A guest post from Defence Synergia
We in DefenceSynergia (DS) fully understand that there are counter views to our own that cat n trap was the right way to go in respect of UK’s carrier fleet and that HMG (originally Labour) are wrong to support F35B. However, we also recognise that if our interpretation is to gain ground we must find other ways of explaining the strategic logic that drives our thinking.
To that end we have focused on the STRATEGIC requirements, implications and rationale for UK defence priorities that are being obscured or overlooked by the ‘powers that be’. In contrast we assess that a carrier policy is Strategic and must be based around a complete system not an individual piece of kit. Like the Independent Nuclear Deterrent the carrier SYSTEM requires enablers to offer full flexibility, coherence and credibility as follows:
- Two carriers required to offer maximum availability for carrier strike capability
- An effective mixed air-group that provides vital AD, Strike, SAR, AEW & AAR beyond land based air-power is essential
- Surface ships and submarines to provide an escort screen beyond land based air-power range are essential
- LRMPA and AWAC to provide an escort screen within land based air-power range are highly desirable
- Fleet support from dedicated RFA tankers and stores replenishment vessels is essential
However, not all these enablers are in-place and the SYSTEM is therefore flawed.
No 1 will remain uncertain until SDSR 2015 has been completed.
No 2 is practicably impossible without CATOBAR
No 3 is a major challenge for a total fleet of 19 FF/DD and 7 SSN
No 4 fails on LRMPA (unless the capability is restored) & fails on E3-D interoperability unless the ‘Project Eagle’ Block 40/45 upgrade is funded
No 5 as things stand RFA support would appear to be totally inadequate
Note: The published and stated position of CDS is that a fleet of 14 RAF A330-200 cancel out the inherent disadvantages of the short range F35B. However, any notion that this level of AAR force is adequate to provide support for the RAF, let alone FAA carrier operations beyond normal landbased range, is a fantasy.
We in DS accept the argument that MOD spending and its budget must be controlled and should not be sacrosanct. However, the evidence is that the costings for the CATOBAR conversion are suspect and less than exhaustive with MOD conducting some pretty half hearted one-dimensional commercial negotiations and research. The latter, it has been alleged, being driven by a ‘line of least resistance’ approach – MOD(Navy) having its focus on STOVL operations over the past few years notwithstanding HMG’s decision in SDSR 2010 to opt for cats n traps.
The S of S and CDS have publicly accept that the F35C is the better aircraft and that a 65,000 ton carrier should have been laid down as cat n trap from the outset, yet they still fail to articulate the strategic requirement and voluntarily opt for less capability. One can be forgiven for thinking that they seem almost sanguine about the notion of accepting the F35B despite the cost implications, obvious production difficulties and the operational limitations it will impose upon both the RAF and RN. Their decision apparently being made on the basis that the first carrier will be in service two years earlier than planned whilst conveniently ignoring MOD and Government decisions which created the carrier/air-power capability gap in the first place.
Therefore, you may wonder as we do, why (now that Dr Fox is no longer in post) MOD apparently accept quite blithely that it will take until 2023 (eleven years) and cost an extra £2bn for the carrier consortium to complete a single cat n trap conversion? Yet unexplained anomalies associated with the rationale for the decision go unanswered. EG. If the decision was primarily to balance the budget why has MOD failed to explore commercially available, less expensive, modern steam generating systems – in lieu of EMALS – that are not dependent upon the main or supplementary electrical power plants (such systems are known to the USN, UK maritime commerce, DS and probably TD contributors – then why not MOD)? Why was the Lockheed Martin F35 (BAE Systems as a major partner) the only option on MOD (Navy)’s wish list when a more cost effective alternative like the Boeing F18 Super Hornet – half the cost to buy and a third less to operate – was not even considered for the RN?
You might also wonder why, in all the speeches and statements surrounding the decision, before and after the announcement was made, the RAF operational requirement (OR) case has not apparently been an issue. Of course it is not for DS to speak for the Air Staff but one does wonder how the F35B, the most complex, the most expensive to buy and operate and least capable of three F35 variants suddenly fits the OR for either Deep Penetration or even a 5th generation stealthy fast jet to replace the Tornado?
What effect has the inflexible MOD policy for a 2 fast jet fleet concept played?
Which brings us back to the DS strategic position in respect of financing MOD requirements.
It is the government’s stated view in the National Security Strategy (NSS) that UK will continue to play its traditional world wide role and that Force 2020 should be expeditionary, built around strategic air and sea lift. A crucial element being a carrier/amphibious capability to project power.
Therefore, from a UK strategic point of view, the policy fails if the principal asset – the aircraft carrier – is unable to carry out certain roles like anti access and area denial tasks – what the US refer to as A2/AD. Although this is a US Navy definition based on air/sea battle doctrine – which may also call for USMC, army and air force support – if the UK does not define its strategic doctrine for use of the F35B equipped carrier, MOD is in danger of situating the appreciation yet again by trying to fit its doctrine around the capability. [Despite the current and former CDS endorsing the F35B the aircraft is seen outside MOD by many defence analysts as an expensive Harrier replacement ('mud mover') to support combined amphibious ops with little, if any, real strategic utility].
The S of S made great play over some short term facts changing to justify his CATOBAR U Turn.
But the U turn itself may well have changed the medium to long term facts too and affected the UK’s strategic capability. The question we are all left with is this:
When considering the nations long term security and international interests should UK Strategic capability requirements provide the bench mark or should short term Treasury aspirations do it?
There is also the question of attrition, which cuts both ways.
My understanding is that we sometimes buy more airframes than are strictly needed (a) to be able to replace operational and other losses and (b) to rotate airframes, keep hours down and thus make the fleet last longer.
The other option would be a ‘scrap and build’ policy. Under this version we could keep fleet numbers tighter, work them hard, scrap them when they’re worn out and replace them with new builds. This has two advantages (a) it costs less capital up front and (b) it allows you to keep your production line open longer. Any actual operational losses are easier to replace becuause you have a production line open and skills hot.
@ APATS – So if we have two QE’s and two air groups each able to operate 24 F35b’s and one avilable (but not neccesarily on deployment then we need 20 * 4 aircraft 80 total. Is that right?
thanks
Martin
I remember reading somewhere that for every three aircraft in squadron service, another two were required for training and attrition. That would require the equivalent 20 for each squadron 12 active four training four attrition. So the maths is easy 20 ordered one squadron, 60= three squadrons, 80= four squadrons. If we look at how long it has taken the RAF to get four front line Typhoon squadrons, its looking like around 2025 to get three or four F35 squadrons.
Hi,
Just started reading thinkdefence – I have a few questions which have bugged me for a while and this seems the place to get them answered. No worries if I’m being thick with any of this, do tell me, just genuinely interested:
T45s – Are the ships themselves crippled by no anti ship/ sub capability or is that rubbish? If you strapped on enough extra goodies would they be world beating ships?
Carriers – Are they designed to take a few hits by an attacking force or would one strike send them to the bottom? (Aren’t US carriers designed to be super-tough as possible?)
Maritime patrol – Could you make a decent platform out of the Global Express? If so wouldn’t buying say 12 MRA versions, 8 to replace RAF’s 125 and 146 fleet and either maintaining or converting the 5 sentinels make a lot of sense – progressing on a proven platform, maintaining skills, reducing airframe types?
Wildcat – is it going to be any good for the navy?
Ta
@ Jim
I would say a range of likely operations are worked out and how many hours are to be used, then how many hours used in training for those ops, level of availability with regard to maintanince, a loss rate either training or on ops, how long each airframe will last and finally budget then you have your answer. You also have to add in sqns such as the OEU and OCU which will be different from the operation sqns.
If it can help, the Italian Navy was (is?) planning to buy 22 F35B with the assumption that 3 would stay in the US as contribution to the training system (italian pilots will train in the US, as anyway they do even now with the AV8B+ Harrier), 5 would be always in mainteinance, and 14 available for frontline use.
The UK plans to keep 6 F35B in the US at the Eglin ITC for training.
Martin, 80 aircraft should be enough to generate 4 squadrons, yes. The problem would be manning the 2 carriers at the same time. Especially for fixed wing ops.
@ Jim and APATS
If these numbers are correct how come we needed 74 HArriers for two squadron’s in JFH. I know it started with three each with nine but I believe by the end it only operated one naval and one RAF squadron.
Topman are the OCU if not the OEU supposed to be based in the US I thought our first eight aircraft were to be based there as part of a joint US/UK training wing.
@ Topman – so is 20 enough for an opertional squadron?
what is OCU and OEU?
Topman,
the sensible approach would be to start with the budget, then work down from there. There’s very little demonstrated need for these boats and jets anyway, only a set of wants, wishes, and a desire for single service glory.
I’d be surprised, and very irritated, if we end up with more than 24 of them. Keep 12 on a carrier, the other 12 for training back in the UK. Fill the rest of the boat up with something useful like helicopters and marines.
Martin JFH started off with four squadrons, 1,3 and 4 RAF and 800 NAS and 20 Squadron RAF as the OCU.
OCU Operation Conversion Unit
OEU Operational Evaluation Unit
@ Jim
Yes there are plans for training in the us. The exact nature hasn’t been published, I understand they will be at Edwards and Eglin AFB.
@ martin
The first is a training unit for converting pilots on to type, the second tests and evalutates the a/c.
Martin, OCU Operational Conversion Unit, OEU Operational Evaluation Unit.
James, Now we have the carriers we will at least buy enough to properly utilise them in a crisis. So 50 for 3 squadrons is a pretty safe bet. On the bright side they will not spend all their time at sea and will be utilised to help provide the air supremacy and on tap CAS that the army now takes for granted.
@ James
‘the sensible approach would be to start with the budget, then work down from there’
Possible so, that was just my understand of how it works. I don’t work with the head sheds so I may well be wrong.
@ APATS – Did you not know that James’s Army can do it all with out fixed wing air support. Apparently the entire fall of France and Dunkirk was just a little blip.
@ APATS, JIM and Top man. Thanks for the info regarding squadron number’s. Our original plan to purchase 150 JCA seems very ambitious then.
Martin, remember that originally it was going to be a carrier capability and replace GR4.
@ APATS – I thought in SDR 1998 that FOAS was to replace GR4 with JCA being slotted in as GR4 replacement in SDSR 2010.
martin, I did not mean quite that originally!
@APATS
Any views on attrition?
Should we buy more jets and rotate and prolong service life? Or go with fewer, work them hard, scrap and build, to keep the production line open longer?
APATS,
CAS is mostly done by AH these days, which are better and more flexible from a land perspective (although I’ll grant that CAS is certainly possible from something like an F-35B). The RAF used to be pretty poor at CAS anyway in the late 80s / early 90s, and not much interested in it. Once the Cold War ended the role pretty much disappeared in practice even if it remained a theoretical possibility. IN GW1 the RAF did not bother, in Bosnia we had some Harriers from one of the CVS who were so poor we asked them not to bother, In GW2 it was not an RAF role, and from what I hear, it is not common in AFG, and declining with every request for CAS requiring a 15-step process that add’s hours to the mission.
Air supremacy – that’s more of a Typhoon task, is it not?
F-35Bs will be useful for protecting their own little floaty airfield (the self-licking lollipop argument), and probably for strike missions. F-35B launching from a carrier will be extremely sub-optimal for CAS, and probably not as good at ensuring air supremacy as Typhoon.
Peter Elliot, it is an interesting question, once you have them you have them. Does that affect upgrades etc so you have to pay to upgrade jets that may not actually be in use. Whilst if you buy new ones they are at the correct state. Not sure.
It also lessens immediate costs but the danger is use it or lose it to some other purchase.
Glad it is not my decision but with my natural mistrust of Politicians and budgets I say, lets get the number we need whilst we seem to have the cash.
Regarding the T-26, I do see the need for 8-9 ASW High end vessels but I like the idea of retaining the same hull and dumbing down the design fr the GP role and adding a few hulls to the order. I know the arguement saying that this will leed to fewer High end once the Treasury sees that the “Dumb” seems to do all the tasks required, but many european navies have followed this track and it works. Using the same hull and machinery would save some funds and if the basic design for both was modular would allow incremental improvements etc being carried out faster and also cheaper.
James, In Afghanistan low fly overs and shows of force by fast jets are often enough to deter attacks. The f35 with its extremely accurate munitions and fabulous sensor package will be good at CAS. It can also respond much quicker than an AH, especially if loitering on call.
As for air supremacy, it may not be its primary role but unless you guys are planning on invading Russia, China or India it is more than adequate.
Just noticed that from 13 miles offshore of the Pakistani coast, it is 415 nautical miles to Camp Bastion. How long will the F35B be able to loiter over Helmand in order to provide CAS (following the 15-step authorisation process) before it needs to head off and refuel? Particularly if it needs to burn lots of fuel in a low-level fast show of force mode?
Of course, they could always be based at Bastion, but if it is CAS from a land base you want, you wouldn’t buy an F-35B.
EDIT – your post above appeared while I was drafting this post. But I think I addressed the issues you raise by coincidence!
Trying looking at CAS as a system of doctrine, comms, people on the ground, legal constraints. It is why it was so spectacularly useless in Bosnia, as the pilots never had a clue as to what was going on at the tactical level. UNPF asked for only US CAS aircraft after the Sea Harriers let us down in Sector South West, and the Dutch F-16s did so over Srebrenica.
James, Why not? Tornados cannot fly off a carrier but f35B can fly off the carrier or from bastion as required. It is inherently flexible.
You could have an RN squadron at a bastion type location providing support to army ops when a Beirut type NEO happens, no problem just an RAF f 35B squadron on the carrier for air cover. (before anyone points out about Cyprus, I said a Beirut type NEO, not in Beirut).
James, The problem with Bosnia was not the ability to conduct CAS but the Command and Control structure in place at the time. It should be cited and you do as you experienced it but we have got an awful lot better since then.
Last time I asked the MoD they said that we had 48 Typhoon in “front line” and 24 in “sustainment”. Sustainment are aircraft that need to be serviced (deeply) and would also by used as an attrition pool.
That’s 72 Typhoon for 4 squadrons.
With Harrier we ended up with 4 squdrons of 9 aircraft (36) out of a total of 72 airframes. Some of these (not exactly sure how many) were trainers. This is what happens when airframes get old, they spend more time being serviced – just like cars!
Once the first few aircraft have been delivered and we’re into “real” operable jets all aicraft that aren’t in pieces being serviced can be used on the front line (wartime). Usually we end up having to evaluate new functionality prior to “going live” and train pilots coming up from Hawks, etc to how best to use them. How many aircraft we allocate to these functions can change depending on how many pilots need training and how many new functions are being delivered.
I work on the fact that wartime will see, on average, 2/3 of the fleet on the front line.
James,
“Just noticed that from 13 miles offshore of the Pakistani coast, it is 415 nautical miles to Camp Bastion. How long will the F35B be able to loiter over Helmand in order to provide CAS”
Is there any A2A refueling allowed?
If not, F35B simply cannot do loiter overhead.
If so, bascially for ages.
Simon, It could of course launch from the carrier conduct a mission or loiter to be on call, recover to bastion for some gas then launch from Bastion and recover to the carrier. Flexible, flexible, flexible.
APATS,
I was assuming there was no fuel (in the air or on the ground).
You’re right though that you don’t have to A2A refuel if there’s a runway (or dual carriageway) and fuel nearby.
http://www.x-plane.org/home/urf/aviation/img/saab/gripen/gall99/gripen_g50_roadb.jpg
@ James
So you are saying that AAC see CAS as one of their primary missions but the RAF aren’t interested in CAS. So do you think fixed wing CAS would be better done by the AAC?
@x
I think he was refering to the past, if it wasn’t in the tail end of the cold war* it certainly is now. I know you’ll think me biased but it is something we do well particlurly with it being important in afghan. I know when I was last there, we were constantly asked for more and more hours.
* I don’t know it was before my time.
X,
just about everything the Kevins do in the land tactical battlespace would be better done by the AAC, because the AAC understand the land tactical picture, have compatible comms, are part of the same chain of command for dynamic retaking and supporting the main effort, work to the same doctrine and don’t come with inbuilt aversions to mud or stupidly short tour deployments that never see them get up to speed before they go home.
APATS, if it is flexibility you want, they need to be permanently based at Bastion, including ground crew as well. Then there’s no need for any flying back and forth. That does slightly destroy the argument for the carrier to exist though, and if we don’t need to consider carrier operations, then we could have bought a more suitable aircraft at considerably less cost. Flexibility would also include having an air-to-air refuelling capability, but it seems we were so keen to buy the expensive toys that we thought we could skimp on that.
I have just found this interesting set of graphics on the net, showing the radii of F35A and B overlaid onto our last half dozen campaigns. Clearly the FI is best suited for carrier ops, but there’s very little evidence otherwise that we need carriers at all. Particularly ones that operate very short-legged aircraft with no air to air refuelling.
http://grandlogistics.blogspot.co.uk/2010/06/f35c-versus-f35b-combat-radii-applied.html
@ Simon
I’m not sure that would work in afghan!
@APATS
We are indeed the current position becuase we have been on a trend of cutting cabs since the end of the cold war – so its been the line of least resistance to focus spend on sustainment of attrition airframes in the Tornado and Harrier fleets.
“once you have them you have them”
With Typhoon and F35 we actually have choices – how many to buy and how quickly to delvier. As it happens with Typhoon I think the decision to sell slots to the Saudis and slow the delivery rate has turned out really well for us. People lament how long it has taken to stand up 4 squadrons but that looks like ‘willie waving’ to me. If we had stood up 4 squadrons from the beginning they would have all been tranche 1 standard and only good for QRA which would have been a waste of scarce resources.
Its no diasater that the tranche 1 we did buy are now worn out – we can replace them with much more capable new ones. Why spend on sustainment of old cabs when the line is still open?
Maybe we should go the same route with F35 not by accident but as a matter of policy. Start with a limited buy just enough for a couple of FAA squadrons and then feed the rest in over a long time, complementing a slow run down of Tornado.
Do it right and we can cut our spend on ‘sustainment’ right down. So scrap and build saves both capital (not buying number that allows for sustainment spares) and operating costs (the costs of doing the sustainment). Plus you get the bonus of always having a modern up to date product available for export.
James, The F35b has a combat radius of 460miles and a longer range in a strike mission profile than F18E. As for flexibility, read my posts again, I answered your question ref loiter time as you introduced the carrier off Pakistan into the equation. I had earlier pointed out that we would use them both from land bases and carriers, hence flexible.
As for past ops I am very much afraid that we as a nation are exceptionally guilty of being ready to fight yesterdays war tomorrow.
The Carrier and F35b allows us to not only use them from land bases but gives us the option to project power in areas that we currently cannot.
Without a carrier or a land base anyone with 8 or 10 serviceable Mig 21s can flip us the bird because they could simply napalm the land based forces and shoot the helos down.
@ James
But, but since I have been visiting this here blog I have been told we live in a purple world where we share and we all have a common purpose and it is only silly pro-navy numpties who think air power isn’t an end itself but supports the mission on the surface. You realise TD will ban you for heresy don’t you? Don’t take the next step and advocate the AAC take on large helicopters and fixed wing transport or you will truly be damned…
James, the interesting thing about the graphics shown was that only the Falklands was indisputably done in the defence of UK national interest. it is also the only Op that we had to conduct alone relying on our national assets.
APATS,
if we had them now while we are still in Afghanistan, they would be based at Bastion. There’s simply no need for a carrier in this instance.
The carrier is only useful in the highly unlikely situation that there are no land bases available, and that every possible target is within 450 nm (which is not true in Afghanistan). What we are doing is buying two boats that we can scarcely justify at all, and putting a seriously compromised aircraft onto them at vast price and with lots of development risk. With no AAR, AEW based on helicopters, and no MPA elsewhere in the inventory. Barking mad.
I don’t really understand your last point. When since WW1 have we ever not used our airpower? It’s what it is for. Are you suggesting that without CVF and F-35B, we ignore the Typhoon, Tornado, etc?
APATS,
let me be more controversial. The carriers were not the key to success in the FI. I won’t say that they were not hugely useful, nor that they didn’t save lives by delivering some CAP missions. What was the single factor that ensured success was the amphibious fleet, who in turn were mostly – and very bravely – supported by escorts.
I believe that – should we have to run a repeat of 1982 again – we would be militarily better off with 2 proper amphibious ships such as JC, one carrying 12 F-35B and the other troop lift helos rather than one QEC with even 36 F-35B. We’d certainly be financially better off.
The FI is the only military contingency that I can conceive* where land bases would not be available.
* ie considering Britain’s actual interests in the world, not some hypothetical scenario where we are trying to protect somewhere like Mongolia against China.
James
‘Of course, they could always be based at Bastion, but if it is CAS from a land base you want, you wouldn’t buy an F-35B.’
Or better still if its CAS you want to provide then rather than having your expensive and modest inventoried jets flying circles in the sky, burning Her Majesties finest parafin and their airframe flight hours uselessly, you base the aircraft at Kandahar and launch on the tasking call. You aren’t going to have a CASCAP pair in immediate strike range of every place in theatre immediately anyway so the difference between a -35C pair loitering at 400nm from Bastion and a -35B pair sat at readiness on the ground at Kandahar is measured in a small number of minutes on the response time. Kandahar obviously being a base unsuited to conventional strikefighters originally, but, easily exploited at the time by STOL types…cough…cough….like F-35B.
No-one would suggest trying to base a gen5 LO strikefighter like F-35B at a collection of tents and a length of pierced-plank like we did at San Carlos with the Harriers, but, exploitation of ‘austere basing’ with a suitable hard strip and the ability to receive C-130/A400M lift is going to be another string to the bow of Carrier Strike and UK rapid deployment combat power as a whole.
By this I mean we will have a single operational deck…if we need it to be in two places we have a problem. If we can put a det of half a dozen -35B’s ashore at some beat-up (or otherwise short-stripped) airport to cover a stabilised beachhead we then get the opportunity to retask the carrier and let it be elsewhere.
The obvious one here being a situation where Argentina has managed to neutralise the runway at MPA. Nothing we have can deploy to the Falklands without that strip. With air refueling, even if the duty carrier is tasked elsewhere, RAF F-35B’s can be AAR dragged out to Stanley Airport and operate happily from the 900ft strip there. With 450nm of range and Storm Shadow they even have the ability to give the closer Argentine airfields a sincere and meaningful clobbering.
STOVL and deployability have always been closely aligned. The vision of GR3′s hiding behind German barns is a tough one to shake for many of us I know, but, just because that is no longer the paradigm and F-35B isnt suited for trollying through the mud it doesnt mean deployability is no longer an extremely desireable capability to possess.
Not been about much recently, was travelling to Australia, but should be able to catch up and chip in a bit more now I am here.
I posted the stuff from DS because opposing views are good, no?
@ Jonesy
“Where you say “but at the same time I’m still not convinced by the whole CVF argument in general” is where we differ in my opinion the original STOVL CVF/Carrier Strike combination I saw as one of the best pieces of original thought I’ve seen in a while”
I have to be cautious, lest I cause the whole CVF argument to erupt around us once more! There hasn’t been a good CVF comment war for a while. My general position is that the money earmarked for the Carriers and F-35B could be better spent elsewhere, possibly along with some of the RAF’s money earmarked for future deep strike. Failing that though, B plus CVF will likely provide good service and come in handy.
I think where I’m getting confused with regards to the manning is whether both carriers will be active at the same time (with one at sea and one in port) or whether they’ll operate on a rotation similar to the Albions, whereby QE spends her first four years active, then when PoW comes into service QE will go into refit for a few years etc?
“The length of deployments undertaken now its not uncommon for a ships company to be different in some departments on return to home port than the one that set out”
Sssssshh! I suggested something like this once and I was set upon by a ravenous pack of wolves, their dark blue fur already drenched in blood, a small scrap of light blue shirt stuck in one of their teeths. Don’t you know every seaman deploys for 8 months at a time and only gets two days break in between tours!!
Actually one of the bar staff who used to work at a bar I bounced a few years ago has just finished up at HMS Sultan. Not sure what trade he was doing, but he seems pleased. I still can’t get my head around the Navy naming its bases like ships. Very odd!
“Again, as above, you may already ‘be there’ before you commit to deploying force”
My thinking was that CVF would withdraw to a safe distance if it needed to embark extra jets? Would that not be a prudent approach? If not possible then you take those six hours or so to qualify the whole new batch of twelve, surely that could be slotted in over the course of one day still? If we assume a 20 sortie per day pace required for normal operations, if they’re launched two per serial that only needs 10 serials, should leave you plenty of time to qualify the newbies in groups. Of course once we start getting into 24 pilots then things do get bloody hectic!
@ APATS (I know it was someone else, but I want to butt in and hoover up some info, greedy bastard that I am)
“If we want to keep a squadron deployed in say Afghan permanently then yes we need 3 squadrons to stay within leave regulations, separated service regs etc”
Would that be 3 squadrons, each deploying the whole squadron to theatre? Or Flights deploying, which over 3 squadrons gives us 6 flights? Or are you including combined FAA and RAF squadrons, so 3 Sqns of each?
@ James (I’m getting through everyone I think!)
“just about everything the Kevins do in the land tactical battlespace would be better done by the AAC, because the AAC understand the land tactical picture, have compatible comms, are part of the same chain of command for dynamic retaking and supporting the main effort, work to the same doctrine and don’t come with inbuilt aversions to mud or stupidly short tour deployments that never see them get up to speed before they go home.”
Are not the issues with the tactical picture, comms, being intertwined with the decision making chain, and working to the same doctrine, problems that could be solved much easier with a bit of training and tweaking than buliding a whole new aircraft and assigning it to the AAC? The mud aversion and short tours aside.
@ TD
Well now Ixion is Sectary of State for Defence don’t expect any help from back home if the Chinese appear on the horizon.
Chris B,
yes those CAS issues could be sorted out, but there appears to be zero willingness by the RAF to get involved, and the AAC are keen to do it. AH-64D and Tornado clearly have different operating characteristics though, but on the other hand AAC know what land forces need. Swings and roundabouts. On balance, I’d prefer CAS to be delivered by the AAC from AH-64D in most circumstances, but accept that sometimes it would not be ideal.
Topman,
Don’t they “do” roads out there?
James,
I like your chutzpah – you may be right about the amphibs in FI. And nowadays with decent anti-air systems you could be even more right.
I can see we’ve all had a pint at lunchtime today