The study has been running for some time but has now concluded.
A statement from Nick Harvey (Minister of State for Defence)
The Defence Rotary Wing Capability Study was commissioned to ensure that the Department has the right plans in place to meet the demands on helicopter capability in the future. I am pleased to say that the study is now complete and, given the interest taken in the study by Parliament, I wanted to take the opportunity to announce its key findings. As the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend Peter Luff, who has responsibility for defence equipment, support and technology, stated in his response on 30 April 2012, Hansard, column 1142W, I should reiterate that the findings include no major changes to our previously announced plans.
The study reviewed the full rotary wing requirement for the land, sea and air environments. This encompassed all helicopter roles: attack, lift, reconnaissance and search and rescue. The study was broken down into six work strands covering future force structure, training and simulation, support, specialist roles, basing, and search and rescue.
The aim was to look across all areas of the Department to ensure that we are working as efficiently as possible to deliver the plans for rotary wing capability outlined in the strategic defence and security review. The study confirmed the following plans:
to move the MOD’s rotary wing capability to four core fleets, the Chinook, Wildcat, Merlin and Apache helicopters;
to complete the Puma life extension programme, which extends the out of service date for Puma Mk2 to 2025; this offers resilience to the Department’s lift capability as it transitions to the four core fleets; and
to transfer the Merlin Mk 3/3a to the Royal Navy’s commando helicopter force.
As a result of this review, the Department has:
identified opportunities in training and support as the most promising areas to achieve rationalisation and efficiencies. Broadly this includes making better use of simulated training and adopting a simpler approach to procurement and alternative models for support;
considered alternative ways of organising our helicopters and concluded that Joint Helicopter Command should continue to command land-based (battlefield) helicopters and Navy Command should continue to command maritime helicopters;
confirmed the end of MOD provision of Rotary Wing Search and Rescue at the remaining eight military bases upon withdrawal of the Sea King in April 2016. This will then be performed by a contractor through the Department for Transport, as the Secretary of State for Transport announced to Parliament on 28 November 2011, Hansard, columns 52-53WS.
The MOD and other interested parties will now consider the recommendations and these findings will now be taken forward as part of routine departmental business.
“move the MOD’s rotary wing capability to four core fleets, the Chinook, Wildcat, Merlin and Apache helicopters”
- I wonder at what number the Merlin fleet will end up, once the Puma/ Merlin mix and reshuffling has been sorted? The other 3 fleets stand close to 60 each
- does this mean that in the early 20′s the medium helo will be looked at again? Or will we be the only ones in the world missing that rung on the ladder (not counting these http://www.helihub.com/2012/01/13/uk-special-forces-add-fifth-n3-dauphin/ nor the 212s in Brunei)
@ACC
I find it hard to believe that Chinooks and Wildcat could replace the medium sized Puma. But then with the Apaches needing SLEPs (Block III) I rather not think too hard about it.
So presumably this review mentioned nothing about either of the above needs. It makes you wonder what goes through these people’s minds.
@ArmChairCivvy and Opinion3
The Merlin fleet once it’s all transferred and upgraded should stand at nearly 70 airframes in 3 different variants (can anyone explain why only 25 RAF Merlin’s will be transferred instead of all 28?).
I look at the Wildcat and see that it’s a brilliant naval helicopter, one that is small, fast, can be nicely packed with weaponry and although not cheap doesn’t cost the earth.
It really isn’t suited to the Army’s needs though, I can’t see a defined role that calls for this sort of capability. The Army has Apaches and Chinooks around that have really defined and useful roles. What exactly is Wildcat’s role? I really think that in the next few years a medium lift helicopter needs to be sought, as long as it’s an off the shelf and relatively cheap platform.
Would Wildcat be suitable as a rotary UAV? Perhaps optionaly manned? I believe the Yanks are talking about operating UAV’s from Apaches and one of the main roles for the Wildcat is scouting for our Apaches…
Op 3, the Army Air Corps have always flown the best anti submarine helicopters Westlands can make. There’s your answer
Hi Challenger,
” (can anyone explain why only 25 RAF Merlin’s will be transferred instead of all 28?).”
- mishaps? Been quite a number of years of operation
Navy’s Merlins upgrade contract also only had only an option for the last 8
- I have always read that one as the number being set aside for a separate Crowsnest upgrade
…now we are already down with 11 as for the general purpose Merlin fleet
Challenger,
3 of the Merlins are broken and awaiting either money to repair or permission to scrap.
The army variant of the Wildcat is no more cable than the Lynx Mk9 and a huge waste of money. Its role is to fly senior army officers around the UK (primary role and hence why it is being bought) and carryout ISTAR and escort duties on Ops as long as its not too hot.
Puma 2 will be a good medium lift helicopter with excellent hot and high performance once it comes in and hopefully still be easy to service/repair in the field.
All the Merlins will be converted to Mk4 standard (standardised cockpits etc, but the Mk3a will continue to have the majority of its quirks and differences) and the Navy will waste millions fitting folding tails to the old Mk3/3a instead of getting a better gearbox and more spares on the shelf.
All the helicopters falling under JHC will continue to suffer from poor funding (they belong to the army) and miss management due too much army influence. I say this due to the limited experience Army Officers have at operating and more importantly managing aircraft and it is Army Officers that fill the majority of posts at JHC (and they ultimately all report to Commander Land Forces).
The real missed opportunity is not getting rid of JHC in order to streamline and shrink the command structure. If the navy can direct its own helicopter fleet, why can’t the army and airforce respectively? The end of JHC would create savings that could pay for fewer redundancies at the sharp end, maybe even a very handy infantry battalion. My position is that if it flies the RAF should own it from an administrative and training point of view, but the important thing is that the command/control, in both training and operations, should always be subourdinate to the most senior army or navy officer, dependent on the circumstances. This latter approach would enforce that horrible word ‘jointness’.
badrobot,
JHC controls all land based helicopters including the SK4s (Navy).
JHC is tiny as an organisation, in fact it is too small to do its job properly. Any savings would be tiny, if anything.