So, where to start?
No other issue, it seems, gets people so excised as aircraft carriers and their aircraft, they remain such an iconic capability and subject area huge volumes are written about them.
One thing is certain; those looking in from the outside are not in possession of all the facts so whatever I might think it is important to appreciate this.
The statement in full from the SoS Defence…
With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on the Carrier Strike programme.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review considered the carrier strike programme, put in place by the previous Government, as part of a wide ranging review of options for delivering effective future defence while dealing with the black-hole in Labour’s Defence budget and the unaffordable “fantasy” equipment plan bequeathed to us by the Party opposite. While the Review confirmed that carrier strike would be a key capability in delivering Future Force 2020, it also recognised the unsustainability as a whole of the Defence Equipment Plan we inherited.
The strategic decision on carrier strike which emerged from the SDSR process was to convert one carrier with catapults and arrestor gear to operate the Carrier Variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, facilitating greater interoperability with allies, with a decision on the future use or disposal of the second carrier to be taken at the 2015 SDSR. The decision was also taken routinely to embark 12 fast jets while retaining the ability to surge up to the previously planned level of 36 aircraft. As the House would expect for such a complex and high-value project, the strategic decision taken at SDSR was followed by the commissioning of a detailed programme of work to look at the costs, risks and technical feasibility of all aspects of the proposed solution. That study was expected to take eighteen months, completing by the end of 2012.
Since I took on the role of Defence Secretary in October last year, my overriding concern, after current operations and the welfare of our Armed Forces, has been to ensure the deliverability of the MOD’s Equipment Plan and the achievement of a balanced and sustainable budget. That will give our Armed Forces the assurance they need to carry out the massive transformation that will deliver Future Force 2020 – the concept for our Armed Forces set out in the SDSR. The Carrier project is a large element of the Equipment Programme and I have worked closely with the new Chief of Defence Materiel, Bernard Gray, to assess the technical and financial risks involved in it.
It quickly became clear to me that a number of the underlying facts on which the SDSR decision on carriers was based were changing:
First, as the programme to convert a carrier to operate with a catapult system has matured, and more detailed analysis has been carried out by suppliers, it has become clear that operational Carrier Strike capability, using the ‘cats and traps’ system, could not be delivered until late 2023 at the earliest, considerably later than the date envisaged at the time of the SDSR of “around 2020”. Because Britain’s carriers will have all electric propulsion, and therefore do not generate steam like nuclear powered vessels, the catapult system would need to be the innovative Electromagnetic version (EMALS), being developed for the US Navy. Fitting this new system to a UK carrier has presented greater design challenges than were anticipated.
Secondly, and partly as a result of the delayed timetable, the estimated cost of fitting this equipment to the Prince of Wales has more than doubled in the last 17 months, rising from an estimated £950M to around £2Bn, with no guarantee that it will not rise further.
Technical complexity and the cost of retrofitting cats and traps to the Queen Elizabeth, the first carrier, would be even higher, making it unlikely that she would ever, in practice, be converted in the future.
Thirdly, at the time of the SDSR, there was judged to be a very significant technical risk around the STOVL version of JSF and some commentators were speculating that it could even be cancelled. Indeed, the STOVL programme was subsequently placed on probation by the Pentagon However, over the last year, the STOVL programme has made excellent progress and in the last few months has been removed from probation. The aircraft has completed over 900 hours of flying, including flights from the USS Wasp and the US Marine Corp has a high degree of confidence in the in-service date for the aircraft. The balance of risk has changed and there is now judged to be no greater risk in STOVL than in other variants of JSF.
And fourthly, further work with our allies on the best approach to collaborative operation has satisfied us that joint maritime task groups involving our carriers, with co-ordinated scheduling of maintenance and refit periods, and an emphasis on carrier availability, rather than cross-deck operations, is the more appropriate route to optimising alliance capabilities.
Mr Speaker, when the facts change, the responsible thing to do is to examine the decisions you have made and to be willing to change your mind.
However inconvenient that may be. Doing what is right for Britain. Not burying your head in the sand and ploughing on regardless, as the last Government so often did. A persistent failure to observe this simple principle is at the root of many of the MOD budget problems that we inherited from the party opposite. I do not intend to repeat their mistakes.
The decision taken in the SDSR to proceed with a carrier strike capability, despite the massive challenges we faced with the MOD’s budget, was the right decision.
The decision to seek to contain costs, by going for “cats and traps”; on a single carrier with greater interoperability with allies, and the cheaper CV version of the JSF aircraft, was also the right decision, based on the information available at the time.
But the facts have changed. I am not prepared to accept a delay in regenerating Britain’s carrier strike capability beyond the timetable set out in the SDSR.
And I am not prepared to put the equipment plan, which will support Future Force 2020, at risk of a billion-pound plus increase in the carrier programme and unquantifiable risk of further cost rises.
So, I can announce today that the National Security Council has agreed not to proceed with the “cats and traps” conversion, but to complete both carriers in STOVL configuration. This will give us the ability to use both carriers to provide continuous carrier availability – at a net additional operating cost averaging about £60M per year. As we set out in the SDSR, a final decision on the use of the second carrier will be taken as part of SDSR 2015.
We will switch the order for JSF aircraft from CV to STOVL, which we can do without delaying delivery and, by making this announcement today, we can plan on the basis of the first operational aircraft being delivered with a UK weapons fit package.
We expect HMS Queen Elizabeth to be handed over to the Navy in early 2017 for sea trials.
We expect to take delivery of our first test aircraft in July of this year, and we expect the first production aircraft to be delivered to us in 2016, with flying from the Queen Elizabeth to begin in 2018, after her sea trials are complete.
We have discussed this decision with the French Government and with the United States. The French confirm that they are satisfied with our commitment to jointly planned carrier operations to enhance European-NATO capability.
The United States, on whose support we would rely in regenerating either type of carrier capability, has been highly supportive throughout this review and I would like to record my personal thanks to the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, the Navy and the Marine Corps for their high level of engagement with us. I spoke to Secretary Panetta last night and he confirmed the US willingness to support our decision and its view that UK carrier strike availability and our commitment to the JSF programme are the key factors.
The Chief of the Defence Staff and his fellow Chiefs of Staff – all of them – endorse this decision as the quickest and most assured way now to deliver carrier strike as part of an overall affordable equipment programme that will support Future Force 2020.
Mr Speaker, this was not an easy decision to take. But our responsibility is to make the right decision on the basis of the facts available to us. Neither I, nor any of my colleagues came into Government expecting decisions to be easy or pain-free.
I have a responsibility to clear up the financial mess we inherited in the MOD, just as we are clearing up the mess we inherited across Government as a whole. To set a balanced budget. And an affordable, deliverable Equipment Programme. With manageable and bounded risk.
This decision addresses one of the last impediments to me announcing the achievement of those objectives to the House, and I hope to be able to do so very soon.
But Mr Speaker, it isn’t just about balancing budgets, critical as that is. It is about the UK’s Defence – secured by having an appropriate and sustainable military capability. This announcement delivers an affordable solution to securing that capability and, with 2 useable carriers, gives us the option of continuous carrier availability. It confirms the expected delivery of the first test aircraft this summer; of the first production aircraft in 2016; of the first carrier into sea trials in 2017; and of the first flight of the JSF from the deck of the carrier in 2018, with an operational military capability in 2020. It confirms the support of our principal allies – the US and France. And that of the Defence Chiefs.
Mr Speaker, it shows that we, at least, are not afraid to take difficult decisions when they are right for Britain. I commend this statement to the House.
My opinion, as ill-informed as it might be, is that this is the correct decision and as evidenced by all posts on the subject I have consistently maintained the F35B was the most sensible choice throughout the debate.
The reason I thought and think the F35B represents a sensible, practical, pragmatic and reasonable choice is based on taking a wide angle view across all three services.
That the F35B is more expensive in isolation to buy and maintain, or that it has less range and payload than the F35C is no revelation but that is not the point.
Neither is the objective of the Joint Combat Aircraft and CVF to get aircraft and aircraft carriers into service as a means unto itself, neither is it important to discuss the legacy, tradition or heritage of British naval aviation innovation and development.
Talk of being second only to the USN, having so called ‘proper’ aircraft carriers is just nonsense, designed to obfuscate the real issue of delivering effects across multiple defence lines of development within, and this is the crucial part, a fixed budget.
We often hear comments like ‘if we are going to do it we should do it properly’ or this is a ‘short term financial decision’ but that sounds like business as usual and a very short cut to increasing the size of the budget black hole. The MoD has to live within its means; I am not sure why so many people have difficulty understanding this fundamental principle.
It is not an option to raid the other services future equipment programmes either, CVF/JCA should not be allowed to dominate the equipment programme and future operating budgets because it is one of many things we need to be spending money.
If only we could buy off the shelf people might argue but it is British wealth that pays the MoD’s bills so to try and divorce the industrial, foreign exchange and intellectual property benefits of F35 from other options is simply naive.
Everything is connected, everything is important.
So yes, I accept that it is a compromise in pure specification terms in comparison with the F35C but when taken in the round, a pragmatic decision based on the realism of operating carrier strike in British armed forces, not anyone else’s.
The MoD now needs to inject some stability into the programme and to be honest, get it off the front pages. Those involved need the space, support and funding to deliver the capability and anyone whinging needs to think twice.
It seems clear that neither the RAF or RN has covered themselves in glory with their leaky/briefy games, I hope that the guilty take the time to reflect on their actions.
I am going to have a look at some of these issues in more depth in a future post but for now, the choice has been made (again) and I think the current Secretary of State for Defence needs roundly congratulating for having the balls to take a tough decision with serious political consequences for the wider good of the MoD but make no mistake, there are many question about how exactly the comedic decision making process went from Plan A to Plan B and then back to Plan A, this has cost anywhere between £40 and £50 million PLUS any cancellation/exit costs with US suppliers.
There are serious issues of competence to address but the two key issues that stand out for me are
- What and who prompted the change in the SDSR, how much have we wasted and exactly how this Fleet strength cockup actually happened, looking back
- Can we just get on with it, looking forward
@All Politicians are the Same
I suggest you do some proper research from Portuguese and Brazilian sources rather than just English ones if you wish to understand the magnitude of the Brazilian Navy’s aspirations. Some of their official documents actually show the PA2 (French variant of the CVF) as a model of their planned carrier acquisition. A brief summary of numbers will be found at:
http://www.camaras.org.br/Arquivos/Download/Upload/442.pdf
Yes, the plan is spread into the 2040s, but that is the whole point of building a navy – you do it in stages, not create something overnight that you cannot operate. On the other hand it does not seem to be taking the UK very long to dismantle the Royal Navy.
Simon, re your beach assault.
I can only think that you have not read Clausewitz’s dictum “clout, don’t dribble” (“klotzern, nicht kleckern”), and have certainly not watched Apocalypse Now.
You don’t do beach assaults over 24 hours to get 800 men ashore in penny packets. You do a beach assault in 5 minutes to get 800 men ashore, preferably by both air and sea, and the air element at maximum mutually supporting range from the sea element. You do it with maximum aggression, or at least potential aggression if it is undefended.
This is what a proper all-air assault looks like:
SF pre-deployed
NGS (on call)
CAS on call
AH 2 minutes before assault wave, then circling overhead and neutralising threats to 4 kms.
Assault wave 1: 2 x companies
Assault wave 2: 2 x companies plus C2
Assault wave 3: organic indirect fire assets, NGSFOs, engineers, rear link detachment.
Support wave 1: medics, ammunition.
Support wave 2: ammunition, water, light vehicles underslung.
Now, you want all three assault waves coming ashore within 5 minutes. By my reckoning, that is something like 30 Merlins. The two support waves need to be there within one hour, so that is another 10 Merlins.
Can you get 40 Merlins into the air from a QEC 200 nm out, plus 8 AH, plus a couple of CAS pairs, and airborne C2, and is it easy?
That’s only one Commando. You need to do all of that three times more in the next 4 hours to get the whole Brigade ashore.
Hi FBOT,
RE “upgrading the T23 fleet in various stages over the next 4-6 years”
I have (only) read between the lines that to even it out in expenditure terms, the deliveries will stretch out to 2035, also dictated by when even the youngest current hull will “die”.
So take the difference between (2012+6) and 2035 and divide that by 8 or 13…one and half years a ship, and it is not a big ship. You would ideally probably want 35-50% concurrency in construction (I don’t know if there any benefits from that when in the fitting-out phase)
- over to the shipwrights for comment
James
ref: “but the mood is apparently that the Andrew have brought it on themselves.”
Definately not shooting you as the messenger (my Father was Cavalry, he wouldn’t let me) but that kind of shit really, really pisses me off !
The frakkin 1st Sea Lord did not get out of bed one morning pior to 98 SDR and say “bugger me, I think I will mortgage the future of the RN for the sake of 2 carriers, yep, grand idea…..” and then bimble off and frakking make it so.
Carriers were a government forgein policy and defence policy ‘decision’. Various flavours of HMG wanted to do “expeditionary warfare” and thought carriers would be a good idea. Not the RN, not the MoD per se, but the Cabinet.
Now I am not saying the Admirals are completely blameless for not getting them made into Cavours, or cancelled out right when the chances presented themselves, but the RN top brass of the mid-90′s did not invent the aircraft carrier or the concept of expeditionary warfare, because they thought it would get them one up on the Air Vice Marshalls ! Similarlry how many Generals jumped up and down in outrage at the whole “we will go into Helmand and come out without firing a shot” bollocks ? (and lets not even get into Iraq and “Snatch LR”).
Genuine question, have we ever put that amount of people, that quickly ashore before?
I prefer to look at research that is realistic rather than aspirational. They are really going to introduce 15 Frigates in 7 years, at 2 a year? Sea trials teams, work ups, engineering trials, personnel to cover all these? I also like to take into account things such as training requirements and manning. There is a fair amount of South American, mines is bigger than yours involved in the extremely aspirational plans of the Brazilian Navy. A bit like the Argentinean nuclear Submarine. Nothing wrong with being optimistic though.
@ Simon Well Augusta -Westland, have certainly kept that quiet!
@ F35B Whether we like the decision or not! We have made our bed, and now we must live with it.
Time to crack on with it, and make the best out of it.
Topman,
yes, with some regularity. D Day (possibly not a representative example
) 6 Divisions in 4 hours. More recently, on various AMF exercises, an entire Commando including supporting arms and first line support in less than 4 minutes, by both RIB / LC and air. 24 Airmobile Brigade could put an anti-tank Battlegroup onto something beach sized (although typically onto 3-4 areas) in under 2 minutes, when the Chinooks were available, and with supporting Lynx flying ahead.
Mark at May 10, 2012 at 18:54
Wikipedia (and it’s all I have to go on) says F35B “combat radius” on internal fuel, with itnernal weapons is 383nm – so were does the 450nm come from ? not disputing – just asking ?
Is it with external tanks ? If so then all that money to buy a so called “stealth” aircraft was wasted was it not ?
@ James
I thought someone might say D Day!
Interesting I didn’t know it happened so often.
‘an entire Commando including supporting arms and first line support in less than 4 minutes, by both RIB / LC and air.’
How many is that about 600? What was the split air/sea and how far out did the troops start when they went to their ribs and chinooks?
Also has that sized and time wise assault happened in an operation, possibly suez?
AH to 8km. The newer “man portable” motars have ranges to 8km, any less and they can still pop a few rounds on your beachhead to ruin your day.
5 min for 3 waves with only Merlins is a bit unrealistic, and 30 of them is stretching it, even without the need to generate AH support. A lot of the assault, especially Wave 1 would be using landing craft, not heliborne, though it really helps a lot if your light armour could swim too. I’m guessing 1 company by air ~ 12 Merlins, assuming 1 squad per helo, and the rest by sea.
That is, assuming you can find an LZ for the helis that someone hasn’t mined 8 ways to Sunday. Fast rope/Heli rappel?
Topman, Even Royal doesn’t have that as doctrine. For starters they would land on top of each other or you would need a bigger beach!
We do not have the capability to make an opposed beach landing. So generally SF are ashore and themselves and ISTAR push inland to provide recon. The beach is run by the beach recce team from the amphibs. You take the LPDs close inshore under cover of darkness first light and offload utilising the flight deck, dock and LCVPs simultaneously. Each LPD can operate 2 Merlin/Junglies at the same time when you are 2NM offshore it is amazing how quickly you can shuttle Royal ashore especially utilisng the Bays flight decks as well. Thye first load can fly from the LPH or CVF drop on the beach and then the helos make the short shuttle hops.
4 LCVPs will also be making runs first load from the davits but after that the docks on the Bays and Albions.
Hopefully a faster LCU will speed things up.
I wonder if anyone has looked at QE/PoW to see if they could operate Russian style i.e ski ramp + arrester wires?
That could be cheap & flexible.
At least French/USN aircraft could make emergency landings on RN carriers even if they had to be landed at port.
Not easy “Can you get 40 Merlins into the air from a QEC 200 nm out, plus 8 AH, plus a couple of CAS pairs, and airborne C2, and is it easy?”
That is why I raised the Chinooks: take them on QEC, then prepare by flying them out to Albions/ Bays, so their larger capacity is used while not denying most of the 9carrier’s] deck for other uses
- also, to avoid the “repeat 3 times” was the reason why I mentioned C-17s for a drop (of one bn)…2 Commandos, the initial tank squadron and a parachuted bn is a good start to mustering a brigade?
James,
Hang on…
8-10 Merlin on QE – lands 2 companies.
8-10 Merlin on Albion and 2 Bay – lands 2 companies.
6 LCU + 4 LCVP from Albion and two Bays land another 2 companies behind 6 tanks.
The vertical assault can now be done four times in 24-hours landing a total of sixteen companies – a total of 18 companies (~1800 men) landed.
The first wave delivers one Commando battalion, the remaining troops come in a little bit less well organised as three copter waves of 400.
James, you cheated
Chooks drop 30 people per load, though it loses the ability to fast rope. Merlins don’t have that kind of capacity.
I’m really of 2 minds with the rope. Having to stick to known LZs makes me nervous, though the extra space and capacity is nice, but not worth taking an area defence mine in the rotor IMO.
@All Politicians are the Same
Go and do the research properly and open your eyes to the speed with which Brazil is developing in all kinds of ways – you are making some very patronising assumptions about the (in)ability of the Brazilians to make the transition into great power status. Their long term goals may be aspirational, but they are real targets and have been discussed at international conferences. They have built their first submarine and have signed agreements with the French on acquiring nuclear reactors for nuclear boats. The UK has just sold three OPVs and a license for 5 more. BAE is targeting Brazil as a prime customer for Type 26/Global Combat Ship with building to take place there. The country is deciding between ordering Rafale and F-18 which will give them a potential carrier capability. And so on. All this is linked to major economic growth and a desire to secure a permanent place on the UN Security Council. Your ‘realistic’ thinking is the same sort of complacency that prevented many observers imagining the rise of the Chinese and Indian Navies.
Topman’s initial default position was that the assault was all-air from 200 nm out, with a declaration of “easy”.
We tend not to have enough support helos to do all-air, hence the mix. And to generate the mix, you need the boats close inshore.
So the question is how much risk are we prepared to take with our QEC, when the only amphibious ships we have cannot offload very quickly?
@ APATS the entire commando was from James not me. I was just thinking out loud how much of the beach assualt talk that was going on up thread was realistic. How often have we used it and have we all the right kit to do the numbers we would like and so. Thanks for the info.
A serious question. What would be better for the Army or the Marines. The Merlin or the Chinook as a Main Assault Helicopter, flying of CVF.
Would 8 Navalised Chinooks be better than 10 Navaliised Commando Merlins?
Fatman, I have exercised with the Brazilian Navy and generally they are pretty good but they are not trying to evolve they are trying to move from jet flight to moon landing in 2 decades! Good luck to them but I also know how difficult it is to expand at the rate they are trying to and keep up existing skill levels never mind develop the required skill set to operate Carriers, SSNs and modern escorts. There is a difference between being able to afford to nuy or build something and running and manning it.
Cat and pigeon time
If we cant deliver a reasonable number of personnel over the beach in a reasonable time and only if the enemy decide to take a day off what exactly is the point of the Royal Marines and the Royal Navy’s amphibious capabilities?
Equally, if we cannot air drop and sustain an reasonable airborne force, what is the point of maintaining the Parachute Regiment?
In your own time!
@ James
‘Topman’s initial default position was that the assault was all-air from 200 nm out, with a declaration of “easy”.’
Not me gov.
Jed
The jroc sar document delivered from the pentagon to congress in april estimates the f35b mission radius kpp currently at 469nm this required a takeoff distance of 568ft without a ski jump an increase of 22ft.
Topman,
there’s no point in putting an entire Commando ashore in blobs and blobs over 24 hours for anything less than an entirely benign environment. British tourists arrive more rapidly in Malaga airport than that at the height of the season – this is not Butlins!
Hmm good question James. And I suspect the answer is “not very”. So my guess is that the RM are going to have to sneak on shore. At least some of their light armour swims, so that should help a bit.
@ James
I’m slightly confused (easily done) to which comment of mine is your post @ 20.48 replying to?
Regarding AEW options, transferring the Searchwater’s over to the Merlin platform is almost a given.
IIRC plans call for the equipment to be palletised. This implies little alterations to the aircraft itself under the MASC (now Crows Nest?) project.
Interestingly if the equipment is indeed palletised, then carriage in the rear of a V-22 (unfortunately named TOSS proposal) might be a relatively rapid transition, with the Merlin as an interim step:
1) Remove Serachwater equipment from the retired Sea Kings;
2) Convert Searchwater kit to self contained pallets;
3) Slide them into the back of an appropriate Merlin;
4) Wait for the inevitable V-22 purchases (Rolls Royce Allison engines as political sweetener);
5) Slide some pallets into the back of a few appropriate tiltrotors.
TD,
JC x 3, 1 @ CVF with some small affordable number of F35B aboard and the rest of the space taken up with ISOs, 2 @ LPH/D positively bulging with helicopters.
£3B, airwing = £2B.
Cash left over. In fact, enough for son of FRES!
Topman,
sorry to misquote you (the original text is too difficult to find), but I recall you thought it was less than complex.
@TD
Would you consider a Pallet similar to a Container?
Observer, others will know better, but isn’t this
“At least some of their light armour swims”
just the Vikings
- v useful, but have no utility in armour role
@ James
‘sorry to misquote you (the original text is too difficult to find), but I recall you thought it was less than complex.’
No problem. Whoever it was it wasn’t me.
Simon RE: Merlin or Chook
Both. I mentioned that the Chinook can’t drop infantry very well, no bar to hook up + the back ramp door, but its capacity and loadcarrying is wonderful. OTOH, having to put infantry in hard to reach places, you need the Merlin. I suspect the loss of one SF Chinook in Afganistan just after OBL was killed was due to a pre-placed ambush at an LZ. So they each have their strengths and limitations and are best used together rather than an all or nothing approach.
@ACC
“Observer, others will know better, but isn’t this
“At least some of their light armour swims”
just the Vikings
You rather swim ashore in nothing but a “bullet-proof” vest? At least the Bvs are proof up to 7.62. I’ve always wondered 7.62 NATO or 7.62-S lol. Got to put that to one of their sales rep one of these days.
BTW, swimming in vests is a serious “not recommended”. You might not come back up.
On Amphibious offload. (remember we only do unopposed landings) A Chinook can carry 50 booties? So even if we keep the Carrier 50Nm offshore. Let’s say it launches 4 Chinooks, so we have 200 Royals enroute, the LPD and 2 Bays have detached and with escorts proceeded inshore, docked down and at 6Nm launched their LCUs and LCVPs to arrive at the beach at the same time. They have continued to close to 4Nm. The 2 LCUs from the Bays bring 1 Ch2 each. The 4 from the LPD are 1 x beach recovery vehicle and 3 x 50 RM (round figures so i can count). Now before the LPD and Bays closed the coast they embarked 2 Merlin on the LPD and 1 each on the Bays from the AOR. So let’s say each Merlin also launches with 20 Royal onboard. The 4 LCVPs from the LPD are also launched with 30 royals in them. So we have utilised 6 LCU, 4 LCVP, 4 Chinook and 4 Merlin to put 570 RM and 2 CH2 plus the beach recovery vehicle. The helos can then do short hops backwards and forwards between the Bays, LPD and shore as required moving under slung loads, personnel as required whilst the 6 LCUs move heavy equipment and 4 LCVPs light equipment. The LPD and Bays have the ability to refuel Merlin and Chinook.
@APATS
50… maybe, but that’s a bit overload. There are only 4 banks of 8 seats with belts.
Just for a bit of fun, go to this web site
http://www.freemaptools.com/radius-around-point.htm
Put in a figure of 869km and place the marker on a target of your choice.
I put it on Misrata, just for an illustration.
Why do we need a carrier then?
By the way, this is my second wind up of the evening
@TD
Less beans for dinner in the future?
Though you do have a point that a lot of the world can be covered by land based air.
OTOH, in the defence of carrier air, there is also the problem of people unhappy with you dropping an arifield in the middle of their backyard.
Pros and Cons.
obs, RAF website claims 55!
APATS,
50 seems a bit ambitious for Chinook. Remember the boys are going to be carrying shedloads of kit for 3-5 days, batteries, ammo, etc. I think 30 is more like it (each man at 90 kilos plus 70 kilos of kit, but it is the bulk not weight that cuts down on passenger space). Call it a Troop or Platoon per Chinook. That’s therefore 10 Chinooks for two companies each of 120 men ashore, not your four.
(edited: that was in response to your earlier comment. 55 on the RAF website is ridiculous, but what you’d expect from the RAF. 55 Fray Bentos pies, or 5.5 loadmasters in their grow bags, maybe, but not tooled up troops. No way)
Why did we ever rotate the Gurkhas away from the air-assault bn role!
“RAF website claims 55″
Didn’t Bravo November do 70 paras in one lift in 1982
James, It was an estimate but we still have the capability without increasing chinook numbers to put 400 plus ashore and I was not overly generous with numbers on an LCU Mk 10. It is rated for 100 so lets say 70 and we are back to my 570 on the beach at once.
@ Observor. Thank you
A couple of weeks ago I did come across a report on the web, stating, that the American Company that makes the gearboxes to power fold the rotor blades for the Ch-47. Had been approached by an unnamed foreign CH-47 operator. Asking for information and prices for converting some of their CH-47′s.
Barring the USN, we are the only country that could (eventually) deck down, a Chinook. As neither the Mistral or Juna Carlos Class LPH’s Hangers can hold a Chinook. Although I’m not holding my breath, that it is us.
There’s such an aura around Bravo November that I wouldn’t be surprised if she actually carried out the Black Buck raids and not the Vulcans!
There are photos readily Googleable of a Chinook struck below decks on Juan Carlos I.
I think everyone should turn on news night right now.
@The Other Chris
SHH!!!…
They’re not supposed to know that.
@TD
If it did, good for it, but the pilot had better be very careful of what he’s doing or he’s going to get a lot of angry marines in the cargo hold. And the hold is directly connected to the cockpit. lol
55 is possible standing in the cargo hold, (32 seated, 18 standing) but if you have seen how these things fly normally, with 60 degree bank turns and all (I swear they always choose FJ rejects to fly those things), you.. might not want to stand. Straight line flight though, might be tolerable.
@ACC
32 seated. I counted the seats 1st time I flew on one.
Observer. “FJ” is redundant. All Kevins are rejects. If you want to be flown in a support helicopter, arrive alive, where you are meant to be and not in the next door field, pointing toward the enemy, and on time, fly CHF.
18 Chinook loads to move 1 light battalion
34 Puma loads to move 1 light battalion
Extrapolate Merlin lifts from those figures.