So, where to start?
No other issue, it seems, gets people so excised as aircraft carriers and their aircraft, they remain such an iconic capability and subject area huge volumes are written about them.
One thing is certain; those looking in from the outside are not in possession of all the facts so whatever I might think it is important to appreciate this.
The statement in full from the SoS Defence…
With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on the Carrier Strike programme.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review considered the carrier strike programme, put in place by the previous Government, as part of a wide ranging review of options for delivering effective future defence while dealing with the black-hole in Labour’s Defence budget and the unaffordable “fantasy” equipment plan bequeathed to us by the Party opposite. While the Review confirmed that carrier strike would be a key capability in delivering Future Force 2020, it also recognised the unsustainability as a whole of the Defence Equipment Plan we inherited.
The strategic decision on carrier strike which emerged from the SDSR process was to convert one carrier with catapults and arrestor gear to operate the Carrier Variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, facilitating greater interoperability with allies, with a decision on the future use or disposal of the second carrier to be taken at the 2015 SDSR. The decision was also taken routinely to embark 12 fast jets while retaining the ability to surge up to the previously planned level of 36 aircraft. As the House would expect for such a complex and high-value project, the strategic decision taken at SDSR was followed by the commissioning of a detailed programme of work to look at the costs, risks and technical feasibility of all aspects of the proposed solution. That study was expected to take eighteen months, completing by the end of 2012.
Since I took on the role of Defence Secretary in October last year, my overriding concern, after current operations and the welfare of our Armed Forces, has been to ensure the deliverability of the MOD’s Equipment Plan and the achievement of a balanced and sustainable budget. That will give our Armed Forces the assurance they need to carry out the massive transformation that will deliver Future Force 2020 – the concept for our Armed Forces set out in the SDSR. The Carrier project is a large element of the Equipment Programme and I have worked closely with the new Chief of Defence Materiel, Bernard Gray, to assess the technical and financial risks involved in it.
It quickly became clear to me that a number of the underlying facts on which the SDSR decision on carriers was based were changing:
First, as the programme to convert a carrier to operate with a catapult system has matured, and more detailed analysis has been carried out by suppliers, it has become clear that operational Carrier Strike capability, using the ‘cats and traps’ system, could not be delivered until late 2023 at the earliest, considerably later than the date envisaged at the time of the SDSR of “around 2020”. Because Britain’s carriers will have all electric propulsion, and therefore do not generate steam like nuclear powered vessels, the catapult system would need to be the innovative Electromagnetic version (EMALS), being developed for the US Navy. Fitting this new system to a UK carrier has presented greater design challenges than were anticipated.
Secondly, and partly as a result of the delayed timetable, the estimated cost of fitting this equipment to the Prince of Wales has more than doubled in the last 17 months, rising from an estimated £950M to around £2Bn, with no guarantee that it will not rise further.
Technical complexity and the cost of retrofitting cats and traps to the Queen Elizabeth, the first carrier, would be even higher, making it unlikely that she would ever, in practice, be converted in the future.
Thirdly, at the time of the SDSR, there was judged to be a very significant technical risk around the STOVL version of JSF and some commentators were speculating that it could even be cancelled. Indeed, the STOVL programme was subsequently placed on probation by the Pentagon However, over the last year, the STOVL programme has made excellent progress and in the last few months has been removed from probation. The aircraft has completed over 900 hours of flying, including flights from the USS Wasp and the US Marine Corp has a high degree of confidence in the in-service date for the aircraft. The balance of risk has changed and there is now judged to be no greater risk in STOVL than in other variants of JSF.
And fourthly, further work with our allies on the best approach to collaborative operation has satisfied us that joint maritime task groups involving our carriers, with co-ordinated scheduling of maintenance and refit periods, and an emphasis on carrier availability, rather than cross-deck operations, is the more appropriate route to optimising alliance capabilities.
Mr Speaker, when the facts change, the responsible thing to do is to examine the decisions you have made and to be willing to change your mind.
However inconvenient that may be. Doing what is right for Britain. Not burying your head in the sand and ploughing on regardless, as the last Government so often did. A persistent failure to observe this simple principle is at the root of many of the MOD budget problems that we inherited from the party opposite. I do not intend to repeat their mistakes.
The decision taken in the SDSR to proceed with a carrier strike capability, despite the massive challenges we faced with the MOD’s budget, was the right decision.
The decision to seek to contain costs, by going for “cats and traps”; on a single carrier with greater interoperability with allies, and the cheaper CV version of the JSF aircraft, was also the right decision, based on the information available at the time.
But the facts have changed. I am not prepared to accept a delay in regenerating Britain’s carrier strike capability beyond the timetable set out in the SDSR.
And I am not prepared to put the equipment plan, which will support Future Force 2020, at risk of a billion-pound plus increase in the carrier programme and unquantifiable risk of further cost rises.
So, I can announce today that the National Security Council has agreed not to proceed with the “cats and traps” conversion, but to complete both carriers in STOVL configuration. This will give us the ability to use both carriers to provide continuous carrier availability – at a net additional operating cost averaging about £60M per year. As we set out in the SDSR, a final decision on the use of the second carrier will be taken as part of SDSR 2015.
We will switch the order for JSF aircraft from CV to STOVL, which we can do without delaying delivery and, by making this announcement today, we can plan on the basis of the first operational aircraft being delivered with a UK weapons fit package.
We expect HMS Queen Elizabeth to be handed over to the Navy in early 2017 for sea trials.
We expect to take delivery of our first test aircraft in July of this year, and we expect the first production aircraft to be delivered to us in 2016, with flying from the Queen Elizabeth to begin in 2018, after her sea trials are complete.
We have discussed this decision with the French Government and with the United States. The French confirm that they are satisfied with our commitment to jointly planned carrier operations to enhance European-NATO capability.
The United States, on whose support we would rely in regenerating either type of carrier capability, has been highly supportive throughout this review and I would like to record my personal thanks to the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, the Navy and the Marine Corps for their high level of engagement with us. I spoke to Secretary Panetta last night and he confirmed the US willingness to support our decision and its view that UK carrier strike availability and our commitment to the JSF programme are the key factors.
The Chief of the Defence Staff and his fellow Chiefs of Staff – all of them – endorse this decision as the quickest and most assured way now to deliver carrier strike as part of an overall affordable equipment programme that will support Future Force 2020.
Mr Speaker, this was not an easy decision to take. But our responsibility is to make the right decision on the basis of the facts available to us. Neither I, nor any of my colleagues came into Government expecting decisions to be easy or pain-free.
I have a responsibility to clear up the financial mess we inherited in the MOD, just as we are clearing up the mess we inherited across Government as a whole. To set a balanced budget. And an affordable, deliverable Equipment Programme. With manageable and bounded risk.
This decision addresses one of the last impediments to me announcing the achievement of those objectives to the House, and I hope to be able to do so very soon.
But Mr Speaker, it isn’t just about balancing budgets, critical as that is. It is about the UK’s Defence – secured by having an appropriate and sustainable military capability. This announcement delivers an affordable solution to securing that capability and, with 2 useable carriers, gives us the option of continuous carrier availability. It confirms the expected delivery of the first test aircraft this summer; of the first production aircraft in 2016; of the first carrier into sea trials in 2017; and of the first flight of the JSF from the deck of the carrier in 2018, with an operational military capability in 2020. It confirms the support of our principal allies – the US and France. And that of the Defence Chiefs.
Mr Speaker, it shows that we, at least, are not afraid to take difficult decisions when they are right for Britain. I commend this statement to the House.
My opinion, as ill-informed as it might be, is that this is the correct decision and as evidenced by all posts on the subject I have consistently maintained the F35B was the most sensible choice throughout the debate.
The reason I thought and think the F35B represents a sensible, practical, pragmatic and reasonable choice is based on taking a wide angle view across all three services.
That the F35B is more expensive in isolation to buy and maintain, or that it has less range and payload than the F35C is no revelation but that is not the point.
Neither is the objective of the Joint Combat Aircraft and CVF to get aircraft and aircraft carriers into service as a means unto itself, neither is it important to discuss the legacy, tradition or heritage of British naval aviation innovation and development.
Talk of being second only to the USN, having so called ‘proper’ aircraft carriers is just nonsense, designed to obfuscate the real issue of delivering effects across multiple defence lines of development within, and this is the crucial part, a fixed budget.
We often hear comments like ‘if we are going to do it we should do it properly’ or this is a ‘short term financial decision’ but that sounds like business as usual and a very short cut to increasing the size of the budget black hole. The MoD has to live within its means; I am not sure why so many people have difficulty understanding this fundamental principle.
It is not an option to raid the other services future equipment programmes either, CVF/JCA should not be allowed to dominate the equipment programme and future operating budgets because it is one of many things we need to be spending money.
If only we could buy off the shelf people might argue but it is British wealth that pays the MoD’s bills so to try and divorce the industrial, foreign exchange and intellectual property benefits of F35 from other options is simply naive.
Everything is connected, everything is important.
So yes, I accept that it is a compromise in pure specification terms in comparison with the F35C but when taken in the round, a pragmatic decision based on the realism of operating carrier strike in British armed forces, not anyone else’s.
The MoD now needs to inject some stability into the programme and to be honest, get it off the front pages. Those involved need the space, support and funding to deliver the capability and anyone whinging needs to think twice.
It seems clear that neither the RAF or RN has covered themselves in glory with their leaky/briefy games, I hope that the guilty take the time to reflect on their actions.
I am going to have a look at some of these issues in more depth in a future post but for now, the choice has been made (again) and I think the current Secretary of State for Defence needs roundly congratulating for having the balls to take a tough decision with serious political consequences for the wider good of the MoD but make no mistake, there are many question about how exactly the comedic decision making process went from Plan A to Plan B and then back to Plan A, this has cost anywhere between £40 and £50 million PLUS any cancellation/exit costs with US suppliers.
There are serious issues of competence to address but the two key issues that stand out for me are
- What and who prompted the change in the SDSR, how much have we wasted and exactly how this Fleet strength cockup actually happened, looking back
- Can we just get on with it, looking forward
“further work with our allies on the best approach to collaborative operation has satisfied us that joint maritime task groups involving our carriers, with co-ordinated scheduling of maintenance and refit periods, and an emphasis on carrier availability, rather than cross-deck operations, is the more appropriate route to optimising alliance capabilities”
ROFLMAO!
“So, I can announce today that the National Security Council has agreed not to proceed with the “cats and traps” conversion, but to complete both carriers in STOVL configuration. This will give us the ability to use both carriers to provide continuous carrier availability – at a net additional operating cost averaging about £60M per year.”
No really?
“We have discussed this decision with the French Government and with the United States. The French confirm that they are satisfied with our commitment to jointly planned carrier operations to enhance European-NATO capability.”
Been making this very argument myself, and no surprise that america supports it as it forms the core of an independently capable europe on which america lean, rather than support.
“This announcement delivers an affordable solution to securing that capability and, with 2 useable carriers, gives us the option of continuous carrier availability.”
To conclude smugly if i may; “i told people so”.
Hoorah for common sense!
Jedi, if there is an orderly queue for smugness, would you mind awfully getting into line behind me
hehe, fair enough.
so, that leaves us with:
2 carriers and most of the amphib fleet.
still two intervention brigades
and an army of 82,000 by 2020.
just five ‘proper’ brigades
anyone doubt that HMG did not make a fundamental choice, re: maritime-raiding vs land-stabilisation, eighteen months ago?
[smug mode still firmly "on"]
Excellent bit of “blame game” from Phil there.
If they decide against two carriers in 2015 there will be trouble
Now let’s just hope that clutch that sits between a massively powerful jet turbine and that lift fan actually holds up in real life use… it’s the only bit of the technical solution I have concerns with.
TD
If PH had cojones he would re-activate a Harrier capability and he would get AR back into service.
The money is there to do it, we can find money at the drop of a hat to fund feasibility studies but we cannot find money to do real work.
As for the detail in the statement the lack of intellectual curiosity and rigour is shameful.
We were told that the CVF was designed with CATOBAR in mind, however it cannot do steam.
What rubbish, Maersk get steam from their diesels with no problems at all.
Look at the spec of any commercial ship with diesels and a steam output is part of the deal.
If I was the government I’d wonder why we are buying “adaptable” carriers which cost the same to convert as to build new ones we have been fleeced again by BAE systems and Thales we’ve paid vastly over the odds for a 65,000 ton stovl carrier when we could have built one the same size as Charles D’Gaulle it’s ok saying we’ll get 2 carriers now but they will wait till the next SDSR to make up there minds also the 1st Sea Lord has stated we won’t have the manpower to crew both ships or are they planning to remotely operate it ? this is nothing short of short-term politic’s something they swore they wouldn’t do
@ Admin – “What and who prompted the change in the SDSR, how much have we wasted and exactly how this Fleet strength cockup actually happened, looking back”
If we look at what Con Coughlin writes, completely reverse the logic on the presumption that he’s got things ass backwards as usual, then we arrive at the following:
“Hammond’s carrier decision makes nonsense of scrapping the Harriers”
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100157323/hammonds-carrier-decision-makes-nonsense-of-scrapping-the-harriers/
No Con,
Scrapping the harriers was precisely WHY the government was happy to change to the cats-n-traps F35c.
Cost savings in the short term.
As well as binning the harrier fleet, it allowed them to not need to find the cash to run both carriers, preferring to defer any final decision to a later date.
Well, now the Future army review has recommended further reducing the army from 95,000 to 82,000 and lo, we can now have both carriers.
This has to be the right decision.
As we all know, the principal reason to switch from the STOVL F-35B to the CATOBAR F-35C was because the former aircraft had not merely encountered serious technical issues but was ‘put on probation’ with a view to cancelling it altogether. Any government would have needed to reconsider their original choice. The mistake our unctuous PM made was not to fully evaluate the cost of switching before committing to it.
While there is an obvious cost penalty to this amateurish behaviour, the Coalition still has some way to go before matching the previous government’s over-expenditure and black hole of unfunded commitments (including £250 million on FRES without a single vehicle being fielded).
I don’t know whether blame should be attached to Cameron or Fox, but I think Philip Hammond has shown that he is a safe pair of hands.
As I said in a previous post, the F-35B is already a better aircraft than the Harrier (which you would hope after a gap of more than a decade since its technology was last upgraded).
- Longer range on internal fuel tanks than Harrier
- Greater weapons payload than Harrier
- Faster and more agile than the Harrier
- Easier to train pilots on than Harrier
- Easier to fly and therefore safer than Harrier
- More complex and expensive to service than F-35C but significantly less so than Harrier
- Superb on-board systems that give the pilot unprecedented situational awareness
- Stealth and Low Observability characteristics
- Easier deck recovery than F-35C and in sea states that would ground all CATOBAR types
In summary, the F-35B is undoubtedly a better combat aircraft than the Harrier it is intended to replace. Even so, the Harrier today still packs a punch, so all things considered, my F-35B cup is half full not half empty.
Will the F-35A and F-35C be better than the aircraft types they are intended to replace? Now that is an interesting question.
OK – so we wasted 2 years fannying about on one decision but now have a firm and affordable plan for the Carriers their Fast Jets. Good.
Still plenty of loose ends on the equipment programme and our ability to project power across the oceans. Unanswered questions for me include:
AEW&C to replace Sea King (presumably Merlin)
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (for both SAR and ASuW)
Ability to land and sustain a Medium Brigade across an undefended beach
Ocean replacement / Argus replacement / concurrent use of QEC #2.
Plus the 82,000 man Army’s actual structure and armour levels.
Plus Tornado replacement and should Typhoon be asked to do it all.
Hopefully the full gory horror of PR12 will reveal some of the answers but I suspect quite a bit be left to fester on until SDSR 2015.
Month @ 12.26
No matter who is in power the MOD is there to muck it up.
However Dave the Rave has just upped the bar regarding equipment disasters.
Very noticeable how he – Dave … – was nowhere to be seen.
In fact he seems to be lying low today – A/stan tomorrow anyone?
However I cannot agree with your view on the F35B and the way it compares to the Harrier.
Harrier – light fighter.
F35B – heavy fighter
How much money are we spending to move from one to the other?
The Harrier force was around 80 airframes from memory.
We are going to aim for 50 F35Bs at a cost of £8-9bill or £10bill in reality just to procure the planes.
That is some amount of opportunity cost that we are putting on the table for a very limited fleet.
Harrier force + £10bill – What would that get you and how would it compare with 50 F35B’s?
At least the clutch is a bit of UK kit! What about the cracked bulkhead?
Why the reluctance to say that both carriers will enter service? To base the decision on saying that both could now be completed but not to confirm that both will enter service is perverse. More tortuous “logic” to justify another bout of short-termism.
What will it carry? What will it bring back? What will it bring back in tropical conditions? These are crucial considerations that did for Sea Harrier. Is it really going to only able to carry 2 x 500lb Paveway IV and 2 x AIM-120 internally? Why no JDAM? Why no consideration of completing F136 development? Sorry – short term money issues again. Hammond said that over 30 years he believed that F-35B would be cheaper – I’m assuming that’s the aircraft’s projected life not the carriers’. Are we to expect a split buy in 2015/16 or whenever they are forced to think about this again?
TD – I thought you wanted the carriers cancelled anyway. Apologies if I’ve remembered incorrectly – there have been so many different discussions on this subject.
I will post a more measured response later, when I have caslmed down!!!
for now… I have heard so much bollocks in all my life!!
1. So the fuckwits admit that the SDSR was a load of bollocks.. NO shit sherlock.
2. They made a major decision to switch to the F35C A. to cover the sale of Harriers B. on a whim with no idea of the true costs!!! Sackable offence!!
3. We paid for an “ADAPTABLE” design that is not fcuking ADAPTABLE…
SUE the fuck out of the Carrier Alliance. NO really take them to court and bankrupt the fuckers!!!
4. what fucking differnce does an extra 3 years make, theu have already taken a lifetime to get this far
5.Its not just the fact that the F35B is a rather poor aircraft, compared to the other two which are not as good as LM would have us all believe, but going down the STOVL route fucks up our options for AEW/ISTAR in general, probably prevents the use of X47B/Tarannis, not too mention if the F35B fail (and I still think it might, you have no fall back position.
6. What a cluster fuck of all cluster fucks. We have a government, MoD and Military leadership who are simply not fit for purpose.
Going to gym to vent aggression!!!!
I am embarressed to be British we have become a country of clowns, well run by clowns anyway,
Chris
“Why no consideration of completing F136 development? ”
It had no US support and also to reduce costs of the programe…however I do think the project could/is still going ahead, albiet slower and at the maunufacturers own cost.
TD
Well then, the smug-o-meter must be bursting!
“Talk of being second only to the USN, having so called ‘proper’ aircraft carriers is just nonsense,”
Amen to that.
We’ve done brilliantly with the STOVL idea for over 3 decades-ish and I see no need/nor funds for us to have a ‘proper’ carrier…I mean, outside the US no-one else has such systems in palce to sustain and truely work it right…the french only come close, but no dice.
I just hope now that both carriers can come into service…
Also, the Harrier Gr9 was not even a ‘light fighter’ really… they never performed CAP at sea, DACT yes…but them facing Su-33′s? Or MiG-29K’s? Or even SHAR51′s? I doubt it. Like the tonka and Jag, it was defensive capability. ‘Gr’ for a reason…it could do it, but not at a sustained rate.
Anyway, sticking with what BB said yesterday, 2015 will be when its carved in stone, before that we have Pr12 to think and rant about.
Why does TD care who drove the change to F35C in Whitehall unless the ThinkRAF police are planning some midnight raids after their scare around another air force getting capable aircraft?
AAC beware, you are next.
FBOT,
I must admit that I’m with you regarding the Harrier/F35B comparison. They are different beasts and as you say, mainly in terms of size, weight or logistical footprint.
I think the fact that the USMC are having to lose a well deck on America demonstrates the aircraft size leap from Harrier –> F35B and Sea Knight –> V22.
I think (again, great with the benefit of hindsight) that there was a good opportunity for Harrier III for the UK, Italy, Spain, and of course the USMC. A low-observable, subsonic, STOVL jet.
If you can get the funding, I’ll design the beast!
Simon @ 13.27
I have tried to work a couple of numbers into a potential Harrier 3.
Looking at 15K lbs unladen.
Looking at 30K lbs thrust.
Consequently light fighter but chunky engine.
Same basic layout but stealthy, more robust and better servicing arrangements.
Looking at Typhoon cast offs / parts bin raid for sensors and information spine.
Not sure what weapon load could be carried internally but that would go with the F35 style fuselage.
Failing that there is always the Yak 41/43/45 …
Where would £100mill in development money get us plus half a dozen existing airframes to butcher?
One year fag packet design staff plus development with 200 designers for three years?
Run an engine programme at £50 mill with RR?
Joint venture with any interested outside parties?
Results – 4 engines and 2 flying prototypes?
FBOT,
I’m sure RR can provide the engine (it’s essentially the F136). I seem to remember the 3-bearing swivel nozzle is patented, which is amazing since it was nicked from the Yak. Perhaps we should build it in China where they don’t recognise patents?
Like the idea of using systems that are already available – just need flight control developing (I’ll do that on my iPhone
).
I reckon a design that can get two 1000lb Paveways inside would make LM nervous!
Chris, yes, right back at the beginning, before we had starting incurring costs on CVF I did think that cancellation was worth doing but as time has moved on I have listened to more argument and mellowed but I still think it is something that we need to keep at minimal cost and above all, realistic
i thought you didn’t believe in sunk costs? (cheeky grin)
I’m getting screen burn from all the smugness radiating from this post. However, no aircraft numbers and no firm commitment to utilizing both ships, so could well be a case of premature smugness. Also, Hammond says that the C decision was “based on the information available at the time. But the facts have changed”, so the present flip-flopped decision is probably not the best validation for the position that “I have consistently maintained the F35B was the most sensible choice throughout the debate”. Either the facts have changed – so supporting the F35B throughout was irrational and ill-considered, or the facts have never changed – and so Hammond’s current plan is just as likely to ignore those facts as with the different plans that have come before.
I’m getting screen burn from all the smugness radiating from this post. However, no aircraft numbers and no firm commitment to utilizing both ships, so could well be a case of premature smugness. Also, Hammond says that the C decision was “based on the information available at the time. But the facts have changed”, so the present flip-flopped decision is probably not the best validation for the position that “I have consistently maintained the F35B was the most sensible choice throughout the debate”. Either the facts have changed – so supporting the F35B throughout was irrational and ill-considered, or the facts have never changed – and so Hammond’s current plan is just as likely to ignore those facts as with the different plans that have come before.
I didn’t and don’t, but I have had a road to Damascus carrier conversion, just not to cats and flaps
Simon @ 13.51
I would go for a Pegasus on steroids.
It is a Harrier 3 not an EU F35.
Just a case of listing the issues with the existing aircraft and trying to sort out the issues in a flexible and efficient manner.
I think one of the most interesting lines in the statement was “Fitting [EMALS] to a UK carrier has presented greater design challenges than were anticipated”.
I’d like to know why a ship apparently designed for the possible inclusion of this kit is suddenly unsuitable to be fitted with it. We were all aware there’d be costs associated with fitting the cats, but this seems like a new revelation.
Brian Black,
You tend to get the impression that “adaptable” really meant STOVL but we’ll cross the CATOBAR bridge when we come to it.
If we are saving £2Bn on not having an EMALS (just imagine – a solenoid on steroids with a bit of wire costing twenty F35Bs), can we reinvest that in cutting a large flap in the back of the ruddy boats so that we can make a proper well-dock? We don’t need so much hangar space as we’ll only ever be able to afford 12 aircraft on board, and the electric drive means you don’t need a long straight run for the propeller shafts.
Then the bloody things may actually be useful.
BB @ 14.16
The design work for EMALS onto the CVF involved a BWoS functionary ticking a box after he had taken Sir Bufton Tufton – MOD 3rd Secretary (Acting) / Capital Ships / Aircraft Capable – out to a nice lunch and some cricket.
It tells you ll you need to know about the quality of the design team behind the CVF.
They have all the ability and delivery of the Fiesta team’s attempt to do a 44 ton truck.
http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=19704
Interesting article, cost of converting both carriers would have been £5bn!!! Also EMALS would have huge running costs (assume generators running flat out thus burning fuel). Also interesting choice of whether one or two carriers and how many planes appears to have been deferred until 2015.
Waddi,
So that link states that converting both carriers would cost the same as building them in the first place! I’m sorry, but quite frankly I don’t believe it. Perhaps they should have gone somewhere other than BAe to get a quote… oh, of course, they couldn’t, it’s a monopoly.
In the abstract, the decision to procure 65,000 ton aircraft carriers to operate STOVL aircraft still baffles me. It seems like such a waste to me when a 40,000 ton vessel could probably accomplish the same mission (and at a lower cost). What a confusing program…
That said, given that the time to procure a smaller vessel has long since passed, the B procurement decision seems like a wise choice. If CATOBAR configuration can’t be achieved in an affordable fashion, then STOVL is the right (only?) choice.
Adun,
You needed 65kt to operate 36 jets + AEW, which is what they kept on going on about.
A 40kt ship will manage about 20 + AEW with a 10000nm range (~28 + AEW if you drop to a range of 7500-8000nm).
I agree completely daft, minor technical point its not BAE building the carriers, it worse. It is anyone that could have built the carriers on their own, thus taking out any competition i.e. BAE, Babcock and Thales plus any marine metal fabricator available such as Appledore, Camel Laird etc. It’s not a BAE monopoly it is total UK industry monopoly.
Waddi,
Silly me, getting carried away
“As the House would expect for such a complex and high-value project, the strategic decision taken at SDSR was followed by the commissioning of a detailed programme of work to look at the costs, risks and technical feasibility of all aspects of the proposed solution. That study was expected to take eighteen months, completing by the end of 2012”.
Yet we have to pay a cancelation fee to the suppliers.
Ah so we under took a £50 million 18 month long review (surly a sensible strategy) However before that review was concluded we thought we may as well but the £400 million EMLAS system.
Either spread sheet Phil is lying about the detailed investigation program and misleading the house (entirely possible) or some numpty really needs to get fired. I can’t believe that even in the MOD someone can order such a thing as an EMLAS without prior consent from the minister.
I have to say that while I respect the balls to make the decision it really strikes me as sad that a secretary of state not least the defence minister would spend so much time trying to party politics and blame the last government for all his ills. However it is what I have come to expect from the present government.
The leaks are also becoming ridiculous. I think any reader of TD could have written that speech this morning based on the information available in the Telegraph. Every cost and aspect of the thing has been in the press for weeks with amazing accuracy.
The magic balck hole really is the gift that just keeps on giving and I suspect we will hear of it well past 2015. No one in government has yet pointed out that the vast majority of program over runs were from project’s started before Tony Blair even came in to power. Typhoon, T45, Astute, MRA4 all started and approved before 1997.
How has the government gone for maritime raiding when 66% of its rapid reaction land forces are more than likely to be delivered by air and there is a very clear commitment to enduring operations on land?
Anyway, hopefully that’s it now. Let’s just build the damn things and probably end up using them as commando carriers anyway. In the typical half arsed British fashion.
Constant carrier availability is not to be sniffed at.
The 64k ton vessel does have advantages over smaller alternatives such as a Mistral analog (aka Invincible-class Mk2).
Greater range, stores, stability, hospital, barracks and surge squadron capacity being not least among them.
Hindsight is all well and good, discussions should really now look at what we’re going to do about future equipment aspects such as AEW and the complexities involved in ski-jump launching a UCAV.
I look forward to TD writing articles along these lines or accepting Guest writers. Get scribbling!
Aside: How is the ski-jump capable Sea Gripen coming along?
“At the time of the 2010 review it was decided to conduct a two-year in-depth study of the conversion costs, as early £400m and £500m estimates had been based on the use of steam catapult technology, rather than EMALS”.
Not being funny hear but if it was going to be £400 million for steam and £2 billion for EMLAS did no one think of simply buying some diesel generators and a few boilers from B&Q to cram in the hull somewhere. I know we have talked about the cost of adding a steam system before but £ 2 billion buys a lot of piping.
PAS2 had a common design and used steam.
@ The Other Chris
“ski-jump launching a UCAV”
You are right about this. If this carrier is going to operate for 50 years as it was envisaged and it can quite clearly never be operated in a CATOBAR configuration as it was suppose to later in life then we really have to ask how long it will be useful for if we can’t square that circle. I don’t see the Ski Jump launching as the issue. Lost of large fixed wings planes can already do that it’s the recovery that is the big question for me.
@Martin
Your suggestions of how we might have spent the £2bn differently misses the point. The reason why this decision has been taken is that there is no £2bn – so we can’t spend it on anything.
Same comment applies to @James who wants to spend the £2bn we don’t have on butchering a stern ramp into the QEC. Sadly nothing much will be spent on the Amphib capability until Albion and Bulwark are literally falling to bits. Given how much use we managed to eke out of Fearless and Intrepid that could be a very long time coming.
Peter Elliott,
fully aware that the £2B isn’t there – I was getting carried away. Should have specced the well-dock to start with (or indeed gone for Wasp or JC).
Does make you wonder how the wonder-ARG is going to get ashore though, when there is not a port. Given the last usage in 1982, the carriers are likely to be hiding in the next ocean over when the boys need to disembark, and it’s going to be a slow process from the Albions and Bays.
@ Adun – “In the abstract, the decision to procure 65,000 ton aircraft carriers to operate STOVL aircraft still baffles me. It seems like such a waste to me when a 40,000 ton vessel could probably accomplish the same mission (and at a lower cost). What a confusing program…”
As with Not A Boffin I am constantly amazed at how persistent this rabbit hole is proving.
Having spent the last eight years following the design evolution of the CVF on the Warships1 forum it comes as NO surprise that the carrier is 65k tonnes:
It is the size it is to generate the sortie rates, and thus the effect on target deemed necessary as per the scenario planning conducted by the MoD.
They tinkered around with 45k tonnes at the same time as 65k tonnes, then they tried a compromise of 55k tonnes. It didn’t work, so they went back to 65k tonnes.
I agree, unless things change on the money front we will be lucky to get two carriers and two LPDs working back-to-back providing 365 day a year availability between each pair.
Albion and Bulwark will probably be run into the ground – well that’s one way of doing an amphibious landing!
We now have our jet supported amphibious fleet for the next 10-20 years:
Q.E.
Albion
2 x Bay
@James
As I said over on the ‘spleen’ thread, in any serious duffy we will have little choice but to send both QEC: one in the FJ Carrier role and the other as the LPH.
We also have to hope T45 and Sea Viper will be on their game to protect such a big targets close to the shore.
@ Peter Elliot
I realsie the £ 2 billion is not there. I was just curious when the article from defence talk mentioned that the £ 400 million conversion cost was based on steam why not on thought hang on we have been launching steam catapults for 67 years why not keep doing it and not bother with EMLAS.
@Peter Elliott
In a serious scuffle both QE and PoW will operate under the Power Projection doctrine, operating Fast Jets and Helicopters simultaneously and rotating as necessary.
regarding james thoughts on ARG. I wonder if any one has any insite into navy plans for landing a force 1982 style when we can only generate a single task force.
It’s my understanding that lack of escorts has prompted the decision to move away from the two task force capability with an ARG and CBG combined in a single force. If we were in a San Carlos style situation would the navy allow the QEC class to come in close enough to shore to allow the Bay’s and Albion to offload while still using the same escorts to cover both. It would be one hell of a target.
@Martin
My understanding of the recent leaks and briefs is that the approach is to initially land on “undefended beaches” with helicopter transportation being the primary insertion method and superiority gained to secure the landing achieved through air power, primarily through FJ and Attack Helicopters (Maritime cleared AH1′s and Wildcats).
Hi Mike, RE
“however I do think the project [F136] could/is still going ahead, albiet slower and at the maunufacturers own cost.”
- cancelled
- they offered to finish it for 2 bn, the rest covered by the manufacturers; the offer was not taken up
@ The Other Chris
I understand the inital assault but follow on forces will have to come in with heavy equiptment. The Bay’s can’t use Mexi Floats well otu to sea (TD may have a heart attack in anything happended to them)
Ergo either the Bay’s have to come in to shore with out escorts on the carrier stays out to sea with little in the way of escort. Or the carrier comes in close to shore with the Bay’s