air bases at Gibraltar (and Cyprus for air base) and Diego Garcia, forward supply / lesser military bases in the Falklands, Ascension, Oman and Singapore and small detachments / training facilities in Belieze, Canada, Brunei and Kenya would give the UK a truely global reach. Hang on… Apart from bulking in up Diego Garcia and making more use of Singapore we have this already right…
The UK should just start by confirming the relevance of the Five Power pact and it’s position as an equal to the other nations involved. We should then abandon our efforts to cosy up with the French and start to commit more resources for training etc.
Sorry, missed we should be making more of “Gibraltar” also…
Europe will be a deadzone for the next 50 years; some minor strife maybe. As long as we do not ignore the primary duty of defending the UK, Europe will be decreasing in relevance and our future prosperity will be dependant on getting out their and engaging in the world as a whole (the military is only part of this of course!)
“Europe will be a deadzone for the next 50 years; some minor strife maybe. As long as we do not ignore the primary duty of defending the UK, Europe will be decreasing in relevance and our future prosperity will be dependant on getting out their and engaging in the world as a whole (the military is only part of this of course!)”
– Just as the Eurozone is on the brink of collapse, the EU wants to create a European Superstate, and a lot of raw national feelings are being rubbed together around the continent?
Europe may just get a far lot more “interesting” shall we say in the next decade.