A guest post from Defence Synergia
We in DefenceSynergia (DS) fully understand that there are counter views to our own that cat n trap was the right way to go in respect of UK’s carrier fleet and that HMG (originally Labour) are wrong to support F35B. However, we also recognise that if our interpretation is to gain ground we must find other ways of explaining the strategic logic that drives our thinking.
To that end we have focused on the STRATEGIC requirements, implications and rationale for UK defence priorities that are being obscured or overlooked by the ‘powers that be’. In contrast we assess that a carrier policy is Strategic and must be based around a complete system not an individual piece of kit. Like the Independent Nuclear Deterrent the carrier SYSTEM requires enablers to offer full flexibility, coherence and credibility as follows:
- Two carriers required to offer maximum availability for carrier strike capability
- An effective mixed air-group that provides vital AD, Strike, SAR, AEW & AAR beyond land based air-power is essential
- Surface ships and submarines to provide an escort screen beyond land based air-power range are essential
- LRMPA and AWAC to provide an escort screen within land based air-power range are highly desirable
- Fleet support from dedicated RFA tankers and stores replenishment vessels is essential
However, not all these enablers are in-place and the SYSTEM is therefore flawed.
No 1 will remain uncertain until SDSR 2015 has been completed.
No 2 is practicably impossible without CATOBAR
No 3 is a major challenge for a total fleet of 19 FF/DD and 7 SSN
No 4 fails on LRMPA (unless the capability is restored) & fails on E3-D interoperability unless the ‘Project Eagle’ Block 40/45 upgrade is funded
No 5 as things stand RFA support would appear to be totally inadequate
Note: The published and stated position of CDS is that a fleet of 14 RAF A330-200 cancel out the inherent disadvantages of the short range F35B. However, any notion that this level of AAR force is adequate to provide support for the RAF, let alone FAA carrier operations beyond normal landbased range, is a fantasy.
We in DS accept the argument that MOD spending and its budget must be controlled and should not be sacrosanct. However, the evidence is that the costings for the CATOBAR conversion are suspect and less than exhaustive with MOD conducting some pretty half hearted one-dimensional commercial negotiations and research. The latter, it has been alleged, being driven by a ‘line of least resistance’ approach – MOD(Navy) having its focus on STOVL operations over the past few years notwithstanding HMG’s decision in SDSR 2010 to opt for cats n traps.
The S of S and CDS have publicly accept that the F35C is the better aircraft and that a 65,000 ton carrier should have been laid down as cat n trap from the outset, yet they still fail to articulate the strategic requirement and voluntarily opt for less capability. One can be forgiven for thinking that they seem almost sanguine about the notion of accepting the F35B despite the cost implications, obvious production difficulties and the operational limitations it will impose upon both the RAF and RN. Their decision apparently being made on the basis that the first carrier will be in service two years earlier than planned whilst conveniently ignoring MOD and Government decisions which created the carrier/air-power capability gap in the first place.
Therefore, you may wonder as we do, why (now that Dr Fox is no longer in post) MOD apparently accept quite blithely that it will take until 2023 (eleven years) and cost an extra £2bn for the carrier consortium to complete a single cat n trap conversion? Yet unexplained anomalies associated with the rationale for the decision go unanswered. EG. If the decision was primarily to balance the budget why has MOD failed to explore commercially available, less expensive, modern steam generating systems – in lieu of EMALS – that are not dependent upon the main or supplementary electrical power plants (such systems are known to the USN, UK maritime commerce, DS and probably TD contributors – then why not MOD)? Why was the Lockheed Martin F35 (BAE Systems as a major partner) the only option on MOD (Navy)’s wish list when a more cost effective alternative like the Boeing F18 Super Hornet – half the cost to buy and a third less to operate – was not even considered for the RN?
You might also wonder why, in all the speeches and statements surrounding the decision, before and after the announcement was made, the RAF operational requirement (OR) case has not apparently been an issue. Of course it is not for DS to speak for the Air Staff but one does wonder how the F35B, the most complex, the most expensive to buy and operate and least capable of three F35 variants suddenly fits the OR for either Deep Penetration or even a 5th generation stealthy fast jet to replace the Tornado?
What effect has the inflexible MOD policy for a 2 fast jet fleet concept played?
Which brings us back to the DS strategic position in respect of financing MOD requirements.
It is the government’s stated view in the National Security Strategy (NSS) that UK will continue to play its traditional world wide role and that Force 2020 should be expeditionary, built around strategic air and sea lift. A crucial element being a carrier/amphibious capability to project power.
Therefore, from a UK strategic point of view, the policy fails if the principal asset – the aircraft carrier – is unable to carry out certain roles like anti access and area denial tasks – what the US refer to as A2/AD. Although this is a US Navy definition based on air/sea battle doctrine – which may also call for USMC, army and air force support – if the UK does not define its strategic doctrine for use of the F35B equipped carrier, MOD is in danger of situating the appreciation yet again by trying to fit its doctrine around the capability. [Despite the current and former CDS endorsing the F35B the aircraft is seen outside MOD by many defence analysts as an expensive Harrier replacement ('mud mover') to support combined amphibious ops with little, if any, real strategic utility].
The S of S made great play over some short term facts changing to justify his CATOBAR U Turn.
But the U turn itself may well have changed the medium to long term facts too and affected the UK’s strategic capability. The question we are all left with is this:
When considering the nations long term security and international interests should UK Strategic capability requirements provide the bench mark or should short term Treasury aspirations do it?
Eugh, this is sad but true. If you want big, capable carriers, you need cats/traps. If you get that you need pretty much 2 destroyers, a sub, 2 frigates and assorted RFA assets each. Keep in mind standing commitments and availability, plus unforeseen events… we’re screwed, because if you think you need 2 carriers, you really need three, and if you need three, you should have four. We need to swap the army and navy budgets round. NOW.
I can answer the last question as a tax-payer.
I am not interested in short-termism. If I have to pay more in the long term then that means other things have to fall by the wayside (e.g. cure for prostate cancer, etc). This is not acceptable.
I expect H.M. Government to invest in the long term interests of every man, woman and child in the UK.
A comprehensive laying out of the DS position and I agree that on performance grounds CATOBAR will always be the most effective option. Also that the flip-flop conversion costs are laughable and could do with a reassessment. But I have two wee niggles:-
1) Now you have laid down your position, how do you intend to go about providing it? (ensure adequate funding now; delay procurement until achievable; go back in time and do it properly first time). Remember over and above cats-n-traps conversion & related training costs, there are still escorts and auxiliaries, points 3 & 5 on your capability list, to be funded; and there’s little point in going for CATOBAR efficiency and then sticking with sub-optimal (range/operating-alt) helo-borne AEW so include new AEW aircraft as well.
2) Argue CATOBAR advantage on its own merits. Saying, as in point 2, that AD, SAR, Strike, AEW are “practically impossible” without CATOBAR, flies in the face of 35 years of ops and at least one successful air campaign won primarily with a STOVL air-wing. If you’re including AAR (a tricky proposition with STOVL) within the very same point to water-down the others and make the conclusion valid, then that is being deliberately disingenuous. If for arguments sake the entirety of point 2 was true and STOVL has always been a true false ‘for-show-only’ capability and never adequate for the UK’s needs, then a lot of retired Admirals are hypocrites at best and criminally fraudulent at worst. Having creating comfortable careers, crafting knowingly suspect doctrine & submitting bills for taxpayer funded equipment.
There is no Money for Cat and ‘flaps’
You also underestimate the capability of E3, and its future potency.
“We need to swap the army and navy budgets round. NOW.”
Not while we’re in Afghanistan. And throwing non-existant money at it wont sort out the RN’s problems or deliver what you want on time.
Where was the debate when the original descision was made? Why is it only now people are debating the B Vs C varient rather than when we entered the program before billions has been spent and steel cut? The argument for CATOBAR would have been far stronger then. Even then, after long planning and assessment, the B was what we went for…
I think what many of us need to do is to stop trying to come up with ways a dozen F35x do what a USN carrier air group can do. Can’t be done.
We have to put USN capabilities to one side and compare ourselves with the world’s other navies. For the most part we are still ahead of many of them. And we need to maintain our advantages over those other navies such as SSN, ASW, a marine corps better than most countries’ special forces, and a solid training regime.
We need to think about F35x in a similar way to in which Sea Harrier was first envisioned. Basically as a platform to loft missiles when needed at great ranges and great speed whether these missiles are for AAW, ground attack, or anti-ship (yes navies sink ships…..honest.) F35 is a generation or three ahead of many of the aircraft fielded by potential enemies.
You can’t have to many flight decks and CVF will be a welcome addition to any coalition effort. If we do work with the French they can’t ignore 12 (or more) FJ we will bring or additional substantial helicopter assets. Even working with the US those few acres of flight deck will be of use. Imagine CVF operating USMC F35b to free deck space on their LHD.
The main problem with CVF is that we have ended up a strike carrier and not a truly multi-role ship like Cavour.
x,
By my reckoning (spreadsheet) there was a cutoff cost of the CATBOAR upgrade – it was about £3.7b for both CVF, any more and STOVL is more cost-effective, any less and C was the flavour of the day.
I also included 3 x Cavour-esque ships (and 2 x Cavour-esque + 1 x Ocean-ish LPH). The cutoff there was that if you can build the Cavour-esques for £1b you’re laughing all the way to the bank.
And all that assumed the same trough-life cost of F35B and F35C.
@ Simon
I didn’t make myself clear. We should have got two Cavour-esque 60k tonners. The extra utility 30k tons brings is worth a lot more than the difference in price between CVF and Cavour. In terms of systems Cavour is nearly as complex as CVF; you don’t get much from going small with an aviation ship because you still need those complex systems. We wouldn’t need an Ocean replacement with a mega-Cavour. In crewing terms you don’t save much either.
Unfortunately this post is spot on. There was absolutely no point in building two large carriers if the aircraft complement was going to be fundamentally handicapped. F35B is the single worst procurement decision we have made, a hugely capable and effective future 5th generation strike fighter with its wings clipped and engine bastardised to allow it to land on small decks. DS puts the whole problem in the right light – the whole project is a failure in defence procurement.
It’s great that the MoD’s books are back in the black, but we do have the treasury rather than the military running the defence of the realm. That the government needs to ‘define it’s strategic doctrine’ is correct, not just in the narrow terms of the carriers – the whole caboodle.
We’ve had no over-riding strategy for years now. We continue to drift on the whim of individuals – which sometimes gets mistaken for following a strategy.
A treasury led defence may deliver affordable equipment, but without strategic doctrine there will unlikely be any coherence between individual areas. Just because something is affordable and properly funded doesn’t mean that it’s value for money or the right tool for the job.
@ Somewhat
I hear the RAN are looking for extra bodies….
Not the best decision no. But 2 carriers are better than 1. Western tech’ is still a generations ahead of the Chinese or Indians. Fixing the problem would mean a radical departure in defence thinking and HMG doesn’t do radical departures in defence thinking. We won’t, as you have told me, being to war on our own. I am just hoping the ships themselves don’t turn out to be lemons.
I agree that CATOBAR is preferable. I also agree that on current ‘facts’ we cannot afford it.
My prescription would be to proceed with purchase of around 50 F35B to use for the first 10 years of the carriers’ lives, while at the same time looking much harder at how to do the conversion more efficiently and cheaply. Resurrect EMCAT, look again at Steam, get more prices from more people, whatever.
In 2025 we can then decide again: either (1) proceed with conversion, choose a suitable plane (Evolved Typhoon?) and (1a) sell the F35B to whover wants them or (1b) keep them to fly from our two new LHDs after 2030. Option (2) If the costs are still horrific or if we’re still broke stick with STOVL and top up with as many F35B as seem appropriate at that time.
I broadly agree with thus analysis (for the record).
In my opinion:
Dr Fox presence/absence was not the issue.
BWoS: Time and cost conversion estimates are a mystery.
EMALS was not the issue (costs guaranteed by USA).
Royal Navy was willing to accept F/A-18 E/F.
Official line F/A-18 E/F will cost as much as F35B (90 million USD).
The super CVS/F35B solution had already been accepted, and was path of least resistance and default solution.
It’s an ill-informed political decision and the justification is a snow job.
I find it sad that F18 was not even presented as an option. For a project like CVF, the aircraft are the long pole in the tent: starting the project with the aircraft being the low risk part is by far the most sensible option
Is this post a joke? You can’t talk about strategy without enumerating what it is – in terms of Britain’s place in the world – and jump straight into details about equipment types.
In my opinion, the UK’s defence strategy as stated does not automatically lead to the unchallengeable decision that we need aircraft carriers at all, far less 2 specifically as opposed to 1 or 20 or 100 carriers, and is completely unconnected to any decisions as to what mix of capabilities are needed, and even less so to specific types or models.
Who the hell are Defence Synergia anyway? A bunch of primary school children? Whoever they are – and I’ve never heard of them – if anytime in the future I do I will look with huge scepticism at whatever the hell they are banging on about.
Fail.
James,
http://www.defencesynergia.co.uk/DefenceSynergia/Contacts.html
What is your understanding of the UKs strategy?
Thank you Simon. I confess that I have heard of none of them individually (nor will they of me – I don’t set myself up as an expert in this field), and on reading their biographies, there is nothing in any of them that give confidence in any individual or collective strategic military judgement they may publish. Everyone is entitled to an opinion though.
I do have however another entry in the list of “crap bogus consultancies to run a mile from”, so perhaps the article has done some good. I have no doubt they will mutually file me under the same category.
My understanding of the UK’s defence strategy starts with the foreign office, the international economic situation, societal pressures, climate change and population trends, at least as far as those things can be reasonably predicted over the next 30-50 years. It does not start with an argument about EMALS or F35B.
{….to add}… Those things are down in the weeds. They are not part of strategy, they are part of local, short-term and necessarily temporary implementation choices.
James,
I must say, although I’d love to agree with them all, I did think that it was a joke – hence my initial response (as a tax payer).
How does “climate change” affect UK defence strategy? Just curious as I think I’ve seen it mentioned before.
Simon,
millions of people in Saharan Africa wanting to come to Europe, or millions of people in central Asia following dwindling water supplies, or millions of people in Bangladesh watching the rising water take over their villages. Where are they going to go to, and what impact will their movement have on where they migrate towards?
1: A CVF CBG with 30 plus F35B’s and even with MASC Merlin’s on board will be seen as a clear and present danger to anyone that we send it against.
2: CVF/F35B is a done deal. Time for people to stop pissing in the wind and move on.
James,
Migration basically then. Understandable.
@ Simon
According to some sources the UK has a population not of 60million but 70million. Most of those “missing” 10million are supposedly in the South East. Thames Water (even though like most utility companies is patches more than carries out wholesale repairs to protect the balance sheet) is struggling with empty reservoirs not only through a lack of rain but probably also because it is trying to serve an extra 10 million customers that supposedly don’t exist. Population movements for whatever reason put pressure on resources.
James,
Given the compromises and limitations of the equipment chosen, your strategic options are severely narrowed. More capable equipment more strategic options (and the cost savings do not justify the compromises in performance).
STOVL is a bad decision (No strike, Compromised AEW, No AAR).
Gas Turbines is a bad decision (140 USD per barrel, break even for Nuclear, effectively no refueling).
Helicopter AEW is a bad decision (Endurance, Ceiling, Unpressurised).
Land only AAR is a bad decision (Availability, Range).
It is a bad decision and a miserable compromise that will cost more and deliver less over the life of the project, while limiting the potential for strategic action.
I could go on …
@Peter Elliott.
I really agree with you on you’re earlier point about waiting and seeing. The fact we are all aware of is that CATOBAR is very expensive and would put back the in service dates even further, hence why it isn’t a viable option….at the moment.
A limited buy of F35B gets airframes and more crucially pilots on-to flight decks. It means we can spend a few years seeing just how good or bad a machine the aircraft is and also how the price is looking in the years ahead.
In conjunction with this I agree lets have some more thinking proceed on all angles of the catapult dilemma, seeing more broadly what the options are and if it will be viable to convert at a later date.
These two strands would hopefully converge in the early 2020′s, the information from which could enable us to make some far better placed decisions on the future of the carriers, the lightning and on a Tornado replacement as a whole.
It’s the smartest and as far as I am concerned the only way to go.
@ x
What sources are those? I’ve not come across the suggestion that there are an extra 10m people in the UK. If true then that is a national scandal
erebus,
you seem to confuse me with someone who thinks that a carrier whether STOVL or CATOBAR or any other form of money-wasting – let alone 2 carriers – is a sensible use of resources.
“….. when a more cost effective alternative like the Boeing F18 Super Hornet – half the cost to buy and a third less to operate – was not even considered for the RN?”
I read this and knew instantly that whoever Defence Synergia are, fact checking is clearly not their strong point. I can only presume the rest of the article is similarly riddled with inaccuracy and not worth the time.
James,
I’m going to put my head above the parapet now!
Regarding Climate Change. The Planet is GETTING COLDER.
The Sea Ice in the Bering Sea is at this moment the greatest it has ever been. Glaciers throughout the world are growing! Eastern Europe has had a Terrible Winter, not that many people in the UK would know it.
There has been NO INCREASE in Global Temperatures since 1998. The reason why London and the South East of Britain is usually in a permanent shortage of water is that, to many people are living in that area. Whilst the land simply cannot support them.
Our summers in the last 5 years have become a washout. Consider this: A British Farmer should get 2 crops out of any one field per year. What would happen if he/she could only get one. Answer Food Prices would go through the roof.
Every Astrophysicist on the planet, is predicting that we are now entering a Mini-Ice-age, if we are lucky! And have been saying this for a couple of years. This is down to the SUN and not Co2 or Mankind.
This Planet, for the last million plus years runs through a cycle of 100000 years of a full blown Ice Age, then 11500 years of an Inter Glacial period. Guess which one, we are now at the end of?
As Al Gore was receiving his Nobel Peace Price, for his Documentary Film : An Inconvenient Truth. It was being struck down as a pack of lies by the High Court in London. An Inconvenient Truth for Mr Gore. By the way, has anyone seen or heard from him in the last couple of years?
I doubt, if any of you believe me on this, however please check out the following websites:
Iceagenow.info
Climaterealists.com
Icecap (This particular site is very science heavy)
Weatheraction.com. (This website is run by Piers Corbyn, brother of Labour MP Jeremy Corbyn. He runs a private weather prediction company. He does come over as abit of a Mad scientist. However he predicted in October 2010 that, that December 2010 would be like Hell Frozen over. He wasn’t wrong. have a look at his Weatheraction videos on YouTube.)
Have a good read through them.
One last thing. When the Planet is warm, life on Earth is good. When the Planet is Cold, Life is Extremely Bad.
Imagine the world reaction if the Chinese were building two 65,000 t carriers each equipped with 36 5th gen stovl aircraft which would be escorted by the worlds best aaw destroyer, asw frigate and ssn.
Cvf will give us all the strategic capability we
need and more than any other navy outside the USn
We need to stop comparing the capabilities of the CVF/F35B and the USNs Super Carriers. What we are getting is a CVL on steriods and will be operated as such but with a proportionately bigger air wing. Imagine how the Falklands would have been if we had 2 CVF sized platforms each with 30+ Sea Harriers and Harriers. WE have been out of the CATOBAR game for nearly 40 years and we could never afford to regenerate that capability from scratch. WE were the world leader in operation STOVL carriers, which did punch above their weight especially when they operated both types of Harrier. Yes we have squandered these skills in the name of fiscal prudence but they are far far easier to regenerate after a gap of 6-8 years than the alternative.
An AEW&C Merlin with whichever radar is chosen will be an effective platform that will meet are requirements. We have NO intention of storming up to the Kola Peninsular or retaking Hong Kong. The CVF still meets are needs.
One of the problems I see it is the lack of supporting platforms and other capability Gaps
Increased TLAM launch capability
Lack of sufficient Escorts.
Lack of RFa vessels to support a CVF Task Force and/or the Amphibious Force.
Land Based MPA Cover: Remember Nimrods were operating over the Task Force during the Falklands conflict and were armed with AIM-9s to deal with hostile MPAs earning the tag “The World’s largest fighter”.
So can people stop the moaning about how we will no have proper CATOBAR carriers. It was never a real possibility just a Political points scoring aspiration barely linked to reality.
@ Simon257,
That’s brilliant. It is a race in time between Lockheed, BWoS and God as to whether the ruddy jets, the pigging boats or the seas freezing over get delivered first. Who would have thought that nature itself would confound the Sea Lords’ plan for naval dominance?
I’m not sure that even in my bravest and most swaggering of days I’d have gone into a MoD Capability Planning Conference and voted against the carriers on the grounds of the next Ice Age being upon us, but I salute a man who is clearly more in touch with reality than most in the MoD.
There’s a job in here for FBOT’s Glaswegian welders. Fuck-off great ice skates to be attached to the hulls of the QEC, or tracks. Another £billion on the cost.
Lord Jim
We are paying 90% (or more) of the cost for 50% of the capability.
How is that a good deal ?
We have pilots with the USN and the French, and guess what they can land on a CVN and CdG.
Re: Kola Peninsula: You underestimate my megalomania
(Just in case Prime Minister Putin is reading. That was a Joke)
Why not do the job properly and get a sovereign capability, on a smaller scale than USN ?
“Speak softly, and carry a big stick.”
Teddy Roosevelt
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Stick_ideology
“Roosevelt described his style of foreign policy as “the exercise of intelligent forethought and of decisive action sufficiently far in advance of any likely crisis”" [Wikipedia].
I might comment on “Making Sense of the F35 decision”, just for fun.
Re: Making Sense of F35 decision.
http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a77626f47-3e4e-4a75-99be-604b211bdf73
100 F/A-18E/F at 70 Million = 06Bn.
Assuming 25% premium in purchase price for B.
100 F35C at 160 Million USD = 16Bn.
100 F35B at 200 Million USD = 20Bn.
Saving of C over B with purchase of 100 aircraft = 4Bn USD.
(Plus additional lifetime saving of operating savings for 50 years).
Should cover extra costs of cats and traps with money to spare.
At only 06Bn for F/A-18E/F and lower operational costs for duration (15 years), an interim purchase of F/A-18E/F could well be economic.
Hi Erebus,
Are you really comparing like for like? I am assuming you are comparing F/A-18E/F at today’s prices against LRIP for F-35? Wouldn’t a more sensible comparison be to take the current LRIP price of the F-35 reduce it by the margin the F-22 went from LRIP to full scale production, and then add inflation to a set point (my suggestion is 2016), and then take the F/A-18E/F (make sure you add in any Government Furnished equipment) and add inflation to the same point, and THEN compare prices. I bet the gap would be under 20%, furthermore I suspect that kinematically the F-35B would not be that far from the F/A-18E/F and that the F-35B will totally edge the F/A-18E/F in all mission profiles with the possible exception of WVR combat, and even then I bet the IR reduction and better situational awareness of the F-35B will outway any kinematic drawbacks it might have.
After wishing for the F35C I can now see the benefits of the B version. We should get both carriers and one will always be available. Very flexible airgroup can be embarked, depending on requirement, which for a low resourced military is an excellent thing in my book.
Also surely the ‘stealth’ fator is only for night/first strike missions, all other times will no doubt be external hardpoints in use and if the intenal bays are filled with fuel tanks then longer range?
I haven’t seen anywhere if they can have fuel tanks in the internal bay but why not?
Flexibility is definitely the key here something us ‘Brits’ have always been good at when needed.
No 3 is a major challenge for a total fleet of 19 FF/DD and 7 SSN
The requirement is surely for one CVBG at a time, not two – only two CVs in total. They’re saying that we can’t escort a single carrier with everything available from 19 surface escorts and 7 subs?
Agreed.
In any scenario where we send both QEC the Sh1t will have hit the fan and we will also send every escort we have – regardless of readiness, training or standing tasks.
^ The ‘Islands that shall not be named’ round 2 ^
@Peter Elliott
Completely agreed. Normal operation would be a single CVF with a small number of escorts and auxiliaries.
@JWD
Almost a developing Voldemort situation!
Why would you want to put fuel tanks in the internal bomb bays then hang the weapons from the wings? Sorry cannot see any advantage.
LM are aiming for six AMRAAM internally enough for the A2A/CAP profile. Two 500lb paveway or six SDB and two AMRAAM for the strike mission. However I can see normal CVF missions having external tanks and weapons fitted not every mission will need the LO profile.
Tubby.
The figures are not mine, Boeing can confirm prices for F/A/G-18E/F.
Aviation Week -> Ares Blog -> JSF – SAR Discloses Another Three-Year Slip (Popular Blog Posts) Link provided in previous post.
Bill Sweetman high balls, the F/A-18E/F with kitchen sink, and low balls the F35 (missing some engine costs). 160 million USD per aircraft (F35C) is best estimate for full rate production not LRIP. The F18 is the low cost, low risk option.
For the Aircraft: 2 x F18 = 1 x F35B and the F18 is a know quantity unlike the F35 project which in the words of Bill Sweetman is going backwards.
Lets take Airborne AEW.
Does anyone think a helicopter is a substitute for a fixed wing aircraft unless VTOL or hover is essential, (including operating and maintenance costs) especially a substitute for a 200M+ specialist aircraft (E2) in capability, operated by both the USN and France.
Situational Awareness or ISTAR is not a nice to have but a critical piece of functionality.
Land solutions are not a substitute for organic carrier based (but not cheap) solutions, especially East of Suez.
That applies to AEW and AAR and organic fuel and payloads (F35C).
It is possible to deconstruct every aspect of the decision in detail.
But you don’t need a spreadsheet to see the compromises that reduce capacity/capability and increase total lifetime costs.
“You might also wonder why, in all the speeches and statements surrounding the decision, before and after the announcement was made, the RAF operational requirement (OR) case has not apparently been an issue.”
In fact the RAF has been rather quiet on the F35 for quite a while. I’d suspect that’s because the penny has dropped that the RAF isn’t going to be getting any, any time soon. If Phil had trouble finding money for 12 B’s for the navy in his ten year plan, you can imagine how far away the money is for an outright Tornado replacement.
As for the long term view, a particular long term view probably figured highly in the government’s decision. That being that the unexpected air campaign in Libya and the Argentineans ratcheting up the rhetoric has not let the matter of carrier capability disappear from the front pages – hence the long term view that they would rather not have to fight two more elections before anyone gets to see a C fly off a CVF, whereas the three test Bs we already own can now be wheeled out to start repairing the political damage.
@ Erebus
Land solutions are not a substitute for organic carrier based (but not cheap) solutions, especially East of Suez.
Very interesting comment. Could you tell me where East of Suez E3 would be unavailable inn your scenario to provide AWACS? Has the US ever fought a conflict without E3 since it came into service where E2 was essential?
“For the Aircraft: 2 x F18 = 1 x F35B and the F18 is a known quantity unlike the F35 project which in the words of Bill Sweetman is going backwards”.
The spitfire is a known quantity but no one is suggesting we fly one of those of the deck of CVF. Are you suggesting we should not look to use the latest available aircraft just because they are new?
@ Tubby – I have to agree with you. This article mentions F35B being 80% of the cost of the last F22’s but seems to make insufficient allowance for full rate production of F35. The comparisons with F18 always seem to be using old prices without adequate accounting for defence inflation and no one seems to mention the need for ECM and Targeting POD’s for F18 as part of the price.
I am also immensely curios to know why any one feels an F18 would be superior to an F35 in A2A. F18 is every bit the slow bad turning bomb truck F35 is and it has less ability to detect the enemy and does not have LO capability for engaging in BVR.
@ Richard
whereas the three test Bs we already own can now be wheeled out to start repairing the political damage.
Good point I would not be suprised to see us flying these three of the deck of QE as soon as she hits the water so the government can claim to have restored capability.
@Peter Elliott + The Other Chris
I think the issue with the surface fleet is quite simple. Everyone would like to see some more high-end destroyers and frigates procured (I would personally though only like to see 20ish, maybe 8 Type 45 and 12 Type 26).
I don’t however think that this is the crux of the problem. The real issue is not the number of high-end ships in service; instead it’s the complete and total lack of low-end ones to take a share of the work.
The future will see type 45’s and 26’s still, as their predecessors are today, on counter piracy patrols off Somalia and chasing drug runners in the Caribbean. It is just utter madness! The same goes for humanitarian aid or flying the flag across the globe, none of this requires a state of the art and hyper expensive ship.
Even the Falklands could survive with a couple of OPV’S, RAF Mount Pleasant and the occasional visit by an SSN.
A batch of 8-12 light frigates or corvettes would work wonders. Cheap to build, cheap to run ships that can take on all of these roles and allow the high-end ships to do what they are built to do. Plenty of other navies have this kind of mix, why not us?
I don’t think this is fantasy, it’s perfectly possible if the will is there to do it. Unfortunately both the Royal Navy and the RAF are still in a bespoke mentality where only the best will do no matter the cost or the wider implications. Maybe the Army is a little better because it has lived with the horrors of Afghanistan for so long.
I know I’m probably preaching to the converted! I just fancied an afternoon rant!
With you 100% Challenger. It’s the cruisers that we’re desperate for.
I always hoped that the T26 would fill the gap, cheaper more numerous vessels freeing the T45′s for the really meaty work in a Hi-Lo approach.
A modified Khareef would have sufficed provided it was Blue Water capable – we’d need those T26′s to join up with the main fleet(s) when needed.
The current plans for T26 look interesting though. Reusing modern equipment from the T23 refits, equipping the more flexible VLS cells, mission deck, Merlin hangar.
The diesel electric cruising motors with direct gas turbine for sprints and commonality with CVF and US ships to spread costs.
It’s promising. Can’t wait for more details to be released.
Personally I think it is a good article, for all the reasons James seems to think it isnt !
It all comes back to HMG grand strategy, and where the military fits into that. The HMG vision as espoused by SDSR is “expeditionary” – James thinks that can be done without carriers, others think it cant BUT what this article actually points out, is that HMG can’t have it’s cake and eat it too – if your going to do something like carrier avaiation you have to do it properly.
A carrier without a embarked organic AEW capability, and the capability to embark long range strike aircraft if NOT a “strike carrier”. It can be called an escort carrier in WWII parlance, a “sea control” ship in 70′s/80′s language, or even an ASW carrier if it’s carrying a lot of Sea King’s or Merlins for that specific tasking.
But in the end a carrier is just a home for a an air group, the aviation capabilities. So while I agree with other commentor’s that have a “big” aircraft carrier of 60K plus provides inherent flexibility over one of say 30K tonnes, in the end what is the cost benefit analysis of that flexibility if the only aircraft types and numbers could be easily operated from the cheaper 30K tonne hull instead ?
And thus we come back to HMG’s over inflated ideas about it’s role in the world. Did successive governments really, really want us to have a “strike carrier” capability second only to that of the USN, without totally understanding what it would cost ?
Why were they ashamed to settle for a “sea control” capability based on F35B and Merlin ASW from a Cavour sized hull ? Still bigger than the Invincibles, still a capability not many posses but definately NOT a “strike carrier”. Nope, they had to go all big and impressive and build the worlds biggest “light carrier / LPH” – an impressive hull, but a completely broken “system of systems” that will never carry the airwing required to achieve the stated geopolitical / grand strategy aims, never have the layered defense of escorts (including submarines) etc etc
It is another example of UK accepting a “fudged” capability – there is a saying in Yorkshire “don’t cut your nose off just to spite your face” – well in this case perhaps some would have seen the cancellation of CVF as doing just that; agreeing with TD’s stated position that the Queen Elizabeth class with F35B is “much better than nothing” !
However to use another Yorkshire colloquialism the “its neither nowt, nor summat” and the ‘system of systems’ that constitutes a carrier based military capability fit’s that description as noted in this artilce. There is a big part of me that thinks if HMG could not afford to do it properly, it just should not do it at all, and that includes reigning in all it’s SDSR rhetoric about strategic intervention and expeditionary capabilities if it damn well knows it cant afford to do it properly !
Jed,
2 x QE is more cost effective than 3 x Cavour (if you don’t want to be in two places at the same time). I think this then leads to all of our current problems.
If QE was designed as a STOVL LHA we’d all have gone “oh well, same capability as we’ve had for the last 30 years, just with better jets”. But because there was always this glimmer than they could be “proper” we think it’s wasteful that they are not.
Although (in a hushed voice) many here think I’m anti F35B, I’m just caught up in the same quandary as above – we’ve got it, so we may as well use it.
@ Challenger – I have to agree with your comments about a high low mix. We are at present being lead to believe a unit cost of £250 million for T26 with 8 ASW and 5 GP versions.
Assuming first of all that R&D costs for T26 are negligible in comparison to T45 so cutting number’s won’t massively jack up unit costs we might consider scrapping the idea for 5 GP versions. I am guessing here that these vessels will come in around £200 million a pop. If we put the thumb screws on BWoS we might be able to get a fixed price for 10 Khareef’s for the £ 1 billion we save. Swap out MICA for Sea Ceptor and fitted for but not with NSM and job done. It would solve allot of problems for HMG not least of all avoiding the closure of BAE Portsmouth. As far as I can see Khareef is very much a type 21 and should be able to replace RN standing patrols everywhere from Somalia to the Caribbean. I dare say it might even be good enough to fly the flag around the FI.
This would then leave us with 18 high end escorts which I am sure would be able to escort both a Carrier Task Force and Separate Amphibious Ready Group while still being able to perform required NATO missions.
The other benefit would be a de risking of the T26 program. Fleet numbers are on such a knife edge that we really can’t afford to turn 12 into 6 again.
If you want to push costs down, more units and exports are the way to go.
Churn out the hulls with Sylver A70 or M41 vertical launchers and a Merlin hangar. It’s about as general purpose as you can get:
Load in ASW Merlins, Crowsnest Melins, Wildcats, Sea Ceptors, NSM, Tomahawks, Offshore Raiding Craft, etc as you need them.
Our export customers can operate whatever helicopters they want and drop whatever munitions into the M41/Sylver they like.
I have a niggling doubt about the Khareef class in Blue Water.
Don’t forget there is still the MHPC requirement to fulfil too. An opportunity for even cheaper utility hulls.