A guest post from Defence Synergia
We in DefenceSynergia (DS) fully understand that there are counter views to our own that cat n trap was the right way to go in respect of UK’s carrier fleet and that HMG (originally Labour) are wrong to support F35B. However, we also recognise that if our interpretation is to gain ground we must find other ways of explaining the strategic logic that drives our thinking.
To that end we have focused on the STRATEGIC requirements, implications and rationale for UK defence priorities that are being obscured or overlooked by the ‘powers that be’. In contrast we assess that a carrier policy is Strategic and must be based around a complete system not an individual piece of kit. Like the Independent Nuclear Deterrent the carrier SYSTEM requires enablers to offer full flexibility, coherence and credibility as follows:
- Two carriers required to offer maximum availability for carrier strike capability
- An effective mixed air-group that provides vital AD, Strike, SAR, AEW & AAR beyond land based air-power is essential
- Surface ships and submarines to provide an escort screen beyond land based air-power range are essential
- LRMPA and AWAC to provide an escort screen within land based air-power range are highly desirable
- Fleet support from dedicated RFA tankers and stores replenishment vessels is essential
However, not all these enablers are in-place and the SYSTEM is therefore flawed.
No 1 will remain uncertain until SDSR 2015 has been completed.
No 2 is practicably impossible without CATOBAR
No 3 is a major challenge for a total fleet of 19 FF/DD and 7 SSN
No 4 fails on LRMPA (unless the capability is restored) & fails on E3-D interoperability unless the ‘Project Eagle’ Block 40/45 upgrade is funded
No 5 as things stand RFA support would appear to be totally inadequate
Note: The published and stated position of CDS is that a fleet of 14 RAF A330-200 cancel out the inherent disadvantages of the short range F35B. However, any notion that this level of AAR force is adequate to provide support for the RAF, let alone FAA carrier operations beyond normal landbased range, is a fantasy.
We in DS accept the argument that MOD spending and its budget must be controlled and should not be sacrosanct. However, the evidence is that the costings for the CATOBAR conversion are suspect and less than exhaustive with MOD conducting some pretty half hearted one-dimensional commercial negotiations and research. The latter, it has been alleged, being driven by a ‘line of least resistance’ approach – MOD(Navy) having its focus on STOVL operations over the past few years notwithstanding HMG’s decision in SDSR 2010 to opt for cats n traps.
The S of S and CDS have publicly accept that the F35C is the better aircraft and that a 65,000 ton carrier should have been laid down as cat n trap from the outset, yet they still fail to articulate the strategic requirement and voluntarily opt for less capability. One can be forgiven for thinking that they seem almost sanguine about the notion of accepting the F35B despite the cost implications, obvious production difficulties and the operational limitations it will impose upon both the RAF and RN. Their decision apparently being made on the basis that the first carrier will be in service two years earlier than planned whilst conveniently ignoring MOD and Government decisions which created the carrier/air-power capability gap in the first place.
Therefore, you may wonder as we do, why (now that Dr Fox is no longer in post) MOD apparently accept quite blithely that it will take until 2023 (eleven years) and cost an extra £2bn for the carrier consortium to complete a single cat n trap conversion? Yet unexplained anomalies associated with the rationale for the decision go unanswered. EG. If the decision was primarily to balance the budget why has MOD failed to explore commercially available, less expensive, modern steam generating systems – in lieu of EMALS – that are not dependent upon the main or supplementary electrical power plants (such systems are known to the USN, UK maritime commerce, DS and probably TD contributors – then why not MOD)? Why was the Lockheed Martin F35 (BAE Systems as a major partner) the only option on MOD (Navy)’s wish list when a more cost effective alternative like the Boeing F18 Super Hornet – half the cost to buy and a third less to operate – was not even considered for the RN?
You might also wonder why, in all the speeches and statements surrounding the decision, before and after the announcement was made, the RAF operational requirement (OR) case has not apparently been an issue. Of course it is not for DS to speak for the Air Staff but one does wonder how the F35B, the most complex, the most expensive to buy and operate and least capable of three F35 variants suddenly fits the OR for either Deep Penetration or even a 5th generation stealthy fast jet to replace the Tornado?
What effect has the inflexible MOD policy for a 2 fast jet fleet concept played?
Which brings us back to the DS strategic position in respect of financing MOD requirements.
It is the government’s stated view in the National Security Strategy (NSS) that UK will continue to play its traditional world wide role and that Force 2020 should be expeditionary, built around strategic air and sea lift. A crucial element being a carrier/amphibious capability to project power.
Therefore, from a UK strategic point of view, the policy fails if the principal asset – the aircraft carrier – is unable to carry out certain roles like anti access and area denial tasks – what the US refer to as A2/AD. Although this is a US Navy definition based on air/sea battle doctrine – which may also call for USMC, army and air force support – if the UK does not define its strategic doctrine for use of the F35B equipped carrier, MOD is in danger of situating the appreciation yet again by trying to fit its doctrine around the capability. [Despite the current and former CDS endorsing the F35B the aircraft is seen outside MOD by many defence analysts as an expensive Harrier replacement ('mud mover') to support combined amphibious ops with little, if any, real strategic utility].
The S of S made great play over some short term facts changing to justify his CATOBAR U Turn.
But the U turn itself may well have changed the medium to long term facts too and affected the UK’s strategic capability. The question we are all left with is this:
When considering the nations long term security and international interests should UK Strategic capability requirements provide the bench mark or should short term Treasury aspirations do it?
why not? How would you improve the A10 enough to make the costs worthwhile?
Jonesy (and others),
Without getting into the STOVL/CATOBAR debate.
I don’t quite understand why the training issue is such an… issue?
How often do pilots have to fly in order keep their eye in?
Why can’t we have 4 squadrons with 1 active on the carrier, 1 training on a dummy deck and 2 inactive? Obviously we cycle these regularly.
As you can tell I don’t fly (often), but I don’t tend to forget how to do things very quickly.
@APATS: a re-winged A10 with the standard Sniper pod and some uprated TF34′s would do very nicely
I don’t think I’ve mentioned it yet, but the biggest downside for me in getting the B model is that the LifteFan bay is filled with an, err, LiftFan.
Sounds obvious right?
The A and C models still have access to the driveshaft from the F135. Connect that up to a generator and you have the power source for a future solid state laser mounted in the LiftFan bay.
Of course we’ll leave the decision on converting the old Joint F-35 Fleet model B’s into a laser gunships for SDSR 2040.
@Simon
With legacy aircraft, there’s quite a pilot training burden to keep current for carrier operations. There’s quite a lot more gucci technology going into F-35C (a lot of it derived from UK SRVL work) that massively reduces the training burden. It’s likely to only need ship familiarisation in a similar way to operating RAF Harriers off the CVS.
@The Other Chris
You obviously missed the news that F-35 is already armed with wingtip mounted lasers…
http://cencio4.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/f-35-night-aar.jpg
@Hannay
Heh heh! That almost scores as many points as @x’s use of the phrase “It is wizard”.
Taking a step back our armed forces are in pretty good shape. In service kit, due in service kit is well designed, pretty high spec and most bases are covered.
RAF
They have new air defence jets (Typhoon), tankers & transport planes (C130-J, Voyager, C17, Atlas and Chinook). They lack the SIGNIT and ASWASUWSAR provided by the Nimrods but Rivet Joint/Air Seeker is on the way and that only really leaves two capabilities lacking.
Ground attack/bomber role and the above forementioned ASWASUWSAR. Personally I’d be prepared to see both these roles be carried out by the Navy (FAA). Get them some F35Cs and some P-8As when funds allow and train all pilots for CATOBAR etc.
Navy
The have nice new T45s, Astute SSNs and two carriers some kit coming under the MARS program, RORO transports etc are new. Really once again the lack only a few modern capabilities; the T26 frigates and a Trident replacement (umm think that can wait). Helicopter side seems to be in hand, although it would be good for all upgrades to be completed /marinised. Plus of course they lack the BIG one MASC/crowsnest ………
Army
They want their new armoured vehicles….. FRES and all that but I’d wait, lets face it they would have been wasted in the last three operations they have been on.
Unmanned vehicles be it air, surface or subsurface all need investment and it these areas where the investment is most needed which indicate to me that the CATOBAR design should have been continued with.
FA18 planes could have been purchased to train and build up the capabilities switching to Growlers for electronic warfare and buddy to buddy duties as F35Cs came into service. Deck flights of UAVs is clearly going to be more limited without the EMALS kit, this is short sighted, furthermore I fail to see the logic of spending so much on a large decked carrier and then using it as a substandard Wasp class (arguably a cheaper and far superior piece of kit).
But we are where we are, I hope we have weapons to attach to the F35Bs when they come into service and that the defensive kit is fitted to our expensive toys that we do have. Personally I’d go cheap for the frigates FREMMs would be good and look at Mistrals to replace Ocean. I think we should spend the money instead on another T45 and Astute.
@ Challenger and Other Chris
Obviously nothing’s final with T26 however we did give BAE £126 million to design it and those designs are well under way. From the comments from the design team I took that the ASW version would have GT and Diesel electric with speeds of 28 Knots+ whereas the GP version would have Diesel Electric propulsion only with a speed of around 25 Knots.
Noise reduction is a speculation on my part but given the added cost of this I can see it happening in the GP version. I am sure the GP will only get a basic sonar as well. Weapons fit for the two is likely to be identical as is Radar although I am sure with the weapons we will see the usual for but not with.
I am unclear as yet in MCPH was in Phil’s spread sheet for the next ten years and as far as I know there has been no detailed design work started as with T26. However speculation (which is normally right these days) is an 8 boat fleet with a unit cost of £150 million per vessel. We won’t see a single boat from either project until the next decade.
Khareef was originally the 99 meter corvette which was offered in response to the Global Corvette project. Here range could be better but at 4500 miles is not that bad. It’s almost the same as a Type 21 Frigate. With a proper helicopter hanger, AAM and ASM fitted she can perform much the same role as a Type 21 was designed for. We may look to extend her by 10 meters and add in additional fuel tanks but the point is she really seems like a good enough solution that is available today at an affordable price.
Much of the stretch that is being put on the escort fleet is the need to patrol relatively benign coastal waters in the Indian Ocean, Gulf and Mediterranean and she seems ideal for that task.
I really hope the RN resurrects the name Global Corvette for something. It seems like an awesome concept to me and exactly what we need to give us a limited forward and persistent presence.
Given current budgets and warship costs I think the best solution for the RN is to have a small number of very capable escorts used only for task force escort with a larger number of low end vessels for everything else. The RN has the high ends now it just need to get £ 1 billion over the next 10 years for the low ends.
@martin
Thanks for the additional information and nice summary.
I don’t think anyone would begrudge a series of UK equipped Khareef’s.
@ Dave DefenceSynergia
Here’s my take on your (DfSyng’s) article.
According to the resume provided on your site you have a number of very experienced individuals in many fields, including ex-service officers and members of industry.
Yet set against that background of expertise you all decided to take not published figures from the Department of Defense, but a quote from a Boeing salesman.
Something about that should scream to you that you’ve made an error of judgement. It certainly did to me.
Had you indeed not taken the Snake Oil Salesman at Boeing at his word (nothing against Boeing, but dealing with (and making cry) salesman I have a lot of experience with) you would have known that publishing an approximate $50 million cost for an F-18E/F was bloody ludicrous.
In its 2013 Fiscal Year submission the US Navy requested $2.098 billion for 26 E/F Hornets, or in other words about $80.7 million per aircraft, for an aircraft that has been in full rate production since 1997, or about 15 years.
In the same budget statement the cost of 6 STOVL F-35 was pegged at $1.521 billion, a cool $253 million per aircraft. But considering F-35 is still in testing and hasn’t even begun full rate production, that number is obviously set to drop significantly as time passes (interestingly the “C” variants from the same submission come in at $279 million each).
Or in other words at the same time as acknowleding the difficulty of assessing costs, especially in something that hasn’t even begun proper production yet, you’re also misleading people about costs.
Now personally I don’t mind you doing it to me because I have the reasonable time and inclination to double check any number that has “Boeing salesman” attached to it, but if you’re presenting these numbers to politicians then shame on you.
I suspect that you and your colleagues know full well that the divide between F-18E/F and the F-35B will be nowhere near what you’re claiming (50% comparison) though I’m sure it’s not true because I can’t understand, or at least see no valid reason, why you would attempt to use such faulty figures knowingly.
I shall put it down then to a lack of research on your behalf then. Might I suggest that given the combined salaries of your members, which I have little down would be quite siginificant, that you invest in a research assistant. Preferably someone who can type words like “Fiscal Year Budget Submission, Department of the Navy” into Google and who can read and use a calculator.
Alternatively you could save yourselves the money and do it personally. It would have taken you about 15 minutes and avoided a degree of embarassment.
@ SI,
You recounted the list of issues James brought up and questioned what they had to do with Strategy. Now I doubt James needs anyone to fight his battles for him, but I’m online now so I might as well pitch in.
The issues that James brought up are some of the issues that shape the world, its people, its governments, and all their respective actions. Those factors listed were some of the factors that can create conflict or even remove conflict from various areas. They change the nature of the playing field, moving the boundaries and altering the rules.
Thus things like climate change, economic issues, migration etc absolutely shape our defence strategy. If a liberal government won power in Argentina, went to the UN and waived any claim the country had to the Islands that shall not be named, would that not change our strategic outlook in the South Atlantic, in a manner that was entirely beyond our own control?
@ Hannay – Laser firing F35, Who needs super manoeuvrability
@ Opinion 3
Personally I’d go cheap for the frigates FREMMs
What FREMMS’s are cheap exactly? FREMM cost double the estimated cost for T26.
@ Chris B
In its 2013 Fiscal Year submission the US Navy requested $2.098 billion for 26 E/F Hornets, or in other words about $80.7 million per aircraft, for an aircraft that has been in full rate production since 1997, or about 15 years.
In the same budget statement the cost of 6 STOVL F-35 was pegged at $1.521 billion, a cool $253 million per aircraft. But considering F-35 is still in testing and hasn’t even begun full rate production, that number is obviously set to drop significantly as time passes (interestingly the “C” variants from the same submission come in at $279 million each).
Nice bit of research:
The magic cost’s of F18 EF really wind me up. It gets cheaper every time is see it quoted. Not to mention none of these commentators ever talk about the cost of fitting ECM and Targetting pods to F18. The other thing the constantly go on is about lack of Range in F35 compared to F18 when F35B has longer range on internal fuel than F18. I’m all for comparisons and better idea’s but we need hard figures to do such comparisons not snake oil and wikipedia.
erebus,
Sorry to take a while to get back to you. Not a particular fan of the F-35 full stop, but Bill Sweetman is not the best person to take for a balanced view on the F-35 (though obviously neither is Lockheed Martin whos PR material is heading into areas beyond creative). The simple matter is that we would pay very much more for F/A-18E/F than the US does, even today, and in 2016, assuming that we decide not to add any of the optional extra’s the price of the F/A-18E/F will be considerably more than it is now.
Personally think the F-35B is the best of bunch of bad decisions, and had we gone CATOBAR I doudt crowsnest would have been funded, as the up front capital costs would have lead to other capabilities being cut.
@Simon
“I don’t quite understand why the training issue is such an… issue?. How often do pilots have to fly in order keep their eye in? Why can’t we have 4 squadrons with 1 active on the carrier, 1 training on a dummy deck and 2 inactive? Obviously we cycle these regularly.”
Basically because that gives us, at any one point, the active squadron deck qualified and the training squadron set up to be able to take deck quals. USN regs call for pilots who have not operated from the deck for a while to go through a requalification phase, from memory its something like half a dozen day launch/trap cycles and a couple more at night. Doesnt sound much, individually, multiplied by a squadron though thats a good sixty or seventy ‘successful’ launch/trap evolutions to accomplish before the squadron can be combat rated. Thats the best part of a days flying programme and doesnt count the numbers of unsuccessful cycles needed to get the rating.
So the carriers ability to deploy an airwing is contingent on having the time to get the training squadron on to the carrier and worked up without disrupting ongoing operations. Even then it would only be two squadrons embarked with the third shifted to the shore-based simulator to start work ups…prior to starting the whole deck qualification cycle all over again…just with even greater disruption to the flying programme. So, to get the 3 12 plane squadrons operational on deck needed to support CVF’s stipulated maximum sortie rate, will take maybe a week or more with everything going to plan.
Compare that to STOVL where two RAF squadrons can get a tasking order and deploy to the ship as soon as they are fueled!. If the carrier is pre-stocked with spares/ordnance the logistics, beyond that needed for staging the squadrons out to the ship, are already in place. The only likely pause in operations will be waiting for RAF support crews to get out to the ship to augment the RN lads for the bigger airgroup. Basically the STOVL ship is in operation, at full sortie generation rate, likely 4 or more days faster than the CATOBAR hull. Also without all the cost overheads of the shore facility and the erosion of cat/trap airframe life during training.
FREMM isn’t expensive. It is what a modern first rate anti-submarine ship costs. Technology wise FREMM isn’t too much of a jump away from T45; you can see the Horizon influence in the FREMM design just as you can see it in T45. Merlin fits FREMM. FREMM users Slyver. As APATS has pointed out we only have 8 2087 sets. And as I have pointed out the Thales set used in FREMM was the RN’s preferred choice for T45 anyway. We need 12 ASW frigates, we will only get 8, so we will have 14 first rate escorts. Even with second hand kit there is no way BAE will build T26 for the price they say they will. We should have just given DCN £126million and started prepping for FREMM production to start straight after T45 completed. All that is happening yet again is we are paying BAE to reinvent the wheel, HMG think they can buy a Merc for Ford money, and without wishing to channel FBOT too much the upper echelons of the RN thinking yet again they know better than all the world’s other navies with their near mystical subtle insights into naval warfare.
As for Khareefs no thank you. Too small, not enough range, not a ship for the mid-Atlantic mid-winter, and so on and so on.
Jonesy,
So you’re saying that the “active” squadron are the only ones that would go to war? What about the squadron that have just retuned from being “active”, are they not still qualified? This leads me to…
“…USN regs call for pilots who have not operated from the deck for a while to go through a requalification phase…”
How long is the while here? Rough figures are fine. Are we talking a week, a month, a year?
My theory is that you can “go to war” with three of the squadrons: the “active” one, the one that was just active and the one that is training on the dummy deck (obviously these are not as ready as the other two and will need to get refreshment action on the way out).
Just out of interest, here’s what a launch/recovery cycle looks like;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aw4dZ2bJnGI
6 mins, if that.
@ Simon
Currency lasts 12 months longer than that you start from scratch. Within that 12 months you have to keep currency with various check flights.
Although that’s generic across most air forces, the specifics should be online for the usn.
Simon,
I’m saying that at any one point we will only have one deck rated squadron. From memory the USN state that a pilot who has not deck launched/trapped in 3 months must requalify.
I imagine that we could be lucky with the timing and, depending on the stand-down squadrons tasking, there could be a second deck ready squadron. These squadrons will have other shore based taskings though so the shuffle involved in getting deck rated pilots to the ship may not be so simple. The other side of the coin is, of course, if we are not lucky and then those problems reassert themselves.
Against that, with STOVL, no such problems exist. A squadron actually already on forward deployment ashore somewhere could retask to the ship on receipt of the order….even if they have been bombing Toyotas in the desert from Kandahar for the prior 5 months!.
If we were going to work Carrier Strike with dedicated naval squadrons, as the French and US do it, then perhaps CATOBAR was viable. That was never on offer though. STOVL is the key enabler for Carrier Strike keeping the Light Blue in the mix as the Whitehall mandarins seem intent on.
Chris B,
“Just out of interest, here’s what a launch/recovery cycle looks like. 6 mins, if that.”
Indeed. Now all you need to do is repeat that 60 odd times for the other 11 pilots…..interspersed with all the other movements in the flying programme and with all the cycles that dont go quite so well….then go again in the dark!. Then, and only then, you have an operational CATOBAR squadron.
We wouldn’t have the luxury of using Goshawks to do the training cycles though so its operational launch/cycle airframe lives that would be used up in to the bargain.
Well for the Yanky Doodle Dandy’s it’s 6 day and 4 night landings for pilots who have not flown in the last six months. Usually though it would appear they cease their routine cycles for the sake of getting qualifications out of the way. If you use the non-landing path traps you can have someone land and then stick them right back on a trap for another launch which should save a few minutes. You’re looking at maybe an hour per pilot of carrier ops, so maybe 12 ship hours in total. Could be done in one day.
Edit; As seen in the video, you can have more than one pilot on deck at a time, so it shouldn’t even take 12 hours. Tack on the fact that you’ve probably got another operational carrier back at home that can be sent for a quick run around in the North Sea to do Carrier currency work?
“not a truly multi-role ship like Cavour.”
Cavour a multi-role ship…?
Not really. Ro-Ro ramps leading into the flight deck do not a multi-role ship make.
I think some here should remember we are talking about crash landing an aircraft doing 100kts costing tens of millions onto a ship (only a few hundred meters in length and width) doing 25kts costing thousands of millions both filled with lots of stuff that goes bang or burns and oh yes mustn’t forget the crew either.
Plans were for the RAF/FAA split to be 60/40%. So that possibly gives us 3 RAF 2 FAA squadrons. The two FAA squadrons should always be CVF qualified, with the RAF making up the numbers for a third squadron if required. There will not be many times except all out warfare that CVF will need/have 3 F35 squadrons deployed.
I would like to see a F35 squadron (FAA at least) of 16 planes, two squadrons makes 32 and 6 Merlin AEW. The 4 extra planes per F35 squadron makes a huge difference for CAP and strike missions. Also the often quoted 4 AEW aircraft leaves no resilience for breakdowns or maintenance periods, Merlin has a 6 1/2 hour endurance it takes all 4 just to give 24 hours cover. Never mind what effect it has on the crews.
@Chris B
http://navyair.com/LSO_NATOPS_Manual.pdf
Fig6.1 pretty much sets out the requirements. It was 60 days that I dimly recalled was the trigger point for CATOBAR requals with 4 day and 2 night traps to recertify. All to be accomplished within range of a suitable divert field. Might be a bit tricky for us to manage to meet that with a single deck if it were already deployed.
Who do we get to crew the second CVF to take it for a CQ spin round the North Sea by the way?. We are planning to operate CVF’s sequentially not simultaneously!.
You are looking at 12 hours in the flying programme doing nothing else and if every pilot gets it 100% right first crack!. What happens if you do not have the luxury of dedicating the deck to CQ for the joining squadron and actually have to try and generate sorties at the same time!. What happens if two pilots have a bad day, bolter a half dozen times and have issues recovering to the deck?. You then have to launch a recovery buddy-stored aircraft or divert them ashore?. What happens to your flying programme then?.
CATOBAR works for permanently deck-tasked squadrons. We arent going to have that as the FAA arent stood-up for it, the RN cant afford it and I’m damned sure the RAF will want its squadrons ashore a hell of a lot more than afloat!. STOVL is simply more flexible and more appropriate in that context.
@Jim,
With my cynical hat on I’m afraid I always considered that metric to mean 1 FAA squadron (Naval Strike Wing) and 2 RAF. Not precise 60/40 but more likely in my view than a 5 squadron establishment of JCA. I simply never believed we would buy enough JCA to deploy that many front line squadrons plus an OCU and some form of attrition reserve to cycle the cabs through.
Quick summary of the thread so far:
- OP reception is not heavily enthusiastic;
- Nobody believes an F-18 costs $80m per fully equipped unit;
- The “Boys’ Own Guide to Anti-Submarine Warfare” pop-up book is wizard;
- Climate Change affects Strategy;
- @SI is not joining the RAN;
- Crowsnest reception is generally positive;
- F-35B can launch a Strike mission through someone’s window at 600nm;
- There are 10m more people living in Britain than expected, likely Daily Telegraph reading Londoners;
- Type 26 reception is generally positive so far;
- Modified Khareef price and features are attractive but niggling doubts over Blue Water ability;
- CATOBAR meant more planes, more crew, more training, two carriers;
- Smashing a jet onto a carrier safely is hard;
- In ~30 years time we want to convert our old F-35 fleet into Laser Gunships.
@Jonesy: “A squadron actually already on forward deployment ashore somewhere could retask to the ship on receipt of the order….even if they have been bombing Toyotas in the desert from Kandahar for the prior 5 months!”. Err, no. Landing on a moving ship required certification before with Harrier, and with rolling landing added to the process it’s going to be harder. Whether it’s easier or requires more practice than CATOBAR I have no idea, but the chances are it’s going to be a matter of degree, and given that the naval role will have far more emphasis on air defence, it’s not something we can easily flip squadrons between.
When the Sea Harrier fleet was around, pre-embarkation requirements were described as follows:
First experience pilot, daytime flying
before going on the carrier he had to complete a minimum of 10 training sorties of which 5 from ski-jump/dummy deck for launch and recovery practice.
To a pilot with previous experience the requirements were to fly the monthly minimum Sea Harrier flying hours with sorties from dummy deck “whenever possible”.
The Sea Harrier community was however notoriously small and elitary. All Sea Harrier pilots used to be at sea or on training very often, they were very much active, and went to sea in a constant rotation, so had plenty of practice since they were, basically, always the same ones rotating in and out of deployment.
It would be far more interesting to see later requirements for carrier currency when the Joint Force Harrier changed the way things are done.
The US Marines do a lot more training with their Harriers before going at sea. Initial at-sea qualification for day ops, Cat-I weather conditions takes a minimum of 35 vertical landings according to a 2004 USMC manual for AV8B training. http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%203500.76.pdf
A pilot of a USMC squadron needs a minimum of 8 vertical landings on a land based dummy deck before being deployed to the ship. Field Carrier Landing Practice is done on a schedule, and re-qualification is required after 30 days. http://www.military.com/news/article/marine-corps-news/carrier-landing-practice-readies-pilots.html
Land based dummy LHA decks are being built at Yuma and another at the Eglin F35 Training center. http://www.yumasun.com/articles/facility-77978-landing-training.html
Then there’s the issue of weather (category I is the ideal conditions, what about operations in Category II and III?) and night ops.
With the F35B we’ll also have to see what impact Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing eventually has on the training requirements.
The SRVL might prove indispensable to enable operations since even at 5000 lbs, the best case, the Vertical Bring Back margin is way too small.
If it does prove indispensable, it is worth remembering how SRVL was described during the tests:
Using SRVL F-35B aircraft would approach the carrier from astern at about 60 knots indicated air speed, 35 knots relative assuming 25 knots wind over deck (the maximum speed of a CVF will be 25 knots, so 25kts WOD is achievable even in dead calm) on a steep 5-6 degree glide path. Touch down would be about 150 feet from the stern with a stopping distance of 300 to 400 feet depending on conditions (wet flight deck, pitching ships etc). That would leave around 300 feet of flight deck for margin or even “bolters”.
The SRVL technique has a significant impact on ship designs and aviation operations, Commander Tony Ray told a conference in February 2008: “We expect to trade some STOVL flexibility for increased bring-back and fuel. We have to .. check for for relevant CV criteria that apply to slower SRVL operations. For example flightpath control will be a far more important flight criteria for SRVL than it has been for STOVL. It is a CV trait creeping in”.
In other words SRVL is a CATOBAR-style approach, just slower and without cables.
Like it or not, if it is adopted it is going to require skills and training. If it is not adopted, the F35B’s combat capabilities will be severely hampered.
And in addition to the effect on training requirements, please note that 150 feet + 400 feet + plus deck free for bolters means that when a F35B lands with SRVL approach the WHOLE deck, from end to end, has to be clear and any other aviation operation on deck is likely to be stopped entirely, as SRVL is more invasive than even rrested CATOBAR landing.
It is to be seen how much of the training advantage of STOVL is real and how much is virtual with the F35B.
And with SRVL the assumption “STOVL = better simultaneous helicopter and fast jet ops on deck” goes to hell immediately.
Ultimately, to say that a RAF land-based squadron will just move out, land on the carrier and be ready to operate from it in conditions other than “light load, perfect weather”, just like that, is a full-out lie and is deliberately misleading.
Jonesy, Topman, etc,
Thanks for the info re: CATOBAR requals, etc.
I’d always thought that an active “land-based” squadron of STOVL jets can migrate to “sea-based” ops eaiser than with CATOBAR.
Thing is, I’d try and have all and sundry CATOBAR trained and it looks like with only one active carrier it would be a little difficult… Got to question your logic though since the French manage with only one carrier – we’ll have two!
Also got to add that we managed it when we had just Eagle and Ark Royal but I think they usally had an assigned airgroup of two squadrons (Buccaneer and Phantom) each, which meant that 1/2 the non-sustainment jets were in use. What we are suggesting here is that only 1/4 of the non-sustainment jets will be deployed on the carrier because a) we have to share the carrier with copters, and b) we’d rather store them in the hangar which futher limits the embarked numbers of aircraft in peacetime.
PS: I’ve usually assumed we’d have 2 FAA and 2 RAF squadrons with the equivalent of 2 squadrons in sustainment (ish).
The Other Chris,
Love the recap – what a lot of waffle we all spout
I am guessing we will have 3 front line f35b squadrons of 12 aircraft with the rest used for training and as spare air frames. So a total buy of approx 50. Would love it to be 60 giving 4 front line squadrons but cannot see it. In order to maximise familiarity especially in the early years surely the squadrons should rotate and if that means a FAA squadron dropping bombs in support of the army somewhere hot and dusty whilst RAF pilots fly CAP for an RN NEO elsewhere then so be it.
@ X
“think some here should remember we are talking about crash landing an aircraft doing 100kts costing tens of millions onto a ship (only a few hundred meters in length and width) doing 25kts costing thousands of millions both filled with lots of stuff that goes bang or burns and oh yes mustn’t forget the crew either.”
– Granted, carrier landings are bloody dangerous. Were you or I to attempt such a task it would probably end in a fireball and a phone call to a soon to be distraught loved one. The snag here is that pilots tend to be expensively trained and generally very good at the whole flying thing.
Unfortunately it’s almost impossible for me to say this without sounding like I’m diminishing the task at hand, but really, for trained pilots carrier landings aren’t really that extraordinarily difficult. It requires a bit of practice and knowledge of what they’re doing, but overall it’s still just landing a plane on a rough spot, something which most pilots can do once they get the hang of the finer points.
@ Jonesy
The document you posted is dated 2001. I believe since then the USN has changed the qualification requirements. I’m not entirely certain though.
Before I go any further I must preface what I’m going to say by quoting you; “STOVL is simply more flexible and more appropriate in that context”, and saying that I agree that F-35B was the right choice, but for financial reasons as opposed to operational ones; that I believe F-35B is superior to Harrier and (all factors considered) superior to F-18; but at the same time I’m still not convinced by the whole CVF argument in general.
Now; “Who do we get to crew the second CVF to take it for a CQ spin round the North Sea by the way?. We are planning to operate CVF’s sequentially not simultaneously!”
– I was under the belief that both Carriers would need seperate crews, unless we plan to send the same crews repeatedly back into potential hotspots? No? How will they ever rest, have shore leave, if the same crew is required 365 days of the year?
“You are looking at 12 hours in the flying programme doing nothing else and if every pilot gets it 100% right first crack!”
– Well actually, as I said in the edit, you can run two pilots almost concurrently, possibly three, which means 12 hours would become more like 6 hours, or possibly even 4. Given how long it would take to sail to a theatre, even one whole days flying is not a major loss in the grand scheme of things.
“What happens if you do not have the luxury of dedicating the deck to CQ for the joining squadron and actually have to try and generate sorties at the same time!”
– Then I would suggest your doing something wrong. Surely you would not sail into an area that required you to run large numbers of sorties per day while you’re also urgently trying to bring other pilots up to currency?
“What happens if two pilots have a bad day, bolter a half dozen times and have issues recovering to the deck?”
– Then something has gone wrong with the training pipeline and two people at the very least are going to have a rather sobering conversation with their senior officers.
Chris B, having 2 carriers means that one will be available all the time in the same way that any ship is available in between its planned maintenance cycles. The spare will i reckon (hope I am wrong)have a skeleton crew at best and the handover between operational carriers will happen every x years.
The actual days readiness the 2nd hull is to be kep at will be interesting but I think it will take between 60 and 90 days to generate a 2nd operational carrier.
wf,
‘Landing on a moving ship required certification before with Harrier’
Indeed it did and there are deck quals also demanded of FAA pilots, but, they are not comparable in complexity or difficulty with CATOBAR.
The huge difference though is that, as we actually saw on operations, a pilot who had never flown from a ship was able to stage out and land on one!. Do that with CATOBAR without the pilot having a few days in the sim and another few practising on a concrete deck first and see what happens!.
STOVL is fail-safe in terms of emergency need to get planes and pilots on deck to stand up the carrier in full-rate CVA mode. CATOBAR unless you have a big pool of deck-rated pilots, which we wont, is not. Simple as that I’m afraid.
Simon,
The French Aeronavale are only now standing up their second Rafale-M squadron. They have two other dedicated squadrons on Super Etendards if memory serves. They have enough pilots from 4 dedicated naval squadrons to ensure that there is enough to put some kind of airgroup to sea when needed.
We were never going to have more than, to the best of my knowledge, a single dedicated naval squadron – the Naval Strike Wing…the RAF contingent of JCA would have been part-time sea based at best.
As I said earlier…where we following the French model with 4 Fleet Air Arm fastjet squadrons the game changes and CATOBAR becomes viable. That was never, at any time, on offer though so its not a valid comparison I’m afraid.
@ APATS
My main concern about the cycles of the carriers is with the crews of the carrier, and when they will be able to take leave etc.
Chris B, They will take leave in exactly the same manner as any other ships company. Having 2 carriers simply means we will be able to plan maintenance cycles to ensure that we always have one in the operational pool not that it will spend every day of the year at sea.
Jonesy said “they are not comparable in complexity or difficulty with CATOBAR.”
Only in that Harrier is a very difficult aeroplane to fly in the first place…..
@ Chris B
It was just a gentle heads up for us all and not aimed at anyone specific and certainly not you….
I know US carrier squadrons work up for a year before joining the ship and then there is 6 months of ship and air wing training together before they deploy.
How long for navy merlins and sk ?
Jonesy,
“…We were never going to have more than, to the best of my knowledge, a single dedicated naval squadron – the Naval Strike Wing”
What makes you believe that?
I guess it will depend on numbers of aircraft ordered (as APATS said). If the RAF intend to use F35 (whichever flavour) and we intend to be able to surge to 36 aircraft in times of crisis then I would guess we’ll order around 60. Personally I’d go for a maximum of 4 deployable squadrons and a purchase of about 80… but I’m not the one holding the purse
In actual fact we can guage a lot when the final order quantity is placed. Here’s my theory:
24: one active squadron – will convert to CATOBAR later
36: two active squadrons – no money, nothing else later
50: two active squadrons of 16 (1 x FAA + 1 x RAF)
60: three active squadrons of 12 (1 x FAA + 2 x RAF)
80: four active squadrons of 12 (2 x FAA + 2 x RAF)
You are forgetting in a crisis will mean joining the US in another adventure. The surge aircraft may well be USMC F35b.
X – We need 12 ASW frigates, we will only get 8, so we will have 14 first rate escorts. Even with second hand kit there is no way BAE will build T26 for the price they say they will.
So we are f**ked then. You don’t like Khareef because it’s too small for mid-atlantic. What are we doing in the mid atlantic with an OPV? Are we still trying to plug the air gap and defeat the type 7’s?
I know you like FREMM but it cost double the T26 estimate. That translates into six hull’s then. Giving the RN an total of 6 T45 and 6 ASW.
I don’t see how giving DCN money to build more expensive ship’s would help us out here.
@ Jim –
Plans were for the RAF/FAA split to be 60/40%. So that possibly gives us 3 RAF 2 FAA squadrons.
I am guessing you are confusing something here. To generate a squadron you need between 36 and 50 aircraft. 5 squadrons of fighters is more than the entire RAF.
@Chris B
‘The document you posted is dated 2001. I believe since then the USN has changed the qualification requirements. I’m not entirely certain though.’
I’m of the same belief to be honest….I know someone told me 3 months is now the trigger point for the requals…I cant substantiate that right now though, so, in absence of anything else that manual is at least ballpark and of obvious credibility.
Fair comment on outlining your position on the debate. Where you say “but at the same time I’m still not convinced by the whole CVF argument in general” is where we differ in my opinion the original STOVL CVF/Carrier Strike combination I saw as one of the best pieces of original thought I’ve seen in a while. Focused on delivering everything we do need with the greatest efficiency possible and leaving off the expensive parts we have no requirement for…ie blue-water sea control!.
“I was under the belief that both Carriers would need separate crews, unless we plan to send the same crews repeatedly back into potential hotspots? No? How will they ever rest, have shore leave, if the same crew is required 365 days of the year?”
Naturally you have the various trades manned so that, throughout the course of a deployment, personnel can be cycled on and off the ship…thats one of the fundamentals of TOPMAST. With that kind of cycle the actual duty carrier is unimportant. A Fighter Controller could cycle off QE, spend 6 months ashore on a joint task (for example) then rotate back out for an at-sea tour and join up with PoW 3 months into her deployment. The length of deployments undertaken now its not uncommon for a ships company to be different in some departments on return to home port than the one that set out.
“you can run two pilots almost concurrently, possibly three, which means 12 hours would become more like 6 hours, or possibly even 4. Given how long it would take to sail to a theatre, even one whole days flying is not a major loss in the grand scheme of things.”
Absolutely you can again if all goes swimmingly…if you forgive the pun…and you have no other pressures on the programme. If you dont though thats a different story isnt it?. Remember the ‘golf bag’ concept of Carrier Strike…the concept is to have the ship out and on station and augment in theatre as necessary….the ability to tailor the airgroup during a deployment is key to the flexibility of the asset.
“Then I would suggest your doing something wrong. Surely you would not sail into an area that required you to run large numbers of sorties per day while you’re also urgently trying to bring other pilots up to currency”
Again, as above, you may already ‘be there’ before you commit to deploying force. Reconfiguring for CVA with a surge fastjet deployment once the carrier is on station is something we have done before during hostilities. It can be a very efficient method of minimising ops costs and maximising air fleet usefulness if you have the ability to deploy aircraft where they are needed only when they are needed there!. The basic complement of 12 F-35B’s on the ‘peacetime’ CVF deck being sufficient for low-intensity intervention ops etc. The surge group being capable of a great deal more. STOVL is a key enabler for this.
“Then something has gone wrong with the training pipeline and two people at the very least are going to have a rather sobering conversation with their senior officers”
Quite. A meeting without coffee and biscuits as the saying goes. However the flying programme is still in the toilet and its not entirely unheard of for pilots to fail CarQuals!.
@Simon,
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1012/hc10/1092/1092.pdf
Points 2.27 and 2.28 of the NAO’s briefing document point towards an MoD statement that a 12 plane airgroup and a 20 per day sortie generation rate as sufficient to meet requirement and maintain operational currency for a limited airgroup.
Seeing as we never got to stand up 801 again and my view that JCA is going to be a Light Blue hobby horse I dont see where the second FAA squadron comes in?.
@ martin
‘Plans were for the RAF/FAA split to be 60/40%.’
That’s each services contribuation to the manpower plot.
Martin, not sure where you are getting your numbers from. The RAF has 4 operational GR4 squadrons and OTU and OCU squadron. So 6 squadrons of GR4 from not much more than 100 flying air frames! 60 F35b easily give us 3 operational squadrons.
@ APATS – As far as I am aware defence assumptions in SDSR for F35B avilability is 1 in 3 aircraft. 36 to generate 1 squadron.
I could be wrong here and will defer to others wisdom.
Martin, a lot of people seem to get confused by availability. If we want to keep a squadron deployed in say Afghan permanently then yes we need 3 squadrons to stay within leave regulations, separated service regs etc. To actually obtain 36 operational aircraft and 3 front line squadrons available to fit into a deployment cycle does not require the purchase of 108.