Or, why it does actually make a great deal of sense.
Cards on the table, I think the decision to switch back to the F35B is a good one.
Like Marvin the depressed robot in a Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy, the general reaction to the decision has been to adopt a sloped shoulder air of resignation, oh, ok then, it’s not ideal but better than nothing.
‘I suppose we will just have to get on with it’ is the majority view but I think it is entirely positive news and instead of sulking should view it as such.
In this post I am going to try and make sense of the decision, standing back from the mud-slinging as much as possible and then follow it up with a look forward on how we can extract maximum benefit from CVF/JCA in the future.
The choice of aircraft and configuration of the aircraft carrier is intimately connected so when people complain that the CVF is tarred with the JSF brush it seems to me to be completely missing the point.
So what were the options?
Contents
The Rafale and F18 Option
Both of these are fine aircraft.
The Rafale is arguably the more advanced of the two although I suspect it is better in some areas and worse in others and both are current generation aircraft (despite their histories) with the latest F18’s benefitting from lots of development money since it was first introduced.
In performance terms there does not seem to be a great deal between them.
However, what goes against them both is;
- They would both require all UK weapons to be integrated, not impossible, but significant time and cost penalties would accrue
- Both have or would have minimal industrial benefits for the UK at a time when the policy of the government is to pursue and export and manufacturing led recovery
- Both would of course need CVF to have catapults and arrestor gear with all the attendant additional costs
With both, the UK could have benefitted from collaborative training with either the United States or French naval forces and shared logistics and supply chains to mitigate the additional costs.
We also have to ask whether either would have been that good value for money anyway, however ‘cheap’
It is at this point that we enter the murky world of trying to determine unit costs of aircraft, which as I have often said, is almost impossible for the simple reason that specifications and what is included changes between each set of published figures, even for the same type. Trying to compare two different types is even more fraught.
A relatively recent deal might at least provide some insight.
The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) purchased 24 F18’s for about £62 million each but this figure, a simple division of total by quantity, is difficult to extrapolate for a UK purchase because the cost profile is spread over a number of years and includes all sorts of non-equipment and support costs. The RAAF is already an F18 user and would not require many of the cost items the UK would, weapons integration for example.
Comparing this to the F35 is difficult because at this stage we simply do not know beyond broad estimates what the programme cost would be for a UK F35, of any variety.
However, in general terms, compared to the F35, I think it would be fair and reasonable to assume that the unit cost of an F18 would be less, but other programme costs would add to the bill, reducing the differential, perhaps to the point that there is very little difference between a similar number of F18’s and F35’s.
Although one might define the two billion Pounds invested in the F35 as part of our Tier 1 Partner obligations as ‘sunk costs’ in this scenario, the final bill for buying F18’s would at least have this as a line item for information purposes, surely?
Any cost differential would also have to be weighed against two other factors, longevity and capability.
Capability first, again, without delving too deep into the minutia does anyone actually think a brand new design such as the F35 is going to be inferior to the F18?
It stands to reason that something developed from scratch, using the latest design and technology will be superior to one from a generation earlier, no matter how that earlier generation has benefitted from incremental improvements. Some might see that as hopelessly optimistic or swallowing the Lockheed Martin Koolaid but I just see it as a logical outcome of progress in product design, the same progress we see across the entire world of product engineering.
So we would be buying an aircraft that would likely to be somewhere in the same ball park cost wise as a Typhoon but with lower performance in most areas, with little if any industrial benefit (which indirectly lowers the cost) and all the cost penalties of CV operation, just to get something on the deck of an aircraft carrier, a capability that has been strategically or tactically essential very few times in the modern era.
That the Joint Combat Aircraft is meant to fulfil a joint requirement is also often overlooked by F18 advocates.
The F18 offers more or less nothing that the Typhoon does, except operation from an aircraft carrier.
It would therefore cease to be a joint programme and I find it unlikely in the extreme that the Fleet Air Arm could sustain on its own, an aircraft like the F18, without making huge sacrifices elsewhere or eating into the other services programmes.
Not likely in the extreme.
The final nail in the FAA/F18 coffin is that of longevity. If we ordered today, it is unlikely that any UK F18’s would be operating from the deck of a CVF before the early 2020’s by which time even the most optimistic estimates would give us perhaps a decade and a half before it would potentially need to be replaced due to obsolescence issues.
We would have all the pain and cost of bringing into service and maintaining it, for less than 20 years lifespan and then have to do exactly the same; this is not a sensible use of scarce defence funds.
Similar arguments exist for the Rafale, with some differences at the margins but fundamentally the same.
There have been a number of proposals for an interim purchase of F18’s or Rafales and a migration to a, by then, mature F35C towards the end of the 2020’s. Whilst having some potential benefits you simply can’t get away from the cost issue of buying twice.
Another interesting proposal is the Sea Gripen or even Sea Typhoon but both of these exist only in PowerPoint and although offering many industrial benefits they would both leave us with a much greater time gap and with an uncertain, but likely high, development cost.
This leads me to the conclusion that if we are in the market for a new flying machine to deliver against the requirement for the Joint Combat Aircraft, the F35 represents the logical choice.
So which one, B or C?
C v B or Coke v Pepsi
Having discounted all else, the decision comes down to the F35B or the F35C.
This seems to have taken on an almost religious air but it is not the case of right or wrong, just balancing costs, capabilities and a myriad of other factors to come to an opinion on what is more appropriate for the UK.
I would like to emphasise that it is about the UK, a point that many of the more strident advocates of the F35C or F18 also downplay.
We are not the US, have a completely different set of budgetary constraints and issues and should not aspire to be either.
Future Proofing
Detractors of the F35B often point out that given the CVF’s projected lifespan of 50 years it is likely that the aircraft carrier will see multiple generations of aircraft and therefore by going for STOVL and not catapults we limit our options in the future to an, as yet to be designed, STOVL UCAV or a successor STOVL aircraft.
By hitching our wagon to the USMC instead of the USN we will not be able to move with these times.
I just don’t see this, on the 50 year lifespan number first, no doubt that is their projected life but as a comparison, the HMS Ark Royal commissioned in 1955, the one before the next one, would have been still in service during Operation Telic in 2003, not having been decommissioned in 1979 at less than 25 years old. The most recent HMS Ark Royal was in service for 26 years so if CVF stays in service for double the life of the two previous generations of Royal Navy aircraft carriers then fair enough but it will be doing much better than the two before it.
By the time it goes out of service, the Tornado will have been in use for over 40 years; the F18 was introduced in 1983 and via continuous improvement will still likely be in service for another 15 years or more.
Why do people therefore think that the F35 will be out of service before a CVF is sent for recycling, the trend is for longer equipment cycles, not shorter?
In looking far into the future there is also the option of UCAV’s to consider, unmanned combat vehicles are likely to be autonomous but there are significant technical and ethical issues to overcome and one of the features of unmanned systems is their significant range and endurance which is not limited by having on-board aircrew.
As the US concentrates on the Pacific theatre and countering a rising China, the ranges needed are equally immense. The X47B demonstrator, for example, has a range in excess of 2,000nm because these kinds of programmes need to demonstrate that range; the Pacific is a big old place and sophisticated anti-access technologies being fielded by the Chinese such as their anti-ship ballistic missiles which are specifically meant to deal with US carriers means strategic need meets technical requirements quite well.
The US is therefore looking at very long range UCAV’s because it knows in the Pacific it needs them and they must be able to fly from their CVN’s. The UK is very definitely not the US, has very different strategic aspirations and challenges and should look at equipment programmes through a UK shaped lens. Does anyone think we are going to be standing shoulder to shoulder with the USN in the Pacific theatre against the Chinese?
I know we must always be mindful of unknown strategic shock but I find this highly unlikely so to use it as a reason to spend more money we don’t have on a CV F35 seems unreasonable.
Industry
The UK is the only Tier 1 Partner in the Joint strike Fighter Programme, significant sums of public money have been invested and in return, there will be equally significant industrial and economic benefits for the UK.
We need not be somehow ashamed of this, British industry and technical knowhow will be a big part of the F35.
The difference in industrial benefits between a C or B purchase is relatively modest, on face value with the Rolls Royce ‘LiftSystem’ the UK would accrue greater benefit with a larger B purchase but without seeing the detailed agreements it would be impossible to quantify because the design, manufacture and integration work is split between the UK and US.
By confirming the F35B as the chosen aircraft for JCA it may well make the F35B a more attractive export proposition with its attendant industrial benefits for the UK.
Other elements of an F35C purchase such as the electromagnetic launch and recovery system would need to be purchased from the US with no industrial benefits, this coupled with the reduction in LiftSystem quantity would see a net loss to the UK so one might argue the F35B provides greater economic benefit to the UK for a given spend.
Range
The F35C offers greater range.
The JSF KPP for the F35C states a combat radius using internal fuel of 600 nautical miles using a USN mission profile and for the F35B, 450 nautical miles using a USMC profile.
It is clear therefore (accepting potential differences in flight profiles) that the CV variant offers much more range than the STOVL variant, some 25%.
When operating helicopters in support of ground forces CVF will have to be much closer to shore but when engaged in strike activities or defensive counter air this extended mission radius or endurance is extremely valuable.
There are however, a number of mitigating factors that although not negating this advantage do go some way to mitigating it.
When operating CV aircraft in order to provide a margin of safety operators may choose to return with a greater fuel load than in the KPP, thus reducing the effective real world range. STOVL does not have these concerns so can maximise the fuel carried.
Ranges can be extended using external fuel tanks or airborne refuelling using land based aircraft although this also applies to the CV variant of course.
Something else to consider is that the F35B will operate from conventional concrete runways much more often than the deck of a CVF. This isn’t based on dismissing naval aviation but a reality of the joint nature of the aircraft fleet and the operational reality of the Harrier. One thing I have never seen is the projected range figures for both the F35C and F35B variants when using land bases but I wonder if the differential would be the same or different?
The F35C is a clear winner in this area but as with payload and bring back weight, perhaps not as significant on operations as imagined.
Payload and Bring Back
The USMC KPP for the F35B states a short take off of just under 183 metres (137m for the UK JCA) with enough fuel for the KPP mission profile, 2 AMRAAM and 2 1000lb JDAM’s and a vertical landing bring back weight equivalent to enough fuel to safely land with an appropriate margin whilst carrying the same 2 AMRAAM and 2 1000lb JDAM’s.
The KPP also states that this will be carried out with a 10 knot wind over deck (WOD), at sea level (funnily enough!) and in a ‘tropical day’ to allay some of those East of Suez scaremongers.
The standard payload whilst performing the stated KPP mission radius for the F35C is also enough fuel for the mission and 2 AMRAAM but instead of a pair of 1,000lb JDAM’s, a pair of 2,000lb JDAM’s.
CVF has a deck length of nearly 275m.
I am not sure what the maximum payload for short take off is; it would be dependent on many factors, but CVF has some room to spare moving up from the KPP distance and of course, a ski jump.
Maximum weapon load for the F35C is 8,160kg and for the F35B, 6,800kg.
Targeting pods and defensive systems are often carried externally and would eat into this payload but with the F35, most of these are integral to the design so the useable weapon load is high.
Again, the F35C is the clear winner.
But (you knew there was going to be a but)
6,800kg is thirty Paveway IV’s or over 130 Dual Mode Brimstone (not including pylons)
It is a silly example but the point I am making here is that perhaps the real world difference might not be that significant, especially when one considers the rules of engagement in likely operations will demand greater accuracy and smaller explosive yields.
Absolute payload differentials between the two variants therefore become less of a major concern.
If we are going to use the F35B to carry Storm Shadow then the vertical landing bring back weight limitation may result in us dumping million pound missiles into the sea if they are not used because Storm Shadow is a large missile weighing in at just over 1,200kg, self-evidently, not a good thing.
If they hang up on the pylon then the implications might be even more serious so Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL) is designed to use wing lift to increase the maximum landing weight and consequently, the bring back weight for unused munitions. SRVL has been in development for some time and Lockheed Martin was awarded a $13m contract in 2010 to integrate it onto the F35B.
SRVL also lowers stresses on the engine and other components so might be used as a matter of course, or at least it provides the option to do.
I don’t think the final increase in maximum weight that is enabled by the latest iteration of SRVL has been released (I might be wrong on that) but the target was between 900kg and 1,800 kg. At 1,230kg one Storm Shadow might be possible within those boundaries but not two. If we ever do introduce the Naval Strike Missile that is being developed for the F35 then at 450kg, a pair would be within the SRVL lower limit.
The Selected Precision Effects at Range (SPEAR) Capability 3 is proposed as a medium range cruise missile, almost a mini Storm Shadow, possibly using a bomb glide kit. Although there has been a lot of speculation not much has been officially released but I think it would be safe to say, it will not be anywhere near as heavy as a Storm Shadow.
Storm Shadow is arguably, the major problem for bring back and the F35B but again, in the real world, how likely are we going to be using F35B to launch Storm Shadow anyway and how many of those sorties are going to be aborted mid-air or hang up?
Beyond this there are also issues with the weight of pylons and this might impact on the bring back weight, I understand the KPP is based on a clean wing and no gun.
Bring back weight remains a serious challenge and the payload differential between the B and C on paper is not insignificant but its operational impact might be not as limiting as the naysayers would have us all believe.
Flexibility and Surge
It is accepted that operating STOVL aircraft and helicopters is much more efficient and easier than operating CV aircraft and helicopters. It is how we have operated for many decades after all and the move to CV would have required a great deal of very time consuming and very expensive work up.
This would have delayed the introduction of the capability and absorbed a much higher proportion of the aircraft fleet to maintain currency for both deck and aircrew.
Sortie rates are generally accepted to be higher with STOVL although this higher sortie rate may be countered in some scenarios by the greater endurance with CV. The F35B Key Performance Parameter for sorties rates is 4 surge and 3 sustained and 3 and 2 respectively for the F35C.
The CVF and JCA concept is designed to enable flexing of the tailored air group depending upon requirements. The norm will likely be a small number of F35B’s supplemented with varying types and quantities of Merlin, Chinook, Apache and Wildcat. The surge is much easier, because of the training requirement for deck landing and take-off is less with the B than C.
Some have suggested that the rolling vertical landing (SRVL) technique (UK only) that may be used to increase bring back payload in certain climatic conditions make deck operations as complex as CV and thus decrease this flexibility but SRVL will only have to be used in limited circumstances, if the bring back payload exceeds the USMC KPP of fuel; two 1000lb JDAM’s and two AIM-120 AA missiles. If it is used as a matter of course for other reasons then the large deck of the CVF and the extremely detailed simulation, coupled with a massive well of STOVL experience will mitigate any problems.
I find this claim that SRVL provides all the complications of CV with none of the benefits rather difficult to accept given the limited circumstances in which SRVL will be needed, of course, SRVL is not without penalty but it is hardly doom and glom either.
Advances in avionics, landing aids and synthetic training environments could reduce the need for CV training but it seems doubtful that this will ever reach anywhere need the small training requirement for deck operations on the B model.
In short, STOVL makes it quicker and easier to surge aircraft onto CVF should that surge ever be needed, which would be unusual in any event.
So what if CV needs more training, it is a fair enough question to ask.
The problem is that it would take a disproportionate slice out of the training calendar because the UK will have only a modest fleet of F35’s. This would therefore reduce the effective numbers available for use because more would be used for training.
The vast majority of time the UK JCA will be operating from conventional land bases, operations at sea will be the exception so we should look at allowing the largely land based aircrew to transition to sea as easily and cheaply as possible, CV does not do this, by STOVL does.
A mission might see JCA operated from CVF and transition to a land base, this land base might have been damaged and this is where the concept of operating from forward bases can be useful. The Harrier proved the operational viability of operating from forward bases or temporarily damaged air bases in the Falklands, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Although not likely to be used often, and the definition of austere might be interesting to look at, it is something that the F35B can do which the F35C cannot.
This basing flexibility is at the heart of the intentional performance trade-offs with STOVL. As an example, when planning the KPP for STOVL operations the USMC calculated that across the most likely operating environments there are eight times as many runways in existence that can be used for the F35B compared to the F35C and this is before we even examine the options for expeditionary airfield construction. The USMC is very firmly wedded to the concept of expeditionary basing and although the UK is less so, it is something I think that we need to reaffirm as a key advantage of the F35B.
Given the weight and vertical thrust of the F35B operating it from the deck (or flat space) of any ship other than one specially designed for it is not viable but emergency recovery is something that can be done with an F35B. It would likely result in damage to whatever it landed on and take that ship out of normal operations but given the value of the pilot and aircraft this might still save a lot of money and provide an option to save a pilot. This is not a hugely significant advantage of the F35B but it does provide options that are not available to the F35C.
CV makes CVF more specialised, STOVL makes it more flexible.
Interoperability
This always seemed to be a rather weak argument in favour of the switch and many believe it was just cover for the Anglo French defence cooperation agreement.
However, it is certainly true that a CV optimised CVF would enable US and French navy aircraft to operate from its decks and vice versa.
In reality, this is harder to achieve than say.
Different aircraft require different equipment for maintenance and launch/recovery and there have been some concerns that for the Charles de Gaul, the deck might not have the strength to accommodate the F35C.
Assuming that the F35B provides no interoperability with allies is also incorrect, the USMC will be operating the F35B and other Harrier using nations such as Italy and Spain will also likely introduce the F35B. An increased number of F35B’s will reduce the unit cost and with three European nations potentially operating it the opportunities for interoperability seem greater. Those who see European cooperation as both a good thing and inevitable should see three nations with the same mode of operating fast jets at sea is better than two, all we need now is for the French to buy F35B!
We also have to ask beyond if, why.
It has already been made very clear that the agreement on interoperability between the French and UK would amount to no more than coordinating refit periods. The US Navy might find it convenient to operate its F35C’s off a CVF but just how realistic does anything actually think this is.
Come on, really.
It might be equally convenient to operate UK F35C’s from a USN carrier but for what reason, do they not have enough aircraft or something?
I think this one is a score draw between the F35B and F35C; we will have interoperability with the F35B, just with different nations and forces.
Carrier availability for the UK is far more important than interoperability with allies any day of the week and twice on Sundays.
Risk
If the F35B is cancelled then we have nowhere to go so in this respect it represents a higher risk option. If we were to go for the F35C and it was cancelled then a fall back of F18, Rafale or maybe even a development of the Gripen NG become possible.
It was risk that underpinned the original decision to switch; the F35B was looking shaky, under ‘probation’ and surrounded by rumours of cancellation. The publication date of the SDSR meant that some decision was needed within the publication schedule.
Two years later and the risk profile has changed considerably, despite still having many challenges, much progress has been made and the F35C is now having its own collection of problems.
All new aircraft developments have their attendant risks; it seems from the outside looking in that both variants have their own collection, with most of them overplayed by an agenda driven media.
Ultimately, risk is cost, if the risk that the F35B is cancelled it will be very expensive but then it would also be expensive if the F35C was cancelled.
When I read the huge volume of materials posted online that proclaim the F35 to be a lemon, every change in specification a disaster and every setback a double disaster I tend to glass over. It is easy to slag off the F35 because it is expensive, it is late and it is in the public eye but is this any different to other ultimately successful programmes?
I just don’t think it is and I find it simply unbelievable that the Western World’s top aeronautical engineers and companies will not make it a success.
The simple truth is any transformational programme with ambition has risk, the F35 is not a simple incremental improvement to an existing design.
That is not to say it is out of the woods, significant challenges remain but let’s not assume that simply because the aircraft has developmental problems in the middle of its development programme that the sky is going to fall in and we are gambling the family silver on a 100-1 outsider.
AEW, AAR and COD
One of the potential additional costs of CV was the likely need to develop an airborne refuelling capability for the F35C to support recovery refuelling. This could have been extended to provide additional range for a strike package without using land based AAR.
The need for Carrier Onboard Delivery for CVF has never been widely discussed but the need for airborne early warning should be obvious. The current system, the Sea King ASaC Mk 7 goes out of service in 2016 and the successor programme called CROWSNEST has now been confirmed as having secured funding.
By going for a CVF aircraft with catapults and arrestor gear many thought the road would be clear for a purchase of the E2D Hawkeye and even the C2 Greyhound for the COD role.
This was always fantasy.
In the vast majority of operations the RAF’s E3’s will be used for wide area airborne early warning and control with a CVF based solution for shorter range gap filling and in very few operations, this wider area deployment.
The contribution of the Type 45 and the impact of potential UAV based technologies should also be considered when looking at this issue.
The potential for a CV AEW and COD aircraft was the weakest argument for the original switch to CV.
Cost and the Final (again) Decision
This is of course the ‘big un’ and whilst we might discuss the finer points of bring back weights or UCAV’s the decision to revert to the F35B was very much about the Pound notes.
The bottom line of F35 costs is this, we simply do not know beyond estimates and something else that people often do not appreciate is this, JCA is not yet passed Main Gate and thus, no budget has been allocated for the demonstration and manufacture phase, in short, we don’t know how much each one costs and we don’t know how much we have to spend.
I do find it rather bemusing to watch the massed ranks of internet forum members, bloggers and think tank researchers clutching at the definitions of LRIP and flyaway, open source documents and internet information to try and get some sort of meaningful comparison between different deals, different aircraft, different nations and different systems. Most of this information is hugely complex and hugely commercially confidential; hence the degree of variability of that in the public domain.
This is difficult with aircraft in production, let alone those that are in development.
One of the first posts I published on Think Defence was a question, does anyone actually know how much the F35 will be.
The short answer was very few people, if any.
Which leads me to the conclusion that cost comparisons can only be made in very general terms and we should leave detailed cost comparisons to those in possession of the actual figures.
I can’t do a post about this subject without being a bit of a smug git, I am sure you will allow me just a little bit of ‘told you so’
On August 7th 2010 I said
Therefore, for cost reasons, the F35B is the right choice.
On September 13th 2010 I asked the following questions;
- How does changing the design and construction of CVF at this late stage save money
- How does adding several hundred million pounds for catapults save money
- How does maintaining those catapults for 40 years save money
- How do the extra catapult maintainers wages, pensions and other costs over 40 years save money
- How does the extra cost of maintaining perishable carrier operations skills save money
- How does scrapping the 3 F35B’s we have purchased as part of the operational evaluation phase save money
I finished that post by asking this
Am I being thick?
Because I could not understand how the leaks coming out of the MoD prior to the publication of the SDSR that trailed the switch to the F35C were characterised as some sort of cost saving.
I was genuinely puzzled and so it turned out I wasn’t being thick at all, it was the other people!
Several times since then I have asked the same questions and came to the same conclusions, the F35B is actually the cheapest option, not in isolation, but across the whole of defence.
Although it is only a gut feeling because I do not have sight of any detailed costing, I have remained constant on that and continue to do so.
Events would seem to vindicate that opinion.
This conclusion was not based on being omnipotent or ultra-wise but on the simple fact that it was exactly the same reason that the F35B was selected in the first place and although there was some cost growth, not much changed since.
One can imagine the costing spreadsheet used to support the decision was incredibly complex with many scenarios and permutations.
In my Forward to Plan B post last month I tried to summarise where costs would lie;
Deck Crew; estimates vary but a solid assumption is that conventional carrier operations need more deck crew that STOVL; shore accommodation, welfare, pensions, pay and all the other capitation costs we know about. Some of these can be mitigated with sharing arrangements but fundamentally, it is an additional cost.
Flight Crew; although synthetic environments and the F35’s flight control systems hold a great deal of promise, the assumption must be that maintaining carrier qualifications will require more aircraft, more aircrew and more time. This drives up cost or reduces availability. Where that relationship settles is open for discussion but the basic assumption should be we will need more time/crew or accept less mission availability and reduce the ability to rapidly surge in a crisis.
Catapults and Arrestor Gear; no sensible option exists other than the US EMAL’s and associated recovery equipment which is an additional capital cost and significant through life cost. Certainly cheaper than steam but still a considerable extra cost although the risk of it failing to deliver seems remote.
Recovery Refuelling; if we operate the CTOL F35C we need a means of safely providing emergency recovery refuelling but given that no customer exists for the F35C except the USN and they have plenty of other options we would have to fund that ourselves. This would not be an insurmountable problem but at what cost?
What I didn’t cover was the cost of actually converting the CVF to accept catapults and arrestor gear or factor in the number of aircraft used to deliver against a set of mission requirements, this latter variable was part of the rear guard leaking that took place recently.
CVF was supposed to be adaptable; many critics have latched onto this and assumed that converting to catapults and arrestor gear would simply be a case of opening a compartment, dropping in a bit of kit and hey presto. There is no way, they claim, that the reported multi billion cost can be correct, it is a conspiracy by the Carrier Alliance to inflate costs and squeeze yet more money from a gullible MoD.
The estimate from the US that was reportedly much less is interesting but again, caution must be exercised and those apples must be compared with apples.
Whatever the figure and however it might seem incredulous the simple fact is it must be taken as correct. It may well include a high degree of risk cost, it might well be erring on the high side but surely this is actually a good thing because it displays a cautious approach to cost growth that most would agree has been absent for many years at the MoD.
I suspect there was some degree of artistic licence with the word ‘adaptable’
If the project was going to take another decade to come to fruition then scope for even further cost escalation should be obvious to all as well.
On the cost comparisons between individual aircraft, maybe the additional maintenance cost of the F35B is neatly offset by the additional maintenance and CV operating costs of going for the F35C, if so, the cost of conversion then becomes a big issue.
What is a major issue is how this cost estimate proved to be so wildly wide of the mark and when reality dawned, it was obvious there was no other choice, unless that is of course, carrier strike would be pursued at the expense of other services and other projects.
Again, not likely in the extreme
On the issue of needing more aircraft for a given mission set then to this I would simply ask a couple of questions, in what circumstances and how old were the assumptions behind those missions.
To that I would comment that the UK armed forces post SDSR have shrunk, we have accepted we will be doing less with less, CVF and JCA is no different.
Decisions Decisions
The MoD has had some time during which to analyse every last aspect of the decision, unlike before the original reversion was made.
For me, this was an unforgivable mistake, making such a fundamental decision, setting wheels in motion and incurring huge cost before a level of assuredness had been achieved that the decision was the correct one, based on detailed analysis not finger in the air guessing.
Without knowing the full picture, being privy to all the briefings or information provided to Liam Fox and his advisors we can’t pin the blame but the simple fact is, a decision was made on incomplete evidence.
In all fairness, the cost, but not the decision was always subject to further investigation, the SDSR was actually quite clear on this. Soon after, questions were tabled in the House of Commons to which the MoD had no answer, time after time, and not just on carrier strike, an MP would ask an SDSR related question to which the published answer was ‘dunno’
Alarm bells should have been ringing in the press and opposition benches.
Again, without sounding like too much of a smug git, I have written several times about this uncertainty. In my smug git party were a small number of commenters on specialist forums who had a similar view so I must say thank you to them for helping me to understand I was not in fact being a lunatic.
There was a huge degree of hubris behind the announcement and in the mutual backslapping that followed, where the talk was of being a proper navy, assuming our God given right to be second only to the US Navy and returning to the glory days, none of the professional commenters like defence journalists or think tanks actually questioned any of this.
Last month, whilst the rumours and leaks abounded of a reversal I said that the decision would not be about aircraft variants or ‘cats and flaps’ but about the MoD’s financial credibility and the obvious need to regain it because that is the MoD’s most precious commodity.
The announcement by Phil Hammond on changes to the F35 variant was part of that mission to regain credibility and the recent statement to the House of Commons on MoD’s budget being bought back into balance was another.
The decision to revert was therefore all about cost but how did the original change of heart happen, how was such a fundamental error made.
Books will no doubt be written one day on this subject but I have a theory that says the change decision driven from the top down; influenced by a number of factors but ultimately made on the basis of false assumptions and politicians, aided by a derelict defence establishment that did not exercise enough rigour in challenging those assumptions.
That theory starts with a solid understanding and operational analysis of the F35B and a STOVL CVF concept as applied to defence planning assumptions and operational experience.
In the middle is what I think was a fundamental misunderstanding of this concept in the minds of politicians, the defence select committee, media commenters and even some in the services. So whilst it seems that this flexible arrangement of blending command facilities, fixed wing and rotary aviation to meet the demands of a wide range of mission requirements was firmly bedded into the original concept for CVF and JCA, in the minds of others it wasn’t.
An example of how this manifested itself is the continual reference to having the capability to embark 36 aircraft. 36 aircraft was the most demanding compliment and seen as something of an unusual scenario against many, not the norm, but it is often referred to.
The disconnect continued throughout the SDSR period, perhaps the words ‘Carrier Strike’ played part of this misunderstanding, strike was one of a number of missions.
We based our decision to opt for the F35B to fulfil the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement on many years detailed operational analysis, all of a sudden, and to the surprise of almost everyone in the project team, the switch was announced. There is only anecdotal evidence to suggest this element of surprise in those involved but if true is quite telling and would reinforce the notion of a rushed decision making process.
Where did the push for the change come from and on what evidence was it made?
I suggest it came from the top down, a political decision from Liam Fox, advisors with vested interests and influenced by an extremely vocal Royal Navy lobby, a media environment which often paints the Royal Navy as a ‘victim’ and a range of senior service personnel who saw the opportunity for greater capabilities, bragging rights and some degree of service aggrandisement.
They had a collective rush of blood to the head and reverted to typical MoD behaviour, hoping that funding would be found for the second CVF and praying that quick estimates would turn out to be correct, pushing further decision out to the future and being seduced by all the capabilities on offer.
The decision was made before the detailed analysis was completed, as I mentioned above, this is not news and was explicit within the SDSR that costs would be determined via the means of a multi-million Pound study.
The estimates were wholly incorrect, as estimates sometimes are.
The detailed and exhaustive operational analysis that was carried out post SDSR by the people with total command of all the facts would have also made quite plain the operational impact of only having one hull and the likely cost driven impact of the switch on all sorts of capabilities across the services.
Reality met aspiration and so, we are where we are, there really was no other choice to be made.
Summary and Look Forward
The decision is made, no point in sulking or moaning about it and I for one think it was the correct one anyway. I still find it rather exasperating that the original reversion decision was made that has cost us two years and a lot of money but it is water under the bridge now.
We should now look forward to maximising our investment and that will be the subject of the next post.
My maritime (Note: Not naval) focus is part of a civilian goal-lead line of thinking. A look at what assets Britain has remaining to take advantage of. These goals define our Ends: Rebalanced economy, increased links with emerging economies, specifically BRICS in the main but also looking at re-culturing the Commonwealth.
This End is only reached through several Ways: Investment, Technology Transfer, Diplomacy, Aid, Security, to name a few.
Specifically to the interests of this Blog, the most applicable Means that can be developed to support these Ways are primarily (Note: Primarily, not Exclusively) Maritime, and by extension only, has a Naval bent. Given the country’s dwindling resources, siloing the services does not serve to create these Means. Interoperability is mandatory, in this plan. This means Air Force and Royal Navy delivering and supporting the Army.
What are your goals for the country? How do you propose to achieve them? What will we need to enable them?
In the detail, we have both agreed that maritime qualified aircraft are often heavier. Where our arguments have differed is that I have offered figures to suggest that the added weight of folding gear on a Merlin, to use a single specific example among the many we’ve discussed, may make little to no difference in the operational performance of the aircraft. Evidenced by existing variant models and their listed performances.
There is no longer any surmising necessary. A folding rotor variant as used by the Italians or Japanese may not be able to hit 170 knots, or reach more than 14,500ft but if both variants still have a Do Not Exceed speed of 167knots or remain unpressurised, does this weight increase matter to the operation of the aircraft? Especially when the gains would be increased availability in all theatres, not just a subset of them.
There are many items of equipment where specialisation is unavoidable or desirable. Challenger II is the first that springs to my mind. But if opinion is divided, or one commenter is not following the line of another’s thinking, efforts do need to be made to provide examples and case studies instead of dismissing a submission as absurd in a commenters opinion, without qualification.
Hi Chris B, I would tend to agree
“I see no reason why everyone else should have their normal operational capability downgraded on the altar of making up for Naval short falls.”
At the time the Merlin trade-off’s were made, Chinook had not become “the bible” yet and the decisions taken were rational; now we just will have to foot the cost of the retrofit.
The only exception I would make is Wildcat. The RN numbers were made so tight relative to the overall need (light assault was added later, and got a couple reallocated within the total, even though it has not been made public whether they will be for the RM or the SF; probably for both)
- there would have to be full readiness to switch from land to sea
- how’s the undercarriage; does it allow the ship deck lock-down system to be used? Or a day to be spent back at the factory?
- the design is so performant anyway that a few extra kilos being lugged around will not compromise mission capability (and the are so expensive that we better get the best use out of them)
@ACC
- Re: “the design is so performant anyway that a few extra kilos being lugged around will not compromise mission capability”
This covers one of my points entirely, the principle carries over to other items of equipment as well.
I wanted to point out an exception. A lot of designs, having already been through upgrades, may struggle, without taking a hit in mission effectiveness.
Your Merlin examples are very informative. Let’s remember, though, that it was designed to fly and stay in the air over N. Atlantic in all kinds of weathers, which design aim it has accomplished wonderfully. For other uses it has been criticised as
- being over-complex (number of engines)
- being too heavy, relative to payload (derives from the point above?)
We have lots of them, they are very good and paid-for, let’s just take the hit on the extra (marginal) cost and use them in a way providing the best possible fit with the current (emerging?) strategy, and the doctrine that goes with it
- on that last note, have you noticed that the Maritime doctrine was rewritten (very well, I must say) in such a haste that the overall doctrine where it is meant to slot in is still awaiting a similar refresh?
As the ship may operate closer to land surely an updated missile defence like seaceptor can be placed on the ship ,Also the radar to be fitted is good but they are already working on the next version which will double the range.Useful if you dont have a long range e2, the U.S marines have considered a f35b electronic warfare version ,that would also be handy if it could control a couple of the uav,s.
Agreed overall, though arguable that the three turbines (albeit more complex) enable the versatility in payload. Probably a chicken and egg topic unto itself.
Regards to the overall doctrine I certainly wasn’t expecting a refresh, having thought the Maritime followed Overall. Though news of a release of a refresh is very interesting. Have you seen a release schedule at all?
It makes sense to be taking some time though, especially with the NATO discussions yesterday as a suitably cinematic backdrop. Given Iraq withdrawal and a timetable for a full Afghanistan wind down, what now?
Do folks here believe that asymmetric warfare and COIN operations will continue to be the norm in the future? Should we be returning focus to more conventional warfare? Is the expeditionary slant the right approach for either?
One would have thought so “thought the Maritime followed Overall.”
RE “Though news of a release of a refresh is very interesting. Have you seen a release schedule at all?”
- No! And that is even more interesting
- I take the thought leadership angle here (I don’t mean by any service in particular, doctrines are staff matters = joint… or if not, become useless)
The Maritime Doctrine doc makes apologies in several place for the (quoted) overarching doc not having received the updates (and more) and hence not being fully consistent with the newer piece
Good point “asymmetric warfare and COIN operations will continue to be the norm in the future? Should we be returning focus to more conventional warfare? Is the expeditionary slant the right approach for either?”
- with our level of resources (dedicated) you can ONLY cover both with the expeditionary slant
- and it is only through this “intermediate” intellectual stopping post that leads me to lean to the maritime focus (I take it that you, too, but nor sure if for the same reasons?)
Let’s go back to the four basic military tasks
1. Strat. intelligence
- to know what is brewing, to know what to expect and then deter, before needing to respond
2. CASD
- to deter against surprise attack (megalomaniac minds do exist)
3. Defend sovereign territory
4. Minimise damage to facilities (broadly) and to the population at large
One could now go to zero-based budgeting and say:
for 1. we need abt 40.000
for 2. the submarine service is under 2.000 (add the same onshore for the nuclear aspect; or more – I don’t know, does anybody!)
for 3. Falklands garrison, intervention brigades, RAF regiment (INCL. NRBC)plus QRA plus ‘a HMRCG’
for 4. mainly a planning, coordinating body (with command facilities that can be quickly activated) on top of existing civilian layers
- Re: “and it is only through this “intermediate” intellectual stopping post that leads me to lean to the maritime focus (I take it that you, too, but nor sure if for the same reasons?)”
It sounds like a very similar thought process: a case of multiple paths to the same point maybe?
After SDSR I was looking at how this apparent leaning in planning could promote the UK’s interests, mainly in the non-warfighting sense, given reductions in Squadrons, Regiments and hull numbers i.e. How do we achieve these military goals with what we’ve got?
I flipped the question to see if a set of defined civilian goals would shape the military differently instead and still reached a similar place from that starting point as well.
I acknowledged ” a good point” rather than “a good question” to avoid the
- “that’s why I asked it”
I’m glad I did not get that kind of thing back (often happens), Now, from:
“After SDSR I was looking at how this apparent leaning in planning could promote the UK’s interests, mainly in the non-warfighting sense, given reductions in Squadrons, Regiments and hull numbers i.e. How do we achieve these military goals with what we’ve got?”
Of course my zero-based budgeting does not stop there, it is just the “base load”, to build on, to come up to the current level of expenditure
* with better effect*
- some of the things *we’ve got* were effectively mothballed… so that was not a good start for aligning strategy, and the means to deliver good results in pursuit of it
@ The Other Chris,
“My maritime (Note: Not naval)”
They’re effectively the same thing
I think a major problem you’re having is you’re working from the perspective of trying to be the President of the UK, with over arching power to completely reshape the country and its economy, which isn’t really a sound position to start from.
Politicians will decide who they wish to trade with and emerging trends will dictate who is available for the politicians to choose from. The job of the Military is no more and no less to protect those interests that are cultivated by parilament, not for the military to try and shape those interests.
My goals for the country are irrelevant to a discussion about what equipment the military should possess. The goals of the current and future governments are relevant, along with assessing how the world will develop around them. My personal political desires, while perhaps interetsing to some, are largely of no value to this particular discussion. Unfortunately by extension that includes your desires as well.
I’m also not sure why you believe that “Investment, Technology Transfer, Diplomacy, Aid, Security,” are means that can only be served by maritime ways. Investment is a financial tool. Technology can be transfered in person or through electronic means. Diplomacy is largely a face to face matter. Aid is financial again. Security is a broad spectrum concern and depends largely on what you are planning to protect and whom you are planning to protect it from. A Type 45 is of limited value in a campaign against a jungle based guerilla group.
“Where our arguments have differed is that I have offered figures to suggest that the added weight of folding gear on a Merlin, to use a single specific example among the many we’ve discussed, may make little to no difference in the operational performance of the aircraft”
– You didnt provide any figures. Or sources. You listed a few helicopters, but no details on where you obtained their performance information.
“Especially when the gains would be increased availability in all theatres, not just a subset of them.”
– But that’s just that point, the added weight would cause LESS availability and lower performance in all theatres, with the exception of the Maritime theatre, the opposite of what you’re suggesting. The only gain to marinising a helicopter is that it can be used from the deck of a ship. At all other times; at home, in the desert, in the jungle, etc, etc, you are compromsing its design, making it slower, reducing its payload, its range, while increasing its fuel burn and mechanical strain for comparable, sub-maximal missions.
Chris.B.: I think that a key part of The Other Chris’ maritime focus/diplomacy is that we’ll be consistently demonstrating our sincerity and utility to our allies (some ‘new’).
A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis, rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises.
Yup, other ‘assets’ can do that too, and sometimes more suitably/economically; which is why it’s ‘maritime focus’, rather than ‘maritime to the exclusion of all else’.
The Other Chris: You know that I broadly agree with your idea, and everything being marine-compatible is a great idea… in theory… but….
Your case study approach is the one to go for, naturally, but I’d pursue it further (and have, in fact). Plenty of recent ops all over the place (not just ones that the UK’s been involved in) have demonstrated just how tight the performance margins really are, where the stated performance has an unstated ‘operating in standard European conditions’, which translates to ‘the helo can’t even take off in hot and high conditions’. Then add half a ton of marinisation to it.
[You probably understand all this better than I do, but I'm including it for completeness' sake, rather than teaching to suck eggs.] Adding weight, then adding more/heavier engines to offset, then adding the extra fuel necessary to maintain the range/endurance requirement, which adds more weight, which then needs more/heavier engines… can almost immediately become a ruinous vicious circle.
It can be done, for sure, but that’s how you end up with complicated and expensive to run (magnificent) beasts like Merlin.
The German MONARC programme showed pretty clearly how ‘simply marinising’ something can turn out to be Just Not Worth It. Better to just buy a proper, specialised naval mount, designed for that specific purpose (and take the hit on ammo-commonality and capability).
You could counter that if marinisation had been built into the PzH 2000 from the beginning, then there wouldn’t have been that problem, but: then it would have been a very different system, less suitable/cost-effective in its actual core task; this means that your (higher level vision of) maritime focus needs lots of new kit to work.
I think running a few case studies (even to just a back of the envelope level) will support something like Chris.B.’s argument; where it’s something that’s considered desirable for all UK kit, then worked out on a strictly case by case basis; applied where it doesn’t add much compromise/cost (Harpoon replacement, say), with the gaps created filled by specialised kit, designed for that purpose.
But, as we go off into the future then new techs will constantly reduce that margins penalty; so it’s not all bad, but is pretty far future/theoretical at that point.
@Chris.B.
- “They’re effectively the same thing”
Oh dear.
- “[you're] trying to be the President of the UK”
Part of most thought exercises involve assuming the role of a decision maker.
- “…not for the military to try and shape those interests.”
One of my points. Military doctrine should follow Civilian interests.
- “My goals for the country are irrelevant.”
They should be. Your country is your country.
- “why you believe that “Investment, Technology Transfer, Diplomacy, Aid, Security,” are means that can only be served by maritime ways”
Where did I state these were exclusively maritime?
- “You didnt provide any figures. Or sources.”
I refer you to previous posts containing said figures, and sources.
- “added weight would cause LESS availability and lower performance in all theatres”
I also return, once again, to ask “How Much?” is performance reduced by this additional weight of which I am not disputing? If it does not affect affect operational performance I ask, once again, “Does it matter?”
AgustaWestland AH1 seems to operate in both “hot and high” and “wet and low” without a problem. Why is this capability not desirable in other units for an Armed Services designed around Expeditionary warfare?
- Early on, you said “FRES needs to be what the army need it to be, not what the Navy would like it to be.”
This comment is probably fairly critical to our exchanges since. To clarify, I agree. Specifically I think the Army should take into consideration the facilities and capabilities that the RAF and RN can provide when determining their vehicle. To suggest that I think the RN should specify an Armoured Fighting Vehicle for the Army would be, to use your term, absurd.
@tsz52
Certainly valid to consider.
What’s been lost in the depths of debate from my thought exercise is the “Where we should be” section.
Had events turned out as suggested in the exercise we’d have had 60 years of heavier maritime leanings and the R&D, investment and experience to facilitate. That would certainly have made constructing equipment that handled these performance ranges easier. We rely on mankind’s ability to innovate when necessitated.
This is the enabler for a paradigm shift in thinking that the thought exercise is exploring: It is not Model A Variant L for Land, Model A Variant M for Sea.
Instead everyone’s thinking would be Model A for Air Superiority. Model S for Strike. Model C for CAS. Regardless of basing.
To use current models as inspiration in an alternate timeline, think along the lines of Typhoon for Air Superiority, Supersonic Harriers for CAS, F-35 for Strike. No service variants.
For example, instead of thinking about folding up a helicopter to fit a space as per convention, why are we not considering an aircraft that fits the space or a space that accommodates the aircraft?
Maybe operating CVS has taught our designers to rely on origami. Maybe cancelling CVA has meant we never considered a different shape aircraft carrier.
The Other Chris: Aye, I completely took that on board. But the only real utility in your idea is to the extent that it affects/effects something real. I love alternate timeline, What If?, ‘should have’, theoretical stuff more than most; but this isn’t that kind of Blog so much, so perceived relevance (here) will be more about near-future/attainable.
Extrapolating from 60 years ago to now to a possible 60 years in the future is useful, for sure, as part of your argument (to illustrate the ‘over-arching vision’ [egad, I hate phrases like that!]), but there needs to be plenty of near-term, realistic, pragmatic, nuts and bolts examples in there too (if you want to win people over, and effect actual change).
@ The Other Chris,
You’re complaining because I assessed Maritime and Naval as being the same. They are. They are just two different words. This maritime strategy that you’re talking about involves ships and the Navy, there fore it is fairly obvious that you’re using the terms maritime and naval interchangeably. To try and back out of that now is pointless.
“Part of most thought exercises involve assuming the role of a decision maker”
– Yes, a decision maker appropriate to the level of what you’re talking about. So here we’re talking about the composition of the military, thus it is appropriate for you to assume the position of the CDS for example, not the head of government.
“They should be [my goals]. Your country is your country”
– Maybe, but the future course of the country is decided by more than just me. It’s a democratic choice of the nation as a whole. Therefore my individual opinion on the nation is largely irrelevant compared to that of the populace and the governments that they elect.
“Where did I state these were exclusively maritime?”
–My apology’s you didn’t say exclusively. You said “primarily, but not exclusively”. Or in other words, ‘maritime, but maybe with a bit of something else’. It’s as good as, as your consistent position has made clear.
“refer you to previous posts containing said figures, and sources”
– You posted approximate figures and then the names of some helicopters. Those aren’t sources. A source is a document that can be referenced to provide support. Not just naming something.
“I also return, once again, to ask “How Much?” is performance reduced by this additional weight of which I am not disputing? If it does not affect affect operational performance I ask, once again, “Does it matter”
– This is what gets my goat. How can added weight NOT affect performance? Unless the weight is a new engine or a lifting surface, then clearly it is going to effect performance, isn’t it. You’re talking about adding several hundred kilos to a helicopter that – under ideal circumstances – can only lift about 4,100kgs. 250kg of added bulk cuts out 6% of the performance under ideal conditions, let along in more marginal circumstances.
“AgustaWestland AH1 seems to operate in both “hot and high” and “wet and low” without a problem”
– There’s no such thing as an AW-AH1? Are you talking about Apaches? Or maybe the AH-1 Cobra?
“To suggest that I think the RN should specify an Armoured Fighting Vehicle for the Army would be, to use your term, absurd”,
– On May 17th you said “FRES needs to be able to embark/disembark from our fleet and landing craft”. Sorry, what were you saying?
@TsZ52
Give me the choice of an aircraft carrier or a skilled diplomat as a tool of international diplomacy and I’ll take the dimplomat 100 times out of 100. The notion of parading ships and planes as a tool of diplomacy is chronically over rated, as evidenced by the work of Russian diplomats over the last 60 or more years.
Chris B,
it’s inflation. It used to be gunboat diplomacy, to back up the locally-posted diplomat. Now the Sea Lords want Carrier Strike Group diplomacy, and Gordon Brown wanted lots of jobs in Scotland, and BAE Systems just wanted lots of money. In fact the answer is more probably found, and certainly more affordably found, in a bunch of new gunboats, along with a proper ARG on call. A proper ARG, not what we currently have which is a lash-up of ships poorly fitted for putting a combat brigade ashore.
I’ll leave it to others to define a modern gunboat, but the answer is about 30 of them. I quite liked the look of the Swedish Visby thing, which is probably cheaper than a single F35-B.
Chris.B.: Cool, when we devise some way to ensure that *all* of our diplomats are your skilled ones, rather than some turning out to be the greasy, out of touch ones (that I specifically mentioned), at the most inconvenient time possible.
How many times can you think of, just off the top of your head, where carriers were sent out to kill or deter due to entirely avoidable diplomatic failure? And I mean pretty specifically, rather than in a more generalised ‘all war represents failure in diplomacy’ kind of way.
And I think the maritime focus idea involves appropriate working ships actually working, ‘consistently demonstrating our sincerity and utility to our allies (some ‘new’)’ [like I wrote].
Folks [and I don't mean just yourself] who think that that equates to ‘Painting our carrier black, white and buff and parading it off the coast to keep the savages in line’, are importing something into the text and concept that isn’t actually there.
Nor is it magnanimously shouldering the ‘white man’s burden’ – it’s reciprocal and equitable partnership. The only similarity between those three concepts is that British ships are involved: Any other similarity exists only in the reader’s head.
That’s my interpretation anyway, and The Other Chris doesn’t strike me as being a ravening Colonialist.
- “This is what gets my goat. How can added weight NOT affect performance?”
Ahh, I think I now see what you’re missing. At least with regards rotor lift. It does affect performance as discussed, just not at the 1:1 ratio you’re describing. 6% increase in weight does not equate to a 6% decrease in performance.
Take a look at this impeller performance chart. I know fluid impellers and air rotors behave differently but the curve’s are representative enough for our purposes:
– http://www.pump-zone.com/sites/default/files/NPSH05093.jpg
Follow the bottom 15 BHP line pump for ease of description.
The bottom axis is the capacity of the pump in gallons per minute. This is analogous to the amount of air our rotor needs to displace to lift a given weight.
The left axis is the Head rating for a pump, or the amount of pressure it generates. This is analogous to the performance of our helicopter (ability to accelerate upwards and hover, etc).
Note as you double the capacity from 80 to 160 gallons per minute, Head pressure decreases only slightly. It’s only as you approach maximum capacity (analogous to maximum take-off weight) that the drop in curve begins to impact pressure seriously.
In this curve the maximum capacity is going to be between 560 and 640 gallons per minute. Maximum takeoff weight would be determined by this value. Using the 80% rule, I’d estimate the usual operating performance of this impeller to be around the 320 mark (maximum cruise speed) with peak efficiency at the 80 gallons mark (efficient cruise, equating to maximum endurance as opposed to range, useful for ASW).
If the curve represented air instead of fluid then air density (i.e. heat and altitude) would reduce the amount of pressure you could generate.
This is the reason why you can add weight to a helicopter and not affect its performance as much as you think, provided you don’t reach the tipping point on the curve.
I don’t know where in that curve the 4,100kg listed maximum takeoff weight would be on a Merlin, but I’d be interested to find out.
To give an idea of the similarity of curves, here’s a fan chart for a fixed pitch. The bell curve is due to blade efficiency at those speeds and volumes. True helicopter curves would be very complex, taking into account factors like increased fuel burn, variable pitch, flapping and wave drag offset on swept blades.
It gives you a sense though.
– http://www.fumetech.com.au/images/250perfcurve.gif
“Gunboat diplomacy” has a very marginal use in certain areas, and is entirely reliant on the presence of a big bad wolf to protect people from, providing of course you can show that you can protect them in the first place.
As a tool of general diplomacy its a foolish task.
The world has moved on tsz52. If you want to “influence” Mexico, you’re not going to do it with a Type 45. You’re going to do it by offering to train their counter drug forces or help train their intelligence gathering units.
In the wake of Kennedy’s assassination, the Foreign Office had a field day sending SAS bodyguarding teams around the world to win friends and influence people.
The days when people used to be cowed by a battleship with a pair of triple turrets are long gone. Diplomacy has evolved into an infinitely more subtle and complex art, which requires time and resources, not a flag waving frigate.
The simple notion that you build a bunch of warships and then use them to coerce people into doing business with the UK is intellectually bankrupt.
@ The Other Chris,
I didn’t see your post before making my last, my apologies.
But you missed completely what I said. Not a 6% increase in helicopter weight, a 6% decrease in the already limited available lifting capacity of the Merlin. And that’s just for the rotor folding kit. That’s before we start counting things like the points needed for tying down etc.
And no. Helicopters and water pumps, not the same thing.
A good place to leave it then.
Chris.B.: My best reply is to simply quote my last couple of posts – when it gets to that stage, it’s best to leave it.
If you’re actually bothered, please just re-read them, but take your ‘OMG this guy doesn’t know how the modern world actually works, and is an RN fanboy stuck in Pax Britannica land, advocating gunboat diplomacy lol’ goggles off first.
You’re the only one talking about any of those things, and repeatedly, despite being told that you’re on completely the wrong track. You’re reading and responding to stuff that’s not actually there: and what is there is the exact opposite of that, in fact (except that it involves ships, to some extent, though not used in the way you think, or as exclusively).
Parading carriers, gunboat diplomacy, cowing and coercing: What?!
I’m out.
@ Tsz52
“You’re reading and responding to stuff that’s not actually there…”
To quote you directly;
“A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis, rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises”
That is effectively the same, in a slightly FBOT’esque manner of using catchy phrases, of saying that you believe a ship is a more effective tool of diplomacy than someone like an ambassador.
If you don’t want to be interpreted as being a “RN fanboy stuck in Pax Britannica land, advocating gunboat diplomacy lol”, to use your phrasing, then you should probably avoid posting statements about boats being more effective tools of diplomacy than actual people sitting down and discussing big issues face to face with senior members of other governments.
If you genuinely believe that “flying the flag” in someones port has more influence than a visit from a British Minister or one of his authorised subordinates then I would suggest you’ve got a lot more reading to do on the subject of diplomacy.
A port visit can help, as can training exercises, cooperation etc, but the meat of the deals are done in plushly laid out official offices by slick talking men in finely tailored suits. That’s just the nature of the world.
If you want to expand Britains global influence and prestige in the areas that The Other Chris desires to (Investment, Technology Transfer, Diplomacy, Aid, Security) then rather than spending billions converting Britain over to a Maritime focus, you should be spending millions hiring the slickest and most silver tongued corporate sales people that money can buy.
We had some discussion of the “cheap” cost of f18s and growlers ect the latest fms to aus of 12 growler conversion kits and there support(this doesn’t include buying the plane which they already have) http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2012/Australia_12-27.pdf
@ Mark
Damn! Spread across the airframes that’s $141 million each! That’s quite the statement of intent by the Aussies, to spend that much on Electronic attack.
Chris.B. [You might want to read this on a monitor rather than phone]: Catch-phrases: I **loathe** them, but as folks become ever-more TL;DR, they become increasingly necessary for brevity (at the expense of precision).
Your repeated fallacies/misinterpretations:-
1 Maritime focus = maritime to the exclusion of all else. So focusing a bit more (to be defined in a more nuts and bolts kind of way) upon the maritime = getting rid of all your diplomats, SAS bodyguards etc. Straw man and false dichotomy. See “Yup, other ‘assets’ can do that too, and sometimes more suitably/economically; which is why it’s ‘maritime focus’, rather than ‘maritime to the exclusion of all else’.”;
2 Maritime focus = Pax Britannica = being out of touch with the contemporary world and how it really works, and how it’s moved on. Straw man (and see #3);
3 Maritime focus = gunboat diplomacy. Therefore “appropriate working ships actually working, ‘consistently demonstrating our sincerity and utility to our allies (some ‘new’)’ [like I wrote]” which “allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis” can only ever *possibly* be interpreted as ‘a ship designed exclusively to intimidate, cow and coerce powers who can’t fight back properly’. Ie a ‘gunboat’, as opposed to ‘sloop’ say. [Tooled up Visby would be the other definition of gunboat; 'well armed but small, littoral defensive craft'.] Others referring to the likes of the Black Swan IIs as ‘gunboats’ *really* isn’t helpful. Straw man.
Here, you’d be looking at The Other Chris’ post where he laid the idea out; particularly the bit where it’s ‘Instead of [list of Victorian bad old days policies] try [list of things more realistic for today, and substantially more enlightened/genuinely co-operative]‘.
Or my: “And I think the maritime focus idea involves appropriate working ships actually working, ‘consistently demonstrating our sincerity and utility to our allies (some ‘new’)’ [like I wrote].
Folks [and I don't mean just yourself] who think that that equates to ‘Painting our carrier black, white and buff and parading it off the coast to keep the savages in line’, are importing something into the text and concept that isn’t actually there.
Nor is it magnanimously shouldering the ‘white man’s burden’ – it’s reciprocal and equitable partnership*. The only similarity between those three concepts is that British ships are involved: Any other similarity exists only in the reader’s head.
That’s my interpretation anyway, and The Other Chris doesn’t strike me as being a ravening Colonialist.” post;
*[This was more in response to something that someone else said in another thread, than yourself; to the effect of 'this forward basing rubbish always makes me think of the natives rowing their proas out to speak to the white superman' - I think it was x.]
4 “greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises” = *All* diplomats are greasy, out of touch, and make empty promises = We should get rid of *all* of our diplomats and send gunboats to intimidate instead, everywhere. Straw man, False dichotomy, arguing from *a* specific to law-like generalisation, and pretty much every other logical fallacy in the Big Book of Logical Fallacies. See #1.
Summary
This is about strengthening existing alliances and developing new ones in the actual, contemporary world that we live in, not Imperialistic/Colonialistic dominance (which wouldn’t work today, even if that’s what we wanted);
We have many strings to our bow, and long may that continue (to be funded);
We will attempt to achieve the above task as economically and efficiently as possible, using our full range of assets. If the diplomat turns out to be a skilled one, or BAE salesmen/tech transfer, or SAS bodyguards etc turn out to be the best and most economical solution, then happy days (saves us a few bob);
The newer alliances (particularly) can only be strengthened by our “*consistently demonstrating*” that we are reliable and useful as allies. Talk is never worth a squirt of pi$$, unless it’s consistently backed up by action. So we need to ensure that we always have the means to bring to the table something more than a (*specifically*) ‘greasy, out of touch, diplomat, making empty promises’. Whatever else we do bring is the most efficient and economical thing that we can bring, from our big tool box, for that specific circumstance;
Balanced, working (not just intimidating) fighting ships (discuss armament vs utilitarian stuff ratio**) are useful tools in that varied and balanced toolbox, since they bring various capabilities and actual utilities without the politically problematic things that come with being on another country’s actual soil. So it’s worthwhile having some, in addition to everything else that you can. You can imagine situations where our allied President would love us to have something more specifically useful like four F-35Bs or a small Company of infantry based by his Capital, but it would be political death for him, so a ship it is instead. Or the ship might actually be more useful – they sometimes are;
**[Note: Again, it is the very antithesis of the misinterpretation, since 'battleships with triple turrets to cow and coerce' are the exact opposite of what's really being explored: 'swapping some armament and protection for other things that add more utility in things other than peer vs peer 'warfighting'' - for these specific types of ships.]
Pretty much HMG foreign policy as is (if you see any Pax Britannica in this, please re-read until you don’t). But this is the radical departure:-
Should something come up that needs us to demonstrate our sincerity and utility, that involves a ship being the best tool, then we should be able to reliably provide that ship. Gasp!
This will require some measure (to be defined at a more nuts and bolts level) of resource re-allocation, to ensure that that is the case; whilst retaining our varied and healthy toolbox.
Now, if we could stop with the repeated misinterpretations, all of those words above are no longer needed, and the proper discussion starts here.
The Other Chris: With respect, I think that you might be being a ‘wood for the trees’ where your helo comparisons are concerned, and looking at the wrong metrics.
Massively over-simplifying (since aerodynamics are always important; helos being aerodynes and all), but you’re more or less looking at:-
At the lower end of the envelope, good old-fashioned Newtonian laws (with things like power to weight, and momentum) trump aerodynamics;
At the upper end of the envelope, aerodynamics (particularly for helos) assert themselves very strongly, and trump the basic Newtonian stuff;
Most of the time, helos are operating within the regime where mass, power and force (therefore fuel burn, therefore range/endurance) matter more than aerodynamics, so this is where adding quarter to half a tonne of mass really bites into its core capability.
So payload and range (in apples with apples conditions) are your main figures of merit, rather than ceiling or speed (where a bit of extra weight doesn’t make much difference, since aerodynamics rule that realm).
@ The Other Chris (and following on from what tsz52 said above)
I can’t believe I forgot this earlier. The biggest and best example of why 250kgs makes a difference to a helicopter is to look at Merlins engines. The transmission on the Merlin is unable to cope with the raw power of all three engines. Many pilots have thus been rather anxious for AW to just accept they made a mistake (as most pilots seem to believe they did) and cut the third engine. That would remove… drum roll please…. about 280kgs of weight. Lots of people very close to the machine seem to believe that this would have quite a significant impact on the performance of it.
Hopefully that helps.
@ TSZ52
I do hate it when people go on about straw mans and arguments that aren’t there etc, when once again I refer you to “A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis, rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises”. I noticed in your last reply you made a point of posting that phrase but with the bit about the diplomat cut off to remove the context.
There is no other way of reading that except “ships > diplomats”. Whether you hold this position or not is irrelevant because that’s what you wrote. You can’t write something like that and then criticise the reading skills of someone else. If you didn’t mean it then fine, just write something like “I’m sorry, that’s not what I intended” but don’t try and turn it on others and attack them for not being psychic, or try to claim they’re not reading things the right way. You are what you write on the Internet.
Moving on “Maritime Focus” may not be exlusively maritime, but it’s not the forerunner of a balanced force is it? By definition focus means to hone in on something, to pay extraordinary attention to it. By nature then a Maritime Focus, in order to be a true Maritime Focus, would have to see significant shift towards the Maritime environment.
And specifically you’re missing the point that The Other Chris made about using a maritime focus as the means to achieve his Grand Strategy.
THE MEANS.
In other words, his plan is to use a Maritime Focus as the foundation and enabler of his strategy. If he meant using diplomats and special forces etc, then he should have chosen his words a little more carefully. Using – a maritime focus as the means to achieve a strategy – can only be interpreted one way.
Again, this is the Internet and by the virtue of the medium misunderstandings are easy, thus you can’t expect people to read a few lines and extrapolate your entire meaning from it. If you don’t intend using ships as a primary means or enabler to achieve your diplomatic goals, then don’t use the word “means”.
The same applies to you and your use of the argument against Diplomats. You may have only meant one specific diplomat, but the way you phrased it – “A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis, rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises” – suggests a general disdain of all diplomats.
You cannot expect a reader on the other end to extrapolate from that, that you were specifically addressing the bad diplomats and not the good diplomats, or that you meant only when ships are better than diplomats etc. You can’t fudge context into your statements later and attack someone for not being psychic. I’m sorry but the error is yours, not mine.
“The newer alliances (particularly) can only be strengthened by our “*consistently demonstrating*” that we are reliable and useful as allies. Talk is never worth a squirt of pi$$, unless it’s consistently backed up by action.”
The problem is that most of what we do for our allies is done financially or through trade. Military action is a small part of modern alliances. China’s diplomatic growth into Africa has been almost exlcusively carried by financial means.
Chris.B.: Ah, that it should have ever come to this….:)
Yup, that whole ‘you’re straw man-ing’ malarkey is pretty obnoxious, so it wasn’t used lightly; but Rule #1 in My First Picture-Book on Meaningful Discourse (which is also wizard) is:-
Rule #1: ‘When you realise that every time you say ‘elephant’, the other guy’s thinking ‘giraffe’, then all further discourse is worse than useless – unless you can get the other guy to realise what an elephant actually is.’
As far as I was concerned, I’d tried the lower levels of clarifying repeatedly, and all that was left was the ‘you’re straw man-ing’ bomb.
Now this is probably even more tedious for everbody else than it is for us pair, but just to clarify a few points you mentioned in your last post:-
1 Context wasn’t fudged on at the end, but there from the beginning:-
“Chris.B.: I think that a key part of The Other Chris’ maritime focus/diplomacy is that we’ll be consistently demonstrating our sincerity and utility to our allies (some ‘new’).
A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis, rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises.
Yup, other ‘assets’ can do that too, and sometimes more suitably/economically; which is why it’s ‘maritime focus’, rather than ‘maritime to the exclusion of all else’.”
Which can be summarised as: Actions (para 1) speak louder than words (para 2), with para 3 providing realistic balance (ships will not always be the optimal solution). There were also other examples of providing context later.
2 Our pesky greasy diplomat, causing trouble here, was one of those semi-throwaway lines that ends up getting focused on way more than it ever really merited. If I’d known that it would get so focused on, I would have been more clear; and certainly wouldn’t have used those ghastly catch-phrases about our ship walking the walk through the grass roots – yech!
[I'm more used to forums where anything more than 2-3 short paragraphs is responded to with 'TL;DR lol whatevs' - there seems to be a bit more elbow-room here.:)]
I’d thought that our subsequent exchanges had clarified that I was dealing with a specific (and I did write that word later, and even put stars around it) type of diplomat in a specific type of situation (rubbish diplomat, out of touch, and left with no local assets by HMGov to back his words up, in terms of both our promised utility and possible necessity for deterrence: plenty of examples of that), rather than making a law-like generalisation about all diplomats. Further, even if he’s a great diplomat, then he still needs those assets to give his words substance.
I’m thinking here of something that The Other Chris mentioned somewhere else, to the effect of ‘We don’t want to be in a situation where our ship with helo there is needed for promised disaster relief, but we have to say “I’m sorry, it was needed for a NATO exercise elsewhere.”
Regardless of how good or bad the diplomat is, and this is especially important for our newer allies, as we build up trust.
But I can see that I wasn’t as categorical in this as I was at saying ‘FFS, it’s the very antithesis of gunboat diplomacy – how many more times?!’ (which didn’t seem to make much impact either), so: I’m sorry, that isn’t what I intended.:)
3 I deliberately separated the ship from the diplomat in the post that you’re talking about, to clarify the component parts of the argument – not for any dirty sophist reasons. *NEVER* that. Ever.
This is pretty much the same level of context-robbery (deliberate or not) as quoting the ‘greasy diplomat etc’ paragraph without the contextual paragraph that preceded it.
4 I’ve already written that what I’m on about is *my* interpretation of The Other Chris’ idea. But ‘re-interpretation’ is probably a more accurate word, since I would balance it differently, and favour the nuts and bolts of how we get from here to something like there (to be defined, once the proper discussion starts), rather than just presenting a theoretical ‘vision’ (his word, not mine) that exists in splendid isolation (for this forum particularly: bunch of hard-nosed pragmatists).:)
He may well be thinking ‘I wish this guy would get off my side,’ but I’m not particularly on his side (nor particulalry against it), so it’s all good. I would particularly re-balance the MEANS bit, as you say; though it would still involve much more of a maritime focus than exists currently (a re-balancing of resources etc, to some extent to be properly defined).
Kind of a Judaean Peoples’ Front/Peoples’ Front of Judaea thing, probably.
5 Now just for me, now that we’re a bit clearer (hopefully) please re-read my first few posts above that relate to this (won’t take long; starts at the infamous ‘walk the walk, greasy diplomats’ post of May 22, 15:16, about half way up the page), on a monitor – just so that you can see where I was coming from, and that I’m not stupid or mad or anything, and why I might have been frustrated enough to drop the ‘you’re straw man-ing’ bomb.
You don’t study Jacques Derrida etc and come away unscathed, so I’m always mindful of the *innate* ambiguity of words; after you’ve re-read the above, through a slightly modified pair of eyes (knowing what you know now), then I’m genuinely sorry for my part in any misunderstandings above.
Hopefully, now that all the forensic BS is out of the road, the actual discussion can begin: How many Dreadnoughts can we buy if we disband the Army and RAF?
@ TSZ52
I think what gets me most riled about your comments is the air of arrogance about them.
“Please read this on a monitor” (I am, my phone doesn’t even have a colour screen, let alone the pleasures of the Internet). “When you realise that every time you say ‘elephant’, the other guy’s thinking ‘giraffe’, then all further discourse is worse than useless – unless you can get the other guy to realise what an elephant actually is”.
The problem you’ve had is that you’re not saying Elephant. Even if you mean Elephant, you’re the one saying Giraffe (this has gotten weird real quick).
You’re trying to take the argument that The Other Chris put forward (using the maritime environment as a means, a method, an enabler, to achieve his global plan) and trying to turn it into something else.
You’re also trying to back out of the comment about the diplomat, but there really is no way out of it. That comment can only be read one way. Like I said before, if you didn’t mean it that way, then fine, but you have to accept that your comment read like “ships > diplomats”. That’s just the unfortunate way that you wrote it.
And this is what draws my ire so much. The mistake is yours. Its not a huge mistake and could easily have been clarified by an apology and saying “oh that’s not what I meant, sorry”. But instead you’ve gone to some quite exceptional lengths to try and make it out that people reading your comment are wrong etc.
I don’t like the way you’re trying to shift blame and take a very intellectually superior tone, as if everyone should have been able to dissect the fine detail and alternate meaning of your in fact quite unambiguous statement.
If you’ve made an error, which you have, then just admit it and move on. Don’t try and pass the buck and throw the blame on me because you chose your words poorly.
The reason I got so annoyed about the Straw man comments is because there is no straw man. You made a comment that I quoted in its entirety. A comment that was really quite plain and unambiguous. You’re using this whole straw man stuff to try and back out of the comment and shift blame elsewhere.
In case you weren’t aware, now you know why politicians are so despised by the general public, because you’re using (or trying to) the very same form of argument that they do.
Chris.B.: I’m arguing like a politician, and you’re arguing like a journalist. It’s just not going to work is it? Forget it.
@ tsz52
“…and you’re arguing like a journalist.”
– If by that you mean holding you to account for what you said, then yes, I guess so.
“It’s just not going to work is it? Forget it.”
– You’ve only just figured that out?
Nope, can’t leave it like that.
The arrogance is yours in thinking that your interpretation of the statement is the only possible correct one. The short post was to be taken as a whole:-
“Chris.B.: I think that a key part of The Other Chris’ maritime focus/diplomacy is that we’ll be consistently demonstrating our sincerity and utility to our allies (some ‘new’).
A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis, rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises.
Yup, other ‘assets’ can do that too, and sometimes more suitably/economically; which is why it’s ‘maritime focus’, rather than ‘maritime to the exclusion of all else’.”
The first para provides context. Taking the second para alone, and quoting it to death (however quoted in full that single paragraph is), has robbed it of its context. I’ve already said that so this is just another example of me having to repeat myself again.
If you want to insanely fixate on that one trivial paragraph (was your Dad a diplomat or something?), then let’s do that.
The most unambiguous (ie most technically logical) reading of that statement is this [paragraph quoted again for ease of comparison]:-
“A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis, rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises.”
Breaks down like this:-
If, and *only* if, the diplomat is “some [ie 'a'; singular - given later singular form - ie *a specific*] greasy, out of touch, diplomat [sent; from "sending"] to make empty promises; *and* if, and *only* if “A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis [than "some [singular] greasy, out of touch, diplomat [sent] to make empty promises”]; *then* [to use your shorthand] ship > diplomat.
A computer could understand that: What’s your excuse? “Intellectual superiority”… hard to avoid compared to the tripe you’re coming out with.
So not backtracking thankyouverymuch [nor on my 'support' for The Other Chris' idea, since I'd already written, a few days earlier, that I liked the idea but would re-balance it, on another thread]: *You* turned the specific into law-like generalisation, and there was *nothing* in the statement to support that. Ask a few other people who actually have basic comprehension skills, especially if they use words in very precise ways for a living, or/and can understand logic.
I’ve already apologised twice (but you probably missed that as well, like everything else, over and over and over again) – your turn, for keeping on wasting my time, twisting my words, accusing me of fudging and backtracking, intimating that I would cut part of a statement off to deliberately deceive, and *particularly* that politician dig.
Or better yet, just don’t respond, and take your time-wasting somewhere else.
For the love of god. This is becoming an English lesson.
“The most unambiguous (ie most technically logical) reading of that statement is this [paragraph quoted again for ease of comparison]:-
“A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis, rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises.”
Breaks down like this:-
If, and *only* if, the diplomat is “some [ie 'a'; singular - given later singular form - ie *a specific*] greasy, out of touch, diplomat [sent; from "sending"] to make empty promises; *and* if, and *only* if “A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis [than "some [singular] greasy, out of touch, diplomat [sent] to make empty promises”]; *then* [to use your shorthand] ship > diplomat.”
– This is what astounds me perhaps the most. Look at what you’ve said again. The Most technically logical? A logical statement reads as it is. That’s why it’s called a logical statement, because it explains itself. It can only really mean one thing. Can you not see that in order to turn the statement from what it actually is into what you want it to be/read as, you’ve had to practically double the word count, inserting words like “sent” completely out of the original context into the last sentence?
Read part of the statement again, leaving out the bit about ships to avoid any arguments over maritime focus;
“…rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises”
The way your statement reads to normal people is simple and has to do with basic bloody English. It suggests a strong distaste of diplomats. If you meant it to mean just one diplomat or a small but specific section of the diplomatic corps, you would need to qualify that.
Let me change the name, away from diplomat, to see if that helps you.
“… I had my car serviced by some cocky, Dagenham Dave mechanic who tried to overcharge me!”
The implicit suggestion in that statement is that Mechanics are not to be trusted. The suggestion may not specifically include every single mechanic in the western world by name, but the tone and language suggests that the speaker is someone who has a great distrust for all mechanics in general.
Now read your statement again;
“”…rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises”
While your statement doesn’t specifically reference every single diplomat, the tone and language of the statement suggests to the casual obeserver a general distrust, disdain and/or dislike of diplomats, for whatever reason. It would suggest that they don’t inspire confidence in you.
That’s fine. You’re wrong, because our diplomatic corps is by all accounts world class, but if you don’t like them then that’s fine as far as this “Think English” exercise is concerned.
The issue is that you’re trying to turn your statement into something it’s not. You’re trying to bring the other two statements before and after it into the equation, but neither of them adds any context to your interpretation. If you must be pedantic and call on that first paragraph then lets do so, if only to further strengthen the case against you;
“I think that a key part of The Other Chris’ maritime focus/diplomacy is that we’ll be consistently demonstrating our sincerity and utility to our allies (some ‘new’).
A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis, rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises”
In fact, we can shorten that just a tincy bit to, putting it together as one paragrapgh for ease;
“… we’ll be consistently demonstrating our sincerity and utility to our allies (some ‘new’). A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis, rather than just sending some greasy, out of touch, diplomat to make empty promises”
If you didn’t believe so before, hopefully now attaching the bit about sincerity and utility will help to define that the structure of your paragraph goes against your interpretation. The implicit suggestion in this statement, as read I would suspect by the majority of people, is that you believe “greasy, out of touch” diplomats, who make “empty promises” are not as reliable at “demonstrating our sincerity and utility to our allies” as a ship in the region, that would allow us to “walk the walk, at a more ‘grass-roots’ level, on a daily basis”.
If you only meant that sometimes a ship would be better than a diplomat depending on the situation and the quality of the diplomat you would need to entirely re-word the bloody statement, in order for it to come even close to your interpretation. Something like:
– ‘I think that a key part of The Other Chris’ maritime focus/diplomacy is that we’ll be consistently reinforcing our sincerity and utility to our allies (some ‘new’). A ship in the region allows us to walk the walk at a ‘grass-roots’ level on a daily basis, which would serve as a strong compliment to our other diplomatic efforts, and in a case where other means fail, could become the prime source of demonstrating said utility and sincerity,’
Your f**king welcome! Learn to speak English proper like what I do.
“Your f**king welcome!” Cheers.:)
Why I’m still banging my head against this farcical wall, is because I care about the subject, and hope that if The Other Chris does drop his finished piece here, then this BS will be already put to bed for good, to give proper discussion about the subject a bit more of a fighting chance.
You’ve used knee-jerk misinterpretation (maritime focus = gunboat diplomacy) and repeated that over and over again, despite being told in many different ways that it was the opposite of gunboat diplomacy.
You’ve latched onto a peripheral and trivial statement and continued to bang on about that, even after it was immediately clarified that what you thought it meant wasn’t what was meant (specific not general: see the posts – I’m not quoting them). This includes ludicrous levels of hyper-analysis about the statement, but your seeming to consider your own ambiguous statements to be immune to the same process. I have to be held to account for my words… but you don’t. Why?
And you’ve just added fake-a$$ ‘populist’ ‘I am speaking for the common man’ BS to the mix (thus completing the set of logical fallacies by adding ‘appeal to the majority’: Full House! Well done).
All of this to stop further meaningful discourse dead in its tracks (deliberately or not). This also gives you the Brucie Bonus of being able to suggest that I’m weaselling out of defining my particular version of maritime focus (and backtracking), just like a politician [I assume that you meant *all* politicians, right?]. Well done, again.
This is what I meant by arguing like a journalist. Please note, I mean that specific set of journalist (as defined by the above) whose stock in trade that is; not all journalists.
There are two things happening with our beloved greasy diplomat:-
1 A relevant discussion about the real world utility of diplomats vs other assets, including ships;
2 An irrelevant and absurd dissection of a fairly trivial statement, going right into the heart of linguistic theory and logic.
Apparently, all you wanted was for me to apologise and say that what you thought I meant wasn’t what I intended. Well, I’ve done that, but you don’t seem to have noticed (again).
So, let me say again: I did not intend the negative statement about the hypothetical diplomat to be taken that I meant all diplomats. I did not intend the specific that I mentioned to be taken as a law-like generalisation. I fully acknowledge that, in some specific situations, a skilled diplomat is a peerless asset and force for good.
Had I known that the semi-throwaway, conversational in tone statement on some forum would be subject to extraordinarily high levels of linguistic/logical analysis, that would ordinarily only ever be applied to the grading of a philosophy thesis (and even then, probably to a lower level), then I certainly would have taken greater pains to word it more clearly; and to clarify – with absolute surety – later, that the generalised interpretation wasn’t what I’d intended.
Further, I apologise for any offence that may have been caused to any skilled diplomats who are doubtless avidly reading this important forum exchange, and to the families and loved ones of said skilled diplomats.
I’m sorry, I’m sorry, I’m sorry, I’m f**king sorry!
Soz.
FFS.
I’ll let that stand separately, since that’s the particularly relevant bit, and don’t want it go get missed again. Buuut, when ‘attacked’ I will defend myself, so #2 does need to go back under that microscope again.
That’s better
A very interesting article and subsequent discussion! I believe that the conclusion that the F35B is a better choice than the F35C is wrong. Firstly, stop and think….why are we building two 65000 ton Aircraft Carriers at a cost of billions if we don’t intend to use them for the role they are supposed to fulfil??? What is that role? A true/properly equiped carrier is a floating fully self contained airfied with Fighter/Strike capability along with AEW and ECM able to deply to anywhere in the world at short notice. In the event of a possible military confrontation, where Military Airpower may be required at short notice, intelligence normally provides some degree of warning – if only a few days, during those few days a carrier can be deployed to a position where it can project the Military airpower to cover a number of scenarios at very short notice. It negates the need to gain approval from a another nation to deploy land based aircraft to their bases( often at considerable cost)and have to use your transport fleet to fly out all the required ground based back up. Or indeed, gain permission to fly through someone else’s airspace. In Libya, the UK, with the Worlds third largest Defence Budget, only flew 8% of the total of Air Sorties flown, whilst paying the Italian Government millions every week for the use of their concrete – because we didn’t have a carrier!
The QE class as built with STOVL, will never be self-contained. They will never fulfil the role of a Strike Carrier, they will merely serve as the worlds largest Helicopter Carriers with a handful of jump jets, oh joy!
As for the F35B, well it’s still not out of the woods yet, and the best we can hope for is that it will be cancelled.