It is very difficult to write anything original about the Falklands Conflict in 1982, there is such a huge volume of published material and very little not covered.
This is a follow on from the article on the Atlantic Conveyor, another under reported story.
We often think that once the Atlantic Conveyor had offloading her precious cargo of Sea Harriers and Harrier GR3’s her job was more or less done but although the original concept for Atlantic Conveyor was just as a transport for the Harriers at the last minute it was decided to use her to carry two other things.
The first of these ‘others’ was a number of Chinook and Wessex helicopters and in the previous post we discussed the impact of losing all the helicopters but a single Chinook (Bravo November) on subsequent plans, especially the ill-fated landings at Bluff Cove. The loss of the vast majority of the heavy lift helicopters meant ground forces had to walk to Stanley.
The second and much less known of the trio of vital items on-board the Atlantic Conveyor was a complete Harrier Forward Operating Base that would have allowed the Sea Harriers and Harrier GR3’s to operate from land rather than far offshore on the two carriers.
Planning assumptions for the FOB included sustained operations over a 22 day period before resupply with fuel, weapons, air traffic control and maintenance facilities for 12 aircraft with a 400m runway.
The key planning metric was 8 sorties per day.
Harrier GR1
The design of the Harrier was predicated on operating away from large airbases and in austere operating bases.
In all the bitterness that has surfaced between the RAF and Fleet Air Arm over Harrier operations in the South Atlantic and the huge volume of material that has been published the role of the Forward Operating Base as provided by the Royal Engineers has been less discussed.
This is the story of the San Carlos FOB…
Combat engineering support for the Task Force came in the form of 59 Independent Field Squadron RE supporting 3 Commando, 9 Parachute Squadron RE supporting 5 Infantry Brigade and detachments and elements from 2 Port Control Regiment, 36 Engineer Regiment, 38 Engineer Regiment, 33 Engineer Regiment and the Royal Pioneer Corps, over 800 personnel in total.
On the 8th of May a signal to the task force made it clear that the establishment of a landing site for Harriers and helicopters should be a top priority
While ‘Repossession’ remains the ultimate aim it can only be achieved in stages. The first stage is to build a secure bridgehead, where sea/air resupply can be conducted in safety. This must be followed by the establishment of a landing site ashore for helos and Harriers.
On the 12t of May CINCFLEET issued the order 3/82 for Operation SUTTON. The same day a signal from Major General Moore to Brigadier Thompson again made it clear.
You are to secure a bridgehead on East Falkland, into which reinforcements can be landed, in which an airstrip can be established, and from which operations to repossess the Falkland Islands can be developed.
Once 2 Para, 3 Para, 40 Cdo and 45 Cdo had landed the next priority was to establish local ground based air defence because due to the distance from San Carlos to the carriers the Sea Harriers could only stay over the area in their Combat Air Patrol role for 10 minutes.
At this stage the safety of the carriers was paramount, without them it was doubtful the operation would be successful so they were positioned Eastward, out of range of attacking aircraft and the Exocet.
12 Rapier firing units were established and the build-up of supplies continued. A pair of GR3’s from HMS Hermes destroyed an Argentine Chinook and Puma which greatly degraded their ability to counter attack the vulnerable beachhead but an Aermacchi sortie from Stanley spotted the shipping in San Carlos water and soon after the serious air attacks began.
On D+1 the site was reconnoitered and construction commenced on D+2 by both 11 and 59 Squadrons.
The old Auster strip at San Carlos settlement was also considered but discounted because of load bearing concerns.
Building the FOB
The attacks on shipping at San Carlos are well documented, as are the Argentine pilot’s poor choice of targets, unresolved bomb arming issues and dogged, heroic determination. It was during this period that discussions and disagreements about the most effective means of defending against air attack emerged, bringing the carriers closer, positioning the escorts away from the close confines of the landing area, using the Type 22/42 pairing for better Sea Harrier control for example.
The Fleet Air Arm delivered extremely impressive sortie rates and were equally as effective but their time on station was limited.
On the 24th of May the Stromness, Norland and Sir Percivale had been emptied of their stores
By the 25th commanders felt increasing optimism, the beachhead had been secured, stores were being built up and combined forces had started to achieve the upper hand in the air war, despite significant losses. Argentine commanders correctly assumed that the opportunity to dislodge British forces from San Carlos had passed and their best course of action was to disrupt the sustainment of a blockade.
The 25th of May saw a large scale attack and as per the post on the Atlantic Conveyor, she was hit by two Exocet missiles. On board the Atlantic Conveyor was a large quantity of specialised AM2 aluminium runway matting and aircraft refuelling equipment.
This was a huge blow to the construction of the FOB.
There is some contradiction in the various sources used for this post on what surface materials were actually used.
Some say there was a quantity of AM2 matting available on the Stronmess and others indicate that the sappers had to scrounge matting material from all over the place, pierced steel planking (PSP), Class 30 trackway, bomb damage repair matting, MEXE Pads and even the materials used for temporary helicopter pads on the many civilian ships were assembled and used instead, again, much of it from the Stromness.
[UPDATE, David Morgan DSC commented on the post that it was PSA 1 (Pre-fabricated Strip, Aluminium)]
Building the San Carlos FOB
Harrier GR3 at the San Carlos FOB
Sea Harrier San Carlos FOB, IWM
San Carlos FOB, note bulk fuel pillow tanks
San Carlos FOB
San Carlos FOB
Whether it was AM2, PSP, Clas 30 trackway, MEXE Pads, repair matting, PSA 1 or a combination of all of them is an interesting technical point but the fact remains that a 260m runway was established.
A set of emergency fuel handling equipment was also secured from the Stromness and a Combat Engineer Tractor (one of only 2 sent South) was used to excavate the bunding for the EBFI fuel bladders.
HMS/RNAS Sheathbill or RAF Port San Carlos was the official name for the FOB depending on which service you belonged to and it was also called Sid’s Strip after Flt Lt Sid Morris, the FOB commander.
The runway was just over 260m long with a separate vertical landing area and parking space for 4 Harriers, much less than the planning assumption of 12.
San Carlos FOB
San Carlos FOB
The Forward Operating Base for Harriers and helicopters had been established by 28th of May when helicopters were refuelled and the battle for San Carlos was deemed to be over. The FOB was declared operational on the 2nd of June and almost immediately used for helicopters although weather would cause problems for a few days and it was not until the 5th when the first Harriers used it.
San Carlos FOB
A difference of opinion surfaced between Admiral Fieldhouse and Major General Moore about the threat posed to the carriers. Major General Moore was firmly of the opinion that the threat had diminished to a level that would allow them to be bought in closer to the islands and therefore provide longer duration combat air patrols and offensive missions in support of ground forces. Admiral Fieldhouse was not convinced.
The official history records;
Fieldhouse continued to fret about the carriers, postulating hypothetical and rather daring Argentine moves, well beyond recent activity, involving feints by a frigate and destroyer force to draw escorts away from the British carrier group and leave it more vulnerable to air attack
He won the argument and the carriers remained far offshore meaning that the FOB became doubly useful, if not essential.
The normal Sea Harrier sortie was 75 minutes long which included a 65 minute journey to and from the carriers, only 10 minutes effective mission time. The FOB allowed the Sea Harriers to complete their transit and refuel a number of times before flying back to the aircraft carriers.
For the GR3’s the FOB meant they could wait there for a tasking from a Forward Air Controller.
Fuel was always a problem even though after MOGAS (motor gasoline) for the Rapier units, AVGAS for the FOB was a top priority. At its peak the FOB dispensed over 50,000 litres of fuel per and supported nearly 120 aircraft movements per day.
All was not rosy in the FOB garden though.
It was shorter than planned with only the facilities to refuel and not much else.
Although all Rapier batteries were fully operational by the 8th of June and SOP’s established for the departure and arrival of aircraft via Fanning Head the lack of IFF equipment on the Task Force helicopters meant that due to almost continual lock ons the Rapier Blindfire system had to be shut down, degrading the usefulness of the system as a whole.
Also on the 8th of June there was an incident at the FOB
Harrier FOB crash
The Harrier GR3 in the picture is XZ289/07 of 1(F) Squadron RAF; the pilot was Wing Commander Peter Squire who later went on to become an Air Chief Marshal. The aircraft was carrying a few defects but it was intended to mount Ground Alert at the FOB, upon landing at the FOB the pilot misjudged the approach and caused what was assumed to be a pin or other foreign object of some sort to be ingested into the engine. As the aircraft overshot it became obvious that the damage was significant and because the aircraft was pointing at a Rapier firing unit the pilot elected to stay with the aircraft instead of ejecting. It came to rest at the end of the landing strip close to a trench which was occupied at the time by a member of the RAF Regiment, the person looking somewhat interestingly into the cockpit, apparently!
Harrier FOB crash
Harrier FOB crash
Harrier FOB crash
The GR3 was stripped for parts and because of the small size of the FOB was out of action for a few hours whilst repairs were made.
A detachment of 820 NAS Sea Kings were stationed near to the FOB from the 9th for reconnaissance and intelligence purposes and sometimes used the refuelling facilities.
On the 13th another incident at the FOB saw the sole British Chinook, Bravo November, lift a number of matting planks with its down draught, throwing them to one side and requiring a significant repair effort. This happened at precisely the wrong time as a pair of Harriers were returning to refuel.
They were too low on fuel to divert to the carriers and so the landing decks of the assault ships HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid were hastily cleared to allow them a temporary landing spot where they were refuelled and send on their way soon after.
Sea Harrier landing onboard HMS Intrepid
San Carlos FOB – Sea Harrier divert to HMS Intrepid
San Carlos FOB – Sea Harrier divert to HMS Intrepid
San Carlos FOB – Sea Harrier divert to HMS Intrepid
The 14th saw the Argentine forces surrender and the FOB out of action in the early morning due to icing.
Ifs, Buts and Maybe’s
When you write something like this it is interesting to pose a few questions, not trying to have a revisionist slant but looking at possible alternative pathways.
If the FOB was large enough to withstand being closed by the accident could it have been used to provide air patrols on the 8th. The 8th is of course the date of the attack on HMS Plymouth, RFA Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad?
As planned the FOB would certainly have been larger and with much greater capacity and perhaps been able to provide sufficient cover, 51 men lost their lives during that attack with many more wounded.
The second question revolves around timing.
Whilst there is no doubt that the logistic priority for the initial phase of the landing was personnel from the Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines, their ammunition and Rapier firing units the Atlantic Conveyor was not due to offload her cargo of FOB stores until the 25th or 4 days after the initial landings.
Had this been scheduled for sooner would it have made any difference and would it have been possible to offload it any quicker in any case?
Finally, if a fully constituted FOB was in operation that meant day and night operations with maintenance and arming facilities could the Argentine Air Force C130 flights into Stanley have been interdicted?
It was one of these missions, on or around the 10th of June that bought an Exocet missile and ships launcher that was subsequently modified for truck launching.
On the 12th, it was fired at HMS Glamorgan, killing 13.
I really don’t want this one to descend into an F35B v F35C argument but although we see often VSTOL as a niche capability at least in 1982 it proved its worth.
Sources
It has taken some time to research this piece because of the distinct lack of information and what is out there is often contradictory, sources of information and images for this piece include;
Fast Air UK
Military Engineering in the Falklands, Institute of Civil Engineers, Sinclair, Barton and Kennedy
The Army Rumour Service
Britain’s Small Wars
Imperial War Museum
RAF Web Site
Some of the images are seen in any number of locations so it is difficult to pin down the originator, as usual, thanks in advance to those I haven’t managed to get permission from in advance
Boss,
Very nicely done, especially based on the surprisingly limited source material. (I wonder if any more of the raw operational details — the daily chatter on site development and operational planning-on-the-go will come out of the PRO now we’ve reached the thirty-year mark.) Just one niggle: it was Four-Two Commando who went ashore with Four-Five. But that’s just typing: I particularly love the war art you found of the FOB’s construction.
Very interesting post TD. I suppose the operation of the FOB opens many questions. I know from interviews General Moore was shocked when Woodford told him the carriers would stay far out to see and he was expected to conducted the landing with little in the way of air cover. A myth has certainly grown up around the harrier and the two aircraft carriers. The constant tag line that if we had lost one carrier we would have lost the war. However by this stage of the battle the carriers seem to be doing little other than guarding the carriers themselves. Many of the interview I have seen on the subject has woodford telling captains of friagtes and destroyers to put themselves at risk either looking for mines with their hulls or sitting in less than optimal defensive positions and used as bate as with coventry. However the admiral and the carriers had to stay far out to see. While I have every admiration for the pilots of the sea harriers it was the escorting frigates and destroyers who did most of the damage to the Argentine airforce. One wonders how many less casualties we would have suffered if we had either had the full complement of 12 harriers at the FOB or if the carriers had come in closer to guard the landings.
@TD: I doubt the FOB would have made much difference to Bluff Cove. Given the lack of either AEW or a functional ground radar chain over Lafonia, even Sea Harriers based at San Carlos wouldn’t know in time to intercept.
I’d guess that if the Argentine air forces weren’t also severely constained then the FOB would have been essential to generate the air-cover sorties necessary.
The only real benefit I can see for the FOB in this case is tat if the war had gone on longer it would have allowed the carriers to reposition knowing that air-cover was being provided by the FOB.
I’d have then put Vince or Hermes the other side of the Falklands to push the whole Argentine air force back – assuming we really did have the edge with SHAR.
Interesting on the FOB. I was in BAOR in the mid 80s, and recall that the RAF still had a number of pre-prepared woodland sites for the Harriers to use in the event of the Cold War turning hot, but that whole concept seems to have dies a death from the early 90s onwards.
Also interesting to note the disagreement between the Admiral and Gen Moore about positioning of the carriers (“far out to sea”). I have heard before the joke of the carriers gaining a Far East Service medal, but how far were they? 30 minutes of flight by TD’s figures, which sounds like about 200 miles at a fairly conservative speed. That seems ridiculously far, when it was known that the Argentines themselves could only just about make Falkland Sound, and they had nothing on the Islands of any threat to the carriers. Would not 50 miles offshore have been safe enough? That would have given the Harriers a greater endurance.
“That seems ridiculously far, when it was known that the Argentines themselves could only just about make Falkland Sound, and they had nothing on the Islands of any threat to the carriers. Would not 50 miles offshore have been safe enough? That would have given the Harriers a greater endurance.”
If you consider that the Atlantic Conveyor was hit by Exocets when being positioned at not many miles ahead of the Carriers in the main battlegroup “far” out at sea, you realize that the risk definitely existed. Indeed, it was kind of a luck that the Exocets locked into the Conveyor. Had the merchant ship not been there, the next in line was Hermes.
Woodward had also to keep in mind that the enemy carrier “25 de Mayo” was still alive and well, as the SSNs Spartan and Splendid had failed to mark her. And the carrier was possibly capable to take aboard the Etendards, for what he knew. (The argentine Etendards actually carrier-qualified a few months after the war, but back then the admiral could not know it)
There was no reason, to Woodward’s knowledge, why the args couldn’t try to make a sortie out with the carrier, launch a skyhawk assault, or just act as a refueling base midway for the Etendards with Exocet, allowing them to turn around the battlegroup in a wide turn and attack the carriers from even the back.
Too easy to talk now, with 30 years of information over what the Args could or could not do.
The quality of information on what the Args air force could do back then was far from optimal.
@James
The concept was still going strong all through the nineties and early 00′s with air support squadrons in 39 Engr Regt. The equipment and FOB’s, along with the Engr Sqn’s were drawn down from Germany early to mid nineties, with the Harriers moving to Wittering with the creation of JFH.
The expeditionary aspect was kept alive and kicking but with the Engr Sqn’s tasked with the full range of air support from conventional ADR to kicking tin for the Harriers and the JFH.
I think the expeditionary idea is still going but at this stage it is centered around the construction of airfields for conventional aircraft as in the case of Bastion.
This adds to something I don’t understand with the Falklands planning. If the FOB’s were part of the planning assumptions as an option, then why did they not take one of the Eng Sqn’s with all the necessary from BAOR who’s job it was to kick tin for the Harrier’s.
@ James re carriers
The only way to get any sort of handle on that is to read Woodward’s book 100 Days, Ward’s Sea Harrier Over the Falklands, and Clapp’s Amphibious Assualt Falklands and then draw your own conclusions. Of those three books I read 100 Days last after reading a substantial amount of literature on the conflict during the late 90s and early 00s. All I will say is that IMHO if the Black Buck raids get talked up beyond their real usefulness (and so have inflated importance within the public consciousness) then much can be said of Woodward as the sailor who won back the Falklands.
What sturdiness of temporary runway construction would a F-35B need? It is heavier than the Harrier so would the aluminium sheets still be viable? Perhaps a combination of the metal sheets and concrete canvas though the latter would add a lot of bulk to be transported and handled. Maybe a sandwich of concrete canvas – weld mesh – concrete canvas.
Given the existence of the Apache is it likely these days that that would take over some of the roles the GR3s did in the Falklands?
just throwing it out there.
Although b’s can, in theory, operate from austere sites, c’s have vastly longer range.
A c 150km out and a b at a fob?
Is there going to be much difference?
Excellent article administration.
Is there any indication that the f35b would be similarly able to operate from such austere basing?
No jsf variant can be considered ‘rugged’.
Interesting article as ever TD, it always did seem a bit barmy keeping harriers at sea and not land-based, though I had read before that the AC was carrying materials for temp. runways and its loss was the reason (without anything more about the FOB). Re: the F35-B doing a similar, isn’t there an issue with the heat it generates in vertical mode (as seen in the US tests on a Marine landing ship I believe?) which melts conventional materials, so this would be another concern? Finally, and a bit off-topic here, but do we have any proper long-range ground-to-air missiles systems, like the US Patriots, in the Falklands or is it mainly Rapier based? (Idle Speculation Alert) -> Do people think there is any value / possibility in adapting a ground-based version of the Sea Viper system for Mount Pleasant etc?
elizzar,
Love the idea of a mobile land-based Sea Viper system. However, there’s two concerns:
1. How do you get the radar high enough to get a reasonable radar horizon?
2. How heavy would it be? i.e. How many Asters? They are 1/2 tonne (ish) each, then there’s the launch tube…
Enjoyed reading this one Very nice piece and great ingenuity when it’s needed.
Jedi I dont if it’s been tested yet but it is due to be.
http://www.navair.navy.mil/nawcad/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.content_detail&key=99E8E3FA-3C12-4BCC-A905-6838819A5C10
And this article should reduce some of the other myths
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20111018/DEFSECT01/110180301/U-S-Marine-Corps-Demonstrates-F-35B-Sea
Thanks all
@Jackstaff, the art work is by the famous Terence Cuneo who always included a mouse in all his paintings. I read it was 40 and 45 in the official history; sorry if there is an error, anyone know different?
@Martin, I think Hermes had to retire for boiler cleaning, X is very well read on the FI perhaps he could clarify. I agree about myths, Corporate is full to gunnels with them but they are interesting nonetheless. Whilst I was researching for this I read that the Sea Harriers didn’t use their radars once and were guided onto targets by the Type 42/22 combination, fascinating stuff. They certainly generated a wickedly high sortie rate though but was pretty shocked to read just how little time they had in the area. If you go back to the Atlantic Conveyor post it was clear that once the Harriers had disembarked it was no longer considered a high value unit, with a different set of priorities and perhaps an improved appreciation of the value of the FOB things might have been very very different.
@wf, good point, but with proximity to the FOB Bluff Cove could have been covered from above, rather than by ground alert. Even the presence of airborne Sea Harriers was often enough to deter attacks.
@Simon, the FOB was providing air cover but because it was austere it was limited
@James, good point and it is one of those imponderables isn’t it, if you put yourself in the position of the commanders it was clear to them the threat posed by the Argentine fast jets was significant, clearly they thought this was their overriding concern so the decision to keep the carriers close or far would I assume been about balancing risks of one set of losses versus another, difficult choices I think.
@Gab, interesting that your position seems to have changed from complete certainty about all things to trying to see a degree of uncertainty, friction and confusion. Have you had a road to Damascus conversion?
@DavidN, I think 11 Sqn was the lead for air ops. To be honest, I can see expeditionary air ops taking a hit in the post SDSR draw down, sadly, but let’s wait and see what happens. A lot of the airfield stuff was in the follow on, ready for victory and making sure that Stanley was able to operate fast jets, have been reading a lot about that and working on a future post about expeditionary air ops with Stanley and the FOB as a starting point.
@a different Gareth, will be looking at F35B austere operations in the post above. It’s not as dire as you think it would be but certainly not in the same league as the Harrier and I agree, Apache would have done a great deal, but not all, of the GR3 missions which opens up another interesting debate I guess.
@DomJ, howdy, nice to have you back. Good point, but, it’s all about trade-offs.
@JediB, cheers, as above, watch this space.
@elizzar, the whole concept of initial carrier operations followed by austere basing on land followed by better basing on land is often dismissed but the more I read and think about it offers something unique and eminently sensible.
@Mark, you beat me to it!
All, this is a fascinating subject and actually informative of current debates.
Did anyone check out the picture of a Harrier landing on Fearless!
TD
To take your last point first and the abilities of the F35B regarding its role as a Harrier alternative.
As noted by others it is not as simple as that.
The basic issue is that the F35 is a full on / very high tech / heavy fighter.
The Harrier on the other hand is a flexible / capable / light fighter.
The two are different almost to the point of being complementary.
That is the basis for my questions about the possibility of a Harrier 3 and what it would involve price / performance / progess wise.
We are currently moving long term to a 2 FJ type air power nation.
A lot is riding on the F35 so my thoughts are we go for the very capable and flexible design not the capable and the very flexible.
Moving to 2 FJ types is wrong.
Losing the Harrier was wrong big style.
Turning the Harrier role into a heavy fighter role is wrong.
On other stuff –
Rapier – was it sent south as a meccano set?
The time to operational readiness seems very long.
I think the carrier crews were in line for the Burma Star given their location during the conflict.
As for the positioning the 75 minute sortie split – 65 + 10 tells it all.
If the Harriers could have managed 90 minutes it would have been similar – 80 + 10.
I fear the Curse of 42 was hanging over the RN.
Pity as Bulwark was still in existence and No.2 was working up.
The FOB story is interesting.
800+ Engineer / Logistics bodies – no wonder WC could get very cross over the size of the tail.
What level of mechanization did they have as the productivity level appears low?
Interesting that the Harrier can work of a 260m long runway, was there never any thought of doing a Q+D conversion on an oil tanker – Loch Long was full of them in 82 – and using that as a FOD in San Carlos Water? The AF would have run out of bombs before the ship ran out of steel.
Finally regarding Bulwark, was she a poorly run ship at the end?
Her Wiki entry is one mishap after another.
@ Martin
The real air war in the Falklands was between Hermes lead by senior aviation officer on Woodward’s staff and Black and Ward in Invincible.
It wasn’t just the carriers’ position it was also as much do with how the CAP from the carriers was deployed. I am about to eat afterwards I will drag SHOTF off the shelf and precis the differences. I will also dip into Brown (the other one) to check up about Hermes and boiler cleaning.
As for frigates and destroyers doing their part they just did that. Both Dart and Wolf worked well for systems of their time. But gunnery in an enclosed anchorage with targets doing in excess of 450kts more luck than judgement. And I say that as somebody who is very fond of big guns. I am one of those who believe the RN should have followed a more Continental route with regard to small to medium guns vs missiles. A radar layed 3in would have been a lot better than SeaMouse.
FBOT
800+ is not much bigger than a normal Engr Regt.
I presume the mechanization would have been minimal as both 59 and 9 Sqn’s were scaled with only a few light wheeled tractors each but 59 did have a few CET’s (but only 2 were taken for the entire force, don’t know which units they were from but both 38 + 36 would have had some along with a few pieces of plant)
Kicking tin is a labor intensive job as it requires each individual piece to be laid by hand interlocking with the other which can not be done with a machine, the same goes for the M2 matting up to a point.
33 Engr Regt would not have been involved with construction of the FOB as they are an EOD unit.
I think they did well considering the lack of equipment and ground conditions.
davidN @ 2.26
Not an easy job especially if most of the stuff was hand-balled.
However I am surprised at the lack of kit – either engineering or combat taken to the FI.
Do you have any info on the use of a Harrier on a grass strip?
If it is possible what are the numbers on ground conditions?
@ TD – another fascinating post TD; Looking forward to the future Expeditionary post.
X,
I’m very interested to hear what you manage to dig out. Especially why the carriers didn’t come further in once we had, let’s say, air superiority.
I’ve also wondered how we managed to provide CAP to the N and S of the Falkland Sound AND provide another CAP elsewhere (Mount Pleasant?) with only 20-24 SHAR from 200nm? Perhaps it’s one of these fallacies I’ve picked up.
FOB’s for STOVL jets don’t have to be on land. DK Brown was very keen to get as many STOVL flight decks in the fleet as possible for sea-harriers, and there have been a number of suggestions put forward for “floating” FOB’s. for example this skyhook frigate:
http://t0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcR3rf-jvUtvC6ScjmGqg_eY277wB-VmA4csovFSEOCs6rOS31nzXaBydBnD
FBOT’s suggestion of an airfield on an Oil Tanker mirrors DK Brown’s suggestion in future surface fleet, his was for refueling CTOL interceptors from the UK as he viewed refueling aircraft as very vunerable.
FBOT@2:37
I presume the lack of kit taken was due to the Engr assets taken being purely field sqn (good for supporting the fighting units but scaled for little else ) which considering the make up of the task force were all spearhead units of some degree, its also understandable. I don’t know if any elements of a support sqn were taken but judging from the plant available I’d hazard a guess at either no or very little.
I’ve never seen a harrier operate from grass strips and can imagine if you did it would be a nightmare.
The first downpour of rain would probably kill it dead, due to rutting which have to be leveled after every take off plus the loss of traction if the water did not drain quickly enough and left a film of wet soil resting on everyone’s nightmare, Clay.
There are just too many problems to consider with the ground conditions to not lay matting and after all the faffing about you are probably better off just to lay the stuff as a matter of course, which is probably why I never saw it done operationally.
The Falklands are basically the Pennines when it comes to ground conditions wet and soft in the low areas or rock hard higher up.
Taking up FBOT’s point about Heavy/Light aircraft and playing Devil’s advocate, would the (Sea) Grippen be a better expeditionary aircraft than the F-35 both B and C? It is designed to be operated from roads and other austre sites, with a ground crew of 5.
David N @ 3.11
Fair point on the ground conditions – they look poor – and as you say they would be a good stand in for the Pennines / Teughterland.
I only ask because from memory the AF ran Pucaras out of Pebble Island and I think it was a grass strip. Not sure the RAF standard on grass strips – great BB image / flights taking off together – and as the Harrier was always thought to have a hard, frontline personality I thought it must have been on the agenda.
Regarding the Enginnering issue the lack of kit in the FI campaign was / is a surprise to me. Some of the images seemed to be straight out of WW2 with modern jackets. How do things stand at the moment? Next to commercial shipping CE plant has probably made the biggest strides in the last 30 years with a move to a cheap and reliable component set and some strange looking but high productivity contraptions becoming mainstream. The concept of the “Tool Carrier” really has taken off plus a lot of stuff has went jumbo without adding another zero to the price.
However I will leave my AFV rant for another day.
landviper on top of a hill on west falkland would be fearsome, but hugely vulnerable.
Both to underwater knife fighters or a missile attack.
Its a serious doctrinal shift
FBOT@3:11
I am sure the MOD must have done some tests as to the viability of the Harrier operating from grass strips, and I would personally give it a go on the right ground and in the right weather conditions, as a way of starting flight ops while You await the construction of the FOB. But as to continued ops from grass strips I think would be a non starter. The Pucaras have a higher and tricycle arrangement of the landing gear as opposed to the Harriers which might of helped them, but there are still a few pictures of Pucaras with their wheels half sunk into the ground which would probably have stopped the Harrier in the STOVL role.
At the moment engineering kit is quite good in both terms of plant and general engineering. There are a few issues such as the Terrier being about a decade and half late and other little niggles, but I think the debacle of the front line first and options for change have been addressed. In terms of engineering we can truly say we are ranked along with the best in the world in both equipment and ability, It would be a shame to start to erode it as it is something we can bring to the table in coalition operations that few nations can match, especially in areas such as expeditionary air operations.
Hi Simon, google SAMP-T for “2. How heavy would it be? i.e. How many Asters? They are 1/2 tonne (ish) each, then there’s the launch tube…”
- the system exists; the French and the Italians have ordered it, too
ACC,
Interesting. Still, they’re not going to get much of a radar horizon without AEW doing the tracking.
I’m surprised it’s designed for Aster 30 (because of my above statement).
Also, isn’t Sea Ceptor supposed to have a land-based version – that makes a little more sense to me. Cheap, light and lower range.
Out of all this, the photo of the crashed Gr3 with trepaulin over the nose…
http://www.flickr.com/photos/73614187@N03/7100647691/
Couldn’t help notice the bottom left corner! immense XD
Fantastic article TD, and interesting comments..balanced as well.
I remember the F-35B being trumpeted as capable of emulating the Harriers rough strip characteristics… ‘doubtful’ is hardly fitting!
I always compared Falklands to Dartmoor when I was there.
CAP over San Carlos – notes from Sea Harrier over the Falklands by Ward
Commodore Mike Clapp (Commodore Amphibious Warfare, ex-FAA ) was relying on 3 CAP stations to cover the San Carlos AOA. CAP was mounted during daylight only with three pairs of aircraft in station north, south and west of the AOA. At that point there were 25 Sea Harriers available for operations but all had to be committed to the AOA there were no spare aircraft to provide CAP for the task group. This meant Woodward had to balance closing the islands to provide CAP with maximum time on station and protect the carriers. 801 staff had worked out this safe distance was 425nm from Argentina.
WARD CO, NAS801 ordered his pilots to fly at low level as Blue Fox had no look down capability over land and to maximise time over AOA they were to fly at endurance speeds unless in combat (obviously). He said the maximum recovery fuel for the sorties was 800lb; Ward said that NAS800 Sea Harriers (Hermes) had been returning with 2000lb of fuel after CAP above the task group. Last sortie of day Ward lands back on Invincible with 200lbs of fuel. In contrast the 800 Harriers were flying at 8000ft or more on their northerly station which proved to be of little deterrence against incoming attacks and could only engage targets leaving after attacks. Often being directed by ships actually under attack. 800 were ordered to fly at that altitude by Staff. Time over AOA was about 10 minutes. Ward gives two examples of how their CAP height cost the landing force., One an attack on Brilliant, and two 800 shooting down two of the three A4s that finished of HMS Ardent; Ward says if they had been lower Ardent might have survived to reach San Carlos. (Ardent was the sacrificial goat used to draw Argentine fire. I think everybody is familiar with the Argentines mistaking Canberra for a hospital ship.)
By May 25 it had become apparent to Clapp that most leakers through CAP screen from the north which is 800‘s CAP station. Broadsword (B1 T22) and Coventry (T42) dispatched to cover the northern approach with their respective missile systems; Sea Wolf PDMS in Broadsword and Sea Dart area weapon in Coventry. The Type 64 (ugh!) is attacked by a group of A4s using low flying and the islands as cover. And I think it is implied by Ward emboldened by the lack of visible 800 CAP but actually they had been called of as they were to close the Type 64‘s missile engagement zone. Too much shipping in too small a space results in Coventry breaking Broadsword’s Sea Wolf system target lock. Coventry is sunk by bombs and Broadsword receives damage.
On this day the Task Group is 100miles north east of Stanley just inside Super Étendard range. The task force is attacked and the Atlantic conveyor is lost. And though there 801 Harriers on deck Invincible engages with a Sea Dart volley in the confusion. How did the Argentines know the approximate location of the Task Force? As well occasional night time reconnaissance by a variety of aircraft like 707, Neptune, and even Lear Jet they also had surveillance radar on both East and West Falkland to track high level transit of CAPS on and off station. The Argentine pilots were professionals and I suppose with a copy of Janes’, a met’ report, and a calculator it would not take them long to work out the Task Force’s approximate position.
Anything specific you want to know ask and I will try to look it up.
Hi Simon,
RE ” not going to get much of a radar horizon without AEW doing the tracking”
Check the topographics as for the spots they’ve put surveillance radar stations into (I haven’t)
- I would guess it will be partly “look-down” and certainly to horizon
- they are not in Mt. Pleasant so having some range would not be a bad thing (and the launchers protected; the radar stations have a light defence each)
Missed a bit…….
One of the main themes that run through the book Sea Harrier over the Falklands is that was little understanding within the MoD, RAF, or FAA of the potential of the Sea Harrier in 82. Through the book Ward gives several examples concerning Blue Fox Radar. One example, as we are talking about CAP over AOA, concerned an incident over a pair leaving Hermes just before first light to reach San Carlos by dawn. 800 had been instructed by Staff not to use Blue Fox to facilitate members of a CAP finding each other. On this morning Ward and his number 2 were 120nm down range by the time the 800 pair found each other still circling Hermes. He couples the lack of understanding of the capabilities of the aircraft to what he regarded as 800 poor standard of training. If you don’t know the aircraft you can’t train to use it effectively is what I think he was trying to say.
X @ 6.58
I think the Harrier training issues has made the papers a number of times.
Interesting that there was so much conflict regarding tactics between the different squadrons.
Who organised the training of the SH squadrons?
Regarding the radar stations, we’re they known about at the time?
If they were, was any attempt made to destroy them?
Finally why was the TF 100 miles NE of Stanley, why weren’t they 100 miles east of San Carlos Water?
SAMP-T, truck mounted, being tested. Not sure what’s providing the targetting data:
Re; Exocet,
I’m not sure what the deal was after Sheffield, but certainly prior to that the evidence given to the Naval Board of Inquiry into the sinking suggests that Exocet and the general threat of anti-shipping missiles was not taken that seriously. I’ll see if I can find the quote in a bit.
X,
Daylight only CAP, daylight, so that’s how they managed to provide cover. Thank you.
Just imaging trying to provide 24-7 cover nowadays with SHAR. Proof that endurance is the key to fast jet cover.
Another SAMP-T presentation, along with some Tres Dramatique (?) sounding music:
ACC, Chris B,
Just goes to show that the ASaC platform is possibly to most formidable in theatre air-defence asset… as long as you’ve managed to get those things (and a few Type 45) hidden away somewhere.
I would say its proof airborne early warning is the key to cover with limited assets. Had E3D been available and flown like nimrod was or canberra was or indeed the asac you could control your assets to ensure they were in the right place at the right time.
@ FBOT
Yes the stations were known about. Two of the Vulcan missions was against Argentine radar stations using the American Shrike missile.
Ward was Mr Sea Harrier at the MoD. So he produced a lot of the material for training and evaluation. It seems it was a very young platform that was difficult to fly and so all the effort went into the latter. Ward was probably a year or three ahead of the curve. It would be interesting to know what the standard of Sea Harrier technical knowledge was like say 10 years on. I suspect it would have been much, much better as experience was gained on type by more pilots and technical staff. I think the senior pilot on the squadron is responsible for training I shall check. A good number in 800 squadron weren’t cleared for night operations. It wasn’t a question of competency for any of them more about getting ticks in boxes and signatures in task books.
As for infighting as I have said loads of time here some of the problems with defence are tribal because humans are tribal. We can’t expect our service personnel to be other than human and not be tribal too. Ships, squadrons, departments are all little tribes. Further Ward though he had done time at the MoD, very knowledgeable about the aircraft, and commanded a squadron he was at the time only a 2-and-a-half ringer which isn’t that far up the tree.
As for the TF position I don’t know. I will look at a map and read up. But I don’t think there will be anything specific.
Two things we should always have in mind when looking back and thinking this or that (I am as guilty as anyone) are
1. The sheer speed that we put together plans and equipment.
2. The complete lack of realistic experience for an 8,000 mile operation of this scale
@ Chris B re ASM
Well SeaWolf was seen as the answer to that question. It was developed to attack Soviet pop-missiles launched from submarines. The Mod 0 was potent as in testing it knocked a 4.5in shell doing 1 or 2 mach out of the air. The Mod 1 VLS improved even on that especially after the solid state gyros were fitted. If SeaCeptor does as promised and improve on SeaWolf it will be freakin’ awesome.
As for T42 well Sea Dart did offer a level of anti-ASM capability. It was supposed to have a lightweight SeaWolf variant fitted but it was deleted on cost grounds and because of top-weight issues. You will see drawings of the launcher having 4 not 6 missiles but most of the weight would have had to have been saved in the tracker which has to be placed high. Remember all T42 should have looked like the B3 ships which were longer and 2 feett greater in the beam and a nice round 50ft longer. And original projected build figures were somewhere in the mid-20s. Compared to the cancelled T81 B3 T42 are still small.
Argentine T42 did carry Exocet. The British T42 just had the gun, Skua, and a limited ASM through Sea Dart (so I understand.)
Sea Dart was an area weapon designed to reach out and hit crossing targets. T42 would have worked as part of a group to provide that capability; it would have not been there to be escorted. T42 carried sonar, STWS, and a ASW Lynx. Mix and match of capabilties but with all units providing at least some credible capability in all around defence (and attack.) Those who think Daring having no ASW should remember that.
Makes one wonder how close the RN would let their beloved strike carrier get to the target nation. You dont need first day strike aircraft if the carrier is never let near the coastline of a country with defences that deserve that level of respect….
Have decided to turn this into a mini series looking at Harrier basing flexibility in 1982
Part 1 – Atlantic Conveyor
Part 2 – San Carlos FOB
Part 3 – RAF Stanley in the early days
So, on to Part 3, anyone got any decent links bang em in here!
Ward does go on a bit about RAF Stanley. Apparently there was an FAA Chief, an AB, and a Sea Cadet to 8000 RAF techies. In the epilogue of the book he also says that the government would have save a bundle just deploying Harrier to Stanley and not bothering with MPA
chrism
if memory serves, the cvf is supposed to mount 8 sorties per plane in the first two days.
If each sortie carries two stormshadows, and there are 36 jets, thats 576 hits, add in 60 tomahawks from astute, and i dont think its unreasonable to believe the enemy airforce wont ever get off the ground.
carpe jugulam.
Should be interesting TD the following is interesting about the falklands in general page 97 onwards is all about harrier
http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/documents/Journal%2030%20-%20Seminar%20-%20The%20Falklands%20Campaign.pdf
@ DomJ
Let see 36 jets at £50million a copy equals what about 1800 TLAM not including buying extra TLAM through not buying AVCAT, pilot training, etc. ?That’s his airforce, army, and his navy out for the duration……
Thanks Mark
As an aside I was interested to see the GR3s carrying the 2″ Navy pattern rocket pods rather than the more usual 68mm SNEBs. Presumably the later weren’t cleared for operation off ships due to electromagnetic hazard concerns?