The rumour mill has been flapping faster than a shithouse door in a Force 9 on the subject of the change from F35C to F35B.
Right at the beginning of this post it is important to state loud and clear that this is only a rumour, albeit given some credibility by comments from Lockheed Martin who confirmed that a switch back could be accommodated. You can read into that what you want but I don’t think it is an endorsement of the rumour one way or the other.
The MoD is keeping tight lipped, simply confirming they are looking at all options as the annual budget planning round draws ever closer to its gripping and car crash-esque conclusion. I think I made the point a year back that PR12 i.e. this one, would be every bit as brutal as the last so in the crazy world of annual budgets and short term expedients that is public sector finance, nothing should come as a surprise.
Seeing a spot of weakness in the position many have come out with their buy the F18 proposition, these should be roundly rebuffed though.
I think we all knew the SDSR, despite its billing, was going to turn into an incoherent mess, characterised by salami slicing and short term decisions but the move to switch horses mid-stream and opting for the catapult launched version of the F35 Lightning to fulfil the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement was a genuine surprise. It is certainly true that the vast majority of the UK JCA team only knew when they watched the SDSR unveiled in Parliament, anecdotal evidence that has emerged since would seem confirm this.
The rationale behind the decision, one would assume, came down to a question of risk.
The F35B at that time was the poster child for the woes of the programme, some justified, some not and given the build timing issues and loss of Harrier the decision was on face value understandable. If the F35B was cancelled we would have very few options open to us, made even worse by the decision to withdraw and sell the Harriers. The Harrier decision was still the right one but I don’t want a rehearsal of that, it is now ancient history.
At the time I maintained that the speed of the decision and lack of corporate knowledge of the costs of operating a conventional carrier aircraft would come back to haunt the MoD and if the rumours are true, those fears have been realised.
The MoD used a spot of smoke and mirrors accounting to justify the decision by rolling the JCA requirement into the RAF’s search for a Tornado replacement and thus saved a billion pounds.
The replacement for Tornado by the way could be the subject of any number of posts, it morphing from Future Offensive Air Capability to Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability over a number of fruitless years;
Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability (DPOC) [will] enable the timely engagement of static and mobile targets deep behind enemy lines. Additionally there will be a capability shortfall created by Tornado GR4 being withdrawn from service around 2025. An Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) is a potential cost-effective solution.
At the time, we were going unmanned crazy so the preferred route was unmanned, the Strategic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Experiment (SUAVE) programme would take things from that point although much thought had also gone into a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft, plus cruise missiles.
DPOC was consigned to the round filing cabinet in the SDSR and the savings of a billion pounds (nice round number that) taken as part of the cost justification for the switch, the MoD argued that if the JCA requirement was met by the F35C, it could also meet DPOC requirements. Farting around with FOAS and DPOC has likely cost several hundred million pounds and delivered very little, it’s like FRES.
As I said above, the issue of risk was the primary justification but in making the switch the MoD has just swapped one set for another.
Instead of concerns about the additional cost of the F35B or whether it would be cancelled the MoD now had to worry itself about a whole raft of issues on which it had no operational knowledge, except looking over the shoulders of the USN and cribbing their answers.
The NAO recognised this, the PAC recognised this and so did a lot of other people but in the hubris laden atmosphere post SDSR anyone questioning the switch became something of a pariah, after all, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, supposedly, wanted the F35C because of all that extra range and bomb load compared to the fat wheezy kid that is the F35B.
Depending on your view point you might see the Short Take off and Vertical Landing capability of the F35B to be operationally useful or a gimmick but it is really not the issue, it’s a pros and cons type situation with no right or wrong answer, there are implications though.
Regardless of the performance benefits, what were these extra costs and risks associated with going back to having ‘proper carriers’
Deck Crew; estimates vary but a solid assumption is that conventional carrier operations need more deck crew that STOVL; shore accommodation, welfare, pensions, pay and all the other capitation costs we know about. Some of these can be mitigated with sharing arrangements but fundamentally, it is an additional cost.
Flight Crew; although synthetic environments and the F35’s flight control systems hold a great deal of promise, the assumption must be that maintaining carrier qualifications will require more aircraft, more aircrew and more time. This drives up cost or reduces availability. Where that relationship settles is open for discussion but the basic assumption should be we will need more time/crew or accept less mission availability and reduce the ability to rapidly surge in a crisis.
Catapults and Arrestor Gear; no sensible option exists other than the US EMAL’s and associated recovery equipment which is an additional capital cost and significant through life cost. Certainly cheaper than steam but still a considerable extra cost although the risk of it failing to deliver seems remote.
Doubts on the second carrier; by putting additional costs and delay into the programme something had to give and that something was the second carrier. Operating one carrier with F35C’s might provide a performance uplift over F35B’s but if our loan carrier is in refit or has an accident it doesn’t matter what performance advantage there is. Relying on the French might seem a reasonable option if one’s head is firmly in the sand but does anyone else think will see Rafale’s providing cover for a UK only operation?
Deck Handling and the CEPP; carrier strike has morphed into Carrier Enabled Power Projection (who thinks these up by the way, is there a training course one attends?) which is a blend of carrier borne fast jets, helicopters and in the future UAV’s, supported by other capabilities and force elements. The Royal Navy openly admit that the move to conventional aircraft handling will complicate matters in this regard, noting in evidence to a House of Commons Select Committee that no other maritime force will be doing this and that the challenges are significant. With STOVL aircraft the deck movement challenges are much fewer and we have a deep well of experience from which to draw.
Recovery Refuelling; if we operate the CTOL F35C we need a means of safely providing emergency recovery refuelling but given that no customer exists for the F35C except the USN and they have plenty of other options we would have to fund that ourselves. This would not be an insurmountable problem but at what cost?
Interoperability; the SDSR made great play of interoperability but this only means the US and French maritime forces, the F35B allows us to work with the USMC, Italian and Spanish forces, maybe Australians in the future, in addition to the US and French Navies, plus a number of other prospective F35B buyers and at the very least we would be able to carry out an emergency recovery of an F35B on almost any vessel in the fleet.
I would also ask whether the performance difference between the F35C and F35B is in a REALISTIC operational context are really that significant.
I personally don’t think they are so in light of the extra costs and other risks; simply don’t think it was worth it.
With F35B testing looking rather better and the probation period ended some of those original risks have greatly diminished.
That the F35B is more expensive to operate in isolation than the F35C is no revelation but the question when looking at this is to ask if those greater costs are balanced out by reductions elsewhere, I don’t have the answers but suspect that over the life time of the whole CVF/JCA capability these additional maintenance costs will not be that great in comparison.
The impact of operations over Libya were also illuminating where I do not think it was Ocean or Charles De Gaul that were the eye openers but USS Kearsage with its blend of Harriers, V22 and helicopters. When it was operating it provided an invaluable and flexible range of capabilities and this is what the Carrier Enabled Power Projection capability should be aspiring to.
The CVF and JCA programme (accepting they are different but related) has been shocking, a mix of corrosive inter service politics, over ambition, political meddling and financial mismanagement writ large.
It does the MoD and successive governments no credit whatsoever but the original plan of two ships, starting with Harriers and migrating to the F35B made a lot of sense. Although the planned 150 aircraft was clearly pie in the sky I am failing to see the down sides, with a smaller number of aircraft but a mix of helicopters, small UAV’s and a modest embarked force the QE class could have provided a flexible, capable and relatively low cost capability for UK defence, relevant for the vast majority of situations.
The relative priority for fast jets has to stop; at one point the UK was planning for 232 Typhoon, 150 JCA plus a replacement for Tornado whilst planning for a tactical airlift fleet of just 25 A400M, an indicator of just how we used to think before budget reality hove into view.
The rumoured cost increase of £1.8b over the next six years just to provide 1 converted carrier are truly eye watering, if true of course.
Another influencing factor would possibly have been the emergence of the USMC Expeditionary Strike Group concept in the Bold Alligator exercise earlier this year where the stand off range afforded by the V22 and potential of the F35B in this concept provided some unique insights into the future.
The UK going for a Hawkeye was always pie in the sky which also removes another justification for the switch.
Is there a way forward?
Carrying on with the decision to go for the F35C is going to add a lot of cost, I think we can all agree on that and it has to be paid for from a finite and reducing defence vote, you might think depriving other capability areas across all three services is a price worth paying.
I do not.
I also think it is insane to have only one carrier, a truly idiotic notion if ever there was one.
Whatever people might think, the original notion for CVF was strike, hence the term Carrier Strike. This has changed to Carrier Enabled Power Projection despite the switch to F35C making it more ‘strike’ than ever.
CVF with F35C is now more niche, not less.
This is emphatically not what we need from CVF, however much water has flowed under the bridge.
Libya and Bold Alligator have confirmed, at least to me, that what the UK needs in order to meet defence planning assumptions and the reality of likely operations is something more akin to an America class, a flexible aviation platform that can integrate with a variety of surface, sub surface, air and land capabilities from the UK and our allies to cover a broad range of operational needs.
If you read what Italy intends to do with their F35B and other equipment mix it is equally interesting, a model of jointery it would seem.
The future direction that CVF/JCA/CEPP should take is one of closer integration between all three services and a more rounded collection of capabilities that can be flexed up and down depending on need.
So, if I were Generalissimo for the day (verging dangerously into fantasy fleet mode) I would be looking at these ten equipment options, in addition to loads of training and a reintroduction of the rum ration;
1. Draw Down Tornado as Fast as Possible
The operating costs are significant and whilst they have delivered absolutely unrivalled service over a number of decades and at a relatively low cost, despite their critics spouting nonsense, it is time for them to go.
Air operations in Afghanistan are changing and we might reasonably ask our allies to fill any gaps before the cessation of operations.
This will save considerable sums and provide funds for other options.
2. Increase Pace of Typhoon Weapons Integration
As the Tornado is progressively withdrawn we should accelerate integration of Storm Shadow, Paveway IV and Brimstone onto the Typhoon.
I do not know if this is possible, obviously this will be dependent upon many factors, timing, availability of airframes and crew etc. but as a general objective, we should be accelerating the demise of one type against the rise of another.
This may mean some increasing risk in certain areas but if costs savings can be had it is worth that risk, the cost savings will be used to fund other capabilities within this domain.
On the nice to have list would be conformal fuel tanks but this might be promoted to the must have if Storm Shadow integration produces too much drag and reduces range, having said that the Typhoon is very fuel efficient so who knows.
Even though DPOC was cancelled it seems that Libya has shown that Typhoon, with a modest investment in weapons integration (Brimstone and Paveway IV), combined with whatever comes out of the Anglo French MALE UAV programme (Mantis), Storm Shadow and Tomahawk, could fulfil that role. Add in the F35B and I am not seeing a weak capability but one that is fearsome.
Also remember those pesky defence planning assumptions when looking at quantities, this combination may well fulfil the requirement without spending a billion.
3. Improve Apache Maritime Capability
Operation in Libya highlighted the tremendous capability of Apaches operating in a maritime context but also a number of deficiencies.
Addressing these should not in comparison be hugely expensive and possibly carried out concurrent with any Block III enhancements, there is a huge potential in Apache.
On the nice to have list would also be Lightweight Multirole Missile integration.
4. Confirm ASaC7 Replacement
Sea King is going out of service in 2016 and the recent suggestions of mounting the LM Vigilance pod on a Merlin or transferring the mission equipment directly from the Mk7’s would both appear to be reasonable on face value.
Four years is not a long time and this is a capability we should not gap if the CVF becomes operational in the same time frame by reverting back to the B model.
5. Investigate Chinook Powered Blade Fold
But what about Merlin conversion, given the relative performance differential of the two especially in regards to sling loading and moving vehicles from ship to shore I think this would provide greater value.
It would all come down to cost of course but if the price of developing a powered fold for Chinook was even close to converting the RAF’s HC3/3a’s for rotor/tail fold then my preference would be for Chinook.
Although Chinook can be accommodated in the hangar of a CVF it is not without compromise and lots of wasted space.
Providing the Royal Marines with an organic lift capability is desirable but helicopter lift should be provided from a joint pool of aircraft, used when needed.
Both would be better though, providing much greater flexibility and I might even be swayed into considering the V22 if Santa was knocking about.
5. Integrate Watchkeeper with CVF
As Watchkeeper comes into service (hopefully) this year and once the initial introduction period has finished, we could investigate operating it from CVF from the 2016 onwards timeframe.
Hermes 450, upon which Watchkeeper is based, can be launched from a Robonics pneumatic rail launcher and given the significant deck size and relatively low mass/landing speed of the air vehicle would this necessarily be a hugely expensive exercise?
Again, not sure but if we could, it would provide an extremely valuable addition to CEPP without a major project or new equipment introduction.
At the very least we should but a couple of dozen Scan Eagles or Integrators to try from 2013 onwards and work up the concept of operating UAV’s from CVF, with Ocean as the surrogate until CVF comes into service.
6. Second CVF
Once more, it is all down to costs but if we are not converting one of the CVF’s could that mean that the second CVF became available?
The current plan is for it to go into extended readiness and because it would be likely never to be converted its value is limited. If however, no conversion were needed then we could still have it at a lower readiness state to provide continuous availability, covering refit periods for example.
This lower readiness state could include sponsored reserve crews, RFA or other lower cost options because the assumption would be that it would never be operationally deployed unless crewed by a Royal Navy crew, but that it must be maintained at a level of availability such that it could be transferred with little preparation.
The second vessel then becomes an active spare, at an identical equipment fit but only used in home waters and with a reduced cost crew in order to maintain that readiness.
7. Investigate Troop/Vehicle Handling Capacity of CVF
Adding a well deck would not be feasible within the scope of this proposal but an improved landing craft handling facility may be possible without too much additional cost. This would improve CVF’s operational flexibility when operating with an embarked force.
Internal arrangements might also be investigated with modular solutions for storing small quantities of vehicles, perhaps on demountable ‘racks’ in the hangar for example. The hangar is very high but space inefficient when storing vehicles.
The aim of this study would be to provide modest and low cost improvements to the embarked force facilities, some on a temporary basis, trading aviation capacity where applicable.
Obviously nothing above the max sling load of a Chinook, roughly ten tonnes, I don’t foresee Mexeflote handling facilities, ramps or craning vehicles off the deck onto landing craft as feasible!
The focus would be on air delivered embarked forces but a rudimentary surface delivery capability.
9. Do Not Replace HMS Ocean and Investigate Withdrawal of RFA Argus
Accepting the loss of vehicle and boat handling capabilities in comparison with CVF, this is a compromise worth accepting.
It might even be possible to trade Ocean against the second CVF and bring that into service proper, not as the suggestion in item 6 of a using it as an active spare.
2 CVF or 1 CVF and 1 Ocean replacement, interesting thought but as usual, dependant on cost.
Although RFA Argus provides a casualty receiving capability its main role is aviation support and training, could we use the second CVF or active spare in this role and offset one cost against the other?
10. Yes, Revert to F35B
The magic number, about 40 to 50
This provides the single CVF with a normal operating compliment of between 6 and 18. Some might see this number as too small and no improvement over CVS but the F35B is no Harrier and there would still be the ability to surge, potentially embarking USMC or other operators as needed.
There is also Apache, Wildcat, Merlin, Chinook, Watchkeeper, TLAM, Storm Shadow, Fire Shadow and men with luxurious facial hair to consider, concentrate less on the fast jet element and think about the whole package.
The question on numbers is what is the minimum needed for UK only operations, a Sierra Leone or TITSNBM!
If funds allow this could be increased (the line will be open for a long time) but the concept presented here is to get a reasonable capability at a reasonable cost, one that is aligned with realistic scenarios and actual defence planning assumptions.
At this stage I don’t care who operates them but all things (mainly cost) being equal the proposed joint force seems to offer the best of all options. As ever though, if there are significant savings to be had from folding the FAA into the RAF and no significant operational disadvantages then that would be my preferred route.
By reverting to the F35B we are still getting the significant and I think as yet, not fully appreciated, benefits of the F35’s integrated systems, still getting the industrial benefits, still providing a solid foundation for potentially replacing Typhoon with it many decades into the future (not with the B of course), still retaining the operational land/sea flexibility of the Harrier, still obtaining significant interoperability benefits with a range of allies, still leveraging the huge multi-national logistics backbone and still getting a vast improvement over Harrier.
Whilst we are not getting the benefits of the additional performance of the C variant, closing off the Hawkeye option, a future maritime UCAV route and potentially paying more for the privilege we are realising significant cost savings in other areas to balance that and allowing a true CEPP vision to emerge that leverages the size of CVF, its huge flexibility and a range of traditional land and sea based capabilities to provide something that is for want of a better turn of phrase;
Hard as woodpeckers lips!
If this is affordable, what’s not to like?
a stern gate should be a simple enough solution to getting vehicles off the ship…
i like most of the concepts but i’m wondering. why is the British military so big on the idea of embarking allied aircrews aboard its ships.
i don’t hear any other nation talking about it with as much glee as the Brits except when the Brits are around.
why is that idea so holy to your way of thinking now?
@ Generalissimo TD
Excellent summary of options
You have my vote
A design compromise too many if you ask me. The STOVL capability is of questionable use given not only the thirst for fuel but in addition the already limited range of the F-35 as a consequence of accommodating the stealth characteristics (which are also of questionable usefulness) and the next to useless payload.
The C-variant is still a better idea, I think
Its not Holy Sol, just a logical extension of what we already do. Happened in the Libyan operations, US forces operating from HMS Ocean for example
Gets my vote as well. The thing I would do is look at ensuring funding for an extended range version of storm shadow and AESA radar for typhoon
Ehmm… ” in the Libyan operations, US forces operating from HMS Ocean for example”
- their ship having to go away, through Suez, should things get hot there , too
- and us, being left without CSAR, were given some to “host”
Not the best example; are there others?
Good article.
If I were cynical, and if this is all to happen, then I’d argue that the MOD has a jolly good PR case for the switch back along the lines of “well the MOD wanted CTOL, but the budget is no longer affordable and we are concerned with no longer playing fantasy budgets”. Showing a concern for cost and taxpayers money, and not clinging on for dear life when costs escalate is possibly a smooth PR line.
Some good arguments in favour of the F-35B and two carriers.
One question the carriers are expected to last for 50 years. That is one of the reasons given for them being future proofed to convert to cat and traps. Obviously a no go if present speculation
is to be believed. Do you think the B will last 50 years and if not what will we do with two carriers only able to accommodate outdated aircraft. Should we not bite the bullet now or hope that in 20-30 years we are in a better position financially to do the conversions.
I say again the Italian ASaC Merlin is in the air, can’t we just buy that?
The only easy way I can see to get vehicles loaded would be by substituting one of the lifts for a ramp. There’s no way one could be put aft.
Hi x,
If an ASW Merlin is 50/50 between a working airframe and mission kit, I would bet that ASaC is at least the same… kit working, palletise it, use on more airframes, as and when needed
- loadsa money saved
- not saying I don’t like the Italian model
TD
Gd summary. The B to C capability. C has 200m extra range and can take a 2000lb bomb internally. Yes always better to have as high an internal fuel fraction as possible and C meets tornado range req better however the UK is using Paveway 4 as its sole LGB and even with a penetrator warhead ive read and it fits internal on the B model. Storm shadow is external no matter which version. As you have guaranteed carrier capability a land range requirement becomes less an issue and a carrier could close to target enough to mitgate the issue. Its all a question of risk oh and the Norwegian NSM would be nice. BTW think you forgot the 25 herc Js and 14 a400ms and 8 c17s and 25 a400ms in your air transport FJ last 15 years!!
Looks like were bailing out of afghan next year so draw down on tornado may be possible.
If you want 2 storm shadow on typhoon then conformal are more than nice to halves.
Apache agreed would want a DAS upgrade thrown in noticed the US army had apache at see in the gulf recently.
Merlin to replace seaking awacs id go for priority on that one.
Watchkeeper on CVF think watchkeeper has enough problems with the air vehicle and data link.
Absolutely vital if we revert to the B that both CVF and LPDs return to pre sdsr operating patterns this would be primary mover in accepting an a/c change.
Youre magic number is shy 40 a/c at least but well not agree there. a ucavs should be designed for a marham libya mission without refuelling and not carrier capable but thats post 2030.
On the FJ priority piece I was referring to original plans, in which the C17 never featured and neither did the J’s but 150 JCA and 232 Typhoon did, but I take your point
Have you read the recent operational updates on Afghan Tornado activity, it is pretty low now to be honest so as you say, that linked with a an end in sight full stop should make it at least worthy of consideration if a) it was parctical and b) presented enough savings to be worthwhile
There are so many variables and information we can’t see its impossible for us to be certain I guess
Watchkeeper I know has a few problems but as a maturity aspiration I can’t see why not
I would not support a reversion of the LPD decision however desirable but then I am Mr Scrooge when it comes to these things and don’t want to run off into spending loads we haven’t got.
A very good post TD. You and I are fundamentally in the same way of thinking.
Given the scale of the budgetary challenge, the only question worth addressing is “can we afford it (capability)”? I see remarkably few scenarios where the ONLY capability we absolutely have to have is a CTOL carrier with embarked FJ air wing. It might be a “nice to have”, but given absolute financial limits and competing needs for other capabilities elsewhere in the forces, the answer to me is “it is not affordable”. Particularly as the costs of the mid-course (possible) changes from F35 B to C and maybe back to B escalate upwards.
I tend to tune out of some of the more technical debate on this matter – fuel, endurance, wing area etc of the B vs C debate. Not that those things are not important, it’s just that to me they tend to be second order questions that should be put to one side while we look at the affordability question. The only thing that matters is the cost of the entire system: CVF plus aircraft plus crew plus enabling C3ISTAR, and training plus everything else. Within that, the cost of F35B vs F35C is just a line entry.
The other interesting debate is around “Carrier Enabled Power Projection”. I’m told by a still serving mate that while that initially started in the maritime community, it is rapidly becoming a very joint way of thinking, and that the “carrier enabled” part is now coming under sustained pressure. The issue is that the Navy never advanced intellectual arguments as to what happened in weeks 2-n of the scenario: they merely wanted to make a case for the sexy CVF/JCA system to show up offshore and dominate the initial phase of the operation. Possibly unkind as smarter Naval officers will have realised that there’s a lot more to do than that, nevertheless the inter-service politics was all about preserving the CVF, so uncomfortable truths get swept under the carpet.
I think that we need a fundamental rethink. So what if steel is being cut – it can be recycled. Designs can be rolled up and put back on the shelf. BAE Systems can be told that the price of canceling the CVF contract is that they are sole source builders for 4 Juan Carlos-type ships, one of which to be paid for by DFID out of money the Indians don’t want, and to be equipped for disaster relief. BAE Systems could either buy the Juan Carlos design, or the USMC carrier design. We could still operate F35B from a Juan Carlos if we want, so we may still buy some. The RAF could replace Tornado with F35 A or B, depending on their specific requirements. Whatever, we are still going to get 90% of the CVF capability, and indeed 150% for some amphibious scenarios, and playing around with some of the public numbers, will save £4B on acquisition and more in through-life costs.
@ ACC
I am not a great believer in modules apart from as an aid to maintenance mainly because I wouldn’t trust the MoD to buy enough! Further it seems these modern aircraft are tested so much that I can’t see how it would be worth the effort separating mission module for platform. Lots of times I have said here that the airframe that CVF should have been built around wasn’t the FJ but the ASaC/AEW/AWACS platform. When I read about the wars over those islands it is the lack of that platform more than any other capability that comes across as the most serious. It is a priority. CVF is just an aircraft ferry without it.
James, as I stated the other day to much shock I do think that looking at the whole concept again, a Juan Carlos/America class purchase would have been ideal if the F35B was going to be bought.
It is I believe now far too late, the NAO report stated that we even in 2010 we would only save £1 Billion by cancelling both carriers. the extra saving were made by cancelling F35 until 2025.
Love to see teh figures that show that running 4 Juan Carlos class (with identical Ships company to a CVF) would be cheaper than running 2 X CVF.
Steel has gone beyond being cut, it is being assembled. There is also the sever national humiliation and loss of prestige in world terms of cancelling. Much the same as anyone who puts on camo is seen as the army the entire Uk armed forces would lose that little bit of kudos and respect from any cancellation decision, sometimes the (their British don’t mess with them saves lives).
In short we are past point of no return now so lets get 2 massively useful 65k hulls in the water and develop as we go along.
The first T23 HMS Norfolk entered service without even a command system, the last will leave the service with the best ASW helo in service, the best towed array sonar in service, a superb command system and the ability to engage air contacts out to 18NM thanks to CAMMS and Artisan. Who knows what a 2030 CVF may look like but it wiont look like anything if we cancel them now.
Don’t think that there is a simple return to the B, if the ski jump is already being removed from the QE it may be too late for it to be easily retro fitted and thus 2 ships are not available for the B , we seem to have forgotten how challenging its going to be to get the B both up and down with any payload. Must have the ski jump!!
Also while it may seem that the B has avoided many of it’s critical engineering problems I don’t think there has been enough mention of the potential cost and performance issues that remain with the engine and power train for the B. The USMC have still not fixed the drive for the V22 and we could never afford the maintenance levels that they accept.
All the focus on price gets put on Lockheed, who have no impact on the most poorly controlled costs at the moment which are with Pratt and Whitney, with the F136 killed off (a simply mad idea) I reckon the engine price for the B will become a nightmare.
My remaining feeling is that if the rumours started with Jim Murphy… they are odds on to be wrong, single bright spot may be the close relationship between David and Barack which may influence the UK to deliver the two carriers in support of the US need for carrier support as the Indy retires and they spend a worrying time with only ten.
Funds being found from outside the MOD to deliver on strategic considerations ( as the afghan costs decline) i.e. some sort of contingent funding
Might year-on-year costs for increased deck crews be seen as preferable to a larger up-front lump sum for buying the B? The C might be prohibitively expensive to buy in substantial numbers, what if B cost 20-30m more up-front; and what if we subsequently find some nightmare price tag attached to maintaining the lift fan? Going STOVL now is not a risk free option.
@ James
If cost was the only consideration then we wouldn’t be buying the F-35 at all.
Bold alligator
http://www.sldforum.com/2012/03/the-bac1-11-anticipates-the-future-an-interview-with-general-dog-davis/
We hear a lot about increased through life costs due to deck crews etc. however the RN have never asked for an increase in manpower for CVF. AH will be a sideways entry profession and we will be paying the people whether they see out their career doing current jobs or as chalk heads on a CVF. Sacrifices will be made elsewhere in the manpower plot to keep overall manning levels flat.
APATS,
it’s acquisition plus support costs, not only support costs. Plus, under my scenario, DFID pay for their own ship and people. So it’s really only 3 JC-types vs 2 CVFs in MoD costs.
You are also only taking the published (NAO) figures for contract costs, or rather DIS-costs. Within the IT world, we are being threatened with primary legislation if we don’t post-facto renegotiate prices of our contracts, margin, etc. Why should not the same not apply to BAE Systems? Particularly if they get the work to build 4 x JC instead of 2 x CVF?
I wonder how much time and money could be saved if they quit doing all these “studies” and just get down to business.
I do agree with the Tornado draw down, with the reduction of ops tempo overseas, there is a short window for upgrading to Typhoon and getting it intergrated, the longer this is delayed, the bigger the “window of vulnerability” to being caught without.
Also agree with James. Carriers are nice to have, good to hold, but when you go broke, consider it sold! Without the funding to build, maintain and sustain carrier ops, all this is going to do is give someone the “Varyag 2″. Military spending must always be considered as a subset of the economy, then military utility, not utility, then realise you can’t afford it. Look at N.Korea or Indonesia or Russia during the breakup. All the military hardware, but most of it “not servicable” due to lack of parts, either by embargo or poor economy.
As an aside, do you think a fix percentage on military spending, say 2-2.5%? as part of annual budget is a good idea? It would force the armed forces to live within their budget vis a vis the bigger economic picture, without the risk of breaking the bank, and in times of conflict, can be increased temporarily. This would also force a slow stockpiling of equipment rather than large tract buys, smoothening expenditure flow and production.
James, I am quoting the figures from the only proper survey ever done and they are 18 months wort of construction and support contract signing out of date.
I am not a contract lawyer but if you want to go and take on BAE over billion dollar contacts because it happens in IT crack on. What happens when they simply say, ok we are shutting our UK yards? You guys get the social security bill. Big picture stuff.
The Ozzies are paying 1 Billion a pop for their Canberras so DFID may not fancy spending 15% of an annual budget to buy us a Ship?
You may well have the answer taht was correct at the time but we have crossed our Rubicon ref Carriers and it now only remains to get the best out of them.
Agree on the critical importance of the AEW&C system. Unless we leapfrog to swarming UAVs (unlikely) then altitude ceiling is the key.
Sea King, 3,050 Ceiling, 228 KM radar range
Merlin, 4,575 Ceiling, 279 KM radar range
Osprey, 7,620 Ceiling, 361 KM radar range
Hawkeye, 10,576 Ceiling, 425 KM radar range
On this thread we can’t have Hawkeye so it has to be Osprey. It can lift 9,070KG as well so palletise the kit and the ‘spare’ airframes can be made to work for their living. They can do your COD, some ferrying of marines, and maybe a bit of medium range MPA. You could even palletise some fuel tanks for rescue AAR.
@APATS
If they ever resorted to threats like that, they deserve a kick in the arse. You can set up a military/government affiliated nationalised company to build stuff to armed forces requests instead of market pressure, yay.
‘Sacrifices will be made elsewhere in the manpower plot to keep overall manning levels flat.’
That sounds like some effort to produce that. I’ve seen the navy have problems in manning, highlighted today with the pinch points trades list in the AFPRB. Sounds like it’s going to be a juggling act. I don’t pretend to know the numbers but unless there are cutbacks in other areas I can’t see it being sustainable long term.
Observer, well it would have been in response to HMG trying to rip up signed contracts and re negotiate. The problem we have is that we save pennies that cost us millions. We send civil servants and mediocre HMD employed lawyers to negotiate contracts with the “varsity”, that private companies retain.
TD
Your thoughtful musings prove only one thing – the complete collapse of our military capabilities and the hugely inflated unit cost of destruction that underpins any thoughts of progress.
I don’t know who to blame but the whole military industrial complex is optimised for only one thing – spending other people’s money.
Case in point – we flog Harriers to the US at $2mill per airframe plus 100 containers worth of spares.
We talk about a short term assignments for the F/A 18 and all the talk is whether we will be able to get build slots before the line shuts – you couldn’t make it up.
Everything the MOD does is in slow motion.
Even then it is two steps forward – one step back followed by another review – again and again and again.
The decision should not be about B or C.
It should be about what type of RAF we want regarding fast jets.
My thoughts are make everything mobile – living out of containers and making sure all the new stuff will fly off an Maersk Triple E.
So for me the future is getting the Harriers back – light fighter spec is needed.
The future is working with 2 squadrons of F/A18s for 10years to get the basics working.
It means a lot of scrap iron engineering to get a prototype carrier in the water in 24 months.
The main thing is getting things to move fast.
The whole military industrial complex is fat, slow and breathing out its erse.
We have plenty of money to spend on contractors.
We have lots of money to spend on feasibility studies.
We have nothing to spend on actually doing something.
The Navy needs money spent on it.
The unit cost structure has to be torn down.
We need to go C not B – when the time comes and the discover value – real aircraft that does a real job for the new invigorated, expeditionary RAF.
We need STOVL but it needs value and numbers – Harrier 3 – packs the batting and provides flexibility.
Currently we are in the worst possible position.
Shaving costs but chopping capabilities.
We need TVM – Total Value Management.
Topman, It is a juggling act but in the longer term we are moving to fewer and leaner manned platforms. For instance Astute will have 30 fewer people onboard than a Trafalgar but nobody trumpets the reduced through life manning costs there. it is about balancing numbers within the agreed Naval manning limits.
Dave Cameron on F35b, 19th October 2010, column 778.
“This is another area where the last Government got it badly wrong. There is only one thing worse than spending money you do not have and that is buying the wrong things with it, and doing so in the wrong way. The carriers are unable to work effectively with our key defence partners, the United States or France. … They ordered the more expensive, less capable version of the Joint Strike Fighter to fly off the carriers”
All Pats @ 10.18
Regarding BWoS and the 3K people they hold hostage – sorry employ on the Clyde the issue is use them or lose them.
That can be shipyards, facilities or workforces.
They can’t even be bothered to move into new product areas.
You know the go-go world of the emerging market in RAS tankers.
Why should they when they can just fleece the tax payer at the drop of a pen.
As things stand shipyards are a strategic national asset.
They should only be rented by the state to people who want to use them.
I see that, I think just about every piece of kit going has ‘ less manpower’ stamped all over it. A juggling act it will be, the navy are in a state of flux and are short of people in all sorts of areas. I’d be very surprised if in 5 – 10 years there weren’t the same numbers of shortfalls. Not that I think you aren’t trying or anything. It’s just a big challenge manning is a tricky business and the carriers are going to a big pull on manpower for a long time to come.
I guess that also begs the question if the carrier is top of the list what is at the bottom?
APATS,
£3.75B saved in one year from central government IT contracts, all of which continue in renegotiated form. More for this coming year, more again next year. Will probably top out at around £12B in savings.
BAE Sys are not going anywhere. It’s all bluster. They know they make money from HMG long term. Even if they did decide to abandon ship, they can’t take their facilities and workers with them. They make a reasonable amount of money in the USA, but they cannot move across wholesale. If they somehow did move, offer the facilities and existing support contracts as a job lot to Thales, Selex, Raytheon or GD and you’ll have a buyer, maybe not at market value, but at a small discount.
FBOT, I agree ref the ship yards, i believe you underestimate the complexities and actually the tasks a warship has to achieve though. You say Maersk Triple E which with a 14.5M draught we are meant to berth where? Which Ports could it visit on defence diplomacy visits etc?
I guess that also begs the question if the carrier is top of the list what is at the bottom?
Multi role brigades?
Jmaes, i do not doubt you but there has been a remarkable lack of crowing or even reporting over such a massive saving. perhaps you mean 3.75 Billion overall as listed below from a parliamentary question.
Andrew Bridgen, MP for North West Leicestershire, welcomed the news that the Government has made £3.75 billion of cash savings in just ten months from May 2010 to March 2011.
Last year Cabinet Office Minister Francis Maude promised to leave ‘no stone unturned’ in the hunt for savings from central Government spending. The Government has done just that to save billions of pounds of taxpayer money.
The money saved includes:
£870 million saved by cutting spending on consultants
Nearly £500 million by spending less on temporary agency staff
£800 million saved by negotiating better deals with suppliers
£300 million saved from IT projects
£90 million saved by better monitoring the properties Government rents
£400 million saved from marketing.
Even so £300 million is not to be sniffed at.
Yes, we could fund almost 4 MOD feasability studies with a budget liek that!
>Even so £300 million is not to be sniffed at.
James
Does that include the NHS computer at 12b which didnt work.
APATS,
those were not the figures I was thinking of, but rather through contract savings for the main contracts. Target is £12B in three years. I will grant you that some are for cancellations – around £1.2B in the NHS for example. I’ve got the figures on a Powerpoint in the office – I’ll see if I can dig out the details.
Nevertheless, as a principle, it shows what “can” be done if a Government is prepared to act tough. I see no reason why the Government could not turn around and say “either you talk about changing this CVF contract for something we can afford and both Government and industry take a bit of a hit on sunk costs, or we just cancel it and you close down your ship building business. If you are prepared to act responsibly, we’ll give you the work of building 4 ships to keep your business open”
JC-types seem from a Google to cost £500M (the original was £300M), in comparison to £6.5B for 2 CVF. JC-types will be cheaper to run each year, even if the ship’s company is equally sized. And, I would argue, for all but one or 2 completely specific scenarios, they are more useful than CVFs.
Just to add some grist to the rumour mill.
Reports out of Sweden suggest that their defence department has been in talks with an unnamed partner nation, with an intent to share costs for further development of Gripen in order to meet requirements beyond 2020. This has been concurrent to reports of jitters in the UK’s F35 procurement plans (source – teh internets).
Could funding a navalised Gripen provide a viable cheaper solution to the F35c while, more importantly, avoiding the embarrassment of going back to an aircraft branded as Labour’s mistake, and also again highlighting the sale of Harriers in return for a handful of magic beans?
Mark,
some of the NHS contracts are still going, some bits are cancelled. It’s a spotty picture.
‘Could funding a navalised Gripen provide a viable cheaper solution to the F35c while, more importantly, avoiding the embarrassment of going back to an aircraft branded as Labour’s mistake, and also again highlighting the sale of Harriers in return for a handful of magic beans?’
I can’t see how since we would be starting from scratch.
BTW how much do you think we should have gotten for them?
James, The Australians are paying £1 Billion each for their Canberras, read Ozzie JC class and that is allowing a lot of construction to happen in Spain to make it cheaper.
As specific units possibly they are more useful but you have to think of whole fleet capability and name me a scenario where 2 JC or even 3 are better than 1 or 2 LPDs a bay or 2 and a CVF.
it is the equivalent of you argiung that all brigades should be mechanised as they offer mosy versatility and forgetting they could be supported by Infantry or Armoured Brigades.
They were worth whatever anyone was prepared to pay for them
@James
I think we will eventually get our Juan Carlos clones, but as a replacement for the Albions, not for the CVF. Just depends how long the Albions take to rot. Could be a long time if we’re only using one at a time.
@TD God bless capitalism.
I agree TD, it’s a thing I see a bit but no-one says how much they think they were worth, and to who else we were going to sell them. The US needed them and there was only place to go shopping. To my mind we needed each and came to a price that we could agree on, therefore it was the right price.
@ APATS,
1. re JC price: it’s only from a Google. The original was 360M euros – that’s a stretch to £1B the Aussies are paying. There must be something else to account for such a difference?
2. Re whole fleet capability. Turn all of that logic around. I don’t much care if the answer is LPDs, Bays, JCs etc and I certainly understand about battle grouping capabilities.
I do know that 2 CVFs + variable numbers of JCA of either B or C model + a spastic procurement programme + a financial crisis + only one scenario in which fast carrier air is the ONLY answer to a problem = an unaffordable nightmare. And it is time to stop it.
All PATS @ 10.43
Either we run at 14.5m draught and we use ballast water to get the ship to that level on the high seas or we do a fag packet re-design to a twin skeg layout and reduce the hull depth by 3-4m.
Either that or it spends all its time doing soft diplomacy by visiting container mega ports across the world.
My thoughts on sizing are –
360m x 42m x 11m draught / 22m depth to main deck.
Then you add the hangar / flight deck slices – 72m wide / 15m high.
The hangar would be 180m x 25m x 8m plus open workshop area at the stern.
Looking at 90K tons fully loaded displacement.
Probably go large with 120MW motive power for 28 knots.
The two island idea would come in handy to hide the two large funnels – one each for the forward and rear engine rooms.
We can but dream.
James, I agree on the stretch in price but that is the price they are paying for them. The original rice was 2005 as well. they look almost the same ships. As for fast carrier air being the only answer, since when have we stopped deciding having the best answer available. heavy armour has never been the only answer to any conflict we have had to get involved in since the end of the cold war but we retain it.